My father was 16 in October 1944 and lived in Dolores, Eastern Samar. He told me he woke when he heard the sound of big guns going off. He said he ran towards the beach and climbed up the highest coconut tree to “watch” the battle. (For reference on a clear day in SoCal, Catalina Island can be seen which is 26 miles away. From what I’ve read about the naval battle, visibility was 20+ miles October 25th). He could see ships but couldn’t distinguish who was whom. He wasn’t sure how long he held on to the tree. But he said he watched until the sound of big guns stopped. Needless to say, he despised the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Previous to the battle, he and a friend were captured by Japanese soldiers. They tortured my dad and his friend asking where American GIs were being hidden by the locals. My dad’s friend relented and lied thinking the Japanese would release them. The Japanese took my dad’s friend away and that was the last time he saw him. My dad didn’t talk and eventually the Japanese released him. But he had the scars on his back from the bayonet piercing done to him. After watching the battle, my dad secretly went to enlist with the US Navy. He was rejected because he couldn’t prove he was the legal age. So he returned home and had the town mayor write a letter stating he was 18. He brought the letter back and was accepted. My dad passed away May 2019 and I found his DD-214. I also found his dress blues and whites plus his medals and ribbons. He never talked about the medals and I had no clue what they were for. I discovered he was awarded the WW II Victory Medal, the Asiatic Pacific Campaign Medal-WW II, National Defense Medal, the US Occupation-Europe Medal, the Navy Unit Commendation Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and the Good Conduct Medal. My dad served 20 years active and 10 reserve. He retired as a Chief Petty Officer. At his funeral, the US Navy sent a captain and seaman for formalities. Before the ceremony began, the captain asked what i knew about my dad. I let him know what I knew and was touched when he began to weep. He recognized the sacrifice my dad, and mom, made through those years. He began weeping again when he presented the US flag to me that was draped over his coffin. From that day forward, respect for my dad increased tenfold. Thanks dad and mom-and thank you US Navy. 🇺🇸
Excellent. My wife's father was a Filipino Scout and laid ambushes for the Japanese in Sorsogon. His patrol once had to cross a river but he could not swim. So he walked across the bottom holding his breath and his rifle up above water. Or so the legend goes. Many stories I could tell about him.
Captain Totti will always be a legend in the U.S. Navy.For those that don't know,capt. Totti was responsible for the information that led to the overturned conviction of Charles Mcvay,the skipper of the Indianapolis who was court marshaled for losing his heavy cruiser.In 1998,99?.The reason I say that capt Totti is a hero is because he gathered information to over turn and clear Mcvay of any wring doing.Mr. Totti is very humble,he doesn't interrupt people when they are speaking,and is highly regarded by the U.S. navy to once be in charge of a nuclear submarine. That's the highest honor a man can have,and was trusted with weapons that could have ended our world.
He's obviously extremely intelligent and knowledgeable, but doesn't show off. He would have been in the astronaut program if born with better eyesight.
Commander Ernest E. Evans is one of the most extraordinary sailors I have ever heard of - a credit to his service and his country. As you have rightly said, you couldn't make this stuff up. I am an Australian subscriber and I take this opportunity to congratulate and thank you, Seth, Bill, Jon and all your other collaborators, for this outstanding series.
Seth,you do a wonderful job of orchestrating the show.Your guidance means the show will always be complete when discussing what went on during these battles.
You know I got to thinking, which is always dangerous, but pre-internet, pre UA-cam and pre- podcasts, where would we be? How would we access content such as the Unauthorized History of the War in the Pacific? While we live in very complicated times, at least we have this show to look forward to every Torpedo Tuesday!🇺🇸⚓️💯🙏👍💖😊
I visited the USS Iowa (BB-61) museum in 2019 or so. As we walked through the ship, there were volunteers in some of the compartments. They were there to answer questions from us tourists. There were lots of people visiting the ship that day, and the passageways were crowded. At one point we came upon an elderly gentleman, one of the volunteers. I heard someone ahead of me ask this gentleman what he did during the war. He answered "I was on the USS Hoel". The lady who asked the question moved on. She didn't understand the significance of that simple answer. I did. When I got to him I asked him "did you mean USS Hoel, from the Battle of Samar?" He said "yes". I was kind of blown away at that point and didn't even know what to say. I thought it would seem too cheesy and "touristy" and cheap to ask for a photo, so I just shook his hand and thanked him.
I have been on the Iowa (in San Pedro) a few times, but never ran into anyone who was in the War. This must have been amazing to you! Back in the late '90s I was doing a trade show (computers) in NYC, and a black guy came by my booth, wearing a Pearl Harbor survivor cap, and when I talked to him at the booth and found out that he was there on Dec 7, 19421, I took him out to lunch. We talked about the war and that day at Pearl Harbor, but then continued on about the plight of the black man in the US during the many decades after the War, and his involvement. This was a VERY interesting lunch. I took him to one of the famous NYC delies on 7th ave. The food their was wonderful! Also, the Intrepid is berthed on the Hudson in NYC, and I have been on it and toured it. Back then, it had am SR-71 on its deck!
Parshall refers to Korita later stating that he should have gone into Leyte. Korita later retracted this remark. There was all sorts of criticism afterwards, and he did not explain himself. He did not fight back against this criticism. He largely said nothing for decades afterwards about this decision. But shortly before he died and when he was in his 80s, Kurita began to again speak of his actions at Leyte. He claimed privately to a former Naval Academy student (and biographer), Jiro Ooka, that he withdrew the fleet from the battle because he did not believe in wasting the lives of his men in a futile effort, having long since believed that the war was lost. He was not willing to engage in the suicidal banzai charge.
@@TheJazsa80 Too true. What is interesting is that Korita represented the minority of Japanese leadership that did not buy into the suicide tactics. The last banzai charge on Saipan inflicted a lot of harm, as did subsequent Kamikazes. But Korita apparently did not believe in it. It is worth noting that the sinking of transports at Leyte would only be sinking empty transports.
@@Bob.W. For years, I believed that Korita had blundered by "running away." I no longer believe that, as I accept the humanity of a commander who decides not to waste the lives of his men on behalf of a lost cause. If only more in Japan had thought like Korita, a million lives would have been saved, and the atomic bombings unnecessary. With that calculus in mind, who can demean the actions of a Japanese commander who rejected the death cult ethos of the Japanese military.
I’ve spoken about how enjoyable this podcast is many times and thank you guys again, but I would like to thank the administration of Mississippi Museum for allowing Seth to host this endeavor.
This is by far the best explanation (since the word police now state that synopsis has been deemed verboten) of the Battle of Samar I have ever heard/read. It is making sense of what for me has always been a chaotic ordeal by combat with a fully armored Samurai warrior versus a really energetic chicken. This makes so much sense and a movie/television mini-series focusing in on the aircrews and deck handlers of the CVE's on this fight may allow us a much truer insight into this battle. The fight was never between the escorts and CVE's versus the Japanese Center Force, but between the 400+ aircrews of the CVE's and the Center Force.
To explain all the sub, destroyer, CVE actions on one side in a desperate battle with roughly half of Kurita's starting battle line, with angry Wildcats and Avengers thrown in the mix. Could Drach be as thorough, enjoyable, and historically spot on? THE WORLD WONDERS X
@davidelliott5843 trust me, this is a fairly breezy overview, with the highlights and main points well covered. So many amazing details and horrific scenes they just can't include in a 1-2 hour podcast. Scenes like Copeland calling up his chief engineer prior to their torpedo run to tell him not to worry about the engines, they are going to need every ounce of speed they can get. The Ch-eng, Trowbridge, disables the pressure safeties and takes the 400lb steam plant up to 600lbs, and 22 knot Sammy B hits 28 knots. Or a snipe on Johnston being sent down into the dark interior to shaft alley after she is first hit to pour lube oil over her last remaining propeller shaft to stop the dying screech of metal on metal. That ship was litterally kept in the fight with blood and sweat. Teams of sailors taking turns spinning the manual hydrolic pump for the rudder for over an hour, turning the ship with physical human strength. Men blown apart at their stations, decapitated, blood and gore flowing down the decks... There is much, much more to this fight. It's even more extraordinary as you learn the details.
@@Bob.W. I am talking about in offensive fire. The DD's and DE's soaked up a lot of damage and attention from the IJN CA's and BB's but really didn't do anything else. Battles are won and loss by how much of a hurting you can put on the other guy, not how much of a hurting you can absorb.
Another excellent episode covering this iconic naval battle! My grandfather was one of Admiral Halsey's flyers and on 25 October 1944 was in the thick of the Battle off Cape Engano - one of his vivid memories was overflying Task Force 34 as it peeled off and turned 180 degrees in an attempt to rush to Taffy 3's aid. During my own naval service I had the unforgettable experience of retracing Kurita's path through the Sibuyan Sea, transiting San Bernardino Strait in darkness and entering the waters off Samar just after dawn - on 25 October 2014, exactly 70 years after the battle!
Gentlemen, thank you for correcting the record. You had superb detail, but only necessary details. This was a spectacular episode and absolutely riveting. So many myths, so many myths.
My father was an engineering officer on the Kalinin Bay "Lucky K". Fortunately he wrote his experiences down. James Hornfischer talked to him several times in researching "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" . My sons have been educated on the sacrifices of the Tin Can Sailors and pilots of the CVEs and bravery of 17 year old kid that pulled a pair of dungarees from a bilge bump of the flooding engine room on CVE-68. Thanks for all you guys do.
There is so much content in this podcast I’m watching it again trying to get my head around everything happening. It’s amazing how taffy 3-2-1 sent the Japanese home with their tails between their legs. The chain of events with the accuracy you guys convey is superb, thanks.
One thing to keep in mind was that it was a tactical as well as a strategic victory. Kurita’s cruisers were savaged during the battle. They lost three CA’s off Samar. I believe, with more damaged. And one could make a pretty good argument that the Japanese heavy cruisers were the most formidable surface threat in the Japanese arsenal at this point. Most of them carried 10 8” guns, they were all equipped with Long Lance torpedos and they were FAST. Most of the Japanese battleships were quite speedy for their time, but with a few exceptions that time was WWI. The Kongos could do about 31 knots and the Yamatos could make do a bit more than 27 at full throttle but the rest of the Japanese battle line was stuck in the 23-25 knot range. Nagato and Mutsu could make turns for 26 knots when they were first built but they lost a little over a knot after their refits. The rest of the Japanese battleships were slower. That just wasn’t useful speed for a major warship in the Pacific theater. Yamato made turns for 27.49 knots during trials, which was adequate for her intended role but only just. And that was what she ran at light load before she’d had her secondaries and AA beefed up & various other accoutrements added on: By the time Leyte rolled around Yamato & Musashi had packed on some pounds. It wasn’t just that Japan’s interpretation of MahanIan doctrine was flawed or that battleships had been supplanted by CVs as the main striking arm of major navies. Battleships were still useful during WWII by navies and officers who’d adjusted to the new meta. Japan hadn’t adjusted, however & the battleships they had were not, for the most part, for for purpose.
Bob Hagen of the Johnston deserves more attention. The man was in BOTH of the Navy's two most intense surface fights of the war. He was the radar officer on the USS Aaron Ward at the 1st Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and was wounded there.
Center Force attacking Taffy Three was like Grizzly bears provoking an angry hornets nest protected by a loyal pack of vicious mutant dachshunds with lasers on their heads.
The padding on the message to Halsey, "The world wonders", is from "Charge of the Light Brigade", by Alfred, Lord Tennyson. October 25, the date of the Battle, was the 90th anniversary of that charge (October 25, 1854)
I have heard that, too, but the poem is "All the world wondered". I'm not really sure because the poem is about bravery but also about incompetent commanders ("...the soldier knew/Someone had blundered") which would make it a pretty ambiguous choice, however apt.
Dont forget Tacloban airfield. Many planes landed, gassed up and reloaded machine guns. The FM2 Wildcat is the most underrated plane of the Pacific War. Please do a JIMMY DOOLITTLE episode. Make it about his life and not just the raid on Tokyo. That was only 2% of his career. Major to three stars during the war. He convinced Shell Oil to create aviation fuel. He was their sales rep for 25 years. First man to fly blind on instruments. Second PHD in aerospace engineering ever given from MIT. Multiple time world speed record holder. He destroyed the Luftwaffe after he kicked the Japanese in the nuts with his raid! Do a live episode from Wash DC.
FM2 was very good and underfed to be sure... but most underrated ? two army birds get the call for me the P40 the primary fighter/fighter bomber of the RAAF and the P39 which had parity ( in aircraft destroyed) or near parity with the IJA and IJN in the first dark months of the war . The P39 is so forgotten (snubbed) that at the USAF Academy there is not statue of it next to the other fighters / Purist aircraft of the war.
Another amazing job on Tom Hanks/ Steven Spielberg new mini series. You finally cleared up the combination of ad hoc airpower, incredibly brave midgets attacking Giants. The IJN Center Force, or the surviving half, brave and still determined after 40 hours of culling Cruisers, losing Musahi, from submarine, aircraft and now a 7 ship escort of DD and DE. Epic Pacific History. Thanks for the Big 3, John is big time, Seth has a brilliantly done note sheet. Bill tosses softballs and keeps it moving.
Seth’s mosquito analogy and Bill’s No-See-Ems follow on after 1:32:15 reminds me of one of the worst nights of my life. A friend and I went fishing in the Minnesota boundary waters on a hot summer weekend in 1982. Note that the state bird of Minnesota is the mosquito. The day was an ongoing fight with blackflies, horseflies, mosquitoes, and no-see-ems. After finishing dinner, we got in the tent and killed all the mosquitoes that got in with us. As I lay there with my eyes closed, I could swear I was being bitten anew. After a few minutes, I opened my eyes and saw the ceiling of the tent covered with thousands, I mean thousands, of No-See-Ems. The netting was small enough to prevent the larger insects from getting in, but not these biting creatures.
I am sensitive to those dog-on no-see-ems. (Montana) they itch like a bear-cat. I too have been in Minnesota "lake country" fishing among swarms of mostly little mosquitoes....unbelievable! Thanks for sharing. Appreciated.
Well done gentleman. I think one of the sayings you have applied about naval forces in these histories, "the sum is greater than the whole of the parts" can be applied also to your work and accomplishment in bringing this history of the war in the pacific to all of us. Bravo!
@@jayjohnson9996 LOL he is a tedious little internet gobshite with a forced over scripted sense of supposed humour. 'The man loves the sound of his own voice. Why use one word when you can use sixty eight. You could always try thinking for yourself
You can learn a lot from him at his UA-cam site. In his world, everything either looks like a ship or a naval base. He provides the history of development of British ships and submarines including their tragic errors such as center of gravity and associated instability. ua-cam.com/users/results?search_query=drachininfel ua-cam.com/video/k7LKQBdXsHk/v-deo.html&pp=ygUMZHJhY2hpbmluZmVs Alex is one of the world's experts with an ironic sense of humor.@@jayjohnson9996
Something worth correcting in the narrative. Halsey is never communicating with Kinkaid, nor did his orders require any communication with Kinkaid. They were in completely separate commands, and there were no orders concerning their coordination. Kinkaid was reading Halsey's dispatches to Nimitz even though not intended for him. Kinkaid was confused by Halsey's ambiguous dispatches, but they were never intended for him. Kinkaid's communications were going to MacArthur, and Halsey did not get any messages from Kinkaid. The command structure was a mess at Leyte, and Halsey was not responsible for that. He made enough other mistakes, but not this one. It was a byproduct of Nimitz not confronting MacArthur about him retaining control of a large portion of the Navy assets at Leyte, resulting in this split command structure with no coordination. The complex Japanese plan accidently exploited this screwball mess.
Agreed! Moreover, It is quite possible that Halsey did not actually mess up at all! I confess to flip-flopping on the issue of Halsey's competence at this point of his career... But, taking a step back and looking at the larger strategic picture...it is quite possible that the IJN "toothless" flattops were the main target at this point in the war. This may explain why Nimitz's orders stated that if the IJN carriers are sighted, they become a "priority" target for Halsey. Although it is generally true that protecting a landing site would be the priority for the fleet, maybe our Naval leaders realized that at this stage in the war, sinking the Japanese carriers was a greater priority. Heck, most of those leaders actually initially wanted to bypass the Philippines altogether... Maybe this landing was a reverse Midway? Sure, landing our forces on Leyte would be a good thing, buy enticing the carriers to show themselves would be a more important outcome!?
Thank you. Excellent contribution to the discussion. I ŵas thinking that Ķurita had more excuses than HALSEY for being disoriented. When he finally headed for home and away he had those 400 aircraft buzzing in his head and all around his physical space. Halsey never experienced anything like this, even during the worst of '42. Capt Toti really pours it on, appropriately.
@@lapaprofundous3788 I have had thoughts like yours for years about this. I think the crucial point though was made in this talk, and that was that Halsey lost situational awareness. It is true that Nimitz had given Halsey permission to leave the landings and pursue carriers if they showed up. This was an apparent reaction to Philippine Sea where the orders to Spruance were to protect the landings first. It turned out OK there, but it was clearly a problem to let the Japanese carriers attack first (even though their planes got chopped to pieces en route). Plus MacArthur had his own fleet under Kinkaid to protect the Leyte landings, and it was not Halsey's primary responsibility. Later, Halsey would try to blame Kinkaid for sailing south to counter that attack. But the presence of the powerful Kurita force required that Halsey account for it as part of an overall plan. He was one-tracked once he had carriers to hit. Not only did he ignore the possiblity of Kurita reversing course, he did not inform anyone else that he was not protecting San Bernardino Strait. He just took off after the carriers, and issued ambiguous statements about his overall plan. Even if appropriate to dash for the carriers, he had to have a plan for Kurita if he turned around to attack again. And he had to make his plan clear to Nimitz. None of that happened.
Remember Kurita was forced to turn away from the CVEs early in the fight to dodge Johnston torpedoes. He could not turn in to comb the wakes because the Haruna was off his starboard quarter. Kurita sailed AWAY from the target for a long time. I think THAT is the reason he felt he wasn't gaining on them and that he faced fleet CVs.
That’s an interesting thought. He was almost certainly exhausted and disoriented by this point. And Center Force had already taken a pounding from the air & from submarines. This makes a lot of sense, really.
This action, was in my opinion, the finest performance of US arms by any branch, in any battle, since the civil war. I'm an ex-infantry officer and a historical obsessive - the absolute MOH level courage by ever officer on this field along with the pilots was something almost unique in history. In every battle but this one somebody hesitates - not here. Yours being the best narrative of WW 2 US pacific history, I think you folks should get authorized. As Hirohito is no longer here perhaps King Charles will do the honors.
Great episodes as always! Really enjoy hearing you guys unpack these events. When I first started out as a pastor in the early 90's I had a retired colleague who was on the Gambier Bay. He was only 18 or 19 at the time and told how the Japanese just pounded the ship. He spent some time in the water after abandoning ship and in his case defined the "there's no atheists in foxholes" saying (though there are). He had a "come to Jesus" moment and when he got home after the war went to Bible college and became a pastor.
24:00, to the lack of long lance torpedo activity. The Japanese mistakenly believed they were facing Cruisers, Battleships, and Fleet Carriers. Is it possible they set the depth to deep and simply sent all their fish UNDER the Destroyers and Escort Carriers?
Learn something new about the Pacific War every time I listen to you guys. Very entertaining, and fun, addition to my morning. Thanks and have a good week gentlemen
I have def found my WW2 Historian brothers in arms with your amazing channel you guys. I’ve been watching since the beginning and I just have to say that these Battle of Leyte Gulf episodes are some of the very best you’ve done so far. I thought that your Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Tarawa, Marshalls, Pelelieu and Marianas episodes were excellent but these were even better. This is bc I had always believed that Mikawa just turned tail and ran for almost no reason (other then the battle of the Tin Can Soldiers who were nothing short of MONSTER HEROIC before understanding the powerful effect of the 400+ airplanes and combat 440+ sorties from the CVE’s of Taffy 1, 2 and 3 and the incredible amount of whoop ass that they unleashed on Mikawa’s ships, particularly the heavy cruisers. GREAT JOB FELLAS and I can’t wait for the next episodes to come!!😊
What a week! You guys really need to do an episode sharing your time travelling experience 😂 On a serious note. Another great episode, gents! Can't wait for the next episode!
Another exciting recitation of this important sea battle. Great detail and impressive heroism exhibited by the American Navy. One of your best episodes.
Good grief. Only 1.6k likes and 299 comments. Guys, you deserve so much more! I've immensely enjoyed your conversation and relived the events of Samar with you (can I say "relived" if I'm far too young to have been there in the first place? Anyway. You know what I mean). Again, your love for tinny tiny detail adds so much life to the topic at hand. Even in some quite serious accounts of serious historians, it is the hopeless charge of the destroyers that what is supposed to have played major role in Kurita's decision to turn back but you are absolutely right in shifting the weight to the role of air attacks. In your discussion this battle finally makes perfect sense. Thank you so much for another great 90+ minutes with you!
I am of the opinion that despite Halsey’s major blunder, it actually worked out for the best that a major American battle line wasn’t present when Kurita shows up. Obviously it meant certain death for the intensely brave men of the destroyer forces, but consider this- if the Oldendorf or even the new Iowa class battleships had been anywhere nearby, they absolutely would have tangled with Yamato and a dozen other battleships and cruisers. Now, I’m no suggesting such an American force couldn’t have held their own, but they would surely have taken hits and probably some losses too. And instead of losing 3 destroyers and 3 escorts, the fleet may have lost 120,000 tons worth of battleships, and mission killed another few who would have needed repairs. Plus the thousands of men on board each of those massive ships. So, although it’s counterintuitive, I actually believe that the way it happened probably yielded the fewest losses for the Americans.
In hindsight, maybe? It still killed over 1,000 US sailors. But TF34 are ships of the line. Their job is to fight capital ships. Witholding them for fear of damage is entirely counterintuitive. May as well not have them at all if that's the way we treat them. TF 77.4 was an auxiliary detachment and never should have been placed in the line of battle.
I think your point has some merit. I think if Halsey had left all the battleships and included two of his large carriers with them then perhaps it would have been enough to have reduced the Japs ability to wreck havoc with our battleships. Unfortunately he wasn't for sure what he was facing in that Jap northern force and didn't want to divide his forces. That's kind of the way Halsey operated.
@@garrettwood201Right, this is kind of the point that I’m making. If they’d been anywhere nearby you couldn’t possibly have justified not using them. That’s why I’m saying it’s maybe better that they weren’t. After all, the lesson of this entire war was that the traditional “battle line” was made obsolete by the same air power that- as we just heard- was what really beat the IJN at Samar. By the way, when one of those giant battleships goes down they regularly bring 1000 men with them all at once.
@matthewnewton8812 it depends on how those BB go down. Kirishima only lost ~300 from her pummeling at the hands of Washington. Obviously concentrated aur power is preferable for dealing with fleet units. But 77.4 was an ASW and CAS force, not anti-ship. If Kurita engages with any degree of organization or coordination, Taffy 3 doesn't last nearly as long as it does, and we're having a different discussion. It worked in this scenario, but making it a habit of engaging fleet units with large concentrations of auxiliaries isn't a way of conducting smart naval warfare in the 1940's. Taffy 3 was the absolute last thing you want in that position.
I'm not a big fan of late-war Halsey for all of the reasons stated, but at the end of the day the box score is pretty amazing even if limited to Samar only (and not considering the other 3 sub-battles). If you said we're going to fight a battle and sink a super BB, (was it) 8 CAs, and 4 or 5 CVs and CVLs for the loss of 2 or DDs, a DDE and 2 CVLs, anyone would have taken it! The fact that a lot that what we did lose was unnecessary is painful, but clearly the USN was willing to give up 5 or 6 minor units and 1,000 sailors to clear the IJN out. Had Halsey not taken the bait, we'd have had to deal with the "fleet in being." The OP makes a good point that if TF34 had engaged Center Force we might well have lost at least one major unit and quite possibly more casualties. Of course the Gun Club would have met their destiny and been proud of the inevitable result. One is in awe of the bravery and sacrifice of both the tin can sailors and the aircrews of the TAFFYs. Very sad that the survivors were left adrift for 3 days but not unprecedented, think Juneau, Indianapolis and others we don't know about because no one lived to tell the tale.
A lot of brave sailors lost their lives in this battle. The bravery of the DDs and DEs wow hard to describe, but should be remembered by all for their sacrifice. When the 3 of you get together, it makes for a very entertaining yet informative program. Thanks Seth, Bill, and Jon--great job once again!!!
Not to be overly "post modernist" the IJN force had a pretty good idea that they were attacking a Buzz saw with a Log.. They were brave too, just on the wrong side (Japan's actions were as evil and Germany or USSR at this time )
The last episode caused me to do some more research around Halsey and this battle. I was sort of surprised to learn that even until his death Halsey vehemently denied that he had made any error at all in this battle. It’s sad because his legacy was already secure. His leadership in the crucible of the Solomons fight had been critical to winning the campaign that broke the back of the Japanese military. Had he been willing to admit he had errored it would if anything have enhanced his reputation. After all everyone is human and even the best of us make mistakes. To recognize what was already widely understood and admit to it wouldn’t have diminished his accomplishments in any way. But in his continued vehement refusals to admit error we are left wondering if this was the bluster of a MacArthur level ego that had to always be right or was his judgement really that poor? I’m also surprised that Carney his Chief of Staff rose to CNO despite having been a part not only of this mess but also Halsey’s Typhoons. Considering that only Halsey’s reputation and the desire to avoid scandal prevented him from being relieved you would have thought that Carney’s career would have ended right there.
This is the best history series that I have encountered to date. Thank you so much for taking the time to produce this series. Its important to remember these events, and you are keeping them alive. As a result of this series, and particularly the Submarine events, I have found, purchased, and have been playing'Silent War 2.0', a boardgame that replays the whole WW2 Pacific Submarine Campaign and some of the famous patrols by Wahoo, Tang etc. It creates an understanding of the pressures and frustrations of the service including the issues with the Mk XIV Torpedoes.
I don’t remember the name of the book but I believe it was a USNI Press “Blue Jacket” series about the USS Johnston that I read over 20 years ago contained the following exchange(paraphrase best as I can remember) - After the Johnston’s Commissioning ceremony a lady who was one of the guests asked CDR Evans “How often does a little ship like this sink”. Evans replied “Usually just once.” Enjoy your series - trying to “binge” watch to catch up!
When judging Kurita's decision to retire, it's important to remember the sacrifices that were made by the Southern and Northern forces. These sacrifices were made with one purpose in mind; to allow Kurita to make it into Leyte Gulf, and he failed to do so when he had the opportunity. Of course, I am writing this while sitting comfortably in my easy chair with a glass of wine... and nobody is shooting at me!
Thanks for yet another outstanding episode Gents! I have to say that this one (parts 1 and 2) was my absolute favorite to date. (Whenever I hear the words "Taffy 3", "Battle Off Samar", or "USS Samuel B. Roberts" I get a lump in my throat.) Visit the monument to their heroism on Harbor Drive in Sand Diego. If you're wondering what you should wear on camera for the next episode, you should consider printing up some T-shits (or golf shirts with collar for the Captain), they'd sell like hotcakes and the proceeds would compensate you guys a tiny bit for your time and effort invested in the series.
On the lack of Japanese torpedo attacks, I have seen reports on how a destroyer division was in position early on to fire a full spread through the retreating CVE formation, but Admiral Kurita then recalled them because he was apparently concerned that they were using too much fuel running at flank (which was one of several indicators that he was looking to get as many of his ships back to base as possible and did not view his force as expendable even if that was required to destroy the landing support units).
Hmmm. If so, that’s a strange move. It’s a matter of minutes to fire torpedoes off once you’re already in position. Maybe even seconds. And how could he justify a trip across the ocean and back only to not do what he came for while he was actually there? Wouldn’t that be the REAL misuse of fuel?
@@matthewnewton8812 One of many strange moves by the Japanese in this action. Some commanders face an expectation of disaster with a response of "I've got nothing to lose" and actually pull off something incredible (Foch on the Marne, or in fact Evans at Samar), while others freeze up and become very tentative.
I've read this as well; the issue was that the Japs were already in an extreme fuel shortage era due to our cutting the oil lifeline. This moving the jap destroyers to the back illustrates the tactical repercussions in their mind.
It's been a while since I read Last Stand of the Tin Can sailors, but I seem to recall they did fire torpedoes late in the battle. When they recount here the Johnston taking a column of destroyers (led by I think the light cruiser Yahagi) under 5 inch gunfire, those destroyers were maneuvering for a torpedo shot. I also recall from the book US naval aircraft shooting at torpedoes as they closed in on the CVEs. The explanation given was that the destroyers fired from extreme range and bad angle due to Johston's gunnery. I am not sure that Johnston's fire control radar was out at that point either. Hagen describes having to wrench it back into place after Johnston's mast comes down on the mk 37 director, but I believe it contined to work. Only Bob Hollenbaugh's turret 3 (I think) was on local control at this point in the fight. So a column of destroyers had their T crossed by the smoking ruin of the Johnston, and were sent packing for friendlier waters.
The courage these sailors exhibited was astounding. Kuritas decision will be the head scratcher of all Navel decisions from now on. Another great episode. Thanks,
Thank you for explaining the role of aircraft. I have always wondered why in this battle aircraft wasn’t portrayed as decisive as it was in other engagements and why U.S. was considered such underdogs. Once again you guys have set the record straight.
Great stuff as usual. I have to wonder if the face saving IJN Commanders were loathe to admit being hit by (5" fire) what were sawed off runts compared to their mighty ships of war. There is no doubt that US DD, DE's pressed (their) attack and poked the IJN force in the eye. The unquestionably brave escort force didn't sit back and tell the carrier planes to "go get 'em boys". Amazing seamanship (& bravery) by all the US ships including the escort carriers & pilots. Thanks Seth, Captain Toti and Jon....very good work. You're appreciated.
I have waited “all week” for the second episode. Thank you! Yet again a new perspective. OK, the Japanese retreat made sense. I love you guys. Thank You!
You guys are great. Not only in facts and History. But most of all the candor and casual conversations between telling the off the History. Thanks so much.
I love what you and Bill are doing here. I 've been waiting for this episode as I have a personal attachment to the battle off Samar, my dad's 2nd brother was radio/radar officer aboard Adm. Stump's flagship USS Natoma Bay CVE -63.
Been waiting all week for this Torpedo Tuesday and this one comes with a costume change. I never tire of hearing this story. I always have to get the ole converter out when you old salts start talking ranges in yards. Hard for me to visualize. I live on the plains of Texas and can see for miles but we measure distances with time, not yards. We say it's about 30 minutes away or something like that. But 36,000 yards would be like hitting the town 20 miles down the road. I can see the grain elevators of these towns from my roof. It is incredible to imagine battleships fighting. Can't wait until next week.
Fantastic episode! I really enjoy when Captain Totti speaks about leadership, decision making, and the responsibility of command. Such a unique wrinkle. A question on the historiography: It seemed like Japanese damage control records carried precedence over the reports of US gun crews in assessing who scored hits on the Japanese ships. There was heavy traffic during my commute, I apologize if I’m mischaracterizing- just curious how you glean the truth from sets of records tainted by the chaos of incoming ordinance on the one hand and the tendency to over-claim on the other. Thank you gentlemen
Here is what a destroyer man said about the DEs. quote> Just at the end of dinner that evening, an officer at a nearby table rose and came over. I recognized him as the skipper of one of the destroyers with which we had operated off Okinawa. He was a full Commander, and his Naval Academy class ring was prominent. I would have risen, but he held me down with a hand on my shoulder. "I don't want to intrude on your evening," he said, looking down the table, "and I'm glad to see you enjoying yourselves, because you sure as hell deserve to! I couldn't help hearing that you're from the Abercrombie. We operated with you a couple of times out west and there's something I want to say." He paused, and he had the whole table's attention. "You DE sailors," he went on, "did one hell of a job out there. Don't you ever take a back seat to anyone as far as fighting that war is concerned." (That last sentence was spoken like an order.) "You went out there right out of civilian life, most of you right out of school or your parents' homes, with a minimum of hurried training, in little ships that could have been better armed and equipped, and you did damned near everything we did with bigger, better, faster ships and a hell of a lot more training - and you did it just as well, sometimes better. I'm proud as hell of you and I want you to know it!" The next morning after quarters I called the whole crew back on the fantail and repeated that little speech as best I could, being especially careful to cite its source. No man who heard it at either first or second hand has forgotten it. I like to think that it was because it had the ring of sincerity - and truth. Edward P. Stafford - Little Ship Big War
solid content IJN had already failed to go all in at Guadalcanal. It now shied away from Leyte. The were presented with two "decisive battles", but did not recognize them.
I think the conclusion that Kurita had had enough and wasn't willing to throw away any more lives may be the real bottom line. I'll have to review Stille on Leyte again, but I hadn't remembered the theory that the "northern masts sighting" was fabricated after the fact.
@@UPNilesCyn Indeed-there is no actual record of the supposed transmission from Mikawa that Kurita claims he received. His staff never *denied* that it existed either-so it was either all agreed upon by them as the 'official' reason for turning back or it was lost.
I did some research a few years ago about Kurita's reasons for pulling out and retreating from this battle. I came across a report on an interview with him years after the War. My recollection of this interview was the following: (1) His fleet was days late to the scene, so whatever havoc his fleet could have mustered would have been essentially a bit too late (5 days), and that the landings would still have continued. (2) He and many of the others thought that they had run into a much more powerful force than it was, partly due to misjudging the US ships, thinking that destroyers were cruises, destroyer escorts were destroyers, and that the carriers seen were fleet carriers. (3) That moving forward with the attack would have resulted in his fleet's total or near total destruction, and that he was concerned about the lives of his men, and that further forward movement would have resulted in many, many lives lost, and for little gain. I think Kurita's concerns were pretty much right on, especially with our knowledge on how the battle wagon fleet had been called upon from Halsey, and Hurita's fleet stuck around, the appearance of the US battleships would have annihilated his fleet. It also appears to me that the Japanese navy was much more concerned about their loses, both in ships and lives lost, than the Japanese army ever was. You can see this trend throughout the whole Pacific War.
Prior to Leyte, Captain Copeland became incensed when he was told that the single quintuple torpedo mount on the Sammy B was going to be removed and replaced with additional 40mm AA guns. He went to see the officer who was promulgating this order and told him that he flat out refused to have his torpedoes taken away. When asked why, he replied "One day my ship is going to be asked to do a man's job, and I need a man's tools to do it with." And so, he kept his quintuple mount. No Higher Honor...
Thank you , you guys make so much sense of this mythic battle. I tend to agree with Seth, the masts on the horizon are like the periscope sightings that keep you from picking up survivors.
I was born on the shores oh the Coral Sea, two weeks old at the time of the epic battle so I think fondly of America and the heroics of your servicemen. I have loved the story of Taffy 2 but have wondered if Halsey should have been court-martialed. Seems my suspicions were correct.
One of the battles I really looked forward to hearing their version of it. This is the standard I reviere for courage, bravery, and determination. I still get chills thinking about it. This battle is the very defition of courage in the face of overwhelming odds. No other battle brings tears to my eyes as this battle does.
I love Bill’s comment that the main thing is the main thing as well as his description of Halsey of playing checkers in a chess match. I have never understood how Halsey, the “Fighting Admiral,” received his fifth star while Spruance, the “Quiet Warrior,” did not.
Once again guys another good episode that I truly enjoyed. I learned something new outside the epic clash of the destroyers clashing with the IJN. All I can say is well done guys!!!!!
Thanks so much for this episode and the series. I wonder if historians have discounted how much the Japanese were playing for a negotiated end to the war . Perhaps they were thinking that negotiations without capital Japanese ships in the mix, would be very difficult. And this battle could have ended with their side in a far reduced negotiating position had they pressed on. As we think of Lee after Gettysburg, perhaps; hoping for the best deal they could get.
Great show! @ 35:00 talking about the DE, 600 rounds in 35 minutes is around 8 rounds a gun per minute. Awesome to see your channel so popular! You would think Hollywood would make some dramas about these battles. They could even call it The Admirals and do both sides. I'd watch that! Maybe one of you guys can become screenwriters? If you do it include their families back home so it has more dramatic elements to it and a wider audience. WW2 dramas never get old.
Another most informative presentation. Thank you for your insight and dedication. I love to compare your presentations with my readings of Samuel Eliot Morrison's books. Great job!
I've been studying and trying to figure out Jurita's motivations and reasons for turning North for years. He really only publicly talked about the battle twice. Once in 1946 for the US SBS. That one was filmed and is easy to find. Kurita speaks clear reasonably fluent English. And once for a magazine interview shortly before his death. I think the failure to understand his turn North stems from everybody believing what I suspect to be a lie in the SBS interview. When asked about Surigao Strait Kurita claims it was never the plan to use Surigao Strait as his intended exit. But if you look at it and work the numbers, it honestly had to be. First up we have to understand one clear element of Kurita's personality. Kurita clearly did not believe in suicide missions if they could be avoided. He did not seem keen on suicide overall. Note he made no moves to end himself after the disgrace of Leyte Gulf. In spite of the shame and scorn. I once saw it speculated that Kurita was Japanese Catholic. I never found clear evidence of this, but it might make sense. The analysis of Samar everyone fails to do is Kurita's fuel state. While the "cowards hiding in basements under Tokyo" (direct quote from the magazine interview) Might have intended Leyte to be a suicide mission, Kurita did not. And had budgeted his fuel to get home. At the point Kurita turned North a few things had happened. He was losing Cruisers to aerial attack from never ending swarms of carrier aircraft. Much more aircraft then he could see carriers for. He had just received word of what had happened to Nishimura's Southern Force, and that Surigao Strait had a fleet of American heavies astride it. And he was nearing his point of no return fuel state. Remember all the turns in the Siboyan Sea? He'd eaten up a lot of fuel. And now he was concerned about another force coming down from the north. Which would cut him off from San Bernadino Strait. He turned for San Bernadino Strait while it was still an option and while he still had fuel to reach friendly bases.
I'm australian, love this show, i started watching late but caught up , it's tuesday nigh here in Brisbane 645 about an hour to go before part 3, bring it on
My father was 16 in October 1944 and lived in Dolores, Eastern Samar. He told me he woke when he heard the sound of big guns going off. He said he ran towards the beach and climbed up the highest coconut tree to “watch” the battle. (For reference on a clear day in SoCal, Catalina Island can be seen which is 26 miles away. From what I’ve read about the naval battle, visibility was 20+ miles October 25th). He could see ships but couldn’t distinguish who was whom. He wasn’t sure how long he held on to the tree. But he said he watched until the sound of big guns stopped.
Needless to say, he despised the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Previous to the battle, he and a friend were captured by Japanese soldiers. They tortured my dad and his friend asking where American GIs were being hidden by the locals. My dad’s friend relented and lied thinking the Japanese would release them. The Japanese took my dad’s friend away and that was the last time he saw him. My dad didn’t talk and eventually the Japanese released him. But he had the scars on his back from the bayonet piercing done to him.
After watching the battle, my dad secretly went to enlist with the US Navy. He was rejected because he couldn’t prove he was the legal age. So he returned home and had the town mayor write a letter stating he was 18. He brought the letter back and was accepted. My dad passed away May 2019 and I found his DD-214. I also found his dress blues and whites plus his medals and ribbons. He never talked about the medals and I had no clue what they were for. I discovered he was awarded the WW II Victory Medal, the Asiatic Pacific Campaign Medal-WW II, National Defense Medal, the US Occupation-Europe Medal, the Navy Unit Commendation Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and the Good Conduct Medal. My dad served 20 years active and 10 reserve. He retired as a Chief Petty Officer.
At his funeral, the US Navy sent a captain and seaman for formalities. Before the ceremony began, the captain asked what i knew about my dad. I let him know what I knew and was touched when he began to weep. He recognized the sacrifice my dad, and mom, made through those years. He began weeping again when he presented the US flag to me that was draped over his coffin. From that day forward, respect for my dad increased tenfold. Thanks dad and mom-and thank you US Navy. 🇺🇸
What an utterly awesome account. Thank you for sharing.
God bless your father, your family and the country your father served, another great American. I salute him. Thanks much appreciated.
That is a wonderful story about your father. I understand why the Captain was moved to tears. Thank you for sharing.
Excellent. My wife's father was a Filipino Scout and laid ambushes for the Japanese in Sorsogon. His patrol once had to cross a river but he could not swim. So he walked across the bottom holding his breath and his rifle up above water. Or so the legend goes. Many stories I could tell about him.
May I join you in the respect of Dad and Mom.
Captain Totti will always be a legend in the U.S. Navy.For those that don't know,capt. Totti was responsible for the information that led to the overturned conviction of Charles Mcvay,the skipper of the Indianapolis who was court marshaled for losing his heavy cruiser.In 1998,99?.The reason I say that capt Totti is a hero is because he gathered information to over turn and clear Mcvay of any wring doing.Mr. Totti is very humble,he doesn't interrupt people when they are speaking,and is highly regarded by the U.S. navy to once be in charge of a nuclear submarine. That's the highest honor a man can have,and was trusted with weapons that could have ended our world.
Thanks for that information, I did not know that😊
Your welcome
He a great man. Totti, hope you read this!!!! All of you are tops in my estimate.
He's obviously extremely intelligent and knowledgeable, but doesn't show off.
He would have been in the astronaut program if born with better eyesight.
I find him a good man, the info on Capt. Mcvay adds to the luster.
Commander Ernest E. Evans is one of the most extraordinary sailors I have ever heard of - a credit to his service and his country. As you have rightly said, you couldn't make this stuff up.
I am an Australian subscriber and I take this opportunity to congratulate and thank you, Seth, Bill, Jon and all your other collaborators, for this outstanding series.
Copeland as well.
Me too.
He ripped his shirt off...
Evans was Native American
Read " Last stand of the tin can sailors" .... great book written about this battle.
Seth,you do a wonderful job of orchestrating the show.Your guidance means the show will always be complete when discussing what went on during these battles.
Thanks. With all the time I put in researching and writing each one, I need it to flow to satisfy my ocd.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWaryou are great at it.
@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Agree Seth, always professional. You & Captain Toti ( Jon & guests) are important historians. Much appreciated.
You know I got to thinking, which is always dangerous, but pre-internet, pre UA-cam and pre- podcasts, where would we be? How would we access content such as the Unauthorized History of the War in the Pacific? While we live in very complicated times, at least we have this show to look forward to every Torpedo Tuesday!🇺🇸⚓️💯🙏👍💖😊
I visited the USS Iowa (BB-61) museum in 2019 or so. As we walked through the ship, there were volunteers in some of the compartments. They were there to answer questions from us tourists. There were lots of people visiting the ship that day, and the passageways were crowded. At one point we came upon an elderly gentleman, one of the volunteers. I heard someone ahead of me ask this gentleman what he did during the war. He answered "I was on the USS Hoel". The lady who asked the question moved on. She didn't understand the significance of that simple answer. I did. When I got to him I asked him "did you mean USS Hoel, from the Battle of Samar?" He said "yes". I was kind of blown away at that point and didn't even know what to say. I thought it would seem too cheesy and "touristy" and cheap to ask for a photo, so I just shook his hand and thanked him.
What you said and did was perfect !😮😢😊
I have been on the Iowa (in San Pedro) a few times, but never ran into anyone who was in the War. This must have been amazing to you! Back in the late '90s I was doing a trade show (computers) in NYC, and a black guy came by my booth, wearing a Pearl Harbor survivor cap, and when I talked to him at the booth and found out that he was there on Dec 7, 19421, I took him out to lunch. We talked about the war and that day at Pearl Harbor, but then continued on about the plight of the black man in the US during the many decades after the War, and his involvement. This was a VERY interesting lunch. I took him to one of the famous NYC delies on 7th ave. The food their was wonderful! Also, the Intrepid is berthed on the Hudson in NYC, and I have been on it and toured it. Back then, it had am SR-71 on its deck!
Parshall refers to Korita later stating that he should have gone into Leyte. Korita later retracted this remark. There was all sorts of criticism afterwards, and he did not explain himself. He did not fight back against this criticism. He largely said nothing for decades afterwards about this decision.
But shortly before he died and when he was in his 80s, Kurita began to again speak of his actions at Leyte. He claimed privately to a former Naval Academy student (and biographer), Jiro Ooka, that he withdrew the fleet from the battle because he did not believe in wasting the lives of his men in a futile effort, having long since believed that the war was lost.
He was not willing to engage in the suicidal banzai charge.
I recall reading that, possibly in the book Four Commanders, or in The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.
It's funny because it's probably the only time a suicidal charge would have actually done some real damage.
@@TheJazsa80 Too true. What is interesting is that Korita represented the minority of Japanese leadership that did not buy into the suicide tactics. The last banzai charge on Saipan inflicted a lot of harm, as did subsequent Kamikazes. But Korita apparently did not believe in it.
It is worth noting that the sinking of transports at Leyte would only be sinking empty transports.
@@Bob.W. For years, I believed that Korita had blundered by "running away." I no longer believe that, as I accept the humanity of a commander who decides not to waste the lives of his men on behalf of a lost cause. If only more in Japan had thought like Korita, a million lives would have been saved, and the atomic bombings unnecessary. With that calculus in mind, who can demean the actions of a Japanese commander who rejected the death cult ethos of the Japanese military.
😅
The USS Indianapolis fast attack submarine in its heavy configuration weighs five times as much as the Samuel B. Roberts did!!! You guys rock so much.
I love this podcast. Thanks for all the work you all do to put these shows together. I am such a big fan of you three "amigos" and your shirts!
I’ve spoken about how enjoyable this podcast is many times and thank you guys again, but I would like to thank the administration of Mississippi Museum for allowing Seth to host this endeavor.
This is by far the best explanation (since the word police now state that synopsis has been deemed verboten) of the Battle of Samar I have ever heard/read. It is making sense of what for me has always been a chaotic ordeal by combat with a fully armored Samurai warrior versus a really energetic chicken. This makes so much sense and a movie/television mini-series focusing in on the aircrews and deck handlers of the CVE's on this fight may allow us a much truer insight into this battle. The fight was never between the escorts and CVE's versus the Japanese Center Force, but between the 400+ aircrews of the CVE's and the Center Force.
I think the destroyers and the DE would beg to differ. They were part of it as I recall.
To explain all the sub, destroyer, CVE actions on one side in a desperate battle with roughly half of Kurita's starting battle line, with angry Wildcats and Avengers thrown in the mix.
Could Drach be as thorough, enjoyable, and historically spot on?
THE WORLD WONDERS X
This is far more than a synopsis. It’s a detailed examination of the events.
@davidelliott5843 trust me, this is a fairly breezy overview, with the highlights and main points well covered. So many amazing details and horrific scenes they just can't include in a 1-2 hour podcast.
Scenes like Copeland calling up his chief engineer prior to their torpedo run to tell him not to worry about the engines, they are going to need every ounce of speed they can get. The Ch-eng, Trowbridge, disables the pressure safeties and takes the 400lb steam plant up to 600lbs, and 22 knot Sammy B hits 28 knots. Or a snipe on Johnston being sent down into the dark interior to shaft alley after she is first hit to pour lube oil over her last remaining propeller shaft to stop the dying screech of metal on metal. That ship was litterally kept in the fight with blood and sweat. Teams of sailors taking turns spinning the manual hydrolic pump for the rudder for over an hour, turning the ship with physical human strength. Men blown apart at their stations, decapitated, blood and gore flowing down the decks...
There is much, much more to this fight. It's even more extraordinary as you learn the details.
@@Bob.W. I am talking about in offensive fire. The DD's and DE's soaked up a lot of damage and attention from the IJN CA's and BB's but really didn't do anything else. Battles are won and loss by how much of a hurting you can put on the other guy, not how much of a hurting you can absorb.
“Do some of that destroyer stuff!” - I love it.
Another excellent episode covering this iconic naval battle! My grandfather was one of Admiral Halsey's flyers and on 25 October 1944 was in the thick of the Battle off Cape Engano - one of his vivid memories was overflying Task Force 34 as it peeled off and turned 180 degrees in an attempt to rush to Taffy 3's aid. During my own naval service I had the unforgettable experience of retracing Kurita's path through the Sibuyan Sea, transiting San Bernardino Strait in darkness and entering the waters off Samar just after dawn - on 25 October 2014, exactly 70 years after the battle!
Gentlemen, thank you for correcting the record. You had superb detail, but only necessary details.
This was a spectacular episode and absolutely riveting. So many myths, so many myths.
My father was an engineering officer on the Kalinin Bay "Lucky K". Fortunately he wrote his experiences down. James Hornfischer talked to him several times in researching "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" . My sons have been educated on the sacrifices of the Tin Can Sailors and pilots of the CVEs and bravery of 17 year old kid that pulled a pair of dungarees from a bilge bump of the flooding engine room on CVE-68. Thanks for all you guys do.
There is so much content in this podcast I’m watching it again trying to get my head around everything happening. It’s amazing how taffy 3-2-1 sent the Japanese home with their tails between their legs. The chain of events with the accuracy you guys convey is superb, thanks.
One thing to keep in mind was that it was a tactical as well as a strategic victory. Kurita’s cruisers were savaged during the battle. They lost three CA’s off Samar. I believe, with more damaged. And one could make a pretty good argument that the Japanese heavy cruisers were the most formidable surface threat in the Japanese arsenal at this point. Most of them carried 10 8” guns, they were all equipped with Long Lance torpedos and they were FAST.
Most of the Japanese battleships were quite speedy for their time, but with a few exceptions that time was WWI. The Kongos could do about 31 knots and the Yamatos could make do a bit more than 27 at full throttle but the rest of the Japanese battle line was stuck in the 23-25 knot range.
Nagato and Mutsu could make turns for 26 knots when they were first built but they lost a little over a knot after their refits. The rest of the Japanese battleships were slower.
That just wasn’t useful speed for a major warship in the Pacific theater. Yamato made turns for 27.49 knots during trials, which was adequate for her intended role but only just. And that was what she ran at light load before she’d had her secondaries and AA beefed up & various other accoutrements added on:
By the time Leyte rolled around Yamato & Musashi had packed on some pounds.
It wasn’t just that Japan’s interpretation of MahanIan doctrine was flawed or that battleships had been supplanted by CVs as the main striking arm of major navies. Battleships were still useful during WWII by navies and officers who’d adjusted to the new meta.
Japan hadn’t adjusted, however & the battleships they had were not, for the most part, for for purpose.
Bob Hagen of the Johnston deserves more attention. The man was in BOTH of the Navy's two most intense surface fights of the war. He was the radar officer on the USS Aaron Ward at the 1st Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and was wounded there.
Thanks for the info.
Indeed.
Thanks appreciated.
Center Force attacking Taffy Three was like Grizzly bears provoking an angry hornets nest protected by a loyal pack of vicious mutant dachshunds with lasers on their heads.
Grizzly Bears attacked by honey badgers, I would say.
The padding on the message to Halsey, "The world wonders", is from "Charge of the Light Brigade", by Alfred, Lord Tennyson. October 25, the date of the Battle, was the 90th anniversary of that charge (October 25, 1854)
maybe Halsey just REALLY disliked that poem 😅
I have heard that, too, but the poem is "All the world wondered". I'm not really sure because the poem is about bravery but also about incompetent commanders ("...the soldier knew/Someone had blundered") which would make it a pretty ambiguous choice, however apt.
Do we know who did the padding? Someone lost to history?
@@dmbeasterBegs the question of the system for padding
@@knutanderswik7562 Not all that ambiguous, IMHO. "Someone had blundered" -- and at whose desk did the buck stop, but Halsey's?
Dont forget Tacloban airfield. Many planes landed, gassed up and reloaded machine guns. The FM2 Wildcat is the most underrated plane of the Pacific War. Please do a JIMMY DOOLITTLE episode. Make it about his life and not just the raid on Tokyo. That was only 2% of his career. Major to three stars during the war. He convinced Shell Oil to create aviation fuel. He was their sales rep for 25 years. First man to fly blind on instruments. Second PHD in aerospace engineering ever given from MIT. Multiple time world speed record holder. He destroyed the Luftwaffe after he kicked the Japanese in the nuts with his raid! Do a live episode from Wash DC.
FM2 was very good and underfed to be sure... but most underrated ? two army birds get the call for me the P40 the primary fighter/fighter bomber of the RAAF and the P39 which had parity ( in aircraft destroyed) or near parity with the IJA and IJN in the first dark months of the war . The P39 is so forgotten (snubbed) that at the USAF Academy there is not statue of it next to the other fighters / Purist aircraft of the war.
Another amazing job on Tom Hanks/ Steven Spielberg new mini series.
You finally cleared up the combination of ad hoc airpower, incredibly brave midgets attacking Giants.
The IJN Center Force, or the surviving half, brave and still determined after 40 hours of culling Cruisers, losing Musahi, from submarine, aircraft and now a 7 ship escort of DD and DE.
Epic Pacific History.
Thanks for the Big 3, John is big time, Seth has a brilliantly done note sheet. Bill tosses softballs and keeps it moving.
Seth’s mosquito analogy and Bill’s No-See-Ems follow on after 1:32:15 reminds me of one of the worst nights of my life. A friend and I went fishing in the Minnesota boundary waters on a hot summer weekend in 1982. Note that the state bird of Minnesota is the mosquito.
The day was an ongoing fight with blackflies, horseflies, mosquitoes, and no-see-ems. After finishing dinner, we got in the tent and killed all the mosquitoes that got in with us. As I lay there with my eyes closed, I could swear I was being bitten anew. After a few minutes, I opened my eyes and saw the ceiling of the tent covered with thousands, I mean thousands, of No-See-Ems. The netting was small enough to prevent the larger insects from getting in, but not these biting creatures.
I am sensitive to those dog-on no-see-ems. (Montana) they itch like a bear-cat. I too have been in Minnesota "lake country" fishing among swarms of mostly little mosquitoes....unbelievable! Thanks for sharing. Appreciated.
This 2 part series along with the other are freaking AWESOME. thanks SO MUCH.
Well done gentleman. I think one of the sayings you have applied about naval forces in these histories, "the sum is greater than the whole of the parts" can be applied also to your work and accomplishment in bringing this history of the war in the pacific to all of us. Bravo!
Outstanding. I’ve been waiting patiently all week for this drop!
I’ve been waiting impatiently all week for this drop!
Same!
Same!!
An extraordinary set of the 3 battles even before the wardrobe malfunctions.You are awarded 10 stars each.
Another GREAT show guys.
🇺🇸 THANK YOU 🇺🇸 😊
Great show but not as good a history as I have come to expect from John Parshall.
“Faced with an opponent where a single main turret outweighs his entire ship, Evans decides ‘running is boring’.” -Drachinifel
Drachinifel is good. 👍
@@ricardokowalski1579Drach is great…. not just good.
Drachinifel is the man!!!!
@@jayjohnson9996 LOL he is a tedious little internet gobshite with a forced over scripted sense of supposed humour. 'The man loves the sound of his own voice. Why use one word when you can use sixty eight. You could always try thinking for yourself
You can learn a lot from him at his UA-cam site. In his world, everything either looks like a ship or a naval base. He provides the history of development of British ships and submarines including their tragic errors such as center of gravity and associated instability. ua-cam.com/users/results?search_query=drachininfel ua-cam.com/video/k7LKQBdXsHk/v-deo.html&pp=ygUMZHJhY2hpbmluZmVs Alex is one of the world's experts with an ironic sense of humor.@@jayjohnson9996
Something worth correcting in the narrative.
Halsey is never communicating with Kinkaid, nor did his orders require any communication with Kinkaid. They were in completely separate commands, and there were no orders concerning their coordination. Kinkaid was reading Halsey's dispatches to Nimitz even though not intended for him. Kinkaid was confused by Halsey's ambiguous dispatches, but they were never intended for him. Kinkaid's communications were going to MacArthur, and Halsey did not get any messages from Kinkaid.
The command structure was a mess at Leyte, and Halsey was not responsible for that. He made enough other mistakes, but not this one. It was a byproduct of Nimitz not confronting MacArthur about him retaining control of a large portion of the Navy assets at Leyte, resulting in this split command structure with no coordination. The complex Japanese plan accidently exploited this screwball mess.
Agree.Thanks appreciated.
That is a very good point... thx
Agreed!
Moreover, It is quite possible that Halsey did not actually mess up at all!
I confess to flip-flopping on the issue of Halsey's competence at this point of his career...
But, taking a step back and looking at the larger strategic picture...it is quite possible that the IJN "toothless" flattops were the main target at this point in the war.
This may explain why Nimitz's orders stated that if the IJN carriers are sighted, they become a "priority" target for Halsey.
Although it is generally true that protecting a landing site would be the priority for the fleet, maybe our Naval leaders realized that at this stage in the war, sinking the Japanese carriers was a greater priority.
Heck, most of those leaders actually initially wanted to bypass the Philippines altogether...
Maybe this landing was a reverse Midway? Sure, landing our forces on Leyte would be a good thing, buy enticing the carriers to show themselves would be a more important outcome!?
Thank you. Excellent contribution to the discussion. I ŵas thinking that Ķurita had more excuses than HALSEY for being disoriented. When he finally headed for home and away he had those 400 aircraft buzzing in his head and all around his physical space. Halsey never experienced anything like this, even during the worst of '42. Capt Toti really pours it on, appropriately.
@@lapaprofundous3788 I have had thoughts like yours for years about this. I think the crucial point though was made in this talk, and that was that Halsey lost situational awareness.
It is true that Nimitz had given Halsey permission to leave the landings and pursue carriers if they showed up. This was an apparent reaction to Philippine Sea where the orders to Spruance were to protect the landings first. It turned out OK there, but it was clearly a problem to let the Japanese carriers attack first (even though their planes got chopped to pieces en route). Plus MacArthur had his own fleet under Kinkaid to protect the Leyte landings, and it was not Halsey's primary responsibility. Later, Halsey would try to blame Kinkaid for sailing south to counter that attack.
But the presence of the powerful Kurita force required that Halsey account for it as part of an overall plan. He was one-tracked once he had carriers to hit. Not only did he ignore the possiblity of Kurita reversing course, he did not inform anyone else that he was not protecting San Bernardino Strait. He just took off after the carriers, and issued ambiguous statements about his overall plan.
Even if appropriate to dash for the carriers, he had to have a plan for Kurita if he turned around to attack again. And he had to make his plan clear to Nimitz. None of that happened.
Remember Kurita was forced to turn away from the CVEs early in the fight to dodge Johnston torpedoes. He could not turn in to comb the wakes because the Haruna was off his starboard quarter. Kurita sailed AWAY from the target for a long time. I think THAT is the reason he felt he wasn't gaining on them and that he faced fleet CVs.
That’s an interesting thought. He was almost certainly exhausted and disoriented by this point. And Center Force had already taken a pounding from the air & from submarines. This makes a lot of sense, really.
The torpedoes Yamato dodged were fired by Hoel.
This action, was in my opinion, the finest performance of US arms by any branch, in any battle, since the civil war. I'm an ex-infantry officer and a historical obsessive - the absolute MOH level courage by ever officer on this field along with the pilots was something almost unique in history. In every battle but this one somebody hesitates - not here.
Yours being the best narrative of WW 2 US pacific history, I think you folks should get authorized. As Hirohito is no longer here perhaps King Charles will do the honors.
Great episodes as always! Really enjoy hearing you guys unpack these events. When I first started out as a pastor in the early 90's I had a retired colleague who was on the Gambier Bay. He was only 18 or 19 at the time and told how the Japanese just pounded the ship. He spent some time in the water after abandoning ship and in his case defined the "there's no atheists in foxholes" saying (though there are). He had a "come to Jesus" moment and when he got home after the war went to Bible college and became a pastor.
Just remember, “It is not how big your Johnston is, it is how you use it.” TLE
Touché!!!
GREAT ONE!!!!!
24:00, to the lack of long lance torpedo activity. The Japanese mistakenly believed they were facing Cruisers, Battleships, and Fleet Carriers. Is it possible they set the depth to deep and simply sent all their fish UNDER the Destroyers and Escort Carriers?
Learn something new about the Pacific War every time I listen to you guys. Very entertaining, and fun, addition to my morning. Thanks and have a good week gentlemen
Agreed...
I have def found my WW2 Historian brothers in arms with your amazing channel you guys.
I’ve been watching since the beginning and I just have to say that these Battle of Leyte Gulf episodes are some of the very best you’ve done so far.
I thought that your Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Tarawa, Marshalls, Pelelieu and Marianas episodes were excellent but these were even better.
This is bc I had always believed that Mikawa just turned tail and ran for almost no reason (other then the battle of the Tin Can Soldiers who were nothing short of MONSTER HEROIC before understanding the powerful effect of the 400+ airplanes and combat 440+ sorties from the CVE’s of Taffy 1, 2 and 3 and the incredible amount of whoop ass that they unleashed on Mikawa’s ships, particularly the heavy cruisers.
GREAT JOB FELLAS and I can’t wait for the next episodes to come!!😊
What a week! You guys really need to do an episode sharing your time travelling experience 😂
On a serious note. Another great episode, gents! Can't wait for the next episode!
"It seems like minutes". That never grows old.
Another exciting recitation of this important sea battle. Great detail and impressive heroism exhibited by the American Navy. One of your best episodes.
Good grief. Only 1.6k likes and 299 comments. Guys, you deserve so much more! I've immensely enjoyed your conversation and relived the events of Samar with you (can I say "relived" if I'm far too young to have been there in the first place? Anyway. You know what I mean).
Again, your love for tinny tiny detail adds so much life to the topic at hand. Even in some quite serious accounts of serious historians, it is the hopeless charge of the destroyers that what is supposed to have played major role in Kurita's decision to turn back but you are absolutely right in shifting the weight to the role of air attacks. In your discussion this battle finally makes perfect sense. Thank you so much for another great 90+ minutes with you!
I first heard about Samar at NTC San Diego in 1978. I've been half in love with Sammy B. ever since. Thanks, guys. Marvelous episode!
I am of the opinion that despite Halsey’s major blunder, it actually worked out for the best that a major American battle line wasn’t present when Kurita shows up. Obviously it meant certain death for the intensely brave men of the destroyer forces, but consider this- if the Oldendorf or even the new Iowa class battleships had been anywhere nearby, they absolutely would have tangled with Yamato and a dozen other battleships and cruisers. Now, I’m no suggesting such an American force couldn’t have held their own, but they would surely have taken hits and probably some losses too. And instead of losing 3 destroyers and 3 escorts, the fleet may have lost 120,000 tons worth of battleships, and mission killed another few who would have needed repairs. Plus the thousands of men on board each of those massive ships.
So, although it’s counterintuitive, I actually believe that the way it happened probably yielded the fewest losses for the Americans.
In hindsight, maybe? It still killed over 1,000 US sailors.
But TF34 are ships of the line. Their job is to fight capital ships. Witholding them for fear of damage is entirely counterintuitive. May as well not have them at all if that's the way we treat them. TF 77.4 was an auxiliary detachment and never should have been placed in the line of battle.
I think your point has some merit. I think if Halsey had left all the battleships and included two of his large carriers with them then perhaps it would have been enough to have reduced the Japs ability to wreck havoc with our battleships. Unfortunately he wasn't for sure what he was facing in that Jap northern force and didn't want to divide his forces. That's kind of the way Halsey operated.
@@garrettwood201Right, this is kind of the point that I’m making. If they’d been anywhere nearby you couldn’t possibly have justified not using them. That’s why I’m saying it’s maybe better that they weren’t. After all, the lesson of this entire war was that the traditional “battle line” was made obsolete by the same air power that- as we just heard- was what really beat the IJN at Samar.
By the way, when one of those giant battleships goes down they regularly bring 1000 men with them all at once.
@matthewnewton8812 it depends on how those BB go down. Kirishima only lost ~300 from her pummeling at the hands of Washington.
Obviously concentrated aur power is preferable for dealing with fleet units. But 77.4 was an ASW and CAS force, not anti-ship. If Kurita engages with any degree of organization or coordination, Taffy 3 doesn't last nearly as long as it does, and we're having a different discussion.
It worked in this scenario, but making it a habit of engaging fleet units with large concentrations of auxiliaries isn't a way of conducting smart naval warfare in the 1940's. Taffy 3 was the absolute last thing you want in that position.
I'm not a big fan of late-war Halsey for all of the reasons stated, but at the end of the day the box score is pretty amazing even if limited to Samar only (and not considering the other 3 sub-battles). If you said we're going to fight a battle and sink a super BB, (was it) 8 CAs, and 4 or 5 CVs and CVLs for the loss of 2 or DDs, a DDE and 2 CVLs, anyone would have taken it! The fact that a lot that what we did lose was unnecessary is painful, but clearly the USN was willing to give up 5 or 6 minor units and 1,000 sailors to clear the IJN out. Had Halsey not taken the bait, we'd have had to deal with the "fleet in being." The OP makes a good point that if TF34 had engaged Center Force we might well have lost at least one major unit and quite possibly more casualties. Of course the Gun Club would have met their destiny and been proud of the inevitable result. One is in awe of the bravery and sacrifice of both the tin can sailors and the aircrews of the TAFFYs. Very sad that the survivors were left adrift for 3 days but not unprecedented, think Juneau, Indianapolis and others we don't know about because no one lived to tell the tale.
A lot of brave sailors lost their lives in this battle. The bravery of the DDs and DEs wow hard to describe, but should be remembered by all for their sacrifice. When the 3 of you get together, it makes for a very entertaining yet informative program. Thanks Seth, Bill, and Jon--great job once again!!!
This is not a great story of War,
It is a legend.
Not to be overly "post modernist" the IJN force had a pretty good idea that they were attacking a Buzz saw with a Log.. They were brave too, just on the wrong side (Japan's actions were as evil and Germany or USSR at this time )
Sailors getting Scalded in absolutely terrifying !! That has to be the worst injury ever !
Oh, yes! I didn’t think this episode was coming out until tomorrow for some reason. Great great great. Thanks as always, fellas. Can’t wait to listen
"Balls of solid rock," phooey! Ernie Evans had balls of stainless steel, man!
I am very impressed by the knowledge of many commenters. It is a rare thing when comments add a significant amount to the video.
The last episode caused me to do some more research around Halsey and this battle. I was sort of surprised to learn that even until his death Halsey vehemently denied that he had made any error at all in this battle.
It’s sad because his legacy was already secure. His leadership in the crucible of the Solomons fight had been critical to winning the campaign that broke the back of the Japanese military.
Had he been willing to admit he had errored it would if anything have enhanced his reputation. After all everyone is human and even the best of us make mistakes. To recognize what was already widely understood and admit to it wouldn’t have diminished his accomplishments in any way. But in his continued vehement refusals to admit error we are left wondering if this was the bluster of a MacArthur level ego that had to always be right or was his judgement really that poor?
I’m also surprised that Carney his Chief of Staff rose to CNO despite having been a part not only of this mess but also Halsey’s Typhoons. Considering that only Halsey’s reputation and the desire to avoid scandal prevented him from being relieved you would have thought that Carney’s career would have ended right there.
Another great show,,I always look forward every Tuesday evening, seeing I am in dumaguete negros orriental, Philippines 🇵🇭
We always tune in from Cavite, neighbor!
This is the best history series that I have encountered to date. Thank you so much for taking the time to produce this series. Its important to remember these events, and you are keeping them alive. As a result of this series, and particularly the Submarine events, I have found, purchased, and have been playing'Silent War 2.0', a boardgame that replays the whole WW2 Pacific Submarine Campaign and some of the famous patrols by Wahoo, Tang etc. It creates an understanding of the pressures and frustrations of the service including the issues with the Mk XIV Torpedoes.
I don’t remember the name of the book but I believe it was a USNI Press “Blue Jacket” series about the USS Johnston that I read over 20 years ago contained the following exchange(paraphrase best as I can remember) - After the Johnston’s Commissioning ceremony a lady who was one of the guests asked CDR Evans “How often does a little ship like this sink”. Evans replied “Usually just once.”
Enjoy your series - trying to “binge” watch to catch up!
When judging Kurita's decision to retire, it's important to remember the sacrifices that were made by the Southern and Northern forces. These sacrifices were made with one purpose in mind; to allow Kurita to make it into Leyte Gulf, and he failed to do so when he had the opportunity.
Of course, I am writing this while sitting comfortably in my easy chair with a glass of wine... and nobody is shooting at me!
Thanks for yet another outstanding episode Gents! I have to say that this one (parts 1 and 2) was my absolute favorite to date. (Whenever I hear the words "Taffy 3", "Battle Off Samar", or "USS Samuel B. Roberts" I get a lump in my throat.) Visit the monument to their heroism on Harbor Drive in Sand Diego.
If you're wondering what you should wear on camera for the next episode, you should consider printing up some T-shits (or golf shirts with collar for the Captain), they'd sell like hotcakes and the proceeds would compensate you guys a tiny bit for your time and effort invested in the series.
This battle gives me goosebumps every time. Destroyers and escorts were f***ing METAL 🤘🏻🤘🏻🤘🏻
Head out to Albany, NY and visit the USS Slater DE 766 then and Buffalo Naval Museum where USS The SULLIVAN'S resides.
Thank you Bill Seth and Jon.
On the lack of Japanese torpedo attacks, I have seen reports on how a destroyer division was in position early on to fire a full spread through the retreating CVE formation, but Admiral Kurita then recalled them because he was apparently concerned that they were using too much fuel running at flank (which was one of several indicators that he was looking to get as many of his ships back to base as possible and did not view his force as expendable even if that was required to destroy the landing support units).
Hmmm. If so, that’s a strange move. It’s a matter of minutes to fire torpedoes off once you’re already in position. Maybe even seconds. And how could he justify a trip across the ocean and back only to not do what he came for while he was actually there? Wouldn’t that be the REAL misuse of fuel?
@@matthewnewton8812 One of many strange moves by the Japanese in this action. Some commanders face an expectation of disaster with a response of "I've got nothing to lose" and actually pull off something incredible (Foch on the Marne, or in fact Evans at Samar), while others freeze up and become very tentative.
I've read this as well; the issue was that the Japs were already in an extreme fuel shortage era due to our cutting the oil lifeline. This moving the jap destroyers to the back illustrates the tactical repercussions in their mind.
It's been a while since I read Last Stand of the Tin Can sailors, but I seem to recall they did fire torpedoes late in the battle. When they recount here the Johnston taking a column of destroyers (led by I think the light cruiser Yahagi) under 5 inch gunfire, those destroyers were maneuvering for a torpedo shot. I also recall from the book US naval aircraft shooting at torpedoes as they closed in on the CVEs. The explanation given was that the destroyers fired from extreme range and bad angle due to Johston's gunnery.
I am not sure that Johnston's fire control radar was out at that point either. Hagen describes having to wrench it back into place after Johnston's mast comes down on the mk 37 director, but I believe it contined to work. Only Bob Hollenbaugh's turret 3 (I think) was on local control at this point in the fight.
So a column of destroyers had their T crossed by the smoking ruin of the Johnston, and were sent packing for friendlier waters.
Also the battle happened quickly and scattered Kuita's ships, he had to consider remote chances of friendly fire. Appreciated.
The courage these sailors exhibited was astounding. Kuritas decision will be the head scratcher of all Navel decisions from now on. Another great episode. Thanks,
Thank you so much for “skewering” those myths!
Thank you for explaining the role of aircraft. I have always wondered why in this battle aircraft wasn’t portrayed as decisive as it was in other engagements and why U.S. was considered such underdogs. Once again you guys have set the record straight.
Great stuff as usual. I have to wonder if the face saving IJN Commanders were loathe to admit being hit by (5" fire) what were sawed off runts compared to their mighty ships of war. There is no doubt that US DD, DE's pressed (their) attack and poked the IJN force in the eye. The unquestionably brave escort force didn't sit back and tell the carrier planes to "go get 'em boys". Amazing seamanship (& bravery) by all the US ships including the escort carriers & pilots.
Thanks Seth, Captain Toti and Jon....very good work. You're appreciated.
Whaddya mean "sawed-off runts?" Try Chihuahuas against Rottweilers, better!
@@seanbigay1042 it's old school argot, didn't mean for it to be taken as pejorative. Thanks.
I have waited “all week” for the second episode. Thank you! Yet again a new perspective. OK, the Japanese retreat made sense.
I love you guys. Thank You!
You guys are great. Not only in facts and History. But most of all the candor and casual conversations between telling the off the History. Thanks so much.
Big fan of the channel. The interaction of the three of you, and knowledge of the subject matter pulls the viewer in. Well done
Outstanding guys. You always take the battles to the highest insight possible.
A rock solid , ball swinging, discussion.
Well done!
I love what you and Bill are doing here. I 've been waiting for this episode as I have a personal attachment to the battle off Samar, my dad's 2nd brother was radio/radar officer aboard Adm. Stump's flagship USS Natoma Bay CVE -63.
Thanks!
All these episodes are most impressive, thanks😊😎👌👍👍👍!
Exceptional!, simply Exceptional! analysis and brilliant presentation!
Good evening gentlemen! Its time again to catch up with history.
You guys do a great job. Thank you!
Epic retelling! Thanks guys
Been waiting all week for this Torpedo Tuesday and this one comes with a costume change.
I never tire of hearing this story. I always have to get the ole converter out when you old salts start talking ranges in yards. Hard for me to visualize. I live on the plains of Texas and can see for miles but we measure distances with time, not yards. We say it's about 30 minutes away or something like that. But 36,000 yards would be like hitting the town 20 miles down the road. I can see the grain elevators of these towns from my roof. It is incredible to imagine battleships fighting.
Can't wait until next week.
What a great episode. Many thanks guys.
Excellent. Worth the wait. Thank you .... caught up in the story and missed the wardrobe change. 😀
Fantastic episode! I really enjoy when Captain Totti speaks about leadership, decision making, and the responsibility of command. Such a unique wrinkle.
A question on the historiography: It seemed like Japanese damage control records carried precedence over the reports of US gun crews in assessing who scored hits on the Japanese ships.
There was heavy traffic during my commute, I apologize if I’m mischaracterizing- just curious how you glean the truth from sets of records tainted by the chaos of incoming ordinance on the one hand and the tendency to over-claim on the other.
Thank you gentlemen
Here is what a destroyer man said about the DEs.
quote> Just at the end of dinner that evening, an officer at a nearby table rose and came over. I recognized him as the skipper of one of the destroyers with which we had operated off Okinawa. He was a full Commander, and his Naval Academy class ring was prominent. I would have risen, but he held me down with a hand on my shoulder.
"I don't want to intrude on your evening," he said, looking down the table, "and I'm glad to see you enjoying yourselves, because you sure as hell deserve to! I couldn't help hearing that you're from the Abercrombie. We operated with you a couple of times out west and there's something I want to say." He paused, and he had the whole table's attention.
"You DE sailors," he went on, "did one hell of a job out there. Don't you ever take a back seat to anyone as far as fighting that war is concerned." (That last sentence was spoken like an order.) "You went out there right out of civilian life, most of you right out of school or your parents' homes, with a minimum of hurried training, in little ships that could have been better armed and equipped, and you did damned near everything we did with bigger, better, faster ships and a hell of a lot more training - and you did it just as well, sometimes better. I'm proud as hell of you and I want you to know it!"
The next morning after quarters I called the whole crew back on the fantail and repeated that little speech as best I could, being especially careful to cite its source. No man who heard it at either first or second hand has forgotten it. I like to think that it was because it had the ring of sincerity - and truth.
Edward P. Stafford - Little Ship Big War
you guys are awesome. Keep up the great work!
There is something deeply satisfying and calming about listening to these 3.
solid content
IJN had already failed to go all in at Guadalcanal. It now shied away from Leyte.
The were presented with two "decisive battles", but did not recognize them.
I think the conclusion that Kurita had had enough and wasn't willing to throw away any more lives may be the real bottom line. I'll have to review Stille on Leyte again, but I hadn't remembered the theory that the "northern masts sighting" was fabricated after the fact.
@@UPNilesCyn Indeed-there is no actual record of the supposed transmission from Mikawa that Kurita claims he received. His staff never *denied* that it existed either-so it was either all agreed upon by them as the 'official' reason for turning back or it was lost.
Well done gentlemen, very enjoyable.
I did some research a few years ago about Kurita's reasons for pulling out and retreating from this battle. I came across a report on an interview with him years after the War. My recollection of this interview was the following: (1) His fleet was days late to the scene, so whatever havoc his fleet could have mustered would have been essentially a bit too late (5 days), and that the landings would still have continued. (2) He and many of the others thought that they had run into a much more powerful force than it was, partly due to misjudging the US ships, thinking that destroyers were cruises, destroyer escorts were destroyers, and that the carriers seen were fleet carriers. (3) That moving forward with the attack would have resulted in his fleet's total or near total destruction, and that he was concerned about the lives of his men, and that further forward movement would have resulted in many, many lives lost, and for little gain. I think Kurita's concerns were pretty much right on, especially with our knowledge on how the battle wagon fleet had been called upon from Halsey, and Hurita's fleet stuck around, the appearance of the US battleships would have annihilated his fleet. It also appears to me that the Japanese navy was much more concerned about their loses, both in ships and lives lost, than the Japanese army ever was. You can see this trend throughout the whole Pacific War.
Prior to Leyte, Captain Copeland became incensed when he was told that the single quintuple torpedo mount on the Sammy B was going to be removed and replaced with additional 40mm AA guns. He went to see the officer who was promulgating this order and told him that he flat out refused to have his torpedoes taken away. When asked why, he replied "One day my ship is going to be asked to do a man's job, and I need a man's tools to do it with."
And so, he kept his quintuple mount.
No Higher Honor...
he needed to keep five torpedoes to match the pair of brass b∆lls he had.
👍
@@ricardokowalski1579 His book, "The Spirit of the Sammy B", is well-worth reading.
Thank you , you guys make so much sense of this mythic battle. I tend to agree with Seth, the masts on the horizon are like the periscope sightings that keep you from picking up survivors.
Great video as always, guys.
I was born on the shores oh the Coral Sea, two weeks old at the time of the epic battle so I think fondly of America and the heroics of your servicemen. I have loved the story of Taffy 2 but have wondered if Halsey should have been court-martialed. Seems my suspicions were correct.
One of the battles I really looked forward to hearing their version of it. This is the standard I reviere for courage, bravery, and determination. I still get chills thinking about it. This battle is the very defition of courage in the face of overwhelming odds. No other battle brings tears to my eyes as this battle does.
Another excellent episode. "Bravery meter to11."
You guys are all terrific, authoritative, with lots of higher teir ideas, and extras.
I love Bill’s comment that the main thing is the main thing as well as his description of Halsey of playing checkers in a chess match. I have never understood how Halsey, the “Fighting Admiral,” received his fifth star while Spruance, the “Quiet Warrior,” did not.
Once again guys another good episode that I truly enjoyed. I learned something new outside the epic clash of the destroyers clashing with the IJN. All I can say is well done guys!!!!!
Excellent! Again.
Also, Fujinami captain ordered his crew not to shoot US survivor in water, and also saluted them for their bravery
Thanks so much for this episode and the series. I wonder if historians have discounted how much the Japanese were playing for a negotiated end to the war . Perhaps they were thinking that negotiations without capital Japanese ships in the mix, would be very difficult. And this battle could have ended with their side in a far reduced negotiating position had they pressed on. As we think of Lee after Gettysburg, perhaps; hoping for the best deal they could get.
Great show! @ 35:00 talking about the DE, 600 rounds in 35 minutes is around 8 rounds a gun per minute. Awesome to see your channel so popular! You would think Hollywood would make some dramas about these battles. They could even call it The Admirals and do both sides. I'd watch that! Maybe one of you guys can become screenwriters? If you do it include their families back home so it has more dramatic elements to it and a wider audience. WW2 dramas never get old.
Another most informative presentation. Thank you for your insight and dedication. I love to compare your presentations with my readings of Samuel Eliot Morrison's books. Great job!
Great show gentlemen.
I've been studying and trying to figure out Jurita's motivations and reasons for turning North for years. He really only publicly talked about the battle twice. Once in 1946 for the US SBS. That one was filmed and is easy to find. Kurita speaks clear reasonably fluent English. And once for a magazine interview shortly before his death.
I think the failure to understand his turn North stems from everybody believing what I suspect to be a lie in the SBS interview. When asked about Surigao Strait Kurita claims it was never the plan to use Surigao Strait as his intended exit. But if you look at it and work the numbers, it honestly had to be.
First up we have to understand one clear element of Kurita's personality. Kurita clearly did not believe in suicide missions if they could be avoided. He did not seem keen on suicide overall. Note he made no moves to end himself after the disgrace of Leyte Gulf. In spite of the shame and scorn. I once saw it speculated that Kurita was Japanese Catholic. I never found clear evidence of this, but it might make sense.
The analysis of Samar everyone fails to do is Kurita's fuel state. While the "cowards hiding in basements under Tokyo" (direct quote from the magazine interview) Might have intended Leyte to be a suicide mission, Kurita did not. And had budgeted his fuel to get home.
At the point Kurita turned North a few things had happened. He was losing Cruisers to aerial attack from never ending swarms of carrier aircraft. Much more aircraft then he could see carriers for. He had just received word of what had happened to Nishimura's Southern Force, and that Surigao Strait had a fleet of American heavies astride it. And he was nearing his point of no return fuel state. Remember all the turns in the Siboyan Sea? He'd eaten up a lot of fuel. And now he was concerned about another force coming down from the north. Which would cut him off from San Bernadino Strait.
He turned for San Bernadino Strait while it was still an option and while he still had fuel to reach friendly bases.
Thank you gentlemen.
Wow it's like deja vu all over again
I'm australian, love this show, i started watching late but caught up , it's tuesday nigh here in Brisbane 645 about an hour to go before part 3, bring it on