From my opinion the US military has focused a lot on overwhelming firepower, either in quantitative or qualitative ways. When opponents have less means usually overwhelm them, when opponents have higher numbers use precision and technological superiority to slow the opponent and get it to back down. That meant a whole system of procurement, logistics and planning was built around this, that means that there is a strong administrative pull to get back to conventional war planning as soon as possible. And this relates as well in the way that officers will be promoted through the ranks, a limited insurgency war might get you combat experience. But it's mostly a quagmire of mixed results, so I don't think that career minded officers would want to focus that much on that. Here lies a deep problem, the current procurement processes favour highly complex and expensive systems built in small batches in almost artisanal manner. This is done to allow for a very concentrated number of defense contractors to lower their capex and improve their profitability. Which means that the US military doctrine and procurement model are in a state of dissonance, because if the US tries a strategy of overwhelming fires on a near peer. It might find itself reliving the experience that British armed forces endured in both great ways. Where rationing ammo and supplies is a reality. I think also that the failure of the US military on counterinsurgency wars, has been mostly due to a lack of knowledge in terms of sociology and in social sciences in general by most political decision makers and military cadres. There are situations where much smaller powers have been more effective by using political and social actions that create wedges between the insurgents and their supporters.
Afghanistan was a failure because of lack of knowledge. US was employing cousins of Taliban while fighting the Taliban and refused to rehabilitate the Taliban.
The American Way of War can be defined by one phrase: Reconnaissance by fire. Also known as send as much metal down range as possible then move forward. Regardless of the cost in terms of logistics or civilian casualties. This is matched in the civil law enforcement arena: The US law enforcement officer empties his or her entire magazine into a wanted criminal while a European or British or Commonwealth law enforcement officer fires one or two shots if they fire at all.
I would not agree that the US Army focuses on the LSCO (Large Scale Combat Operations as the current phrasing goes) because of a focus on quantitative metrics, at least as far as culture goes. Rather the focus on the decisive battle, or the war of annihilation, is more so born out of a judging of priorities (again culturally). If you do not have the fundamental ability to win the big wars, you won't have to worry about the small wars (unless you lose and then are on the defensive). We wouldn't have had to worry about counter insurgency in Iraq if we didn't win the invasion, you have to win that first.
Another excellent video. Thank you. Thanks also for the suggested reading. I was unaware of the book by Brian Linn so I'm grateful you pointed that one out (I also like Cathal Nolan's book, The Allure of Battle, which is much broader in scope but is very interesting). Looking forward to part 2....
American way of war as described by a WW2 joke 1. When the Germans fly over the British and Americans duck. 2. When the British fly over the Germans duck. 3. When the US flies over everyone ducks. Also the American way of war as described in Vietnam “We had to destroy the village to save the village.”
Clausewitz says that war is policy by other means; that war starts with policy and ends with policy. Each war is a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Quantitate Analysis is best in planning for the middle part of a war. It is not a replacement for policy, and cannot dictate foreign and/or economic policy. The prep for big war has done a good job in staring down Putin in Ukraine, and Xi over Taiwan. But we need other tools if we are to establish nation building in a hostile atmosphere--such places as Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. We're not even bothering with Sudan. Also, our navy has kept the sea lanes open however, no amount of materiel will keep down the Houthis. Clausewitz also says that the way nations fight a war is based on the nature of that nation and the object of the war. Focusing entirely on materiel and systems can only create a policy of war for its own sake. Be we do often get things right for instance, using the US military to deliver humanitarian aid to Haiti. So we will never be fully prepared until we can set a global policy and define America's role in it.
It seems that one thing that's been even more problematic for the US military than counterinsurgency is peacekeeping. Per your categorization, peacekeeping is also one thing that's even more removed from a Big/Total war than is COIN. Comments?
I believe what you are stating a term I've heard called overmatch. we seek to overmatch the enemy. The good old USA does not have, at this time, unlimited amounts of money. We are trillions of dollars in debt. We have much more limited industrial capacity than we have had in the past. If we continue down this path how can we hope to overmatch the countries that we now perceive as threats?
Selling a war to the US population requires a moral justification. A National Interest argument won't do because that would be called "neo-imperialism" and get the anti-colonialists all riled up. This prevents the formulation of clear goals for military actions. Our adversaries can pursue their clear interests, which gives them an advantage. Then there's the "Pottery Barn" principle, where you go into the pottery barn, smash all the pottery, clean it up, and "make it better" after chasing off the proprietor to a comfortable retirement in Dubai. However, if you have a good reason to smash up the Barn, you can leave it that way. After 9-11, smacking the Taliban made sense but sticking around to build schools was a form of self-flagellation. Let Pakistan and India arm their Afghan proxies after leaving -- that'll be punishment enough. The Iraq war was a mistake based on faulty intelligence or outright lies, your choice.
I'm still angry about the Iraq war. The intelligence wasn't faulty, though. What happened was that people in the Bush admin cherry picked and read in it what they wanted to justify a war that was dictated by a weird theory of history rather than any genuine concern for WMD. What weird theory of history? Based on interviews with people involved, I believe that the infamous neo-cons in the Bush Admin believed more or less in Fukiyama's famous theory about the triumph of liberal democracy/economics but saw the Middle East as failing to progress. The theory was that if they gave a swift kick to Saddam's regime, that would break the log-jam and history finally would flow. In a way they were right, as one can argue that w/o the Iraq war there might not have been an Arab Spring. On the other hand, the Arab Spring didn't exactly go as I imagine the same theorists had hoped.
@@michaelshurkin613 I think the head of the CIA told President Bush that the intelligence on WMD in Iraq was a Slam Dunk -- but they were shooting hoops at the time, so maybe he was talking about something else. Personally, I thought the "Pinochet Option" made more sense for Iraq. At least that's what I would tell people who hated Pinochet. The reason I'm no longer a Democrat is because of the double-think you need to impose on yourself. For instance, Kamala Harris now says she is for Fracking. If you support fracking, you are supposed to believe her. If you are against fracking, you're supposed to think she is lying to the narrow-minded, science-denying rubes to get their votes and, once elected, will regulate it out of existence (the more realistic scenario -- safe water for children being important, too). Holding two mutually annihilating thoughts in your mind simultaneously can be tiring.
@@michaelshurkin613 Yes, it even tainted our cred when we warned Ukraine about the upcoming Russian attack. "Well, the intelligence was wrong about Iraq's WMD's..." "Ahem... No, we lied about the situation."
@@michaelshurkin613theory is great in a classroom but when you get 19 years old Marines and Infantrymen to implement it then things fall apart. Same happened in Vietnam when the theorists in Rand and the US Pentagon came up with the Domino theory under MacNamara and backed corrupt and morally bankrupt South Vietnamese Buddhist regimes. Every US policy advisor needs to read the Pentagon Papers and then The Quiet American by Graham Greene.
I sort of feel the american way of war is winning every battle with overwhelming force and then get surprised the civilians dont immediately adopt a western style democracy.
The US is slow to get involved, goes over the top and dominates, then is terrible about what do after the win and it ends up looking like a loss.
From my opinion the US military has focused a lot on overwhelming firepower, either in quantitative or qualitative ways. When opponents have less means usually overwhelm them, when opponents have higher numbers use precision and technological superiority to slow the opponent and get it to back down.
That meant a whole system of procurement, logistics and planning was built around this, that means that there is a strong administrative pull to get back to conventional war planning as soon as possible. And this relates as well in the way that officers will be promoted through the ranks, a limited insurgency war might get you combat experience. But it's mostly a quagmire of mixed results, so I don't think that career minded officers would want to focus that much on that.
Here lies a deep problem, the current procurement processes favour highly complex and expensive systems built in small batches in almost artisanal manner. This is done to allow for a very concentrated number of defense contractors to lower their capex and improve their profitability. Which means that the US military doctrine and procurement model are in a state of dissonance, because if the US tries a strategy of overwhelming fires on a near peer. It might find itself reliving the experience that British armed forces endured in both great ways. Where rationing ammo and supplies is a reality.
I think also that the failure of the US military on counterinsurgency wars, has been mostly due to a lack of knowledge in terms of sociology and in social sciences in general by most political decision makers and military cadres. There are situations where much smaller powers have been more effective by using political and social actions that create wedges between the insurgents and their supporters.
Afghanistan was a failure because of lack of knowledge. US was employing cousins of Taliban while fighting the Taliban and refused to rehabilitate the Taliban.
The American Way of War can be defined by one phrase: Reconnaissance by fire. Also known as send as much metal down range as possible then move forward. Regardless of the cost in terms of logistics or civilian casualties.
This is matched in the civil law enforcement arena: The US law enforcement officer empties his or her entire magazine into a wanted criminal while a European or British or Commonwealth law enforcement officer fires one or two shots if they fire at all.
I would not agree that the US Army focuses on the LSCO (Large Scale Combat Operations as the current phrasing goes) because of a focus on quantitative metrics, at least as far as culture goes. Rather the focus on the decisive battle, or the war of annihilation, is more so born out of a judging of priorities (again culturally). If you do not have the fundamental ability to win the big wars, you won't have to worry about the small wars (unless you lose and then are on the defensive). We wouldn't have had to worry about counter insurgency in Iraq if we didn't win the invasion, you have to win that first.
Excellent analysis. Points well made.
Another excellent video. Thank you. Thanks also for the suggested reading. I was unaware of the book by Brian Linn so I'm grateful you pointed that one out (I also like Cathal Nolan's book, The Allure of Battle, which is much broader in scope but is very interesting). Looking forward to part 2....
American way of war as described by a WW2 joke
1. When the Germans fly over the British and Americans duck.
2. When the British fly over the Germans duck.
3. When the US flies over everyone ducks.
Also the American way of war as described in Vietnam
“We had to destroy the village to save the village.”
Brilliant video and it's been a long while,since you made a military theory video.
Clausewitz says that war is policy by other means; that war starts with policy and ends with policy. Each war is a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Quantitate Analysis is best in planning for the middle part of a war. It is not a replacement for policy, and cannot dictate foreign and/or economic policy. The prep for big war has done a good job in staring down Putin in Ukraine, and Xi over Taiwan. But we need other tools if we are to establish nation building in a hostile atmosphere--such places as Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. We're not even bothering with Sudan. Also, our navy has kept the sea lanes open however, no amount of materiel will keep down the Houthis. Clausewitz also says that the way nations fight a war is based on the nature of that nation and the object of the war. Focusing entirely on materiel and systems can only create a policy of war for its own sake. Be we do often get things right for instance, using the US military to deliver humanitarian aid to Haiti. So we will never be fully prepared until we can set a global policy and define America's role in it.
It seems that one thing that's been even more problematic for the US military than counterinsurgency is peacekeeping. Per your categorization, peacekeeping is also one thing that's even more removed from a Big/Total war than is COIN. Comments?
The US is slow to get involved, goes over the top and dominates, then is terrible about what do after the win and it ends up looking like a loss.
I believe what you are stating a term I've heard called overmatch. we seek to overmatch the enemy. The good old USA does not have, at this time, unlimited amounts of money. We are trillions of dollars in debt. We have much more limited industrial capacity than we have had in the past. If we continue down this path how can we hope to overmatch the countries that we now perceive as threats?
Selling a war to the US population requires a moral justification. A National Interest argument won't do because that would be called "neo-imperialism" and get the anti-colonialists all riled up. This prevents the formulation of clear goals for military actions. Our adversaries can pursue their clear interests, which gives them an advantage.
Then there's the "Pottery Barn" principle, where you go into the pottery barn, smash all the pottery, clean it up, and "make it better" after chasing off the proprietor to a comfortable retirement in Dubai. However, if you have a good reason to smash up the Barn, you can leave it that way. After 9-11, smacking the Taliban made sense but sticking around to build schools was a form of self-flagellation. Let Pakistan and India arm their Afghan proxies after leaving -- that'll be punishment enough.
The Iraq war was a mistake based on faulty intelligence or outright lies, your choice.
I'm still angry about the Iraq war. The intelligence wasn't faulty, though. What happened was that people in the Bush admin cherry picked and read in it what they wanted to justify a war that was dictated by a weird theory of history rather than any genuine concern for WMD. What weird theory of history? Based on interviews with people involved, I believe that the infamous neo-cons in the Bush Admin believed more or less in Fukiyama's famous theory about the triumph of liberal democracy/economics but saw the Middle East as failing to progress. The theory was that if they gave a swift kick to Saddam's regime, that would break the log-jam and history finally would flow. In a way they were right, as one can argue that w/o the Iraq war there might not have been an Arab Spring. On the other hand, the Arab Spring didn't exactly go as I imagine the same theorists had hoped.
@@michaelshurkin613 I think the head of the CIA told President Bush that the intelligence on WMD in Iraq was a Slam Dunk -- but they were shooting hoops at the time, so maybe he was talking about something else. Personally, I thought the "Pinochet Option" made more sense for Iraq. At least that's what I would tell people who hated Pinochet.
The reason I'm no longer a Democrat is because of the double-think you need to impose on yourself. For instance, Kamala Harris now says she is for Fracking. If you support fracking, you are supposed to believe her. If you are against fracking, you're supposed to think she is lying to the narrow-minded, science-denying rubes to get their votes and, once elected, will regulate it out of existence (the more realistic scenario -- safe water for children being important, too). Holding two mutually annihilating thoughts in your mind simultaneously can be tiring.
@@michaelshurkin613 Yes, it even tainted our cred when we warned Ukraine about the upcoming Russian attack. "Well, the intelligence was wrong about Iraq's WMD's..."
"Ahem... No, we lied about the situation."
@@michaelshurkin613theory is great in a classroom but when you get 19 years old Marines and Infantrymen to implement it then things fall apart. Same happened in Vietnam when the theorists in Rand and the US Pentagon came up with the Domino theory under MacNamara and backed corrupt and morally bankrupt South Vietnamese Buddhist regimes. Every US policy advisor needs to read the Pentagon Papers and then The Quiet American by Graham Greene.
I sort of feel the american way of war is winning every battle with overwhelming force and then get surprised the civilians dont immediately adopt a western style democracy.
Who exactly are we judging the American military against?
Very interesting, but I struggle to listen through the lip smacking :(.