Really enjoyed this. I had 9 relatives in the 12th NJ Company F, one of whom died from injury charging the property on the morning of the 3rd William H H Stratton or Henry. Hope part 2 is coming soon!
Are there more vignettes that delve into Wright's dramatic penetration (off screen to the south) after the 30 minute time stamp? I've seen the solid video regarding the 1st Minnesota, but having a discussion about the 19th Maine will address the last few implications raised by the bravery of the 19th Maine! - - Five Notable Notes - - o Wright's units are lined up opposite The Angle in the Federal Line; this is only about 500 feet away from where Picket's Charge lands on Day 3 (with much worse results). o In a world of perfect knowledge, I too would have stopped at the same place that Posey's units stopped. North of The Angle, Meade's fishhook begins its curve, making reserve units much more numerous and available to reinforce any attacks north of The Angle. An "en echelon" is rarely intended to run the entire length of the defender's line. o Accordingly, we might examine this question: If (a more obedient) Mahone had marched forward along with Posey's last units, would he have noticed the Union's massive 1,800' gap south of The Angle, defended by just 2 disconnected Federal Units (1st Minnesota & 19th Maine)? o If Mahone's units had kept pace with Wright and Posey, would there have been a reasonable expectation for Mahone exploit this temporary gap by shifting behind, and then to the right of, Posey's line of march. Supporting Wright's advance by being immediately available to Wright's rear - - providing a rotation of rested units and refreshed ammunition - - may have been just enough for Wright and Mahone to have punched a hole in the Federal line just south of The Angle. o While Posey's units would technically be exposed on their left, by Posey "refusing" his left wing, Wright and Mahone might have had enough time to change the course of Gettysburg history on Day 2!
Holy Shitake Mushrooms! What I learned today by watching this video significantly changes my notions and ideas about how Lee's attack-in-echelon assault against Union dispositions south of Gettysburg. I am speechless and a bit confused. I was very aware of the back and forth fighting for control of the Bliss Farm. According to my understanding Posey had more or less lost effective control of his brigade during the protracted fighting around the Bliss Farm such that Posey wasn't able to advance his brigade across the Emmitsburg Road at the appointed time in accordance to the attack-in-echelon sequence of assaults that was gravitating north due to stubborn Union resistance at the Bliss Farm. As Wright's brigade crossed Emmitsburg Road and advanced further east he finds himself in a vacuous, yawning gap in the Union center just waiting to be exploited with a few brigades to very possibly turn the Union lines inside out. Posey's arrival on Wright's left was to have been this support that Wright needed to sew confusion and begin a possible domino effect from left to right along the rest of Hancock's II Corps consisting of Gibbon's disorganized division at that particular point in the battle and Hays' Division. While this is essentially accurate I now learn that Posey had indeed wrested control of the Bliss farm from Union skirmishers but wasn't able to fall into the echelon attack sequence due to the disorganized state of his brigade's 4 Mississippi regiments. It now appears to me that he felt hamstrung to cross Emmitsburg road due to the strong presence of Union skirmish troops to his left that could have enfiladed his left flank and possibly threaten his rear. This was a real possibility for two reasons: (1.) Mahone's insubordination and to my ABSOLUTE SHOCK his inexplicable deployment BEHIND Pender's Division on Seminary Ridge!?!? and (2.) the absence of skirmish troops in front of and to the north of Posey's line of advance that should have been provided by Mahone's brigade, the last of Anderson's 5 brigade division!!! I see that Pender had a well defined skirmish line along the front of his division but it wasn't advanced far enough to force Union skirmishers back which would have better enabled Posey to advance forward across Emmitsburg Road. Christmas on a Cracker what the hell was Mahone doing deployed BEHIND Pender? Didn't Anderson or any of Anderson's brigadier generals along Seminary Ridge not see this and raise concerns about this obvious screw up in deployment? I was always under the impression that Mahone's brigade was situated due north of Posey's brigade on Seminary Ridge, specifically in the McMillan Farm woodlot with two brigades of Pender's Division deployed closely behind Mahone and the other two Pender brigades deployed in "stacked" formation due north of Mahone's position north of the McMillan Farm due to lack of space with Rode's division deployed along Hagerstown Road extending inside of Gettysburg proper. I knew of Mahone's insubordination but always assumed he flat out refused to budge from his dispositions in the McMillan woodlot, NOT from BEHIND Pender's Division. Given his totally nuts position behind Pender's Division it stands to reason he would not be able to follow Posey's advance towards Cemetery Ridge/Hill. I have so many questions!!! I guess this only underscores a failure in leadership. Lee had charged Longstreet with making sure all their ducks were in a row for the coming assault but as we all know he more or less clocked out once the last of his I Corps brigades (Woffords) was released. UNBELIEVABLE! Either way I have always strongly felt that Mahone should have been quickly court-martialed and shot or hung for his outrageous insubordination when Posey and Wright's messengers were begging him to act and salvage the assault that was running off the rails that evening on July 2nd. That assault which had been progressing quite nicely in my estimation was the last chance for a Confederate victory that should have ended with a coordinated assault against both sides of the Cemetery Hill salient with Rodes and Early's division...effecting the dislodgement of Union forces on Cemetery Hill. By my count 11 Confederate brigades failed to advance due to the derailment. Just WOW! Thanks for this video. It has been a great help.
Thanks for the "comment/input". Not too much I can say here except for perhaps...check out GettysburgAnimated.com where you be able to gain access to the animation of the ENTIRE battlefield (Day 1 - 3) and you can follow the movement of exactly "how" Mahone got to the "back" of Mcmillian woods (behind Thomas) and how he got skirmishers inter-mixed with Thomas' as you noted. Also - check out James Woods' book "Gettysburg, July 2, The Ebb & Flow of Battle". It is a massive map book than documents the less-famous unit movments. Have fun. PS - Also forgot to mention...Thomas' brigade got there first. Again - see our APP and Woods' book. :-)
Thanks for the compliment and comment. Your point re: "Smith"/Smyth...I really tried here. I Asked about a dozen experts and got a 50/50 response. Frequently the proponents of the "eye" pronounciation cited the fact he was of Irish ancestory. Just so y'all know - I really do try. 🙂
@@gettysburg-fullyanimated There is always conflicting information on how to pronounce unique Civil War names. The name spelled with a "Y" comes from the Old English when "i" and "y" were used interchangeably. However, there are families in the UK that spell it with the "y" and differ on how to pronounce it. In other words, there is no standard way to pronounce it with the "y".
Really enjoyed this. I had 9 relatives in the 12th NJ Company F, one of whom died from injury charging the property on the morning of the 3rd William H H Stratton or Henry. Hope part 2 is coming soon!
This is really fantastic! I read the book on the 2nd day's fighting. This really makes things clear!
Are there more vignettes that delve into Wright's dramatic penetration (off screen to the south) after the 30 minute time stamp? I've seen the solid video regarding the 1st Minnesota, but having a discussion about the 19th Maine will address the last few implications raised by the bravery of the 19th Maine!
- - Five Notable Notes - -
o Wright's units are lined up opposite The Angle in the Federal Line; this is only about 500 feet away from where Picket's Charge lands on Day 3 (with much worse results).
o In a world of perfect knowledge, I too would have stopped at the same place that Posey's units stopped. North of The Angle, Meade's fishhook begins its curve, making reserve units much more numerous and available to reinforce any attacks north of The Angle. An "en echelon" is rarely intended to run the entire length of the defender's line.
o Accordingly, we might examine this question: If (a more obedient) Mahone had marched forward along with Posey's last units, would he have noticed the Union's massive 1,800' gap south of The Angle, defended by just 2 disconnected Federal Units (1st Minnesota & 19th Maine)?
o If Mahone's units had kept pace with Wright and Posey, would there have been a reasonable expectation for Mahone exploit this temporary gap by shifting behind, and then to the right of, Posey's line of march. Supporting Wright's advance by being immediately available to Wright's rear - - providing a rotation of rested units and refreshed ammunition - - may have been just enough for Wright and Mahone to have punched a hole in the Federal line just south of The Angle.
o While Posey's units would technically be exposed on their left, by Posey "refusing" his left wing, Wright and Mahone might have had enough time to change the course of Gettysburg history on Day 2!
More vignettes are coming, we promise. Wright's brigade advance on Day 2 to "beyond Day 3's High Water Mark" will be one of them.
Holy Shitake Mushrooms! What I learned today by watching this video significantly changes my notions and ideas about how Lee's attack-in-echelon assault against Union dispositions south of Gettysburg. I am speechless and a bit confused. I was very aware of the back and forth fighting for control of the Bliss Farm. According to my understanding Posey had more or less lost effective control of his brigade during the protracted fighting around the Bliss Farm such that Posey wasn't able to advance his brigade across the Emmitsburg Road at the appointed time in accordance to the attack-in-echelon sequence of assaults that was gravitating north due to stubborn Union resistance at the Bliss Farm. As Wright's brigade crossed Emmitsburg Road and advanced further east he finds himself in a vacuous, yawning gap in the Union center just waiting to be exploited with a few brigades to very possibly turn the Union lines inside out. Posey's arrival on Wright's left was to have been this support that Wright needed to sew confusion and begin a possible domino effect from left to right along the rest of Hancock's II Corps consisting of Gibbon's disorganized division at that particular point in the battle and Hays' Division. While this is essentially accurate I now learn that Posey had indeed wrested control of the Bliss farm from Union skirmishers but wasn't able to fall into the echelon attack sequence due to the disorganized state of his brigade's 4 Mississippi regiments. It now appears to me that he felt hamstrung to cross Emmitsburg road due to the strong presence of Union skirmish troops to his left that could have enfiladed his left flank and possibly threaten his rear. This was a real possibility for two reasons: (1.) Mahone's insubordination and to my ABSOLUTE SHOCK his inexplicable deployment BEHIND Pender's Division on Seminary Ridge!?!? and (2.) the absence of skirmish troops in front of and to the north of Posey's line of advance that should have been provided by Mahone's brigade, the last of Anderson's 5 brigade division!!! I see that Pender had a well defined skirmish line along the front of his division but it wasn't advanced far enough to force Union skirmishers back which would have better enabled Posey to advance forward across Emmitsburg Road. Christmas on a Cracker what the hell was Mahone doing deployed BEHIND Pender? Didn't Anderson or any of Anderson's brigadier generals along Seminary Ridge not see this and raise concerns about this obvious screw up in deployment? I was always under the impression that Mahone's brigade was situated due north of Posey's brigade on Seminary Ridge, specifically in the McMillan Farm woodlot with two brigades of Pender's Division deployed closely behind Mahone and the other two Pender brigades deployed in "stacked" formation due north of Mahone's position north of the McMillan Farm due to lack of space with Rode's division deployed along Hagerstown Road extending inside of Gettysburg proper. I knew of Mahone's insubordination but always assumed he flat out refused to budge from his dispositions in the McMillan woodlot, NOT from BEHIND Pender's Division. Given his totally nuts position behind Pender's Division it stands to reason he would not be able to follow Posey's advance towards Cemetery Ridge/Hill. I have so many questions!!! I guess this only underscores a failure in leadership. Lee had charged Longstreet with making sure all their ducks were in a row for the coming assault but as we all know he more or less clocked out once the last of his I Corps brigades (Woffords) was released. UNBELIEVABLE! Either way I have always strongly felt that Mahone should have been quickly court-martialed and shot or hung for his outrageous insubordination when Posey and Wright's messengers were begging him to act and salvage the assault that was running off the rails that evening on July 2nd. That assault which had been progressing quite nicely in my estimation was the last chance for a Confederate victory that should have ended with a coordinated assault against both sides of the Cemetery Hill salient with Rodes and Early's division...effecting the dislodgement of Union forces on Cemetery Hill. By my count 11 Confederate brigades failed to advance due to the derailment. Just WOW! Thanks for this video. It has been a great help.
Thanks for the "comment/input". Not too much I can say here except for perhaps...check out GettysburgAnimated.com where you be able to gain access to the animation of the ENTIRE battlefield (Day 1 - 3) and you can follow the movement of exactly "how" Mahone got to the "back" of Mcmillian woods (behind Thomas) and how he got skirmishers inter-mixed with Thomas' as you noted. Also - check out James Woods' book "Gettysburg, July 2, The Ebb & Flow of Battle". It is a massive map book than documents the less-famous unit movments. Have fun. PS - Also forgot to mention...Thomas' brigade got there first. Again - see our APP and Woods' book. :-)
This was excellent. Thanks for doing it. One minor correction, Colonel Thomas Smyth's last name is pronounced "Smith."
Thanks for the compliment and comment. Your point re: "Smith"/Smyth...I really tried here. I Asked about a dozen experts and got a 50/50 response. Frequently the proponents of the "eye" pronounciation cited the fact he was of Irish ancestory. Just so y'all know - I really do try. 🙂
@@gettysburg-fullyanimated There is always conflicting information on how to pronounce unique Civil War names. The name spelled with a "Y" comes from the Old English when "i" and "y" were used interchangeably. However, there are families in the UK that spell it with the "y" and differ on how to pronounce it. In other words, there is no standard way to pronounce it with the "y".
I believe it’s Sm”eye”th. Thus the Y
poor colonel Harris. Seems like Band of Brothers and Dick Winters having to put up with a West Point lieutenant.