You should think of the good valued at 1 includes all possible side payments. (This was implicitly not the case in the issue indivisibility lecture. I didn't make it explicit because it adds more complication to the model without any additional benefits...unless someone makes the connection that you did.) That being the case, no credible peaceful settlements exist.
This is IR 101 and is already way harder to understand than anything I was taught at my faculty. Not because it is so complicated but because to my professor it is more important, that we memorize books than actually learning and understanding anything.
Right. We want to know when war is avoidable, i.e. when both states would be willing to bargain. So we started by assuming B would want to bargain and checked when A would want to bargain as well. Then we verified that B would actually want to bargain under those same conditions that A would want to bargain. Put differently, we showed y was true by assuming x was true. Then we showed that x is true when y is true.
IRAQ's preemptive attack on IRAN is a good example that it led to no positive points for both sides after 8 years of fighting. ( Saddam Hussein couldn't finally reach his goal of starting a war however IRAN suffered the greatest losses of soldiers and civilians But not anything from its lands )
On the diagram shown from 6:45 to 8:52, I think-I guess-it would be easier to see what is going on if the blue delta bars were drawn based not at p.a but rather at (p.a - c.a) and (p.a + c.b), respectively, so as to indicate that the end point of the bargaining range is shifted inward. Going from (p.a - c.a) to (p.a + δ.a - c.a), or to ((p.a - c.a) + δ.a) if you prefer, will be relating an already understood notion to the new notion. Relating p.a to (p.a + δ.a) to (p.a + δ.a - c.a) does not do that-or at least, it didn't do it for me. I still understood it just fine, but I think the other way of diagramming would be more intuitive and helpful.
Earlier in the algebraic explanation, it's said if war costs you, then there will be a rational reason to bargain. While in this scenario, preemptive war can cover for that cost. So I think this is quite intuitive.
At 3:23, the slide says A's expected utility for preempting is Pa - Ca + Da, but doesn't this only hold, if B wants to bargain? If both want to preempt, there should be no first strike advantages, so A's expected utility from this scenario should be only Pa - Ca; Da only comes in play when B does not want to fight.
You should think of the good valued at 1 includes all possible side payments. (This was implicitly not the case in the issue indivisibility lecture. I didn't make it explicit because it adds more complication to the model without any additional benefits...unless someone makes the connection that you did.) That being the case, no credible peaceful settlements exist.
This is IR 101 and is already way harder to understand than anything I was taught at my faculty. Not because it is so complicated but because to my professor it is more important, that we memorize books than actually learning and understanding anything.
Right. We want to know when war is avoidable, i.e. when both states would be willing to bargain. So we started by assuming B would want to bargain and checked when A would want to bargain as well. Then we verified that B would actually want to bargain under those same conditions that A would want to bargain.
Put differently, we showed y was true by assuming x was true. Then we showed that x is true when y is true.
IRAQ's preemptive attack on IRAN is a good example that it led to no positive points for both sides after 8 years of fighting. ( Saddam Hussein couldn't finally reach his goal of starting a war however IRAN suffered the greatest losses of soldiers and civilians But not anything from its lands )
On the diagram shown from 6:45 to 8:52, I think-I guess-it would be easier to see what is going on if the blue delta bars were drawn based not at p.a but rather at (p.a - c.a) and (p.a + c.b), respectively, so as to indicate that the end point of the bargaining range is shifted inward.
Going from (p.a - c.a) to (p.a + δ.a - c.a), or to ((p.a - c.a) + δ.a) if you prefer, will be relating an already understood notion to the new notion. Relating p.a to (p.a + δ.a) to (p.a + δ.a - c.a) does not do that-or at least, it didn't do it for me. I still understood it just fine, but I think the other way of diagramming would be more intuitive and helpful.
Earlier in the algebraic explanation, it's said if war costs you, then there will be a rational reason to bargain. While in this scenario, preemptive war can cover for that cost. So I think this is quite intuitive.
Preemptive war? More like "More knowledge scored!" Thanks for another great video.
At 3:23, the slide says A's expected utility for preempting is Pa - Ca + Da, but doesn't this only hold, if B wants to bargain? If both want to preempt, there should be no first strike advantages, so A's expected utility from this scenario should be only Pa - Ca; Da only comes in play when B does not want to fight.
At 3:20 William says that it's assumed that B will bargain.
Great videos !! Thank you :-)