Chalmers argues that philosophical zombies are possible because we can conceive of them. Does the fact that something is conceivable (without leading to a contradiction) mean it's possible?
To me this argument always felt like the conclusion is contained in the premise. But I'm just not smart enough elaborate. It smells like the ontological argument of St. Anselm.
@@gergelymagyarosi9285 Yeah, it’s circular reasoning. “Assume there’s beings that behave (down to the molecular level) like us but still have no consciousness. [Rest of the argument]” means that in that hypothetical scenario, we’re not in a physicalist world. We therefore can’t conclude this part, as it’s part of the premise. If you start with “Assume we’re in a physicalist world”, then a being like that can’t exist. Either it is like us down to the molecular level (which gives it a consciousness because us having our kind of molecular makeup gives us one) or it’s not like us down to the molecular level.
@@flying-sheep It's not really circular, it's scientific logic that's instantly performable. It has the hypothesis 'If consciousness is physical then zombies are unimaginable', then an experiment where the person attempts to imagine a zombie and then a result, they are able to imagine a zombie, then a conclusion that consciousness is not physical. It's just that since the experiment is performed within the imagination by using the factual limits of imagination, that a contradictory object cannot be realised, it is expected to be intuitively understood.
@@voxsvoxs4261 Dreaming up illogical assertions is something even the dumbest computer can do. Nobody will argue that they therefore have a non-physical component (electrical charge is physical). Maybe we’ll one day figure out what parts are necessary to form consciousness and can therefore directly measure it in a creature. Then we’d know that a zombie world wouldn’t actually be possible. We could still imagine it no problem, because our thinking can handle logical contradictions. /edit: This quote from the Wikipedia article is exactly what I said: “Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky saw the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.”
That logic is circular: the conclusion is effectively used as a premise, since non-conscious zombies could only be possible if consciousness is not physical. IOW, if consciousness is physical, then physically identical "duplicates" would have it. After all, we can just as easily conceive of physically identical "duplicates" that are conscious, and use the same logic to conclude that consciousness must be physical.
I think you're on to something. I don't necessarily buy the argument. However, I wouldn't say it's circular. I agree that that non-phenomenally-conscious zombies are only possible if consciousness is not physical. But that doesn't mean it's circular. Any deductively valid argument will have premises that are true only if the conclusion is true. But that doesn't mean all deductively valid arguments are circular. However, in your defense I think it can be tricky to properly define "circular reasoning." Determining when a premise "assumes the conclusion is true" vs. when it "entails (but does not assume) the conclusion is true" is actually more complicated than most people think. To your second point, I don't think the argument can be used in the other direction. Assuming there are physically identical duplicates that are phenomenally conscious would not show that consciousness is physical. A physical duplicate without consciousness should show that the physical stuff is not necessary for the consciousness. But a physical duplicate with consciousness does not should that non-physical stuff is not necessary for consciousness. By analogy, if I can show you that there are rectangles that are not squares, then I've shown that being a being a square is not necessary for being a rectangle. But if you show me that there are rectangles that are squares, that doesn't mean you've shown that being a square is necessary for being a rectangle. That being said, I think you can simply deny the premise. You can say, although it might seem like it's possible to have a physical duplicate without phenomenal consciousness, it's actually impossible. I don't think simply conceiving of a zombie is sufficient to ground the metaphysical possibility of it.
You're absolutely right. It seems to me like philosophers are too concerned with the semantics of 'logical arguments' to see the wood for the trees. Chalmers notion wouldn't last 5 minutes in a proper scientific debate.
You are wrong. The "hidden" assumption is NOT that consciousness is not physical. Let me rephrase the argument: (0) The assumption is that the concept of consciousness is not derivable from physical concepts. (1) The fact that the concept of consciousness is not derivable from physical concepts makes the concept of zombies conceivable (non-contradictory). (2) If the concept of zombies is non-contradictory, then the concept of a zombie-world (the "copy" of our world modulo consciousness) is also non-contradictory. (3) If the concept of a zombie-world is not contradictory, and there is no other blocking factor, then the zombie-world can be a possible world. (4) If the zombie-world can be a possible world, then consciousness is not physical and physicalism is false. (5) Consciousness is not physical and physicalism is false. So the argument is not circular. If you would like to deny the conclusion, you can either deny (0) by saying that the concept of consciousness is derivable from physical terms - this is almost surely false. (E.g, eliminativism, behaviorism, functionalism etc.) or (3) You must provide a "blocking factor" that explains why such a world is not possible. You can say that "because consciousness IS physical, that's why", but note that it is just a brute force assumption the only motivation of which is to save the materialism dogma (that everything must be physical). And notice that if you would like to explain why a zombie-world is not possible you probably have to turn to concepts that are beyond physics or force consciousness under the territory of physics as a fundemental fact. Both ways go against the current shape of physicalism. Finally, note that the assumptions of the zombie-argument are lightweight and almost trivial: 1st person experience exists and it cannot be described by the 3rd person terminology of physics. But if you would like to deny the conclusion you have to resort to almost dumb (0) or problematic assumptions (3).
@@npc-aix-84 Or I could say that (3) consciousness MAY OR MAY NOT BE physical, since you denied using the assumption that consciousness is not physical. Then the conclusion becomes "consciousness may or may not be physical". Note that this only violates your assumption (0) if it's equivalent to the assumption you deny.
This video on philosophical zombies reminded me of why A.I. hasn't risen up to our level. My reasoning here is how that Ted and Zed comparison felt. Ted was responding to reality and Zed responded to a simulation. Is Zed's behavior any different from a scripted response?
Your comment is related to a debate about whether consciousness is anything more than functioning in a certain way. AI can function in really complex ways that might make it appear as if it is conscious. But is it conscious? Some philosophers argue that if you have sufficiently complex cognition and function, then you have consciousness. Others argue (similar to this Zombie argument) that consciousness is not reducible to merely functioning in a particular way.
I've always found P-zombies confusing. First, I'm sympathetic to the objection that their "conceivability" might be illusory. In other words, we might think that we can imagine beings like zombies, but actually we can't, and so functionalists still maintain that if we could TRULY imagine a being with a physical brain that can generate all of our behaviours, then that structure would have to be conscious as well. But, to me, that seems irrelevant. At least to the "hard problem" of consciousness. Even IF zombies were impossible - in other words, consciousness was firmly rooted in physical processes and human-brain-like functions - it still does not explain why or how a system like that could generate first-person experience. Again, in more other words, it seems to me that I don't *have to* conceive of a being like a P-zombie in the first place. It's enough for me to simply note that functions and physical processes are just fundamentally different sorts of thing than first-person consciousness, and so the one can't lead to the other for that reason. What is meant by "fundamentally different" is obviously where the meat is, but it definitely not "two different descriptions of what could be the same thing". The feeling of pain itself and a description of a brain of someone in pain are not two different (and potentially equivalent) descriptions. There is - in my view - a very basic different in ontology there.
Yeah. I have varying opinions about this depending on the day of the week. But it seems unfair to say they're not *really* conceivable. I'm pretty sure I can conceive of them. I'm more skeptical of the claim that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. Perhaps conceivability entails logical possibility (or at least no conceptual contradictions). But plausibly there are some a posteriori necessary truths (e.g. water = H2O) that, before discovering them, are not conceptually impossible. That doesn't mean they're metaphysically possible. I think you're right that zombies don't do much to *solve* the hard problem of consciousness. If anything, they serve to illustrate the problem. I'm sympathetic (and I think Chalmers is too) to the idea that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality (almost a kind of panpsychism) but that it's still not physical even if it were necessarily contingent on the physical.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I've never understood the big hangup about conceivability/possibility. Either we have the cognitive capacity to (fallibly) recognize possibility or we don't. Leave conceivability out of it. Are modal truths something we can grasp to a reasonable degree? Unless we're ready to be a modal skeptics, the answer has to be yes.
I remember once asking my grandpa if my friends are conscious or not whilst he was fixing something important. It feels amazing getting this video recommended now after so many years and realizing that I asked this deep philosophical question as a kid out of curiosity.
I used this as a term recently, calling somebody a philosophical zombie as a throwaway insult, totally unconscious of the fact that it's a concept in philosophy until someone asked if it was a known term and someone else explained that it is. So I'm probably a philosophical zombie myself, without knowing it. But I do believe many people are zombies, and this, based primarily on a particularly vivid nightmare I had in 2019
If two entities share exactly the same physical components down to the molecular level, then they share the same consciousness. Zombies, as defined by Chalmers, are not possible.
@@zak2659just as Chalmers is. In order for philosophical zombies to be plausible we have to assume that consciousness is not produced by physical processes, and that's exactly what we are trying to find. That's why this thought experiment is complete useless.
"zombies are possible because... uh... that's the premise that lets me make the conclusion I want." It's like cavemen saying "I can imagine an apply falling up instead of down, and I can't think of any contradiction to that, so gravity is nonphysical"
Except that there is a contradiction. You can think that apples fall 'up' but be but be proven wrong because it can be tested. Drop an apple, and it falls down, clear evidence right there. There's no way you will still logically keep your opinion. But if the premise is true that consciousness is subjective, then there's no way to test that zombies exist because to an outsider, they appear to act like normal people. The only way to come up with a clear contradiction to this whole argument is to get inside the 'zombie's head' and 'feel' its perspective which is of course impossible. TLDR, the argument presents that zombies *could* exist if consciousness isn't physical, but there's no real way to test that, and therefore no way to prove the argument right or wrong. At the end of the day it is really just a frilly complicated thought to play around with.
I feel like I must be missing context or definitions of some sort. Just because you can think up something doesn't make it possible. I can imagine being able to breathe fire but that doesn't make it possible.
There are different notions of "possible" we can talk about. We might talk about what's "physically possible" (sometimes called "nomologically possible") which just means possible given our laws of physics. So it's not physically possible for me to breath fire given my biology. And conceiving of my breathing fire does not change that. However, there's also the notion of "logical possibility." Something is logically possible just in case it doesn't involve any contradiction. Some people think that if I can coherently conceive of something, then it's logically possible. So since I can conceive of myself having the ability to breath fire, it's logically possible. Of course, my biology or the laws of nature would have to be different in that case. But it's not like it's logically impossible for me to do it. So when some argue that conceivability entails possibility, they mean it entails logical possibility. So if zombies are *logically* possible, then it's logically possible to have our exact physical structure but no "what it's like feeling" of consciousness. And if it's logically possible to have our exact physical structure without consciousness, then consciousness must not necessarily be the physical structure.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I suspect I lack the nomenclature to follow what you just said. Arguing that a mind exists outside a physical universe because of something a mind can do seems like circular reasoning to me.
I think this argument is rather poor, because it's only in the conceptual infinite that someone is ruling it possible, but consciousness being physical is also possible in this realm. Which one has more evidence? Consciousness being physical. Done.
I think the biggest issue with this argument / thought experiment is Claim 1: "zombies are possible". This is the sketchiest, flimsiest part of the whole thing, IMO. It seems silly to say "ok, but are zombies POSSIBLE -- in ANY universe?" when the entire point of the argument is to ground consciousness IN OUR universe. It's comparing apples to oranges, it doesn't work. And this is coming from someone who believes that consciousness is NOT just a code in our brains, and is "something more".
Good questions. “What’s the difference?” and “How can you tell?” have different answers. The difference is *supposedly* that Ted “feels” things consciously and Zed doesn’t. Zed is sort of like a biological robot-indistinguishable from you or I but “inside” there’s no felt experience. So that means the answer to “How can you tell?” is “You can’t.” But that’s actually part of the point. If you can’t tell whether someone is a p-zombie no matter what physical metric you check, that suggests phenomenal consciousness is not a physical thing (according to the argument).
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I guess even philisophical arguments should be based on science, the reality that is observed. Like, let's take a pain for ex. If we consider physical metric like nerves and cells and biomolecules etc. - if zombie has this then he definitely feels the pain. Even if he would tell the opposite. We know he should experience pain. On the other side if zombie states that he experience pain, but he lacks certain material components, then he's lying. More over he's not a zombie (as defined) - he's just some different creature.
Great video on a subject I've been long interested in. One question I've stewed over is how would a person know if they were interacting with a Philosophical Zombie? In other words, if I were having a conversation with a being who was identical to a normal human in every way except they don't experience consciousness, would there be any way to really tell? What are the possibilities of some kind of test? A modified Turning Test, perhaps? Thanks again for a great video!
It seems like there couldn’t be any test even in principle given the personal/subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness. And zombies are supposed to be functionally equivalent to people with qualia so from the outside they’d seem identical.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff Thanks for the reply. However, I'm not so sure there wouldn't be a way to subtly distinguish between a PZ and a normal human being. It seems there was even a paper written on the subject I once came across - which I can't find now- but it seemed to suggest there would be differences in descriptive phraseologies used, other behaviors which would be different, etc. Anyway, it's food for thought. Thanks!
@@Knockface If the imagined zombie was possible that suggests human consciousness serves no purpose. I mean...it might not, but it would seem this thought experiment if not fatally flawed in some way proves consciousness doesn't serve a functional purpose...just a decoration for personal pleasure. And why would life evolve something that remarkable without it serving some purpose? While specific reflex reactions may not depend on consciousness i.e. we act before we are conscious of action, I think iterative thinking does depend on consciousness and that would mean zombies would not be able to benefit from 'thinking through' things and coming up with different ways of doing things.
@@rizdekd3912 A Well a reasoned response, & definitely gives me some things to consider. I would tend to agree with your conclusion that "zombies" would not benefit from "thinking things through" as you put it, which would be a certain way to distinguish them from a conscious entity. Personally, I keep coming back to using AI as a good example of the zombie conundrum -especially as it further advances and becomes almost indistinguishable in its interactions with human users. At present, it certainly can seem & act conscious (i.e. ChatGPT, et al) but our basic instincts, for now, alert us that we are not interacting with a sentient being - only a mirage. Whether our senses will be able to continue to do this as AI further advances is an open question. This IMHO is the true heart of the argument of dualism, which the zombie thought experiment trys to address.
Yes, but if Chalmers is wrong, it teaches us nothing about consciousness. Chalmers' first premise relies on whether zombies are conceivable. To my mind, it is NOT conceivable that an exact duplicate of a human being can operate without a conscious element. This would be like saying that you can imagine a five sided triangle. We can concieve of the IDEA of trying to imagine a five sided triangle, but can't actually realise a five sided triangle in our minds. Similarly, we can conceive of the IDEA of a body without consciousness but we can't actually realise a body without consciousness in our minds. We can conceive of the IDEA but not necessarily the thing itself. Therefore, just like the impossibilty of the five sided triangle, the zombie is not possible either. Otherwise, if Chalmers' argument is to be given credence, you'd have to believe that the five sided triangle is also possible, which is clearly nonsense.
This problem seem to appear everywhere in Philosophy: Concrete modal realism argues that it is impossible that no concrete objects exist; for since worlds are concrete, there is at least one concrete object-the world itself-at each world. OR A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical being that behaves indistinguishably from a normal human but lacks conscious experiences, thoughts, and beliefs. If someone claims, "I am a philosophical zombie," then, for this claim to be logically coherent, the speaker must believe their statement to be true. However, the concept of a philosophical zombie is one that lacks beliefs, since beliefs are a product of conscious experience. Therefore, if the person who states "I am a philosophical zombie" truly was a philosophical zombie, they wouldn't hold any beliefs, including the belief that they are a philosophical zombie. Thus, the act of making this claim contradicts itself: if the claim were true, the speaker couldn't believe it to be true and, therefore, couldn't logically or coherently make the claim in the first place. It's hard to get a grip on the main issue here, but it seems to me like there is a switch in Reality that prevents someone to make a certain conclusion...
I am not smart enough to imagine a Ted and Zed being equal molecule by molecule and even so they are different. One of them has conscience and the other has not. I do not feel Zed as conceivable and possible.
Sorry, but (1) does contain a contradiction. If you want precise physical matches, but different behaviours, that's a contradiction when discussing macroscopic objects. You can have P-zombies that look similar, and pass all current tests, but that's not the precise physical matches you assume in (2). And at that point it's a Chinese Room and Knowability problem. There is no wriggle room here.
Premise 1 doesn't say you could have precise physical matches but different behaviors. It says you could have precise physical matches and precise behavioral matches, but lack the "what it's like" feeling of being conscious. The difference between a normal human and a zombie is indistinguishable from the outside--both at the micro and macro level. Now, you might think that's still impossible. And it might be. So the defender of this argument needs to support the claim that it's possible. But it's not a contradiction to say it's possible.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff but isn't that definition alredy implying that consciousness is not phisical? Stating that p-zombies have the same phisical structure but no qualia implies that the structure and the qualia are unrelated, but the truth is we do not know. Because we leave in a deterministic universe, stating that the same phisical arrangement can bring two different outcomes: qualia and not qualia, is contradictory, therefore either p-zombies, for as they are defined, are impossible, but there actually is some difference in the brain structure that can make consciousness arise, or just as stated in the video, imply that consciousness is not phisical and exists something like a "soul" in a non phisical space, and personally i consider the first one much more reasonable, instead of assuming the existence of something that is effectivly unprovable
a sole zombie is a sole that's normal sole exactly the same as a normal sole but has no Consciousness 1, sole zombie are possible. 2, if sole zombie are then consciousness is not metaphysical
Essentially, P zombies are only possible in the case that consciousness isn't physical. They are exact physical duplicates, so in the case where physicalism is true all resultant properties should also be the same. We are carrying out an experiment without carrying it out, then assuming an outcome. First, you'd need to be able to replicate someone's physiology down to the quantum level, then you'd have to be able to tell the difference between a P zombie and a person with a consciousness. Then with your conclusion you could make a determination. This argument skips all that rubbish and asserts in the first premise that the p zombie is possible, which is only true if the experiment would be carried out and shown in their favor. Sure, I can "imagine" the experiment going in the non-physicalist's favor but that doesn't mean it is literally possible, it means It is possible that physicalism is wrong but to know, we'd actually have to carry out the experiment to see what the ACTUAL truth would be. But no, physicalism isn't true or false based on my ability to imagine it is true or false. Possible in the sense that I can imagine an outcome, or another is not the same as possible showing there are no literal contradictions in reality preventing my ideas from being true.
I could think a 5-mile-high Eiffel Tower is possible if I know nothing about engineering, architecture or metallurgy. It proves nothing, only my lack of knowledge. Saying we can conceive of them and therefore they are possible is incredibly dumb.
But simply saying there's no contradiction is a mere assertion and meaningless. Just because one can conceive of something doesn't make it possible. And simply sitting back and saying someone else can't find the contradiction doesn't mean there isn't one and even if there isn't a contradiction, doesn't mean the made up world is possible. How would you know that once you've completely recreated a human right down to the quantum level that consciousness wouldn't just...be there? Simply because you SAID it wasn't there? Since we don't what or how consciousness, no one can know what will or won't be there. Positing a zombie that can for absolutely everything be just like a human may be positing something that may not be possible...a physical being that simulates completely what a human does and can do with its consciousness. This makes it sound like the human consciousness does nothing. Is that the point? So what if Ted can 'picture' the beautiful painting....does it lead to any different behavior? Does that mean consciousness is like the proverbial 'teats on a boar hog'...there but useless for anything but a chuckle?
Elaborate no true Scotsman fallacy. Impossible and improbable are different. Consciousness is physical in the sense that a physical body is needed but how we conceive of the ideas that form from physical activity in our minds in our efforts to define consciousness are always beyond our ability to express coherently since if we were to attain perfect understanding of consciousness AND also gain perfect ability to express this understanding, we would immediately find ourselves in the position of knowing all C and all E which generates instantaneously a new set C and new set E that now includes our perfect understanding of consciousness and expression. In other words, once we reached the point of knowing every thing about consciousness then we would need to now come to know what this new understanding means with respect to our consciousness...what does it mean to our consciousness that we perfectly understand consciousness? We are forever covered by a veil of our own process of knowing and integrating new understanding to form the basis for all that we know. tldr: we can never outrun our own learning; there is not some metaphysical limit set on the amount of knowledge and understanding of consciousness...as long as life evolves in an evolving universe, consciousness is simply an emergent phenomenon of that coexistence and evolves as well.
It really is begging the question. Zombies are impossible. To say otherwise would be antithetical to the concept of an intelligence which is intelligent by virtue of being indistinguishable from a human being in his interactions. (Chinese Room Argument). It would certainly be antithetical to a more fundamental premise of evidence based discourse since it assumes the possibility of a state of affairs (i.e. the absence of consciousness in an entity ostensibly conscious) which cannot be discerned/verified/falsified experimentally. Which is already begging the question of the non-physicality of consciousness.
I don’t agree with the argument that consciousness is non-physical, I think it would be more correct to say that consciousness is physical in the sense that it is fundamental to the universe similar to, say, gravity, because experiences and qualia cannot be reduced to being described in any language. Our knowledge is incomplete so far on that. However, it is wrong to say zombies are impossible. Possibility here refers to logical possibility. It infers the existence of something that is not contradictory in its nature. There is nothing logically impossible about the existence of philosophical zombies or unicorns, even if they may be physically impossible. However, a five sided triangle is actually logically impossible, and therefore cannot be conceived.
@@Thatoneguy-mh4bx that's a facetious argument. Logical possibility because one has not spotted a contradiction does not mean that the contradiction is not there. Conceiving without contradiction. It's a facetious device to presume that there is no contradiction in perception which is always filled with it. Idk. If its my monist tendencies but this seeming non-contradiction is not necessarily a non-contradiction and cannot be a starting point. The physical impossibility should be taken as evidence to support the contrary position. Now, I think I am more sympathetic to Gaunilo than to Anselm as I grow older.
@@helioliskfire5954 You are correct that not spotting a contradiction does not mean there is not a contradiction. However, not spotting a contradiction, does not mean there IS a contradiction either. It seems to me that you do not know the difference between a physical possibility and a logical possibility
@@Thatoneguy-mh4bx i am familiar with the ontological argument. This one is just as facetious. I read math. This language game looks ludicrous and disingenuous to me. For the simple reason that there are many mathematical (logical) impossibilities that are conceivable. The fact that an inconsistency is not immediately obvious, as in the case of triangle with two sides, is not sufficient to guaranty the consistency of a claim or of a concept. I used to like Anselm's argument. But now I'm with Aquinas in calling it as a fraud. This argument is just like that.
A Zombie looking at a painting would have no logical reason to say it was beautiful- without emotion it would need a preprogrammed response to what conscious humans would say was beautiful. If a zombie was vocalizing an actual emotional reaction it would not be a zombie. So, the axiom that Ted and Zed are identical in every way cannot be valid- without emotion Zed will not respond the way Ted would.
@@omaravelar3271 - yes- I said exactly that. My point is that If Zed could mimic Ted in every way, then their brains physically are not ‘identical in every way’, just their actions. Besides, one would need to know somehow how Ted’s consciousness would work in every and any situation- a Laplace’s Demon of the Mind, as it were, and program that into Zed. To me the zombie argument is specious and non-explanatory.
Your argument is exactly what I wanted to say as well. It reminds me of arrogant people who claim that animals have no consciousness. I mean how can u conceive an animal that shows emotions without feeling them. Interestingely there is a lot of evidence that people are unable to make decisions without emotions, obviously the same goes for animals. The problem in this argument is the definition of conceive I can coceive of a purple Yoda but that does not give any support for the fact there might be one or not.
Actually, zombies could really say that a painting is beautiful. When they look at the painting, substances of hormones of oxytocin are released. Depending on the art is being demonstrated, different kinds of hormones can be released. So these biochemical reactions can alter the brain states and make zombies behave like if they felt everything is being shown there. Thoughts are electrical things and feelings are biochemical things All of that is well explained by neuroscience. But, what neuroscience doesn't explain is why we feel conscious about things, and why we are not just bioelectrochemical robots made of ball particles interacting here and there.
Instead of Zombies, you should call them Scarecrows because this is a straw-man argument. I can make up 1000's of fictional characters with their own imagined qualities that would just so happen to support my arguments. Don't be stupid!
Consciousness is scientifically a physical process. The real question is this: If conscious beings feel conscious, do unconscious beings feel unconscious. I get the brain is a collection of atoms working complex processes but why is there an arbitrary limit to what atoms and structures get their own perspective. Why doesn't the universe feel like the universe and the individual parts of it feel like individual parts of it?
There are no zombies. They are not possible. Some emergent property must exit to elicit novel action. If a unicorn existed, could you be gourd by it's horn? Yes. Do they? No. Everything is physical. We just don't understand the infinite realm of physicality.
if you assume everything is physical then of course youll arrive at your conclusion. The point is that we could build a robot that presumably has no consciousness and yet can move around and make decision based on sensory information just like us. The question is why do we have conscious experience, if it probabyl isnt necessary.
Chalmers argues that philosophical zombies are possible because we can conceive of them. Does the fact that something is conceivable (without leading to a contradiction) mean it's possible?
yes, in a universe that is mental
To me this argument always felt like the conclusion is contained in the premise.
But I'm just not smart enough elaborate.
It smells like the ontological argument of St. Anselm.
@@gergelymagyarosi9285 Yeah, it’s circular reasoning. “Assume there’s beings that behave (down to the molecular level) like us but still have no consciousness. [Rest of the argument]” means that in that hypothetical scenario, we’re not in a physicalist world. We therefore can’t conclude this part, as it’s part of the premise. If you start with “Assume we’re in a physicalist world”, then a being like that can’t exist. Either it is like us down to the molecular level (which gives it a consciousness because us having our kind of molecular makeup gives us one) or it’s not like us down to the molecular level.
@@flying-sheep It's not really circular, it's scientific logic that's instantly performable. It has the hypothesis 'If consciousness is physical then zombies are unimaginable', then an experiment where the person attempts to imagine a zombie and then a result, they are able to imagine a zombie, then a conclusion that consciousness is not physical.
It's just that since the experiment is performed within the imagination by using the factual limits of imagination, that a contradictory object cannot be realised, it is expected to be intuitively understood.
@@voxsvoxs4261 Dreaming up illogical assertions is something even the dumbest computer can do. Nobody will argue that they therefore have a non-physical component (electrical charge is physical). Maybe we’ll one day figure out what parts are necessary to form consciousness and can therefore directly measure it in a creature. Then we’d know that a zombie world wouldn’t actually be possible. We could still imagine it no problem, because our thinking can handle logical contradictions.
/edit: This quote from the Wikipedia article is exactly what I said: “Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky saw the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.”
That logic is circular: the conclusion is effectively used as a premise, since non-conscious zombies could only be possible if consciousness is not physical. IOW, if consciousness is physical, then physically identical "duplicates" would have it. After all, we can just as easily conceive of physically identical "duplicates" that are conscious, and use the same logic to conclude that consciousness must be physical.
I think you're on to something. I don't necessarily buy the argument. However, I wouldn't say it's circular. I agree that that non-phenomenally-conscious zombies are only possible if consciousness is not physical. But that doesn't mean it's circular. Any deductively valid argument will have premises that are true only if the conclusion is true. But that doesn't mean all deductively valid arguments are circular. However, in your defense I think it can be tricky to properly define "circular reasoning." Determining when a premise "assumes the conclusion is true" vs. when it "entails (but does not assume) the conclusion is true" is actually more complicated than most people think.
To your second point, I don't think the argument can be used in the other direction. Assuming there are physically identical duplicates that are phenomenally conscious would not show that consciousness is physical. A physical duplicate without consciousness should show that the physical stuff is not necessary for the consciousness. But a physical duplicate with consciousness does not should that non-physical stuff is not necessary for consciousness. By analogy, if I can show you that there are rectangles that are not squares, then I've shown that being a being a square is not necessary for being a rectangle. But if you show me that there are rectangles that are squares, that doesn't mean you've shown that being a square is necessary for being a rectangle.
That being said, I think you can simply deny the premise. You can say, although it might seem like it's possible to have a physical duplicate without phenomenal consciousness, it's actually impossible. I don't think simply conceiving of a zombie is sufficient to ground the metaphysical possibility of it.
You're absolutely right. It seems to me like philosophers are too concerned with the semantics of 'logical arguments' to see the wood for the trees. Chalmers notion wouldn't last 5 minutes in a proper scientific debate.
You are wrong.
The "hidden" assumption is NOT that consciousness is not physical.
Let me rephrase the argument:
(0) The assumption is that the concept of consciousness is not derivable from physical concepts.
(1) The fact that the concept of consciousness is not derivable from physical concepts makes the concept of zombies conceivable (non-contradictory).
(2) If the concept of zombies is non-contradictory, then the concept of a zombie-world (the "copy" of our world modulo consciousness) is also non-contradictory.
(3) If the concept of a zombie-world is not contradictory, and there is no other blocking factor, then the zombie-world can be a possible world.
(4) If the zombie-world can be a possible world, then consciousness is not physical and physicalism is false.
(5) Consciousness is not physical and physicalism is false.
So the argument is not circular.
If you would like to deny the conclusion, you can either deny
(0) by saying that the concept of consciousness is derivable from physical terms - this is almost surely false. (E.g, eliminativism, behaviorism, functionalism etc.)
or
(3) You must provide a "blocking factor" that explains why such a world is not possible. You can say that "because consciousness IS physical, that's why", but note that it is just a brute force assumption the only motivation of which is to save the materialism dogma (that everything must be physical). And notice that if you would like to explain why a zombie-world is not possible you probably have to turn to concepts that are beyond physics or force consciousness under the territory of physics as a fundemental fact. Both ways go against the current shape of physicalism.
Finally, note that the assumptions of the zombie-argument are lightweight and almost trivial: 1st person experience exists and it cannot be described by the 3rd person terminology of physics. But if you would like to deny the conclusion you have to resort to almost dumb (0) or problematic assumptions (3).
@@npc-aix-84 Or I could say that (3) consciousness MAY OR MAY NOT BE physical, since you denied using the assumption that consciousness is not physical. Then the conclusion becomes "consciousness may or may not be physical".
Note that this only violates your assumption (0) if it's equivalent to the assumption you deny.
@@alanjones4358 I don't really get it. Could you please clarify this a bit more? How then the argument would look like?
not me using this video to help me remember what the heck a p-zombie is while working on a grad-level research paper
This video on philosophical zombies reminded me of why A.I. hasn't risen up to our level. My reasoning here is how that Ted and Zed comparison felt. Ted was responding to reality and Zed responded to a simulation. Is Zed's behavior any different from a scripted response?
Your comment is related to a debate about whether consciousness is anything more than functioning in a certain way. AI can function in really complex ways that might make it appear as if it is conscious. But is it conscious? Some philosophers argue that if you have sufficiently complex cognition and function, then you have consciousness. Others argue (similar to this Zombie argument) that consciousness is not reducible to merely functioning in a particular way.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff what philosophers argue that it is possible to have consciousness?
I'm schizophrenic, and i suffer from philosophical zombies ideas, truman show, matrix etc.
based schizo
dont forget to take your medicine please
I've always found P-zombies confusing. First, I'm sympathetic to the objection that their "conceivability" might be illusory. In other words, we might think that we can imagine beings like zombies, but actually we can't, and so functionalists still maintain that if we could TRULY imagine a being with a physical brain that can generate all of our behaviours, then that structure would have to be conscious as well.
But, to me, that seems irrelevant. At least to the "hard problem" of consciousness. Even IF zombies were impossible - in other words, consciousness was firmly rooted in physical processes and human-brain-like functions - it still does not explain why or how a system like that could generate first-person experience. Again, in more other words, it seems to me that I don't *have to* conceive of a being like a P-zombie in the first place. It's enough for me to simply note that functions and physical processes are just fundamentally different sorts of thing than first-person consciousness, and so the one can't lead to the other for that reason. What is meant by "fundamentally different" is obviously where the meat is, but it definitely not "two different descriptions of what could be the same thing". The feeling of pain itself and a description of a brain of someone in pain are not two different (and potentially equivalent) descriptions. There is - in my view - a very basic different in ontology there.
Yeah. I have varying opinions about this depending on the day of the week. But it seems unfair to say they're not *really* conceivable. I'm pretty sure I can conceive of them. I'm more skeptical of the claim that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. Perhaps conceivability entails logical possibility (or at least no conceptual contradictions). But plausibly there are some a posteriori necessary truths (e.g. water = H2O) that, before discovering them, are not conceptually impossible. That doesn't mean they're metaphysically possible.
I think you're right that zombies don't do much to *solve* the hard problem of consciousness. If anything, they serve to illustrate the problem. I'm sympathetic (and I think Chalmers is too) to the idea that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality (almost a kind of panpsychism) but that it's still not physical even if it were necessarily contingent on the physical.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I've never understood the big hangup about conceivability/possibility. Either we have the cognitive capacity to (fallibly) recognize possibility or we don't. Leave conceivability out of it. Are modal truths something we can grasp to a reasonable degree? Unless we're ready to be a modal skeptics, the answer has to be yes.
I remember once asking my grandpa if my friends are conscious or not whilst he was fixing something important. It feels amazing getting this video recommended now after so many years and realizing that I asked this deep philosophical question as a kid out of curiosity.
I used this as a term recently, calling somebody a philosophical zombie as a throwaway insult, totally unconscious of the fact that it's a concept in philosophy until someone asked if it was a known term and someone else explained that it is. So I'm probably a philosophical zombie myself, without knowing it. But I do believe many people are zombies, and this, based primarily on a particularly vivid nightmare I had in 2019
If two entities share exactly the same physical components down to the molecular level, then they share the same consciousness. Zombies, as defined by Chalmers, are not possible.
you are begging the question.
@@zak2659just as Chalmers is. In order for philosophical zombies to be plausible we have to assume that consciousness is not produced by physical processes, and that's exactly what we are trying to find. That's why this thought experiment is complete useless.
"zombies are possible because... uh... that's the premise that lets me make the conclusion I want."
It's like cavemen saying "I can imagine an apply falling up instead of down, and I can't think of any contradiction to that, so gravity is nonphysical"
Except that there is a contradiction. You can think that apples fall 'up' but be but be proven wrong because it can be tested. Drop an apple, and it falls down, clear evidence right there. There's no way you will still logically keep your opinion. But if the premise is true that consciousness is subjective, then there's no way to test that zombies exist because to an outsider, they appear to act like normal people. The only way to come up with a clear contradiction to this whole argument is to get inside the 'zombie's head' and 'feel' its perspective which is of course impossible.
TLDR, the argument presents that zombies *could* exist if consciousness isn't physical, but there's no real way to test that, and therefore no way to prove the argument right or wrong.
At the end of the day it is really just a frilly complicated thought to play around with.
They are like npcs in video games
I feel like I must be missing context or definitions of some sort.
Just because you can think up something doesn't make it possible.
I can imagine being able to breathe fire but that doesn't make it possible.
There are different notions of "possible" we can talk about. We might talk about what's "physically possible" (sometimes called "nomologically possible") which just means possible given our laws of physics. So it's not physically possible for me to breath fire given my biology. And conceiving of my breathing fire does not change that.
However, there's also the notion of "logical possibility." Something is logically possible just in case it doesn't involve any contradiction. Some people think that if I can coherently conceive of something, then it's logically possible. So since I can conceive of myself having the ability to breath fire, it's logically possible. Of course, my biology or the laws of nature would have to be different in that case. But it's not like it's logically impossible for me to do it. So when some argue that conceivability entails possibility, they mean it entails logical possibility.
So if zombies are *logically* possible, then it's logically possible to have our exact physical structure but no "what it's like feeling" of consciousness. And if it's logically possible to have our exact physical structure without consciousness, then consciousness must not necessarily be the physical structure.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff
I suspect I lack the nomenclature to follow what you just said.
Arguing that a mind exists outside a physical universe because of something a mind can do seems like circular reasoning to me.
I think this argument is rather poor, because it's only in the conceptual infinite that someone is ruling it possible, but consciousness being physical is also possible in this realm.
Which one has more evidence? Consciousness being physical. Done.
I think the biggest issue with this argument / thought experiment is Claim 1: "zombies are possible". This is the sketchiest, flimsiest part of the whole thing, IMO. It seems silly to say "ok, but are zombies POSSIBLE -- in ANY universe?" when the entire point of the argument is to ground consciousness IN OUR universe. It's comparing apples to oranges, it doesn't work.
And this is coming from someone who believes that consciousness is NOT just a code in our brains, and is "something more".
Maybe zombies are not possible
What's the difference between Ted and Zed? How can you tell one from the other?
Good questions. “What’s the difference?” and “How can you tell?” have different answers. The difference is *supposedly* that Ted “feels” things consciously and Zed doesn’t. Zed is sort of like a biological robot-indistinguishable from you or I but “inside” there’s no felt experience. So that means the answer to “How can you tell?” is “You can’t.” But that’s actually part of the point. If you can’t tell whether someone is a p-zombie no matter what physical metric you check, that suggests phenomenal consciousness is not a physical thing (according to the argument).
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I guess even philisophical arguments should be based on science, the reality that is observed. Like, let's take a pain for ex. If we consider physical metric like nerves and cells and biomolecules etc. - if zombie has this then he definitely feels the pain. Even if he would tell the opposite. We know he should experience pain. On the other side if zombie states that he experience pain, but he lacks certain material components, then he's lying. More over he's not a zombie (as defined) - he's just some different creature.
Really easy video to understand thanks!!!
Great video on a subject I've been long interested in. One question I've stewed over is how would a person know if they were interacting with a Philosophical Zombie? In other words, if I were having a conversation with a being who was identical to a normal human in every way except they don't experience consciousness, would there be any way to really tell? What are the possibilities of some kind of test? A modified Turning Test, perhaps? Thanks again for a great video!
It seems like there couldn’t be any test even in principle given the personal/subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness. And zombies are supposed to be functionally equivalent to people with qualia so from the outside they’d seem identical.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff Thanks for the reply. However, I'm not so sure there wouldn't be a way to subtly distinguish between a PZ and a normal human being. It seems there was even a paper written on the subject I once came across - which I can't find now- but it seemed to suggest there would be differences in descriptive phraseologies used, other behaviors which would be different, etc. Anyway, it's food for thought. Thanks!
@@Knockface If the imagined zombie was possible that suggests human consciousness serves no purpose. I mean...it might not, but it would seem this thought experiment if not fatally flawed in some way proves consciousness doesn't serve a functional purpose...just a decoration for personal pleasure. And why would life evolve something that remarkable without it serving some purpose? While specific reflex reactions may not depend on consciousness i.e. we act before we are conscious of action, I think iterative thinking does depend on consciousness and that would mean zombies would not be able to benefit from 'thinking through' things and coming up with different ways of doing things.
@@rizdekd3912 A Well a reasoned response, & definitely gives me some things to consider. I would tend to agree with your conclusion that "zombies" would not benefit from "thinking things through" as you put it, which would be a certain way to distinguish them from a conscious entity. Personally, I keep coming back to using AI as a good example of the zombie conundrum -especially as it further advances and becomes almost indistinguishable in its interactions with human users. At present, it certainly can seem & act conscious (i.e. ChatGPT, et al) but our basic instincts, for now, alert us that we are not interacting with a sentient being - only a mirage. Whether our senses will be able to continue to do this as AI further advances is an open question. This IMHO is the true heart of the argument of dualism, which the zombie thought experiment trys to address.
Would a philosophical zombie laugh and cry? Or in other words: Can emotions only be expressed, when experienced by conciousness?
Yes, but if Chalmers is wrong, it teaches us nothing about consciousness. Chalmers' first premise relies on whether zombies are conceivable. To my mind, it is NOT conceivable that an exact duplicate of a human being can operate without a conscious element. This would be like saying that you can imagine a five sided triangle. We can concieve of the IDEA of trying to imagine a five sided triangle, but can't actually realise a five sided triangle in our minds. Similarly, we can conceive of the IDEA of a body without consciousness but we can't actually realise a body without consciousness in our minds. We can conceive of the IDEA but not necessarily the thing itself. Therefore, just like the impossibilty of the five sided triangle, the zombie is not possible either. Otherwise, if Chalmers' argument is to be given credence, you'd have to believe that the five sided triangle is also possible, which is clearly nonsense.
The main contradiction to Chalmers is, that he misses one big possiblity: He IS a zombie. And in-fact, we can not prove whether he is not.
This problem seem to appear everywhere in Philosophy:
Concrete modal realism argues that it is impossible that no concrete objects exist; for since worlds are concrete, there is at least one concrete object-the world itself-at each world.
OR
A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical being that behaves indistinguishably from a normal human but lacks conscious experiences, thoughts, and beliefs.
If someone claims, "I am a philosophical zombie," then, for this claim to be logically coherent, the speaker must believe their statement to be true.
However, the concept of a philosophical zombie is one that lacks beliefs, since beliefs are a product of conscious experience.
Therefore, if the person who states "I am a philosophical zombie" truly was a philosophical zombie, they wouldn't hold any beliefs, including the belief that they are a philosophical zombie.
Thus, the act of making this claim contradicts itself: if the claim were true, the speaker couldn't believe it to be true and, therefore, couldn't logically or coherently make the claim in the first place.
It's hard to get a grip on the main issue here, but it seems to me like there is a switch in Reality that prevents someone to make a certain conclusion...
I am not smart enough to imagine a Ted and Zed being equal molecule by molecule and even so they are different. One of them has conscience and the other has not. I do not feel Zed as conceivable and possible.
Sorry, but (1) does contain a contradiction. If you want precise physical matches, but different behaviours, that's a contradiction when discussing macroscopic objects. You can have P-zombies that look similar, and pass all current tests, but that's not the precise physical matches you assume in (2). And at that point it's a Chinese Room and Knowability problem.
There is no wriggle room here.
Premise 1 doesn't say you could have precise physical matches but different behaviors. It says you could have precise physical matches and precise behavioral matches, but lack the "what it's like" feeling of being conscious. The difference between a normal human and a zombie is indistinguishable from the outside--both at the micro and macro level.
Now, you might think that's still impossible. And it might be. So the defender of this argument needs to support the claim that it's possible. But it's not a contradiction to say it's possible.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff but isn't that definition alredy implying that consciousness is not phisical?
Stating that p-zombies have the same phisical structure but no qualia implies that the structure and the qualia are unrelated, but the truth is we do not know.
Because we leave in a deterministic universe, stating that the same phisical arrangement can bring two different outcomes: qualia and not qualia, is contradictory, therefore either p-zombies, for as they are defined, are impossible, but there actually is some difference in the brain structure that can make consciousness arise, or just as stated in the video, imply that consciousness is not phisical and exists something like a "soul" in a non phisical space, and personally i consider the first one much more reasonable, instead of assuming the existence of something that is effectivly unprovable
a sole zombie is a sole that's normal sole exactly the same as a normal sole but has no Consciousness
1, sole zombie are possible.
2, if sole zombie are then consciousness is not metaphysical
awesome video I want to credited it in a university essay whats your name?
Essentially, P zombies are only possible in the case that consciousness isn't physical. They are exact physical duplicates, so in the case where physicalism is true all resultant properties should also be the same.
We are carrying out an experiment without carrying it out, then assuming an outcome.
First, you'd need to be able to replicate someone's physiology down to the quantum level, then you'd have to be able to tell the difference between a P zombie and a person with a consciousness. Then with your conclusion you could make a determination.
This argument skips all that rubbish and asserts in the first premise that the p zombie is possible, which is only true if the experiment would be carried out and shown in their favor.
Sure, I can "imagine" the experiment going in the non-physicalist's favor but that doesn't mean it is literally possible, it means It is possible that physicalism is wrong but to know, we'd actually have to carry out the experiment to see what the ACTUAL truth would be.
But no, physicalism isn't true or false based on my ability to imagine it is true or false. Possible in the sense that I can imagine an outcome, or another is not the same as possible showing there are no literal contradictions in reality preventing my ideas from being true.
Whare do you edit your video from
I could think a 5-mile-high Eiffel Tower is possible if I know nothing about engineering, architecture or metallurgy. It proves nothing, only my lack of knowledge. Saying we can conceive of them and therefore they are possible is incredibly dumb.
Im a p.zombie only if i drink big amounts of cofein i feel my self if i dont.then most times i dont even remember what i did in that time.
But simply saying there's no contradiction is a mere assertion and meaningless. Just because one can conceive of something doesn't make it possible. And simply sitting back and saying someone else can't find the contradiction doesn't mean there isn't one and even if there isn't a contradiction, doesn't mean the made up world is possible. How would you know that once you've completely recreated a human right down to the quantum level that consciousness wouldn't just...be there? Simply because you SAID it wasn't there? Since we don't what or how consciousness, no one can know what will or won't be there. Positing a zombie that can for absolutely everything be just like a human may be positing something that may not be possible...a physical being that simulates completely what a human does and can do with its consciousness. This makes it sound like the human consciousness does nothing. Is that the point? So what if Ted can 'picture' the beautiful painting....does it lead to any different behavior? Does that mean consciousness is like the proverbial 'teats on a boar hog'...there but useless for anything but a chuckle?
Elaborate no true Scotsman fallacy. Impossible and improbable are different. Consciousness is physical in the sense that a physical body is needed but how we conceive of the ideas that form from physical activity in our minds in our efforts to define consciousness are always beyond our ability to express coherently since if we were to attain perfect understanding of consciousness AND also gain perfect ability to express this understanding, we would immediately find ourselves in the position of knowing all C and all E which generates instantaneously a new set C and new set E that now includes our perfect understanding of consciousness and expression. In other words, once we reached the point of knowing every thing about consciousness then we would need to now come to know what this new understanding means with respect to our consciousness...what does it mean to our consciousness that we perfectly understand consciousness? We are forever covered by a veil of our own process of knowing and integrating new understanding to form the basis for all that we know.
tldr: we can never outrun our own learning; there is not some metaphysical limit set on the amount of knowledge and understanding of consciousness...as long as life evolves in an evolving universe, consciousness is simply an emergent phenomenon of that coexistence and evolves as well.
It really is begging the question. Zombies are impossible. To say otherwise would be antithetical to the concept of an intelligence which is intelligent by virtue of being indistinguishable from a human being in his interactions. (Chinese Room Argument). It would certainly be antithetical to a more fundamental premise of evidence based discourse since it assumes the possibility of a state of affairs (i.e. the absence of consciousness in an entity ostensibly conscious) which cannot be discerned/verified/falsified experimentally. Which is already begging the question of the non-physicality of consciousness.
I don’t agree with the argument that consciousness is non-physical, I think it would be more correct to say that consciousness is physical in the sense that it is fundamental to the universe similar to, say, gravity, because experiences and qualia cannot be reduced to being described in any language. Our knowledge is incomplete so far on that.
However, it is wrong to say zombies are impossible. Possibility here refers to logical possibility. It infers the existence of something that is not contradictory in its nature. There is nothing logically impossible about the existence of philosophical zombies or unicorns, even if they may be physically impossible. However, a five sided triangle is actually logically impossible, and therefore cannot be conceived.
@@Thatoneguy-mh4bx that's a facetious argument. Logical possibility because one has not spotted a contradiction does not mean that the contradiction is not there. Conceiving without contradiction. It's a facetious device to presume that there is no contradiction in perception which is always filled with it. Idk. If its my monist tendencies but this seeming non-contradiction is not necessarily a non-contradiction and cannot be a starting point. The physical impossibility should be taken as evidence to support the contrary position.
Now, I think I am more sympathetic to Gaunilo than to Anselm as I grow older.
@@helioliskfire5954 You are correct that not spotting a contradiction does not mean there is not a contradiction. However, not spotting a contradiction, does not mean there IS a contradiction either.
It seems to me that you do not know the difference between a physical possibility and a logical possibility
@@Thatoneguy-mh4bx i am familiar with the ontological argument. This one is just as facetious.
I read math. This language game looks ludicrous and disingenuous to me. For the simple reason that there are many mathematical (logical) impossibilities that are conceivable. The fact that an inconsistency is not immediately obvious, as in the case of triangle with two sides, is not sufficient to guaranty the consistency of a claim or of a concept.
I used to like Anselm's argument. But now I'm with Aquinas in calling it as a fraud. This argument is just like that.
@@Thatoneguy-mh4bx I don't think we have the same notion of logical possibility
A Zombie looking at a painting would have no logical reason to say it was beautiful- without emotion it would need a preprogrammed response to what conscious humans would say was beautiful. If a zombie was vocalizing an actual emotional reaction it would not be a zombie. So, the axiom that Ted and Zed are identical in every way cannot be valid- without emotion Zed will not respond the way Ted would.
What is zed says it because he knows that’s what someone like ted would say
@@omaravelar3271 - yes- I said exactly that. My point is that If Zed could mimic Ted in every way, then their brains physically are not ‘identical in every way’, just their actions. Besides, one would need to know somehow how Ted’s consciousness would work in every and any situation- a Laplace’s Demon of the Mind, as it were, and program that into Zed. To me the zombie argument is specious and non-explanatory.
Your argument is exactly what I wanted to say as well. It reminds me of arrogant people who claim that animals have no consciousness. I mean how can u conceive an animal that shows emotions without feeling them. Interestingely there is a lot of evidence that people are unable to make decisions without emotions, obviously the same goes for animals. The problem in this argument is the definition of conceive I can coceive of a purple Yoda but that does not give any support for the fact there might be one or not.
@@warriormode6513 - interesting- then A.I. Might need emotions to ‘make decisions’ or we’ll be slaves to Spock’s Vulcan logic...
Actually, zombies could really say that a painting is beautiful. When they look at the painting, substances of hormones of oxytocin are released. Depending on the art is being demonstrated, different kinds of hormones can be released. So these biochemical reactions can alter the brain states and make zombies behave like if they felt everything is being shown there.
Thoughts are electrical things and feelings are biochemical things All of that is well explained by neuroscience. But, what neuroscience doesn't explain is why we feel conscious about things, and why we are not just bioelectrochemical robots made of ball particles interacting here and there.
Instead of Zombies, you should call them Scarecrows because this is a straw-man argument. I can make up 1000's of fictional characters with their own imagined qualities that would just so happen to support my arguments. Don't be stupid!
Consciousness is scientifically a physical process. The real question is this: If conscious beings feel conscious, do unconscious beings feel unconscious. I get the brain is a collection of atoms working complex processes but why is there an arbitrary limit to what atoms and structures get their own perspective. Why doesn't the universe feel like the universe and the individual parts of it feel like individual parts of it?
There are no zombies. They are not possible. Some emergent property must exit to elicit novel action. If a unicorn existed, could you be gourd by it's horn? Yes. Do they? No. Everything is physical. We just don't understand the infinite realm of physicality.
if you assume everything is physical then of course youll arrive at your conclusion. The point is that we could build a robot that presumably has no consciousness and yet can move around and make decision based on sensory information just like us. The question is why do we have conscious experience, if it probabyl isnt necessary.