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"Only those who do not seek power are qualified to hold it." - Plato - Bill Allen refused to be the president at first because he knew and respected that he is not an engineer. Then he continued respecting engineering. Such a rare piece of history.
Being lawyer might be the best man for the job, he know that getting sued would lose more money and reputation in the long run, keeping it clean is priceless.
"I have a theory that you can make any sentence seem profound by writing the name of a dead philosopher at the end of it." -Banksy... yeah, also, Plato never said that.
I worked at McDonnell Douglas Finance back in the 90s. Both McDonnell Douglas and Boeing were obsessed with market share and kept trying to underbid each other to win sales based on low prices, which meant that the "winner" of any competition would have trouble making a profit. It's like they were trying to drive each other out of business. I found it somewhat amusing when the two companies merged and then had to fulfill ALL the unprofitable deals they had forced each other into. As I recall, that was about the time when cost-cutting and "Lean Manufacturing" took a stranglehold on all kinds of decision-making.
Lean manufacturing can be very powerful for a company, but only when applied where it makes sense. Sadly a lot of execs use it as an excuse to cost cut anything that doesn’t have a clear and immediate ROI, like quality, R&D, etc.
The relationship of management, engineers and workers always reminds me what Mr. Douglas said when he retired from Douglas. It is not fun anymore because I used to talk to engineers and technicians and now I talk to lawyers and accountants. This morphed into a total money and stock view in MD which was inherited by Boeing during the merge.
If it were just that things would probably be fine. There is nothing inherent about a shift in focus that can cause a culture to collapse. What really killed things was that MD brought a culture of transactional antagonism and zero sum thinking. Suppliers went from 'partners' to 'need to be defeated and conquered'.. employees went from being 'partners' to 'internal competition where place had to be shown'. management went from being 'someone we work with' to 'enemies that will screw you'
About the head of a company, there is a very nice book : "In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing Disasters" by Merrill R. Chapman where we learn that all IT companies Chapman analysed failed the moment where a tech leader have been replaced by a non-tech one. Regarding the company culture there may be ad additional explanation that sometimes we European don't take in consideration. I work since 15 years ad a consultant for USA-based companies. I realized that if my US colleagues loses the job, they lose health insurance and maybe the car and the house because lately many Americans basically live on loans of the banks. Lately this converted many good workers into "yes men". In other words, employees often have to choose between their welfare and standing in front of their boss and speak honestly. This is very sad.
Thank you, I will have to read that book. And yes, loosing your job in the US often means no health care for the family at the least. If someone has a chronic condition the cost could make you loose all else.
It was Stonecipher/McNerny & Calhoun - three Jack Welch guys from GE who shifted BA to focus on financial results, rather than engineering quality. McNerny - CEO from 2005-2015, & Stonecipher, made the decision on the Max/787 & 777X - all troubled programs that the company has to deal with, today.
…and who killed several hundred people due to the execs’ willful negligence… It galls me that the execs step away with tens of millions in compensation dipped in the blood of employees, customers and the flying public.
You got that r I right. He and Juan Brown are my main info guys, so its sad what Boeing is going throgh. They are such a part of American flying culture.
When safety culture is tossed away, I would hope that Pilot unions threaten to subsidize pilots in changing to airbus types and ultimately refuse to fly them - a low supply of people wanting to fly boeings new jet will pressure airlines not to buy them
Very well done. A separate story, when Boeing first designed the 727, back when European labor rates were much lower than American rates, Boeing did not outsource, they did not go the cheap way. They simply decided to engineer a superior airplane which would be worth its extra cost. And indeed it was superior to what the British and French industries produced. And it sold a lot and was quite profitable. Boeing would never do that today
So true. Old Boeing shows what happens when quality of the product comes first and profits second. Nowadays it's the other way round. What happens now at Boeing is a kind reminder why engineers and not bean-counting economists should make the decisions.
@@BongoBaggins The 787 is a great design, but the insistence on an unrealistically accelerated schedule resulted in numerous unplanned redesigns during development which delayed the design and exploded costs. The development is best described by the old engineering maxim: "never time to do it right, always time to do it over". The initial half dozen planes ended up badly overweight and not easily certifiable as Boeing had lost track of all the numerous design revisions and no longer knew the precise configuration the planes had been built to. Boeing ended up donating them to museums and taking a tax write off.
Except for the fact that globalization wasn’t really a thing yet. The only thing Europe was for was cheap small cars and cheap movie making (Spaghetti Westerns et al). Concorde was the first plane to have major subassemblies made by different companies in different locations.. with Airbus quickly following suit.. because no single European country could ever hope to compete with American industrial might. Boeing was flush with cash from world war and Cold War spending in an era where the aircraft that could transport huge subassemblies were literally just being invented by John Conroy to move spacecraft and boosters for NASA.
As a person that has been both an Air Load Master and Non Detructive Testing Team member . As somebody sat in despair at what is happening, this video of yours is sad but fantastically accurate, hope you move in this direction. Wonderful effort.
McDonnell Douglas was predominantly a business management corporation that employed engineers, whereas Boeing was predominantly a engineering firm that employed business managers. As soon as a company gives power to bean counters, business managers, and shareholders (aka leeches) enshittification inevitably follows.
The lawyer and business/beancounter "culture" goes way back to the 60s. You can find a 5 part series, just search for "Seattle Times, Boeing, Safety at Issue: the 737", and you will find it, published NINETEEN NINETY SIX, before the merger! Title of the lawyer stuff part is "When jets crash: How Boeing fights to limit liability"
I hope you know I'm 100% going to start including enshittification into my lexicon because it's too hard to come across such a brilliant creation and not use it liberally in the future
To be fair, lots of big and old companies have tons of unnecessary processes and bureaucracy. The average engineer in big companies spends like half their time in pointless status report meetings.
@@Mike-oz4cv all true. In the retail business (ex: a parallel comparison for Boeing-Douglas would be the Kroger-HT merger a few years ago), they are repeating the same issues that Boeing is now experiencing with tons of unnecessary processes that greatly hurt company efficiency while doing non-stop audits that only meet the corporate's end status quo at the same they are NOT listening to what their associates are saying. The same could be said of the healthcare system (I have a relative who is a 30+-year-old healthcare veteran nurse) because half the time, staff have to attend pointless status report Zoom calls, which take almost four hours of upper management droning on digital devices about what policies would work from an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) business standpoint for the business for their customers instead of listening to what nurses and other staff think about these changes, etc. Most of the world has a business administrator view of things, given what they have learned from college. Still, it doesn't cover everything internally about the welfare of the internal staff/co-workers, etc. What are their benefits, and how can practical solutions increase staff "morale"-the key term many companies like Boeing have forgotten to consider? When morale is extremely low, and you see job sites with very low approval ratings for your company, then you know there has to be some serious shakeup for their business to survive in an almost post-COVID world.
In 2022 Boeing streamlined quality manufacturing procedural specification development and refactoring QMPSDR with a supplemental program identified as spontaneously initiated process efficacy review and reduction SIPERR which included an employee incentive program called work intrinsic rewards for employee curtailing of unnecessary trudgery WIRECUT. It was 2.7% effective based on results of the bi-annual normalized guage survey of effective limitations of frustrations BANGSELF, which replaced the original ill-conceived half-annual version of the program.
I’ll never forget this merger, I was a kid then. My hometown St.Louis was pretty upset to see McDonnell Douglas leave STL. I’ll always remember my father and his buddies at the airlines saying how bad of a merger this would be down the line. They knew the airplane business well!
The fact that the general public (who may not care about aircraft type like us aviation geeks) are using sites like Expedia to select aircraft type and AVOID Boeing should be setting off alarm bells at Boeing’s HQ.
@@calvinnickel9995I mean, one of their DC-10’s caused the single deadliest aviation accident in U.S. history. Can’t say I blame them, even though that accident was caused mostly by improper maintenance (aka: it was *their* fault).
So, in summary, the CEO doesn’t have to be an engineer, but can’t be an MBA. I have a story. When I was a supervisor in a telecom sales call center (which is just two steps above rep and lead) my team always performed in the top three. Then the promoted a well liked rep who just got his MBA. To his credit, going to school and getting his MBA is impressive. Then in a supervisor meeting we all talked to the regional director and we all got a say. I talked about how I motivated my team, how I looked out for them and how I was there by their side and train them. The MBA talked about stock holder value, maximizing interactions and reducing cost. Huh? Dude, you’re supervisor. Guess whose team would consistently beat his? Yup this high school grad. Who ended up getting promoted? Yup, the MBA. He became the call centers operations manager, which is the second in charge of the whole call center. In reality, he was the one that did everything, the call center director, who was awful by the way, just sat at her desk and reported numbers to the higher ups. He made sweeping changes. Hired on his husband as a trainer (no training experience) and they came up with a script and implemented it. So now when you called, it was the same pitch. Customers aren’t dumb, they know that after the third time they called that are being sold. It was robotic at best. But they were so impressed by him that they made the script official and gave it to our sister call centers. Numbers fell, I told my team to abandon the script and sell like I knew they could. Didn’t matter that I was top supervisor, I got scolded and eventually written up. So I forced my team to go back on the script, but don’t be so impersonal. I flew under the radar. Numbers sucked for the call center, they modified the script, didn’t make much of a difference. My telecom got bought by another, which was awful, because they were the lowest rated but had the money to do so. Obviously the layoffs started. Him, the director, and his husband were the very first to get laid off. Yay right? No. They came in with their own MBAs, cut the pensions, obviously, made the commission even harder to get and surprise! A new script. When that wasn’t enough, they shut down call centers, opened up a bunch in Costa Rica, some did get moved to Texas and Florida. I quit, which is what they obviously wanted us to do, and became a nurse. Never going back to sales.
Years ago waiting at the auto shop I read a story by a guy who bought a fast food franchise. He had no formal business education so when he had a chance to go to a business seminar at Harvard he was excited. He came away appalled and I will never forget how he described what they were teaching. Just like your MBA. He said without his employees he had no business but the way they described how things should be run was treating both the the employees and customers like you know what. Sorry you had such a ordeal.
The thing is - it's not the MBA that's the problem. That's just a toolkit of training. The problem is taking an MBA's word for it that they know what they're doing. It's like promoting someone with a brand new set of car tools to run your racing team.
I think a fundamental difference between Boeing and Douglas was the top management of the two companies. Before yielding day to day responsibility to his son, Donald Wills Douglas, Sr. WAS Douglas Aircraft Company. Employees were fond of saying, "We don't work for Douglas; we work for Doug." The loyalty of even senior executives and engineers was to one man, a loyalty his son did not command. Many left the company, and within ten years, this aviation giant was broke.
Douglas was a good company before it was forced to work with McDonnell who are just out for themselves and are now the toxic DNA of Boeing. When we criticise Boeing we should point our finger firmly towards McDonnell who were saved by the merger from becoming a second rate aircraft company. Mentour has been hitting the books, nice presentation.
It appears that humility and character are prerequisite for leadership. Note to self: 1) Be considerate of my associates views 2) Don’t talk to much, let others talk 3) Make a sincere effort to understand labour’s viewpoint 4) Develop a (postwar) future for Boeing
One of the worst decisions Boeing ever made internally was passing over Alan Mulally for the CEO position in the mid-2000s. He could have returned the company to its engineering-first principles.
Huge Alan Mulally fan. What he did with the 777 and at Ford were both outstanding. I wish he had written more on his product development and management ideas.
I agree - In my role as a development pilot for Ansett involved in the introduction of the 737-200 Advanced (1981) and then the 737-300 (1985), I also met Alan when he was the lead engineer on the 7J7 project. I went to a Seattle presentation on this new aircraft in around 1987 and it was clear that Alan was first and foremost an engineer, as were all of the Boeing people I worked with in those years. Such a pity these engineering skills and culture were overrun by corporate greed.
I grew up right near JFK in New York. When the 747 first started operating I couldn’t believe how such a huge plane could fly. A few years later I got to travel in one. Still my favorite plane to fly on. What a marvel of engineering!
I have a rich family history with Douglas Aircraft. My parents both worked for Douglas in Long Beach, California. That's where they met, so in a way, I am a child of Douglas. After my mother died, my father married another Douglas employee, and my step-sister likewise worked for Douglas for a time. Even I did! While we were living in Toronto, Canada, due to my father's Douglas employment, I worked there during the summer of 1968. When my father died in 1976 he was still an employee -- though Douglas had merged with McDonnell by then. So I had a family loyalty to Douglas. And Boeing was "the enemy"! LOL! Long after McDonnell-Douglas merged with Boeing, I happened to be visiting a USAF air base around 1978 during an air show, and by chance had a conversation with a couple of Boeing employees who were showing off the KC-10 tanker aircraft. These two men had been Boeing employees before the merger, and they told me that after the merger the culture in the company had gone down the tubes. And they blamed this on the culture that came in with Douglas. I have no idea if this was true. But perhaps it was.
I'd bet money it was McDonnell, not Douglas, that is the ruinous factor in all of these. Douglas was known for really solid if somewhat iterative designs, with them being second basically only to Boeing in the commercial jet liner business. And, obviously enough, they put out some great designs - the DC-8, of course, but also to some degree the DC-9 and DC-10 (the trijet and the unfortunately cancelled twinjet). You'll notice that as soon as MD took over, all the bold moves were replaced by a much more cautious, conservative approach... one that was money first, everything else later.
@@davidfuller581 Indeed, exactly. And interestingly McDonnell is today only just remembered as the "M" before Douglas - because it was obvious that Douglas was the Manufacturer of all the famous Aircrafts from the DC-2 up to the MD-11 and McDonnell was - what? And yes, especially the "Mad Dogs" were difining Aircrafts of their time in the 1980ies and 1990ies and even in the first years of the new Century. The DC-10 had a great, but - as you know - also difficult History. The Story of the DC-8 probably really started with its Late Use as Freighters - the DC-8 putted as Freighters the B 707 into the shadow.
Not entirely, Mc Donnell is the part to blame for the decay, Douglas itself was a respected company well known for it's quality build and design, only perhaps outrun by Lockheed's engineering. Boeing has been successful at doing it's thing, but their strong point always was Marketing. it's saviour grail was the 367-80. Without it they would have been stuck being a mediocre company.
@@DirtyRocha - Well, of course a couple of Boeing engineers might be expected to say it's Douglas's fault. My father was a quality control guy at Douglas, and he was entirely dedicated to it. He was head of the quality control team in England, where a British company was making the nosewheel for the DC-10. They tried to sneak a few badly-made items past him, but he was too observant. One time they tried to get a poorly-machined strut past him by painting their errors over in the wee hours of the morning. But one of their own workers snitched on them to my dad, so he showed up for an inspection around midnight and caught them!
I trained as an Airframe Technician with Short Brothers in Belfast, Northern Ireland, c 1980 apprenticeship intake. At that time Short Brothers employees were told to regard Boeing as the Gold Standard for aircraft engineering and quality. Pride in excellence, was the motto. Sadly, since that time greed and shareholder profits have taken the lead. In the old days, true aircraft people ran companies like Boeing. These days, the bean counters and sociopath managers rule.
I flew the Shorts C23 Sherpa in Iraq as well as the US. The guys and ladies that flew the aircraft loved it. The Georgia crash was my unit. I had been scheduled for that flight, but another pilot was going through upgrade training. While in Iraq, the unit was flying a lot of hours without any major problems. One engine failure going to Takrit that landed safely. The Army was screwed over by the Air Force for the C27J. Army aviation was always about the troops needs, no matter what
Yes and no. Yes, because since then only one large Aircraft Manufacturer for Civil Aircrafts exists in the US (important here: for CIVIL AIRCRAFTS because Lockheed Martin is still an important Aircraft Manufacturer for Military Aircrafts). No, because in the late 1990ies Airbus had become the most important Competitor for Boeing, while the then small European Manufacturer had no real competeting function in the 1960ies and 1970ies, Airbus in the 1970ies included.
The B-17 was nothing like as good as people make out. EG it had the same MTO as the Halifax (main bomber before the Lancaster) but total engine power was 4800HP compared to near 6500 for the Halifax. Specifically if you lost an engine you had to get rid of your war load immediately. The Halifax had just over 4800 available on 3 engines and with half fuel and bombs dropped could just about keep up with the bomber stream on two. Then there is the issue of the B-17 turret guns which would ice up and become useless at maximum altitude which meant you had to fly lower where flak could get you more easily or be defenseless against fighters. they achieved in daytime raids about the same accuracy as the Halifax did at night (IE very few bombs within 1 mile) and there are loads of other issues. To fly those things the crews must have had balls so big they walked funny.
The 707, 747, 757(kind of) and 777 were all programs that Boeing literally bet the future of the company on their success. If these aircraft failed, Boeing Commercial Aircraft would too! This motivated Boeing to build these aircraft as well as they did. The Boeing of today, the Boeing ran by shareholders, accountants and lawyers....not engineers would never take that risk. Thats why they refuse to build the NMA. Accountants aren't innovators in this space!
Business people have no place in business. Every time you see a company go down, it's generally not the fault of the workers, or the product. Companies fail most often because of mismanagement. This is especially true in the manufacturing space.
@jeromethiel4323 is your solution all workers, no management, and workers make business decisions by vote? Group vote to approve vacation requests? Which product to make? Pricing? Marketing message? Suppliers to use?
@@marylut6077Business people with expertise in the fields they are managing, not business people from general business schools. But you bring up an interesting notion. If democracy doesn't work in a business, then maybe it doesn't work in a government. But clearly it's the least worst option in a national government because that means a single person or a cadre doesn't get to run an entire nation to the ground so why afford companies which people rely on for their livelihoods that risk?
When such a story comes from a Mentour Now, a huge enthusiast of Boeing, we know there is a real problem at Boeing… Thank you for covering it from this angle.
A big difference between military and commercial aerospace requirements is safety. Commercial requires three orders of magnitude greater safety. As someone who started in military, it was a big change for me to mentally shift to a commercial safety focus. Having worked at McDonnell Aircraft/McDonnell Douglas/ Boeing and after meeting with Dennis Muilenburg, I don't think he ever made the shift.
I hope that in a few years you can produce a series called: "Boeing's Rise to Greatness". ...I hope. Being an important symbol of American ingenuity and manufacturing prowess, I hope that title becomes reality.
@@MentourNow In the moment looks like more that, Boeing goes bankrupt, they are loosing Money big time. I mean this is the net income in the last few years in million of US Dollars: 2023 $-2,222 2022 $-4,935 2021 $-4,202 2020 $-11,873 2019 $-636 2018 $10,453 Oh and in the Last Quartal they had a net income of -3,9 billion US Dollars. Add to it they delivered only 83 Passenger and freight planes out.
American manufacturing is dead due to 3 reasons: 1 worship of Neoliberalism. 2 worship of shareholder value at all costs which comes at the expense of long term planning. 3 Jack Welch’s time at GE became the norm for American CEOs. Which is how you get Boeing talking about E VTOL taxis and AI, which is Boeing doing PR to try to chase industry trends to pump up their stock price.
As a European I hope the same. I'd rather keep Boeing as a rival than shady Chinese manufacturers (I was going to say Russians too but those are out of the game for now).
after now FIVE YEARS of investigations and fines, and raised fingers, NOTHING has changed, on the contrary. They keep requesting permissions to drop safety inspections! The whole company needs to go down, and has to be rebuilt with ALL NEW employees, from the bottom up, and I mean it! I worked there myself, and the attitudes of the "colleagues" are bad! No new boss can simply walk in and change the whole culture. It would take a total dictator, and the company is too large for a dictator to succeed with the necessary micro-management. Fire EVERYBODY, and hire new college graduates, period. An incentive could be a government financing of engineering degrees for Boeing employees, if they can work and built good planes.
As someone who heads an R&D/Product Development department - i can tell you first hand that a manager with a technical background is not necessarily the right fit. Neither is a manager without a technical background. What is absolutely important is a manager who empowers, leads and provides solid and deliberate vision. Most of the time, this will most likely come from a non-technical manager because they wont get carried away being bogged down by the actual technical issues. They will empower their teams to do the great work that the team can do, while the manager themselves guide everyone to the finish line. Trust me - I've had a supremely technical manager with no actual managerial skills who completely effed up the entire R&D department. Great as a consultant, SUCKED BALLS as a manager and had amazing team members quitting left right and center.
A 2nd Boeing whistleblower died. This time by "rapid infection". I think it's time these whistleblowers start their testimonies with "I'm not suicidal and I have a clean bill of health".
The good thing about a lawyer as CEO might be that he knows he’s neither an engineer nor an accountant.and is trained in listening to the separate parties.
I've been a subscriber to your videos for some time now, and have always found them to be first rate. This, however, is a landmark video. It stands so far above anything I have ever seen that I can't really put a classification on it. You have put a corporate history into perspective in a way no one else I've ever seen has done. I just turned 70, and a whole lot of my aerospace career (including 10 years at FAA) has been involved with Boeing. You've completely revised my perspective on the company, and my experiences with it, all in one eye-opening, and really amazingly well done video. I'll make this as well known in my circles as possible, and in the mean time just express my admiration for your abilities, and my thanks for your wonderful work.
And today.... last time my group requested buying new 2TB hard drives for our test stands so we could record FQT data without filling up.. it was rejected.
@@angelachouinard4581 oh it is so much worse... it isn't even about the cost. There were two main issues: (1) conflict over who would pay. The site? The org? the program? the customer? Sorta an anti-turf war there. (2) there is a 'I bet my career on it' push in the software org to move everything 'into the cloud', so upgrading existing lab equipment to work is a direct affront to the direction we are supposed to be going. So buying a 2TB drive is a political threat that everyone wants someone else to pay for.
@@neeneko I retired after 40+ years in IT and I would _never_ put anything I cared about in the cloud. If it's something I want to be sure will survive, I keep it locally. If it's something I don't want anyone else to steal, I keep it locally. "The Cloud" is just another way of saying "Other people's computers."
@@johnopalko5223 Well, the new mandate at Boeing is 'all cloud'.. all development, all requirements, all test, all going to AWS. I imagine the people pushing for it will move on to better things before it all goes to pot.
Despite what consultants say, cloud is not cheaper than in house, unless you are serving a large number of customers. IAAS is, put simply, renting someone else's computer.
I remember watching an investigation of a DC3 (I think) crash. IIRC it was a 30 year old plane. When they found a bad instrumentation connector wire crimp (that turned out to be the cause) they knew within days when that wire end was crimped, by whom, using what tool. Boeing still can't supply any of the names or records of who attached that door that flew off in flight. The aircraft industry used to be so amazing in it's unyielding attention to each part.
Their brand name is toast. My brother in law used to work for them and he told me the company went to shite when MD managers took over the company. Engineers and scientists were treated like commodities that could easily be replaced. Fast forward 20 years and they couldn't even get a crew cabin to work for the ISS. Their space program is basically toast at this point and even Boeing appears to be throwing in the towel. Most ex Boeing engineers I know in the Seattle area don't think they have the staff anymore to even design another new commercial plane.
Watch PBS "Frontline". You will find all the info you need about the Boeing company history, 737 and the 787, plus interviews with Boeing engineers, workers, journalists...
@@MentourNow well TBH most of us would still watch it... Most likely several times (I hope I'm not the only one relistening these videos on my commute to work) 😁
I worked at McDonnell Douglas from 1989 until 1995 and at Boeing Everett from 1996-1998.....Boeing routinely retaliated against is employees, violated it's own protocols regarding safety even back then....so saying that the change in culture started in 1997 is incorrect......I was in flight test For McDonnell Douglas on the MD-11 and C-17 programs, and was in production and safety on the 747 line ( and got hired back into flight test for the 747-8, but lost that position when Boeing refused to honor the union contract).....In 1998 the fix for the TWA 800 explosion was instituted, and when the parts called out in the drawing were not available, the floor managers said to disregard the drawings and substitute non approved parts......the F.A.A. had to be called to force Boeing to acquire the correct parts.....a couple months later when I submitted my notice that I was quitting, Boeing Management informed me ( and the HR rep) that they would not allow me to quit, initially I was told that my personal tools and belongings had to be left behind or I would not be allowed to leave the building........I had to threaten to call the police.........Boeing local management is the issue, the not the corporate management ( well, the upper management is part of the issue, but they are not responsible for the build quality and retaliation issues) the floor/manufacturing management is the source of the issues with quality and workers.......
Peter, excellent video. I recommend your channel to all of my aviator friends and airline pilots. You do an amazing job of describing and illustrating the various accidents and incidents. It makes me feel like I am right there with the crew! Hoppas att du forsätter med många flera reportage!
I worked at MDC Long Beach, was on the first group of layoffs, some friends who survived the early layoffs, told me the merger of Boeing and Douglas, the New name was the "BOGUS Aircraft Company" 😁 "Excellent Video"
I worked for a company and I loved working there as an account manager for 14 years. Then the accountants took over and half a year later I was fired while I was bringing in 40% of the revenue of a _salesteam_ of five. They ignored labor laws and refused to pay me the bonus I was owed, but my lawyer pried it out of their greedy, sweaty hands eventually. Half a year later they had three people working my region and five years later sales is still down. They turned to the dark side and there's no way back.
I am honestly really sad to see boeing in this situation. They used to be my favorite manufacturer, but since the McDonnell Douglas merger, things sadly went downhill pretty fast.
Everywhere you go within any of the Wa state plants , you will see broken / worn out vehicles and equipment. Everywhere you go , you see faded paint , algae on the sides of vehicles and buildings. No plant anywhere looks fresh and or maintained. The senior employees have zero positive comments, most speak longingly of the old days when they were younger and Boeing was a company with a bright future….most are counting the days till they can walk out the door for last time. The new employees…..there are a few good ones coming through the door but many are substandard as measured by the hiring standards of the golden era. The morale is a joke it is so far gone , the managers that are solid do not stick around, they go to Blue Origin , or elsewhere. I worked there for 5 years, and it was a lousy experience. I truly do not believe there is going to be turnaround. It is too far gone. I am not the only one who thinks this. I would not get on any newer Boeing aircraft if there is a alternative.
Was the same in CA. The old guys were being pressured very hard to leave, I think we lost 4000 in a few months since Boeing were threatening pensions and retirement benefits. Boeing stopped all maintenance, all IR&D, squeezed everyone (including Phds) into tiny noisy cubicles. Total disregard for the tech staff. New hires generally left in a few months due to the depressing atmosphere. Didn't help that the quota hires were worthless or the politicians started meddling in the business. What's left is a tiny fraction of what used to be there and I don't know how they stay in business, they get very little work since their stuff is outdated.
This corporate "culture" of prioritizing profits at all costs is happening everywhere. It just happens to be more evident on a company that makes planes. It will be interesting, if I'm alive by then to see what happens in the long run since I do not think it is viable having ultra rich people hoarding all the money.
Interesting fact is that in 1933 TWA was going to buy the Boeing 247 which was the fastest mail plane then and could carry 9 passengers but then made a proposition to Donald Douglas to make a plane that was larger than the 247 and could climb out with 1 engine inoperative at a high elevation airport with high temperatures. Born was the DC-1, later DC-2 and DC-3.
Fantastic idea for a series. Looking forward to the next video. Your presentation style is top notch and easy to follow. Thank you for sharing your time, knowledge, and perspective as a professional pilot.
As a Boeing shareholder, it may seem self defeating, but I suggest Boeing focus less on shareholder “value” and focus on what has always been more important…safety and innovation.
The downfall of the McDonnell Douglas merger was very similar to what Boeing is going through now. Relentless cost-cutting caused safety issues, which caused crashers, which killed sales. It stifled innovation until the company had no money, no sales, and no hope.
ah yes, it seems the american way of life. you need to fail several times before you believe your failures are failures. a smart man learns from his mistakes a wise man learns from other's mistakes. boeing did neither
It's emblematic of the failings of doing business to please a shareholder, by divesting the path from best practices and quality to cutting costs in every way possible and making quality an afterthought. In short, capitalism's worst qualities are reflected in their current predicament and won't be fixed easily. It takes decades to get this way and decades to correct it.
Even worse, that shareholder is no longer a person, or a mutual fund, but a hedge fund which does not necessarily consider long term performance of a company, so short term gain is prioritised.
I knew Bob Hood, president of DAC. He told me they just couldn’t compete with the “third” engine they had on the -11. He gave me a signed DC-3 book and an MD80 model, but there was a fire and …poof
@@markiliff happens when english is your 3rd language. But keep correcting us in that nice way 👍In my experience many people in europe are thankfull when it is done in a nice way.
@@heikoscheuermann Speaking of Europe...at least Airbus doesnt have doors falling off in midair, although I think their fly by wire joystick idea isnt great. Boeing might become the next DeHavilland as Airbus becomes dominant, and in much the same way.
I'm just a simple plane/accident enthusiast. I heard about all this quite late-but as soon as I heard Boeing was going down due to safety issues-inherently due to cost saving measures, I knew that the manufactoring culture that caused the DC crashes in the 70s, AA96 and TKY981 had not been fixed. It's simply this. shit company+plus good company=disaster. McDonnell Douglas is a cancer, I used to love Boeing, now I'm checking what planes I'm booking. It makes me incredibly angry and I'm just someone who flies. I cannot imagine the stress, anxiety and anger of families and workers who make and operate these planes. This whole situation sickens me.
@@MentourNow I'm so glad to hear you say that, it's very reassuring. I loved flying 747's, I always felt safe and secure, plus the company I prefer flying with flies Boeing's almost exclusively. Thank you for responding!
That's so ironic... Boeing had its best success as a business when it was run by a lawyer, and now it needs a battalion of lawyers to conduct any business
Oh jeah I see a pattern there Peter. McDD lack of innovation after their merger took the cheaper road by updating their working designs, the DC-10 and DC-9 into MD-11 and MD-80’s After the merger with Boeing with management consisting of McDD, they continue the trend by milking the 737NG to fill the role of the discontinued 757 whitout succes instead to produce a wothy 757 replacement. Then with the A320 NEO announcement, the again took the cheaper option to milking the 737 design once again to compete. Now we all know what happened. In Spanish they say “Lo barato sale caro” that means, cheaper is always more expensive. We can now see this saying in all its glory in Boeing now. So sad, cause I love Boeing!
As a Third Generation Boeing Employee, my tour of duty was 1984-1996. This was before the massive Outsourcing Binge that Boeing began shortly after I left. I knew about the differences between the Douglas and Boeing Cultures. I have told many people that Boeing Management lost the Merger Battle. It's not the company that it used to be before it became tainted.
I think the narrative that Douglas resulted in Boeing's culture shift (if it was real) is correlation without causal proof at best. Overall companies in that period shifted to more short sighted practices. I think this should be attributed to the overall pressures that started in the 1980s with private capital firms. Even if you weren't taken over there was the pressure and expectations of that for publicly traded firms. I actually have never worked anywhere where there isn't a tension between safety and work output. Sometimes too much process can cause these defects as people rely fully on process. Other times workforce turnover and lead to enough mistakes in the Swiss cheese. If an airplane can have an accident and the Swiss cheese fail it can on the manufacturing side also.
I have worked for an Airbus supplier and spent weeks at a time on their flight line in Toulouse, They do not cut corners at all. Even hand tools from approved suppliers had to be checked before use. Some like wire strippers and crimpers were checked monthly.
What you are inadvertently referring to is the Anglo Saxon worship of neoliberal capitalism and the cancer that the notorious CEO of General Electric exported to the corporate world. That short term gains in stock value at all costs even at the long term viability of the company. Cut staff if you think it will drive up stock prices, stock buy backs whenever you make a profit, never anticipate future trends in markets and instead always chase current market trends to ensure shareholder value. That all began in America in the 80s.
Internally at Boeing, you could actually track the impact of MD sites and MD managers and culture shift. Even today the difference between ex-MD and ex-Boeing sites can be pretty glaring. It isn't just a tension between safety and output, but instead a swap out of leadership that valued competitive instead of collaborative mindsets. Yes, external pressures have an impact and they were pretty universal at the time, but the internal change was dramatic and poisonous resulting in a very differnt response to those EXTERNAL pressures based off INTERNAL structures.
My uncle was a MD test pilot back in the 70s and worked out of Long Beach airport. My aunt was a secretary at their facility off Bolsa Chica in Huntington Beach. I have fond memories from those days. Was very sad when the merger occurred.
Most excellent historic perspective on the three companies! I worked for Boeing for eighteen years, in two separate stints from 1977 to 1999, with a break in the middle to get an aero engineering degree. I also worked briefly after graduation for United Airlines, another company with legacy connections with Boeing. Even I was not aware of the Boeing CEO story before Bill Allen. Boeing was indeed an engineering company, and largely built airplanes as designed by engineers at that time. When managers actually sat done, shut up, and listened to those designing and building the airplanes. They also listened to customer Airlines’s much better then too. But Boeing presented airplane designs to the customer airlines, trying to get sufficient interest before committing to build them. The Sonic Cruiser being a great example of this. The 7J7 being another. Boeing, back then, was excellent at taking technologies paid for by military projects and leveraging that investment, paid for by the government, to design commercial aircraft derivatives. Boeing was so successful with it that other manufacturers like Airbus spent years claiming that Boeing aircraft were in fact subsidized by the U.S. government. And that Airbus, which from its beginning was very largely subsidized by European governments also. But, that is another story for a future telling. Anyway, Boeings’ problems today are the direct result of a failure to listen to the engineers that create airplane designs and then figure out how to translate drawings and computer simulations into the actual metal and composite flying machines that everyone can see, touch, and fly all around the world inside of. Engineers, when given a problem to solve, were then largely left alone to make the magic happen. While the non-engineering mangers, aka, bean counting accountants figured out both how to pay for it and also how to later profit from the investments. You mention the issues that led to the near bankruptcy of McDonnell/Douglas after similar issues led to the merger of the once separate McDonnell and Douglas companies. This was indeed a great competition between disparate corporate cultures. First between McDonnell and Douglas in the late 1960s. And, later between McDonald’s and Boeing in the late 1990s. I too, should point out the irony of these two mergers as you so eloquently narrated. The resulting similarities are quite striking. I can’t wait to see your Part 2 of this story. I trust that you will relay the rest of the story just as well as you have with this first episode. Because of my personal experience with Boeing and after another career flying both Boeing and Airbus airliner aircraft, I can confirm the validity of your take on this history. My question remains though, how can this Boeing successfully weather the current storm and recover the amazing fortunes of the past as the aerospace industry continues to evolve? Will, or can Boeing regain some semblance of its past glory days and regain the trust of its customers in this new era of the false narrative of “too big to fail”? I will content that nothing, and no one is really too big to fail. And, certainly not survive without properly changing to meet the modern day challenges. Or, will this Boeing merge with some other entity and continue whitewashing the systemic problems once again. As I like to paraphrase an infamous quote, “resistance (to change) is futile.” Assimilation will always and forever be impossible without first fully submitting to the reality that without absolute and complete change, successful change is damned near impossible. Such change will always be the greatest advantage and strength of the entrepreneurial spirit. Yet, even the greatest entrepreneurs find it very difficult to evolve their creations into reproducible, and most importantly profitable and successful commercial endeavors. McDonnell and Douglas failed miserably at it. And now, even the once great Boeing has caught the very same disease.
What stands out in my memory working for an airline in the mid-late 90s are two statements. One: “we have three airframes, the arrogant [Boeing], the incompetent [McDonnell-Douglas], and the hungry [Airbus].” The other quote arose following the Valujet-AirTran merger, “valujet by any other name still flies Douglas company aeroplanes;” this despite our airline flying >100 MD-80s and 90s at the time. I think this pretty much encapsulates the general attitudes of people in the know at that time (at least in my circles). I’m looking forward to watching Peter’s explanation of why Boeing wanted to buy MD, but I remember thinking how arrogant it must be to think you can buy a dysfunctional company of that size and not have it infect the purchasing company.
McDonnell Douglas might not have brought new stuff to market, but their r&d was second to none. The DCX rocket in the 1980s is the basis for everything SpaceX does now.
Considering that one whistle blower abruptly committed suicide, and the other died from a rare disease for someone so young rather abruptly, I can understand why Boeing employees don’t want to speak. Coincidence or not, people are probably worried about falling out of windows like Russian doctors seem to do.
There are a lot of material about the problems caused by the merge of Boing and McDonnald Douglas. One huge problem is the ruthless management of McDonnald Douglas which caused a lot of reputation of Boing.
Everyone is focused (rightly) on Boeing at this time, because their corporate attitude seems to be the epitome of the "bad boss". Unfortunately, I see this as an epidemic in so many (if not most) American corporations. In the 1950s, workers in a company were seen as a RESOURCE to be maintained, cultivated, and retained for a company to be successful. Today's upper management do not see workers as a resource, but an EXPENSE, like rent, or operating costs that needs to be minimized, and during difficult times something to be CUT ALTOGETHER. Today's management comes from the "money engineering division" of every company. CFO's are more likely to become CEOs than someone from the actual product division that comes up in the ranks and knows the company's BUSINESS, not just its accounting. They do not see negative feedback from the workers as something to use to improve the company or its products. Workers giving any negative feedback at all are seen as "troublemakers" to be removed. It was a long slow process, but over time it has made American companies a lot worse to work for and for the consumer, a lot more difficult to deal with.
Mostly true. I don’t like seeing bad business practices that hurt America’s standing in the competitive corporate sphere. It’s the same problem with trains and automobiles too, losing out to foreign firms like Siemens and Toyota. But indeed the 1950s had drawbacks beyond the one mentioned (propaganda and intimidation towards women to be housewives submissive to husbands for example). Also emphasizing stock buybacks over research/development is a losing move in the long run. I touched on very little too. Thus I see Airbus, Siemens, and Toyota eat my country’s breakfast.
I thought the biggest problem affecting the commercial success of the Boeing Stratocruiser was the choice of engines: The Pratt & Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major was one of the most powerful radial piston engines ever made, with 28 cylinders in 4 rows of 7, with a total displacement of 71.5 litres. However, it was also the most complex engine of this type ever made, and because it was never used in any active combat during WW2, was also not developed so thoroughly. As such, the maintenance required was so expensive that airliners using this engine could not be commercially viable and required government subsidies to operate at all. The nearest competitor aircraft at the time such as the Lockheed Constellation didn't have this drawback because they used a different engine: The Wright R-3350 Duplex-Cyclone, which was also a radial piston engine, with 18 cylinders in 2 rows of 9, with a total displacement of just under 55 litres. This engine was used much more extensively during WW2 and as such was subjected to far more development to improve both power output and reliability. It also benefitted postwar from the inclusion of power recovery blowdown turbines driven by the engine exhaust, which contributed an extra 450 horsepower (increasing maximum power output by 16%) for the same rate of fuel consumption. This was a valuable increase in fuel efficiency, which was especially important for long-haul flights. The paradox of which was that the most modern heavy bomber used during WW2 (the Boeing B-29 superfortress) actually used the R-3350 engine almost exclusively. Since the Stratocruiser was developed from the B-29, you might think that it would have used the same engines - and it may well have been commercially viable if it had done so.
The wartime record of those engines on the B-29 was not good. Far from it. I'm guessing that by war's end Wright had worked out those reliability issues. For a fun check on piston engine complexity and reliability, check out the Wiki on "turbo compound engines" . Not "turbocharged" but "turbo compound".
Leadership isn't about being good at the thing the people you're leading do (though having that insight can be helpful sometimes). It's about getting the most out of those people. Engineers are smart creative people who value being allowed some latitude in managing their own activities, and who respect people who listen to them and take what they're saying on board (note, not agreeing, but listening). Boeing sounds like it was most successful in its golden age because it had leadership that valued and respected their engineers, even if they weren't engineers themselves, and in doing so they engendered respect, trust, and the desire to go above and beyond to get the job done. That's good leadership. Not shouting orders or setting deadlines or micromanaging every second of your employees' days, but really listening to your people and helping them reach their full potential whilst steering them in the direction that serves both their and the company's interest.
My dad worked at Douglas in LB for 31 years! He finished by running the C-17 program. They were a great company and the day Boeing took over was the last day my father worked there. Mercedes know owns the last building on Lakewood Blvd in Long Beach but the old Fly Douglas Jets emblem was still kept on that building last time I drove past there 10 years ago.
Funniest thing is you had a video on the main channel yesterday that was about an MD plane and after the emergency landing, that one had an emergency slide that wasn’t mounted properly. Just like a Boeing 767 had an emergency slide rip off mid flight, a day before your video. Which I find hilarious coincidence
"I would like everyone to leave the room except the engineers..." ... "IT WAS A MERGER! IT WAS A MERGER!!! We were supposed to merge with McDonnell Douglas, not the other way around! We should have just bought Embraer and Bombardier instead of this bunch of beancounters! Now, look at Airbus, they got the A220 from the CSeries and what have we got? Plug doors flying off with loose screws!"
There is so much to learn from the MD/Boeing merger and the disasters from the management that came from the merger. The issues are neither new nor rare. This has been a growing trend in all business ownership for a long time. In the past 50 years, it has accelerated (since Trickle Down Economics and other programs designed to funnel more money to a few people). Health care is another industry killing people for profits. Insurance has been in the business of claim denial forever (that is crucial for them to make money). Automotive manufacturers, food, etc. Most companies do risk analysis to balance the potential profits against the risk of legal action and the cost thereof when creating new products or manufacturing/growing what we buy. Our legal systems around the world not only allow for this, but make it very profitable for the few at the top.
I worked for MDC from 1985 to 1997 before the merger, and then for Boeing after the merger until 2000. I worked in facilities maintenance, so I had access to and supported all programs plantwide in Long Beach, C17, MD80, MD90, MD95, DC10, KC10 refueler, metallurgical heat treatment, instrumentation, internal networks, data center, spar mills, etc. I had master keys for 95% of the entire Long Beach facility. I knew something was up in 1995 when a company wide "worth inventory" was performed, and sure enough, 2 years later, a merger took place between Boeing and MDC that monopoly laws should have prevented.
All Boeing needs to do is retooling of the entire company. If they do this Boeing will survive and become a better and safer airplane manufacturer in commercial aviation and military aviation as well. Boeing also needs to focus on its own future and not worry about what Airbus is doing or not doing. It is as plane as day. Rock on Boeing.
They need to find their way back into becoming a great engineering company which they once were. Seems to be less a question of what and more how Boeing is doing it.
Alan Mulally was a brilliant engineer who knew how to manage a very complex and robust organization. His 777 program was fantastic. When he moved to Ford as CEO, he inherited a company with engineers and bean counters at odds with other because of the MBA's calling the shots. His solution was to uncover the problems, find solutions, and implement corrective actions. Management 101. And he did it better than most. Boeing needs to find another Mulally within its ranks who understands engineering and knows accounting.
Hmm! seem to remember the odd engine falling off Boeing's and issues with pressure bulkheads, MD used to pop their doors collapse floors and shred their rear ends with exploding engines. Seems the 'merger' worked well. Went on a tour of the Triumph Motorcycle factory a few years back. Every single bolt and its tightening torque was logged into a database for each 'cycle. These machine have just a few feet to fall if things go wrong. An aircraft has tens of thousands of feet to fall.
It is true, engineers should not be in charge, engineers should be listened too by those in charge, that is how we get comapnies that make a profit without making a 737 max, Challenger or a Colombia.
I was in the Boeing Model Shop from 1979 to 1983. Those were the model years for the 757/767. Great airplane, both. Those were the last analog tested models. I learned more in those four years than any other four year period of my life. We were taught to test and build these planes as if our families were on board. After 1983 the Model Shop was eliminated for the Catia Software platform. That wasn't the fall of Boeing, the merger with Mcdonald Douglas was. That brought about the bean counters, and the rest is history.
At the time, when McDonnel-Douglas had planned to release MD-12 it may have been a huge success... the main problem with A380 was that it came way too late, and was launched almost exactly when the financial crisis of 2008 struck... and the second problem of A380 is, that this plane is so strictly focus on passenger transport, that it's not economy valuable convert it into freighter... If you had an A380like plane, with XLR capabilities and the possibility to be converted to a freighter with ease - that would be an absolutely 747killer, maybe even a 777killer (if this plane would be able to carry appropriate cargo loads)...
The A380, because of its immense size and huge passenger capability, only made sense after the airlines had decided to operate in the hub-and-spoke route design of the latter part of the 20th century. When the airlines went to the point-to-point route design later in the early 21st century, the A380 was physically too large to function into and out of smaller airports and those airports were unable to embark and disembark 800 passengers from the plane the size of the A380. Airbus had made a stupid and fatal mistake in the late 1990s when planning was started for the A380. Now almost all A380s are parked and out of use.
@@rays2506 You said, "Now almost all A380s are parked and out of use." Try again. 147 of the 251 built for customers are in active service as of the release of this video. Now, I will agree with you that the A380 was built to a specification that no longer reflected what airlines wanted, and it's a commercial flop in that sense. The fleet was also particularly hard-hit by the pandemic. That said, A380s still see robust service for some carriers.
@@rays2506 Yes, and no. For Emirates, the A380 is a dream-plane - that exactly fits their needs, and if only Airbus would be able to create a neo version, or even better - twin-engine A380 - Emirates, would probably blindly buy at least as many units as it currently operates A380s... What's more - if filled to 100% - these machines have unmatched fuel economy per passenger. If Airbus did not stop with the smallest version but was tempted to make a larger version (-900 or -1000), based on which an extended-range version could be built - then who knows if, for example, A380s would not conquer ultra-long direct routes? The problem with the current version of the A380 is also that it has wings for the larger version (planned -900 or 1000) - then, who knows - maybe the cargo capacity would be much smaller. Because, you know, judging the current A380 is a bit like judging the A320 family solely based on the A319 ;)
Americans make the mistake of rubbishing the a380. Here in Australia we don't because they are very valuable on ultra long hauls and hubbed routes like dubai or Singapore
I'm looking forward to the next segment(s) and how this story plays out with your expert and unique point of view. Like many people, I look at the downturn of Boeing as starting with Bill Allen's departure and the merger with MD. I want to see if I was wrong or right. Thank you for this.
I grew up in Washington State and my grandmother worked on bombers during WWII. Boeing was always a prestigious point of pride for the local economy. Sorry to see them fall on such hard times.
I was *there* in 2000, working on the DCAC/MRM project. We were kind of a company within a company, fast moving, innovative, using Linux before any other part of Boeing did... and then word came down the pipe at the end of November that we were being absorbed into mainstream Commercial Airplanes... the major impact to our work being that even the tiniest of changes would require three signatures, one waaaay the heck up in the food chain. I had only been there slightly more than a year and had no idea of the backstory, but 20/20 hindsight tells me this was Harry Stonecipher putting the brakes on our old-school move-fast-and-engineer-the-hell-out-of-it approach... Anyway. I was not the only one who headed for the exits, as it turned out. We were justifiably proud of the NG - and the customers loved it, I talked to them myself; both flight deck and cabin crew were ecstatic. But those were the last decent aeroplanes the Rubber Company ever produced, at least from my POV.
I worked for them on ALL platforms- 737, 747-x, 757, 767. 777, 787. Comanche, apache, osprey, etc. It all went to Fook when McD bought it.they even canceled all the worker hobbies like the ham radio club. Scum. It all went downhill from there. The regular jsf outflow the Lockheed. They couldn't design a vertical takeoff.
Blaming McD for their current failures is like me,as a 50 year old man, blaming my parents for not raising me better. = McD has been gone for too long to be relevant to Boeings current failed status.
Boeing is not the first example. Kodak was not only the world market leader, but also a technological leader - Kodak had developed the first digital camera, for example. Nevertheless, it was possible that the greed of the shareholders destroyed this company.
"Boeing seems to be going from crisis to crisis nowadays." Well, I suppose that at least means that they have the virtue of consistency. Well done, by the way - I didn't hear the word 'iconic' mentioned once in a 24-minute long presentation on Boeing.
Fascinating stuff. I've always been intrigued by the marriage of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. I come from a family of fly boys. Dad was airforce, taught his 3 boys probably quite illegally how to fly but I've had the love forever. I love your channel - never fails to interest. And I hope Boeing can sort their shit out....
Looking @19:19 made me recall something I've wondered about ever since the haydays of Mythbusters: How do developers and engineers account for _the properties_ of materials not scaling "symetrically" with the size of parts and components, when making small(er) scale *_physical_*_ models_ for various testing? Seem like in many such tests, material properties must surely have an impact on performance => test results (?) - Heck in some tests surely even the size, mass and inertia of the model would make it behave in a manner that doesn't scale linearly with model scale.
Do their best, but then re-run stress tests at full scale. That's why prototyping exists, and why many prototypes are significantly modified later to reach final design. In more detail, some types of scaling are well-characterized and can be accounted-for: things like beam stiffess, drag scaling, etc. Others, and often ones not immediately obvious, the best that can be done is rough approximations before full-size testing.
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Love the way you said "a lawyer" could feel your discomfort 😂
I love the content. Keep it coming 🤙🏽
@Gavin-zp6nk you need $100,000 for flight lessons my son
I wonder, why do you always change the thumbnail after an hour or so?
Title just lost you a subscriber
"Only those who do not seek power are qualified to hold it." - Plato -
Bill Allen refused to be the president at first because he knew and respected that he is not an engineer. Then he continued respecting engineering. Such a rare piece of history.
Being lawyer might be the best man for the job, he know that getting sued would lose more money and reputation in the long run, keeping it clean is priceless.
@@worawatli8952 Yes, and lawyers know how to negotiate and listen to experts in fields they aren't experts on.
@@worawatli8952Boy they got your gullible self fooled. A lawyer is NEVER the answer. They are typically the problem.
"I have a theory that you can make any sentence seem profound by writing the name of a dead philosopher at the end of it." -Banksy... yeah, also, Plato never said that.
Southwest Airlines co-founder Herb Kelleher was also a lawyer. And an amazing airline CEO.
I worked at McDonnell Douglas Finance back in the 90s. Both McDonnell Douglas and Boeing were obsessed with market share and kept trying to underbid each other to win sales based on low prices, which meant that the "winner" of any competition would have trouble making a profit. It's like they were trying to drive each other out of business.
I found it somewhat amusing when the two companies merged and then had to fulfill ALL the unprofitable deals they had forced each other into. As I recall, that was about the time when cost-cutting and "Lean Manufacturing" took a stranglehold on all kinds of decision-making.
Did you work in St.Louis? My grandmother was a secretary for an exec at the HQ
No irony for management who got paid out to retire post merger
No, I was a SoCal employee. MD Finance was closely involved in commercial airline sales at Douglas (DAC). We didn't do much with McDonnell in STL.
This is a direct result of the neoliberal vulture capitalism culture of Reaganomics and Thatcherism of the 1980's.
Lean manufacturing can be very powerful for a company, but only when applied where it makes sense. Sadly a lot of execs use it as an excuse to cost cut anything that doesn’t have a clear and immediate ROI, like quality, R&D, etc.
The relationship of management, engineers and workers always reminds me what Mr. Douglas said when he retired from Douglas. It is not fun anymore because I used to talk to engineers and technicians and now I talk to lawyers and accountants. This morphed into a total money and stock view in MD which was inherited by Boeing during the merge.
And we will get to that, very soon
it has also been phrased as "the focus shifted from making better airplanes to making bigger paychecks"
The Union hires people that got fired TWICE, and fire those that SPEAK about it.
It is no surprise to me that the jets are literally falling apart.
If it were just that things would probably be fine. There is nothing inherent about a shift in focus that can cause a culture to collapse. What really killed things was that MD brought a culture of transactional antagonism and zero sum thinking. Suppliers went from 'partners' to 'need to be defeated and conquered'.. employees went from being 'partners' to 'internal competition where place had to be shown'. management went from being 'someone we work with' to 'enemies that will screw you'
just like Oracle is for software engineering.
About the head of a company, there is a very nice book : "In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing Disasters" by Merrill R. Chapman where we learn that all IT companies Chapman analysed failed the moment where a tech leader have been replaced by a non-tech one.
Regarding the company culture there may be ad additional explanation that sometimes we European don't take in consideration. I work since 15 years ad a consultant for USA-based companies. I realized that if my US colleagues loses the job, they lose health insurance and maybe the car and the house because lately many Americans basically live on loans of the banks.
Lately this converted many good workers into "yes men". In other words, employees often have to choose between their welfare and standing in front of their boss and speak honestly.
This is very sad.
Thank you, I will have to read that book. And yes, loosing your job in the US often means no health care for the family at the least. If someone has a chronic condition the cost could make you loose all else.
Add to that the IT industry's decimation of the U.S. Middle Class via Outsourcing and Insourcing, the ultimate Economic Treason against America.
fuck yeah america
Me too. Thanks for the thought provoking observation.are you a Brit?
@@robertenn6818 No, just a disillusioned Yank who , worked i IT, traveled and has friends in many countries.
It was Stonecipher/McNerny & Calhoun - three Jack Welch guys from GE who shifted BA to focus on financial results, rather than engineering quality. McNerny - CEO from 2005-2015, & Stonecipher, made the decision on the Max/787 & 777X - all troubled programs that the company has to deal with, today.
Absolutely true.
Stay tuned!
Oh, lets outsource everything so we get everyone's problems and we can't control them. Great idea, yes men all said.
…and who killed several hundred people due to the execs’ willful negligence…
It galls me that the execs step away with tens of millions in compensation dipped in the blood of employees, customers and the flying public.
@@MentourNow I like that! Thank you.
When Mentour Now starts a series about Boeing’s fall of grace we know that things at Boeing are really bad.
It’s been a fascinating thing to research
You got that r I right.
He and Juan Brown are my main info guys, so its sad what Boeing is going throgh.
They are such a part of American flying culture.
When safety culture is tossed away, I would hope that Pilot unions threaten to subsidize pilots in changing to airbus types and ultimately refuse to fly them - a low supply of people wanting to fly boeings new jet will pressure airlines not to buy them
Well a few Hours before this video, boeing lost again parts from a plane....
@@MentourNow as an American, who happens to be a lawyer, the slow downfall of Boeing has been extremely disappointing.
Very well done. A separate story, when Boeing first designed the 727, back when European labor rates were much lower than American rates, Boeing did not outsource, they did not go the cheap way. They simply decided to engineer a superior airplane which would be worth its extra cost. And indeed it was superior to what the British and French industries produced. And it sold a lot and was quite profitable. Boeing would never do that today
They did, with the design of 787. They just blew it with the construction of the 787.
So true. Old Boeing shows what happens when quality of the product comes first and profits second. Nowadays it's the other way round. What happens now at Boeing is a kind reminder why engineers and not bean-counting economists should make the decisions.
@@BongoBaggins The 787 is a great design, but the insistence on an unrealistically accelerated schedule resulted in numerous unplanned redesigns during development which delayed the design and exploded costs. The development is best described by the old engineering maxim: "never time to do it right, always time to do it over". The initial half dozen planes ended up badly overweight and not easily certifiable as Boeing had lost track of all the numerous design revisions and no longer knew the precise configuration the planes had been built to. Boeing ended up donating them to museums and taking a tax write off.
It is an issue that because bmd has classified military projects, they are prohibited from outsourcing.
This is what saved the USA auto industry.
Except for the fact that globalization wasn’t really a thing yet.
The only thing Europe was for was cheap small cars and cheap movie making (Spaghetti Westerns et al).
Concorde was the first plane to have major subassemblies made by different companies in different locations.. with Airbus quickly following suit.. because no single European country could ever hope to compete with American industrial might.
Boeing was flush with cash from world war and Cold War spending in an era where the aircraft that could transport huge subassemblies were literally just being invented by John Conroy to move spacecraft and boosters for NASA.
As a person that has been both an Air Load Master and Non Detructive Testing Team member . As somebody sat in despair at what is happening, this video of yours is sad but fantastically accurate, hope you move in this direction. Wonderful effort.
Thank you!
McDonnell Douglas was predominantly a business management corporation that employed engineers, whereas Boeing was predominantly a engineering firm that employed business managers.
As soon as a company gives power to bean counters, business managers, and shareholders (aka leeches) enshittification inevitably follows.
Stop using the term bean counters. It either identifies you or falsely lumps you in with morons
The lawyer and business/beancounter "culture" goes way back to the 60s. You can find a 5 part series, just search for "Seattle Times, Boeing, Safety at Issue: the 737", and you will find it, published NINETEEN NINETY SIX, before the merger! Title of the lawyer stuff part is "When jets crash: How Boeing fights to limit liability"
"Enshittification"- first time I've seen that one- and my absolute favorite new word! Hello Merriam-Webster?
"Enshitification" is something I would steal.
I hope you know I'm 100% going to start including enshittification into my lexicon because it's too hard to come across such a brilliant creation and not use it liberally in the future
Boeing Engineer: So how many processes are we hoping to cut back on?
Boeing Management: Yes
To be fair, lots of big and old companies have tons of unnecessary processes and bureaucracy. The average engineer in big companies spends like half their time in pointless status report meetings.
Actually, Boeing management has a new process to help them decide what processes to cut back on.
@@Mike-oz4cv all true. In the retail business (ex: a parallel comparison for Boeing-Douglas would be the Kroger-HT merger a few years ago), they are repeating the same issues that Boeing is now experiencing with tons of unnecessary processes that greatly hurt company efficiency while doing non-stop audits that only meet the corporate's end status quo at the same they are NOT listening to what their associates are saying.
The same could be said of the healthcare system (I have a relative who is a 30+-year-old healthcare veteran nurse) because half the time, staff have to attend pointless status report Zoom calls, which take almost four hours of upper management droning on digital devices about what policies would work from an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) business standpoint for the business for their customers instead of listening to what nurses and other staff think about these changes, etc. Most of the world has a business administrator view of things, given what they have learned from college. Still, it doesn't cover everything internally about the welfare of the internal staff/co-workers, etc.
What are their benefits, and how can practical solutions increase staff "morale"-the key term many companies like Boeing have forgotten to consider? When morale is extremely low, and you see job sites with very low approval ratings for your company, then you know there has to be some serious shakeup for their business to survive in an almost post-COVID world.
In 2022 Boeing streamlined quality manufacturing procedural specification development and refactoring QMPSDR with a supplemental program identified as spontaneously initiated process efficacy review and reduction SIPERR which included an employee incentive program called work intrinsic rewards for employee curtailing of unnecessary trudgery WIRECUT.
It was 2.7% effective based on results of the bi-annual normalized guage survey of effective limitations of frustrations BANGSELF, which replaced the original ill-conceived half-annual version of the program.
Boeing dis-management.
I’ll never forget this merger, I was a kid then. My hometown St.Louis was pretty upset to see McDonnell Douglas leave STL. I’ll always remember my father and his buddies at the airlines saying how bad of a merger this would be down the line. They knew the airplane business well!
The fact that the general public (who may not care about aircraft type like us aviation geeks) are using sites like Expedia to select aircraft type and AVOID Boeing should be setting off alarm bells at Boeing’s HQ.
The DC-10 suffered a similar reputation. American Airlines removed the DC-10 logo from their “Luxury Liners”.
@@calvinnickel9995I mean, one of their DC-10’s caused the single deadliest aviation accident in U.S. history. Can’t say I blame them, even though that accident was caused mostly by improper maintenance (aka: it was *their* fault).
So, in summary, the CEO doesn’t have to be an engineer, but can’t be an MBA.
I have a story. When I was a supervisor in a telecom sales call center (which is just two steps above rep and lead) my team always performed in the top three. Then the promoted a well liked rep who just got his MBA. To his credit, going to school and getting his MBA is impressive. Then in a supervisor meeting we all talked to the regional director and we all got a say. I talked about how I motivated my team, how I looked out for them and how I was there by their side and train them. The MBA talked about stock holder value, maximizing interactions and reducing cost. Huh? Dude, you’re supervisor. Guess whose team would consistently beat his? Yup this high school grad. Who ended up getting promoted? Yup, the MBA. He became the call centers operations manager, which is the second in charge of the whole call center. In reality, he was the one that did everything, the call center director, who was awful by the way, just sat at her desk and reported numbers to the higher ups. He made sweeping changes. Hired on his husband as a trainer (no training experience) and they came up with a script and implemented it. So now when you called, it was the same pitch. Customers aren’t dumb, they know that after the third time they called that are being sold. It was robotic at best. But they were so impressed by him that they made the script official and gave it to our sister call centers. Numbers fell, I told my team to abandon the script and sell like I knew they could. Didn’t matter that I was top supervisor, I got scolded and eventually written up. So I forced my team to go back on the script, but don’t be so impersonal. I flew under the radar. Numbers sucked for the call center, they modified the script, didn’t make much of a difference. My telecom got bought by another, which was awful, because they were the lowest rated but had the money to do so. Obviously the layoffs started. Him, the director, and his husband were the very first to get laid off. Yay right? No. They came in with their own MBAs, cut the pensions, obviously, made the commission even harder to get and surprise! A new script. When that wasn’t enough, they shut down call centers, opened up a bunch in Costa Rica, some did get moved to Texas and Florida.
I quit, which is what they obviously wanted us to do, and became a nurse. Never going back to sales.
Years ago waiting at the auto shop I read a story by a guy who bought a fast food franchise. He had no formal business education so when he had a chance to go to a business seminar at Harvard he was excited. He came away appalled and I will never forget how he described what they were teaching. Just like your MBA. He said without his employees he had no business but the way they described how things should be run was treating both the the employees and customers like you know what. Sorry you had such a ordeal.
The thing is - it's not the MBA that's the problem. That's just a toolkit of training. The problem is taking an MBA's word for it that they know what they're doing. It's like promoting someone with a brand new set of car tools to run your racing team.
“HIS” husband was all I needed to hear to know that guy was a cancer.
@@cm1133 the worst part is the nepotism.
What are you actually saying?
"It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it." - Robert Sinclair.
Human Factor.... Pay peanuts you get monkeys.....
4-28-24. This applies to the talking heads at NBC and MSNBC news Almost painful to watch regarding a GOP or Trump related story.
@@77space-vt8wino one asked.
I think a fundamental difference between Boeing and Douglas was the top management of the two companies. Before yielding day to day responsibility to his son, Donald Wills Douglas, Sr. WAS Douglas Aircraft Company. Employees were fond of saying, "We don't work for Douglas; we work for Doug." The loyalty of even senior executives and engineers was to one man, a loyalty his son did not command. Many left the company, and within ten years, this aviation giant was broke.
Douglas was a good company before it was forced to work with McDonnell who are just out for themselves and are now the toxic DNA of Boeing. When we criticise Boeing we should point our finger firmly towards McDonnell who were saved by the merger from becoming a second rate aircraft company. Mentour has been hitting the books, nice presentation.
As a former Boeing employee of 15 years, I can tell it is Boeing in name only now. The 'merger' killed everything good about Boeing.
It appears that humility and character are prerequisite for leadership.
Note to self:
1) Be considerate of my associates views
2) Don’t talk to much, let others talk
3) Make a sincere effort to understand labour’s viewpoint
4) Develop a (postwar) future for Boeing
One of the worst decisions Boeing ever made internally was passing over Alan Mulally for the CEO position in the mid-2000s. He could have returned the company to its engineering-first principles.
You're going to like the next episode..!
didn't they instead bring in that guy who ruined GE?
Huge Alan Mulally fan. What he did with the 777 and at Ford were both outstanding. I wish he had written more on his product development and management ideas.
I agree - In my role as a development pilot for Ansett involved in the introduction of the 737-200 Advanced (1981) and then the 737-300 (1985), I also met Alan when he was the lead engineer on the 7J7 project. I went to a Seattle presentation on this new aircraft in around 1987 and it was clear that Alan was first and foremost an engineer, as were all of the Boeing people I worked with in those years. Such a pity these engineering skills and culture were overrun by corporate greed.
@@Ted-Hanoimoney plays nowadays in the whole world
I grew up right near JFK in New York. When the 747 first started operating I couldn’t believe how such a huge plane could fly. A few years later I got to travel in one. Still my favorite plane to fly on. What a marvel of engineering!
I have a rich family history with Douglas Aircraft. My parents both worked for Douglas in Long Beach, California. That's where they met, so in a way, I am a child of Douglas. After my mother died, my father married another Douglas employee, and my step-sister likewise worked for Douglas for a time. Even I did! While we were living in Toronto, Canada, due to my father's Douglas employment, I worked there during the summer of 1968. When my father died in 1976 he was still an employee -- though Douglas had merged with McDonnell by then. So I had a family loyalty to Douglas. And Boeing was "the enemy"! LOL!
Long after McDonnell-Douglas merged with Boeing, I happened to be visiting a USAF air base around 1978 during an air show, and by chance had a conversation with a couple of Boeing employees who were showing off the KC-10 tanker aircraft. These two men had been Boeing employees before the merger, and they told me that after the merger the culture in the company had gone down the tubes. And they blamed this on the culture that came in with Douglas. I have no idea if this was true. But perhaps it was.
I'd bet money it was McDonnell, not Douglas, that is the ruinous factor in all of these. Douglas was known for really solid if somewhat iterative designs, with them being second basically only to Boeing in the commercial jet liner business. And, obviously enough, they put out some great designs - the DC-8, of course, but also to some degree the DC-9 and DC-10 (the trijet and the unfortunately cancelled twinjet).
You'll notice that as soon as MD took over, all the bold moves were replaced by a much more cautious, conservative approach... one that was money first, everything else later.
Thank you very much for sharing your Experience!
@@davidfuller581 Indeed, exactly. And interestingly McDonnell is today only just remembered as the "M" before Douglas - because it was obvious that Douglas was the Manufacturer of all the famous Aircrafts from the DC-2 up to the MD-11 and McDonnell was - what?
And yes, especially the "Mad Dogs" were difining Aircrafts of their time in the 1980ies and 1990ies and even in the first years of the new Century. The DC-10 had a great, but - as you know - also difficult History. The Story of the DC-8 probably really started with its Late Use as Freighters - the DC-8 putted as Freighters the B 707 into the shadow.
Not entirely, Mc Donnell is the part to blame for the decay, Douglas itself was a respected company well known for it's quality build and design, only perhaps outrun by Lockheed's engineering. Boeing has been successful at doing it's thing, but their strong point always was Marketing. it's saviour grail was the 367-80. Without it they would have been stuck being a mediocre company.
@@DirtyRocha - Well, of course a couple of Boeing engineers might be expected to say it's Douglas's fault.
My father was a quality control guy at Douglas, and he was entirely dedicated to it. He was head of the quality control team in England, where a British company was making the nosewheel for the DC-10. They tried to sneak a few badly-made items past him, but he was too observant. One time they tried to get a poorly-machined strut past him by painting their errors over in the wee hours of the morning. But one of their own workers snitched on them to my dad, so he showed up for an inspection around midnight and caught them!
I trained as an Airframe Technician with Short Brothers in Belfast, Northern Ireland, c 1980 apprenticeship intake. At that time Short Brothers employees were told to regard Boeing as the Gold Standard for aircraft engineering and quality. Pride in excellence, was the motto. Sadly, since that time greed and shareholder profits have taken the lead. In the old days, true aircraft people ran companies like Boeing. These days, the bean counters and sociopath managers rule.
I flew the Shorts C23 Sherpa in Iraq as well as the US. The guys and ladies that flew the aircraft loved it. The Georgia crash was my unit. I had been scheduled for that flight, but another pilot was going through upgrade training. While in Iraq, the unit was flying a lot of hours without any major problems. One engine failure going to Takrit that landed safely.
The Army was screwed over by the Air Force for the C27J. Army aviation was always about the troops needs, no matter what
The McDonnell-Douglas merger definitely did one thing: eliminated competition. Less competition might lead to some “efficiencies” that cut corners.
Yes and no. Yes, because since then only one large Aircraft Manufacturer for Civil Aircrafts exists in the US (important here: for CIVIL AIRCRAFTS because Lockheed Martin is still an important Aircraft Manufacturer for Military Aircrafts). No, because in the late 1990ies Airbus had become the most important Competitor for Boeing, while the then small European Manufacturer had no real competeting function in the 1960ies and 1970ies, Airbus in the 1970ies included.
The B-17 was nothing like as good as people make out. EG it had the same MTO as the Halifax (main bomber before the Lancaster) but total engine power was 4800HP compared to near 6500 for the Halifax. Specifically if you lost an engine you had to get rid of your war load immediately. The Halifax had just over 4800 available on 3 engines and with half fuel and bombs dropped could just about keep up with the bomber stream on two. Then there is the issue of the B-17 turret guns which would ice up and become useless at maximum altitude which meant you had to fly lower where flak could get you more easily or be defenseless against fighters. they achieved in daytime raids about the same accuracy as the Halifax did at night (IE very few bombs within 1 mile) and there are loads of other issues. To fly those things the crews must have had balls so big they walked funny.
The 707, 747, 757(kind of) and 777 were all programs that Boeing literally bet the future of the company on their success. If these aircraft failed, Boeing Commercial Aircraft would too! This motivated Boeing to build these aircraft as well as they did. The Boeing of today, the Boeing ran by shareholders, accountants and lawyers....not engineers would never take that risk. Thats why they refuse to build the NMA. Accountants aren't innovators in this space!
Or in any space. Engineers use calculus, accountants rely rise above arithmetic.
Did you even watch the video... The functional department is not what determines the success of a leader, it's the leader's character instead.
That is why Boeing decided to let partners share the risk in making the 787, putting the task of producing some parts and risks with the partners.
It takes 40 years to build a good reputation and just a few months to destroy it. It then takes 10-20 years to rebuild it.
Yep
Business people have no place in business. Every time you see a company go down, it's generally not the fault of the workers, or the product. Companies fail most often because of mismanagement. This is especially true in the manufacturing space.
@jeromethiel4323 is your solution all workers, no management, and workers make business decisions by vote? Group vote to approve vacation requests? Which product to make? Pricing? Marketing message? Suppliers to use?
Informative, succinct! TY
@@marylut6077Business people with expertise in the fields they are managing, not business people from general business schools.
But you bring up an interesting notion. If democracy doesn't work in a business, then maybe it doesn't work in a government. But clearly it's the least worst option in a national government because that means a single person or a cadre doesn't get to run an entire nation to the ground so why afford companies which people rely on for their livelihoods that risk?
When such a story comes from a Mentour Now, a huge enthusiast of Boeing, we know there is a real problem at Boeing… Thank you for covering it from this angle.
Absolutely .I always suspected he is a Boeing fan boy
I really lke the use of actual video footage instead of AI 👍
And not every second clip showing a Boeing plane in a dramatic, vertical takeoff. 😅
UA-camrs with access to AI video have been as annoying as an 8 year old with access to a drum set.
A big difference between military and commercial aerospace requirements is safety. Commercial requires three orders of magnitude greater safety. As someone who started in military, it was a big change for me to mentally shift to a commercial safety focus. Having worked at McDonnell Aircraft/McDonnell Douglas/ Boeing and after meeting with Dennis Muilenburg, I don't think he ever made the shift.
You think it'd be the opposite with military planes given how they'll become acceptable targets in the event war occurs.
I hope that in a few years you can produce a series called: "Boeing's Rise to Greatness".
...I hope.
Being an important symbol of American ingenuity and manufacturing prowess, I hope that title becomes reality.
I really hope so to!
@@MentourNow In the moment looks like more that, Boeing goes bankrupt, they are loosing Money big time.
I mean this is the net income in the last few years in million of US Dollars:
2023 $-2,222
2022 $-4,935
2021 $-4,202
2020 $-11,873
2019 $-636
2018 $10,453
Oh and in the Last Quartal they had a net income of -3,9 billion US Dollars.
Add to it they delivered only 83 Passenger and freight planes out.
American manufacturing is dead due to 3 reasons: 1 worship of
Neoliberalism. 2 worship of shareholder value at all costs which comes at the expense of long term planning. 3 Jack Welch’s time at GE became the norm for American CEOs. Which is how you get Boeing talking about E VTOL taxis and AI, which is Boeing doing PR to try to chase industry trends to pump up their stock price.
As a European I hope the same. I'd rather keep Boeing as a rival than shady Chinese manufacturers (I was going to say Russians too but those are out of the game for now).
after now FIVE YEARS of investigations and fines, and raised fingers, NOTHING has changed, on the contrary. They keep requesting permissions to drop safety inspections! The whole company needs to go down, and has to be rebuilt with ALL NEW employees, from the bottom up, and I mean it! I worked there myself, and the attitudes of the "colleagues" are bad! No new boss can simply walk in and change the whole culture. It would take a total dictator, and the company is too large for a dictator to succeed with the necessary micro-management.
Fire EVERYBODY, and hire new college graduates, period. An incentive could be a government financing of engineering degrees for Boeing employees, if they can work and built good planes.
As someone who heads an R&D/Product Development department - i can tell you first hand that a manager with a technical background is not necessarily the right fit. Neither is a manager without a technical background.
What is absolutely important is a manager who empowers, leads and provides solid and deliberate vision. Most of the time, this will most likely come from a non-technical manager because they wont get carried away being bogged down by the actual technical issues. They will empower their teams to do the great work that the team can do, while the manager themselves guide everyone to the finish line.
Trust me - I've had a supremely technical manager with no actual managerial skills who completely effed up the entire R&D department. Great as a consultant, SUCKED BALLS as a manager and had amazing team members quitting left right and center.
This is correct. What you need is a great leader who knows the way and understands how to get the best from people and systems in getting there.
A 2nd Boeing whistleblower died. This time by "rapid infection". I think it's time these whistleblowers start their testimonies with "I'm not suicidal and I have a clean bill of health".
The good thing about a lawyer as CEO might be that he knows he’s neither an engineer nor an accountant.and is trained in listening to the separate parties.
yeah sure.
A lawyer back then was just a bachelor's degree
A good lawyer: Yes.
Many of us wished the McDonnell and Douglas merger never happened.
Probably would not have made a difference. Business is about making money..
In 1967? Please elaborate. I know very little about that one.
Another whistleblower just died under weird circumstances, not long after testifying against Boeing. Very concerning.
I've been a subscriber to your videos for some time now, and have always found them to be first rate. This, however, is a landmark video. It stands so far above anything I have ever seen that I can't really put a classification on it. You have put a corporate history into perspective in a way no one else I've ever seen has done. I just turned 70, and a whole lot of my aerospace career (including 10 years at FAA) has been involved with Boeing. You've completely revised my perspective on the company, and my experiences with it, all in one eye-opening, and really amazingly well done video. I'll make this as well known in my circles as possible, and in the mean time just express my admiration for your abilities, and my thanks for your wonderful work.
And today.... last time my group requested buying new 2TB hard drives for our test stands so we could record FQT data without filling up.. it was rejected.
Dear heaven! 2 TB hardly costs a thing. I'm just an old retired lady and I have multiple 4 TB drives. That's beyond poor management.
@@angelachouinard4581 oh it is so much worse... it isn't even about the cost. There were two main issues:
(1) conflict over who would pay. The site? The org? the program? the customer? Sorta an anti-turf war there.
(2) there is a 'I bet my career on it' push in the software org to move everything 'into the cloud', so upgrading existing lab equipment to work is a direct affront to the direction we are supposed to be going.
So buying a 2TB drive is a political threat that everyone wants someone else to pay for.
@@neeneko I retired after 40+ years in IT and I would _never_ put anything I cared about in the cloud. If it's something I want to be sure will survive, I keep it locally. If it's something I don't want anyone else to steal, I keep it locally. "The Cloud" is just another way of saying "Other people's computers."
@@johnopalko5223 Well, the new mandate at Boeing is 'all cloud'.. all development, all requirements, all test, all going to AWS. I imagine the people pushing for it will move on to better things before it all goes to pot.
Despite what consultants say, cloud is not cheaper than in house, unless you are serving a large number of customers. IAAS is, put simply, renting someone else's computer.
I remember watching an investigation of a DC3 (I think) crash. IIRC it was a 30 year old plane. When they found a bad instrumentation connector wire crimp (that turned out to be the cause) they knew within days when that wire end was crimped, by whom, using what tool.
Boeing still can't supply any of the names or records of who attached that door that flew off in flight. The aircraft industry used to be so amazing in it's unyielding attention to each part.
From “If it is not Boeing,am not going “to If its Boeing am not going 😢😭.
Their brand name is toast. My brother in law used to work for them and he told me the company went to shite when MD managers took over the company. Engineers and scientists were treated like commodities that could easily be replaced. Fast forward 20 years and they couldn't even get a crew cabin to work for the ISS. Their space program is basically toast at this point and even Boeing appears to be throwing in the towel. Most ex Boeing engineers I know in the Seattle area don't think they have the staff anymore to even design another new commercial plane.
This was fascinating, but I don’t think I like how this series ends….it’s like watching a 3 part series on the Titanic 😳
Regards from the Patreon crew
Watch PBS "Frontline". You will find all the info you need about the Boeing company history, 737 and the 787, plus interviews with Boeing engineers, workers, journalists...
I know, I avoid doing series on both channels for this reason. But the alternative was to make this video over an hour long.
@@MentourNow well TBH most of us would still watch it... Most likely several times (I hope I'm not the only one relistening these videos on my commute to work) 😁
Thank you for this series Petter. An inside view is one thing, but an overall picture like the one you are building is also really valuable.
Thank you!
I worked at McDonnell Douglas from 1989 until 1995 and at Boeing Everett from 1996-1998.....Boeing routinely retaliated against is employees, violated it's own protocols regarding safety even back then....so saying that the change in culture started in 1997 is incorrect......I was in flight test For McDonnell Douglas on the MD-11 and C-17 programs, and was in production and safety on the 747 line ( and got hired back into flight test for the 747-8, but lost that position when Boeing refused to honor the union contract).....In 1998 the fix for the TWA 800 explosion was instituted, and when the parts called out in the drawing were not available, the floor managers said to disregard the drawings and substitute non approved parts......the F.A.A. had to be called to force Boeing to acquire the correct parts.....a couple months later when I submitted my notice that I was quitting, Boeing Management informed me ( and the HR rep) that they would not allow me to quit, initially I was told that my personal tools and belongings had to be left behind or I would not be allowed to leave the building........I had to threaten to call the police.........Boeing local management is the issue, the not the corporate management ( well, the upper management is part of the issue, but they are not responsible for the build quality and retaliation issues) the floor/manufacturing management is the source of the issues with quality and workers.......
Peter, excellent video. I recommend your channel to all of my aviator friends and airline pilots. You do an amazing job of describing and illustrating the various accidents and incidents. It makes me feel like I am right there with the crew! Hoppas att du forsätter med många flera reportage!
I worked at MDC Long Beach, was on the first group of layoffs, some friends who survived the early layoffs, told me the merger of Boeing and Douglas, the New name was the "BOGUS Aircraft Company" 😁 "Excellent Video"
I worked for a company and I loved working there as an account manager for 14 years.
Then the accountants took over and half a year later I was fired while I was bringing in 40% of the revenue of a _salesteam_ of five. They ignored labor laws and refused to pay me the bonus I was owed, but my lawyer pried it out of their greedy, sweaty hands eventually.
Half a year later they had three people working my region and five years later sales is still down.
They turned to the dark side and there's no way back.
I am honestly really sad to see boeing in this situation. They used to be my favorite manufacturer, but since the McDonnell Douglas merger, things sadly went downhill pretty fast.
I am sad to. I’ve flown Boeing aircraft my entire career
Everywhere you go within any of the Wa state plants , you will see broken / worn out vehicles and equipment. Everywhere you go , you see faded paint , algae on the sides of vehicles and buildings. No plant anywhere looks fresh and or maintained. The senior employees have zero positive comments, most speak longingly of the old days when they were younger and Boeing was a company with a bright future….most are counting the days till they can walk out the door for last time. The new employees…..there are a few good ones coming through the door but many are substandard as measured by the hiring standards of the golden era. The morale is a joke it is so far gone , the managers that are solid do not stick around, they go to Blue Origin , or elsewhere. I worked there for 5 years, and it was a lousy experience. I truly do not believe there is going to be turnaround. It is too far gone. I am not the only one who thinks this. I would not get on any newer Boeing aircraft if there is a alternative.
Was the same in CA. The old guys were being pressured very hard to leave, I think we lost 4000 in a few months since Boeing were threatening pensions and retirement benefits. Boeing stopped all maintenance, all IR&D, squeezed everyone (including Phds) into tiny noisy cubicles. Total disregard for the tech staff. New hires generally left in a few months due to the depressing atmosphere. Didn't help that the quota hires were worthless or the politicians started meddling in the business. What's left is a tiny fraction of what used to be there and I don't know how they stay in business, they get very little work since their stuff is outdated.
This corporate "culture" of prioritizing profits at all costs is happening everywhere. It just happens to be more evident on a company that makes planes. It will be interesting, if I'm alive by then to see what happens in the long run since I do not think it is viable having ultra rich people hoarding all the money.
I think these MBAs forget why customers pay in the first place, and it's not to give stockholders a buyback, or executives a mansion.
Me too. I concur.
Interesting fact is that in 1933 TWA was going to buy the Boeing 247 which was the fastest mail plane then and could carry 9 passengers but then made a proposition to Donald Douglas to make a plane that was larger than the 247 and could climb out with 1 engine inoperative at a high elevation airport with high temperatures. Born was the DC-1, later DC-2 and DC-3.
That’s all in the DC-3 video, it’s a good one.
Fantastic idea for a series. Looking forward to the next video. Your presentation style is top notch and easy to follow. Thank you for sharing your time, knowledge, and perspective as a professional pilot.
Thank you very much!
As a Boeing shareholder, it may seem self defeating, but I suggest Boeing focus less on shareholder “value” and focus on what has always been more important…safety and innovation.
The downfall of the McDonnell Douglas merger was very similar to what Boeing is going through now. Relentless cost-cutting caused safety issues, which caused crashers, which killed sales. It stifled innovation until the company had no money, no sales, and no hope.
ah yes, it seems the american way of life. you need to fail several times before you believe your failures are failures.
a smart man learns from his mistakes
a wise man learns from other's mistakes.
boeing did neither
It's emblematic of the failings of doing business to please a shareholder, by divesting the path from best practices and quality to cutting costs in every way possible and making quality an afterthought. In short, capitalism's worst qualities are reflected in their current predicament and won't be fixed easily. It takes decades to get this way and decades to correct it.
Even worse, that shareholder is no longer a person, or a mutual fund, but a hedge fund which does not necessarily consider long term performance of a company, so short term gain is prioritised.
@@tristanmills4948 Damn the door plugs. what about muh shareholder returns?! ...in action, yep.
I knew Bob Hood, president of DAC. He told me they just couldn’t compete with the “third” engine they had on the -11. He gave me a signed DC-3 book and an MD80 model, but there was a fire and …poof
Yesterday I heard this: this car has less doors than Boeing midair.
*fewer
;-)
@@markiliff happens when english is your 3rd language. But keep correcting us in that nice way 👍In my experience many people in europe are thankfull when it is done in a nice way.
So did it start the trip with doors.
🤔
@@heikoscheuermann Speaking of Europe...at least Airbus doesnt have doors falling off in midair, although I think their fly by wire joystick idea isnt great.
Boeing might become the next DeHavilland as Airbus becomes dominant, and in much the same way.
I'm just a simple plane/accident enthusiast. I heard about all this quite late-but as soon as I heard Boeing was going down due to safety issues-inherently due to cost saving measures, I knew that the manufactoring culture that caused the DC crashes in the 70s, AA96 and TKY981 had not been fixed. It's simply this. shit company+plus good company=disaster. McDonnell Douglas is a cancer, I used to love Boeing, now I'm checking what planes I'm booking. It makes me incredibly angry and I'm just someone who flies. I cannot imagine the stress, anxiety and anger of families and workers who make and operate these planes.
This whole situation sickens me.
I understand but, at least I believe, that it can still be reversed. The core of Boeing is still good.
@@MentourNow I'm so glad to hear you say that, it's very reassuring. I loved flying 747's, I always felt safe and secure, plus the company I prefer flying with flies Boeing's almost exclusively.
Thank you for responding!
@@MentourNow
i believe they are past the point of return. and if they are not it will take a decade at least.
@MentourNow
Let's hope so
McDonnell: 100% efficiency record in destroying every other great aircraft manufacturer it merges with.
That's so ironic... Boeing had its best success as a business when it was run by a lawyer, and now it needs a battalion of lawyers to conduct any business
Every cleen sheet desing made by Boeing was a Game changer. 1969, 737, 747; 1981, 767; 1982, 757; 1995, 777 ; 2011, 787
Oh jeah I see a pattern there Peter.
McDD lack of innovation after their merger took the cheaper road by updating their working designs, the DC-10 and DC-9 into MD-11 and MD-80’s
After the merger with Boeing with management consisting of McDD, they continue the trend by milking the 737NG to fill the role of the discontinued 757 whitout succes instead to produce a wothy 757 replacement.
Then with the A320 NEO announcement, the again took the cheaper option to milking the 737 design once again to compete.
Now we all know what happened.
In Spanish they say “Lo barato sale caro” that means, cheaper is always more expensive.
We can now see this saying in all its glory in Boeing now.
So sad, cause I love Boeing!
Good point. Only the 787 doesn´t fit into this pattern.
As a Third Generation Boeing Employee, my tour of duty was 1984-1996. This was before the massive Outsourcing Binge that Boeing began shortly after I left. I knew about the differences between the Douglas and Boeing Cultures. I have told many people that Boeing Management lost the Merger Battle. It's not the company that it used to be before it became tainted.
I think the narrative that Douglas resulted in Boeing's culture shift (if it was real) is correlation without causal proof at best. Overall companies in that period shifted to more short sighted practices. I think this should be attributed to the overall pressures that started in the 1980s with private capital firms. Even if you weren't taken over there was the pressure and expectations of that for publicly traded firms.
I actually have never worked anywhere where there isn't a tension between safety and work output. Sometimes too much process can cause these defects as people rely fully on process. Other times workforce turnover and lead to enough mistakes in the Swiss cheese. If an airplane can have an accident and the Swiss cheese fail it can on the manufacturing side also.
I have worked for an Airbus supplier and spent weeks at a time on their flight line in Toulouse, They do not cut corners at all. Even hand tools from approved suppliers had to be checked before use. Some like wire strippers and crimpers were checked monthly.
We will see more about the corporate influx in next weeks episode
What you are inadvertently referring to is the Anglo Saxon worship of neoliberal capitalism and the cancer that the notorious CEO of General Electric exported to the corporate world. That short term gains in stock value at all costs even at the long term viability of the company. Cut staff if you think it will drive up stock prices, stock buy backs whenever you make a profit, never anticipate future trends in markets and instead always chase current market trends to ensure shareholder value. That all began in America in the 80s.
@gordonlawrence1448 that's amazing to hear, thanks for sharing your experience!
Internally at Boeing, you could actually track the impact of MD sites and MD managers and culture shift. Even today the difference between ex-MD and ex-Boeing sites can be pretty glaring. It isn't just a tension between safety and output, but instead a swap out of leadership that valued competitive instead of collaborative mindsets.
Yes, external pressures have an impact and they were pretty universal at the time, but the internal change was dramatic and poisonous resulting in a very differnt response to those EXTERNAL pressures based off INTERNAL structures.
My uncle was a MD test pilot back in the 70s and worked out of Long Beach airport. My aunt was a secretary at their facility off Bolsa Chica in Huntington Beach. I have fond memories from those days. Was very sad when the merger occurred.
My brother was an U S AirForce jet engine mechanic.They used to say, in jest, I hope, "FuckIt I'm not gonna fly it."
That’s terrible
Different priorities in the military.
gallows humour?
Most excellent historic perspective on the three companies! I worked for Boeing for eighteen years, in two separate stints from 1977 to 1999, with a break in the middle to get an aero engineering degree. I also worked briefly after graduation for United Airlines, another company with legacy connections with Boeing. Even I was not aware of the Boeing CEO story before Bill Allen. Boeing was indeed an engineering company, and largely built airplanes as designed by engineers at that time. When managers actually sat done, shut up, and listened to those designing and building the airplanes. They also listened to customer Airlines’s much better then too. But Boeing presented airplane designs to the customer airlines, trying to get sufficient interest before committing to build them. The Sonic Cruiser being a great example of this. The 7J7 being another. Boeing, back then, was excellent at taking technologies paid for by military projects and leveraging that investment, paid for by the government, to design commercial aircraft derivatives. Boeing was so successful with it that other manufacturers like Airbus spent years claiming that Boeing aircraft were in fact subsidized by the U.S. government. And that Airbus, which from its beginning was very largely subsidized by European governments also. But, that is another story for a future telling.
Anyway, Boeings’ problems today are the direct result of a failure to listen to the engineers that create airplane designs and then figure out how to translate drawings and computer simulations into the actual metal and composite flying machines that everyone can see, touch, and fly all around the world inside of. Engineers, when given a problem to solve, were then largely left alone to make the magic happen. While the non-engineering mangers, aka, bean counting accountants figured out both how to pay for it and also how to later profit from the investments. You mention the issues that led to the near bankruptcy of McDonnell/Douglas after similar issues led to the merger of the once separate McDonnell and Douglas companies. This was indeed a great competition between disparate corporate cultures. First between McDonnell and Douglas in the late 1960s. And, later between McDonald’s and Boeing in the late 1990s. I too, should point out the irony of these two mergers as you so eloquently narrated. The resulting similarities are quite striking. I can’t wait to see your Part 2 of this story. I trust that you will relay the rest of the story just as well as you have with this first episode. Because of my personal experience with Boeing and after another career flying both Boeing and Airbus airliner aircraft, I can confirm the validity of your take on this history. My question remains though, how can this Boeing successfully weather the current storm and recover the amazing fortunes of the past as the aerospace industry continues to evolve? Will, or can Boeing regain some semblance of its past glory days and regain the trust of its customers in this new era of the false narrative of “too big to fail”? I will content that nothing, and no one is really too big to fail. And, certainly not survive without properly changing to meet the modern day challenges. Or, will this Boeing merge with some other entity and continue whitewashing the systemic problems once again. As I like to paraphrase an infamous quote, “resistance (to change) is futile.” Assimilation will always and forever be impossible without first fully submitting to the reality that without absolute and complete change, successful change is damned near impossible. Such change will always be the greatest advantage and strength of the entrepreneurial spirit. Yet, even the greatest entrepreneurs find it very difficult to evolve their creations into reproducible, and most importantly profitable and successful commercial endeavors. McDonnell and Douglas failed miserably at it. And now, even the once great Boeing has caught the very same disease.
2nd whistleblower mysteriously died a few days ago. Hmmmmmmmm
What stands out in my memory working for an airline in the mid-late 90s are two statements. One: “we have three airframes, the arrogant [Boeing], the incompetent [McDonnell-Douglas], and the hungry [Airbus].” The other quote arose following the Valujet-AirTran merger, “valujet by any other name still flies Douglas company aeroplanes;” this despite our airline flying >100 MD-80s and 90s at the time. I think this pretty much encapsulates the general attitudes of people in the know at that time (at least in my circles). I’m looking forward to watching Peter’s explanation of why Boeing wanted to buy MD, but I remember thinking how arrogant it must be to think you can buy a dysfunctional company of that size and not have it infect the purchasing company.
Very interesting stuff, waiting for next week !!
McDonnell Douglas might not have brought new stuff to market, but their r&d was second to none. The DCX rocket in the 1980s is the basis for everything SpaceX does now.
Considering that one whistle blower abruptly committed suicide, and the other died from a rare disease for someone so young rather abruptly, I can understand why Boeing employees don’t want to speak. Coincidence or not, people are probably worried about falling out of windows like Russian doctors seem to do.
There are a lot of material about the problems caused by the merge of Boing and McDonnald Douglas. One huge problem is the ruthless management of McDonnald Douglas which caused a lot of reputation of Boing.
Everyone is focused (rightly) on Boeing at this time, because their corporate attitude seems to be the epitome of the "bad boss". Unfortunately, I see this as an epidemic in so many (if not most) American corporations.
In the 1950s, workers in a company were seen as a RESOURCE to be maintained, cultivated, and retained for a company to be successful.
Today's upper management do not see workers as a resource, but an EXPENSE, like rent, or operating costs that needs to be minimized, and during difficult times something to be CUT ALTOGETHER. Today's management comes from the "money engineering division" of every company. CFO's are more likely to become CEOs than someone from the actual product division that comes up in the ranks and knows the company's BUSINESS, not just its accounting.
They do not see negative feedback from the workers as something to use to improve the company or its products. Workers giving any negative feedback at all are seen as "troublemakers" to be removed.
It was a long slow process, but over time it has made American companies a lot worse to work for and for the consumer, a lot more difficult to deal with.
Mostly true. I don’t like seeing bad business practices that hurt America’s standing in the competitive corporate sphere. It’s the same problem with trains and automobiles too, losing out to foreign firms like Siemens and Toyota. But indeed the 1950s had drawbacks beyond the one mentioned (propaganda and intimidation towards women to be housewives submissive to husbands for example). Also emphasizing stock buybacks over research/development is a losing move in the long run. I touched on very little too. Thus I see Airbus, Siemens, and Toyota eat my country’s breakfast.
I thought the biggest problem affecting the commercial success of the Boeing Stratocruiser was the choice of engines: The Pratt & Whitney R-4360 Wasp Major was one of the most powerful radial piston engines ever made, with 28 cylinders in 4 rows of 7, with a total displacement of 71.5 litres. However, it was also the most complex engine of this type ever made, and because it was never used in any active combat during WW2, was also not developed so thoroughly. As such, the maintenance required was so expensive that airliners using this engine could not be commercially viable and required government subsidies to operate at all.
The nearest competitor aircraft at the time such as the Lockheed Constellation didn't have this drawback because they used a different engine: The Wright R-3350 Duplex-Cyclone, which was also a radial piston engine, with 18 cylinders in 2 rows of 9, with a total displacement of just under 55 litres. This engine was used much more extensively during WW2 and as such was subjected to far more development to improve both power output and reliability. It also benefitted postwar from the inclusion of power recovery blowdown turbines driven by the engine exhaust, which contributed an extra 450 horsepower (increasing maximum power output by 16%) for the same rate of fuel consumption. This was a valuable increase in fuel efficiency, which was especially important for long-haul flights.
The paradox of which was that the most modern heavy bomber used during WW2 (the Boeing B-29 superfortress) actually used the R-3350 engine almost exclusively. Since the Stratocruiser was developed from the B-29, you might think that it would have used the same engines - and it may well have been commercially viable if it had done so.
The wartime record of those engines on the B-29 was not good. Far from it. I'm guessing that by war's end Wright had worked out those reliability issues.
For a fun check on piston engine complexity and reliability, check out the Wiki on "turbo compound engines" . Not "turbocharged" but "turbo compound".
Leadership isn't about being good at the thing the people you're leading do (though having that insight can be helpful sometimes). It's about getting the most out of those people. Engineers are smart creative people who value being allowed some latitude in managing their own activities, and who respect people who listen to them and take what they're saying on board (note, not agreeing, but listening).
Boeing sounds like it was most successful in its golden age because it had leadership that valued and respected their engineers, even if they weren't engineers themselves, and in doing so they engendered respect, trust, and the desire to go above and beyond to get the job done.
That's good leadership. Not shouting orders or setting deadlines or micromanaging every second of your employees' days, but really listening to your people and helping them reach their full potential whilst steering them in the direction that serves both their and the company's interest.
It must suck to be an engineer putting in loads of effort to design a new plane only to have management seemingly arbitrarily say "no".
My dad worked at Douglas in LB for 31 years! He finished by running the C-17 program. They were a great company and the day Boeing took over was the last day my father worked there. Mercedes know owns the last building on Lakewood Blvd in Long Beach but the old Fly Douglas Jets emblem was still kept on that building last time I drove past there 10 years ago.
Funniest thing is you had a video on the main channel yesterday that was about an MD plane and after the emergency landing, that one had an emergency slide that wasn’t mounted properly.
Just like a Boeing 767 had an emergency slide rip off mid flight, a day before your video.
Which I find hilarious coincidence
I was born in the 1950s, so it's fun to hear these things, and how the company has evolved. Thank you for this series!
- "If 737 Max 9's counter-attacks, everything will be alright"
- "My President, Max 9 cannot find enough screws. The attack didn't take place"
"I would like everyone to leave the room except the engineers..." ... "IT WAS A MERGER! IT WAS A MERGER!!! We were supposed to merge with McDonnell Douglas, not the other way around! We should have just bought Embraer and Bombardier instead of this bunch of beancounters! Now, look at Airbus, they got the A220 from the CSeries and what have we got? Plug doors flying off with loose screws!"
@@Cairannx COWARDS, ALL OF THEM!!! ALL THE SCREWS ARE LYING COWARDS!!!
There is so much to learn from the MD/Boeing merger and the disasters from the management that came from the merger.
The issues are neither new nor rare. This has been a growing trend in all business ownership for a long time. In the past 50 years, it has accelerated (since Trickle Down Economics and other programs designed to funnel more money to a few people).
Health care is another industry killing people for profits. Insurance has been in the business of claim denial forever (that is crucial for them to make money). Automotive manufacturers, food, etc.
Most companies do risk analysis to balance the potential profits against the risk of legal action and the cost thereof when creating new products or manufacturing/growing what we buy. Our legal systems around the world not only allow for this, but make it very profitable for the few at the top.
Why are the whistleblowers all suddenly dying? Coincidence?
I worked for MDC from 1985 to 1997 before the merger, and then for Boeing after the merger until 2000. I worked in facilities maintenance, so I had access to and supported all programs plantwide in Long Beach, C17, MD80, MD90, MD95, DC10, KC10 refueler, metallurgical heat treatment, instrumentation, internal networks, data center, spar mills, etc. I had master keys for 95% of the entire Long Beach facility. I knew something was up in 1995 when a company wide "worth inventory" was performed, and sure enough, 2 years later, a merger took place between Boeing and MDC that monopoly laws should have prevented.
All Boeing needs to do is retooling of the entire company. If they do this Boeing will survive and become a better and safer airplane manufacturer in commercial aviation and military aviation as well. Boeing also needs to focus on its own future and not worry about what Airbus is doing or not doing. It is as plane as day. Rock on Boeing.
fat chance, i suspect they are past the return
They need to find their way back into becoming a great engineering company which they once were. Seems to be less a question of what and more how Boeing is doing it.
Alan Mulally was a brilliant engineer who knew how to manage a very complex and robust organization. His 777 program was fantastic. When he moved to Ford as CEO, he inherited a company with engineers and bean counters at odds with other because of the MBA's calling the shots. His solution was to uncover the problems, find solutions, and implement corrective actions. Management 101. And he did it better than most. Boeing needs to find another Mulally within its ranks who understands engineering and knows accounting.
Hmm! seem to remember the odd engine falling off Boeing's and issues with pressure bulkheads, MD used to pop their doors collapse floors and shred their rear ends with exploding engines. Seems the 'merger' worked well. Went on a tour of the Triumph Motorcycle factory a few years back. Every single bolt and its tightening torque was logged into a database for each 'cycle. These machine have just a few feet to fall if things go wrong. An aircraft has tens of thousands of feet to fall.
👍
It is true, engineers should not be in charge, engineers should be listened too by those in charge, that is how we get comapnies that make a profit without making a 737 max, Challenger or a Colombia.
Hey man, I love your channel. Also thanks for releasing this on my b day! A day off, a birthday, a mentour now video an a deboss video?
Happy birthday!!
@@MentourNow thanks bud
I was in the Boeing Model Shop from 1979 to 1983. Those were the model years for the 757/767. Great airplane, both. Those were the last analog tested models. I learned more in those four years than any other four year period of my life. We were taught to test and build these planes as if our families were on board. After 1983 the Model Shop was eliminated for the Catia Software platform. That wasn't the fall of Boeing, the merger with Mcdonald Douglas was. That brought about the bean counters, and the rest is history.
At the time, when McDonnel-Douglas had planned to release MD-12 it may have been a huge success... the main problem with A380 was that it came way too late, and was launched almost exactly when the financial crisis of 2008 struck... and the second problem of A380 is, that this plane is so strictly focus on passenger transport, that it's not economy valuable convert it into freighter... If you had an A380like plane, with XLR capabilities and the possibility to be converted to a freighter with ease - that would be an absolutely 747killer, maybe even a 777killer (if this plane would be able to carry appropriate cargo loads)...
The A380, because of its immense size and huge passenger capability, only made sense after the airlines had decided to operate in the hub-and-spoke route design of the latter part of the 20th century. When the airlines went to the point-to-point route design later in the early 21st century, the A380 was physically too large to function into and out of smaller airports and those airports were unable to embark and disembark 800 passengers from the plane the size of the A380. Airbus had made a stupid and fatal mistake in the late 1990s when planning was started for the A380. Now almost all A380s are parked and out of use.
@@rays2506 You said, "Now almost all A380s are parked and out of use." Try again. 147 of the 251 built for customers are in active service as of the release of this video. Now, I will agree with you that the A380 was built to a specification that no longer reflected what airlines wanted, and it's a commercial flop in that sense. The fleet was also particularly hard-hit by the pandemic. That said, A380s still see robust service for some carriers.
@@rays2506 Yes, and no. For Emirates, the A380 is a dream-plane - that exactly fits their needs, and if only Airbus would be able to create a neo version, or even better - twin-engine A380 - Emirates, would probably blindly buy at least as many units as it currently operates A380s...
What's more - if filled to 100% - these machines have unmatched fuel economy per passenger.
If Airbus did not stop with the smallest version but was tempted to make a larger version (-900 or -1000), based on which an extended-range version could be built - then who knows if, for example, A380s would not conquer ultra-long direct routes?
The problem with the current version of the A380 is also that it has wings for the larger version (planned -900 or 1000) - then, who knows - maybe the cargo capacity would be much smaller.
Because, you know, judging the current A380 is a bit like judging the A320 family solely based on the A319 ;)
Americans make the mistake of rubbishing the a380. Here in Australia we don't because they are very valuable on ultra long hauls and hubbed routes like dubai or Singapore
I'm looking forward to the next segment(s) and how this story plays out with your expert and unique point of view. Like many people, I look at the downturn of Boeing as starting with Bill Allen's departure and the merger with MD. I want to see if I was wrong or right. Thank you for this.
I grew up in Washington State and my grandmother worked on bombers during WWII. Boeing was always a prestigious point of pride for the local economy. Sorry to see them fall on such hard times.
I was *there* in 2000, working on the DCAC/MRM project. We were kind of a company within a company, fast moving, innovative, using Linux before any other part of Boeing did... and then word came down the pipe at the end of November that we were being absorbed into mainstream Commercial Airplanes... the major impact to our work being that even the tiniest of changes would require three signatures, one waaaay the heck up in the food chain. I had only been there slightly more than a year and had no idea of the backstory, but 20/20 hindsight tells me this was Harry Stonecipher putting the brakes on our old-school move-fast-and-engineer-the-hell-out-of-it approach...
Anyway. I was not the only one who headed for the exits, as it turned out. We were justifiably proud of the NG - and the customers loved it, I talked to them myself; both flight deck and cabin crew were ecstatic. But those were the last decent aeroplanes the Rubber Company ever produced, at least from my POV.
I worked for them on ALL platforms- 737, 747-x, 757, 767. 777, 787. Comanche, apache, osprey, etc. It all went to Fook when McD bought it.they even canceled all the worker hobbies like the ham radio club. Scum. It all went downhill from there. The regular jsf outflow the Lockheed. They couldn't design a vertical takeoff.
Blaming McD for their current failures is like me,as a 50 year old man, blaming my parents for not raising me better. =
McD has been gone for too long to be relevant to Boeings current failed status.
Boeing is not the first example. Kodak was not only the world market leader, but also a technological leader - Kodak had developed the first digital camera, for example. Nevertheless, it was possible that the greed of the shareholders destroyed this company.
i think in this case it was not greed. look into the reason why kodak failed.
"Boeing seems to be going from crisis to crisis nowadays." Well, I suppose that at least means that they have the virtue of consistency. Well done, by the way - I didn't hear the word 'iconic' mentioned once in a 24-minute long presentation on Boeing.
And... a 2nd whistleblower just died
Fascinating stuff. I've always been intrigued by the marriage of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. I come from a family of fly boys. Dad was airforce, taught his 3 boys probably quite illegally how to fly but I've had the love forever. I love your channel - never fails to interest.
And I hope Boeing can sort their shit out....
Looking @19:19 made me recall something I've wondered about ever since the haydays of Mythbusters: How do developers and engineers account for _the properties_ of materials not scaling "symetrically" with the size of parts and components, when making small(er) scale *_physical_*_ models_ for various testing? Seem like in many such tests, material properties must surely have an impact on performance => test results (?) - Heck in some tests surely even the size, mass and inertia of the model would make it behave in a manner that doesn't scale linearly with model scale.
Do their best, but then re-run stress tests at full scale. That's why prototyping exists, and why many prototypes are significantly modified later to reach final design.
In more detail, some types of scaling are well-characterized and can be accounted-for: things like beam stiffess, drag scaling, etc. Others, and often ones not immediately obvious, the best that can be done is rough approximations before full-size testing.