Gosh I love your explanation of Aquinas, sometimes he can be very heavy, and having someone talk through it is great. I'll stick with a root beer though. ;)
You don't accept his argument because you don't understand it. According to the the “second way” of St. Thomas, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. When St. Thomas uses the term “cause” he does not mean some temporal event, rather he is referring to an agent. Aristotle admitted an eternal universe, yet nonetheless recognized you can't have an infinite regression of simultaneously operating causes. Perhaps it's easier to understand if you replace the term "cause" with "explanatory principle." You can't have an infinite regress of ever more fundamental physical principles or agents behind observed physical phenomena. Eventually you come to physical first principles. These are either "brute facts", i.e., without reason and absurd, or they have some more fundamental principle or cause on an immaterial, metaphysical level. Yet these in turn must be grounded in some first metaphysical principle or Necessary Being, or else everything is ultimately arational or "caused by nothing," a literally absurdist position. The “third way” (otherwise known as the argument from contingency) is divided into two parts. First, it is proven that something must necessarily exist. And second, that whatever that necessary being is, it must derive necessity/existence from itself. 1). Something must necessarily exist. We are not talking about logical necessity. It is logically consistent for nothing at all to exist, so existential necessity, if it is anywhere, is to be found only a posteriori, by examining the world as it is. Once we see that one or more things exist, we can deduce that not all of them can be contingent. Even atheists effectively acknowledge as much when they posit spacetime or the multiverse or some other substratum as some ultimate existent that must be, so that there cannot be nothing. However, if the atheist decides that some definite physical property such as mass, momentum or energy is the "necessary being", they would have to ask why does there exist this much mass, momentum or energy rather than some other amount? Since the property in question cannot fully account for this fact, it does not qualify as a necessary or self-sufficient being. [Note: Aquinas is using the term "contingent" here in the Aristotelian sense, of something that can occur only under some conditions, but not others. It is contrasted with necessity or inevitability. Something created ab aeterno (from eternity) by God under necessity would itself be a necessary being, since it can never not exist.] 2). This something must derive necessity/existence from itself For example, in a fatalistic universe, all beings would be necessary, yet some necessities would be determined by others. Ultimately, there must be some being that is not only necessary, but derives its necessity from itself and nowhere else. To St. Thomas and other Scholastics, it would be too obvious for comment that even eternally persisting matter could not derive necessity from itself. Matter cannot exist by itself, but needs form, and needs to receive its form or determination from somewhere. Nor can a material being with some eternally fixed form be self-necessary, since its materiality implies the possibility of change, so there must be something preventing it from changing. Then there should be some immaterial being that is self-necessary. In this regard St. Thomas has only to show, as he does elsewhere, that angels or other purely spiritual beings are not self-necessary. Whatever remains, though we can't describe or define it, is something that does not receive form or any determination of being or even simple existence from anywhere but itself. Not only must it exist, but this necessity derives from itself. Such a being deserves the name of God if anything does. [Note: When the scholastics use terms such as “matter”, “form”, “accident”, etc. they mean something completely different than how we understand the terms today. “Matter” is not to be confused with the modern physicists' idea of matter, which is really a genus of substance; or the early modern mechanists' notion of matter as extension or body. Matter, by definition, is potentiality in the order of essence. That is to say, it is the aspect of essence (what a thing is) that is the potential to receive some specific form and thereby constitute a substance (a thing that is). For corporeal substances, matter is a principle of individuation, which is to say, the principle by which "this substance" is numerically distinct from "that substance," even if they are identical in form. "Form” is that which makes something a certain kind or species of substance.]
"You don't accept his argument because you don't understand it" since I didn't give a reason why I don't accept it, you cannot conclude that I do not understand it. However, I see you have put a lot of effort into your response, so I will read it in detail later and respond.
According to the the “second way” of St. Thomas, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. When St. Thomas uses the term “cause” he does not mean some temporal event, rather he is referring to an agent. Aristotle admitted an eternal universe, yet nonetheless recognized you can't have an infinite regression of simultaneously operating causes. Perhaps it's easier to understand if you replace the term "cause" with "explanatory principle." You can't have an infinite regress of ever more fundamental physical principles or agents behind observed physical phenomena. Eventually you come to physical first principles. These are either "brute facts", i.e., without reason and absurd, or they have some more fundamental principle or cause on an immaterial, metaphysical level. Yet these in turn must be grounded in some first metaphysical principle or Necessary Being, or else everything is ultimately arational or "caused by nothing," a literally absurdist position. The “third way” (otherwise known as the argument from contingency” is divided into two parts. First, it is proven that something must necessarily exist. And second, that whatever that necessary being is, it must derive necessity/existence from itself. 1). Something must necessarily exist. We are not talking about logical necessity. It is logically consistent for nothing at all to exist, so existential necessity, if it is anywhere, is to be found only a posteriori, by examining the world as it is. Once we see that one or more things exist, we can deduce that not all of them can be contingent. Even atheists effectively acknowledge as much when they posit spacetime or the multiverse or some other substratum as some ultimate existent that must be, so that there cannot be nothing. However, if the atheist decides that some definite physical property such as mass, momentum or energy is the "necessary being", they would have to ask why does there exist this much mass, momentum or energy rather than some other amount? Since the property in question cannot fully account for this fact, it does not qualify as a necessary or self-sufficient being. [Note: Aquinas is using the term "contingent" here in the Aristotelian sense, of something that can occur only under some conditions, but not others. It is contrasted with necessity or inevitability. Something created ab aeterno (from eternity) by God under necessity would itself be a necessary being, since it can never not exist.] 2). This something must derive necessity/existence from itself For example, in a fatalistic universe, all beings would be necessary, yet some necessities would be determined by others. Ultimately, there must be some being that is not only necessary, but derives its necessity from itself and nowhere else. To St. Thomas and other Scholastics, it would be too obvious for comment that even eternally persisting matter could not derive necessity from itself. Matter cannot exist by itself, but needs form, and needs to receive its form or determination from somewhere. Nor can a material being with some eternally fixed form be self-necessary, since its materiality implies the possibility of change, so there must be something preventing it from changing. Then there should be some immaterial being that is self-necessary. In this regard St. Thomas has only to show, as he does elsewhere, that angels or other purely spiritual beings are not self-necessary. Whatever remains, though we can't describe or define it, is something that does not receive form or any determination of being or even simple existence from anywhere but itself. Not only must it exist, but this necessity derives from itself. Such a being deserves the name of God if anything does. [Note: When the scholastics use terms such as “matter”, “form”, “accident”, etc. they mean something completely different than how we understand the terms today. “Matter” is not to be confused with the modern physicists' idea of matter, which is really a genus of substance; or the early modern mechanists' notion of matter as extension or body. Matter, by definition, is potentiality in the order of essence. That is to say, it is the aspect of essence (what a thing is) that is the potential to receive some specific form and thereby constitute a substance (a thing that is). For corporeal substances, matter is a principle of individuation, which is to say, the principle by which "this substance" is numerically distinct from "that substance," even if they are identical in form. "Form” is that which makes something a certain kind or species of substance.]
I was going through some hard stuff with my faith today, I'm really glad you make these
Gosh I love your explanation of Aquinas, sometimes he can be very heavy, and having someone talk through it is great. I'll stick with a root beer though. ;)
Amazing!!
I do not accept Aquinas's judgement about god's existence any more than I accept such biblical claims. It's all just people giving their opinions.
You don't accept his argument because you don't understand it.
According to the the “second way” of St. Thomas, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. When St. Thomas uses the term “cause” he does not mean some temporal event, rather he is referring to an agent. Aristotle admitted an eternal universe, yet nonetheless recognized you can't have an infinite regression of simultaneously operating causes. Perhaps it's easier to understand if you replace the term "cause" with "explanatory principle." You can't have an infinite regress of ever more fundamental physical principles or agents behind observed physical phenomena. Eventually you come to physical first principles. These are either "brute facts", i.e., without reason and absurd, or they have some more fundamental principle or cause on an immaterial, metaphysical level. Yet these in turn must be grounded in some first metaphysical principle or Necessary Being, or else everything is ultimately arational or "caused by nothing," a literally absurdist position.
The “third way” (otherwise known as the argument from contingency) is divided into two parts. First, it is proven that something must necessarily exist. And second, that whatever that necessary being is, it must derive necessity/existence from itself.
1). Something must necessarily exist.
We are not talking about logical necessity. It is logically consistent for nothing at all to exist, so existential necessity, if it is anywhere, is to be found only a posteriori, by examining the world as it is. Once we see that one or more things exist, we can deduce that not all of them can be contingent. Even atheists effectively acknowledge as much when they posit spacetime or the multiverse or some other substratum as some ultimate existent that must be, so that there cannot be nothing. However, if the atheist decides that some definite physical property such as mass, momentum or energy is the "necessary being", they would have to ask why does there exist this much mass, momentum or energy rather than some other amount? Since the property in question cannot fully account for this fact, it does not qualify as a necessary or self-sufficient being.
[Note: Aquinas is using the term "contingent" here in the Aristotelian sense, of something that can occur only under some conditions, but not others. It is contrasted with necessity or inevitability. Something created ab aeterno (from eternity) by God under necessity would itself be a necessary being, since it can never not exist.]
2). This something must derive necessity/existence from itself
For example, in a fatalistic universe, all beings would be necessary, yet some necessities would be determined by others. Ultimately, there must be some being that is not only necessary, but derives its necessity from itself and nowhere else. To St. Thomas and other Scholastics, it would be too obvious for comment that even eternally persisting matter could not derive necessity from itself. Matter cannot exist by itself, but needs form, and needs to receive its form or determination from somewhere. Nor can a material being with some eternally fixed form be self-necessary, since its materiality implies the possibility of change, so there must be something preventing it from changing. Then there should be some immaterial being that is self-necessary. In this regard St. Thomas has only to show, as he does elsewhere, that angels or other purely spiritual beings are not self-necessary. Whatever remains, though we can't describe or define it, is something that does not receive form or any determination of being or even simple existence from anywhere but itself. Not only must it exist, but this necessity derives from itself. Such a being deserves the name of God if anything does.
[Note: When the scholastics use terms such as “matter”, “form”, “accident”, etc. they mean something completely different than how we understand the terms today.
“Matter” is not to be confused with the modern physicists' idea of matter, which is really a genus of substance; or the early modern mechanists' notion of matter as extension or body. Matter, by definition, is potentiality in the order of essence. That is to say, it is the aspect of essence (what a thing is) that is the potential to receive some specific form and thereby constitute a substance (a thing that is). For corporeal substances, matter is a principle of individuation, which is to say, the principle by which "this substance" is numerically distinct from "that substance," even if they are identical in form.
"Form” is that which makes something a certain kind or species of substance.]
"You don't accept his argument because you don't understand it"
since I didn't give a reason why I don't accept it, you cannot conclude that I do not understand it.
However, I see you have put a lot of effort into your response, so I will read it in detail later and respond.
We are still waiting your response
fair enough. however, kinda busy for a few weeks. I will bookmark this and check back in once my current set of important tasks is completed.
John Williams All right then, I guess
Things exist, some of these things say god exists, therefore god exists. This logic is infuriating.
According to the the “second way” of St. Thomas, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. When St. Thomas uses the term “cause” he does not mean some temporal event, rather he is referring to an agent. Aristotle admitted an eternal universe, yet nonetheless recognized you can't have an infinite regression of simultaneously operating causes. Perhaps it's easier to understand if you replace the term "cause" with "explanatory principle." You can't have an infinite regress of ever more fundamental physical principles or agents behind observed physical phenomena. Eventually you come to physical first principles. These are either "brute facts", i.e., without reason and absurd, or they have some more fundamental principle or cause on an immaterial, metaphysical level. Yet these in turn must be grounded in some first metaphysical principle or Necessary Being, or else everything is ultimately arational or "caused by nothing," a literally absurdist position.
The “third way” (otherwise known as the argument from contingency” is divided into two parts. First, it is proven that something must necessarily exist. And second, that whatever that necessary being is, it must derive necessity/existence from itself.
1). Something must necessarily exist.
We are not talking about logical necessity. It is logically consistent for nothing at all to exist, so existential necessity, if it is anywhere, is to be found only a posteriori, by examining the world as it is. Once we see that one or more things exist, we can deduce that not all of them can be contingent. Even atheists effectively acknowledge as much when they posit spacetime or the multiverse or some other substratum as some ultimate existent that must be, so that there cannot be nothing. However, if the atheist decides that some definite physical property such as mass, momentum or energy is the "necessary being", they would have to ask why does there exist this much mass, momentum or energy rather than some other amount? Since the property in question cannot fully account for this fact, it does not qualify as a necessary or self-sufficient being.
[Note: Aquinas is using the term "contingent" here in the Aristotelian sense, of something that can occur only under some conditions, but not others. It is contrasted with necessity or inevitability. Something created ab aeterno (from eternity) by God under necessity would itself be a necessary being, since it can never not exist.]
2). This something must derive necessity/existence from itself
For example, in a fatalistic universe, all beings would be necessary, yet some necessities would be determined by others. Ultimately, there must be some being that is not only necessary, but derives its necessity from itself and nowhere else. To St. Thomas and other Scholastics, it would be too obvious for comment that even eternally persisting matter could not derive necessity from itself. Matter cannot exist by itself, but needs form, and needs to receive its form or determination from somewhere. Nor can a material being with some eternally fixed form be self-necessary, since its materiality implies the possibility of change, so there must be something preventing it from changing. Then there should be some immaterial being that is self-necessary. In this regard St. Thomas has only to show, as he does elsewhere, that angels or other purely spiritual beings are not self-necessary. Whatever remains, though we can't describe or define it, is something that does not receive form or any determination of being or even simple existence from anywhere but itself. Not only must it exist, but this necessity derives from itself. Such a being deserves the name of God if anything does.
[Note: When the scholastics use terms such as “matter”, “form”, “accident”, etc. they mean something completely different than how we understand the terms today.
“Matter” is not to be confused with the modern physicists' idea of matter, which is really a genus of substance; or the early modern mechanists' notion of matter as extension or body. Matter, by definition, is potentiality in the order of essence. That is to say, it is the aspect of essence (what a thing is) that is the potential to receive some specific form and thereby constitute a substance (a thing that is). For corporeal substances, matter is a principle of individuation, which is to say, the principle by which "this substance" is numerically distinct from "that substance," even if they are identical in form.
"Form” is that which makes something a certain kind or species of substance.]
@@jonathantinnely5107 Yes