I blame Gavin. I am an American. I was in the 82nd, My dad was i the 82nd, and my uncle has a jump with the 505. Not putting priority on the bridge was the reason for failure.
"The 82nd Airborne Division, however, certainly does not deserve any particular criticism for this as their priorities appear to be a further product of the blind optimism that dogged Operation Market Garden, of which everyone involved was guilty. At Nijmegen, as with everywhere else, the assumption was that resistance would be light and so the main concern of the airborne units was to make the advance of the ground forces as rapid and as uncomplicated as possible, instead of devoting all their attention to primary objectives. Furthermore, it should be understood that the 82nd Airborne Division had by far the most complicated plan of any of the Airborne units involved with Market Garden, their troops being required to capture numerous objectives over a considerable expanse of terrain." Pegasus Archive 30. Reasons for Failure page
I don't blame the 82nd Just gaven The whole operation was about securing bridges. Therefore the bridge should have been priority. I retired as a Maj and attended Combined Arms and Services staff course among others. Loved your presentation @@nickdanger3802
General Gavin did put priority on securing the Nijmegen highway bridge, but Colonel Lindquist did not interpret his instructions correctly. The best analysis I've read on this bridge versus ridge debate is by John C McManus in September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), and his veteran's first hand accounts are supported by other witnesses in Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012). McManus also briefly refers to the story of PFC Joe Atkins, whose account of securing the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge with two other scouts before having to withdraw when nobody else showed up proves that the 1st Battalion could have taken the bridge without firing a shot on the first evening, as Gavin had instructed. His short story is recorded in full by Zig Boroughs' collection of stories from veterans in The 508th Connection (2013), and also included in the best update on Market Garden by Swedish historian - Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020), which also debunks many of the myths from A Bridge Too Far. Pegasus Archive online is dated 2001 on the website and doesn't seem to have been updated with the more recent research by any of these researchers.
Market Garden has always fascinated me. This show was a fantastic voyage through the possible points of failure in the overall operation. I knew about Gavin's reluctance to move on the Waal bridge until The Groesbeek Heights were "secured", but Brereton's role in dictating the number of lifts, lack of coup de main operations and lack of air support (weather notwithstanding) is another eye opener. Excellent show, Paul and RG.
John Burns Where was Bradley in the Hurtgen Forest. When did he show up there? How many foxholes did he sleep in? 😉 Montgomery actually arrived in Eindhoven in the battle zone. Pretty amazing for an Army Group commander. Montgomery also got down into the Ardennes during the Bulge, while Bradley was still in a lavish HQ in Luxembourg City.
Paul an extremely interesting program having someone who has done extensive research into this as an unbiased 3rd party. I was surprised to learn the number of mistakes made that led to the failure of this plan, as well as the assessment that it could have succeeded as late as the 19th of September. I am sure I have some preconceived notions as a result of the movie. Discarding the mistakes made by multiple drops and poor decisions by commanders, the one that resonates with me is the failure to take into account the Dutch underground and aerial reconnaissance of the Germain buildup around Arnhem. Very interesting show as usual--thx Paul
Interesting point that came out at Warfest was that the planning for Market Garden wasn't one that was integrated with air other than transport. TAF command simply weren't asked to be involved, say what they were capable of doing or included in the overall plan to support the drops and subsequent ground operations. They could certainly provide air to ground support as they had done with great effect in Normandy but simply weren't asked. Maybe that's down to Brereton but it feels a bit simplistic and more due to the rushed and extemporised planning which characterised, and ultimately doomed, MG from the start. Just a thought. Always good lo listen to RG.
Fantastic as expected from RG. For me, the whole plan is predicated on everything going right. There seems like there was little contingency for error.
I have often thought Brereton has escaped criticism for his role in Operation Market Garden. As someone from the States, it’s easy to point fingers at Browning.
@@bigwoody4704 how could it be his mistake? He was not involved with the operation. You Americans will be blaming Montgomery for the Hurtgen forest debacle and the Bulge debacle next
Montgomery himself was gracious in not blaming anyone else, which he could of and should have. Primarily Brereton. Brereton himself unforgivably tried shifting the blame onto 1st Airborne and XXX Corps and he took no responsibility himself. Brereton was the wrong man to command First Allied Airborne Army. He was not a paratrooper. Somebody's within the airborne should have been promoted to lead it. My choice would have been Ridgway. Brereton was lazy and incompetent.
Great show. I love RG’s Twitter account, first time I have seen him online. Gave “A Bridge Too Far” a rewatch after the show and enjoyed it in a new way 😎
"Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, commander of 38 Group, decided upon the distant location of the drop zones, and despite requests from the 1st Airborne Division, he refused to land troops closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that the closer his aircraft came to Arnhem, the closer they would come to the large anti-aircraft emplacements, which in the event were not in place, at Deelen Airfield. With Transport Command under severe pressure at that stage in the War, ferrying supplies to the front line and bringing back casualties to British hospitals, Hollinghurst, understandably, did not wish to lose any more aircraft than was necessary. The decision, however, ought not have been his to make as it was surely be the job of the air planners to orientate their plan around the requirements of the Airborne troops, not what was most convenient for the Air Forces. The Airborne movement was, however, in its infancy at the time and many errors of judgement, which today seem obvious, were not so clear to its pioneers during the Second World War. Brigadier Hackett describes the planners: 'The airborne movement was very naive. It was very good on getting airborne troops to battle, but they were innocents when it came to fighting the Germans when we arrived. They used to make a beautiful airborne plan and then added the fighting-the-Germans bit afterwards.'" www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/depth_reason1.htm.
The linked article does not provide a reference of the comment that it was AOC38Gp who decided on the LZs and DZs. It is surprising that the decision could have been made by one of the two RAF Gp commanders providing aircraft (38Gp with converted bombers and 46Gp with Dakotas) when the RAF contribution (which was largely towing gliders for the initial waves) was relatively minor compared to IX TCC’s who carried all of the parachute elements (US, British, and Polish). If you have a reference for a contemporaneous source, it would be appreciated.
A excellent and thought provoking show. My only point of contention is using airborne casualty figures as a measure of how hard one unit fought compared to another.
I read General Urquhart's book, among others about Market Garden. It's very well written informative, unbiased and, I'd say, humble. Others I read besides "A Bridge Too Far" include one about the CANLOANS that took part of MG (very interesting) and one written by a glider pilot that was captures at Arnhem but later escaped from war camp along with others. I have Antony Beevor's "Arnhem" on the shelf over the TV, begging me to resume reading it...
Nice Video. Thank you for doing this. The common answer to questions is "I don't know". Poulussen may have had access to sources, but he doesn't demonstrate military or histography understanding in evaluating sources and putting them into perspective. After reading his books and seeing his interview, the only conclusion is that he puts his opinion above evidence. This is why academic peer review is important. The works become a lightening rod for people looking for a specific conclusion. Still a great interview - thank you. Helped me understand the author in more detail.
The alternative to Market-Garden was getting Antwerp on line as a major allied port. The sea approaches were not taken and secured. The channel swept for mines.
That old chestnut? I suppose it's Christmas. The whole point of going for the Rhine crossing sooner rather than later was because it would be easier while the Germans were still off balance and constructing their river and canal defence lines in the Netherlands, while Antwerp's port capacity was a necessity for multiple advances into Germany for Eisenhower's broad front policy once they were over the Rhine. Eisenhower said after Cornelius Ryan's unfinished and incomplete book A Bridge Too Far was published in 1974 - “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015). People need to put the obsession with Antwerp to one side in its proper context and accept that MARKET GARDEN was worth the attempt and only failed by a narrow margin because a bridge was missed at Nijmegen on the first day due to a command failure in one parachute regiment that should have been sorted out in Normandy.
Always considered not taking Nijmegen bridge on the first day - when it would have easily possible - to be the biggest single issue (of all the many things that went wrong!). Read an account by a 1st Airborne survivor - Panzers? No problem, if we had known we would have brought 17 pdrs!
I believe the Germans said the panzers would have been gone in two weeks and wasn’t Montgomery made aware of their presence? Weren’t the unweatherized radios a significant problem? Wasn’t the Reichwald chaos extremely nerve wracking to the Americans? I felt badly for Urqueheart he knew nothing about airborn and was in no position to accurately assess the overview. Thirty corps was relegated to one raised road surrounded by ground too wet for armor as I’ve read, keeping them incredibly vulnerable as. .I would have thought a massive suppressing assault on the German flak followed by immediate jumps would have been considered. Didn’t the Germans find the whole plan in a downed glider? The poles seemed to be used as callously as possible including Maczuga. Grim and sad and always interesting. Thank you
As an American I have always thought that the XXX Corps did its part. The demands on British Armour and infantry formations in basically making frontal assaults continuously is quite compelling in the appreciation of unit elan and professionalism. XXX Corps was designed and trained for maneuver warfare, not trench busting of WWI fame.
Indeed. XXX Corps actually carried out the fasted allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100km in just 3 days. Garden suceeded. It was Market that failed.
Sean O'Sullivan, Yep. After overcoming and destroying the entire German Armored force in France, the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. British 1st Airborne to XXX Corps: "Where have you been? What have you been doing!?" XXX Corps to British 1st Airborne : "We've been fighting for 3 months solid, ever since D-Day, not just for a few days since last Sunday like you!!" 😂
@@bigwoody4704 For Goodwood both the British and the Germans appear to have lost about 140-150 tanks destroyed, though at least 17 of the German tanks were Tigers and over 30 were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the Heer than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British.
@@bigwoody4704 Dont Forget about the 43rd Wessex, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured Divisions who had to fight extremely hard to take Hill 112 from the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Quote *in 1944, men from the 43rd Wessex, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured Divisions finally took control of one of the most strategically important battlegrounds in northern France. It took ten weeks of fierce fighting and cost the lives of 10,000 men, but taking and holding Hill 112 allowed the Allies to retake Caen and continue the liberation of Europe.*
Very thought provoking program. Coming in with the expected American bias based on Ryan’s book and another that hangs the blame on the plan from Monty. Now I find blame isn’t as simple as the Redford scene criticizing British XXX Corps for sitting in Nijmegen drinking tea. Good job.
Yes always annoying that, considering the Guards Armoured Division were still fighting in Nijmegen (Nijmegen wasn't cleared until the following day) and also had been split up over 20 miles or so assisting the short of men 82nd, including helping prevent the Germans from breaking through at Mook at the same time the river crossings were happening. The 82nd were in desperate need of the help from the Guards Armoured Division here there and everywhere. Of course, without the specific help of the Grenadier Guards Group, the Nijmegen bridge would never even have been taken in the first place. An all important factor that many ignore.
John Burns Yes Gavin does seem to have been overly cautious in Nijmegen. It was indeed Gavins decision to retreat completely from Nijmegen on the 18th.
J W Johnson, And Montgomery was overruled in nearly all his ideas for the Market segment. Montgomery preferred: 1. Double missions flown on day one. 2. Drops closer to the targets. 3. Coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused in all of the above. Taylor of the 101st even complained about drops north of Son. The air commanders got their way (Montgomery did not have the jurisdiction over air forces)...... and look what happened. If only Montgomery was allowed to plan and make the decisions for Market. It probably would have worked. Eisenhower also should have shut everything down for a week and given all resources to Market Garden. He didn't. Instead he allowed Patton to continue bumbling in the Lorraine and he allowed Hodges to open up his disastrous attack into the Hurtgen Forest.
John Burns Incredibly, Eisenhower allowed a US 1st Army attack into the Hurtgen Forest just two days after Market Garden began. If Eisenhower had allowed a reasonably sized American diversionary attack towards Aachen in tandem with Market Garden this would have given the Germans plenty to think about and instead of rushing all their reinforcements into the Netherlands to counter Market Garden they would have had to seriously consider the threat to Aachen and would have undoubtedly sent a proportion of their reinforcements to Aachen instead. Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 was actually on trains en route to Aachen on the 17th but when news of the paratroopers dropping in the Netherlands came in its journey towards Aachen was cancelled and it was quickly redeployed to Arnhem.
John Burns, Well I wish that WAS talked about more but it doesn't seem to be. Eisenhower gets away with it. He dropped the ball. He either should have shut everything else down for a week and given all resources to Market Garden, or else opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen to draw away German reinforcements, perhaps even a few days before Market Garden.
On 09/10/1944, General Lewis Hyde Brereton decided to limit the number of lifts to one per day for the entire Market Garden operation. Brereton made this decision on the advice of his senior air commander, Major-General Paul L. Williams, who had commanded the US 9th Troop Carrier Command during Normandy airborne operations. Reputed to accommodate the reasonable wishes of the paratroopers, Williams had deep concerns about his undermanned ground crew being able to refuel, repair battle damage, and perform routine maintenance fast enough to make multiple lifts per day. His ground crew was undermanned because the number of aircraft held by his unit had doubled without a concomitant increase in his ground crew. I am not an armchair general so I am willingly going to defer to Williams’s appraisal of his ground crew’s readiness to handle multiple lifts per day.
Williams was more concerned about exhausting his USAAF personnel rather than the well being of paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines. Brereton, a fellow USAAF man, also cared more about USAAF personnel than his own paratroopers. If a paratrooper had been in command of First Allied Airborne Army this would never have been the case. The operation was killed all because Brereton and Williams put the USAAF ahead of FAAA.
Interesting presentation created to provide an objective analysis of the operation that should disturb our long held views. It does however feel like a well disguised attempt to shift blame in a certain way under the guise of finally asking a neutral party.
Of course, you could always read two American authors who published the year after RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen and therefore couldn't be referenced by him: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) They both go a lot further into exploring what went wrong at Nijmegen, and Nordyke's earlier chapters on the 508th in Normandy give you some context and backstory that explains the command problems in the regiment. Another neutral (Swedish) historian who researched Cornelius Ryan's unpublished documents and interviews and updates A Bridge Too Far, and also debunks the myths in the Hollywood film: Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)
Everyone who saw the movie knows that it was the refusal of the XXX Corps tankers to continue up the road to Arnhem after Robert Redford led the 82nd Airborne in heroically capturing the Waal River Bridge that caused the operation to fail. The tankers brewed tea instead of advancing. I'm joking, of course. This new research is very interesting.
Yes, the film was nonsense. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks that took the bridge, at dusk and they had orders to stop the Germans taking the bridge back that night.
@@lyndoncmp5751 another element the movie got wrong further explains this. The Shermans taken out early on were taken out by handheld AT weapons, not PAKs as the initial bombardment destroyed the latter. The risk of further attacks by such weapons meant that continuing without infantry support, which was still mopping up in Nijmegen, was risky. As it was, a couple of Guards tanks did make it to within sight of Arnhem, to the west a bit. The other nonsense part of the movie was the radios. The short-range radios in jeeps were fine if a bit hampered by woodland as was expected back then. The units being scattered did mean direction communication to the LZ/DZ to Arnhem wasn't possible. US glider troops dropped in two gliders with some excellent long-range radios but both were damaged on landing. Medium-range radios were available so when artillery units got within range these were used to break up German attacks West of Arnhem by forward observers (I think RA placed with the paratroopers) directing accurate fire onto individual StuGs.
:) On a serious note the Germans indicated that there wasn't a defense to face XXX Corps after the bridge was taken. Certainly the reason for not moving given was rest required (Horrock himself was sick) and infantry support needed, but it was a window of opportunity they had. Not that my opinion matters, but I don't blame XXX or any of the units. As an American who did his thesis on this Operation, my ears picked up a few things. 1 Poulussen is pointing out that only Americans were the cause of the failure. (That isn't defensive. It is pulled from his books and this interview). 2. The interviewer has a better understanding of the holistic view, planning, and the commanders themselves. 3. Many of the sources in his books are not able to be found. His books are an interesting read and food for thought, but I don't see how his conclusions have much value.
Some key points of contention about MG.................... * Montgomery originally proposed the operation, but Brereton was appointed Commander for Operation MG, with Eisenhower his Supreme Commander. Both could have postponed the operation if they felt it was risky. * British air planners wanted 2 drops in a day, and RAF officers still felt that at minimum, there was ample time for a second run using fixed wing aircraft only that could have delivered another 2,000 paratroopers in each zone. * Montgomery's staff urged Brereton to allow double drops in the British sector alone, Brereton refused. * This resulted in inadequate resources to carry out the critical coup-de-main attacks that Montgomery had recognised and proposed as being absolutely essential to capture them intact. He fully recognised that conventional ground forces would have had great difficulty capturing those vital bridges intact. Hence his notion of a surprise airborne operation using coup de main tactics. * Intelligence was not ignored, but the situation evolved in the two weeks prior to the commencement. There was no strong SS Panzer Corps around Arnhem, just around 6,500 recuperating troops from 9th/10th SS Panzer Corps with very few tanks (Bittrich claims just 5 top quality tanks). * The greatest oversight was the ability of the 'Blitztransporte' railway system to bring in reserves from Germany (especially Kleve tank depot), Hungary, and Austria. * 30 Corps had a subsidiary route available along a fair section of route 69, but not all of it. So there was no dependency entirely on a single route as is often suggested. * A bridging depot was situated just 7 miles off the Dutch border and enough equipment had been brought to build bailey bridges over every water course. The longest bailey bridge was built in just over 24 hours during WW2, longer in length than any over the Dutch rivers. * If bridges were blown, plans were in place to get troops quickly across via alternative means to continue attacks. * Montgomery readily acknowledged that it was difficult for 30 Corps to attack Arnhem across the area known as 'The Island' south of Arnhem due to strategically-located defensive guns on high ground behind the town. To counteract this he proposed one battalion of British paratroopers take the high ground whilst the other two available on Day One were to take one of the bridges. * A mini coup-de-main was attempted by British 1st Airborne at Arnhem in jeeps, but they were poorly armed to complete such a task and it was a weak alternative to the proper coup-de-main that Montgomery had originally proposed. * Although Frosts battalion of 740 men only took the critical northern end of Arnhem Bridge, they situated themselves in positions to cover both ends from all angles, which was better than fragmenting his already numerically weak force over two points. He explains his reasoning in his autobiography. * 2 attempts were made by the Germans to blow up Arnhem Bridge but they were unsuccessful due to the positioning of British guns at the northern end, vindicating Frosts stance that all points were covered. The Germans failed to attach explosives to the areas of the bridge at the southern end necessary to blow it up because they were too vulnerable to British fire. * Gavin independently considered that the Reichswald Heights were critical to retain, Browning accepted his reasoning. * Gavin admitted this when questioned by the post-war U.S Official enquiry. Both are equally culpable but it was originally Gavin's proposal. * 30 Corps were ordered to start only once or 'after' the first paratroopers had passed overhead, the earliest they could start was 1400 hours on 17th. Synchronisation was critical as per Brereton. * 30 Corps did in fact carry out night-time fighting, though for the sake of movement along route 69, orders were for tanks to stop in darkness. But Horrocks was an advocate of night-time tank fighting, and in Nijmegen the Grenadier Guards did move across the bridges at 0300 hours on 21st. * Gavin was told by 1800 hours on the 17th September by Dutch intelligence and by two of his own Reconnaissance Officers from 505th and 508th PIR, that the Nijmegen Bridge was very weakly held, and that the Reichswald was unable to hold tanks. 30 Corps tanks were supposed to be able to progress straight across upon their arrival at Nijmegen. * British Grenadier Guards tanks took the Nijmegen road-bridge on 20th September, not U.S. forces, after infantry and tanks of Grenadier Guards and U.S. 505th PIR won the vital battle at the southern end of Nijmegen road-bridge during two very heavy days of fighting. * Official records confirm that the first troop of Grenadier Guards tanks completed their crossing at the northern end of the Nijmegen road-bridge and were fighting along the northern embankment towards the rail-bridge at 1830 hours on the 20th, they did not find any U.S. paratroopers on the road-bridge, only half a mile away towards the rail-bridge. * The first U.S. troops reached the road-bridge at 1910 hours and were only officially in control by 1938 hours. The first U.S. troops found Germans in hasty retreat and disorganised according to official U.S 82nd divisional records. * Their arrival coincided with the arrival of the second group of British tanks which crossed at 1930 hours. These were 8 x M10s. * A coup-de-main of the Nijmegen 'rail-bridge' was undertaken by the heroic U.S. paratroopers of 504th PIR with support from Grenadier Guards tanks at the southern end. The northern end was taken at 1740 hours on 20th September though fighting continued until the following morning when tanks of Grenadier Guards crossed. * Once the two Nijmegen Bridges had been taken late on the 20th, both American and British Commanders had orders to consolidate for fear of German counterattack. * By the time Nijmegen town and bridges were fully in control at 2200 hours on 20th September, 30 Corps were split over the entire sector. Coldstream Guards were under Gavin's control temporarily and had helped 82nd Division recapture important ground, 43rd Division were split widely over the area having been drawn back to Uden and Veghel in the U.S. 101st sector, which had been breached. Irish Guards had expended 90% of their artillery shells in supporting Gavin's river crossing. * Potentially, a small window of opportunity was lost by 30 Corps late on the 20th September, but their delay at Nijmegen was simply because 82nd Division had not taken their key objective. * The accusation that 30 Corps were late is a myth, as they arrived at Nijmegen 42 hours (under two full days) from being allowed to commence. * This critical delay caused the operation to fail, with the Arnhem Bridge falling at 8pm on 20th September, though fighting went on there until the early hours, and full German control was only assured by 10am on 21st. * Exhausted British 30 Corps were entirely disorganised on the 21st September, making little progress, still being pulled in all directions. * Some factions of 30 Corps reached Arnhem (Driel) at 8am on 22nd September and stronger elements later that day. But the delay at * All Allied troops fought heroically during Op MG, it was decisions made in the heat of battle, but also by strategic commanders, perhaps notably Brereton, that led to its failure.
* Montgomery and Browning came up with the outline for operation COMET, planned in detail by Browning's I Airborne Corps and Dempsey's 2nd Army. Montgomery cancelled COMET at the last minute on 10 September when he was informed II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised the airborne component was not strong enough. He proposed adding the two US divisions to allow the British and Polish airborne to concentrate in one place with their considerable anti-tank assets, but the planning was now necessarily handed over to Brereton because the whole 1st Allied Airborne Army was now involved. * Brereton compromised on Browning's double airlift and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges (Arnhem, Nijmegen, Grave) planned for COMET due to a lack of night trained navigators in the USAAF Troop Carriers and the glider assaults were therefore considered too risky for broad daylight raids. Browning had advised Dempsey COMET should not go ahead without the glider coup de main assaults, but was unable to protest Brereton's changes because he had already been politically neutralised after protesting Brereton's LINNET II plan. He knew he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and US XVIII Airborne Corps if he threatened to resign again. * The Kleve tank depot was faulty intelligence and gave rise to the silly rumour 1,000 panzers could be hiding in the Reichswald. The Panzer West depot was actually near Münster. Model was assessed to have less than 100 operational panzers in his entire Heeresgruppe B from Aachen to the North Sea coast, and the September returns actually listed 84 operational panzers - coincidentally the same number as anti-tank guns in the British 1st Airborne Division and Polish Parachute Brigade establishments (68+16). Montgomery had 2,400 tanks in 21st Army Group and the Americans had another 1,500 at Aachen. * Not heard of Bittrich claiming 5 tanks, but SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 had three Panthers (possibly off the books) in Arnhem and SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Vorden had 16 Panzer IV (in 5.Kompanie) and 4 StuG III G assault guns (in 7.Kompanie) - both divisions were converted from SS-Panzergrenadier divisions and the StuG Abteilung was reorganised to equip 7 and 8.Kompanie of the new Panzer-Regiments. 1st Parachute Battalion did encounter 5 tanks and about 15 half-tracks on the Amsterdamseweg on the first day and this was most likely the three Panthers and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen' on hand at Arnhem, and Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 at Beekbergen also had at least 5 armoured cars and about 35 half-tracks. The Mark IV tanks were too heavy for the Pannerden ferry and had to be held back until the Arnhem bridge was retaken, so only the StuGs could be deployed to Nijmegen. * The XXX Corps main supply 'Club Route' had a number of 'Heart Route' alternatives using alternative bridge crossings. About 24 bridges were targeted in total by the airborne, with about 10 needed at minimum to get XXX Corps to Arnhem, hence Montgomery's comment the operation was 90% successful. The flanking VIII and XII Corps were also advancing on main supply routes designated 'Spade' and 'Diamond' respectively. * Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion would have a maximum of 613 men according to establishment, some being in the seaborne tail. Figures indicate Frost had 525 going in by air, and the rest of the 740 or so at the bridge were the 1st Parachute Brigade HQ and support elements from Royal Artillery, RASC, Glider Pilots, etc.. Frost's C Company did not reach the bridge, being tasked with the rail bridge as primary objective and the German Ortskommandantur as secondary. C Company from the 3rd Battalion did reach the bridge by following the railway line. * It was the Groesbeek heights south of Nijmegen deemed critical to be held, although the bridges were still the primary objectives. Gavin told Cornelius Ryan he toyed with a British request to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen highway bridge, but eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily, where the 82nd was scattered over wide area and the division was disorganised for days. Instead he opted to instruct 508th CO Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as possible after landing, which he failed to do, despite getting a report in person from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only 18 men guarding the highway bridge. Lindquist was a gifted administrator but not a good field officer, which calls into question Gavin's decision to assign the more aggressive and experienced 505th to the Reichswald sector instead of Nijmegen. It seems he calculated the threat of counter-attack from the Reichswald to be greater than that of mission (and therefore operational) failure at Nijmegen. Browning supported Gavin after the war (both Browning and Gavin were impeccably decent men), but Gavin's divisional plan was his responsibility and the problems with Colonel Lindquist and the 508th had already manifested on their first combat operation in Normandy. * Gavin was informed by the regimental liasion officers to Division HQ that the 508th were dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge and not moving on the bridge until the DZ was cleared, and the Reichwald was found by 505th patrols to be unoccupied and too dense for tanks to operate. He was as "mad" as the 508th LO had ever seen him and they both immediately went to the 508th CP to get Lindquist moving, but it was too late. The delay allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the city and its bridges during the first evening and overnight. * Horrocks said he had ordered a night advance with tanks on only two occasions during the war and they both paid off, but he said he thought he might be pushing his luck a third time with MARKET GARDEN. He was already unhappy with the operation starting on a Sunday, as in his experience operations starting on a Sunday were rarely successful.
@@davemac1197 Love posts like this, full of excellent detail. Thanks DaveMac. Just a few points to respond: - * German tank strength on 23 August 1944 was reported via a Heeresgruppe D report as totalling 47-53 tanks, 2nd SS Panzer Div had 15 tanks, 12th SS Panzer Div had 12 tanks, 9th SS Panzer Div had 20-25 tanks, but 1st and 10th had no tanks. Situation was fluid. It did not say how many of these were in the Arnhem area. * Monty was prepared to postpone Op until 23 September due to supply and strength issues. * RAF 541 Squadron I-mint photos of Arnhem via Lieut-General Brian Urquhart only revealed presence of second rate Panzer 3 tanks, these already known about via intelligence likely to belong to Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Training and Replacement Regiument. * The situation did evolve with tanks being brought into Arnhem, but on 17th September Bittrich claimed he only had 5 top rate tanks at Arnhem, of which only 3 were operational and 2 of which were taken out by the British on the 18th. * The reason coup-de-mains abandoned is interesting, partly as you say due to the inherent risk of gliders landing in daylight near some objectives, but also due to reduced numbers being landed on day one. Distance from objectives was carefully considered with anti-aircraft guns in mind, but even at some distance, increased numbers landed on day one could have landed up to 2,000 more troops on day one using a second run of fixed wing aircraft only within the day light umbrella window, as wanted by British commanders, meaning that some coup de mains could still have been considered and coordinated. * Gavin may have been thoroughly decent, but having previously described Browning as an outstanding General, he later blamed him and said that if he had been in the US Army he would have been summarily dismissed. The official US enquiry seems to have discredited Gavin's account regards verbal orders allegedly given to Lindquist, who denied having received any pre-orders, and furthermore, none of Lieutenant-Colonel Shanley nor Lieutenant-Colonel Warren of 508th, nor Captain Bestebreurtje attached as Dutch Liaison Officer to 82nd Division were aware of any such pre-jump orders given by Gavin. Captain Westover, in charge of the official post-war enquiry, seems to have discredited Gavin here.
@@OldWolflad - I think you mean Heeresgruppe B? 23 August is a little early for Arnhem figures and the September return (I believe 5 September was the returns date) recorded 84 operational panzers in Heeresgruppe B, according to The Army That Got Away - The 15.Armee in the Summer of 1944, by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts (2022). * I have what I think is a satisfactory narrative on the 9 and 10.SS-Panzer-Division tank strengths after pulling together a number of sources. I don't have precise figures on the Hohenstaufen (9.SS-Panzer), but I believe they came out of Normandy with the most tanks and after reaching the Veluwe and the Frundsberg the Achterhoek regions in the Netherlands, a decision was made on sending one division back to Germany for refit and the other refitted in situ. After initially choosing the Frundsberg to be sent back, the Hohenstaufen was chosen instead (I forget the exact reason for the reversal), so the Hohenstaufen was ordered to hand over operational vehicles to the Frundsberg, but some were held back by the administrative subterfuge of removing tracks and guns to render them technically non-operational, out of fear they would not get replacements. So the 3 Panthers and 2 Möbelwagen were retained, and the Mark IV tanks handed over, giving the Frundsberg a total of 16. By 12 October they were down to 6 Mark IV and 3 StuG, but had received 20 brand new Panthers arranged by Model to be delivered direct from the factory, and this fits the 100 de-horsed Panther crewmen SS-Pz.Rgt.9 had in its 'alarm kompanie' acting as infantry. The new tanks were incorporated into SS-Pz.Rgt.10 as the 8.Kompanie, according to Dieter Stenger's combat history of the Frundsberg in Panzers East And West (2017), based on the diary of a family member who was in 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 consisting of the logistics train acting as infantry. By 12 October they were down to 15 Panther, which can be accounted for by 5 knocked out in the area of Elst on the Nijmegen 'island' (Betuwe). I'm assuming Bittrich is not counting the 20 vehicles in SS-Pz.Rgt.10 as being sent to Arnhem as these were actually destined for Nijmegen and not used in action against 1st Airborne Division, although the Mark IV tanks had to wait in Arnhem for the bridge to be cleared. * I have a source on an armour discussion on the axishistory web forum where someone helpfully listed the armour returns for 10.SS-Panzer (as well as the Heer 9 and 116.Panzer-Divisions) for 5 September, 12 October, and 1 November, so the handover seems to have been completed by 5 September with 16 Mark IV and 4 StuG recorded for the Frundsberg. * I also have a German web forum source indicating the Instandsetzung-Zug (maintenance platoon) belonging to at least one of the Panzer Abteilung in the Hohenstaufen was located at the Rosendaelsche Golf Links just north of the official administrative location of SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 in the Saksen-Weimarkazerne in northern Arnhem. It makes sense that the tanks were laagered under trees on the golf course and the RAD (Reich labour service) camp located there would provide suitable accommodations, while the regiment HQ and Werkstatt Kompanie would be logically located in the nearby Dutch army barracks and workshops. * A Dutch historical website has a nice article about a resident living in a house on the corner of Callunastraat with Heijenoordseweg who received a knock on the kitchen door on the morning of Friday 15 September. They were SS panzer crewmen asking for any spare milk, explaining that they had removed their tanks from the barracks to avoid potential Allied bombing and hidden them under trees across the road on Heijenoordseweg. So this tells a story of tanks laagered on the golf course and some in the workshops ("under repair") until they were dispersed in western Arnhem. I love it when these little stories at the granular level are dots that start to join up and develop a clear picture. * According to Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited volumes 1 and 2 by Christer Bergström (2019, 2020), two of the Panthers in western Arnhem were knocked out with a Gammon bomb and PIAT by B Company 3rd Parachute Battalion on 19 (not 18?) September during attempts to reach Frost at the bridge. The third survived to participate in the seige of the Oosterbeek perimeter. I'm currently reading one of my Christmas presents - Leo Heap's Escape From Arnhem (1945) - in which he describes an episode in the Oosterbeek perimeter where a Panther was located in a small wooded area and they decided to go tank hunting with a PIAT, eventually damaging a track and the tank retreated. Unfortunately, Leo is someone who did not believe in giving specific locations so I can't confirm the location of the wood and if the tank was therefore part of Kampfgruppe Harder (SS-Obersturmführer Adolf Harder's SS-Pz.Rgt.9). Some books suggest the Herman Göring training regiment had some Panthers at Oosterbeek, but I can't find any source to confirm they owned anything but older obsolete models (Mark III and early Mark IV), which you're obviously aware of. * The two Möbelwagen are rather more well-documented (and photographed) operating on the Dreyenscheweg north of Oosterbeek with Kampfgruppe Spindler, also on the 19 September, against 4th Parachute Brigade. * Private James Sims of the 2nd Parachute Battalion mortar platoon in his book Arnhem Spearhead (1977) says that he saw an unending line of Mark IV tanks parked under the trees along a boulevard near the bridge as he was led away into captivity. This would support SS-Pz.Rgt.10 having 16 of them, but also Panzer Kompanie Mielke (attached to Kampfgruppe Knaust) from Bielefeld had a total of 8 Mark IV tanks, but only 2 were committed against Frost with 6 Mark III tanks and both Mark IVs were knocked out, so I think the others were also held back for Nijmegen when the Arnhem bridge was cleared. * We know from Heinz Harmel that the Mark IV was too heavy for the ferry operation at Pannerden, but the last two tanks from Kompanie Mielke (a Mark III and a Mark II) were probably passed across the ferry as the lone Panzer II Ausf.b photographed in Hunner Park, Nijmegen after the battle would support this. This tank is also often attributed in photo captions to the Herman Göring Regiment, but they never claimed to own a Mark II, and one is listed for Kompanie Mielke in the Wehrkreis VI returns of equipment sent from Germany to Arnhem. This list was published in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of the Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010), but I also found the full WK VI report online. * Gavin's letter to Captain Westover in 1945 and interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far in 1967 have since been corroborated in two books published in 2012: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far by John C McManus, and Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 by Phil Nordyke. Both use first hand accounts of witnesses to the pre-flight briefing in which Gavin instructed Lindquist to send the 1st Battalion directly to the bridge. McManus has the Division G-3 (Operations) Officer Lt Col Jack Norton, and Nordyke has the 508th Liasion Officer Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham. Note: regiment XO Shanley and 1st Battalion CO Warren were not present. * Chet Graham also details in Nordyke's Normandy chapters how Lindquist was responsible for earlier bad decision making, partilcularly in an incident involving the combat ineffective original regiment XO, who was court-martialled by Matthew Ridgway and kicked out of the Airborne, and again in an attack on Hill 95 (Saint Catherine near La Haye) over open ground on 4 July 1944, leading to excessive casualties. Gavin wrote a post-war report to the US Army recommending a reversal of the policy of replacing officers who made serious mistakes, arguing that leaving them in place would allow them to learn from their mistakes. It seems Gavin was practicing this policy within his own division as Lindquist remained in command of the 508th until deactivation after the war. There were no serious command failures in the regiment during the Battle of the Bulge. I find Lindquist's response to Westover's questionnaire, printed in RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011), to be disingenuous. He said he wasn't told to move on the bridge after he landed until they were in position (on the Groesbeek ridge) and then was instructed to send the 1st Battalion (after Gavin arrived to chew him out, according to Chet Graham). * My impression is that Gavin and Browning were in agreement to take responsibility over the failure at Nijmegen as Gavin did not want to throw a junior officer under the bus. The mistakes made in the divisional plan were Gavin's, and this does explain his subsequent behaviour, twice proposing his own troops be used to make the river assault, despite the XXX Corps default plan (operation BASIL) for this scenario of the Waal bridges still in German hands being an amphibious assault carried out by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with one or two Brigades up (Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Operation Market Garden by John Sliz, 2021). I think this was done to avoid public blame for the failure of the operation being laid at the door of the Americans.
Thanks again Davemac, this is fantastic information that you have regards available tanks, who am I to question that. Its interesting the perception of Gavin, who was undoubtedly an excellent General militarily. It was simply his version of events in the post-war enquiry versus what has been claimed subsequently, and his changing attitude towards Browning that for me raises questions regards the validity of his accounts regards MG. May I ask, if you don't mind, what you make of Poulussen's books? I think his 2nd book 'Little sense of urgency' is considerably more detailed and brings more to the discussion, something I think Rob himself accepts. Thanks again Dave MG@@davemac1197
@@OldWolflad - I don't know that Gavin did have a changing attitude towards Browning after the war - my impression was that Gavin didn't want to throw Lindquist 'under the bus', at least not publicly, but he did give Westover a clear statement and a few hints to Cornelius Ryan (who didn't dig any further) and Browning did what he thought was the decent thing and backed him up. Browning was obviously loathe to be critical of the American divisions under his command and made overwhelmingly positive comments about their performance during the operation, which I think are 99% perfectly valid. I think the problems with Lindquist echoes a similar problem most people are already familiar with in Captain Herbert Sobel, the original commander of Easy Company 506th PIR - the famous 'Band of Brothers'. However, there was no Sergeants mutiny in the 508th and Lindquist was never reassigned like Sobel. I do recommend Nordyke's book on the 508th - it reads like the film script that A Bridge Too Far should have been, at least as far as this regiment is concerned, and of course the 508th wasn't in the film at all. Some people criticise the 506th for not securing the Son bridge before it was blown, but I don't think they appreciate that the Wilhelmina canal was a prepared defence line, all the remaining bridges were prepared for demolition, and General Kurt Student issued standing orders they were to be blown if threatened, which is what happened at Son and Best. Short of dropping a company directly onto the bridges (both of which were in the middle of heavy Flak positions provided by guns of schwere.Flak-Abteilung 428 removed from Deelen airfield) I don't see how they could have been seized intact. The Germans, the 506th, the Guards and the Royal Engineers, all did text book jobs at Son, so I can find no fault with any of them. I think because McManus and Nordyke's witnesses to Gavin's final MARKET briefing were junior officers at the time, and now (in 2012) felt more free to speak out and set the record straight, as the more senior figures involved in this drama had by then passed away. That's not unusual, we gradually get a more clearer picture of events the further away from them we get. An open question is how much did Gavin appreciate Lindquist's shortcomings as a field commander? In his interview with Cornelius Ryan (Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University - Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967), Ryan noted: 'Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight. He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.” Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east. We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days. The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.' Clearly Gavin was speaking with the benefit of hindsight here, but we don't know to what extent. (Was Lindquist even in Sicily? I'm not sure that's correct, unless he went along as an observer - the 508th were still forming in the USA and Nordyke makes no mention of Sicily in Put Us Down In Hell, 2012). I have both of Poulussen's books, I think they're both well-researched. Some of the early stuff on planning COMET and the discussions between Montgomery and Eisenhower over logistics is very interesting. The map showing the glider flight paths for the Arnhem and Nijmegen coup de main assaults is very interesting and shows the tugs were not exposed to Flak near the bridges at all. I already had Lost At Nijmegen on Kindle but opted to buy both hard copies from the author directly and he very kindly offered to sign both books for me, which was very nice of him! Lost At Nijmegen obviously focused on that aspect of the operation and was published the year before McManus and Nordyke, so he didn't have the benefit of the first hand accounts in those books - I do recommend them both - and Poulussen came to the conclusion based on documents there was a miscommunication between Gavin and Lindquist, so that was as far as he could go with his research.
Brereton fully understood that ideally all the paratroopers in Market should be dropped into their designated drop zones on the same day and at the same time. According to Cornelius Ryan, it just was not possible: " Apart from gliders, Brereton had no transports of his own. To achieve complete surprise, the ideal plan called for the three and one-half divisions in Market to be delivered to landing zones on the same day at the same hour. But the immense size of the operation ruled out this possibility. There was an acute shortage of both aircraft and gliders; the planes would have to make more than one trip." Boy Browning was present at the meeting in which Brereton announced that the drops would occur on multiple days; indeed he spoke immediately after Brereton. Browning, moreover, knew the details of Manty's plan expectations because Brereton convened the 10 Sept 44 meeting immediately after he left his meeting with Monty. If Monty's plan was predicated on surprise, Browning knew full well that that predicate would not obtain. In fact, Beevor wrote that once Browning complained to Gale about the multi-day drops, Gale forcefully told Browning that he had to resign from the operation. Browning refused.
I've not heard Gale say that about Browning but Gale said Urquhart should have protested against the RAFs choice of drop and landing zones "to the point of resignation".
You have quickly become my favorite UA-cam military history resource/entertainment. You, and your awesome guests, do an amazing job of presenting very detailed studies of a wide range of topics. I am an avid, lifelong, former Army officer, "armchair military historian and have studied Market Garden since I first read "Bridge Too Far" by Ryan when was 12 years old! I would like to suggest an angle I would like to see you and any of your well-versed guests tackle a topic which NEVER seems to be addressed by anyone, not even the TIK UA-cam host who has numerous videos on the battle. I would like to see you do a show on why Market Garden was doomed to failure from a strategic/logistical perspective to the point that it should NEVER HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTED! Primary reason being logistical - 2nd Army was in no position to make it successful due to most of it's logistic and support units lagging far behind the start line on the Meuse-Escaut canal. Sure, XXX Corp was given the bulk of the resources, and were poised to make the dash to Arnhem, BUT I have read a few different places that both corps on either side of XXX Corp were virtually stripped of resources to make that possible? I have read that most of VIII & XII Corps, on each side of XXX Corps were practically frozen in place and unable to advance due to all priorities going to XXX Corp. Also, many of their supporting units were still back at the Seine area when Market Garden began. So say XXX Corp succeeded with Garden, and all Market tactical issues were resolved and avoided in a timely manner, just HOW was 2nd Army going to "bounce the Rhine" when the logistics support for the entire front moving forward simply was NOT in place by the 17th? Neither XII or VIII Corp on XXX Corp's flanks made much of contribution to the operation at all. Had they moved up on the flanks, they could have secured the corridor couldn't they have? My point is that I think a hard look at 2nd Army's overall logistical situation goes along way in determining that the operation should have never been tried. Worth addressing in a video if you agree! Thanks, Paul! Keep up the good work!
As with any other idea Jon, if a historian came with such a presentation, I would do it in a heartbeat. I'm not like TIK and some others in that I don't choose subjects for discussion myself (well sometimes I do). Its about giving historians, authors and enthusiasts a platform for their research
@@WW2TV Thanks for the prompt response, Paul! That's what makes what you do so interesting and important. You showcase authors who are dialed in and focused on very specific details on operations as opposed to the plethora of "overall/general" look books out there. Someone should do a bio talk on Lewis Brereton sometime - he had to have been the most "unlucky" US general in high places. HIs air force was destroyed on the ground in the Philllipines largely due to his poor operations decisions. He oversaw the disastrous Ploesti bombing mission, and finally the terrible Market decisions he made as commander of 1St Allied Airborne Army.
General Browning was to recall later: "I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it-for . . . painfully obvious reasons . . .. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend." Ltr, Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
The possibility of counterattack from this direction took on added credence from the Dutch resistance reports of panzer formations assembling in the Netherlands. 82nd Airborne Division was led to believe that this armor was concentrating in the Reichswald. This information became "a major and pressing element in the pre-drop picture of German forces." Ltr. Winton to OCMH, 8 Mar 54, OCMH; Intelligence Trace No. 5 in Hq, Troop Carrier Forces FO NO.4, 13 Sep 44; 505th Prcht Inf AAR.
because of the limitations of the D-Day lift, the question of priority of objectives entered the picture. In anticipation of a heavy fight before the ground column could provide artillery and antitank support, General Gavin allotted a portion of his D-Day lift to a parachute artillery battalion. He also scheduled arrival of the rest of his artillery on D plus 1. This meant that the glider infantry regiment could not arrive until D plus 2, so that for the first two days the 82d would have but three regiments of infantry. If these three parachute infantry regiments tried to take all assigned objectives, they would be spread dangerously thin for holding the objectives in the event enemy armor materialized from the Reichswald.
@@desydukuk291 You might be right. I don't know. I am just repeating what was written in the official US Army history of the event. However, I cited in my comment the specific intelligence report dated 13 September 1944 that was apparently relied upon. I have not personally read that cited intelligence report. So, I am just trusting MacDonald that it says what he says it says. However, what cannot be questioned is that for whatever reason the 82d was ordered by Browning to give that ridge top priority and they changed their initial D-Day lift to more artillery and less infantry to deal with the tanks. So, there obviously was some "intelligence" that was effecting decisions. MacDonald and that intelligence report say the information came from Dutch resistance , but who knows, it might have been Nazi misinformation planted to look like information from Dutch resistance.
In 2008 I put info about a Belgian giving exact data about the Start Line and the amount of Allied Ground troops to the Germans on Sept.11/12 1944 on the Axis Forum. That's 5 days before Market-Garden. I recently reveiled the second source which was a spy in London that was able to sent more details about the direction towards Lake IJssel and possibly more north to the Northsea on Sept.12 1944 too. It was sent via Stockholm. So the Germans had 2 independent sources telling the same 5 days before Market-Garden.
True but you got to have scenerios - this plan had none In technical terms all is assume were serial and Binnen of them could be missed - that is a very precarious plan already in theory
this was a great interview and adding insight into this battle but if you were to break it down it was a bad narrow minded plan. The operation failed before Monte came up with it. it failed when Eisenhower appointed Gen. Brereton as commander of the 1st allied army and not Browning or Rideway. Also Monte for not being more involved in the planning and the execution of the operation. It is true that Gavin and Browning are at fault during the battle but the planning and the outside support also needs to be blamed and lastly what could have XXX corp done if they arrived in Arnhem with the 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions there waiting for them. the men fought bravely and did all they could and being a yank I admire the 1st Airborne and the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade who fought at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could have done little or nothing even if they got to Arnhem. The Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp (as well as 99% of Arnhem itself) and had decent fields of fire against anything crossing the bridge. As well as that, there was a road block on the actual bridge. The wreckage of Grabners SS column was strewn all over it. XXX could not have got past that and would have been sitting ducks if they tried.
John Burns It would have been too late by then. The only option by then was a rescue mission. The Germans were too strong around Arnhem. The RAF couldn't have flattened Arnhem either as the British needed the bridge intact. XXX Corps could never have got across the bridge.
As to shifting more of the tactical air power to support Market Garden, what would the logistical impact have been? Understanding the functional benefits (extra guns/bombs/rockets available in the air), keeping those additional planes flying would also require to shift a whole supply chain (fuel depots, ordnance, ground crews). Let alone that airfields within range to support Market Garden should be able to accommodate the additios. Would that have been possible?
There was plenty of air support available, but it was restricted by weather and deconfliction rules that grounded 2nd TAF while the transport airlifts were in the air. What would have been helpful was notification to 2nd TAF in Belgium when the airlifts were delayed by bad weather in England, so they didn't have to be grounded unnecessarily while the skies were clear over the Netherlands. This was an administrative error by 1st Allied Airborne Army in England. Apart from this, the lack of tactical air support has been exaggerated - it was very active. The German ferry operation at Pannerden, for example, was constantly harassed by air attacks and was forced to be conducted at night or during the bad weather periods.
I’ve just watched this one and I’d like to say thank you - it’s very interesting. I agree that Gavin’s performance at Nijmegen has to be questioned. (I actually said as much in an essay a year ago as part of my MA.) A couple of things, though. First, Mr Poulussen says that there weren’t many German forces in the Reichswald which is true (initially), but the Allies didn’t know that and we need to limit the 20/20 hindsight advantage. Gavin had no plan to take the Waal bridge - that’s the problem. Gavin did, on occasion, shift the blame, but he also changed his story. Cornelius Ryan was a friend of Gavin’s, so he wrote rather kindly of what happened at Nijmegen. Finally, we don’t seem to have considered Browning who took his HQ into Gavin’s sector, using valuable glider lift (33 gliders, if I recall correctly?) That HQ was not fit for purpose - it was not trained, nor manned, as a warfighting HQ, so the assumption must be that Browning wanted to be there for his own interests. Moreover, even if Gavin accepted the accusation that it was his failure, where was Browning?! Certainly, Gavin made a massive error of judgement, but Browning oversaw the planning - presumably - and accepted Gavin’s plan - presumably. Why did he not push Gavin to take the Waal bridge, instead of agreeing, after the failed attempt to just wait until day four? I am REALLY surprised that Mr Poulussen doesn’t address this issue. Browning has much to answer for.
@@bigwoody4704 Much of what you say I agree with, but the initial plan of Montgomery's can be bad AND the execution of it also at fault. Regardless of the big error of how Antwerp was handled, I still think it's fair to say that James Gavin made some errors too, as indeed did many commanders in OMG
@@bigwoody4704 Exactly, with 400 shows here, you get 400 opinions. So many of the ongoing debates about the war come down to one opinion against another
@@bigwoody4704I get that Browning said that in 55 and RG addresses that in his book. That's the thing with the accounts of participants' they changed over the course of time. Men like Urquhart, Frost, Gavin, Browning etc said different things at different times. RG has one interpretation, Ryan another etc. I've read the books you mention and others too and many of them make valid cases about what happened. There is no definitive understanding and as history buffs it would be wrong to not examine different theories and indeed change our minds sometimes
@@WW2TV what if Browning had an interview with the official British Historian concerning campaign in 1954, saying that the Groesbeek Heights was more important but then a few days later wrote back to the historian asking to change the story. Would this be of importance?
Question of Lack of Air Support for Market Garden: One point not discussed was the weather condition, from 21 Army Group Reports 1) During 17th September 550 sorties were flown by 83 Group in support of Ground Troops. 2) 18th Sept During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor as it was bad over both over airfields and the battle area. 3) 19th Sept Weather again the limiting factor. Both over airfields and over the battle area it was bad for flying. Only 73 sorties flown. 4) 20th Sept Bad weather and the maintenance lift of re-supply of 1 British airborne Div kept the number of sorties down to 259 of which 181 were purely fighter operations air cover and sweeps. Tactical reconnaissance produced little value both of bad visibility and the prohibition on flying during airborne drops. Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter. Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105) One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately. During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather. {John Terraine, A Time for Courage. NY: MacMillan, 1985, p.670} Support by Bomber Command and 8th Air Force on the night 16th/17th and 17th. Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 90 - 91 1) Night of D-1 282 RAF Bomber attack various airfields 2) Day of 17th 872 B-17’s to attack 117 installations mostly AA batteries along troop carrier route. Supported by 147 P-51’s 3) Other operation attack by 85 Lancaster and 15 Mosquitoes escorted by 5 Spitfires. 4) Late operation was dispatched 50 Mosquitos, 48 B-25’s and 24 Boston’s of 2nd Tactical airforce Clearly weather was a factor during the operation, but on the 17th massive support effort was made by Airforce
Two things I didn’t hear discussed, the role of the Germans in the failure, and the fact that Gavin was tasked with securing Browning’s headquarters position.
Gavin was not "tasked with securing Browning's headquarters position" - both Gavin and Browning's command posts were established in the woods west of Groesbeek in an area secured by the 505th PIR to protect Landing Zone 'N' and the Division from counter-attacks from the Reichswald. Gavin had Ben Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th PIR as division reserve on Hill 81.8 above the CP. The Corps HQ had its own local protection from the Glider Pilot Regiment HQ, and elements of Nos.1 and 2 Flights from 'A' Squadron for the 32 Horsas and 'X' (Independent) Flight for the 6 WACO gliders, who were trained and equipped to operate as light infantry once they hit the ground. The exact position of the Corps HQ was on the north side of the Mooksebaan that runs from Groesbeek to Mook, and at the time was in an area of public woodland fenced off by the Germans and used as a Luftwaffe supply dump for aerial bombs and ammunition called Feld-Luftmunitionslager 15/VI (Mook). The main gate at the Mook end of the facility was opposite the 't Zwaantje Inn - now the Herberg Restaurant 't Zwaantje. The dump was guarded by about 200 German troops and most of them evacuated after destroying the dump during the airborne landings, leaving behind a rearguard. It was a machine-gun post from this rearguard that nearly killed General Gavin and his Dutch liaison officer on their way to the Division CP rendezvous. The role of the Germans was that they were doing their best to defeat the operation and I would recommend Robert Kershaw's book It Never Snows In September (1990) as a starting point on that topic.
@@davemac1197 interesting minutia, but my original comments stand, you did not address them except to misconstrue the first and patronizingly generalize about the second (most likely to distract from your real argument, which is apparently related to my first point). “Secure” does not necessarily mean “provide security for”, it can also mean “acquire.” Gavin was tasked with acquiring the position where Browning would arrive later, was he not? Browning was Gavin’s direct superior, was he not? Gavin and Browning were American and British respectively, correct? If Gavin had failed to seize and maintain control of Browning’s planned HQ area, that would have had political consequences beyond the mere tactical considerations. Not as consequential as failing to seize and control the bridge, but when the host asks, “Why is Gavin so concerned about this?” I feel like I know the answer, but no one says it.
@@GeographyCzar - I think you have it backwards. Why would Gavin divert resouces to secure a position for the Corps headquarters when the most obvious (in my view) and expedient solution was to co-locate the Corps HQ near the Division CP in the centre of the divisional area? They were both located between the 505th and 508th PIRs.
Oh. Well, since I haven’t heard of that controversy, I guess I can’t address it. I thought the question was why Gavin focused on the Groesbeek Heights instead of the Nijmegen Road Bridge.
Brereton was told by Eisenhower after the failure of the American transport pilots during Sicily ( cowardice as some troops called it) during the airborne drops of British gliders. To get his pilots up to par with night flying and navigation. He did nothing of the kind hence the rediculas drops at Normandy . So come market garden, had to be during the daylight hrs. Despite all and any BS excuses. And as shown by some exceptional bravery . Retrieved some of the bad taste felt by some of the veterans of Sicily.
I think the blame for failure lies with the USAAF commander of the Strategic Airlift element when he limited the sorties of his aircrews to just one of carrying airborne units on Day 1 of the operations. I do understand that German AA crews would've been prepared, but they were just as prepared for the original jumps because German radar and troops on the coast had alerted the AA units for the first wave, a second wave would've faced just as much of an AA response as the first. Just my opinion.
@@thevillaaston7811Why would you continue to plan for 2 lifts on the 17th, when you know that only one lift was feasible after the initial planning. See below why one lift was the final decision, and the reason why one lift was decided was the weather. This is from Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 195). Maybe you should read the book especially chapter 3.3 Air Lift to get a fully appreciation of issue with planning the Air Lift. "On 10 September Browning presented his outline plan to the assembled Allied airborne and troop carrier commanders (as we have seen, 1st Airborne Division were not represented at this meeting). The plan stated that the airlift schedule would be ‘in principle as for Linnet’. (WO 219/4998, Operation Sixteen Outline Plan, 10 September 1944.) As so little time was available, decisions were required immediately and, once taken, they had to be adhered to rigidly. So the First Allied Airborne Army planners sprang into action, examining Browning’s outline, the number of aircraft available and the potential combinations of the three airborne divisions that might be infiltrated in any given period with the resources available. Within hours they had become concerned over the prospect of achieving two daylight lifts on the same day: “With the shortening of the days at this time of the year, and complications of turn-around, it is believed that future plans should be made on the basis of one lift per day, with all US aircraft available. This will permit an operation to be carried through in spite of a late start due to bad weather, whereas tight schedule plans based on two lifts per day could not be met if early morning weather were bad. (WO 219/4998, memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bartley, 10 September 1944.” By 12 September Williams (who had overall command of the airlift) had accepted this advice. At another planning meeting, “General Williams pointed out that owing to the reduced number of hours of daylight and increase in distance, it would not be possible to consider more than one lift per day. (WO 219/4998, First Allied Airborne Army memorandum to Brigadier General Ralph Stearley, 12 September 1944.)” Williams had a long-standing and deserved reputation for close co-operation with the airborne forces.10 He had commanded the US troop carriers in Husky, Neptune and Dragoon, and was thus one of the most experienced of all the Allied airborne commanders. So you see that the starting point in the planning was 2 lifts, but at the end of the day the final decision was that only one lift was doable. So were your evidence that 2 lifts were never considered in the planning phrase.
@@thevillaaston7811 I read all those accounts, Yes they state that 2 lifts on 17th would have assisted the operation, and they are right only if 2 lifts were practicable and that would depend on the WEATHER. But TheVilla Aston none of these account mention was the weather on the 17th. Also either Urquhart or Gavin mention in their accounts a request for a second lift. Rick Atkinson again Operation Dragoon is mention which did have 2 lifts yet fails to provide any details regarding the time of the 2 lifts which were the 1st lift (Paratroopers) arrive at 0430 the 2nd lift (Gliders) arrived at 1800 hours 13 1/2 hours later. But you know that. Also he ever mention the weather conditions on the 17th. You also know that fog on the morning of the 17th did not clear until 0900. So base on Dragoon the second lift would no take off until 2230 Hours ( assuming the 1st lift takeoff was 0900) arriving at DZ/LZ until 0130 on the 18th. Remember the night 17/18th is moonless so how would the Gliders see were to land? See below about impact of weather. Montgomery 21 Army Group weather report for 17th regarding Market Garden "Fog over bases clearing by 1000 hours with moderate amounts of cumulus 3000 ft thereafter good visibility. Light winds. Operation proceeded according to plan. The Impact of weather in planning Air Operations "Weather and visibility factors. Successful airborne operations in the Second World War were dependent on a number of favourable weather and visibility factors. Weather conditions had to be sufficiently fine to allow aircraft to take off, transit to their objectives, deliver their paratroops or gliders, complete return journeys and land safely. Overcast conditions rendered glider operations all but impossible. Tow-rope breakages were a regular occurrence when tug and glider combinations flew through cloud, either because the glider pilot lost sight of the tug and the two aircraft got out of alignment or because, in assuming the recommended position for bad weather conditions, the glider inadvertently passed through the tug’s slipstream. Operations executed in darkness or half-light had largely proved unsuccessful. Therefore, by September 1944, the majority of air planners within First Allied Airborne Army were convinced that future operations should be conducted in daylight and in the best possible visibility conditions. Obtaining two or more successive days of clear and calm weather across three weather systems (the UK, the North Sea and Continental Europe) in mid-September was always going to be problematic. But, by that time, the planners had been able to observe the way in which adverse weather had caused the postponement of both Linnet and Comet, and had evidently concluded that they were most likely to obtain favourable conditions by avoiding the dawn lifts that had been proposed for both operations. Hence, as the records show, the attraction of scheduling successive lifts slightly later in the morning was not only that they could be flown at full strength but also that they could exploit the best available periods of visibility. The alternative was to mount smaller follow-up lifts using a schedule that was potentially more vulnerable to weather or visibility problems. Such reasoning would have been reinforced by the prevailing weather conditions in the week leading up to Market Garden, which were characterized by early morning fog on every day except the 16th." Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 199). So TheVilla Aston show how to two lifts was doable. You have on the 17th Sept sunrise at 0617 and sunset at 1811 and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 hours. With morning fog clearing by 0900. Clearly Williams the most experience airmen with regarding plan airborne operation would have used 2 lifts if it was doable for Market Garden as he did with Dragoon and proposed for Operation Linnet. Ask yourself why did he finally decide on a single lift?
@@thevillaaston7811 "If there had been a plan for two lifts on the first day that was only thwarted by weather that defied what was forecast, then Brereton would have been in the clear. But there was no such plan." Your words. Clearly you do not understand how planning an air operation works. All air operations plans are depended on the forecast weather conditions on the day. Your statement "only thwarted by weather that defied what was forecast." The forecast was for morning fog which was expected to clear by 0900 on the 17th. That means the earliest the lift could take-off would be between 0900 to 1000, reaching the drop/landing zones between 1200 to 1300 hours. With sunset around 1811, how can anyone plan a second lift to occur on the 17th with that weather forecast. Your argument would only hold up if the weather forecasts leading up to 17th was for good flying weather with no morning fog expected, but unexpected on the 17th morning fog was present. The decision would have been to postponed the operation just as Operation Comet was postponed on the 8th no to delay the first lift and cancel the 2nd. Two lifts was the starting point, the forecast weather condition of morning fog ruled out any possibility of a second lift. You and I were no there, so how can you know what was planned and how the final decision was determined. As Williams made the decision for a single lift, was the one who plan 2 lifts for Dragoon, clearly would have a very sound reason for that decision. Brereton only agreed with Williams decision. If anyone should be criticize for the decision its Williams not Brereton. As to drop Zone locations at Arnhem, they were decided by the RAF for Operation Comet which Brereton was not involved.
@@thevillaaston7811 As you final to provided any evidence that 2 lifts was possible but thwarted by the weather this may help to realized, why Williams decided against Two lift due to forecast of expected fog on the 17th Planning for 2 lifts the starting point is to 1 determine the earliest time the first lift can take-off based on forecast weather condition (A Hours). This will be depended on the make-up of the lift, for example Transports only, Gliders only or combination of the two. Next is to determine the very latest the 2nd lift can arrive over the DZ/LZ. (B Hours). In that time gap the following stage will be undertaken. 1) Take-off and assembly of the 1st Lift 2) The flight time from assembly point to the Target DZ/LZ 3) The time it will take to deliver the troops and equipment 4) The return flights. (Looking at the time the last planes leave the DZ/LZ to arrive back at base. Last Plane arriving at C Hours 5) The return around time require to prepare the aircraft for second lift. All the aircraft of the lifts will end up into one of 4 groups. Group 1 aircraft with no battle damage, mechanical or electrical issues and are available immediately for 2nd lift. Group 2 planes that suffered battle damage or mechanical or electrical issues that require repairs they are available. Group 3 planes that have return but to the level of damage are written off as total loss. The last group are planes that final to return. The earliest the 2nd lift can take-off is D Hours. At D-hour their sufficient aircraft available from Group 1 to make viable second lift. Next, we need to calculate the latest take-off time for 2nd lift which would be B hours minus the time required to assembly and fly to DZ/LZ. So E Hours is the calculated take-off time. So, if D Hours is earlier than E Hours 2 lifts are doable. The only question does the 2nd Lift take-off at D or E or some point between the two. However, if E Hours is earlier than C Hours only one lift would be possible. As aircraft from the first are still in the air in would not be possible to spot the gliders for the second lift. The question is if E Hours is later than C Hours but earlier than D Hours? Clearly a single Lift is the obvious answer, but what would be the maximum time gap were a 2lift may be possible if timing can be fine-tuned. So TheVilla Aston, the decision whether to go with 1 lift or two would be based on the expected weather conditions and if there sufficient time to incorporate the 2nd Lift. Clearly with expectation of morning fog on the 17th, Williams made the decision that only a single lift was possible. For 2 lifts to have a chance, there need to be sufficient light and visibility for a pre dawn take-off.
Just noticed at 54:47 that casualties list does not include glider regiments for both US divisions (although if im correct one indeed didn`t make it onto ground during operation) so as 1 SBSpad (Polish). Don’t know how much or if at all it would influence this summary, but it is pretty strange omittment. Still, really good video, inciting to read more about the operation 👍🏻
All these people blaming Gavin, the 82nd and Brereton ignore 4 obvious facts: Facts: 1) Poulson's theories rely on him knowing more than Gavin (one of the best most experienced generals of WW2) on 9/18/44; 2) That this was a British plan advanced solely by Monty to Ike; 3) that any serious military person would have known there is no way 2 guarantee capture of all of these bridges & expect no delay; &, finally, 4) the buck stops with Monty who was in overall command of MG. He allowed it to be rushed and his Generals should not be faulted.
They haven't ignored facts, they have interpreted them differently. For decades, pretty much all the blame had been put onto Monty. I, for one, believe we are in a better era of historiography where we can also assess other commanders' roles in Market Garden. If we do that, I think it's clear that Gavin could definitely have done better. Now whether that is hindsight or not, it's still worth studying
@@WW2TV I agree that no one should be immune from examination. Mistakes were made by everyone in WW2...the Hurtgen being one of the most egregious. My point is that Poulson is being used to ignore 1000s of books on MG and ignore Monty's blunder (where the buck needs to stop) and attack Gavin and Brereton (notably ignoring British commanders entirely) who were given a massive job with like no time to prepare. I believe it was less than 30 days from inception to drops. For the record, I think all the troops in MG gave 100%. Unlike Poulson I know there was a 1 in a 1,000,000 chance of success. Arnehm was being easily handled by existing panzer division and entire route for 30 corps was being attacked from both sides. Resupply at Arnhem, etc... by Germans was imminent.
@@MICHALSLAW Well I disagree, I think there's a much greater chance of success (better than fifty-fifty) with a few modifications to the plan - the most important being getting all of 1st Airborne there in one left and more airpower over the Nijmegen / Arnhem road. But the bigger disaster I think would have been if 30 Corps had managed to get into the Roer. That would have been a massive disaster with the German strength still there
@@WW2TV We can agree to disagree and examine new vantage poinst to view this from which is the best part of your youtube videos. I do agree that modifications to the plan, ala Overlord, wuold have changed success rate considerably to favor Allies. In the event, it was rushed and ad hoc and lacked air cover among others.
@@WW2TV Paul one of the biggest problems was the lack of aircraft. This is source from Operation Market Garden Now and Them. The total number of sorties needed to fly in the entire market force was approximately 3,795. The initial lift was 1,525 aircraft (including 478 towing Gliders and 1,047 transports) which was effectively the entire 9th Troop Carrier Command and RAF 38th and 46th Group, hence the need for the 3 lifts. To fly in the entire 1st British Airborne and the Poles would require 1,035 aircraft (383 Transports and 652 towing Gliders). 101st needed 1,330 and 82nd 1,392 aircraft respectively. I think each divisional Commander would have preferred his entire division arriving in 1 lift. If Gavin could have all 4 regiments available on the 17th the issue regarding delay would not have occurred. He would have an entire regiment available to assault the bridge. There are comments that Brereton should have access additional aircraft, the question is from where? 12th Airforce had the 51st TC Wing with 3 groups located in Italy which could possibly provide 152 aircraft, with just 7 days planning could the wing be relocated to England in time. Could the RAF provide additional aircraft? As to lack of CAS between Nijmegen and Arnhem, I think the problem of the weather, distance from base and demands from other sectors limited available aircraft to cover that sector. "One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately.37 During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather." Source Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter; Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105). I feel Brereton get some bad press over think he had no control over, lack of planes and the weather.
Another home run.most valid point,you made.its easy to sit back and critique . different when shot and she'll is whizzing past you been a big fan of ballentine books for 50+ years.farrar Shockley never talked about lack of air support.I never thought of it either.once again you opened my mind. Enough babbling.I thank God for all those brave men in the airborne.the reason market garden wasn't as successful as planned was there were these German guys who still fought hard.lets never forget that
I am taken aback that more historians haven't bothered compared Operation Market Garden to Operation Lumberjack. Comparing these two operations with similar objectives is probably much more instructive than throwing arm-chair invective at any of the Generals or soldiers associated with Market Garden or posturing "if only" scenerios. For all the ink, new or old, spilled over Market Garden what stands out to me is the fact that no one seems to understand that a bridge is considered, in infantry terms, an obstacle. This means that the whole operation was in actuality a large-scale raid. I define "raid" as any military operation where the objective is not to capture or hold the terrain itself (or an objective sited on that terrain). These raid operations have much more planning considerations than any "regular" capture-hold infantry operation which is why in the modern day these types of operations are generally left up to Special Operations Forces (the 82nd itself something of a "farm team" for potential SOF troops). The fact there were large number of airborne forces and the issue of taking up positions in urban settings muddies the fact that the overall objective was not "regular" in infantry terms. With this in mind the ONLY take away from Market Garden is that to "regularize" a raid is something that requires a great deal of careful consideration, and it is no wonder that such an operation like Market Garden appears to be consigned to the garbage heap of operational history.
Operation MARKET was 90% successful in terms of securing 9 out of the minimum 10 in a total of 24 bridges involved in the operation needed to get XXX Corps to Arnhem. Each bridge objective may be considered to be a 'raid' in these terms, in fact the British glider after action reports are called 'raid reports' regardless of the scale of the operation. After reading your comment I find it ironic that the bridge representing the 10% failure in MARKET was the Nijmegen highway bridge, which was the target of 1st Battalion 508th PIR in the 82nd Airborne. Many sources written after the war claim the bridge was de-prioritised in favour of the Groesbeek heights - seen as necessary to secure the 82nd Airborne's airhead, but this is only technically correct after the first failed attempt to secure the bridge on D-Day of the operation, when Airborne Corps commander General Browning rejected 82nd CO General Gavin's proposal to make a second attempt on the bridge before armoured support arrived from XXX Corps. However, Gavin's divisional plan included an instruction to the CO of the 508th to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as possible after landing, which he subsequently failed to do until a late intrvention by Gavin himself to get him moving, by which time it was too late. The race to reinforce the bridge was won by 10.SS-Panzer-Division. This instruction was confirmed by a letter Gavin wrote to US Army Historical officer Captain Westover (dated 17 July 1945) and again to Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for his book A Bridge Too Far (1974). In 2012, both John McManus in September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, and Phil Nordyke in Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, have first hand witnesses to the divisional briefing in which Gavin gave that instruction and emphasied that it was important "to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation" (Captain Chet Graham, 508th liaison officer to Division HQ, in Nordyke 2012). McManus also gives a very thorough analysis and rationale for the bridge versus ridge debate for anyone wanting to get into that and nail the post-war myth the bridge was in any way de-prioritised in the planning of the operation. Gavin's interview with Cornelius Ryan also contains a claim by Gavin that "The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized" (Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University - Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967). Operation LUMBERJACK (1-7 March 1945) was the US 1st Army's advance to the Rhine in the area of Cologne-Bonn, which was preparation for a Rhine crossing and then a pincer on the Ruhr with Montgomery's 21st Army Group from their own Rhine crossing (Operation Plunder on 23/24 March 1945) to the north. The intent was not to take bridges intact with airborne 'raids' on those objectives - the policy was to force the destruction of the bridges and trap as many Germans on the west bank as possible. When the Remagen bridge was found to be still intact it became a target of opportunity to secure it as a crossing. The dictionary defines 'raid' as a surprise attack, so I think MARKET GARDEN (or at least the airborne operation MARKET) was certainly a surprise, whereas I don't think LUMBERJACK qualifies at all, and that's why it doesn't really bear comparison. In fact at Remagen, the surprise was on the American forces when the Germans failed to demolish the bridge.
Operation Market was a bold plan but I think one of the biggest issues is that the paratroopers dropped near Arnhem were dropped over a 3 day period due to lack of planes and bad weather. Sosabowski's Polish force didn't arrive until the 3rd day. Complicating this was the fact that the British were dropped 8 miles from Arnhem.
@@johnburns4017 I never said the Germans claim a victory, just their resistance contributed to the failure of Market garden, just as the weather, lack of Aircraft and the terrain.
@@johnburns4017 You say the initial resistance was poor. Please explain why the 1st and 3rd battalions of 1st Para Brigade failed to reach their objectives on the 17th. You say the road from Zon to Arhem was clear for about 40 hours after the jump. Yet Viktor Grabner and 9 SS Recon Battalion reach Nijmegen by 2000 hours on the 17th, H-Hour +7. Market Garden was a failure in that it did not achieve it objective of placing XXX Corp in a blocking position between Arnhem and Zuider Zee (Refer to 21st Army Group page 3 "the object of Second Army (withborne forces under command after landing) was to position itself astride the rivers Maas, Waal and Neder Rijn in the area of Grave 6253, Nijmegen 7062 and Arnhem E757 and to dominate the country North as far as Zuider Zee thereby cutting communications between Germany and the Low Countries." Clearly Second Army did not reach the Zuider Zee or Arnhem so how was Market Garden not a failure.
@@johnburns4017 "Initial resistance was poor as been explained to You" , all you prove a statement with no evidence or sources. So answer the question explain why 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Para Brigade FAILED to reach their objectives on the 17th , also why didn't the 2nd Para Battalion seize the southern end of the Arnhem Bridge. If the initial resistance was poor the 3rd battalion would have reach the bridge, 1st Battalion the heights at the northern end of Arnhem, Recon Sq would reach the bridge, The southern end would have been seized. So please explain why these objectives were not captured if the initial resistance was poor. From Kershaw, Robert. It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 "General Bittrich, the Commander of IISS Panzer Corps, received the first enemy situation reports at 1330 and issued his first warning order at 1340. Both 9SS and 10SS division headquarters were given ‘stand to’. IISS Corps’ reaction to the crisis reads like a staff command and control exercise. Bittrich based in Doetinchem quickly and expertly deduced the likely enemy aim. Command and staff procedures began to function with the efficiency that was so much a hallmark of the German General Staff. Nijmegen and Arnhem were identified as the key objectives for this renewed Allied offensive. Airborne landings of considerable strength had been identified near both locations. Therefore, the 9SS were to recce Arnhem and Nijmegen, assemble, occupy the former and defeat the enemy landings west of Arnhem by Oosterbeek. This was to be achieved post-haste, and the Arnhem bridge secured. 10SS were to occupy the Nijmegen bridge and form a bridgehead south of it." Clearly German reaction with the 10SS heading to Nijmegen, clearly the road was not clear 40 hours after the landing. Also XXX Corp was stopped by 2 88mm A/t guns on the 18th for 7 hours. Market Garden objective was not to seize Noord Brabant read Montgomery Memoirs it was Zuider Zee, even TIK in his presentation states Zuider Zee was the objective of Market Garden. Stop attempting to change the facts to suit your views.
Theoretical Second Lift on Day One 17 September 1944 Actual first lift 0945 Take off begins 1350 Main jump over Arnhem begins Four hours back to home field not including circling while waiting to land Theoretical Second Lift Assume minimum of one hour for turn around including refueling. The fuel capacity of the C-47 is 882 US gallons 1850 Take off begins (Sunset Arnhem 17 Sept. 2024, 1945 DST Central European Time) 2255 Jump begins Four hours back to base Britain was on Double Summer Time, two hours ahead of GMT.
River Orne bridge and canal bridge coup de main training "Gale tested the company through two exercises where the objective was to capture bridges, when it became apparent that the company would not be able to carry out the mission on its own." "Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night." wiki
The plan was thrown together too quickly and was too complicated while dependent on all factors working. More planning and continuity actions needed to be planned for.
Many people don't realise that MARKET GARDEN had about two weeks for planning since it was based on the previous weeks' cancelled operations COMET for the ground objectives and LINNET/LINNET II for the air plan. The reason LINNET (Tournai) and the alternative targets for LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges) were both cancelled was because the ground forces had overrun the objectives before the airborne operation could be launched. Browning had in fact threatened to resign over Brereton's LINNET II plan because it had too short notice to print and distribute maps to the airborne troops. So you're damned if you take too long and you're damned if you don't take enough time for planning. Montgomery gets criticised for halting XXX Corps on 4 September with 100 Kilometres of fuel still in the tanks after the capture of Antwerp, but if he hadn't there was a danger of using up vital logistics that would be required for the Rhine crossing (COMET/MARKET GARDEN), and it was also the case that he was warned by his administration officer on 11 September that MARKET GARDEN could not be launched until 23 September without more supplies being delivered. Montgomery immediately cabled that warning to Eisenhower and Bedell Smith visited him the next day to promise everything he wanted, which didn't actually materialise, compromising the advance of the flanking VIII and XII Corps during the operation. As for it being "too complicated" - that's a common American complaint, but all I can say is welcome to the British Army - if you can't cope, don't pretend to be as capable. Despite all the well-known problems, the British Airborne at Arnhem secured their prime objective and held it for four days. The Americans at Nijmegen failed to move on an undefended bridge until it was reinforced by SS panzer troops. On flexibility - the airborne operation targeted about 24 bridges in total, many were 'Heart Route' alternative crossings to the 10 bridges on the main 'Club Route' supply line. The weakest point was the river Waal, the main channel of the Dutch Rhine, because there were only two bridges at Nijmegen for many miles and this was the point of failure on the first day. The 508th PIR had an easy run to the bridge in the first vital hours, but failed to exploit it because of poor field command at the top of the regiment, already exposed in Normandy, and for this the divisional commander must take some responsibility. This is why RG Poulussen's book Lost At Nijmegen (2011) correctly identifies the point of failure at Nijmegen, but the following year Phil Nordyke, an 82nd Airborne Division historian with several books written on the division, published his combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) - with more detail and many first hand accounts. I thoroughly recommend both.
@davemac1197 Thanks. I loved your reply. I see the problem that caused the falure as a British military stuck in the WW1 mod of running straight into machine guns. This came from the old plan of Britsh lining up in a row and marching into a musket volley. The world was learning to fight a new war. Today, the UK has one of the finest trained soldiers in the world. American solders that spend time with British soldiers come back and tell me they are outstanding.
@@thatbeme- thanks for that reply, but I have to say if you read Montgomery's service record in the First World War (just the Wiki page on him is sufficient) you should understand that after experiencing the horrors of trench warfare as a young Lieutenant he was determined to fight the Second World War as a Divisonal commander rising to Army Group commander with the minimum of casualties, and gained a reputation (at least in the UK) of being careful with the lives of the men under his command. The British Airborne Corps commander Browning also has a similar First World War record, awarded a DSO for handing a battalion while also a Lieutenant. It's disheartening to see people make comments about these officers being wasteful with the lives of GI's while under their command in MARKET GARDEN, when the worst casualties in both the 101st (the battle at Best for a bridge not requested and already blown) and 82nd Divisions (Waal river assault crossing) were the result of initiatives made by their own divisional commanders and not from the British. I blame Hollywood for much of the mythology, and even Cornelius Ryan's book has many misleading errors of omission.
Excellent show, I agree with many points, but really do not disagree with anything said. As for Gavin, nobody is perfect, injuring your back in a jump on Day 1 is huge since I do have a pinched nerve in my back and is not a pleasant thing to experience in peace time, and I've gotten from many US books about our paratroopers in WWII that the US commanders were overly concerned about the landing zones, especially the follow up drops because they were afraid to have US troops drop in daylight directly onto German forces and also for resupply efforts. Lack of focus I think is a good criticism of US involvement in this campaign.
I think it is possible to have these constructive debates without slinging mud at anyone. Gavin was a great commander in many ways, but nonetheless it is fair to examine his part on OMG
Browning planned the same style glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges for Operation COMET. These got removed by Brereton for MARKET because of the night navigation issues in the USAAF as mentioned in Colin Gibson's comment above.
Always wonder if the 4th Brigade hadn't dropped, the two airlanding battalions arriving on day 1 could have joined the advance to the bridge and with their additional strength could of swung the balance to get to the bridge on day 1. The 4th Brigade brought almost nothing to the battle and were virtually wasted in the woods..
This whole Gavin thing really gets me going for some reason The whole thing presupposes that even if the Waalbrug is taken on the first day, that one battalion could hold it without taking the railway bridge and its anti-aircraft guns which could direct fire on it .... and that the Germans wouldn't do anything different than what they did if it was captured.... Also the battle at Mook is pretty hairy and that is overlooked in this. If they lose the second bridge.... This whole theory simply seems like a way to scapegoating from people who know the entire German OOB now which commanders then didn't. And it also REALLY lessens the effort that was mounted to ACTUALLY take both the bridges later. I've heard a meme of "what bridge?" being bandied about now. Frustrating.
It's a matter of opinions. As we said at the outset, many people have their deeply held views about this. RG has his theory and people can agree or not agree as they believe
I think this again comes down to how "protective" people are of their own interpretation of the OMG plan and people having their favourite culprits. As a Brit, we've had to take 7 decades of all the blame being directed at Monty, Browning and 30 Corps. This Dutch historian's conclusion is both the 82nd and 101st had a role to play in the failure. This show encourages all to re-evaluate
@Answer Questions Hard to disagree with that, some failed less spectacularly than others and there was excpetional commitment and bravery shown by 1st Airborne especially at Platoon level
@@bigwoody4704 had Vandeleur advanced, his armour would have been wiped out. The Germans, having a full set of the battle plans in their possession knew precisely where to place their anti tank weapons. Visit the place (I did, years ago before the area changed so much) and you will see the folly of a single tank advance on an elevated road!
@@bigwoody4704 so in fact it was Eisenhower's decision to support Monty! He accepted the blame because..,...he was the Supreme Commander and made the relevant decision!
(1) This was a great broadcast, absorbing, but perhaps the interviewer should have made his questions (and particularly his comments) more succinct. His guest was left to sometimes just answer in a sentence and given no time to expand. (2) I for one dislike the movie intensely, although I can see in terms of narrative drama, and acting, plus the re-creation of the battle scenes it is superb. However, I'm bound to say it wasn't (as the director Richard Attenborough claimed) an ant-war movie, but an anti- British one, clearly with American money determining its bias. The American troops are displayed as 'get-up-and-go', the Brits. as sluggish, incompetent, and (apart from the 'Red Devils) almost cowardly. What a film to put up for a Royal Command Premier with the Queen (the Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces) forced - with Prince Philip - to watch. (3) I don't (for one moment) think military historians would have allowed this film to influence their writings on Market Garden; like R.G. Poulussen their interpretations would be shaped by research in the various archives. (4) 5/5 stars for this video, excellent. (UK)
That's true enough, RG isn't much of a talker and rather shy, which is why this was a prerecord not live. And also why I did much of the exposition in the interview. I urge you to read his books
@@WW2TV Oh, I understand. So full marks to your then for your exposition. Yes, I did go to Amazon but his book is only in a KINDLE edition. I prefer a hard copy. I am at the moment reading Beevor's "Arnhem". Your broadcast was important for me as an antidote.
Great analysis,& I think you make a great point,as you usually do...these popular movies do have an impact on our opinions,even for those of us who realize the fallacies. Subconsciously,you can't help but have some of that mythology-or exaggeration deep into your consciousness. But awesome job as usual. I like how you point out the biases we all have. Some of it is nationalism,but also our national media. Some of my fellow Americans,act like we single handedly beat the Germans,when the British were going at them,long before us. And the Russians died,killed,& bore far more of the fighting,than America,& Britain combined. Or how important British intelligence was,while US intelligence was pretty overmatched early on. Brits probably had the 2nd best intelligence service on earth,behind Russia,who used their intelligence services against everybody-,friend,or foe. Kinda like how us Americans tend to think we single handedly invented the atomic bomb,but British scientists were very important in the Manhattan project. However, that's also how the Russians stole the bomb eventually, according to my understanding-compromised Brits at Las Alamos. Maybe there were Americans also-Im no expert. But my understanding is they mainly got it through a few key Brits. But the Russians have a tendency to forget there even was a western front,or the contribution the Americans,& British-to a lesser extent-supplied them on the Eastern front. The British tend to ignore the entire empire of help they had,or those from occupied countries,when they were supposedly"alone." The French tend to over rate their role in liberating their country,& highlight the French resistance,while ignoring their many collaborators. And it's often forgotten,that the US,& British,to a lesser degree- had another war going on vs Japan,which Russia didn't have to worry about. This is all my opinion,but every country tends to exaggerate their contributions,& minimize others. Especially since the Cold war basically started before the end of the war,& neither side wanted to credit the other. I know people born in the USSR,who thought as kids-thought they single handedly won everything in WW2. It's not as egregiously dishonest in "Western countries," but we all have our myths,& spin on these things. But crediting your allies,(or even enemies),& admitting your own countries mistakes, doesn't take away from "your side," or discredit the memory of those killed. We only learn from history,if it's accurate. And more than 1 thing can be true at the same time-there we're good,& evil people on all sides,& all sides made contributions,but could not have been as effective,without their allies. But I can also believe that the Allied side had basically an overall just cause-but recognize there were scoundrels on our side,& we made mistakes...even war crimes. The Axis cause was basically a lie,& evil...but there were individual people,who did heroic things,& were basically good people on their side. It's easy to judge them all 80 yrs later,but I think the Allies crossed the line,with some of our strategic bombings over occupied Europe,but especially Germany,& Japan. Some of our troops did commit war crimes,but not remotely on the scale of the Axis...or even Russians. But it's easy for us to judge. If you were a Russian soldier,pumped full of communist propaganda about the Germans-some true,some exaggerated,& some not true...& you saw your whole village wiped out by the SS...how would we react? I don't believe I would justify raping 80 yr old German women,but I might justify murdering German POWs...especially SS...who knows? And the American,& British strategic bombing,did hurt the Germans,though it cost way too many civilian lives,& wasn't as effective as they thought it'd be. But we tend to forget...they didn't have satellite guided bombs,computers,drones,etc. The only way to hit a target was really saturating the target. So,I think we do sometimes judge those people too much. But I think some of our bombings did cross the line. Not the atomic bombings though...I think those saved hundreds of thousands of Allied lives,& probably many millions of Japanese lives,as awful & regrettable as they were. Even after 2,some of the Japanese army tried to pull off a coup,to prevent the Emperor from surrendering. But that's a story,or argument for another day. Great job,I didn't know much about Market Garden-as I tend to gravitate to Allied victories,not defeats-lol. But you both educated me a lot.
Just the fact that they can see the end of the war coming. I mean Germany is right next door. That can subconsciously effect decision making. Maybe make one a little more cautious. They could be thinking " I might be able to make it through this shit show!" Just a thought. What do you think? Great show guys. Thanks so much!
If any of the river bridges (Grave, Nijmegen, Arnhem) were demolished the mission would fail. With the Grave and Nijmegan bridges the most important. This fact alone REQUIRES a coup de main on ALL bridges. The landing plan was the first fail. Everything else is a what if. The Allies were very lucky the Waal bridges were not destroyed on D1, then 1AB would have been 100% gone instead of 50%.
I Going to give My Opinion, Let's Start w the Plan , I'm going to compare it to the Bulge , MG (market garden) Ground Troops 1 One Road of travel I guess the Dutch don't have to many roads Going N-S. Is there not any other roads going N-S ? Now Battle of the Bulge (BB) Germans multi roads push Rt , 3rd Army Patton did He only go up 1 One Road No Multi Roads this is also using the new evidence of your show how quick he counterattack heading west then north ect. Being a NCO E-7 SFC And in combat till You yourself have been in combat there is that thing called (FOG OF WAR) This is very true even for me. I've seen Officers Freeze, NCO Too. What I mean by this is lack of decision-making... good or bad . OK back to the points... Only using one thrust one point of entry vs multi points , Yes you could say there was multi points w the airborne yet even you have so called surprise jumps this was during daylight. Everyone knows airborne units is a light infantry unit they can only last so long w/o air and heavy ground support.. armor/artillery .. TIME was / IS the Factor.. there is also the fact "When things go wrong they will" Plan for the worst not the best. Plan objectives take the bridges, Hold the bridges, I guess you forgot about ARTILLERY Hitting the bridges? A US Army M101 artillery piece can hit a target 7 miles away... was that ever considered? Oh that's right Old men and young boys ? Forgetting that the I believe part of the 7th German Army division escaped from the FALAISE POCKET They just disappeared or did they? If Monte or the allies should have remember in the desert was withdrawals then Strong Defense position and or counterattack.... terrain is a lot different from desert to wooded areas, farmland, towns, cities, urban areas... Did they also forget that they had Pattons Fake Army in England to hold a German Group before D Day ? Saying the plan could have worked is hindsight, knowing all the facts NOW . YET YOU WILL NEVER KNOW. Remember Newtown law when every there is a Action there is a Reaction... The same applies to WAR AND CHESS . The overall goal was to get a deep port for Supplies not to go to Berlin was it not? unless you wanted to go down in History of entry of Germany? And by the way Where was Monte? Did he always lead from the back? Oh that's right he was a Corp Commander .. Now I'm going in a different direction I hear all this of Who to blame ? The PLAN put together to fast w/o Intelligent Reports did Browning just dismiss the reports , Dutch underground? Scout Planes? Landing of 1st AB so far away from Target and not getting full AB division drop then comes the question of supplies not adapting to goal to the objective holding a LZ so far away from Target? 82AB Browning and Gavin at that location why was Browning there? Did he really have to be there remember he saw int.reports 1000 Tanks where did that come from? And if someone knew WHY Did this Plan even go forward ???? AB going against ARMOR Not to good of odds. 101AB not getting to Bridge did anyone think of artillery destruction of bridge before arrival, Also who in there right mind takes the main plans into battle which these plans was used by German High Comand see no one talks about that only that Germans disregarded them or did they ? The way I understand at first they did till a general of German AB reviewed them said they could be legit . Then we come to the one Road assault this one blows my mind you always have a better chance of a spearhead at multi fronts Not a single front its called FLANKING OUT FLANKING your opponent, covering your flank . Even in the Sicily Campaign didn't Monte insist Patton cover his FLANK ? INSTEAD of dropping off at Palermo .. which I believe Monte was right. That's my opinion. See Multi fronts Not a single Front , Now comes the Leadership The plan slapped together with end a few weeks if that , Browning not passing off Intelligent report to higher up , set Goals Bridges, both sides of Road security, Towns of main road security, for a 60 miles route was there even enough men to achieve this and to HOLD ? No matter what there would always be holes in the line . This causing over runs of position supply problems ect .. now comes to the approval of this Plan MONTE, IKE and CHURCHILL . WAS CHURCHILL pressuring Ike cause of the V2 Rockets problem ? Was Ike looking for that deep port of Antwerp? Monte thinking Germans were done they will just give up or I Monte never been defeated overconfidence.... You decide 🤔 So I've asked a lot of questions here . Gave you a few things to consider. As a student of war and history, I hope I didn't offend anyone yet I don't care this is MY OPINION and experience... As always when you are on the ground it always falls to manpower , Intelligence , communications, support, supplies, and goals of the operation plus counter offense.
That would be hard to say, because the operation was little known until after the publication of Ryan's classic 1974 book, and the Hollywood film version in 1977 reached an even wider public audience. The earliest published book I have on MARKET GARDEN is Cornelius Bauer's The Battle Of Arnhem, first published in Dutch as De Slag By Arnhem in 1963 and in English in 1966. The book is based on the 20 years of research into the battle of Arnhem by Dutch Colonel Theodoor Alexander Boeree, a resident of Ede during the battle, and his main conclusion was to refute the 'betrayal myth' that the plans for the operation were betrayed to the Germans by a Dutch double agent, which apparently many believed at the time. The myth served to explain the rapid response to the operation by II.SS-Panzerkorps, but in fact the airborne attack was a complete surprise to German officers with just a couple of exceptions. The quick response was due to the organisation of 'alarm units' for any emergencies, and the II.SS-Panzerkorps HQ in Doetinchem was connected by a direct phone line to the local Luftwaffe air raid observation station in the town, which in turn was part of a communications net linked to the 3.Jagd-Division control bunker 'DIOGENES' near Deelen airfield. SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich was therefore informed of the airborne landings at Arnhem and Nijmegen by telephone as soon as they were happening and he immediately ordered all alarm units in the Korps to be mobilised within the hour. One example of how a myth can persist and be replicated by others for many years is a technical error in German author Wilhem Tieke's In The Firestorm Of The Last Years Of The War - II.SS-Panzerkorps with the 9. and 10.SS-Divisions 'Hohenstaufen' and 'Frundsberg' (1975). Tieke was a member of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen', so he writes from a position of some authority, although he made an error in asserting that SS-Sturmbannfürer Erwin Franz Rudolf Röstel's SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 10 was encountered in the MARKET GARDEN corridor around Valkenswaard in the first two days of the operation, and this has been picked up by Robert Kershaw's pioneering work on the German side of the campaign with his book It Never Snows In September (1990). Kershaw goes further and assumes that the four "assault guns" deployed to Nijmegen by 10.SS-Panzer-Division was a detachment from Röstel's unit, but the (quote unquote) "assault guns" give away the fact this is an error and the vehicles were not from an SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung. Both SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 9 and 10 were equipped with 21 x Jagdpanzer IV/L48 tank destroyers. The abteilung for the Hohenstaufen completed training only in time for the withdrawal from Normandy and lost all but two of its vehicles in France and Germany covering the withdrawal of the division, and the remaining two vehicles were 'alarmed' and in early action at Arnhem. The Frundsberg's unit was detached from the division and sent with all 21 vehicles to 7.Armee in Limburg, where it was operating east of Maastricht in the Valkenburg and Kerkrade areas fighting the US 1st Army advancing on Aachen across the German border. This is probably how the unit's location got Valkenburg conflated with Valkenswaard by Tieke. This myth can be found repeated as gospel in many references until finally put to bed by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts' book Autumn Gale (Herbst Sturm) - Kampfgruppe Chill, schwere Heeres Panzerrjäger-Abteilung 559 and the German recovery in the autumn of 1944 (2013), where the unit responsible for Jagpanthers (1.Kompanie) and StuG IIIGs (2. and 3.Kompanie) in the lower MARKET GARDEN corridor is schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. A unit previously responsible for stopping 11th Armoured Division's advance across the Albert canal in Antwerp to cut off the Zuid-Beveland peninsula (if you want to get into that debate, this is also the book to consult). The four StuG IIIG assault guns in Nijmegen did belong to 10.SS-Panzer, but they were a hangover from the formation of the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions as panzergrenadier-divisions until Hitler ordered them converted to panzer-divisions in 1943. The StuG Abteilung was reorganised into the 7. and 8.Kompanie of the new Panzer-Regiments (to make up the numbers in what should be an all-Panzer IV battalion), so the four StuGs at Nijmegen were the last Normandy survivors concentrated in 7./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 under SS-Obersturmführer Franz Riedel. Confusingly, the commander of 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 was also called Franz, Oberleutnant Franz Kopka, who survived the war and consulted by Didden and Swarts for Autumn Gale. You have to drill down to granular level to get all the dots to join up, and that hasn't really happened until the last 10-12 years in terms of published books.
Just realised I do have an earlier book, Escape From Arnhem by Leo Heaps (1945). Heaps was a CANLOAN officer (Canadian volunteers loaned to the British Army, which was short of officers) and was a bit of an adventurer. After landing on the Normandy beaches on D-Day with the Dorsetshire Regiment, he was evacuated to England with a minor wound and managed to blag his way into getting attached to 1st Parachute Battalion for the Arnhem operation, despite not having jump wings. The CO, Lt Col David Dobie, didn't know what to do with him so gave him a non-job of collecting any German transport he could find and arranged to meet at the bridge, so by accident he avoided getting wiped out with the rest of the battalion. Instead, he made several attempts to get ammunition supplies to the bridge by Jeep or Universal Carrier, all unsuccessful, but did find General Urquhart in western Arnhem. He was involved in the siege of Oosterbeek as part of the 'Lonsdale Force' of 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute, and South Staffords remnants, captured after trying to swim the Rijn, and then escaped from a POW train and evaded to help create the escape lines and organise the Operation Pegasus evacuation as part of Airey Neave's MI-9 organisation. His story is a personal account with a frustrating lack of maps and precise locations and other details, so it doesn't really give a history or view of the operation as such.
@@davemac1197 There is an interview with Frost on youtube from 1977 connected to the release of yhe film. You get the impression that he was quite the celebrity already. There is also footage from 1946 and 1949 alreay from ceremony's in honour of the fallen and ofcourse the Film theyre's is glory. Together this would seem to me that the operation was already mythical early on.
'merican Gavin was in charge, so yor're inferring he had inferior intellect, no local intelligence (the Dutch disagree), no line of command to control his tactical dispersions, lacked balls, a kid promoted beyond his competence, Gavin killed a British Airborne Division fgs. Typical Jan Kees Holywood version comment. Gavin allowed British Airborne Division to die, I will never forgive him.
TIK has mentioned that it was Browning who ordered Gavin to prioritise defence to an attack from the Reichswald .... Browning had his headquarters with Gavin.
@@johnburns4017 Hi John, you are right about TIK not saying in his podcast that Browning had anything to do with Gavin's decision ... but after the broadcast TIK said he had been shown evidence that Browning did order him to deprioritise the bridge ... I forget if it was a copy of the unit diary or something else which TIK hadn't seen before.
@@johnburns4017 TIK mentioned this in a short update post on his website to his main post on the battle where he followed the accepted version that it was Gavin's decision to withdraw from the bridge - something Gavin never challenged later. TIK showed the document - I think it was a HQ log or something which clearly stated that Browning wanted/ordered the withdrawal. Perhaps he thought that Nijmegen was the bridge too far - hahaha. If you confirm it I would be interested to know. Regards
@@johnburns4017 thanks for this ... you are clearly an expert and far more knowledgable than I ... I had the impression that TIK had shown in his update the 'smoking gun' of Browning's responsibility for the withdrawal from the bridge ... alas I cannot find that update now because he showed there that newly discovered/noticed document. Regards
Watched this for about the 10th time again yesterday! I'm an American, but I AGREE that Gavin's performance & decisions at Nijmegen are baffling, particularly why he didn't order the entire 508th to capture the hwy bridge on day 1. Capturing and holding the bridges was the #1 priority over the operation and I see Gavin's 82nd plan for that to be almost just as flawed as 1st Airborne's terrible plan to take the Arnhem bridges. However, I think Browning is as much responsible for the failures at Nijmegen as HE was the overall commander of the airborne component of "Market", as well as he and his hq being onsite at Nijmegen. It amazes me that between Browning & Gavin, the hwy bridge was overlooked as the primary day one objective of 82nd, especially because that failure did not at all fit in with Browning's directive to "seize the bridges with THUNDERCLAP surprise" as is oft quoted. Also, why wasn't there a DZ or LZ on the North side of the Nijmegen bridges that would have assured that "thunderclap surprise". Additionally, this latest viewing of this makes me much more questionable on the 101's plan as well. The whole point of "there really was NO "carpet" of airborne" I had never really thought about. 101's DZ's/LZ's should have been much more spread out to cover their area of objective rather than being as concentrated as they were in the Son area. Why wasn't a regiment dropped immediately South of Eindhoven, and another one dropped farther North in the Veghel/Uden area? I've studied this battle since I was 12 years old, have read most of the books, and had never really thought of that point until seeing this video again. Had 101st secured Eindhoven, bridges and area to the South of the city, XXX Corp would not have had to stop at Valkensward on evening of Day 1 and could have pushed right on through Eindhoven to Son bridge and started the repairs that night, thus pushing the whole timetable up couldn't they have? I do DISAGREE with Polussen's suggestion that the plan was "good", and that it could have succeeded though. Too many variables, too many poor decisions, and the whole thing seemed to be based on the overwhelming desire to "get the airborne into action at any cost" mentality. And of course the total under-estimation of German capabilities and ability to rapidly consolidate defenses as they did. Only way this operation would have worked was if there was hardly any German units in the areas concerned not capable of tenacious defense. The decisions that led to the terrible air plan - drop zones far from primary objectives, no "2nd lift", no coup de main ops, over concerned about flak effects....etc... all reflect a very curious mindset that seems to indicate that Allied commanders were largely discounting the Germans as an effective fighting force and there false assumption that the Allied Airborne Army was just going casually seize all these bridge and that 2nd Army was going to just as casually waltz over the Rhine at Arnhem. Why was there not more emphasis placed on alacrity, speed, and dash on the part of both the airborne and the ground forces? Where was Dempsey? Where was Monty? Would have thought that those commanders would have been much more "hands on", at least have been present, during the battle? Anyway, GREAT WORK! I'm sure this won't be the last time I watch it!
I recommend Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and/or John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012). The answers you're looking for on Nijmegen are in these books, and Nordyke has the backstory on the 508th's CO in Normandy, which is an important element of the story. RG Poulussen's Little Sense Of Urgency (2014) has the answer to the 101st drop zones - they were originally intended to drop south of Eindhoven as well, but this was nixed by Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) on account of the Flak around Eindhoven, and Taylor refused a drop zone around Uden to link up with the 82nd - so no 'airborne carpet'.
Browning was very quiet during MG it is important to know however that he and Brereton did not see eye-to-eye and he had been threatened by replacement. This may have left him reluctant to criticize his American subordinates.
I’ve always been perplexed as to why radio communication was so poor. I realize it is 1944, and real miniaturization has not taken place. No transistors yet, but there seems to be a complete lax attitude by the generals on radio operations.
A Bold Move carries risk. For me, the idea that 30 corps would just drive up on a Sunday drive and wave hello and everything's OK, is absolutely ridiculous. Every op was a hopeful fluke but the expectation for 30 corps near impossible, but absolutely critical for victory to be achieved. It only was a bridge too far for XXX corps But that's not their fault. Great presentation.
XXX Corps did an incredible near 90km in just 42 hours, despite German anti tank ambush, having to build their own bridge, a single lane road, traffic jams and thousands of Dutch civilians celebrating and holding them up. However this was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. The plan was doomed to fail because of the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. The Germans concluded the biggest mistake made by the enemy was dispersed drops and over a number of days. That's all down to the air commanders.
@@bigwoody4704 Utter horse-shit and post-op. arse -covering. I refer to you the comments of the only "young Guards officer" at the scene. Lt. Peter Carrington of the Grenadier Guards, who commanded the tank troop that crossed the bridge with the specific mission of assisting the US paratroopers in holding it against an expected German counter attack. Their arrival was an enormous relief to the Paratroopers, some of whom actually kissed Carringtons tanks and none of whom, including Reuben Tucker, insisted that he drive straight on to Arnhem. Carrington dismissed the very idea when interviewed after the war (when he was the British Foreign Secretary and a Lord) saying it was a ridiculous idea and military nonsensical in the situation.
MG was beyond repair well before this: 1. 80% of British AB were tied up in Oosterbeck 2. Frost men were dead, injured or no ammo 3. 30 corps was not getting by 2 panzer dv on a single raised highway 4. Airborne/30 corp did their job. 5. British plan was flimsy ignored intel.
@@WW2TV Woody, comon now, you know better than that. Brererton and Ike were figureheads. This was Montys baby that was swaddled and fed by Browning. Dont get me wrong though. The gallantry and fighting spirit shown by British and Americans throughout MG were all above and beyond. But to blame Gavin as Poullson does is cheap and lazy. He's an anti American hack whose logic is for shit. The plan was doomed from the start. 30 corps, and its strained supplies, on a single road, was not getting past 2 panzer divs that were going to be reinsforced asap. Hitler was senidng any and all avail units.
Ike was literally commanding the whole lot. He literally signed off on Monty's plan (that wasn't Monty's plan anyway - that was Comet). If Monty is culpable, so is Ike. As for Brereton only being a figurehead, who has say over the Troop Carriers and RAF flights and mission? Exactly, Brereton. With regards Gavin, he himself admitted he made major errors in OMG
The main objective was to get 30k best soldiers sitting in England into the fight. But not too quickly since it was already agreed us/uk would occupy only half of Germany.
MG 70% success 30k into the fight per Ike Map for Germany partition drawn at tehran nov 43. Don't give the Russians land payed for by allied blood per FDR.
Montgomery had been ordered to find a way of ending the war as soon as possible! Two main reasons; shortage of manpower, the development of game changing weapons like the V2 and the ME262 (development of these was delayed by the bombing campaign, and it is fortunate that it did).
Monty and Patton might not have seen the partition map but Ike had a copy or had seen a copy. Video of US Army Officer who was at Tehran where Stalin accused Churchill of trying to assassinate him. Second he saw a map with strange lines on it which later he realized were the partition lines. Around MG Russians still outside of Warsaw? But winter would slow their advance.
I really like this vid!!! My view is that with the planners ignoring the underground reports about having an SS Panzer group in the area. They could not have known that the Germans sent Field Marshal Model out to take over the area, he stopped a retreat through Arnhem he stopped it and in the next 2-3 days set-up a good defense and sent troops back down the road so more german defenders were there to oppose the Americans and British 30. If the drops would have happened 4 days before the plan could have been a resounding success. As for the German SS Panzer's they had not been completely refitted and replenished and were at the time of Model's arrival preparing to pull back I believe. As far as the SS goes it could have been worse if I understand correctly they only had 20-30 fully operational tanks, what if they had had a full compliment of tanks? The British Para's would not have lasted 2 days. Now this is my opinion based on my understanding of the history I have read. Now as for Intel Can you point out to me any military command that did not POO-POOed most intel gathered by any groups other than the coast watchers.
You made several points. 1. The underground reports were not ignored at all. Montgomery received reports on 9 September that II.SS-Panzerkorps with 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen', and presumably its sister unit 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', had arrived in the eastern Netherlands to refit, so he immediately realised Operation COMET due to embark in the early hours of 10 September was not strong enough to deal with them, and issued the cancellation order at the last minute. COMET involved dropping only the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave. Montgomery then proposed an upgraded replacement operation (provisionally called SIXTEEN) to Eisenhower at their scheduled meeting later on 10 September at Brussels airport, by adding the two US Airborne Divisions to seize the bridges between Eindhoven and Nijmegen. This allowed the British division and Polish brigade to concentrate at Arnhem with their superior anti-tank capabilities, where the armoured threat was greatest. 2. Model's Heeresgruppe B Headquarters moved to Oosterbeek just outside Arnhem and was open by 15 September, just two days before MARKET GARDEN. Code intercepts had revealed that the Heeresgruppe B 'FLIVO' (Luftwaffe Liaison officer) was in Oosterbeek (the Luftwaffe codes were easier to break than the army) and the resistance had identified the Hotel Tafelberg in Oosterbeek hosted an army group commander, so Model was known to be in Oosterbeek. The first orders issued to frustrate MARKET GARDEN came from II.SS-Panzerkorps commander Bittrich, not Model, because his HQ in Doetinchem was linked to a Luftwaffe air raid control centre in the town and this was linked to the Luftwaffe 3.Jagd-Division fighter control bunker 'DIOGENES' at Deelen airfield. Bittrich received a phone call from the Luftwaffe network within an hour of the landings starting and had 'alarm units' alerted to move within another hour. He had already issued orders to reconnoitre Arnhem and Nijmegen before Model arrived at his headquarters and approved the moves already made before formally taking control. 3. The two SS panzer divisions were severely degraded in the Normandy battles, losing most of their tanks to anti-tank guns in the British infantry divisions around Caen. SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 had three Panthers at Arnhem, and after the 'Hohenstaufen' had handed over their remaining Mark IVs to the 'Frundsberg', SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 had 16 Mark IV (concentrated in 5./SS-Pz.Rgt.10) and 4 StuG IIIG assault guns (concentrated in 7./SS-Pz.Rgt.10) at Vorden. The 'Frundsberg's Panther battalion was still training in Germany, continually robbed of vehicle deliveries to replace losses in units fighting in Normandy. The battalion would not be operational until the 'Nordwind' counter-offensive in January 1945. Model was estimated to have less than 100 operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B between Aachen and the North Sea coast - in fact we now know Model's September returns listed 84 operational panzers - facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 and the US 1st Army at Aachen with another 1,500 tanks. Remarkably, 84 is the exact number of anti-tank guns on establishment of British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade combined (52 x 6-pounders and 16 x 17 pounders in 1st Airborne, and 16 x 6-pounders in the Polish Anti-Tank Squadron). 4. The British Airborne Divisions had a larger number of anti-tank guns, while their US counterparts had more field artillery in their establishments. They could hold their own against armoured counter-attacks and the Anti-Tank Batteries were briefed to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, including Panthers and Tigers, so they received 'sanitised' (unit identifications stripped out) intel to expect front line armoured units to intervene. The armoured response actually came mostly from training units or alarm units sent from Germany and took several days to arrive. The Germans were wary of British anti-tank capabilities and avoided tank losses as much as possible. It's a fallacy that a large armoured force would simply roll over a British infantry unit. Some of the British guns in the Arnhem bridge and Oosterbeek perimeters hardly fired any rounds throughout the battle, because German armoured vehicles avoided their firing lines. British units were forced to surrender only when they ran out of small arms ammunition (and PIAT bombs used to go out and 'stalk' vehicles) to fend off infantry attacks, and the Germans ended up capturing unused stocks of AT gun rounds. Another example - when the bridge force of 1st Parachute Brigade were finally overran, British prisoners were led past "a seemingly endless line of Mark IV tanks" (James Sims in Arnhem Spearhead, 1978), and possibly included the Tiger I tanks of Panzer Kompanie 'Hummel', parked under the trees along a boulevard leading to the bridge, because they were held back until the bridge was cleared before being sent south to stop Montgomery's tanks at Nijmegen. 5. Your final comment on military commands poo-poo'ing intel I don't understand. Much of the Conventional narrative about intelligence regarding MARKET GARDEN is myth, and the main culprit is A Bridge Too Far - the book has errors of ommission and the film is often deliberately misleading to suit the agendas of the filmmakers. The total absence of airborne anti-tank guns in the film was used to convey the false impression that the airborne were helpless against tanks, for example. The intel on Arnhem turned out to be very accurate, even down to the 400 artillery troops in a collection centre at the Wolfheze psychiatric hospital - the reason it was bombed, the 'old men on bicycles and some Hitler Youth' were a local security battalion and SS training battalion known to be based there. The greatest unknown was the exact location of the 'Frundsberg' division, something the Dutch resistance had not identified, and this unfortunately had a negative affect on the planning at Nijmegen by 82nd Airborne, which ultimately backfired and led to the main compromise of the operation - another aspect completely ommitted by A Bridge Too Far. The city of Nijmegen was evacuated by the Germans after the landings and the highway bridge guarded by just an NCO and seventeen men until later in the evening when Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 (attached to 10.SS-Panzer) got to the bridge first, having been unloaded from rail flat cars at Beekbergen, tracks and guns refitted to make them administratively 'opertional' again, and then travelled all the way down to Nijmegen to conduct its reconnaissance. If the 508th had sent its 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as Gavin instructed, it would have arrived an hour before the SS panzer troops.
Former 2nd Ranger Bn with a combat jump into Rio Hato and later time in a certain SMU, I think the British plan on emphasizing Groesbeek heights to the Americans confused it’s focus.
@@johnburns4017 are you sure occupation of Groesbeck heights weren’t Priority 1# of Boy Browning. I would have to look back at there Warning Order to 82nd Airborne and if not no Leaders noticed there DZ on overlays over distant low priority terrain during final back brief seems impossible.
@@johnburns4017 Well put , 90% of your completely accurate post jump actions in my opinion show the diverging focus of the plan as it unfolded. As a paratrooper you need one objective to keep you from expected distractions. Unless the heights were the only safe DZ the initial DZ should have reinforced the mission objective. Pegasus bridge comes to mind and from my first combat jump 1989 into Rio Hato we were briefed not to defend DZ but attack PDF barracks and armored vehicle park with all forces assembled. You may be right and I appreciate your knowledge but 77 years later we are still trying to work through the Schwerpunkt of Market Garden…cheers
Things that went wrong: 101st at Zon. 30 Corps at Aalst and no exploitation from Nijmegen Bridge. No night movement. 82nd at Nijmegen. British Airborne: breakdown of command, communications and control. Low priority for railway bridge. 8 and 12 Corps not providing adequate flank protection. There’s many many more.
@@rene5600 the Son bridge should have been captured along with the Bridge at Best and Eindhoven should have liberated on September 17th. That was the plan
XXX Corps at Aalst couldn't get any air support to get rid of the German anti tank guns (actually Flak guns used as anti tank guns). German anti tank guns were a nightmare to pass. They stopped/slowed XXX Corps four times, knocking out a considerable number of tanks in total. Soon after kickoff, at Aalst, at the Nijmegen bridge and at Ressen.
@@lyndoncmp5751 both war diaries of the Irish Guards report no losses in tanks or infantry at Aalst, where did you get your info on considerable tank losses?
@@johnburns4017 According to the plan, Lathbury should have had 3 battalions defending Arnhem, not 1 battalion. More troops in Arnhem the longer they hold the objective and prevent Germans going to Elst
This is Arnhem we talking about,this isn't some artillery battery on the coast or some water plant being attack by special operations team,they were two panzer division and some were veterans of the eastern front so proper planning was needed.
It was actually the reinforcements that came in from Germany in the following days (unknown to allied or Dutch intelligence) that really made the difference. The 3 airborne divisions should have had enough to deal with what was there, yes with different planning. The two SS panzer divisions were at less than half strength and didn't have a single available tank between them to muster. They had lost them all in Normandy and didn't receive any new ones until 8 new Panthers arrived in Arnhem on the 20th.
John Burns, Yes. Kompanie Mielke was the first German armour sent into Arnhem. Late on the 18th. On the 17th it was 200 km east at Bielefeld Germany. It was sent to Arnhem through the night of 17/18th, arriving there late on the 18th. It had Panzer IIIs and IVs.
@@lyndoncmp5751 this is correct. The only tanks in the area where those of PK244 (the obsolete French B2s that had mostly been converted to flamethrower tanks) and those of the local school of armour, comprising six equally obsolete Pzkw IIIs and two early-generation Pzkw IVs. The only unit within either 9th SS Panzer or 10th SS Panzer was the 9th Recon unit, led by Graebner, that was seconded to 10th SS Panzer. As you already know well (but others may not!), It was this unit that was decimated by Frost's men on Arnhem bridge upon their return from Nijmegen. The book in my collection titled "German Armor in Arnhem September 1944" by Marcel Zwarts gives a very good insight into what was there and neither 9th SS Panzer nor 10th SS Panzer had any tanks of their own
@@lyndoncmp5751 While contested, some sources suggest there were a whole three Panther's undergoing repairs in Arhem on the day, which were knocked out in the inital fighting.
@@JustMonikaOk Yes there has never been any confirmed proof of this. After finding out that the "Panzer IV" knocked out by 44th Royal Tank Regiment just outside Nuenen was actually a Stummel (half track with a short 75mm on it) I no longer take allied reports at face value. Only German records. No German records show any Panthers in Arnhem until the 20th and there are no pictures of these 3 Panthers. Odd, if they were taken out. There are pictures of all the other German armour taken out in Arnhem/Oosterbeek/Elst.
Arnhem was the objective for Operation Comet, which was planned for 8th September, the first V2 attack only occurred on the 8th September. So, the decision on Arnhem predated the V2's attacks.
@@johnlucas8479 They had gotten a V2 that landed in Sweden by July. The Paratroopers also had orders to kill V2technichians if they where POWs. So yes, they knew about the V2.
@@johnlucas8479 From The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey, pages 135-136: _However, it was not to be. On 9 September, _*_Montgomery received a signal from London concerning the landing of the first V2 rockets, with a request to 'report most urgently by what approximate date you can rope off' the area from which they were launched. When Dempsey flew up to see him the next day with his plan for Wesel, Montgomery met him at the door to his caravan with the telegram in his hand and said. 'Let us save England.' That decided the question. I don't think Monty had really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got the telegram'_* -The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey. Peter Rostron
@@johnlucas8479 From The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey, pages 135-136: _However, it was not to be. On 9 September, Montgomery received a signal from London concerning the landing of the first V2 rockets, with a request to 'report most urgently by what approximate date you can rope off' the area from which they were launched. When Dempsey flew up to see him the next day with his plan for Wesel, Montgomery met him at the door to his caravan with the telegram in his hand and said. 'Let us save England.' That decided the question. _*_I don't think Monty had really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got the telegram'_* -The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey. Peter Rostron
So Horrocks was twiddling his thumbs waiting for Gavin to capture the bridge at Nijmegen. You see, I thought Horrocks was very late to arrive at Nijmegen waiting for the engineers to construct a replacement for the bridge that had been blown up on the Son. Oh wait, the 101st should have prevented that.
Horrocks got there barely behind schedule, all credit to those who put the Bailey bridge in, 101st for providing flank security, and XXX Corps for making good progress thereafter. It was really quite impressive but XXX Corps got bogged down in Nijmegen as that wasn't secured itself, let alone the bridge.
Crete vs Arnhem …Hours into no communication General Student had his operations Officer with long range radio to land on a beach west of Maleme airfield to get a situation report vs no attempt from Monty’s command day after day……this is the Operation in a nutshell…
I’m a little late to this party. I’m not certain the guest is convincing in blaming the failure of the entire operation on Gavin and the 82nd Airborne. Two, maybe 3 things have always bothered me about Operation Market Garden. The first is the brevity of the planning, especially from General Montgomery who was notorious for his methodical some would say ponderous planning. The second is the restriction of XXX Corps to a single in many cases elevated roadway. The success of the entire operation hinged on the rapid advance and relief of the Airborne divisions by this route. It’s not just that it was only a single roadway but that the adjacent terrain was polder country that was too soft to allow deviation of armour off the road and hence prevented any form of maneuver. The third is the medium to long term logistical strategy. At the time of the operation the allies were dependent on supply from Normandy. If Montgomery’s left hook had succeeded were there plans to capture the Scheldt above Antwerp or Rotterdam? The Allied offensive in Autumn of 44 was halted by stretched supply lines. I think I agree with Admiral King that the Scheldt should have been cleared while it was lightly defended in order to establish a closer deep water port. As things played out the eventual clearing of that ground against reinforced German defenders cost too many Canadian and British lives.
@@johnburns4017 I’m aware of your anti American rhetoric just as I am aware of Big Woodie’s Anglophobia. I think your exchanges on this platform do a disservice to the brave men who served in that war, my father among them. I choose not to engage with either of you.
@@johnburns4017 you could also add the fact that the Germans had a full set of the battle plans in their possession; these were removed from the body of a US officer in a Waco glider that was downed near to Student's HQ.
This operation should of never been approved. Montgomery had history of not being a team player, as Patton too. But Patton invaded Germany first and Montgomery was jelous.
Nonsense. Eisenhower publicy said he "insisted" on the operation after Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far was published, and the planning for Operation MARKET by US General Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army included the removal of Browning's original glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, planned for Operation COMET. Browning had advised British 2nd Army that COMET should not go ahead without these glider assaults as part of the plan, but after COMET was cancelled he was unable to protest Brereton's changes for the expanded Operation MARKET because he had already been politically neutralised when his threat to resign over Operation LINNET II would have resulted in Brereton accepting his resignation and replace him with US General Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. LINNET II was thankfully cancelled before it could be launched unprepared with no maps available for the troops, but Browning was unable to influence MARKET until his Corps HQ was on the ground in the Netherlands.
This is a bad and biased presentation. Read the 82nd contemporaneous reports of the action, and the orders given to Gavin. This narrative is very unfactual, and contradicts the contemporaneous written record. I do not care that this guy is Dutch. He just chose to ignore the records of the 82nd. Brereton made decisions to protect the drop and pilots. But it was simply not possible to drop everyone in one lift, nor possible to do two daylight lifts in one day. Plus he did not have the final say if someone senior wanted it different. Gavin absolutely did not think that the Heights should be the top priority. It was orders, and Browning's emphasis, who dropped with Gavin and was his commanding officer. The 82nd reports in writing right after the battle make this crystal clear. The narrative in this video is false and contradicts the written record. The Dutch told Gavin's G2 on 9/17 that there had been 3,000 German troops on the Heights who moved out on the morning of the 17th. It's in the 9/17 report. Where they were was unknown. The idea that there were no Germans in the area has always been false. There were SS Panzer troops at the Nijmegen bridge within hours, having raced there from Arnhem. The 82nd troops (a battalion) entered Nijmegen but could not get to the bridge due to German troops. The bridge itself was protected by blockhouses and several sites for machine guns. The 82nd was not tasked to rush to the Nijmegen bridge. The troops that did go there on the 17th could not get to the bridge due to German troops. The Heights were a concern to planners for two reasons. If the Germans have the Heights, they interdict the road and bridge crossing without having to recapture Nijmegen or the bridge. Also, it was known that there were significant forces on the other side of the forest (West Wall troops) - an attack on the salient at the Heights was thought of as a serious risk, and there was serious fighting there. It was why Gavin was instructed that the top priority was the Heights. The coup de main at Graves was Gavin's idea and not in the original plan. Maybe it was also suggested by someone junior in the 82nd, but Gavin got the change made. The British 1st never captured the Arnhem bridge - they just blocked one side. Even if the XXXth got there by day 3 (by day 2 as planned was impossible without regard to Nijmegen), it gets blown and the whole thing fails anyway. It is doubtful that they could have dashed across the island to Arnhem anyway, and would have had a very difficult fight. The British 1st failed to capture any bridges, which guaranteed failure. The Nijmegen bridge would have been blown on the 17th if it was subject to capture. Market Garden was a bad plan. Blaming the 82nd is bogus.
@@WW2TV I did. And reviewed a lot of the notes. It misses a lot of primary source documentation and presents theories squarely at odds with that evidence. Some of the footnotes flatly do not support the claim made in the book. Shoddy. The action reports of the 82nd are available online at various locations (can also be purchased inexpensively). Some are referenced, but many are ignored. Cornelius Ryan's research archive is also available online at Ohio University, and has a lot of primary source documents. Look at box 100. Folder 03 for daily reports. It hugely contradicts the assertions in the book. Frost himself wrote that Browning ordered Gavin to give the Heights priority over the Waal bridge. The Germans would have blown the Waal bridge on Day 1 if it was at risk of capture. They did so as to the RR bridge. Also, the British 1st took no bridges. There is no reason to believe that XXX would have been able to grab it before it was blown even if they got across the Waal on the 19th instead of the 20th. Frost was only able to block one end, and could do nothing as to the south side. The idea that the 82nd wrecked the plan is calumny. The British 1st "failed" even more so, and never secured the Arnhem bridge. That wrecked the plan. But the better point is that the plan was bad, period, rather than scapegoating the 82nd. And if we are going to trash the 82nd, you have to excoriate the British 1st as if failed to accomplish anything. Fair play if we are going to blame failure on paratroopers.
To be fair, we've had decades of all the blame being put on the British for OMG. RG's point of view is different, but at the very least raises some questions. He's also not the only historian to question the 82nd, James Holland, John McManus and others have also examined the division's performance
I always wonder what would have happened if they had gone for one bridge at a time. Take the bridge and move up the road, then consolidate. Then do the next bridge and move up etc
I truly hope the soundtrack improves. The commentator pissing on the whole idea of Market Garden opinions and is not wanting to do it. His determination that the British and the Americans aren't going to change their minds is also a real downer. I have my doubts, I am just here trying to understand the history of Market Garden not ready to blast an opinion.Please fix your subjects soundtrack, it sucks. Since I'm on a little rant, ,...Coup de Main, you use it some two dozen times at least and don't explain what it means. Not doing so is contemptus mundi, however I was eventually forced to look it up, it all goes to dies irae, and I think credo utitelligam, now that is all clear Im sure. I do like your postings but I just thought I would have a little rant. 😊
Another corker of an interview ,Arnhem like you say its been documented a lot since the film A bridge too far ,how I see it is that the film has many inaccurate areas /parts ,so I think in all fairness in simplistic terms is to say that … it was just to much of a bold venture that was extremely high risk ,but like you say the western allies had to be seen to be doing something so Market garden it was ,and would I be right in saying what could have gone wrong ,did .
Oi, you did a whole show on cancelled airborne ops so you know Monty was under heavy pressure to get 30k into the fight or Bradley and Patton would. The main problem was aircraft had to be assembled and couldn't do log. Troops and aircraft idle in England.
I suppose OBL is still hiding in a cave in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, because any more recent evidence to the contrary is just a conspiracy theory, right?
I blame Gavin. I am an American. I was in the 82nd, My dad was i the 82nd, and my uncle has a jump with the 505. Not putting priority on the bridge was the reason for failure.
"The 82nd Airborne Division, however, certainly does not deserve any particular criticism for this as their priorities appear to be a further product of the blind optimism that dogged Operation Market Garden, of which everyone involved was guilty. At Nijmegen, as with everywhere else, the assumption was that resistance would be light and so the main concern of the airborne units was to make the advance of the ground forces as rapid and as uncomplicated as possible, instead of devoting all their attention to primary objectives. Furthermore, it should be understood that the 82nd Airborne Division had by far the most complicated plan of any of the Airborne units involved with Market Garden, their troops being required to capture numerous objectives over a considerable expanse of terrain."
Pegasus Archive 30. Reasons for Failure page
I don't blame the 82nd Just gaven The whole operation was about securing bridges. Therefore the bridge should have been priority. I retired as a Maj and attended Combined Arms and Services staff course among others. Loved your presentation @@nickdanger3802
General Gavin did put priority on securing the Nijmegen highway bridge, but Colonel Lindquist did not interpret his instructions correctly.
The best analysis I've read on this bridge versus ridge debate is by John C McManus in September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), and his veteran's first hand accounts are supported by other witnesses in Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012). McManus also briefly refers to the story of PFC Joe Atkins, whose account of securing the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge with two other scouts before having to withdraw when nobody else showed up proves that the 1st Battalion could have taken the bridge without firing a shot on the first evening, as Gavin had instructed. His short story is recorded in full by Zig Boroughs' collection of stories from veterans in The 508th Connection (2013), and also included in the best update on Market Garden by Swedish historian - Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020), which also debunks many of the myths from A Bridge Too Far.
Pegasus Archive online is dated 2001 on the website and doesn't seem to have been updated with the more recent research by any of these researchers.
@@stewartorr1939 map Nijmegen day one
i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
Market Garden has always fascinated me. This show was a fantastic voyage through the possible points of failure in the overall operation. I knew about Gavin's reluctance to move on the Waal bridge until The Groesbeek Heights were "secured", but Brereton's role in dictating the number of lifts, lack of coup de main operations and lack of air support (weather notwithstanding) is another eye opener. Excellent show, Paul and RG.
John Burns
Where was Bradley in the Hurtgen Forest. When did he show up there? How many foxholes did he sleep in? 😉
Montgomery actually arrived in Eindhoven in the battle zone. Pretty amazing for an Army Group commander.
Montgomery also got down into the Ardennes during the Bulge, while Bradley was still in a lavish HQ in Luxembourg City.
Map Nijmegen day one i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg
@@bigwoody4704 Not you again!
Paul an extremely interesting program having someone who has done extensive research into this as an unbiased 3rd party. I was surprised to learn the number of mistakes made that led to the failure of this plan, as well as the assessment that it could have succeeded as late as the 19th of September. I am sure I have some preconceived notions as a result of the movie. Discarding the mistakes made by multiple drops and poor decisions by commanders, the one that resonates with me is the failure to take into account the Dutch underground and aerial reconnaissance of the Germain buildup around Arnhem. Very interesting show as usual--thx Paul
Great show. Valuable insights by RG Poulussen. Thank you
Great show, most excellent work. Keep up not only the spirit but also the level of quality of shows and your guests.
Interesting point that came out at Warfest was that the planning for Market Garden wasn't one that was integrated with air other than transport. TAF command simply weren't asked to be involved, say what they were capable of doing or included in the overall plan to support the drops and subsequent ground operations. They could certainly provide air to ground support as they had done with great effect in Normandy but simply weren't asked. Maybe that's down to Brereton but it feels a bit simplistic and more due to the rushed and extemporised planning which characterised, and ultimately doomed, MG from the start. Just a thought. Always good lo listen to RG.
Fantastic as expected from RG. For me, the whole plan is predicated on everything going right. There seems like there was little contingency for error.
I have often thought Brereton has escaped criticism for his role in Operation Market Garden. As someone from the States, it’s easy to point fingers at Browning.
Why Montgomery? It wasn't his operation it was Brereton and Browning,
@@bigwoody4704 how could it be his mistake? He was not involved with the operation. You Americans will be blaming Montgomery for the Hurtgen forest debacle and the Bulge debacle next
@@bigwoody4704 . It was not his operation read about the operation, read a book your just another Holywood historian
@@bigwoody4704. Does the mental institution you are residing at realise you have access to the Internet?
Montgomery himself was gracious in not blaming anyone else, which he could of and should have. Primarily Brereton.
Brereton himself unforgivably tried shifting the blame onto 1st Airborne and XXX Corps and he took no responsibility himself.
Brereton was the wrong man to command First Allied Airborne Army. He was not a paratrooper. Somebody's within the airborne should have been promoted to lead it. My choice would have been Ridgway. Brereton was lazy and incompetent.
Superbly researched and well balanced study! More presentations like this one please!
Great show. I love RG’s Twitter account, first time I have seen him online. Gave “A Bridge Too Far” a rewatch after the show and enjoyed it in a new way 😎
"Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, commander of 38 Group, decided upon the distant location of the drop zones, and despite requests from the 1st Airborne Division, he refused to land troops closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that the closer his aircraft came to Arnhem, the closer they would come to the large anti-aircraft emplacements, which in the event were not in place, at Deelen Airfield. With Transport Command under severe pressure at that stage in the War, ferrying supplies to the front line and bringing back casualties to British hospitals, Hollinghurst, understandably, did not wish to lose any more aircraft than was necessary. The decision, however, ought not have been his to make as it was surely be the job of the air planners to orientate their plan around the requirements of the Airborne troops, not what was most convenient for the Air Forces. The Airborne movement was, however, in its infancy at the time and many errors of judgement, which today seem obvious, were not so clear to its pioneers during the Second World War. Brigadier Hackett describes the planners: 'The airborne movement was very naive. It was very good on getting airborne troops to battle, but they were innocents when it came to fighting the Germans when we arrived. They used to make a beautiful airborne plan and then added the fighting-the-Germans bit afterwards.'" www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/depth_reason1.htm.
The linked article does not provide a reference of the comment that it was AOC38Gp who decided on the LZs and DZs. It is surprising that the decision could have been made by one of the two RAF Gp commanders providing aircraft (38Gp with converted bombers and 46Gp with Dakotas) when the RAF contribution (which was largely towing gliders for the initial waves) was relatively minor compared to IX TCC’s who carried all of the parachute elements (US, British, and Polish). If you have a reference for a contemporaneous source, it would be appreciated.
A excellent and thought provoking show. My only point of contention is using airborne casualty figures as a measure of how hard one unit fought compared to another.
Which I said in the show Scott
I read General Urquhart's book, among others about Market Garden. It's very well written informative, unbiased and, I'd say, humble. Others I read besides "A Bridge Too Far" include one about the CANLOANS that took part of MG (very interesting) and one written by a glider pilot that was captures at Arnhem but later escaped from war camp along with others. I have Antony Beevor's "Arnhem" on the shelf over the TV, begging me to resume reading it...
Mate, Urquhart’s book is full of bias, untruths and lies. Page 1 of Chapter 1 if you can’t tell wants wrong with that, then you don’t have a clue
Great show, interesting to see one in a different format
Nice Video. Thank you for doing this. The common answer to questions is "I don't know". Poulussen may have had access to sources, but he doesn't demonstrate military or histography understanding in evaluating sources and putting them into perspective. After reading his books and seeing his interview, the only conclusion is that he puts his opinion above evidence. This is why academic peer review is important. The works become a lightening rod for people looking for a specific conclusion. Still a great interview - thank you. Helped me understand the author in more detail.
The alternative to Market-Garden was getting Antwerp on line as a major allied port. The sea approaches were not taken and secured. The channel swept for mines.
That old chestnut? I suppose it's Christmas. The whole point of going for the Rhine crossing sooner rather than later was because it would be easier while the Germans were still off balance and constructing their river and canal defence lines in the Netherlands, while Antwerp's port capacity was a necessity for multiple advances into Germany for Eisenhower's broad front policy once they were over the Rhine.
Eisenhower said after Cornelius Ryan's unfinished and incomplete book A Bridge Too Far was published in 1974 - “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015).
People need to put the obsession with Antwerp to one side in its proper context and accept that MARKET GARDEN was worth the attempt and only failed by a narrow margin because a bridge was missed at Nijmegen on the first day due to a command failure in one parachute regiment that should have been sorted out in Normandy.
Always considered not taking Nijmegen bridge on the first day - when it would have easily possible - to be the biggest single issue (of all the many things that went wrong!). Read an account by a 1st Airborne survivor - Panzers? No problem, if we had known we would have brought 17 pdrs!
Four 17 pdr troops were part of1st Airborne's glider load.
I believe the Germans said the panzers would have been gone in two weeks and wasn’t Montgomery made aware of their presence? Weren’t the unweatherized radios a significant problem? Wasn’t the Reichwald chaos extremely nerve wracking to the Americans? I felt badly for Urqueheart he knew nothing about airborn and was in no position to accurately assess the overview. Thirty corps was relegated to one raised road surrounded by ground too wet for armor as I’ve read, keeping them incredibly vulnerable as. .I would have thought a massive suppressing assault on the German flak followed by immediate jumps would have been considered. Didn’t the Germans find the whole plan in a downed glider? The poles seemed to be used as callously as possible including Maczuga. Grim and sad and always interesting. Thank you
Thought provoking stuff. A pleasure to watch this discussion.
As an American I have always thought that the XXX Corps did its part. The demands on British Armour and infantry formations in basically making frontal assaults continuously is quite compelling in the appreciation of unit elan and professionalism. XXX Corps was designed and trained for maneuver warfare, not trench busting of WWI fame.
Indeed. XXX Corps actually carried out the fasted allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100km in just 3 days.
Garden suceeded. It was Market that failed.
@@lyndoncmp5751 and prior to Garden, 21AG had traveled 350 miles in four days
Sean O'Sullivan,
Yep. After overcoming and destroying the entire German Armored force in France, the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2.
British 1st Airborne to XXX Corps:
"Where have you been? What have you been doing!?"
XXX Corps to British 1st Airborne :
"We've been fighting for 3 months solid, ever since D-Day, not just for a few days since last Sunday like you!!"
😂
@@bigwoody4704 For Goodwood both the British and the Germans appear to have lost about 140-150 tanks destroyed, though at least 17 of the German tanks were Tigers and over 30 were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the Heer than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British.
@@bigwoody4704 Dont Forget about the 43rd Wessex, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured Divisions who had to fight extremely hard to take Hill 112 from the 2nd SS Panzer Corps
Quote *in 1944, men from the 43rd Wessex, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured Divisions finally took control of one of the most strategically important battlegrounds in northern France. It took ten weeks of fierce fighting and cost the lives of 10,000 men, but taking and holding Hill 112 allowed the Allies to retake Caen and continue the liberation of Europe.*
First movie we watched when I arrived at 1/508th. Great stuff!!
Very thought provoking program. Coming in with the expected American bias based on Ryan’s book and another that hangs the blame on the plan from Monty. Now I find blame isn’t as simple as the Redford scene criticizing British XXX Corps for sitting in Nijmegen drinking tea. Good job.
Yes always annoying that, considering the Guards Armoured Division were still fighting in Nijmegen (Nijmegen wasn't cleared until the following day) and also had been split up over 20 miles or so assisting the short of men 82nd, including helping prevent the Germans from breaking through at Mook at the same time the river crossings were happening. The 82nd were in desperate need of the help from the Guards Armoured Division here there and everywhere. Of course, without the specific help of the Grenadier Guards Group, the Nijmegen bridge would never even have been taken in the first place. An all important factor that many ignore.
John Burns
Yes Gavin does seem to have been overly cautious in Nijmegen. It was indeed Gavins decision to retreat completely from Nijmegen on the 18th.
J W Johnson,
And Montgomery was overruled in nearly all his ideas for the Market segment. Montgomery preferred:
1. Double missions flown on day one.
2. Drops closer to the targets.
3. Coup de mains on the bridges.
The air commanders refused in all of the above. Taylor of the 101st even complained about drops north of Son.
The air commanders got their way (Montgomery did not have the jurisdiction over air forces)...... and look what happened.
If only Montgomery was allowed to plan and make the decisions for Market. It probably would have worked.
Eisenhower also should have shut everything down for a week and given all resources to Market Garden. He didn't. Instead he allowed Patton to continue bumbling in the Lorraine and he allowed Hodges to open up his disastrous attack into the Hurtgen Forest.
John Burns
Incredibly, Eisenhower allowed a US 1st Army attack into the Hurtgen Forest just two days after Market Garden began.
If Eisenhower had allowed a reasonably sized American diversionary attack towards Aachen in tandem with Market Garden this would have given the Germans plenty to think about and instead of rushing all their reinforcements into the Netherlands to counter Market Garden they would have had to seriously consider the threat to Aachen and would have undoubtedly sent a proportion of their reinforcements to Aachen instead.
Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 was actually on trains en route to Aachen on the 17th but when news of the paratroopers dropping in the Netherlands came in its journey towards Aachen was cancelled and it was quickly redeployed to Arnhem.
John Burns,
Well I wish that WAS talked about more but it doesn't seem to be. Eisenhower gets away with it. He dropped the ball.
He either should have shut everything else down for a week and given all resources to Market Garden, or else opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen to draw away German reinforcements, perhaps even a few days before Market Garden.
On 09/10/1944, General Lewis Hyde Brereton decided to limit the number of lifts to one per day for the entire Market Garden operation. Brereton made this decision on the advice of his senior air commander, Major-General Paul L. Williams, who had commanded the US 9th Troop Carrier Command during Normandy airborne operations. Reputed to accommodate the reasonable wishes of the paratroopers, Williams had deep concerns about his undermanned ground crew being able to refuel, repair battle damage, and perform routine maintenance fast enough to make multiple lifts per day. His ground crew was undermanned because the number of aircraft held by his unit had doubled without a concomitant increase in his ground crew. I am not an armchair general so I am willingly going to defer to Williams’s appraisal of his ground crew’s readiness to handle multiple lifts per day.
Williams was more concerned about exhausting his USAAF personnel rather than the well being of paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines. Brereton, a fellow USAAF man, also cared more about USAAF personnel than his own paratroopers. If a paratrooper had been in command of First Allied Airborne Army this would never have been the case.
The operation was killed all because Brereton and Williams put the USAAF ahead of FAAA.
RG Poulsson and a certain English gentleman called John Frost both agree on the key mistakes in the battle.
Great show chaps. Thanks
Interesting presentation created to provide an objective analysis of the operation that should disturb our long held views. It does however feel like a well disguised attempt to shift blame in a certain way under the guise of finally asking a neutral party.
You make it sound like WW2TV is out to manipulate people
Of course, you could always read two American authors who published the year after RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen and therefore couldn't be referenced by him:
September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012)
Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)
They both go a lot further into exploring what went wrong at Nijmegen, and Nordyke's earlier chapters on the 508th in Normandy give you some context and backstory that explains the command problems in the regiment.
Another neutral (Swedish) historian who researched Cornelius Ryan's unpublished documents and interviews and updates A Bridge Too Far, and also debunks the myths in the Hollywood film:
Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)
@@davemac1197 I have read all those books
Fantastic, read his book some years ago, seeing this author in interview is fantastic!
Everyone who saw the movie knows that it was the refusal of the XXX Corps tankers to continue up the road to Arnhem after Robert Redford led the 82nd Airborne in heroically capturing the Waal River Bridge that caused the operation to fail. The tankers brewed tea instead of advancing.
I'm joking, of course. This new research is very interesting.
Yes, the film was nonsense. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks that took the bridge, at dusk and they had orders to stop the Germans taking the bridge back that night.
@@lyndoncmp5751 another element the movie got wrong further explains this. The Shermans taken out early on were taken out by handheld AT weapons, not PAKs as the initial bombardment destroyed the latter. The risk of further attacks by such weapons meant that continuing without infantry support, which was still mopping up in Nijmegen, was risky. As it was, a couple of Guards tanks did make it to within sight of Arnhem, to the west a bit.
The other nonsense part of the movie was the radios. The short-range radios in jeeps were fine if a bit hampered by woodland as was expected back then. The units being scattered did mean direction communication to the LZ/DZ to Arnhem wasn't possible. US glider troops dropped in two gliders with some excellent long-range radios but both were damaged on landing. Medium-range radios were available so when artillery units got within range these were used to break up German attacks West of Arnhem by forward observers (I think RA placed with the paratroopers) directing accurate fire onto individual StuGs.
:)
On a serious note the Germans indicated that there wasn't a defense to face XXX Corps after the bridge was taken. Certainly the reason for not moving given was rest required (Horrock himself was sick) and infantry support needed, but it was a window of opportunity they had. Not that my opinion matters, but I don't blame XXX or any of the units.
As an American who did his thesis on this Operation, my ears picked up a few things. 1 Poulussen is pointing out that only Americans were the cause of the failure. (That isn't defensive. It is pulled from his books and this interview). 2. The interviewer has a better understanding of the holistic view, planning, and the commanders themselves. 3. Many of the sources in his books are not able to be found.
His books are an interesting read and food for thought, but I don't see how his conclusions have much value.
Some key points of contention about MG....................
* Montgomery originally proposed the operation, but Brereton was appointed Commander for Operation MG, with Eisenhower his Supreme Commander. Both could have postponed the operation if they felt it was risky.
* British air planners wanted 2 drops in a day, and RAF officers still felt that at minimum, there was ample time for a second run using fixed wing aircraft only that could have delivered another 2,000 paratroopers in each zone.
* Montgomery's staff urged Brereton to allow double drops in the British sector alone, Brereton refused.
* This resulted in inadequate resources to carry out the critical coup-de-main attacks that Montgomery had recognised and proposed as being absolutely essential to capture them intact. He fully recognised that conventional ground forces would have had great difficulty capturing those vital bridges intact. Hence his notion of a surprise airborne operation using coup de main tactics.
* Intelligence was not ignored, but the situation evolved in the two weeks prior to the commencement. There was no strong SS Panzer Corps around Arnhem, just around 6,500 recuperating troops from 9th/10th SS Panzer Corps with very few tanks (Bittrich claims just 5 top quality tanks).
* The greatest oversight was the ability of the 'Blitztransporte' railway system to bring in reserves from Germany (especially Kleve tank depot), Hungary, and Austria.
* 30 Corps had a subsidiary route available along a fair section of route 69, but not all of it. So there was no dependency entirely on a single route as is often suggested.
* A bridging depot was situated just 7 miles off the Dutch border and enough equipment had been brought to build bailey bridges over every water course. The longest bailey bridge was built in just over 24 hours during WW2, longer in length than any over the Dutch rivers.
* If bridges were blown, plans were in place to get troops quickly across via alternative means to continue attacks.
* Montgomery readily acknowledged that it was difficult for 30 Corps to attack Arnhem across the area known as 'The Island' south of Arnhem due to strategically-located defensive guns on high ground behind the town. To counteract this he proposed one battalion of British paratroopers take the high ground whilst the other two available on Day One were to take one of the bridges.
* A mini coup-de-main was attempted by British 1st Airborne at Arnhem in jeeps, but they were poorly armed to complete such a task and it was a weak alternative to the proper coup-de-main that Montgomery had originally proposed.
* Although Frosts battalion of 740 men only took the critical northern end of Arnhem Bridge, they situated themselves in positions to cover both ends from all angles, which was better than fragmenting his already numerically weak force over two points. He explains his reasoning in his autobiography.
* 2 attempts were made by the Germans to blow up Arnhem Bridge but they were unsuccessful due to the positioning of British guns at the northern end, vindicating Frosts stance that all points were covered. The Germans failed to attach explosives to the areas of the bridge at the southern end necessary to blow it up because they were too vulnerable to British fire.
* Gavin independently considered that the Reichswald Heights were critical to retain, Browning accepted his reasoning.
* Gavin admitted this when questioned by the post-war U.S Official enquiry. Both are equally culpable but it was originally Gavin's proposal.
* 30 Corps were ordered to start only once or 'after' the first paratroopers had passed overhead, the earliest they could start was 1400 hours on 17th. Synchronisation was critical as per Brereton.
* 30 Corps did in fact carry out night-time fighting, though for the sake of movement along route 69, orders were for tanks to stop in darkness. But Horrocks was an advocate of night-time tank fighting, and in Nijmegen the Grenadier Guards did move across the bridges at 0300 hours on 21st.
* Gavin was told by 1800 hours on the 17th September by Dutch intelligence and by two of his own Reconnaissance Officers from 505th and 508th PIR, that the Nijmegen Bridge was very weakly held, and that the Reichswald was unable to hold tanks. 30 Corps tanks were supposed to be able to progress straight across upon their arrival at Nijmegen.
* British Grenadier Guards tanks took the Nijmegen road-bridge on 20th September, not U.S. forces, after infantry and tanks of Grenadier Guards and U.S. 505th PIR won the vital battle at the southern end of Nijmegen road-bridge during two very heavy days of fighting.
* Official records confirm that the first troop of Grenadier Guards tanks completed their crossing at the northern end of the Nijmegen road-bridge and were fighting along the northern embankment towards the rail-bridge at 1830 hours on the 20th, they did not find any U.S. paratroopers on the road-bridge, only half a mile away towards the rail-bridge.
* The first U.S. troops reached the road-bridge at 1910 hours and were only officially in control by 1938 hours. The first U.S. troops found Germans in hasty retreat and disorganised according to official U.S 82nd divisional records.
* Their arrival coincided with the arrival of the second group of British tanks which crossed at 1930 hours. These were 8 x M10s.
* A coup-de-main of the Nijmegen 'rail-bridge' was undertaken by the heroic U.S. paratroopers of 504th PIR with support from Grenadier Guards tanks at the southern end. The northern end was taken at 1740 hours on 20th September though fighting continued until the following morning when tanks of Grenadier Guards crossed.
* Once the two Nijmegen Bridges had been taken late on the 20th, both American and British Commanders had orders to consolidate for fear of German counterattack.
* By the time Nijmegen town and bridges were fully in control at 2200 hours on 20th September, 30 Corps were split over the entire sector. Coldstream Guards were under Gavin's control temporarily and had helped 82nd Division recapture important ground, 43rd Division were split widely over the area having been drawn back to Uden and Veghel in the U.S. 101st sector, which had been breached. Irish Guards had expended 90% of their artillery shells in supporting Gavin's river crossing.
* Potentially, a small window of opportunity was lost by 30 Corps late on the 20th September, but their delay at Nijmegen was simply because 82nd Division had not taken their key objective.
* The accusation that 30 Corps were late is a myth, as they arrived at Nijmegen 42 hours (under two full days) from being allowed to commence.
* This critical delay caused the operation to fail, with the Arnhem Bridge falling at 8pm on 20th September, though fighting went on there until the early hours, and full German control was only assured by 10am on 21st.
* Exhausted British 30 Corps were entirely disorganised on the 21st September, making little progress, still being pulled in all directions.
* Some factions of 30 Corps reached Arnhem (Driel) at 8am on 22nd September and stronger elements later that day. But the delay at
* All Allied troops fought heroically during Op MG, it was decisions made in the heat of battle, but also by strategic commanders, perhaps notably Brereton, that led to its failure.
* Montgomery and Browning came up with the outline for operation COMET, planned in detail by Browning's I Airborne Corps and Dempsey's 2nd Army. Montgomery cancelled COMET at the last minute on 10 September when he was informed II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised the airborne component was not strong enough. He proposed adding the two US divisions to allow the British and Polish airborne to concentrate in one place with their considerable anti-tank assets, but the planning was now necessarily handed over to Brereton because the whole 1st Allied Airborne Army was now involved.
* Brereton compromised on Browning's double airlift and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges (Arnhem, Nijmegen, Grave) planned for COMET due to a lack of night trained navigators in the USAAF Troop Carriers and the glider assaults were therefore considered too risky for broad daylight raids. Browning had advised Dempsey COMET should not go ahead without the glider coup de main assaults, but was unable to protest Brereton's changes because he had already been politically neutralised after protesting Brereton's LINNET II plan. He knew he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and US XVIII Airborne Corps if he threatened to resign again.
* The Kleve tank depot was faulty intelligence and gave rise to the silly rumour 1,000 panzers could be hiding in the Reichswald. The Panzer West depot was actually near Münster. Model was assessed to have less than 100 operational panzers in his entire Heeresgruppe B from Aachen to the North Sea coast, and the September returns actually listed 84 operational panzers - coincidentally the same number as anti-tank guns in the British 1st Airborne Division and Polish Parachute Brigade establishments (68+16). Montgomery had 2,400 tanks in 21st Army Group and the Americans had another 1,500 at Aachen.
* Not heard of Bittrich claiming 5 tanks, but SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 had three Panthers (possibly off the books) in Arnhem and SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Vorden had 16 Panzer IV (in 5.Kompanie) and 4 StuG III G assault guns (in 7.Kompanie) - both divisions were converted from SS-Panzergrenadier divisions and the StuG Abteilung was reorganised to equip 7 and 8.Kompanie of the new Panzer-Regiments. 1st Parachute Battalion did encounter 5 tanks and about 15 half-tracks on the Amsterdamseweg on the first day and this was most likely the three Panthers and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen' on hand at Arnhem, and Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 at Beekbergen also had at least 5 armoured cars and about 35 half-tracks. The Mark IV tanks were too heavy for the Pannerden ferry and had to be held back until the Arnhem bridge was retaken, so only the StuGs could be deployed to Nijmegen.
* The XXX Corps main supply 'Club Route' had a number of 'Heart Route' alternatives using alternative bridge crossings. About 24 bridges were targeted in total by the airborne, with about 10 needed at minimum to get XXX Corps to Arnhem, hence Montgomery's comment the operation was 90% successful. The flanking VIII and XII Corps were also advancing on main supply routes designated 'Spade' and 'Diamond' respectively.
* Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion would have a maximum of 613 men according to establishment, some being in the seaborne tail. Figures indicate Frost had 525 going in by air, and the rest of the 740 or so at the bridge were the 1st Parachute Brigade HQ and support elements from Royal Artillery, RASC, Glider Pilots, etc.. Frost's C Company did not reach the bridge, being tasked with the rail bridge as primary objective and the German Ortskommandantur as secondary. C Company from the 3rd Battalion did reach the bridge by following the railway line.
* It was the Groesbeek heights south of Nijmegen deemed critical to be held, although the bridges were still the primary objectives. Gavin told Cornelius Ryan he toyed with a British request to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen highway bridge, but eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily, where the 82nd was scattered over wide area and the division was disorganised for days. Instead he opted to instruct 508th CO Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as possible after landing, which he failed to do, despite getting a report in person from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only 18 men guarding the highway bridge. Lindquist was a gifted administrator but not a good field officer, which calls into question Gavin's decision to assign the more aggressive and experienced 505th to the Reichswald sector instead of Nijmegen. It seems he calculated the threat of counter-attack from the Reichswald to be greater than that of mission (and therefore operational) failure at Nijmegen. Browning supported Gavin after the war (both Browning and Gavin were impeccably decent men), but Gavin's divisional plan was his responsibility and the problems with Colonel Lindquist and the 508th had already manifested on their first combat operation in Normandy.
* Gavin was informed by the regimental liasion officers to Division HQ that the 508th were dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge and not moving on the bridge until the DZ was cleared, and the Reichwald was found by 505th patrols to be unoccupied and too dense for tanks to operate. He was as "mad" as the 508th LO had ever seen him and they both immediately went to the 508th CP to get Lindquist moving, but it was too late. The delay allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the city and its bridges during the first evening and overnight.
* Horrocks said he had ordered a night advance with tanks on only two occasions during the war and they both paid off, but he said he thought he might be pushing his luck a third time with MARKET GARDEN. He was already unhappy with the operation starting on a Sunday, as in his experience operations starting on a Sunday were rarely successful.
@@davemac1197 Love posts like this, full of excellent detail. Thanks DaveMac. Just a few points to respond: -
* German tank strength on 23 August 1944 was reported via a Heeresgruppe D report as totalling 47-53 tanks, 2nd SS Panzer Div had 15 tanks, 12th SS Panzer Div had 12 tanks, 9th SS Panzer Div had 20-25 tanks, but 1st and 10th had no tanks. Situation was fluid. It did not say how many of these were in the Arnhem area.
* Monty was prepared to postpone Op until 23 September due to supply and strength issues.
* RAF 541 Squadron I-mint photos of Arnhem via Lieut-General Brian Urquhart only revealed presence of second rate Panzer 3 tanks, these already known about via intelligence likely to belong to Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Training and Replacement Regiument.
* The situation did evolve with tanks being brought into Arnhem, but on 17th September Bittrich claimed he only had 5 top rate tanks at Arnhem, of which only 3 were operational and 2 of which were taken out by the British on the 18th.
* The reason coup-de-mains abandoned is interesting, partly as you say due to the inherent risk of gliders landing in daylight near some objectives, but also due to reduced numbers being landed on day one. Distance from objectives was carefully considered with anti-aircraft guns in mind, but even at some distance, increased numbers landed on day one could have landed up to 2,000 more troops on day one using a second run of fixed wing aircraft only within the day light umbrella window, as wanted by British commanders, meaning that some coup de mains could still have been considered and coordinated.
* Gavin may have been thoroughly decent, but having previously described Browning as an outstanding General, he later blamed him and said that if he had been in the US Army he would have been summarily dismissed. The official US enquiry seems to have discredited Gavin's account regards verbal orders allegedly given to Lindquist, who denied having received any pre-orders, and furthermore, none of Lieutenant-Colonel Shanley nor Lieutenant-Colonel Warren of 508th, nor Captain Bestebreurtje attached as Dutch Liaison Officer to 82nd Division were aware of any such pre-jump orders given by Gavin. Captain Westover, in charge of the official post-war enquiry, seems to have discredited Gavin here.
@@OldWolflad - I think you mean Heeresgruppe B? 23 August is a little early for Arnhem figures and the September return (I believe 5 September was the returns date) recorded 84 operational panzers in Heeresgruppe B, according to The Army That Got Away - The 15.Armee in the Summer of 1944, by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts (2022).
* I have what I think is a satisfactory narrative on the 9 and 10.SS-Panzer-Division tank strengths after pulling together a number of sources. I don't have precise figures on the Hohenstaufen (9.SS-Panzer), but I believe they came out of Normandy with the most tanks and after reaching the Veluwe and the Frundsberg the Achterhoek regions in the Netherlands, a decision was made on sending one division back to Germany for refit and the other refitted in situ. After initially choosing the Frundsberg to be sent back, the Hohenstaufen was chosen instead (I forget the exact reason for the reversal), so the Hohenstaufen was ordered to hand over operational vehicles to the Frundsberg, but some were held back by the administrative subterfuge of removing tracks and guns to render them technically non-operational, out of fear they would not get replacements. So the 3 Panthers and 2 Möbelwagen were retained, and the Mark IV tanks handed over, giving the Frundsberg a total of 16. By 12 October they were down to 6 Mark IV and 3 StuG, but had received 20 brand new Panthers arranged by Model to be delivered direct from the factory, and this fits the 100 de-horsed Panther crewmen SS-Pz.Rgt.9 had in its 'alarm kompanie' acting as infantry. The new tanks were incorporated into SS-Pz.Rgt.10 as the 8.Kompanie, according to Dieter Stenger's combat history of the Frundsberg in Panzers East And West (2017), based on the diary of a family member who was in 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 consisting of the logistics train acting as infantry. By 12 October they were down to 15 Panther, which can be accounted for by 5 knocked out in the area of Elst on the Nijmegen 'island' (Betuwe). I'm assuming Bittrich is not counting the 20 vehicles in SS-Pz.Rgt.10 as being sent to Arnhem as these were actually destined for Nijmegen and not used in action against 1st Airborne Division, although the Mark IV tanks had to wait in Arnhem for the bridge to be cleared.
* I have a source on an armour discussion on the axishistory web forum where someone helpfully listed the armour returns for 10.SS-Panzer (as well as the Heer 9 and 116.Panzer-Divisions) for 5 September, 12 October, and 1 November, so the handover seems to have been completed by 5 September with 16 Mark IV and 4 StuG recorded for the Frundsberg.
* I also have a German web forum source indicating the Instandsetzung-Zug (maintenance platoon) belonging to at least one of the Panzer Abteilung in the Hohenstaufen was located at the Rosendaelsche Golf Links just north of the official administrative location of SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 in the Saksen-Weimarkazerne in northern Arnhem. It makes sense that the tanks were laagered under trees on the golf course and the RAD (Reich labour service) camp located there would provide suitable accommodations, while the regiment HQ and Werkstatt Kompanie would be logically located in the nearby Dutch army barracks and workshops.
* A Dutch historical website has a nice article about a resident living in a house on the corner of Callunastraat with Heijenoordseweg who received a knock on the kitchen door on the morning of Friday 15 September. They were SS panzer crewmen asking for any spare milk, explaining that they had removed their tanks from the barracks to avoid potential Allied bombing and hidden them under trees across the road on Heijenoordseweg. So this tells a story of tanks laagered on the golf course and some in the workshops ("under repair") until they were dispersed in western Arnhem. I love it when these little stories at the granular level are dots that start to join up and develop a clear picture.
* According to Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited volumes 1 and 2 by Christer Bergström (2019, 2020), two of the Panthers in western Arnhem were knocked out with a Gammon bomb and PIAT by B Company 3rd Parachute Battalion on 19 (not 18?) September during attempts to reach Frost at the bridge. The third survived to participate in the seige of the Oosterbeek perimeter. I'm currently reading one of my Christmas presents - Leo Heap's Escape From Arnhem (1945) - in which he describes an episode in the Oosterbeek perimeter where a Panther was located in a small wooded area and they decided to go tank hunting with a PIAT, eventually damaging a track and the tank retreated. Unfortunately, Leo is someone who did not believe in giving specific locations so I can't confirm the location of the wood and if the tank was therefore part of Kampfgruppe Harder (SS-Obersturmführer Adolf Harder's SS-Pz.Rgt.9). Some books suggest the Herman Göring training regiment had some Panthers at Oosterbeek, but I can't find any source to confirm they owned anything but older obsolete models (Mark III and early Mark IV), which you're obviously aware of.
* The two Möbelwagen are rather more well-documented (and photographed) operating on the Dreyenscheweg north of Oosterbeek with Kampfgruppe Spindler, also on the 19 September, against 4th Parachute Brigade.
* Private James Sims of the 2nd Parachute Battalion mortar platoon in his book Arnhem Spearhead (1977) says that he saw an unending line of Mark IV tanks parked under the trees along a boulevard near the bridge as he was led away into captivity. This would support SS-Pz.Rgt.10 having 16 of them, but also Panzer Kompanie Mielke (attached to Kampfgruppe Knaust) from Bielefeld had a total of 8 Mark IV tanks, but only 2 were committed against Frost with 6 Mark III tanks and both Mark IVs were knocked out, so I think the others were also held back for Nijmegen when the Arnhem bridge was cleared.
* We know from Heinz Harmel that the Mark IV was too heavy for the ferry operation at Pannerden, but the last two tanks from Kompanie Mielke (a Mark III and a Mark II) were probably passed across the ferry as the lone Panzer II Ausf.b photographed in Hunner Park, Nijmegen after the battle would support this. This tank is also often attributed in photo captions to the Herman Göring Regiment, but they never claimed to own a Mark II, and one is listed for Kompanie Mielke in the Wehrkreis VI returns of equipment sent from Germany to Arnhem. This list was published in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of the Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010), but I also found the full WK VI report online.
* Gavin's letter to Captain Westover in 1945 and interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far in 1967 have since been corroborated in two books published in 2012: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far by John C McManus, and Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 by Phil Nordyke. Both use first hand accounts of witnesses to the pre-flight briefing in which Gavin instructed Lindquist to send the 1st Battalion directly to the bridge. McManus has the Division G-3 (Operations) Officer Lt Col Jack Norton, and Nordyke has the 508th Liasion Officer Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham. Note: regiment XO Shanley and 1st Battalion CO Warren were not present.
* Chet Graham also details in Nordyke's Normandy chapters how Lindquist was responsible for earlier bad decision making, partilcularly in an incident involving the combat ineffective original regiment XO, who was court-martialled by Matthew Ridgway and kicked out of the Airborne, and again in an attack on Hill 95 (Saint Catherine near La Haye) over open ground on 4 July 1944, leading to excessive casualties. Gavin wrote a post-war report to the US Army recommending a reversal of the policy of replacing officers who made serious mistakes, arguing that leaving them in place would allow them to learn from their mistakes. It seems Gavin was practicing this policy within his own division as Lindquist remained in command of the 508th until deactivation after the war. There were no serious command failures in the regiment during the Battle of the Bulge. I find Lindquist's response to Westover's questionnaire, printed in RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011), to be disingenuous. He said he wasn't told to move on the bridge after he landed until they were in position (on the Groesbeek ridge) and then was instructed to send the 1st Battalion (after Gavin arrived to chew him out, according to Chet Graham).
* My impression is that Gavin and Browning were in agreement to take responsibility over the failure at Nijmegen as Gavin did not want to throw a junior officer under the bus. The mistakes made in the divisional plan were Gavin's, and this does explain his subsequent behaviour, twice proposing his own troops be used to make the river assault, despite the XXX Corps default plan (operation BASIL) for this scenario of the Waal bridges still in German hands being an amphibious assault carried out by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with one or two Brigades up (Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Operation Market Garden by John Sliz, 2021). I think this was done to avoid public blame for the failure of the operation being laid at the door of the Americans.
Thanks again Davemac, this is fantastic information that you have regards available tanks, who am I to question that.
Its interesting the perception of Gavin, who was undoubtedly an excellent General militarily. It was simply his version of events in the post-war enquiry versus what has been claimed subsequently, and his changing attitude towards Browning that for me raises questions regards the validity of his accounts regards MG.
May I ask, if you don't mind, what you make of Poulussen's books? I think his 2nd book 'Little sense of urgency' is considerably more detailed and brings more to the discussion, something I think Rob himself accepts.
Thanks again Dave MG@@davemac1197
@@OldWolflad - I don't know that Gavin did have a changing attitude towards Browning after the war - my impression was that Gavin didn't want to throw Lindquist 'under the bus', at least not publicly, but he did give Westover a clear statement and a few hints to Cornelius Ryan (who didn't dig any further) and Browning did what he thought was the decent thing and backed him up.
Browning was obviously loathe to be critical of the American divisions under his command and made overwhelmingly positive comments about their performance during the operation, which I think are 99% perfectly valid. I think the problems with Lindquist echoes a similar problem most people are already familiar with in Captain Herbert Sobel, the original commander of Easy Company 506th PIR - the famous 'Band of Brothers'. However, there was no Sergeants mutiny in the 508th and Lindquist was never reassigned like Sobel. I do recommend Nordyke's book on the 508th - it reads like the film script that A Bridge Too Far should have been, at least as far as this regiment is concerned, and of course the 508th wasn't in the film at all.
Some people criticise the 506th for not securing the Son bridge before it was blown, but I don't think they appreciate that the Wilhelmina canal was a prepared defence line, all the remaining bridges were prepared for demolition, and General Kurt Student issued standing orders they were to be blown if threatened, which is what happened at Son and Best. Short of dropping a company directly onto the bridges (both of which were in the middle of heavy Flak positions provided by guns of schwere.Flak-Abteilung 428 removed from Deelen airfield) I don't see how they could have been seized intact. The Germans, the 506th, the Guards and the Royal Engineers, all did text book jobs at Son, so I can find no fault with any of them.
I think because McManus and Nordyke's witnesses to Gavin's final MARKET briefing were junior officers at the time, and now (in 2012) felt more free to speak out and set the record straight, as the more senior figures involved in this drama had by then passed away. That's not unusual, we gradually get a more clearer picture of events the further away from them we get.
An open question is how much did Gavin appreciate Lindquist's shortcomings as a field commander? In his interview with Cornelius Ryan (Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University - Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967), Ryan noted:
'Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.
We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.'
Clearly Gavin was speaking with the benefit of hindsight here, but we don't know to what extent. (Was Lindquist even in Sicily? I'm not sure that's correct, unless he went along as an observer - the 508th were still forming in the USA and Nordyke makes no mention of Sicily in Put Us Down In Hell, 2012).
I have both of Poulussen's books, I think they're both well-researched. Some of the early stuff on planning COMET and the discussions between Montgomery and Eisenhower over logistics is very interesting. The map showing the glider flight paths for the Arnhem and Nijmegen coup de main assaults is very interesting and shows the tugs were not exposed to Flak near the bridges at all. I already had Lost At Nijmegen on Kindle but opted to buy both hard copies from the author directly and he very kindly offered to sign both books for me, which was very nice of him! Lost At Nijmegen obviously focused on that aspect of the operation and was published the year before McManus and Nordyke, so he didn't have the benefit of the first hand accounts in those books - I do recommend them both - and Poulussen came to the conclusion based on documents there was a miscommunication between Gavin and Lindquist, so that was as far as he could go with his research.
Another fascinating programme!
Given the ferocity of the fighting, the casualty (KIA) numbers actually seem fairly low.
The overall troop numbers were modest (around 100 000 on each side), and the fighting only lasted a week.
Brereton fully understood that ideally all the paratroopers in Market should be dropped into their designated drop zones on the same day and at the same time. According to Cornelius Ryan, it just was not possible: " Apart from gliders, Brereton had no transports of his own. To achieve complete surprise, the ideal plan called for the three and one-half divisions in Market to be delivered to landing zones on the same day at the same hour. But the immense size of the operation ruled out this possibility. There was an acute shortage of both aircraft and gliders; the planes would have to make more than one trip." Boy Browning was present at the meeting in which Brereton announced that the drops would occur on multiple days; indeed he spoke immediately after Brereton. Browning, moreover, knew the details of Manty's plan expectations because Brereton convened the 10 Sept 44 meeting immediately after he left his meeting with Monty. If Monty's plan was predicated on surprise, Browning knew full well that that predicate would not obtain. In fact, Beevor wrote that once Browning complained to Gale about the multi-day drops, Gale forcefully told Browning that he had to resign from the operation. Browning refused.
I've not heard Gale say that about Browning but Gale said Urquhart should have protested against the RAFs choice of drop and landing zones "to the point of resignation".
You have quickly become my favorite UA-cam military history resource/entertainment. You, and your awesome guests, do an amazing job of presenting very detailed studies of a wide range of topics. I am an avid, lifelong, former Army officer, "armchair military historian and have studied Market Garden since I first read "Bridge Too Far" by Ryan when was 12 years old! I would like to suggest an angle I would like to see you and any of your well-versed guests tackle a topic which NEVER seems to be addressed by anyone, not even the TIK UA-cam host who has numerous videos on the battle. I would like to see you do a show on why Market Garden was doomed to failure from a strategic/logistical perspective to the point that it should NEVER HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTED! Primary reason being logistical - 2nd Army was in no position to make it successful due to most of it's logistic and support units lagging far behind the start line on the Meuse-Escaut canal. Sure, XXX Corp was given the bulk of the resources, and were poised to make the dash to Arnhem, BUT I have read a few different places that both corps on either side of XXX Corp were virtually stripped of resources to make that possible? I have read that most of VIII & XII Corps, on each side of XXX Corps were practically frozen in place and unable to advance due to all priorities going to XXX Corp. Also, many of their supporting units were still back at the Seine area when Market Garden began. So say XXX Corp succeeded with Garden, and all Market tactical issues were resolved and avoided in a timely manner, just HOW was 2nd Army going to "bounce the Rhine" when the logistics support for the entire front moving forward simply was NOT in place by the 17th? Neither XII or VIII Corp on XXX Corp's flanks made much of contribution to the operation at all. Had they moved up on the flanks, they could have secured the corridor couldn't they have? My point is that I think a hard look at 2nd Army's overall logistical situation goes along way in determining that the operation should have never been tried. Worth addressing in a video if you agree! Thanks, Paul! Keep up the good work!
As with any other idea Jon, if a historian came with such a presentation, I would do it in a heartbeat. I'm not like TIK and some others in that I don't choose subjects for discussion myself (well sometimes I do). Its about giving historians, authors and enthusiasts a platform for their research
@@WW2TV Thanks for the prompt response, Paul! That's what makes what you do so interesting and important. You showcase authors who are dialed in and focused on very specific details on operations as opposed to the plethora of "overall/general" look books out there. Someone should do a bio talk on Lewis Brereton sometime - he had to have been the most "unlucky" US general in high places. HIs air force was destroyed on the ground in the Philllipines largely due to his poor operations decisions. He oversaw the disastrous Ploesti bombing mission, and finally the terrible Market decisions he made as commander of 1St Allied Airborne Army.
Keep up the great work.
General Browning was to recall later: "I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it-for . . . painfully obvious reasons . . .. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend." Ltr, Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
The possibility of counterattack from this direction took on added credence from the Dutch resistance reports of panzer formations assembling in the Netherlands. 82nd Airborne Division was led to believe that this armor was concentrating in the Reichswald. This information became "a major and pressing element in the pre-drop picture of German forces." Ltr. Winton to OCMH, 8 Mar 54, OCMH; Intelligence Trace No. 5 in Hq, Troop Carrier Forces FO NO.4, 13 Sep 44; 505th Prcht Inf
AAR.
because of the limitations of the D-Day lift, the question of priority of objectives entered the picture. In anticipation of a heavy fight before the ground column could provide artillery and antitank support, General Gavin allotted a portion of his D-Day lift to a parachute artillery battalion. He also scheduled arrival of the rest of his artillery on D plus 1. This meant that the glider infantry regiment could not arrive until D plus 2, so that for the first two days the 82d would have but three regiments of infantry. If these three parachute infantry regiments tried to take all assigned objectives, they would be spread dangerously thin for holding the objectives in the event enemy armor materialized from the Reichswald.
Siegfried Line Campaign, MacDonald, 1993
@@thomasferlauto2348 No Dutch resistance report to suggest this. American smoke.
@@desydukuk291 You might be right. I don't know. I am just repeating what was written in the official US Army history of the event. However, I cited in my comment the specific intelligence report dated 13 September 1944 that was apparently relied upon. I have not personally read that cited intelligence report. So, I am just trusting MacDonald that it says what he says it says. However, what cannot be questioned is that for whatever reason the 82d was ordered by Browning to give that ridge top priority and they changed their initial D-Day lift to more artillery and less infantry to deal with the tanks. So, there obviously was some "intelligence" that was effecting decisions. MacDonald and that intelligence report say the information came from Dutch resistance , but who knows, it might have been Nazi misinformation planted to look like information from Dutch resistance.
In 2008 I put info about a Belgian giving exact data about the Start Line and the amount of Allied Ground troops to the Germans on Sept.11/12 1944 on the Axis Forum.
That's 5 days before Market-Garden.
I recently reveiled the second source which was a spy in London that was able to sent more details about the direction towards Lake IJssel and possibly more north to the Northsea on Sept.12 1944 too.
It was sent via Stockholm.
So the Germans had 2 independent sources telling the same 5 days before Market-Garden.
No plan survives first contact with the enemy even with the best planning
...so plan to adapt. MG 'planners' didn't. They didn't have time.
True but you got to have scenerios - this plan had none
In technical terms all is assume were serial and Binnen of them could be missed - that is a very precarious plan already in theory
this was a great interview and adding insight into this battle but if you were to break it down it was a bad narrow minded plan. The operation failed before Monte came up with it. it failed when Eisenhower appointed Gen. Brereton as commander of the 1st allied army and not Browning or Rideway. Also Monte for not being more involved in the planning and the execution of the operation. It is true that Gavin and Browning are at fault during the battle but the planning and the outside support also needs to be blamed and lastly what could have XXX corp done if they arrived in Arnhem with the 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions there waiting for them. the men fought bravely and did all they could and being a yank I admire the 1st Airborne and the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade who fought at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could have done little or nothing even if they got to Arnhem. The Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp (as well as 99% of Arnhem itself) and had decent fields of fire against anything crossing the bridge. As well as that, there was a road block on the actual bridge. The wreckage of Grabners SS column was strewn all over it. XXX could not have got past that and would have been sitting ducks if they tried.
John Burns
It would have been too late by then. The only option by then was a rescue mission. The Germans were too strong around Arnhem. The RAF couldn't have flattened Arnhem either as the British needed the bridge intact. XXX Corps could never have got across the bridge.
As to shifting more of the tactical air power to support Market Garden, what would the logistical impact have been? Understanding the functional benefits (extra guns/bombs/rockets available in the air), keeping those additional planes flying would also require to shift a whole supply chain (fuel depots, ordnance, ground crews). Let alone that airfields within range to support Market Garden should be able to accommodate the additios.
Would that have been possible?
There was plenty of air support available, but it was restricted by weather and deconfliction rules that grounded 2nd TAF while the transport airlifts were in the air. What would have been helpful was notification to 2nd TAF in Belgium when the airlifts were delayed by bad weather in England, so they didn't have to be grounded unnecessarily while the skies were clear over the Netherlands. This was an administrative error by 1st Allied Airborne Army in England. Apart from this, the lack of tactical air support has been exaggerated - it was very active. The German ferry operation at Pannerden, for example, was constantly harassed by air attacks and was forced to be conducted at night or during the bad weather periods.
I’ve just watched this one and I’d like to say thank you - it’s very interesting.
I agree that Gavin’s performance at Nijmegen has to be questioned. (I actually said as much in an essay a year ago as part of my MA.) A couple of things, though. First, Mr Poulussen says that there weren’t many German forces in the Reichswald which is true (initially), but the Allies didn’t know that and we need to limit the 20/20 hindsight advantage. Gavin had no plan to take the Waal bridge - that’s the problem. Gavin did, on occasion, shift the blame, but he also changed his story. Cornelius Ryan was a friend of Gavin’s, so he wrote rather kindly of what happened at Nijmegen. Finally, we don’t seem to have considered Browning who took his HQ into Gavin’s sector, using valuable glider lift (33 gliders, if I recall correctly?) That HQ was not fit for purpose - it was not trained, nor manned, as a warfighting HQ, so the assumption must be that Browning wanted to be there for his own interests. Moreover, even if Gavin accepted the accusation that it was his failure, where was Browning?! Certainly, Gavin made a massive error of judgement, but Browning oversaw the planning - presumably - and accepted Gavin’s plan - presumably. Why did he not push Gavin to take the Waal bridge, instead of agreeing, after the failed attempt to just wait until day four? I am REALLY surprised that Mr Poulussen doesn’t address this issue. Browning has much to answer for.
Good points - thanks
@@bigwoody4704 Much of what you say I agree with, but the initial plan of Montgomery's can be bad AND the execution of it also at fault. Regardless of the big error of how Antwerp was handled, I still think it's fair to say that James Gavin made some errors too, as indeed did many commanders in OMG
@@bigwoody4704 Exactly, with 400 shows here, you get 400 opinions. So many of the ongoing debates about the war come down to one opinion against another
@@bigwoody4704I get that Browning said that in 55 and RG addresses that in his book. That's the thing with the accounts of participants' they changed over the course of time. Men like Urquhart, Frost, Gavin, Browning etc said different things at different times. RG has one interpretation, Ryan another etc. I've read the books you mention and others too and many of them make valid cases about what happened. There is no definitive understanding and as history buffs it would be wrong to not examine different theories and indeed change our minds sometimes
@@WW2TV what if Browning had an interview with the official British Historian concerning campaign in 1954, saying that the Groesbeek Heights was more important but then a few days later wrote back to the historian asking to change the story. Would this be of importance?
Question of Lack of Air Support for Market Garden:
One point not discussed was the weather condition, from 21 Army Group Reports
1) During 17th September 550 sorties were flown by 83 Group in support of Ground Troops.
2) 18th Sept During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor as it was bad over both over airfields and the battle area.
3) 19th Sept Weather again the limiting factor. Both over airfields and over the battle area it was bad for flying. Only 73 sorties flown.
4) 20th Sept Bad weather and the maintenance lift of re-supply of 1 British airborne Div kept the number of sorties down to 259 of which 181 were purely fighter operations air cover and sweeps. Tactical reconnaissance produced little value both of bad visibility and the prohibition on flying during airborne drops.
Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter. Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105)
One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately. During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather. {John Terraine, A Time for Courage. NY: MacMillan, 1985, p.670}
Support by Bomber Command and 8th Air Force on the night 16th/17th and 17th.
Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 90 - 91
1) Night of D-1 282 RAF Bomber attack various airfields
2) Day of 17th 872 B-17’s to attack 117 installations mostly AA batteries along troop carrier route. Supported by 147 P-51’s
3) Other operation attack by 85 Lancaster and 15 Mosquitoes escorted by 5 Spitfires.
4) Late operation was dispatched 50 Mosquitos, 48 B-25’s and 24 Boston’s of 2nd Tactical airforce
Clearly weather was a factor during the operation, but on the 17th massive support effort was made by Airforce
You will enjoy the show with Seb Ritchie later this month
Two things I didn’t hear discussed, the role of the Germans in the failure, and the fact that Gavin was tasked with securing Browning’s headquarters position.
Because it was the 10 points this particular historian wanted to bring up
Gavin was not "tasked with securing Browning's headquarters position" - both Gavin and Browning's command posts were established in the woods west of Groesbeek in an area secured by the 505th PIR to protect Landing Zone 'N' and the Division from counter-attacks from the Reichswald. Gavin had Ben Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th PIR as division reserve on Hill 81.8 above the CP. The Corps HQ had its own local protection from the Glider Pilot Regiment HQ, and elements of Nos.1 and 2 Flights from 'A' Squadron for the 32 Horsas and 'X' (Independent) Flight for the 6 WACO gliders, who were trained and equipped to operate as light infantry once they hit the ground.
The exact position of the Corps HQ was on the north side of the Mooksebaan that runs from Groesbeek to Mook, and at the time was in an area of public woodland fenced off by the Germans and used as a Luftwaffe supply dump for aerial bombs and ammunition called Feld-Luftmunitionslager 15/VI (Mook). The main gate at the Mook end of the facility was opposite the 't Zwaantje Inn - now the Herberg Restaurant 't Zwaantje. The dump was guarded by about 200 German troops and most of them evacuated after destroying the dump during the airborne landings, leaving behind a rearguard. It was a machine-gun post from this rearguard that nearly killed General Gavin and his Dutch liaison officer on their way to the Division CP rendezvous.
The role of the Germans was that they were doing their best to defeat the operation and I would recommend Robert Kershaw's book It Never Snows In September (1990) as a starting point on that topic.
@@davemac1197 interesting minutia, but my original comments stand, you did not address them except to misconstrue the first and patronizingly generalize about the second (most likely to distract from your real argument, which is apparently related to my first point). “Secure” does not necessarily mean “provide security for”, it can also mean “acquire.” Gavin was tasked with acquiring the position where Browning would arrive later, was he not? Browning was Gavin’s direct superior, was he not? Gavin and Browning were American and British respectively, correct? If Gavin had failed to seize and maintain control of Browning’s planned HQ area, that would have had political consequences beyond the mere tactical considerations. Not as consequential as failing to seize and control the bridge, but when the host asks, “Why is Gavin so concerned about this?” I feel like I know the answer, but no one says it.
@@GeographyCzar - I think you have it backwards. Why would Gavin divert resouces to secure a position for the Corps headquarters when the most obvious (in my view) and expedient solution was to co-locate the Corps HQ near the Division CP in the centre of the divisional area? They were both located between the 505th and 508th PIRs.
Oh. Well, since I haven’t heard of that controversy, I guess I can’t address it. I thought the question was why Gavin focused on the Groesbeek Heights instead of the Nijmegen Road Bridge.
Brereton was told by Eisenhower after the failure of the American transport pilots during Sicily ( cowardice as some troops called it) during the airborne drops of British gliders. To get his pilots up to par with night flying and navigation. He did nothing of the kind hence the rediculas drops at Normandy . So come market garden, had to be during the daylight hrs. Despite all and any BS excuses.
And as shown by some exceptional bravery . Retrieved some of the bad taste felt by some of the veterans of Sicily.
I think the blame for failure lies with the USAAF commander of the Strategic Airlift element when he limited the sorties of his aircrews to just one of carrying airborne units on Day 1 of the operations. I do understand that German AA crews would've been prepared, but they were just as prepared for the original jumps because German radar and troops on the coast had alerted the AA units for the first wave, a second wave would've faced just as much of an AA response as the first. Just my opinion.
the reason for the single lift was the weather, the forecast fog on the morning of the 17th only cleared by 0900 hours
@@thevillaaston7811Why would you continue to plan for 2 lifts on the 17th, when you know that only one lift was feasible after the initial planning. See below why one lift was the final decision, and the reason why one lift was decided was the weather.
This is from Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 195). Maybe you should read the book especially chapter 3.3 Air Lift to get a fully appreciation of issue with planning the Air Lift.
"On 10 September Browning presented his outline plan to the assembled Allied airborne and troop carrier commanders (as we have seen, 1st Airborne Division were not represented at this meeting). The plan stated that the airlift schedule would be ‘in principle as for Linnet’. (WO 219/4998, Operation Sixteen Outline Plan, 10 September 1944.)
As so little time was available, decisions were required immediately and, once taken, they had to be adhered to rigidly. So the First Allied Airborne Army planners sprang into action, examining Browning’s outline, the number of aircraft available and the potential combinations of the three airborne divisions that might be infiltrated in any given period with the resources available. Within hours they had become concerned over the prospect of achieving two daylight lifts on the same day:
“With the shortening of the days at this time of the year, and complications of turn-around, it is believed that future plans should be made on the basis of one lift per day, with all US aircraft available. This will permit an operation to be carried through in spite of a late start due to bad weather, whereas tight schedule plans based on two lifts per day could not be met if early morning weather were bad. (WO 219/4998, memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bartley, 10 September 1944.”
By 12 September Williams (who had overall command of the airlift) had accepted this advice. At another planning meeting,
“General Williams pointed out that owing to the reduced number of hours of daylight and increase in distance, it would not be possible to consider more than one lift per day. (WO 219/4998, First Allied Airborne Army memorandum to Brigadier General Ralph Stearley, 12 September 1944.)”
Williams had a long-standing and deserved reputation for close co-operation with the airborne forces.10 He had commanded the US troop carriers in Husky, Neptune and Dragoon, and was thus one of the most experienced of all the Allied airborne commanders.
So you see that the starting point in the planning was 2 lifts, but at the end of the day the final decision was that only one lift was doable.
So were your evidence that 2 lifts were never considered in the planning phrase.
@@thevillaaston7811 I read all those accounts, Yes they state that 2 lifts on 17th would have assisted the operation, and they are right only if 2 lifts were practicable and that would depend on the WEATHER.
But TheVilla Aston none of these account mention was the weather on the 17th.
Also either Urquhart or Gavin mention in their accounts a request for a second lift.
Rick Atkinson again Operation Dragoon is mention which did have 2 lifts yet fails to provide any details regarding the time of the 2 lifts which were the 1st lift (Paratroopers) arrive at 0430 the 2nd lift (Gliders) arrived at 1800 hours 13 1/2 hours later. But you know that. Also he ever mention the weather conditions on the 17th. You also know that fog on the morning of the 17th did not clear until 0900. So base on Dragoon the second lift would no take off until 2230 Hours ( assuming the 1st lift takeoff was 0900) arriving at DZ/LZ until 0130 on the 18th. Remember the night 17/18th is moonless so how would the Gliders see were to land? See below about impact of weather.
Montgomery 21 Army Group weather report for 17th regarding Market Garden "Fog over bases clearing by 1000 hours with moderate amounts of cumulus 3000 ft thereafter good visibility. Light winds. Operation proceeded according to plan.
The Impact of weather in planning Air Operations
"Weather and visibility factors. Successful airborne operations in the Second World War were dependent on a number of favourable weather and visibility factors. Weather conditions had to be sufficiently fine to allow aircraft to take off, transit to their objectives, deliver their paratroops or gliders, complete return journeys and land safely. Overcast conditions rendered glider operations all but impossible. Tow-rope breakages were a regular occurrence when tug and glider combinations flew through cloud, either because the glider pilot lost sight of the tug and the two aircraft got out of alignment or because, in assuming the recommended position for bad weather conditions, the glider inadvertently passed through the tug’s slipstream. Operations executed in darkness or half-light had largely proved unsuccessful. Therefore, by September 1944, the majority of air planners within First Allied Airborne Army were convinced that future operations should be conducted in daylight and in the best possible visibility conditions. Obtaining two or more successive days of clear and calm weather across three weather systems (the UK, the North Sea and Continental Europe) in mid-September was always going to be problematic. But, by that time, the planners had been able to observe the way in which adverse weather had caused the postponement of both Linnet and Comet, and had evidently concluded that they were most likely to obtain favourable conditions by avoiding the dawn lifts that had been proposed for both operations. Hence, as the records show, the attraction of scheduling successive lifts slightly later in the morning was not only that they could be flown at full strength but also that they could exploit the best available periods of visibility. The alternative was to mount smaller follow-up lifts using a schedule that was potentially more vulnerable to weather or visibility problems. Such reasoning would have been reinforced by the prevailing weather conditions in the week leading up to Market Garden, which were characterized by early morning fog on every day except the 16th."
Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 199).
So TheVilla Aston show how to two lifts was doable. You have on the 17th Sept sunrise at 0617 and sunset at 1811 and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 hours. With morning fog clearing by 0900.
Clearly Williams the most experience airmen with regarding plan airborne operation would have used 2 lifts if it was doable for Market Garden as he did with Dragoon and proposed for Operation Linnet.
Ask yourself why did he finally decide on a single lift?
@@thevillaaston7811
"If there had been a plan for two lifts on the first day that was only thwarted by weather that defied what was forecast, then Brereton would have been in the clear. But there was no such plan." Your words.
Clearly you do not understand how planning an air operation works. All air operations plans are depended on the forecast weather conditions on the day.
Your statement "only thwarted by weather that defied what was forecast." The forecast was for morning fog which was expected to clear by 0900 on the 17th. That means the earliest the lift could take-off would be between 0900 to 1000, reaching the drop/landing zones between 1200 to 1300 hours. With sunset around 1811, how can anyone plan a second lift to occur on the 17th with that weather forecast.
Your argument would only hold up if the weather forecasts leading up to 17th was for good flying weather with no morning fog expected, but unexpected on the 17th morning fog was present. The decision would have been to postponed the operation just as Operation Comet was postponed on the 8th no to delay the first lift and cancel the 2nd.
Two lifts was the starting point, the forecast weather condition of morning fog ruled out any possibility of a second lift.
You and I were no there, so how can you know what was planned and how the final decision was determined. As Williams made the decision for a single lift, was the one who plan 2 lifts for Dragoon, clearly would have a very sound reason for that decision. Brereton only agreed with Williams decision. If anyone should be criticize for the decision its Williams not Brereton.
As to drop Zone locations at Arnhem, they were decided by the RAF for Operation Comet which Brereton was not involved.
@@thevillaaston7811
As you final to provided any evidence that 2 lifts was possible but thwarted by the weather this may help to realized, why Williams decided against Two lift due to forecast of expected fog on the 17th
Planning for 2 lifts the starting point is to 1 determine the earliest time the first lift can take-off based on forecast weather condition (A Hours). This will be depended on the make-up of the lift, for example Transports only, Gliders only or combination of the two. Next is to determine the very latest the 2nd lift can arrive over the DZ/LZ. (B Hours).
In that time gap the following stage will be undertaken.
1) Take-off and assembly of the 1st Lift
2) The flight time from assembly point to the Target DZ/LZ
3) The time it will take to deliver the troops and equipment
4) The return flights. (Looking at the time the last planes leave the DZ/LZ to arrive back at base. Last Plane arriving at C Hours
5) The return around time require to prepare the aircraft for second lift.
All the aircraft of the lifts will end up into one of 4 groups. Group 1 aircraft with no battle damage, mechanical or electrical issues and are available immediately for 2nd lift. Group 2 planes that suffered battle damage or mechanical or electrical issues that require repairs they are available. Group 3 planes that have return but to the level of damage are written off as total loss. The last group are planes that final to return.
The earliest the 2nd lift can take-off is D Hours. At D-hour their sufficient aircraft available from Group 1 to make viable second lift.
Next, we need to calculate the latest take-off time for 2nd lift which would be B hours minus the time required to assembly and fly to DZ/LZ. So E Hours is the calculated take-off time.
So, if D Hours is earlier than E Hours 2 lifts are doable. The only question does the 2nd Lift take-off at D or E or some point between the two. However, if E Hours is earlier than C Hours only one lift would be possible. As aircraft from the first are still in the air in would not be possible to spot the gliders for the second lift.
The question is if E Hours is later than C Hours but earlier than D Hours?
Clearly a single Lift is the obvious answer, but what would be the maximum time gap were a 2lift may be possible if timing can be fine-tuned.
So TheVilla Aston, the decision whether to go with 1 lift or two would be based on the expected weather conditions and if there sufficient time to incorporate the 2nd Lift.
Clearly with expectation of morning fog on the 17th, Williams made the decision that only a single lift was possible. For 2 lifts to have a chance, there need to be sufficient light and visibility for a pre dawn take-off.
Just noticed at 54:47 that casualties list does not include glider regiments for both US divisions (although if im correct one indeed didn`t make it onto ground during operation) so as 1 SBSpad (Polish). Don’t know how much or if at all it would influence this summary, but it is pretty strange omittment.
Still, really good video, inciting to read more about the operation 👍🏻
All these people blaming Gavin, the 82nd and Brereton ignore 4 obvious facts: Facts: 1) Poulson's theories rely on him knowing more than Gavin (one of the best most experienced generals of WW2) on 9/18/44; 2) That this was a British plan advanced solely by Monty to Ike; 3) that any serious military person would have known there is no way 2 guarantee capture of all of these bridges & expect no delay; &, finally, 4) the buck stops with Monty who was in overall command of MG. He allowed it to be rushed and his Generals should not be faulted.
They haven't ignored facts, they have interpreted them differently. For decades, pretty much all the blame had been put onto Monty. I, for one, believe we are in a better era of historiography where we can also assess other commanders' roles in Market Garden. If we do that, I think it's clear that Gavin could definitely have done better. Now whether that is hindsight or not, it's still worth studying
@@WW2TV I agree that no one should be immune from examination. Mistakes were made by everyone in WW2...the Hurtgen being one of the most egregious. My point is that Poulson is being used to ignore 1000s of books on MG and ignore Monty's blunder (where the buck needs to stop) and attack Gavin and Brereton (notably ignoring British commanders entirely) who were given a massive job with like no time to prepare. I believe it was less than 30 days from inception to drops. For the record, I think all the troops in MG gave 100%. Unlike Poulson I know there was a 1 in a 1,000,000 chance of success. Arnehm was being easily handled by existing panzer division and entire route for 30 corps was being attacked from both sides. Resupply at Arnhem, etc... by Germans was imminent.
@@MICHALSLAW Well I disagree, I think there's a much greater chance of success (better than fifty-fifty) with a few modifications to the plan - the most important being getting all of 1st Airborne there in one left and more airpower over the Nijmegen / Arnhem road. But the bigger disaster I think would have been if 30 Corps had managed to get into the Roer. That would have been a massive disaster with the German strength still there
@@WW2TV We can agree to disagree and examine new vantage poinst to view this from which is the best part of your youtube videos. I do agree that modifications to the plan, ala Overlord, wuold have changed success rate considerably to favor Allies. In the event, it was rushed and ad hoc and lacked air cover among others.
@@WW2TV Paul one of the biggest problems was the lack of aircraft. This is source from Operation Market Garden Now and Them.
The total number of sorties needed to fly in the entire market force was approximately 3,795. The initial lift was 1,525 aircraft (including 478 towing Gliders and 1,047 transports) which was effectively the entire 9th Troop Carrier Command and RAF 38th and 46th Group, hence the need for the 3 lifts. To fly in the entire 1st British Airborne and the Poles would require 1,035 aircraft (383 Transports and 652 towing Gliders). 101st needed 1,330 and 82nd 1,392 aircraft respectively. I think each divisional Commander would have preferred his entire division arriving in 1 lift. If Gavin could have all 4 regiments available on the 17th the issue regarding delay would not have occurred. He would have an entire regiment available to assault the bridge.
There are comments that Brereton should have access additional aircraft, the question is from where? 12th Airforce had the 51st TC Wing with 3 groups located in Italy which could possibly provide 152 aircraft, with just 7 days planning could the wing be relocated to England in time. Could the RAF provide additional aircraft?
As to lack of CAS between Nijmegen and Arnhem, I think the problem of the weather, distance from base and demands from other sectors limited available aircraft to cover that sector.
"One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately.37 During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather." Source Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter; Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105).
I feel Brereton get some bad press over think he had no control over, lack of planes and the weather.
Another home run.most valid point,you made.its easy to sit back and critique . different when shot and she'll is whizzing past you been a big fan of ballentine books for 50+ years.farrar Shockley never talked about lack of air support.I never thought of it either.once again you opened my mind.
Enough babbling.I thank God for all those brave men in the airborne.the reason market garden wasn't as successful as planned was there were these German guys who still fought hard.lets never forget that
Good points
I am taken aback that more historians haven't bothered compared Operation Market Garden to Operation Lumberjack. Comparing these two operations with similar objectives is probably much more instructive than throwing arm-chair invective at any of the Generals or soldiers associated with Market Garden or posturing "if only" scenerios. For all the ink, new or old, spilled over Market Garden what stands out to me is the fact that no one seems to understand that a bridge is considered, in infantry terms, an obstacle. This means that the whole operation was in actuality a large-scale raid. I define "raid" as any military operation where the objective is not to capture or hold the terrain itself (or an objective sited on that terrain). These raid operations have much more planning considerations than any "regular" capture-hold infantry operation which is why in the modern day these types of operations are generally left up to Special Operations Forces (the 82nd itself something of a "farm team" for potential SOF troops). The fact there were large number of airborne forces and the issue of taking up positions in urban settings muddies the fact that the overall objective was not "regular" in infantry terms. With this in mind the ONLY take away from Market Garden is that to "regularize" a raid is something that requires a great deal of careful consideration, and it is no wonder that such an operation like Market Garden appears to be consigned to the garbage heap of operational history.
Operation MARKET was 90% successful in terms of securing 9 out of the minimum 10 in a total of 24 bridges involved in the operation needed to get XXX Corps to Arnhem. Each bridge objective may be considered to be a 'raid' in these terms, in fact the British glider after action reports are called 'raid reports' regardless of the scale of the operation. After reading your comment I find it ironic that the bridge representing the 10% failure in MARKET was the Nijmegen highway bridge, which was the target of 1st Battalion 508th PIR in the 82nd Airborne.
Many sources written after the war claim the bridge was de-prioritised in favour of the Groesbeek heights - seen as necessary to secure the 82nd Airborne's airhead, but this is only technically correct after the first failed attempt to secure the bridge on D-Day of the operation, when Airborne Corps commander General Browning rejected 82nd CO General Gavin's proposal to make a second attempt on the bridge before armoured support arrived from XXX Corps.
However, Gavin's divisional plan included an instruction to the CO of the 508th to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as possible after landing, which he subsequently failed to do until a late intrvention by Gavin himself to get him moving, by which time it was too late. The race to reinforce the bridge was won by 10.SS-Panzer-Division. This instruction was confirmed by a letter Gavin wrote to US Army Historical officer Captain Westover (dated 17 July 1945) and again to Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for his book A Bridge Too Far (1974). In 2012, both John McManus in September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, and Phil Nordyke in Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, have first hand witnesses to the divisional briefing in which Gavin gave that instruction and emphasied that it was important "to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation" (Captain Chet Graham, 508th liaison officer to Division HQ, in Nordyke 2012). McManus also gives a very thorough analysis and rationale for the bridge versus ridge debate for anyone wanting to get into that and nail the post-war myth the bridge was in any way de-prioritised in the planning of the operation.
Gavin's interview with Cornelius Ryan also contains a claim by Gavin that "The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized" (Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University - Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967).
Operation LUMBERJACK (1-7 March 1945) was the US 1st Army's advance to the Rhine in the area of Cologne-Bonn, which was preparation for a Rhine crossing and then a pincer on the Ruhr with Montgomery's 21st Army Group from their own Rhine crossing (Operation Plunder on 23/24 March 1945) to the north. The intent was not to take bridges intact with airborne 'raids' on those objectives - the policy was to force the destruction of the bridges and trap as many Germans on the west bank as possible. When the Remagen bridge was found to be still intact it became a target of opportunity to secure it as a crossing.
The dictionary defines 'raid' as a surprise attack, so I think MARKET GARDEN (or at least the airborne operation MARKET) was certainly a surprise, whereas I don't think LUMBERJACK qualifies at all, and that's why it doesn't really bear comparison. In fact at Remagen, the surprise was on the American forces when the Germans failed to demolish the bridge.
Operation Market was a bold plan but I think one of the biggest issues is that the paratroopers dropped near Arnhem were dropped over a 3 day period due to lack of planes and bad weather. Sosabowski's Polish force didn't arrive until the 3rd day. Complicating this was the fact that the British were dropped 8 miles from Arnhem.
Agreed
@@thevillaaston7811 Not really, the Germans played a key part in stopping Market Garden as well
@@johnburns4017 I never said the Germans claim a victory, just their resistance contributed to the failure of Market garden, just as the weather, lack of Aircraft and the terrain.
@@johnburns4017 You say the initial resistance was poor. Please explain why the 1st and 3rd battalions of 1st Para Brigade failed to reach their objectives on the 17th.
You say the road from Zon to Arhem was clear for about 40 hours after the jump. Yet Viktor Grabner and 9 SS Recon Battalion reach Nijmegen by 2000 hours on the 17th, H-Hour +7.
Market Garden was a failure in that it did not achieve it objective of placing XXX Corp in a blocking position between Arnhem and Zuider Zee (Refer to 21st Army Group page 3
"the object of Second Army (withborne forces under command after landing) was to position itself astride the rivers Maas, Waal and Neder Rijn in the area of Grave 6253, Nijmegen 7062 and Arnhem E757 and to dominate the country North as far as Zuider Zee thereby cutting communications between Germany and the Low Countries."
Clearly Second Army did not reach the Zuider Zee or Arnhem so how was Market Garden not a failure.
@@johnburns4017
"Initial resistance was poor as been explained to You" , all you prove a statement with no evidence or sources.
So answer the question explain why 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st Para Brigade FAILED to reach their objectives on the 17th , also why didn't the 2nd Para Battalion seize the southern end of the Arnhem Bridge. If the initial resistance was poor the 3rd battalion would have reach the bridge, 1st Battalion the heights at the northern end of Arnhem, Recon Sq would reach the bridge, The southern end would have been seized. So please explain why these objectives were not captured if the initial resistance was poor.
From Kershaw, Robert. It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944
"General Bittrich, the Commander of IISS Panzer Corps, received the first enemy situation reports at 1330 and issued his first warning order at 1340. Both 9SS and 10SS division headquarters were given ‘stand to’. IISS Corps’ reaction to the crisis reads like a staff command and control exercise. Bittrich based in Doetinchem quickly and expertly deduced the likely enemy aim. Command and staff procedures began to function with the efficiency that was so much a hallmark of the German General Staff. Nijmegen and Arnhem were identified as the key objectives for this renewed Allied offensive. Airborne landings of considerable strength had been identified near both locations. Therefore, the 9SS were to recce Arnhem and Nijmegen, assemble, occupy the former and defeat the enemy landings west of Arnhem by Oosterbeek. This was to be achieved post-haste, and the Arnhem bridge secured. 10SS were to occupy the Nijmegen bridge and form a bridgehead south of it."
Clearly German reaction with the 10SS heading to Nijmegen, clearly the road was not clear 40 hours after the landing. Also XXX Corp was stopped by 2 88mm A/t guns on the 18th for 7 hours.
Market Garden objective was not to seize Noord Brabant read Montgomery Memoirs it was Zuider Zee, even TIK in his presentation states Zuider Zee was the objective of Market Garden.
Stop attempting to change the facts to suit your views.
Theoretical Second Lift on Day One 17 September 1944
Actual first lift
0945 Take off begins
1350 Main jump over Arnhem begins
Four hours back to home field not including circling while waiting to land
Theoretical Second Lift
Assume minimum of one hour for turn around including refueling. The fuel capacity of the C-47 is 882 US gallons
1850 Take off begins
(Sunset Arnhem 17 Sept. 2024, 1945 DST Central European Time)
2255 Jump begins
Four hours back to base
Britain was on Double Summer Time, two hours ahead of GMT.
That decision violated Nathan Bedford Forrest's most popular dictum and I'm paraphrasing: "Get there the fastest or first with the most."
River Orne bridge and canal bridge coup de main training
"Gale tested the company through two exercises where the objective was to capture bridges, when it became apparent that the company would not be able to carry out the mission on its own."
"Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night."
wiki
The plan was thrown together too quickly and was too complicated while dependent on all factors working. More planning and continuity actions needed to be planned for.
Many people don't realise that MARKET GARDEN had about two weeks for planning since it was based on the previous weeks' cancelled operations COMET for the ground objectives and LINNET/LINNET II for the air plan.
The reason LINNET (Tournai) and the alternative targets for LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges) were both cancelled was because the ground forces had overrun the objectives before the airborne operation could be launched. Browning had in fact threatened to resign over Brereton's LINNET II plan because it had too short notice to print and distribute maps to the airborne troops. So you're damned if you take too long and you're damned if you don't take enough time for planning.
Montgomery gets criticised for halting XXX Corps on 4 September with 100 Kilometres of fuel still in the tanks after the capture of Antwerp, but if he hadn't there was a danger of using up vital logistics that would be required for the Rhine crossing (COMET/MARKET GARDEN), and it was also the case that he was warned by his administration officer on 11 September that MARKET GARDEN could not be launched until 23 September without more supplies being delivered. Montgomery immediately cabled that warning to Eisenhower and Bedell Smith visited him the next day to promise everything he wanted, which didn't actually materialise, compromising the advance of the flanking VIII and XII Corps during the operation.
As for it being "too complicated" - that's a common American complaint, but all I can say is welcome to the British Army - if you can't cope, don't pretend to be as capable. Despite all the well-known problems, the British Airborne at Arnhem secured their prime objective and held it for four days. The Americans at Nijmegen failed to move on an undefended bridge until it was reinforced by SS panzer troops.
On flexibility - the airborne operation targeted about 24 bridges in total, many were 'Heart Route' alternative crossings to the 10 bridges on the main 'Club Route' supply line. The weakest point was the river Waal, the main channel of the Dutch Rhine, because there were only two bridges at Nijmegen for many miles and this was the point of failure on the first day. The 508th PIR had an easy run to the bridge in the first vital hours, but failed to exploit it because of poor field command at the top of the regiment, already exposed in Normandy, and for this the divisional commander must take some responsibility.
This is why RG Poulussen's book Lost At Nijmegen (2011) correctly identifies the point of failure at Nijmegen, but the following year Phil Nordyke, an 82nd Airborne Division historian with several books written on the division, published his combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) - with more detail and many first hand accounts. I thoroughly recommend both.
@davemac1197 Thanks. I loved your reply. I see the problem that caused the falure as a British military stuck in the WW1 mod of running straight into machine guns. This came from the old plan of Britsh lining up in a row and marching into a musket volley. The world was learning to fight a new war. Today, the UK has one of the finest trained soldiers in the world. American solders that spend time with British soldiers come back and tell me they are outstanding.
@@thatbeme- thanks for that reply, but I have to say if you read Montgomery's service record in the First World War (just the Wiki page on him is sufficient) you should understand that after experiencing the horrors of trench warfare as a young Lieutenant he was determined to fight the Second World War as a Divisonal commander rising to Army Group commander with the minimum of casualties, and gained a reputation (at least in the UK) of being careful with the lives of the men under his command. The British Airborne Corps commander Browning also has a similar First World War record, awarded a DSO for handing a battalion while also a Lieutenant.
It's disheartening to see people make comments about these officers being wasteful with the lives of GI's while under their command in MARKET GARDEN, when the worst casualties in both the 101st (the battle at Best for a bridge not requested and already blown) and 82nd Divisions (Waal river assault crossing) were the result of initiatives made by their own divisional commanders and not from the British. I blame Hollywood for much of the mythology, and even Cornelius Ryan's book has many misleading errors of omission.
"Better to be on hand with ten men than absent with ten thousand" Julius Caesar (I think) 18:15
Excellent show, I agree with many points, but really do not disagree with anything said. As for Gavin, nobody is perfect, injuring your back in a jump on Day 1 is huge since I do have a pinched nerve in my back and is not a pleasant thing to experience in peace time, and I've gotten from many US books about our paratroopers in WWII that the US commanders were overly concerned about the landing zones, especially the follow up drops because they were afraid to have US troops drop in daylight directly onto German forces and also for resupply efforts. Lack of focus I think is a good criticism of US involvement in this campaign.
I think it is possible to have these constructive debates without slinging mud at anyone. Gavin was a great commander in many ways, but nonetheless it is fair to examine his part on OMG
British 6th airborne div. Showed the way to take a bridge with airborne troops. On D-Day.
Browning planned the same style glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges for Operation COMET. These got removed by Brereton for MARKET because of the night navigation issues in the USAAF as mentioned in Colin Gibson's comment above.
Always wonder if the 4th Brigade hadn't dropped, the two airlanding battalions arriving on day 1 could have joined the advance to the bridge and with their additional strength could of swung the balance to get to the bridge on day 1. The 4th Brigade brought almost nothing to the battle and were virtually wasted in the woods..
This whole Gavin thing really gets me going for some reason The whole thing presupposes that even if the Waalbrug is taken on the first day, that one battalion could hold it without taking the railway bridge and its anti-aircraft guns which could direct fire on it .... and that the Germans wouldn't do anything different than what they did if it was captured....
Also the battle at Mook is pretty hairy and that is overlooked in this. If they lose the second bridge....
This whole theory simply seems like a way to scapegoating from people who know the entire German OOB now which commanders then didn't. And it also REALLY lessens the effort that was mounted to ACTUALLY take both the bridges later. I've heard a meme of "what bridge?" being bandied about now. Frustrating.
It's a matter of opinions. As we said at the outset, many people have their deeply held views about this. RG has his theory and people can agree or not agree as they believe
I think this again comes down to how "protective" people are of their own interpretation of the OMG plan and people having their favourite culprits. As a Brit, we've had to take 7 decades of all the blame being directed at Monty, Browning and 30 Corps. This Dutch historian's conclusion is both the 82nd and 101st had a role to play in the failure. This show encourages all to re-evaluate
@Answer Questions Hard to disagree with that, some failed less spectacularly than others and there was excpetional commitment and bravery shown by 1st Airborne especially at Platoon level
@@bigwoody4704 had Vandeleur advanced, his armour would have been wiped out. The Germans, having a full set of the battle plans in their possession knew precisely where to place their anti tank weapons. Visit the place (I did, years ago before the area changed so much) and you will see the folly of a single tank advance on an elevated road!
@@bigwoody4704 so in fact it was Eisenhower's decision to support Monty! He accepted the blame because..,...he was the Supreme Commander and made the relevant decision!
(1) This was a great broadcast, absorbing, but perhaps the interviewer should have made his questions (and particularly his comments) more succinct. His guest was left to sometimes just answer in a sentence and given no time to expand. (2) I for one dislike the movie intensely, although I can see in terms of narrative drama, and acting, plus the re-creation of the battle scenes it is superb. However, I'm bound to say it wasn't (as the director Richard Attenborough claimed) an ant-war movie, but an anti- British one, clearly with American money determining its bias. The American troops are displayed as 'get-up-and-go', the Brits. as sluggish, incompetent, and (apart from the 'Red Devils) almost cowardly. What a film to put up for a Royal Command Premier with the Queen (the Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces) forced - with Prince Philip - to watch. (3) I don't (for one moment) think military historians would have allowed this film to influence their writings on Market Garden; like R.G. Poulussen their interpretations would be shaped by research in the various archives. (4) 5/5 stars for this video, excellent. (UK)
That's true enough, RG isn't much of a talker and rather shy, which is why this was a prerecord not live. And also why I did much of the exposition in the interview. I urge you to read his books
@@WW2TV Oh, I understand. So full marks to your then for your exposition. Yes, I did go to Amazon but his book is only in a KINDLE edition. I prefer a hard copy. I am at the moment reading Beevor's "Arnhem". Your broadcast was important for me as an antidote.
@@grumpyoldman8661 Send RG a direct message on Twitter and you can order hardback copies direct from him
@@WW2TV I'm not on Twitter. But thanks anyway.
Great analysis,& I think you make a great point,as you usually do...these popular movies do have an impact on our opinions,even for those of us who realize the fallacies. Subconsciously,you can't help but have some of that mythology-or exaggeration deep into your consciousness. But awesome job as usual. I like how you point out the biases we all have. Some of it is nationalism,but also our national media.
Some of my fellow Americans,act like we single handedly beat the Germans,when the British were going at them,long before us. And the Russians died,killed,& bore far more of the fighting,than America,& Britain combined. Or how important British intelligence was,while US intelligence was pretty overmatched early on. Brits probably had the 2nd best intelligence service on earth,behind Russia,who used their intelligence services against everybody-,friend,or foe. Kinda like how us Americans tend to think we single handedly invented the atomic bomb,but British scientists were very important in the Manhattan project. However, that's also how the Russians stole the bomb eventually, according to my understanding-compromised Brits at Las Alamos. Maybe there were Americans also-Im no expert. But my understanding is they mainly got it through a few key Brits. But the Russians have a tendency to forget there even was a western front,or the contribution the Americans,& British-to a lesser extent-supplied them on the Eastern front. The British tend to ignore the entire empire of help they had,or those from occupied countries,when they were supposedly"alone." The French tend to over rate their role in liberating their country,& highlight the French resistance,while ignoring their many collaborators. And it's often forgotten,that the US,& British,to a lesser degree- had another war going on vs Japan,which Russia didn't have to worry about. This is all my opinion,but every country tends to exaggerate their contributions,& minimize others. Especially since the Cold war basically started before the end of the war,& neither side wanted to credit the other. I know people born in the USSR,who thought as kids-thought they single handedly won everything in WW2. It's not as egregiously dishonest in "Western countries," but we all have our myths,& spin on these things.
But crediting your allies,(or even enemies),& admitting your own countries mistakes, doesn't take away from "your side," or discredit the memory of those killed. We only learn from history,if it's accurate. And more than 1 thing can be true at the same time-there we're good,& evil people on all sides,& all sides made contributions,but could not have been as effective,without their allies. But I can also believe that the Allied side had basically an overall just cause-but recognize there were scoundrels on our side,& we made mistakes...even war crimes. The Axis cause was basically a lie,& evil...but there were individual people,who did heroic things,& were basically good people on their side. It's easy to judge them all 80 yrs later,but I think the Allies crossed the line,with some of our strategic bombings over occupied Europe,but especially Germany,& Japan. Some of our troops did commit war crimes,but not remotely on the scale of the Axis...or even Russians. But it's easy for us to judge. If you were a Russian soldier,pumped full of communist propaganda about the Germans-some true,some exaggerated,& some not true...& you saw your whole village wiped out by the SS...how would we react? I don't believe I would justify raping 80 yr old German women,but I might justify murdering German POWs...especially SS...who knows? And the American,& British strategic bombing,did hurt the Germans,though it cost way too many civilian lives,& wasn't as effective as they thought it'd be. But we tend to forget...they didn't have satellite guided bombs,computers,drones,etc. The only way to hit a target was really saturating the target. So,I think we do sometimes judge those people too much. But I think some of our bombings did cross the line. Not the atomic bombings though...I think those saved hundreds of thousands of Allied lives,& probably many millions of Japanese lives,as awful & regrettable as they were. Even after 2,some of the Japanese army tried to pull off a coup,to prevent the Emperor from surrendering. But that's a story,or argument for another day. Great job,I didn't know much about Market Garden-as I tend to gravitate to Allied victories,not defeats-lol. But you both educated me a lot.
Thanks for the long reply. It's all about seeing and hearing different points of view
Just the fact that they can see the end of the war coming. I mean Germany is right next door. That can subconsciously effect decision making. Maybe make one a little more cautious. They could be thinking " I might be able to make it through this shit show!" Just a thought. What do you think? Great show guys. Thanks so much!
If any of the river bridges (Grave, Nijmegen, Arnhem) were demolished the mission would fail. With the Grave and Nijmegan bridges the most important. This fact alone REQUIRES a coup de main on ALL bridges. The landing plan was the first fail. Everything else is a what if. The Allies were very lucky the Waal bridges were not destroyed on D1, then 1AB would have been 100% gone instead of 50%.
I have both of Robert’s excellent books. I saw that film once, thought it bubblegum and not watched it since.
I cannot find a hard copy either US or UK Amazon. Both are kendle.
Yep, I think it's out of print right now
I Going to give My Opinion, Let's Start w the Plan , I'm going to compare it to the Bulge , MG (market garden) Ground Troops 1 One Road of travel I guess the Dutch don't have to many roads Going N-S. Is there not any other roads going N-S ? Now Battle of the Bulge (BB) Germans multi roads push Rt , 3rd Army Patton did He only go up 1 One Road No Multi Roads this is also using the new evidence of your show how quick he counterattack heading west then north ect.
Being a NCO E-7 SFC And in combat till You yourself have been in combat there is that thing called (FOG OF WAR) This is very true even for me. I've seen Officers Freeze, NCO Too. What I mean by this is lack of decision-making... good or bad . OK back to the points...
Only using one thrust one point of entry vs multi points , Yes you could say there was multi points w the airborne yet even you have so called surprise jumps this was during daylight. Everyone knows airborne units is a light infantry unit they can only last so long w/o air and heavy ground support.. armor/artillery .. TIME was / IS the Factor.. there is also the fact "When things go wrong they will" Plan for the worst not the best. Plan objectives take the bridges, Hold the bridges, I guess you forgot about ARTILLERY Hitting the bridges? A US Army M101 artillery piece can hit a target 7 miles away... was that ever considered? Oh that's right Old men and young boys ? Forgetting that the I believe part of the 7th German Army division escaped from the FALAISE POCKET They just disappeared or did they? If Monte or the allies should have remember in the desert was withdrawals then Strong Defense position and or counterattack.... terrain is a lot different from desert to wooded areas, farmland, towns, cities, urban areas... Did they also forget that they had Pattons Fake Army in England to hold a German Group before D Day ? Saying the plan could have worked is hindsight, knowing all the facts NOW . YET YOU WILL NEVER KNOW. Remember Newtown law when every there is a Action there is a Reaction... The same applies to WAR AND CHESS . The overall goal was to get a deep port for Supplies not to go to Berlin was it not? unless you wanted to go down in History of entry of Germany? And by the way Where was Monte? Did he always lead from the back? Oh that's right he was a Corp Commander ..
Now I'm going in a different direction I hear all this of Who to blame ? The PLAN put together to fast w/o Intelligent Reports did Browning just dismiss the reports , Dutch underground? Scout Planes? Landing of 1st AB so far away from Target and not getting full AB division drop then comes the question of supplies not adapting to goal to the objective holding a LZ so far away from Target? 82AB Browning and Gavin at that location why was Browning there? Did he really have to be there remember he saw int.reports 1000 Tanks where did that come from? And if someone knew WHY Did this Plan even go forward ???? AB going against ARMOR Not to good of odds. 101AB not getting to Bridge did anyone think of artillery destruction of bridge before arrival, Also who in there right mind takes the main plans into battle which these plans was used by German High Comand see no one talks about that only that Germans disregarded them or did they ? The way I understand at first they did till a general of German AB reviewed them said they could be legit . Then we come to the one Road assault this one blows my mind you always have a better chance of a spearhead at multi fronts Not a single front its called FLANKING OUT FLANKING your opponent, covering your flank . Even in the Sicily Campaign didn't Monte insist Patton cover his FLANK ? INSTEAD of dropping off at Palermo .. which I believe Monte was right. That's my opinion. See Multi fronts Not a single Front , Now comes the Leadership The plan slapped together with end a few weeks if that , Browning not passing off Intelligent report to higher up , set Goals Bridges, both sides of Road security, Towns of main road security, for a 60 miles route was there even enough men to achieve this and to HOLD ? No matter what there would always be holes in the line . This causing over runs of position supply problems ect .. now comes to the approval of this Plan MONTE, IKE and CHURCHILL . WAS CHURCHILL pressuring Ike cause of the V2 Rockets problem ? Was Ike looking for that deep port of Antwerp? Monte thinking Germans were done they will just give up or I Monte never been defeated overconfidence.... You decide 🤔
So I've asked a lot of questions here . Gave you a few things to consider. As a student of war and history, I hope I didn't offend anyone yet I don't care this is MY OPINION and experience... As always when you are on the ground it always falls to manpower , Intelligence , communications, support, supplies, and goals of the operation plus counter offense.
I'd like to know what, on average, was the opinion of people on market-garden before Cornelius Ryans book
That would be hard to say, because the operation was little known until after the publication of Ryan's classic 1974 book, and the Hollywood film version in 1977 reached an even wider public audience.
The earliest published book I have on MARKET GARDEN is Cornelius Bauer's The Battle Of Arnhem, first published in Dutch as De Slag By Arnhem in 1963 and in English in 1966. The book is based on the 20 years of research into the battle of Arnhem by Dutch Colonel Theodoor Alexander Boeree, a resident of Ede during the battle, and his main conclusion was to refute the 'betrayal myth' that the plans for the operation were betrayed to the Germans by a Dutch double agent, which apparently many believed at the time. The myth served to explain the rapid response to the operation by II.SS-Panzerkorps, but in fact the airborne attack was a complete surprise to German officers with just a couple of exceptions.
The quick response was due to the organisation of 'alarm units' for any emergencies, and the II.SS-Panzerkorps HQ in Doetinchem was connected by a direct phone line to the local Luftwaffe air raid observation station in the town, which in turn was part of a communications net linked to the 3.Jagd-Division control bunker 'DIOGENES' near Deelen airfield. SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich was therefore informed of the airborne landings at Arnhem and Nijmegen by telephone as soon as they were happening and he immediately ordered all alarm units in the Korps to be mobilised within the hour.
One example of how a myth can persist and be replicated by others for many years is a technical error in German author Wilhem Tieke's In The Firestorm Of The Last Years Of The War - II.SS-Panzerkorps with the 9. and 10.SS-Divisions 'Hohenstaufen' and 'Frundsberg' (1975). Tieke was a member of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen', so he writes from a position of some authority, although he made an error in asserting that SS-Sturmbannfürer Erwin Franz Rudolf Röstel's SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 10 was encountered in the MARKET GARDEN corridor around Valkenswaard in the first two days of the operation, and this has been picked up by Robert Kershaw's pioneering work on the German side of the campaign with his book It Never Snows In September (1990). Kershaw goes further and assumes that the four "assault guns" deployed to Nijmegen by 10.SS-Panzer-Division was a detachment from Röstel's unit, but the (quote unquote) "assault guns" give away the fact this is an error and the vehicles were not from an SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung.
Both SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 9 and 10 were equipped with 21 x Jagdpanzer IV/L48 tank destroyers. The abteilung for the Hohenstaufen completed training only in time for the withdrawal from Normandy and lost all but two of its vehicles in France and Germany covering the withdrawal of the division, and the remaining two vehicles were 'alarmed' and in early action at Arnhem. The Frundsberg's unit was detached from the division and sent with all 21 vehicles to 7.Armee in Limburg, where it was operating east of Maastricht in the Valkenburg and Kerkrade areas fighting the US 1st Army advancing on Aachen across the German border. This is probably how the unit's location got Valkenburg conflated with Valkenswaard by Tieke. This myth can be found repeated as gospel in many references until finally put to bed by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts' book Autumn Gale (Herbst Sturm) - Kampfgruppe Chill, schwere Heeres Panzerrjäger-Abteilung 559 and the German recovery in the autumn of 1944 (2013), where the unit responsible for Jagpanthers (1.Kompanie) and StuG IIIGs (2. and 3.Kompanie) in the lower MARKET GARDEN corridor is schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559. A unit previously responsible for stopping 11th Armoured Division's advance across the Albert canal in Antwerp to cut off the Zuid-Beveland peninsula (if you want to get into that debate, this is also the book to consult).
The four StuG IIIG assault guns in Nijmegen did belong to 10.SS-Panzer, but they were a hangover from the formation of the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions as panzergrenadier-divisions until Hitler ordered them converted to panzer-divisions in 1943. The StuG Abteilung was reorganised into the 7. and 8.Kompanie of the new Panzer-Regiments (to make up the numbers in what should be an all-Panzer IV battalion), so the four StuGs at Nijmegen were the last Normandy survivors concentrated in 7./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 under SS-Obersturmführer Franz Riedel. Confusingly, the commander of 3./Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 was also called Franz, Oberleutnant Franz Kopka, who survived the war and consulted by Didden and Swarts for Autumn Gale.
You have to drill down to granular level to get all the dots to join up, and that hasn't really happened until the last 10-12 years in terms of published books.
Just realised I do have an earlier book, Escape From Arnhem by Leo Heaps (1945). Heaps was a CANLOAN officer (Canadian volunteers loaned to the British Army, which was short of officers) and was a bit of an adventurer. After landing on the Normandy beaches on D-Day with the Dorsetshire Regiment, he was evacuated to England with a minor wound and managed to blag his way into getting attached to 1st Parachute Battalion for the Arnhem operation, despite not having jump wings. The CO, Lt Col David Dobie, didn't know what to do with him so gave him a non-job of collecting any German transport he could find and arranged to meet at the bridge, so by accident he avoided getting wiped out with the rest of the battalion. Instead, he made several attempts to get ammunition supplies to the bridge by Jeep or Universal Carrier, all unsuccessful, but did find General Urquhart in western Arnhem. He was involved in the siege of Oosterbeek as part of the 'Lonsdale Force' of 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute, and South Staffords remnants, captured after trying to swim the Rijn, and then escaped from a POW train and evaded to help create the escape lines and organise the Operation Pegasus evacuation as part of Airey Neave's MI-9 organisation. His story is a personal account with a frustrating lack of maps and precise locations and other details, so it doesn't really give a history or view of the operation as such.
@@davemac1197 There is an interview with Frost on youtube from 1977 connected to the release of yhe film. You get the impression that he was quite the celebrity already. There is also footage from 1946 and 1949 alreay from ceremony's in honour of the fallen and ofcourse the Film theyre's is glory. Together this would seem to me that the operation was already mythical early on.
Interview with Brereton, Frost and Roy Urquhart
ua-cam.com/video/iSeTMmkrDuI/v-deo.html
The attack on the Nijmegen before the 2nd lift was forbidden by browning because of the rumour of forces in the. Reichswald
It seems to have been joint between Gavin and Browning from what I've read but the language is a bit open to interpretation
'merican Gavin was in charge, so yor're inferring he had inferior intellect, no local intelligence (the Dutch disagree), no line of command to control his tactical dispersions, lacked balls, a kid promoted beyond his competence, Gavin killed a British Airborne Division fgs.
Typical Jan Kees Holywood version comment. Gavin allowed British Airborne Division to die, I will never forgive him.
Gavins first regiment was the 505. hence maybe the partial bias...
Definitely, and he never warmed to the 508th
TIK has mentioned that it was Browning who ordered Gavin to prioritise defence to an attack from the Reichswald .... Browning had his headquarters with Gavin.
@@johnburns4017 Hi John, you are right about TIK not saying in his podcast that Browning had anything to do with Gavin's decision ... but after the broadcast TIK said he had been shown evidence that Browning did order him to deprioritise the bridge ... I forget if it was a copy of the unit diary or something else which TIK hadn't seen before.
@@bigwoody4704 Its PEDLAR dummy
@@johnburns4017 TIK mentioned this in a short update post on his website to his main post on the battle where he followed the accepted version that it was Gavin's decision to withdraw from the bridge - something Gavin never challenged later. TIK showed the document - I think it was a HQ log or something which clearly stated that Browning wanted/ordered the withdrawal. Perhaps he thought that Nijmegen was the bridge too far - hahaha. If you confirm it I would be interested to know. Regards
@@johnburns4017 thanks for this ... you are clearly an expert and far more knowledgable than I ... I had the impression that TIK had shown in his update the 'smoking gun' of Browning's responsibility for the withdrawal from the bridge ... alas I cannot find that update now because he showed there that newly discovered/noticed document. Regards
Watched this for about the 10th time again yesterday! I'm an American, but I AGREE that Gavin's performance & decisions at Nijmegen are baffling, particularly why he didn't order the entire 508th to capture the hwy bridge on day 1. Capturing and holding the bridges was the #1 priority over the operation and I see Gavin's 82nd plan for that to be almost just as flawed as 1st Airborne's terrible plan to take the Arnhem bridges. However, I think Browning is as much responsible for the failures at Nijmegen as HE was the overall commander of the airborne component of "Market", as well as he and his hq being onsite at Nijmegen. It amazes me that between Browning & Gavin, the hwy bridge was overlooked as the primary day one objective of 82nd, especially because that failure did not at all fit in with Browning's directive to "seize the bridges with THUNDERCLAP surprise" as is oft quoted. Also, why wasn't there a DZ or LZ on the North side of the Nijmegen bridges that would have assured that "thunderclap surprise". Additionally, this latest viewing of this makes me much more questionable on the 101's plan as well. The whole point of "there really was NO "carpet" of airborne" I had never really thought about. 101's DZ's/LZ's should have been much more spread out to cover their area of objective rather than being as concentrated as they were in the Son area. Why wasn't a regiment dropped immediately South of Eindhoven, and another one dropped farther North in the Veghel/Uden area? I've studied this battle since I was 12 years old, have read most of the books, and had never really thought of that point until seeing this video again. Had 101st secured Eindhoven, bridges and area to the South of the city, XXX Corp would not have had to stop at Valkensward on evening of Day 1 and could have pushed right on through Eindhoven to Son bridge and started the repairs that night, thus pushing the whole timetable up couldn't they have?
I do DISAGREE with Polussen's suggestion that the plan was "good", and that it could have succeeded though. Too many variables, too many poor decisions, and the whole thing seemed to be based on the overwhelming desire to "get the airborne into action at any cost" mentality. And of course the total under-estimation of German capabilities and ability to rapidly consolidate defenses as they did. Only way this operation would have worked was if there was hardly any German units in the areas concerned not capable of tenacious defense. The decisions that led to the terrible air plan - drop zones far from primary objectives, no "2nd lift", no coup de main ops, over concerned about flak effects....etc... all reflect a very curious mindset that seems to indicate that Allied commanders were largely discounting the Germans as an effective fighting force and there false assumption that the Allied Airborne Army was just going casually seize all these bridge and that 2nd Army was going to just as casually waltz over the Rhine at Arnhem. Why was there not more emphasis placed on alacrity, speed, and dash on the part of both the airborne and the ground forces? Where was Dempsey? Where was Monty? Would have thought that those commanders would have been much more "hands on", at least have been present, during the battle? Anyway, GREAT WORK! I'm sure this won't be the last time I watch it!
I recommend Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and/or John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012). The answers you're looking for on Nijmegen are in these books, and Nordyke has the backstory on the 508th's CO in Normandy, which is an important element of the story.
RG Poulussen's Little Sense Of Urgency (2014) has the answer to the 101st drop zones - they were originally intended to drop south of Eindhoven as well, but this was nixed by Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) on account of the Flak around Eindhoven, and Taylor refused a drop zone around Uden to link up with the 82nd - so no 'airborne carpet'.
Browning was very quiet during MG it is important to know however that he and Brereton did not see eye-to-eye and he had been threatened by replacement. This may have left him reluctant to criticize his American subordinates.
I’ve always been perplexed as to why radio communication was so poor. I realize it is 1944, and real miniaturization has not taken place. No transistors yet, but there seems to be a complete lax attitude by the generals on radio operations.
PDF Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden
A Bold Move carries risk. For me, the idea that 30 corps would just drive up on a Sunday drive and wave hello and everything's OK, is absolutely ridiculous. Every op was a hopeful fluke but the expectation for 30 corps near impossible, but absolutely critical for victory to be achieved. It only was a bridge too far for XXX corps But that's not their fault.
Great presentation.
XXX Corps did an incredible near 90km in just 42 hours, despite German anti tank ambush, having to build their own bridge, a single lane road, traffic jams and thousands of Dutch civilians celebrating and holding them up. However this was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.
The plan was doomed to fail because of the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. The Germans concluded the biggest mistake made by the enemy was dispersed drops and over a number of days. That's all down to the air commanders.
@@bigwoody4704 Utter horse-shit and post-op. arse -covering. I refer to you the comments of the only "young Guards officer" at the scene. Lt. Peter Carrington of the Grenadier Guards, who commanded the tank troop that crossed the bridge with the specific mission of assisting the US paratroopers in holding it against an expected German counter attack. Their arrival was an enormous relief to the Paratroopers, some of whom actually kissed Carringtons tanks and none of whom, including Reuben Tucker, insisted that he drive straight on to Arnhem. Carrington dismissed the very idea when interviewed after the war (when he was the British Foreign Secretary and a Lord) saying it was a ridiculous idea and military nonsensical in the situation.
MG was beyond repair well before this:
1. 80% of British AB were tied up in Oosterbeck
2. Frost men were dead, injured or no ammo
3. 30 corps was not getting by 2 panzer dv on a single raised highway
4. Airborne/30 corp did their job.
5. British plan was flimsy ignored intel.
re. point 5. FAAA was lead by an American - Brereton. Why do people always say it was a British plan? It was an Allied plan that Ike signed off on.
@@WW2TV Woody, comon now, you know better than that. Brererton and Ike were figureheads. This was Montys baby that was swaddled and fed by Browning. Dont get me wrong though. The gallantry and fighting spirit shown by British and Americans throughout MG were all above and beyond. But to blame Gavin as Poullson does is cheap and lazy. He's an anti American hack whose logic is for shit. The plan was doomed from the start. 30 corps, and its strained supplies, on a single road, was not getting past 2 panzer divs that were going to be reinsforced asap. Hitler was senidng any and all avail units.
Ike was literally commanding the whole lot. He literally signed off on Monty's plan (that wasn't Monty's plan anyway - that was Comet). If Monty is culpable, so is Ike. As for Brereton only being a figurehead, who has say over the Troop Carriers and RAF flights and mission? Exactly, Brereton. With regards Gavin, he himself admitted he made major errors in OMG
The main objective was to get 30k best soldiers sitting in England into the fight. But not too quickly since it was already agreed us/uk would occupy only half of Germany.
You're suggesting that OMG failed because of a pre-arranged deal to let the Russians occupy half of Germany postwar?
Yep, that's absolute bollox
MG 70% success 30k into the fight per Ike Map for Germany partition drawn at tehran nov 43. Don't give the Russians land payed for by allied blood per FDR.
Montgomery had been ordered to find a way of ending the war as soon as possible! Two main reasons; shortage of manpower, the development of game changing weapons like the V2 and the ME262 (development of these was delayed by the bombing campaign, and it is fortunate that it did).
Monty and Patton might not have seen the partition map but Ike had a copy or had seen a copy. Video of US Army Officer who was at Tehran where Stalin accused Churchill of trying to assassinate him. Second he saw a map with strange lines on it which later he realized were the partition lines. Around MG Russians still outside of Warsaw? But winter would slow their advance.
I really like this vid!!! My view is that with the planners ignoring the underground reports about having an SS Panzer group in the area. They could not have known that the Germans sent Field Marshal Model out to take over the area, he stopped a retreat through Arnhem he stopped it and in the next 2-3 days set-up a good defense and sent troops back down the road so more german defenders were there to oppose the Americans and British 30.
If the drops would have happened 4 days before the plan could have been a resounding success.
As for the German SS Panzer's they had not been completely refitted and replenished and were at the time of Model's arrival preparing to pull back I believe. As far as the SS goes it could have been worse if I understand correctly they only had 20-30 fully operational tanks, what if they had had a full compliment of tanks? The British Para's would not have lasted 2 days.
Now this is my opinion based on my understanding of the history I have read.
Now as for Intel Can you point out to me any military command that did not POO-POOed most intel gathered by any groups other than the coast watchers.
You made several points.
1. The underground reports were not ignored at all. Montgomery received reports on 9 September that II.SS-Panzerkorps with 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen', and presumably its sister unit 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', had arrived in the eastern Netherlands to refit, so he immediately realised Operation COMET due to embark in the early hours of 10 September was not strong enough to deal with them, and issued the cancellation order at the last minute.
COMET involved dropping only the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave. Montgomery then proposed an upgraded replacement operation (provisionally called SIXTEEN) to Eisenhower at their scheduled meeting later on 10 September at Brussels airport, by adding the two US Airborne Divisions to seize the bridges between Eindhoven and Nijmegen. This allowed the British division and Polish brigade to concentrate at Arnhem with their superior anti-tank capabilities, where the armoured threat was greatest.
2. Model's Heeresgruppe B Headquarters moved to Oosterbeek just outside Arnhem and was open by 15 September, just two days before MARKET GARDEN. Code intercepts had revealed that the Heeresgruppe B 'FLIVO' (Luftwaffe Liaison officer) was in Oosterbeek (the Luftwaffe codes were easier to break than the army) and the resistance had identified the Hotel Tafelberg in Oosterbeek hosted an army group commander, so Model was known to be in Oosterbeek. The first orders issued to frustrate MARKET GARDEN came from II.SS-Panzerkorps commander Bittrich, not Model, because his HQ in Doetinchem was linked to a Luftwaffe air raid control centre in the town and this was linked to the Luftwaffe 3.Jagd-Division fighter control bunker 'DIOGENES' at Deelen airfield. Bittrich received a phone call from the Luftwaffe network within an hour of the landings starting and had 'alarm units' alerted to move within another hour. He had already issued orders to reconnoitre Arnhem and Nijmegen before Model arrived at his headquarters and approved the moves already made before formally taking control.
3. The two SS panzer divisions were severely degraded in the Normandy battles, losing most of their tanks to anti-tank guns in the British infantry divisions around Caen. SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 had three Panthers at Arnhem, and after the 'Hohenstaufen' had handed over their remaining Mark IVs to the 'Frundsberg', SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 had 16 Mark IV (concentrated in 5./SS-Pz.Rgt.10) and 4 StuG IIIG assault guns (concentrated in 7./SS-Pz.Rgt.10) at Vorden. The 'Frundsberg's Panther battalion was still training in Germany, continually robbed of vehicle deliveries to replace losses in units fighting in Normandy. The battalion would not be operational until the 'Nordwind' counter-offensive in January 1945.
Model was estimated to have less than 100 operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B between Aachen and the North Sea coast - in fact we now know Model's September returns listed 84 operational panzers - facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 and the US 1st Army at Aachen with another 1,500 tanks. Remarkably, 84 is the exact number of anti-tank guns on establishment of British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade combined (52 x 6-pounders and 16 x 17 pounders in 1st Airborne, and 16 x 6-pounders in the Polish Anti-Tank Squadron).
4. The British Airborne Divisions had a larger number of anti-tank guns, while their US counterparts had more field artillery in their establishments. They could hold their own against armoured counter-attacks and the Anti-Tank Batteries were briefed to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, including Panthers and Tigers, so they received 'sanitised' (unit identifications stripped out) intel to expect front line armoured units to intervene. The armoured response actually came mostly from training units or alarm units sent from Germany and took several days to arrive. The Germans were wary of British anti-tank capabilities and avoided tank losses as much as possible. It's a fallacy that a large armoured force would simply roll over a British infantry unit. Some of the British guns in the Arnhem bridge and Oosterbeek perimeters hardly fired any rounds throughout the battle, because German armoured vehicles avoided their firing lines. British units were forced to surrender only when they ran out of small arms ammunition (and PIAT bombs used to go out and 'stalk' vehicles) to fend off infantry attacks, and the Germans ended up capturing unused stocks of AT gun rounds.
Another example - when the bridge force of 1st Parachute Brigade were finally overran, British prisoners were led past "a seemingly endless line of Mark IV tanks" (James Sims in Arnhem Spearhead, 1978), and possibly included the Tiger I tanks of Panzer Kompanie 'Hummel', parked under the trees along a boulevard leading to the bridge, because they were held back until the bridge was cleared before being sent south to stop Montgomery's tanks at Nijmegen.
5. Your final comment on military commands poo-poo'ing intel I don't understand. Much of the Conventional narrative about intelligence regarding MARKET GARDEN is myth, and the main culprit is A Bridge Too Far - the book has errors of ommission and the film is often deliberately misleading to suit the agendas of the filmmakers. The total absence of airborne anti-tank guns in the film was used to convey the false impression that the airborne were helpless against tanks, for example. The intel on Arnhem turned out to be very accurate, even down to the 400 artillery troops in a collection centre at the Wolfheze psychiatric hospital - the reason it was bombed, the 'old men on bicycles and some Hitler Youth' were a local security battalion and SS training battalion known to be based there.
The greatest unknown was the exact location of the 'Frundsberg' division, something the Dutch resistance had not identified, and this unfortunately had a negative affect on the planning at Nijmegen by 82nd Airborne, which ultimately backfired and led to the main compromise of the operation - another aspect completely ommitted by A Bridge Too Far. The city of Nijmegen was evacuated by the Germans after the landings and the highway bridge guarded by just an NCO and seventeen men until later in the evening when Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 (attached to 10.SS-Panzer) got to the bridge first, having been unloaded from rail flat cars at Beekbergen, tracks and guns refitted to make them administratively 'opertional' again, and then travelled all the way down to Nijmegen to conduct its reconnaissance. If the 508th had sent its 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as Gavin instructed, it would have arrived an hour before the SS panzer troops.
1st AB Intel officer
Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart
ua-cam.com/video/dfuJ4W-wqI4/v-deo.html
Was Gavin try to protect his men?
Its what happens when you ignore intelligence.
Former 2nd Ranger Bn with a combat jump into Rio Hato and later time in a certain SMU, I think the British plan on emphasizing Groesbeek heights to the Americans confused it’s focus.
@@johnburns4017 are you sure occupation of Groesbeck heights weren’t Priority 1# of Boy Browning. I would have to look back at there Warning Order to 82nd Airborne and if not no Leaders noticed there DZ on overlays over distant low priority terrain during final back brief seems impossible.
@@johnburns4017 Well put , 90% of your completely accurate post jump actions in my opinion show the diverging focus of the plan as it unfolded. As a paratrooper you need one objective to keep you from expected distractions. Unless the heights were the only safe DZ the initial DZ should have reinforced the mission objective. Pegasus bridge comes to mind and from my first combat jump 1989 into Rio Hato we were briefed not to defend DZ but attack PDF barracks and armored vehicle park with all forces assembled.
You may be right and I appreciate your knowledge but 77 years later we are still trying to work through the Schwerpunkt of Market Garden…cheers
@@johnburns4017 No worries…will double down on research and have my final answer soon…Cheers
So who picked Groesbeek heights for DZ. Did Gavin after he was told to strong point or was it picked for him?
@@johnburns4017 no drama..at home sick in the Wallowa Mountains Of Oregon…I take it you are British.
Things that went wrong: 101st at Zon.
30 Corps at Aalst and no exploitation from Nijmegen Bridge. No night movement.
82nd at Nijmegen.
British Airborne: breakdown of command, communications and control. Low priority for railway bridge.
8 and 12 Corps not providing adequate flank protection.
There’s many many more.
@@rene5600 the Son bridge should have been captured along with the Bridge at Best and Eindhoven should have liberated on September 17th. That was the plan
XXX Corps at Aalst couldn't get any air support to get rid of the German anti tank guns (actually Flak guns used as anti tank guns). German anti tank guns were a nightmare to pass. They stopped/slowed XXX Corps four times, knocking out a considerable number of tanks in total. Soon after kickoff, at Aalst, at the Nijmegen bridge and at Ressen.
@@lyndoncmp5751 both war diaries of the Irish Guards report no losses in tanks or infantry at Aalst, where did you get your info on considerable tank losses?
@@johnburns4017 According to the plan, Lathbury should have had 3 battalions defending Arnhem, not 1 battalion. More troops in Arnhem the longer they hold the objective and prevent Germans going to Elst
@@johnburns4017 more troops in Arnhem as the plan said in a bigger city area, they could have held on regardless of the other delays.
This is Arnhem we talking about,this isn't some artillery battery on the coast or some water plant being attack by special operations team,they were two panzer division and some were veterans of the eastern front so proper planning was needed.
It was actually the reinforcements that came in from Germany in the following days (unknown to allied or Dutch intelligence) that really made the difference.
The 3 airborne divisions should have had enough to deal with what was there, yes with different planning.
The two SS panzer divisions were at less than half strength and didn't have a single available tank between them to muster. They had lost them all in Normandy and didn't receive any new ones until 8 new Panthers arrived in Arnhem on the 20th.
John Burns,
Yes. Kompanie Mielke was the first German armour sent into Arnhem. Late on the 18th.
On the 17th it was 200 km east at Bielefeld Germany. It was sent to Arnhem through the night of 17/18th, arriving there late on the 18th. It had Panzer IIIs and IVs.
@@lyndoncmp5751 this is correct. The only tanks in the area where those of PK244 (the obsolete French B2s that had mostly been converted to flamethrower tanks) and those of the local school of armour, comprising six equally obsolete Pzkw IIIs and two early-generation Pzkw IVs. The only unit within either 9th SS Panzer or 10th SS Panzer was the 9th Recon unit, led by Graebner, that was seconded to 10th SS Panzer. As you already know well (but others may not!), It was this unit that was decimated by Frost's men on Arnhem bridge upon their return from Nijmegen.
The book in my collection titled "German Armor in Arnhem September 1944" by Marcel Zwarts gives a very good insight into what was there and neither 9th SS Panzer nor 10th SS Panzer had any tanks of their own
@@lyndoncmp5751 While contested, some sources suggest there were a whole three Panther's undergoing repairs in Arhem on the day, which were knocked out in the inital fighting.
@@JustMonikaOk
Yes there has never been any confirmed proof of this. After finding out that the "Panzer IV" knocked out by 44th Royal Tank Regiment just outside Nuenen was actually a Stummel (half track with a short 75mm on it) I no longer take allied reports at face value. Only German records. No German records show any Panthers in Arnhem until the 20th and there are no pictures of these 3 Panthers. Odd, if they were taken out. There are pictures of all the other German armour taken out in Arnhem/Oosterbeek/Elst.
Draw acircle around London with the V2s range and you see why they Chosed Arnhem.
Arnhem was the objective for Operation Comet, which was planned for 8th September, the first V2 attack only occurred on the 8th September. So, the decision on Arnhem predated the V2's attacks.
@@johnlucas8479 They had gotten a V2 that landed in Sweden by July. The Paratroopers also had orders to kill V2technichians if they where POWs. So yes, they knew about the V2.
@@johnlucas8479
From The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey, pages 135-136:
_However, it was not to be. On 9 September, _*_Montgomery received a signal from London concerning the landing of the first V2 rockets, with a request to 'report most urgently by what approximate date you can rope off' the area from which they were launched. When Dempsey flew up to see him the next day with his plan for Wesel, Montgomery met him at the door to his caravan with the telegram in his hand and said. 'Let us save England.' That decided the question. I don't think Monty had really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got the telegram'_*
-The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey. Peter Rostron
@@johnlucas8479
From The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey, pages 135-136:
_However, it was not to be. On 9 September, Montgomery received a signal from London concerning the landing of the first V2 rockets, with a request to 'report most urgently by what approximate date you can rope off' the area from which they were launched. When Dempsey flew up to see him the next day with his plan for Wesel, Montgomery met him at the door to his caravan with the telegram in his hand and said. 'Let us save England.' That decided the question. _*_I don't think Monty had really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got the telegram'_*
-The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey. Peter Rostron
So Horrocks was twiddling his thumbs waiting for Gavin to capture the bridge at Nijmegen. You see, I thought Horrocks was very late to arrive at Nijmegen waiting for the engineers to construct a replacement for the bridge that had been blown up on the Son. Oh wait, the 101st should have prevented that.
Horrocks got there barely behind schedule, all credit to those who put the Bailey bridge in, 101st for providing flank security, and XXX Corps for making good progress thereafter. It was really quite impressive but XXX Corps got bogged down in Nijmegen as that wasn't secured itself, let alone the bridge.
Why is the sound quality so bad?
Are you sure it is, 8000 views and no-one else has said so?
RG Poulussen, renowned for copyright infringement by taking Imperial War Museum photos and videos, to make it his own
That situation has been resolved, but in fairness he was here to talk about his book
He got caught out and doubled down, a disingenuous trait is a still a disingenuous trait
Crete vs Arnhem …Hours into no communication General Student had his operations Officer with long range radio to land on a beach west of Maleme airfield to get a situation report vs no attempt from Monty’s command day after day……this is the Operation in a nutshell…
Monty basically took a back seat and handed it over, well specifically Market, to Brereton and co once they kept overruling him.
just like Montgomery
Maybe d.day should have been
Launched in holland and belgium rather than france!
Those Countries were never really given serious consideration for a landing - for a variety of reasons
I’m a little late to this party. I’m not certain the guest is convincing in blaming the failure of the entire operation on Gavin and the 82nd Airborne. Two, maybe 3 things have always bothered me about Operation Market Garden. The first is the brevity of the planning, especially from General Montgomery who was notorious for his methodical some would say ponderous planning. The second is the restriction of XXX Corps to a single in many cases elevated roadway. The success of the entire operation hinged on the rapid advance and relief of the Airborne divisions by this route. It’s not just that it was only a single roadway but that the adjacent terrain was polder country that was too soft to allow deviation of armour off the road and hence prevented any form of maneuver. The third is the medium to long term logistical strategy. At the time of the operation the allies were dependent on supply from Normandy. If Montgomery’s left hook had succeeded were there plans to capture the Scheldt above Antwerp or Rotterdam? The Allied offensive in Autumn of 44 was halted by stretched supply lines. I think I agree with Admiral King that the Scheldt should have been cleared while it was lightly defended in order to establish a closer deep water port. As things played out the eventual clearing of that ground against reinforced German defenders cost too many Canadian and British lives.
@@johnburns4017 I’m aware of your anti American rhetoric just as I am aware of Big Woodie’s Anglophobia. I think your exchanges on this platform do a disservice to the brave men who served in that war, my father among them. I choose not to engage with either of you.
@@johnburns4017 you could also add the fact that the Germans had a full set of the battle plans in their possession; these were removed from the body of a US officer in a Waco glider that was downed near to Student's HQ.
This operation should of never been approved. Montgomery had history of not being a team player, as Patton too. But Patton invaded Germany first and Montgomery was jelous.
Not quite that simple, in that earlier incarnations of the OMG plan had been considered before Patton was in Germany
Nonsense. Eisenhower publicy said he "insisted" on the operation after Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far was published, and the planning for Operation MARKET by US General Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army included the removal of Browning's original glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, planned for Operation COMET.
Browning had advised British 2nd Army that COMET should not go ahead without these glider assaults as part of the plan, but after COMET was cancelled he was unable to protest Brereton's changes for the expanded Operation MARKET because he had already been politically neutralised when his threat to resign over Operation LINNET II would have resulted in Brereton accepting his resignation and replace him with US General Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation.
LINNET II was thankfully cancelled before it could be launched unprepared with no maps available for the troops, but Browning was unable to influence MARKET until his Corps HQ was on the ground in the Netherlands.
This is a bad and biased presentation. Read the 82nd contemporaneous reports of the action, and the orders given to Gavin. This narrative is very unfactual, and contradicts the contemporaneous written record. I do not care that this guy is Dutch. He just chose to ignore the records of the 82nd.
Brereton made decisions to protect the drop and pilots. But it was simply not possible to drop everyone in one lift, nor possible to do two daylight lifts in one day. Plus he did not have the final say if someone senior wanted it different.
Gavin absolutely did not think that the Heights should be the top priority. It was orders, and Browning's emphasis, who dropped with Gavin and was his commanding officer. The 82nd reports in writing right after the battle make this crystal clear. The narrative in this video is false and contradicts the written record.
The Dutch told Gavin's G2 on 9/17 that there had been 3,000 German troops on the Heights who moved out on the morning of the 17th. It's in the 9/17 report. Where they were was unknown. The idea that there were no Germans in the area has always been false.
There were SS Panzer troops at the Nijmegen bridge within hours, having raced there from Arnhem. The 82nd troops (a battalion) entered Nijmegen but could not get to the bridge due to German troops. The bridge itself was protected by blockhouses and several sites for machine guns.
The 82nd was not tasked to rush to the Nijmegen bridge. The troops that did go there on the 17th could not get to the bridge due to German troops.
The Heights were a concern to planners for two reasons. If the Germans have the Heights, they interdict the road and bridge crossing without having to recapture Nijmegen or the bridge. Also, it was known that there were significant forces on the other side of the forest (West Wall troops) - an attack on the salient at the Heights was thought of as a serious risk, and there was serious fighting there. It was why Gavin was instructed that the top priority was the Heights.
The coup de main at Graves was Gavin's idea and not in the original plan. Maybe it was also suggested by someone junior in the 82nd, but Gavin got the change made.
The British 1st never captured the Arnhem bridge - they just blocked one side. Even if the XXXth got there by day 3 (by day 2 as planned was impossible without regard to Nijmegen), it gets blown and the whole thing fails anyway. It is doubtful that they could have dashed across the island to Arnhem anyway, and would have had a very difficult fight. The British 1st failed to capture any bridges, which guaranteed failure.
The Nijmegen bridge would have been blown on the 17th if it was subject to capture.
Market Garden was a bad plan. Blaming the 82nd is bogus.
Have you read RG's book? Because he lists all his sources
@@WW2TV I did. And reviewed a lot of the notes. It misses a lot of primary source documentation and presents theories squarely at odds with that evidence. Some of the footnotes flatly do not support the claim made in the book. Shoddy.
The action reports of the 82nd are available online at various locations (can also be purchased inexpensively). Some are referenced, but many are ignored.
Cornelius Ryan's research archive is also available online at Ohio University, and has a lot of primary source documents. Look at box 100. Folder 03 for daily reports. It hugely contradicts the assertions in the book.
Frost himself wrote that Browning ordered Gavin to give the Heights priority over the Waal bridge.
The Germans would have blown the Waal bridge on Day 1 if it was at risk of capture. They did so as to the RR bridge.
Also, the British 1st took no bridges. There is no reason to believe that XXX would have been able to grab it before it was blown even if they got across the Waal on the 19th instead of the 20th. Frost was only able to block one end, and could do nothing as to the south side.
The idea that the 82nd wrecked the plan is calumny. The British 1st "failed" even more so, and never secured the Arnhem bridge. That wrecked the plan. But the better point is that the plan was bad, period, rather than scapegoating the 82nd. And if we are going to trash the 82nd, you have to excoriate the British 1st as if failed to accomplish anything. Fair play if we are going to blame failure on paratroopers.
To be fair, we've had decades of all the blame being put on the British for OMG. RG's point of view is different, but at the very least raises some questions. He's also not the only historian to question the 82nd, James Holland, John McManus and others have also examined the division's performance
@@WW2TV By the way, my comments are about this author. Your series are great, and have watched and enjoyed several. Just discovered your work.
@@dmbeaster Thanks and we do try and present different views here - see the show with Paul Ham about the atomic bombs as an example
Regardless of who was at fault I've always regarded this operation as what the American military would call a Charlie Foxtrot
I always wonder what would have happened if they had gone for one bridge at a time.
Take the bridge and move up the road, then consolidate.
Then do the next bridge and move up etc
I truly hope the soundtrack improves. The commentator pissing on the whole idea of Market Garden opinions and is not wanting to do it. His determination that the British and the Americans aren't going to change their minds is also a real downer. I have my doubts, I am just here trying to understand the history of Market Garden not ready to blast an opinion.Please fix your subjects soundtrack, it sucks.
Since I'm on a little rant, ,...Coup de Main, you use it some two dozen times at least and don't explain what it means. Not doing so is contemptus mundi, however I was eventually forced to look it up, it all goes to dies irae, and I think credo utitelligam, now that is all clear Im sure. I do like your postings but I just thought I would have a little rant. 😊
Really surprised you had not heard coup de main before. It's one of the most famous and widely used Airborne terms
Another corker of an interview ,Arnhem like you say its been documented a lot since the film A bridge too far ,how I see it is that the film has many inaccurate areas /parts ,so I think in all fairness in simplistic terms is to say that …
it was just to much of a bold venture that was extremely high risk ,but like you say the western allies had to be seen to be doing something so Market garden it was ,and would I be right in saying what could have gone wrong ,did .
Oi, you did a whole show on cancelled airborne ops so you know Monty was under heavy pressure to get 30k into the fight or Bradley and Patton would. The main problem was aircraft had to be assembled and couldn't do log. Troops and aircraft idle in England.
XXX corps screwed up good ole Monty's plan ..case closed
I suppose OBL is still hiding in a cave in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan, because any more recent evidence to the contrary is just a conspiracy theory, right?
The British guy is defending the landings about the fact that one drop per day had worked in the pass but it failed so the argument is done then...
It was a British disaster person over
Err, pardon? Read that back to yourself David