at 1:10 - Plotinus says explicitly that souls don't carry their memories or experiences with them, those vanish after each termination of an embodied life, even saying that if they achieved henosis they would have no recollection of it so I would guess that Identity vanishes with memories, otherwise, what could it consist of? So, I imagine that even though the soul is immortal, it is partial, and we start each life creating a new identity and the one we worked to create is abondoned on the dungheap of the earth when we depart from it at the end of life, each time, to start over again when the partial re-combines with the total and the new partial soul has completely lost all the dirt that might have attached to the gold. I imagine that souls when they re-integrate with the one after death are reborn without anything remaining of the identity, and the id, ego, or whatever you want to call it, is only Earthly clothing.
It’s interesting that the description of Platonic monism sounds exactly like Advaita Vedanta (and modern Hindu philosophy in general). Also Suhrawardi in Islam. Makes me wonder if there are Christian and Jewish versions as well.
Not modern but hindu non dual philosophy is most ancient non dual philosophy with upanishads but devi shuktham in 10th mandala of rig veda is first mention of non dual oness. And even to this day most deepest and clearest non dual teaching are from india, many other religions and philosophy is 17, 18 and 19 th century got influenced by it.
Amazing grasp of neo-platonism from Eric - almost conpletely internalized it seems... however the lacuna is surely in the lack of discussion of the forms themselves and their interelations?... there is a good start made in the Parmenides... why cant we start the process of reconstructing that world (from only the skeleton in that dialogue), since we now have a grasp on the *external* structures of the different levels as presented by Proclus...? E.g what is the relation between the One, the Whole and the Same? And one question for Eric... this neoplatonic principle of there always being a "division point in the middle" - is this really Platonic?... as surely cutting with the joints implies precisely not to just make middle cuts because you can, rather there to be a good reason to... some of the multiplication of entities that results from the principle of these middle cuts are i would say distracting and sophistic...?
The idea that categorical divisions should be drawn as close to the midpoint as possible is recommended by the Stranger in the Sophist, I think that's because Plato did have a belief in the symetry and harmony of nature and of the supernatural- along with the more practical use of building taxonomies which aren't unduly skewed towards any given particular. The Neoplatonic idea of the necessary middle term is that if we have two entities predicated by A+B and C+D respectively, where consective terms are more similar and distant terms less similar, then a third intermediate entity predicated by B+C should be postulated; think of some examples to disprove that if you think that's sophistical.
@@understandingplato1134 ...just to talk generally about the issue. It seems to me that where something is infinitely divisible (like a line) then you can always find the middle between parts of that infinitely divisible thing - e.g. halfway between two points on a line exists another point on the line. The question is: is conceptual space like this or is it often discreet? Plato said somewhere that when we take a thing (e.g a concept) and we should look to unpack it first into a definite number of parts before 'letting it go to infinity' (from Philibus I believe). This definite, discreet set of parts won't have this infinitely divisible property between them (although each internally may well be infinitely divisible). So for example in the first hypostasis (the first deduction of the Parmenides) there are a finite and definite set of Forms under consideration and we don't multiple entities in between them. E.g. we don't look for a Form between the One and the Same, or between the Same and the Like, or between the Like and the Equal. These are 4 distinct Forms and we seek to understand there inter-relationships but not to posit intermediate Forms between them would you agree?
@@socraticsceptic8047 I would think there would be a spectrum between the Same and the Like, and yet that wouldn't undermine our ability to consider the finite number of end points involved, or to consider the unmixed Forms themselves that define the spectrum.
@@understandingplato1134 ... Unfortunately I haven't got time to give this topic the attention it would need to really go into it... and in the Socratic sense I do not claim to know here what 'the answer' is... but a few points are... yes for any physical object there is always a infinite (in theory) possible objects that are more and more similar to it. but that is surely because more and more parts are similar... not because the relation of similarity itself it multiple. I.e if two things have 99 per cent similar parts then it more similar than somethings with 98 percent similar parts, however it is the same relation of similarity surely? I have yet to see how the relation (Form) of similarity itself is multiple and indeed infinitely graduated towards the limiting case of Sameness?..
I don’t think Proclus saw his system as a “multiaspectual monotheism”. The term Theos in Greek was often used to indicate predictive power so when it is applied to The One, it shouldn’t be equivocated with the god of classical theism. The henads are not aspects of something else because they are “all in each”. Olympiodorus stresses this in saying “all the gods are in Zeus zeusically and in Hera heraically - for no god is incomplete.”
Thomas Aquinas read Proclus; classical theism is based on Neoplatonism through Dionysius- I think the One and the God of CT should be equivocated (providing all are aware of the historical facts that differentiate them). I hope I didn't seem to imply that Proclus considered the henads/One framework to be "multiaspect monotheism", he didn't. Olympiodorus told his Christian students in Alexandria that they could consider the Greek gods (henads) aspects of the same God they believed in. That all the henads, or Forms for that matter, interpenetrate doesn't harm a multiaspect monotheist interpretation, it strengthens it, because they are all in all they can all manifest the same totality of the One (not to cataphatically predicate "totality" there).
@@understandingplato1134 Strictly speaking, no predicate of The One is true because is transcends all categories. Unity itself is the precondition for all dialectical oppositions. It neither is nor is one as stated in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. For Aquinas god is pure actuality and can be understood in part at least through analogy. I think these positions really are antithetical. Neoplatonism has more in common with Taoism in this regard than Classical theism.
@@aliensdidit8452 Aquinas and Dionysius both held that no direct (cataphatic) predication of the One is simply true. Aquinas never thought you could predicate pure actuality of the One in a cataphatic sense, his language (intentionally) relies on analogy. If you read Proclus' essays on the Republic he directly states that we do have some kind of knowledge of the One through its analogies in intelligible and sensible natures, and Iamblichus taught that doctrine in De Mysteriis before him.
@@understandingplato1134 Proclus say’s “the One is in fact everywhere present inasmuch as every single thing has been established by the Gods”, I see the Athenian Neoplatonists as articulating a qualified non-dualism which is quite opposed to the creator-creature distinction you find CT. Henosis for Iamblichus and Proclus refers to the purification and integration of the activity of soul with the activity of a given deity through some kind of theophany. I think Christians, by equating the One with the their god, reify the One and thus fundamentally misunderstand Neoplatonism.
@@aliensdidit8452 The creature-creator distinction is very different in CT, the way it treats the God-World relation is one of its inconsistencies. But the Thomistic/Dionysian concept of God Himself, outside of His relation to His creation, is not significantly different from the One, and Olmpiodorus did in fact make the comparison to his students. The CT concept of creation is largely derived from the doctrine of the Demiurge anyway and we should note that Proclus took that creature-Creator distinction very seriously.
1:07:10 to 1:08:22 to 1:10:15 This is very confusing to me. I don't understand what Aarvoll thinks a self is. It seems to me that you are saying that a diamon is an entity separate from a soul (that which is connected to a body)? Whereas, I think Vervaeke explained diamon as one part of a person's dialogical self. And Vervaeke "defines" a self as a something like the collection of your participatory knowledge.
The daemon can be correctly considered either as a higher aspect of your own soul, or a higher soul that guides you, according to Proclus in "On the First Alcibiades". How you look at it depends on your level of self identification, i.e. whether you identify with the super rational aspects of soul or identify with dianoetic reason (how most people identify).
at 1:10 - Plotinus says explicitly that souls don't carry their memories or experiences with them, those vanish after each termination of an embodied life, even saying that if they achieved henosis they would have no recollection of it so I would guess that Identity vanishes with memories, otherwise, what could it consist of? So, I imagine that even though the soul is immortal, it is partial, and we start each life creating a new identity and the one we worked to create is abondoned on the dungheap of the earth when we depart from it at the end of life, each time, to start over again when the partial re-combines with the total and the new partial soul has completely lost all the dirt that might have attached to the gold. I imagine that souls when they re-integrate with the one after death are reborn without anything remaining of the identity, and the id, ego, or whatever you want to call it, is only Earthly clothing.
Yeah it makes sense to me that your incarnated “identity” is just a partial manifestation of your soul, which “contains” all possible incarnations.
Excellent Podcast, subscribed.
Great stuff! Need to be more of this I feel the same way Platonism is due for a major revival!
Mr. Woods you are glistening in this video
I had no idea Plato or rather Platonism was so complicated. T Y
It’s interesting that the description of Platonic monism sounds exactly like Advaita Vedanta (and modern Hindu philosophy in general). Also Suhrawardi in Islam. Makes me wonder if there are Christian and Jewish versions as well.
And Eastern Orthodox Christian theology. Pseudo-Dionysius, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Maximus the Confessor...
Not modern but hindu non dual philosophy is most ancient non dual philosophy with upanishads but devi shuktham in 10th mandala of rig veda is first mention of non dual oness. And even to this day most deepest and clearest non dual teaching are from india, many other religions and philosophy is 17, 18 and 19 th century got influenced by it.
Amazing grasp of neo-platonism from Eric - almost conpletely internalized it seems... however the lacuna is surely in the lack of discussion of the forms themselves and their interelations?... there is a good start made in the Parmenides... why cant we start the process of reconstructing that world (from only the skeleton in that dialogue), since we now have a grasp on the *external* structures of the different levels as presented by Proclus...? E.g what is the relation between the One, the Whole and the Same?
And one question for Eric... this neoplatonic principle of there always being a "division point in the middle" - is this really Platonic?... as surely cutting with the joints implies precisely not to just make middle cuts because you can, rather there to be a good reason to... some of the multiplication of entities that results from the principle of these middle cuts are i would say distracting and sophistic...?
The idea that categorical divisions should be drawn as close to the midpoint as possible is recommended by the Stranger in the Sophist, I think that's because Plato did have a belief in the symetry and harmony of nature and of the supernatural- along with the more practical use of building taxonomies which aren't unduly skewed towards any given particular. The Neoplatonic idea of the necessary middle term is that if we have two entities predicated by A+B and C+D respectively, where consective terms are more similar and distant terms less similar, then a third intermediate entity predicated by B+C should be postulated; think of some examples to disprove that if you think that's sophistical.
@@understandingplato1134 ...just to talk generally about the issue. It seems to me that where something is infinitely divisible (like a line) then you can always find the middle between parts of that infinitely divisible thing - e.g. halfway between two points on a line exists another point on the line.
The question is: is conceptual space like this or is it often discreet? Plato said somewhere that when we take a thing (e.g a concept) and we should look to unpack it first into a definite number of parts before 'letting it go to infinity' (from Philibus I believe). This definite, discreet set of parts won't have this infinitely divisible property between them (although each internally may well be infinitely divisible).
So for example in the first hypostasis (the first deduction of the Parmenides) there are a finite and definite set of Forms under consideration and we don't multiple entities in between them. E.g. we don't look for a Form between the One and the Same, or between the Same and the Like, or between the Like and the Equal. These are 4 distinct Forms and we seek to understand there inter-relationships but not to posit intermediate Forms between them would you agree?
@@socraticsceptic8047 I would think there would be a spectrum between the Same and the Like, and yet that wouldn't undermine our ability to consider the finite number of end points involved, or to consider the unmixed Forms themselves that define the spectrum.
@@understandingplato1134 ... Unfortunately I haven't got time to give this topic the attention it would need to really go into it... and in the Socratic sense I do not claim to know here what 'the answer' is... but a few points are... yes for any physical object there is always a infinite (in theory) possible objects that are more and more similar to it. but that is surely because more and more parts are similar... not because the relation of similarity itself it multiple. I.e if two things have 99 per cent similar parts then it more similar than somethings with 98 percent similar parts, however it is the same relation of similarity surely?
I have yet to see how the relation (Form) of similarity itself is multiple and indeed infinitely graduated towards the limiting case of Sameness?..
I don’t think Proclus saw his system as a “multiaspectual monotheism”. The term Theos in Greek was often used to indicate predictive power so when it is applied to The One, it shouldn’t be equivocated with the god of classical theism. The henads are not aspects of something else because they are “all in each”. Olympiodorus stresses this in saying “all the gods are in Zeus zeusically and in Hera heraically - for no god is incomplete.”
Thomas Aquinas read Proclus; classical theism is based on Neoplatonism through Dionysius- I think the One and the God of CT should be equivocated (providing all are aware of the historical facts that differentiate them). I hope I didn't seem to imply that Proclus considered the henads/One framework to be "multiaspect monotheism", he didn't. Olympiodorus told his Christian students in Alexandria that they could consider the Greek gods (henads) aspects of the same God they believed in. That all the henads, or Forms for that matter, interpenetrate doesn't harm a multiaspect monotheist interpretation, it strengthens it, because they are all in all they can all manifest the same totality of the One (not to cataphatically predicate "totality" there).
@@understandingplato1134 Strictly speaking, no predicate of The One is true because is transcends all categories. Unity itself is the precondition for all dialectical oppositions. It neither is nor is one as stated in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. For Aquinas god is pure actuality and can be understood in part at least through analogy. I think these positions really are antithetical. Neoplatonism has more in common with Taoism in this regard than Classical theism.
@@aliensdidit8452 Aquinas and Dionysius both held that no direct (cataphatic) predication of the One is simply true. Aquinas never thought you could predicate pure actuality of the One in a cataphatic sense, his language (intentionally) relies on analogy. If you read Proclus' essays on the Republic he directly states that we do have some kind of knowledge of the One through its analogies in intelligible and sensible natures, and Iamblichus taught that doctrine in De Mysteriis before him.
@@understandingplato1134 Proclus say’s “the One is in fact everywhere present inasmuch as every single thing has been established by the Gods”, I see the Athenian Neoplatonists as articulating a qualified non-dualism which is quite opposed to the creator-creature distinction you find CT. Henosis for Iamblichus and Proclus refers to the purification and integration of the activity of soul with the activity of a given deity through some kind of theophany. I think Christians, by equating the One with the their god, reify the One and thus fundamentally misunderstand Neoplatonism.
@@aliensdidit8452 The creature-creator distinction is very different in CT, the way it treats the God-World relation is one of its inconsistencies. But the Thomistic/Dionysian concept of God Himself, outside of His relation to His creation, is not significantly different from the One, and Olmpiodorus did in fact make the comparison to his students. The CT concept of creation is largely derived from the doctrine of the Demiurge anyway and we should note that Proclus took that creature-Creator distinction very seriously.
Numbers are reduced formes.
Porphyrian and Plotinian Neoplatonism are the same thing right?
Porphyry brought in more Aristotelianism
Christianity with extra steps.
1:07:10 to 1:08:22 to 1:10:15 This is very confusing to me. I don't understand what Aarvoll thinks a self is. It seems to me that you are saying that a diamon is an entity separate from a soul (that which is connected to a body)? Whereas, I think Vervaeke explained diamon as one part of a person's dialogical self. And Vervaeke "defines" a self as a something like the collection of your participatory knowledge.
The daemon can be correctly considered either as a higher aspect of your own soul, or a higher soul that guides you, according to Proclus in "On the First Alcibiades". How you look at it depends on your level of self identification, i.e. whether you identify with the super rational aspects of soul or identify with dianoetic reason (how most people identify).
alrighty then
Thought this was gonna be a video about 3 lethargic women named Stacey.
You silly billy you
Why not just use Plato as your foundation?
Why move into Plotinus etc who slightly altered Plato’s ideas?