Not on topic but I was the person who bought Language, Truth, and Logic from you, and I have to say now that it arrived today, you're a better artist than I was expecting. Very striking.
Thank goodness the legend is back. The break was short, but I already started feeling lonely. In all my time studying philosophy, I haven't found a better philosophy channel. Thank you for being with us
Had a mind=blown moment in my math studies when I realized that all valid theorems are already embedded in the axioms we use and that proofs are rhetorical devices.
Well, people are still discussing if math is invented or discovered. And the idea of proving things and making discoveries is pretty engrained in how we think about it. I'm not a mathematician by the way so I don't speak for that community.
Right on, this is a really cool way to put it! Proofs as rhetorical devices. This way of thinking should really be emphasized to anyone who writes proofs, as it would certainly help shift the focus to crafting arguments that are easy to follow.
It seems to me that the recurring theme here is a conflation of "conditional proof" with "unconditional proof". There *is* a formal distinction between these two notions, and that distinction seems compatible with all/most the arguments you outlined. A conditional proof can be *converted into* an unconditional proof precisely when the premises are already validly inferred, and the premises are validly inferred precisely when they are already known, and whether they are already known depends on who exactly is carrying out the argument. Put simply, "begging the question" is a formal fallacy described by the obviously invalid inference "P implies P, therefore P". There's a similar fallacy taking the form "Q implies P, therefore P", which is sometimes also called "begging the question" in situations where P and Q are informally considered to be equivalent. These inferences are obviously invalid, in the sense that there are cases where they fail. A conditional proof doesn't establish its conclusion, it only establishes *an implication* from the premises to the conclusion. If someone argues "P implies P, so you should believe P", we'd say this is a clear instance of begging the question.
The argument needing premises that aren't stated isn't uncommon, for example in a public debate, someone could say "Statistics show that implementing this policy has no other effect than killing people, therefore we shouldn't implement this policy". Logically speaking, this argument is a non-sequitur, but nobody will complain about this because the implied premise, "killing people is bad", is less controversial than the conclusion, "we shouldn't implement this policy". When this becomes a problem is when this tactic is used to sneak in controversial premises, like when one of the implied premises begs the question, making it exactly as contested as the conclusion itself.
@@kappasphere I don't think calling them "implied premises" is accurate; this seems to miss the distinction between conditional and unconditional proofs. A proof where the so-called "premises" are valid inferences is simply an unconditional proof. We wouldn't call a proposition a "premise" if it's validly inferred, otherwise we can just say every single proposition in the entire argument is a "premise" and then every argument is trivially valid. In your example, "killing people is bad" is not an implied premise, it's an implied *inference* , and people accept it because it's a valid inference. Question begging arguments are problematic precisely because they make invalid *inferences* at the outset, implied or otherwise. If someone uses an informal argument to convince you of Q, then we should interpret their argument in such a way as to attempt to construct an *unconditional* proof for Q. This means we cannot interpret *any* implied propositions as if they were premises; all implied premises must be interpreted as if they were asserted unconditionally. By contrast, a conditional proof simply fails to be evidence of its conclusion, since a conditional proof can only establish a *logical implication* "P implies Q", where P is the conjunction of the implied premises. This simply isn't an argument for Q, since "P implies Q" simply isn't Q, so this would be an absurd way to interpret their informal argument.
I agree with your assessment. I think the epistemic approach is correct. An argument that is not question-begging is one where a person considers that the premises provide reasons or grounds or justification for accepting the conclusion. But this is dependent upon a person's background beliefs, as you say. One person might reasonably consider an argument to be QB and another not. That is not problematic: it does not make the issue psychological in some arbitrary way. It just reflects the 'flow' of information within a person's belief set. Two people with different belief sets may reason in different directions.
I agree with what you say, but isn't that a description of the psychological-normative analysis, rather than of the epistemic analysis? The latter was described as claiming objectivity, which you seem to be denying
@@kappasphere Yes, I think this is just a matter of terminology. Epistemology is concerned with knowledge, beliefs and justification. So for me 'epistemic' does not imply objectivity. There are people trying to develop formal systems of epistemology. Maybe if that were successful we could speak objectively about knowledge and the justification of beliefs. But I'm doubtful that such a project will succeed.
16:00 maybe this runs into some issue with "if A then B" vs "[not A] or B". I would probably say that if it's the first version, you might be able to say premise 1 is wrong because there's "no connection" in some sense, and if it's the second version then it's like "god exists therefore god exists".
Take the following two arguments (1) London is the capital city of the UK The prime minister lives in london Therefore tomatoes are vegetables (2) Everything you keep in your fridge is a vegetable You keep tomatoes in your fridge Therefore tomatoes are vegetables I’m sure you’d agree the second argument is better than the first. Its conclusions actually has something to do with the premises (even though the premises are false and the first arguments premises are true). The point is you can have a good argument and not accept its premises. The two (although admittedly connected) are not equivalent. Hope this helped :)
Is whether an argument is 'good' an objective property of an argument, or are arguments only good relative to perspectives? What makes a 'good' argument needs clarification, but I can imagine agreeing an argument is a good one even if I'm not personally in a position to know whether the premises are true.
15:45 Is the reason why the truth of conditionals like 'If the moon orbits the Earth, then Socrates is mortal' seem so counter-intuitive, because in ordinary language we tend to shorten "if and only if" to 'if'? I feel like a casual reading of the proposition is telling me that I can take the fact that the Moon orbits the Earth (instead of not doing that) as an indicator that Socrates is mortal. Which I think means I'm reading if as if and only if.
If the criterion of statistical significance (over 95% probability of being relatively knowable) then the premises not merely but strongly support the conclusion. This is why engineers probably (over 95%) are fans of sound inductive arguments (construction of a bridge from steel and not cheese) but not for philosophers given even a 99.9999 is not enough for undoubtable truth. There could be a possible world where (.00000000001) where the moon orbiting the earth entails Socrates is mortal. Though for an engineer applying statistical significance the premises very weakly support the conclusion for if the moon's orbit of earth were for instance a quantum super computer's instance of a constructive simulated Socrates then Socrates is mortal when the moon completes the orbit whereupon a new Socrates emerges again.
Okay, so I have myself used this argument against logical proofs more than once. But, this video pointing out that the argument itself is a logical proof could be a challenge. So, upon further introspection, not all premises are assumptions. Some premises are true by definition. Socrates fits the definition of a man. Sure there is some ambiguity for where the line is drawn between species, but Socrates isn't near the periphery. He's clearly a man. This is why set theory and other mathematical reasoning seem superior to logic. Socrates is an element of the set of all men, by definition. Men are a subset of things that are mortal, by induction. And no one is arguing that Socrates is an immortal anyhow. But, I also like the point that begging the question is not a bad thing. Sure, gaining knowledge requires new information, but 2+2=4 also is just a rearrangement of the premises. The main problem with proofs isn't that they beg the question. The problem is that they can't not beg the question. New results come out of set theory and maths, like the number e and stuff, but a logical proof can't go beyond its premises.
When I think about it, claims "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal" seem to be supported through inductive reasoning and nobody questions them! Truly a superior form of argumentation.
Do deductive arguments really beg the question in the usual sense? Deductive arguments seem to be mostly "If then" statements. If X is true, then Y is true. X is true, then Y is true. Seems to assume X is true, and the conditional statement regarding X and Y, not necessarily that Y is true. Vs when someone usually begs the question in a colloquial argument, they just start with "Y is true".
Look at the simple version of begging the question A, B |= B. The argument is valid whether B is true or false. Now, look at A, B |= C. The argument is valid if B is true but might become invalid if B is false. Let‘s say C only follows if B is true. Then C becomes a witness for B’s truth, i.e. if C then B is true. That does not work in the first case. Begging the question makes an argument less informative and therefore less capable. „God exists“ |= „God exists“ is not fallacious, it is just uninformative and won’t get you any help whatsoever in finding out if God truly exists, kind of like tautologies.
Seems like you're planning a departure. Well, porta semper aperta est as they used to say in ancient Rome. Maybe it's my false impression, whatever it is let me say it's good that you are. Do not make the world sadder than it already is. Hope it is not your last video. It's not easy to find on YT philosophers with likeable personalities :)
Seems to me that you have an overly broad interpretation of what begging the question means. An argument begs the questions if the conclusion follows directly from one of the premises without requiring other premises. In other words, an argument begs the question when it is circular in the following sense: it effectively says A is true because A is true. Most deductive arguments require more than one premise to infer the conclusion. For example a well-formed modus ponens would say: A is true because B is true and 'if B then A' is true. Thus such arguments do not beg the question. If this isn't what begging the question means, then it should mean this (I'm not ashamed of my linguistic prescriptivism) since the way you use it in this video clearly leads to absurdities.
This is certainly my impression of circularity, that it's a relationship between a single premise and the conclusion. Begging the question has always been unclear to me, but I suspected it shared this property. Can you help me understand how you distinguish them? *"an argument begs the question when it is circular in the following sense: it effectively says A is true because A is true."* -- Isn't this just all forms of circularity? (unless we radically change the topic from deductive logic, of course)
@@HeyHeyHarmonicaLuke Circularity, as I understand it, is actually broader than 'A is true because A is true'. For example, coherentism is an example of a more sophisticated and, some would argue, legitimate circularity. Another example of circularity is using reason to show the reliability of reason. I wouldn't necessarily classify those as begging the question. In the context of using deductive logic however, I would say that begging the question and circular reasoning is the same.
I don't really see anything wrong with "1. God exists. 2. Therefore, God exists." argument. From type-theoretic point of view, such an argument can be thought of as a function that takes a valid proof that god exists, and returns a valid proof that god exists, in other words it demonstrates that the type A → A is inhabited, where A is the type of valid proofs that god exists. Clearly, this construction doesn't say anything about whether type A itself is inhabited, that is, it exists regardless of whether there is such a thing as a valid proof that god exists.
Matt Slick has a long argument that God exists, and at the very end is a sub-argument that Alex Malpass showed was equivalent to "1. God exists. 2. Therefore, God exists". Slick and some fans have asked what's wrong with this if it's logically valid. One way I've found to explain how this is a criticism, is that it is redundant and can be snipped off without affecting the argument. 'Before you get to this final sub-argument, you have a plan to establish the truth of your second last conclusion, "Therefore not not God exists". Just stop there, there's no need to say "therefore God exists" again. It's just as useless as padding out the argument into a book, by repeating it a thousand times. "Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists."
P1) all men are mortal P2) Socrates is a man C) So, Socrates is mortal How do you prove all men are mortal? You would need to individually observe all men dying to rule out any imortal man, but if you did that, you would already observe Socrates dying.
Not on topic but I was the person who bought Language, Truth, and Logic from you, and I have to say now that it arrived today, you're a better artist than I was expecting. Very striking.
Same
Huh????
I envy those who got it as a proper book and not a PDF
Where can I buy it? Thanks in advance.
he draws in his books?
Thank goodness the legend is back. The break was short, but I already started feeling lonely. In all my time studying philosophy, I haven't found a better philosophy channel. Thank you for being with us
Thank you for doing these videos Kane. With tons of pop philosophy channels out there, they trade depth for marketability. I appreciate your insight.
Thanks for the kind comment!
when I read Crime and Punishment I pictured you as Raskolnikov
lmfao
lol
Had a mind=blown moment in my math studies when I realized that all valid theorems are already embedded in the axioms we use and that proofs are rhetorical devices.
Is this not the whole point of math?
Well, people are still discussing if math is invented or discovered. And the idea of proving things and making discoveries is pretty engrained in how we think about it. I'm not a mathematician by the way so I don't speak for that community.
Right on, this is a really cool way to put it! Proofs as rhetorical devices. This way of thinking should really be emphasized to anyone who writes proofs, as it would certainly help shift the focus to crafting arguments that are easy to follow.
One of your best videos. I endorse the view that all deductive arguments are question-begging.
Hey Kane, I'm studying cognitive science right now and your lectures on philosophy of mind have been very helpful. Just wanted to say thanks.
video seems to be begging the question on what begging the question is as a question of begging the question but i fw it
It seems to me that the recurring theme here is a conflation of "conditional proof" with "unconditional proof". There *is* a formal distinction between these two notions, and that distinction seems compatible with all/most the arguments you outlined. A conditional proof can be *converted into* an unconditional proof precisely when the premises are already validly inferred, and the premises are validly inferred precisely when they are already known, and whether they are already known depends on who exactly is carrying out the argument.
Put simply, "begging the question" is a formal fallacy described by the obviously invalid inference "P implies P, therefore P". There's a similar fallacy taking the form "Q implies P, therefore P", which is sometimes also called "begging the question" in situations where P and Q are informally considered to be equivalent. These inferences are obviously invalid, in the sense that there are cases where they fail. A conditional proof doesn't establish its conclusion, it only establishes *an implication* from the premises to the conclusion. If someone argues "P implies P, so you should believe P", we'd say this is a clear instance of begging the question.
Its such a pleasure to hear you think out loud.
thanks for these videos bro, i always learn something new
When people beg the question they are not saying ‘if’ a premise is true… they are assuming their premise is true and usually not even stating it.
The argument needing premises that aren't stated isn't uncommon, for example in a public debate, someone could say
"Statistics show that implementing this policy has no other effect than killing people, therefore we shouldn't implement this policy".
Logically speaking, this argument is a non-sequitur, but nobody will complain about this because the implied premise, "killing people is bad", is less controversial than the conclusion, "we shouldn't implement this policy".
When this becomes a problem is when this tactic is used to sneak in controversial premises, like when one of the implied premises begs the question, making it exactly as contested as the conclusion itself.
@@kappasphere I don't think calling them "implied premises" is accurate; this seems to miss the distinction between conditional and unconditional proofs. A proof where the so-called "premises" are valid inferences is simply an unconditional proof. We wouldn't call a proposition a "premise" if it's validly inferred, otherwise we can just say every single proposition in the entire argument is a "premise" and then every argument is trivially valid. In your example, "killing people is bad" is not an implied premise, it's an implied *inference* , and people accept it because it's a valid inference. Question begging arguments are problematic precisely because they make invalid *inferences* at the outset, implied or otherwise.
If someone uses an informal argument to convince you of Q, then we should interpret their argument in such a way as to attempt to construct an *unconditional* proof for Q. This means we cannot interpret *any* implied propositions as if they were premises; all implied premises must be interpreted as if they were asserted unconditionally. By contrast, a conditional proof simply fails to be evidence of its conclusion, since a conditional proof can only establish a *logical implication* "P implies Q", where P is the conjunction of the implied premises. This simply isn't an argument for Q, since "P implies Q" simply isn't Q, so this would be an absurd way to interpret their informal argument.
I agree with your assessment. I think the epistemic approach is correct. An argument that is not question-begging is one where a person considers that the premises provide reasons or grounds or justification for accepting the conclusion. But this is dependent upon a person's background beliefs, as you say. One person might reasonably consider an argument to be QB and another not. That is not problematic: it does not make the issue psychological in some arbitrary way. It just reflects the 'flow' of information within a person's belief set. Two people with different belief sets may reason in different directions.
I agree with what you say, but isn't that a description of the psychological-normative analysis, rather than of the epistemic analysis? The latter was described as claiming objectivity, which you seem to be denying
@@kappasphere Yes, I think this is just a matter of terminology. Epistemology is concerned with knowledge, beliefs and justification. So for me 'epistemic' does not imply objectivity. There are people trying to develop formal systems of epistemology. Maybe if that were successful we could speak objectively about knowledge and the justification of beliefs. But I'm doubtful that such a project will succeed.
Great video Kane, I would'be liked to see you look at Oppy's 'What Derivations Cannot Do' here too
i missed you kane!! awesome video as always :)
Thanks!
Thank you very much!
We missed you mr kane you are my legend
Smith: "Mr. Kanederson....."
16:00 maybe this runs into some issue with "if A then B" vs "[not A] or B". I would probably say that if it's the first version, you might be able to say premise 1 is wrong because there's "no connection" in some sense, and if it's the second version then it's like "god exists therefore god exists".
I understand circularity to occur as a relationship between a single premise and the conclusion. Does begging the question not share this property?
14:53 I am confused how is it a good argument if i reject the first premise?
Take the following two arguments
(1)
London is the capital city of the UK
The prime minister lives in london
Therefore tomatoes are vegetables
(2)
Everything you keep in your fridge is a vegetable
You keep tomatoes in your fridge
Therefore tomatoes are vegetables
I’m sure you’d agree the second argument is better than the first. Its conclusions actually has something to do with the premises (even though the premises are false and the first arguments premises are true). The point is you can have a good argument and not accept its premises. The two (although admittedly connected) are not equivalent.
Hope this helped :)
Is whether an argument is 'good' an objective property of an argument, or are arguments only good relative to perspectives?
What makes a 'good' argument needs clarification, but I can imagine agreeing an argument is a good one even if I'm not personally in a position to know whether the premises are true.
Dr Kane do you think about publishing books ( like courses) ?
Nah it doesn't seem like it would be worth it. Too much work for too little reward.
I’d love those Werner Herzog DVDs. Hopefully they’re still available to buy.
15:45 Is the reason why the truth of conditionals like 'If the moon orbits the Earth, then Socrates is mortal' seem so counter-intuitive, because in ordinary language we tend to shorten "if and only if" to 'if'?
I feel like a casual reading of the proposition is telling me that I can take the fact that the Moon orbits the Earth (instead of not doing that) as an indicator that Socrates is mortal. Which I think means I'm reading if as if and only if.
Great breakdown of the epistemic implications of begging the question
If the criterion of statistical significance (over 95% probability of being relatively knowable) then the premises not merely but strongly support the conclusion. This is why engineers probably (over 95%) are fans of sound inductive arguments (construction of a bridge from steel and not cheese) but not for philosophers given even a 99.9999 is not enough for undoubtable truth. There could be a possible world where (.00000000001) where the moon orbiting the earth entails Socrates is mortal. Though for an engineer applying statistical significance the premises very weakly support the conclusion for if the moon's orbit of earth were for instance a quantum super computer's instance of a constructive simulated Socrates then Socrates is mortal when the moon completes the orbit whereupon a new Socrates emerges again.
Thanks kane, your videos are great at protecting one's psychic integrity while grocery shopping
I also learned to squeeze melons telepathically during the pandemic ;)
Anyone have a new link for the discord channel?
Okay, so I have myself used this argument against logical proofs more than once. But, this video pointing out that the argument itself is a logical proof could be a challenge.
So, upon further introspection, not all premises are assumptions. Some premises are true by definition. Socrates fits the definition of a man. Sure there is some ambiguity for where the line is drawn between species, but Socrates isn't near the periphery. He's clearly a man. This is why set theory and other mathematical reasoning seem superior to logic. Socrates is an element of the set of all men, by definition. Men are a subset of things that are mortal, by induction. And no one is arguing that Socrates is an immortal anyhow.
But, I also like the point that begging the question is not a bad thing. Sure, gaining knowledge requires new information, but 2+2=4 also is just a rearrangement of the premises. The main problem with proofs isn't that they beg the question. The problem is that they can't not beg the question. New results come out of set theory and maths, like the number e and stuff, but a logical proof can't go beyond its premises.
When I think about it, claims "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal" seem to be supported through inductive reasoning and nobody questions them! Truly a superior form of argumentation.
In the worlds where begging the question is just accepted as copacetic, murder trials are far, far easier for the prosecution.
min 10:00 this is why I love this channel
Hi Kane! Is you discord server still active? I tried the link on your channel and it says its expired.
He deleted it a little bit ago
@@jacobyblanke152 Aw really? Do you know why?
Do deductive arguments really beg the question in the usual sense?
Deductive arguments seem to be mostly "If then" statements. If X is true, then Y is true. X is true, then Y is true. Seems to assume X is true, and the conditional statement regarding X and Y, not necessarily that Y is true.
Vs when someone usually begs the question in a colloquial argument, they just start with "Y is true".
Look at the simple version of begging the question A, B |= B. The argument is valid whether B is true or false. Now, look at A, B |= C. The argument is valid if B is true but might become invalid if B is false. Let‘s say C only follows if B is true. Then C becomes a witness for B’s truth, i.e. if C then B is true. That does not work in the first case. Begging the question makes an argument less informative and therefore less capable. „God exists“ |= „God exists“ is not fallacious, it is just uninformative and won’t get you any help whatsoever in finding out if God truly exists, kind of like tautologies.
You actually need to merely politely inquire the question.
I have to say I much prefer you just selling your stuff to the overproduced 'and now Nord vpn' type moments lol
If entailments exist then deductive arguments beg the question
Entailments exist
Deductive arguments beg the question
Hey i like the residents too
I love all of these ❤
Can someone send me the secret video link
Iv put a bid in there if I get it I’ll put a comment in the next video
@@RestIsPhilosophywho knows if there will be another video
The Kane B drought is over...isn't it?
Kane isn’t going to kill himself is he?
Probably moving house and downsizing
No
no way you like a silver mount zion!!! do you also listen to godspeed?
@@haniel_ulises I bought those CDs over a decade ago, I'm not really into them anymore. I still like some of Godspeed's stuff.
Seems like you're planning a departure. Well, porta semper aperta est as they used to say in ancient Rome. Maybe it's my false impression, whatever it is let me say it's good that you are. Do not make the world sadder than it already is.
Hope it is not your last video. It's not easy to find on YT philosophers with likeable personalities :)
I'm not going anywhere. The videos will probably be less frequent for the near future though.
@@KaneB I assume we are finally getting the POSSIBLE OBJECTS podcast in their stead.
Seems to me that you have an overly broad interpretation of what begging the question means. An argument begs the questions if the conclusion follows directly from one of the premises without requiring other premises. In other words, an argument begs the question when it is circular in the following sense: it effectively says A is true because A is true. Most deductive arguments require more than one premise to infer the conclusion. For example a well-formed modus ponens would say: A is true because B is true and 'if B then A' is true. Thus such arguments do not beg the question. If this isn't what begging the question means, then it should mean this (I'm not ashamed of my linguistic prescriptivism) since the way you use it in this video clearly leads to absurdities.
This is certainly my impression of circularity, that it's a relationship between a single premise and the conclusion. Begging the question has always been unclear to me, but I suspected it shared this property. Can you help me understand how you distinguish them?
*"an argument begs the question when it is circular in the following sense: it effectively says A is true because A is true."*
-- Isn't this just all forms of circularity? (unless we radically change the topic from deductive logic, of course)
@@HeyHeyHarmonicaLuke Circularity, as I understand it, is actually broader than 'A is true because A is true'. For example, coherentism is an example of a more sophisticated and, some would argue, legitimate circularity. Another example of circularity is using reason to show the reliability of reason. I wouldn't necessarily classify those as begging the question. In the context of using deductive logic however, I would say that begging the question and circular reasoning is the same.
I think your desription is missing a word
Thanks for drawing my attention to that!
I don't really see anything wrong with "1. God exists. 2. Therefore, God exists." argument. From type-theoretic point of view, such an argument can be thought of as a function that takes a valid proof that god exists, and returns a valid proof that god exists, in other words it demonstrates that the type A → A is inhabited, where A is the type of valid proofs that god exists. Clearly, this construction doesn't say anything about whether type A itself is inhabited, that is, it exists regardless of whether there is such a thing as a valid proof that god exists.
Matt Slick has a long argument that God exists, and at the very end is a sub-argument that Alex Malpass showed was equivalent to "1. God exists. 2. Therefore, God exists". Slick and some fans have asked what's wrong with this if it's logically valid. One way I've found to explain how this is a criticism, is that it is redundant and can be snipped off without affecting the argument.
'Before you get to this final sub-argument, you have a plan to establish the truth of your second last conclusion, "Therefore not not God exists". Just stop there, there's no need to say "therefore God exists" again. It's just as useless as padding out the argument into a book, by repeating it a thousand times. "Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists. Therefore God exists."
14:50
I think you're begging the question by making this video 🙃
16:10
P1) all men are mortal
P2) Socrates is a man
C) So, Socrates is mortal
How do you prove all men are mortal? You would need to individually observe all men dying to rule out any imortal man, but if you did that, you would already observe Socrates dying.
It’s a model argument, if you knew all the premises were true then the conclusion would follow
We also don't know that Socrates is a human, he could be a demi-god.
Love fallacies.