Gregory T. Doolan: is ‘the Good’ the highest name of God? Aquinas, Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius

Gregory T. Doolan presented "Aquinas on ‘The Good’ as the Principal Name of God: An Aristotelian Reading of Dionysius" for the Inaugural 2022 Dionysius Circle Symposium. See dionysiuscircle.org/home and philosophy.catholic.edu/facul....
Here is the abstract for Doolan's talk:
ABSTRACT: Considering the divine names, Aquinas notably holds that the most proper one for God is ‘He Who Is’. Yet on at least one occasion (ST I.13.11 ad 2), he explicitly acknowledges that, in a certain respect, ‘The Good’ should be seen as the principal name of God (principale nomen dei). Aquinas makes this observation in considering an assertion by Dionysius from On the Divine Names (c. 3) that “the name of ‘Good’ is manifestive of all of the processions of God”. Citing this text, an objector in the Summa theologiae contends that ‘The Good’ must thus be God’s proper name, and not ‘He Who Is’. It is in his reply to this objection that Aquinas acknowledges ‘The Good’ as God’s principal name, but not simply speaking, he clarifies; rather, Aquinas explains, it is principal inasmuch as God is considered as a cause rather than as he is in himself. In this paper, I will examine Aquinas's brief observation from the Summa theologiae by turning to his Commentary on the Divine Names where he offers a more detailed analysis of the aforementioned quotation from Dionysius. As I will show, Aquinas’s interpretation of the Areopagite on this point is informed by a distinctly Aristotelian analysis of causality as it pertains to God’s role as the cause of his created processions.

[@cultofmodernism8477]

How does Dr. Doolan define the term "mode?" Is it one of the categories? If so, how can God have these varying 'modes?'

[@gregoryt.doolan2766]

Thanks for watching and thanks for your question! I appreciate your raising this question because clarifying what Aquinas means by the term ‘mode’ (modus) is important to bring out.
Most generally taken, a mode is a ‘way’ or ‘manner’. But this description alone is rather vague. In fact, Aquinas uses the term as a technical term of art, and in combination with other terms (like ‘signification’, ‘understanding’, and ‘existing’) he derives further technical terms. These combinations shouldn’t be viewed as vague descriptors.
For Aquinas, ‘mode’ is not a categorial term (such as ‘human’ or ‘white’). Neither does it name a transcendental perfection (like ‘good’). Instead, it identifies a determination of something. Citing Augustine, he says the following: "Mode, as Augustine says in Super Gen. ad litteram, is what measure preestablishes, and therefore it means a certain detemrination according to some measure.” (Summa theologiae I-II, q. 49, a. 2).
Aquinas’s position is that everything exists in a certain determinate way (has a mode of existence). Our knowledge of these things is also determinate (i.e. according to a mode), and as a result we signify things with words in a determinate way (namely, according to a mode of signification). This is what I was indicating in my talk.
Aquinas’s position is that even God has a mode of existence. More precisely, his “determination” is in fact his indeterminateness in accord with his infinite and simple nature. So, here the language of determination is, I think, a concession to the limits of our knowledge and language. This is in accord with the via negativa: his determinate manner of existing his his infinite (not finite). And that is unique to God.
What I attempted to bring out in my talk is that we have no positive knowledge of God’s essence, so we do not have an understanding of his mode of existence. So, in our very language we are required semantically to negate the determining aspects of our modes of signification. So, in contrast to the concern you raise about how Aquinas thinks these varying modes of our signification can belong to God, what I was attempting to bring out is Aquinas’s position that in fact none of the modes of our signification belong to him: both abstract and concrete modes need to be denied of him. The reason is that these modes are taken from our mode of understanding, which follows from our knowledge of sensible things. These things are composite (unlike God who is simple) and their forms are not subsistent (unlike God, who is subsistent as a simple “form”).