Also with regards to the “intellectual baggage (all the distinctions like essence and existence, hylemorphism, etc.) you acuse thomism of, for us it’s not baggage, we take it to be necessary for shedding light over common experience. We’d argue that without these distinctions some aspect of reality would remain unintelligible. And as you’d know Thomists are not fans of brute facts. They are committed to reality being fully intelligible. So I think the thomist would argue that having brute facts in one’s ontology is way more of baggage than classical metaphysical concepts that shed light on common experience and highlight the its intelligibility. On another note, thanks for hosting this discussions, though I may disagree I appreciate being able to hear one of todays greatest philosophers of religion offering criticism.
No you see you’re mistaken, no one made an argument about brute facts, the argument just appeared out of nowhere without a cause lol. But yeah brute facts are totally ad hoc and what happens when you just throw out metaphysics
Thomists (or at least the ones I've read) also agree that there are no non-existent things. The view that Dr. Oppy described about positing that non-existing things have some sort of being is a position of the Latin Avicena that Thomas explicitly rejects. So there's no disagreement there. There are no non-existent things because their existence is the very condition of their being there. What the Thomist does posit is that if everything that exists, existed in virtue of what it is (as I understand Dr. Oppy to he saying) then there would be no multiplicity and we would end up being just like Parmenides, there is just the One. That's what Thomas argues in de ente et essentia. That if something has being essentially, then it cannot ve subject to multiplication. Things in our experience are subject to multiplication, therefore in them essence and existence are really distinct. I know the Thomistic Corpus is vast, but this distinction is not one Thomists simply assume, but give arguments for.
Only really just come across Oppy, good to know we have some great thinkers/ philosophers here in Australia. I don't personally tend to side with naturalism or materialism but I appreciate this guys skeptism and intelligence..
What a wonderful discussion! Please do more! Here's an interesting question that I would want to ask Graham: _How would one _*_know_*_ (i.e. in an epistemic sense) when one was in the presence of, or had discovered, a brute necessity _*_or_*_ a brute contingency?_ In other words, what *epistemic criteria* can be brought to bear on the question 'Is x necessary or is x brutely contingent?' Do we just have modal intuitions? Are we within our epistemic rights to utilize *conceivability* as a _prima facie_ guide? Or is there some other source of justification or warrant?
From hearing him talk, it seems as if he's choosing what to make necessary based on something like abduction. Just, whether the theory that uses that thing as the necessary component has more intellectual and explanatory virtues than other theories that use other necessary components.
On the 'Imperfection Argument' for Atheism, the Philosopher *Nicholas Everitt* has written at least two papers on this argument (i) *' Why Only Perfection is Good Enough'* and (ii) *'The Argument from Imperfection: A Novel Argument for the Non-existence of God.'* You should be able to get them both online.
I don't really see why people say that. Whenever someone takes an action, it's their particular brain that transformed that history and set of inputs into that particular action. The inputs themsleves didn't have the action embedded in them by the intentionality of any of the other agents, and most of the process that turns the inputs into actions (the part that has the largest effect) happens within the person's brain. Moreover, if another person had been in their place, they wouldn't have taken the same action because their brains are different. Hence when someone takes an action, it's still them taking the action, and they're still at fault because they're the most important and intentional factor in what made things turn out that way.
@@alexisdumas84 they didn't have a choice though. The person who murders someone does so necessarily. By pointing out that someone else in their place would not have taken the same action is undercutting your own position, because it is the person's nature (choice is absent) that is responsible for their taking the action which they cannot change. And the nature of something is intrinsic, strictly incorrigible.
Yes thats definitely correct, in his book Arguing About Gods, Oppy makes constant references to Quine regarding the epistemology of rationality and departure from perfect rationality. He even states "perhaps this view sound Neo-Quine".
Interesting and wide ranging discussion. I didn't follow the part on needing God PLUS electrons PLUS cats (or whatever) to get the world going. I'd be grateful for some elaboration, or a pointer to where I could read a little more about it.
How is on Leibniz' view only one possible world? There are many, but one is the best. For him God is not a part of the possible world, but even if you look at it from a modern perspective where He is, still there is a possible world where only God exists, so there are at least two possible worlds.
Where you go wrong is that Leibniz thinks the actual world is the best possible world, and that God, as a perfect being, must actualize the best possible world. This implies that the actual world is necesssary, since it is necessarily actualized by a necessary being. God cannot actualize a world in which he exists alone since that is not the best possible world.
@@FruitGod then the very frase "the best possible world" doesn't make sense, since if only one possible world exists, it can't be called 'best', because that's a relational property. I think that if Leibniz had contemporary terminology, he'd say that there are many possible worlds, but only one feasible world. I agree that this gets into the necessitarian issue, but am still unsure as to what is the correct interpretation of Leibniz. For example, in his letters to Arnauld, he describes mulitply notions of Adams as different free decisions of God's, etc.
@@orelazarevic2796 There need not be more than one thing in a class for that class to contain a best thing. As long as value can be properly ascribed to the thing, let's say X, then X can be the best, even if X is the only item of the reference class. For example, you might ask someone which is the best house they own, and even if that person only owns one house, he can properly respond: "This is the best house I own." Anyway, all that is beside the point, because even if there are other possible worlds, God must actualize the best and therefore it is necessary that the best possible world be actualized. So, yes, Leibniz' Best Possible World Theodicy commits him to necessitarianism.
Still not sure why you people discuss "god" as if it's something real. It's merely a hypothesis. And a stupid one a that. Same goes for fantasy concepts such as omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness. Not seeing how this advances our understanding of reality at all.
This is my favorite interview w Oppy so far! Well done
First. Nice having Graham Oppy on.
There are actually some naturalistic hypothesis about before plank time. Penrose discussed his CCC theorem with Craig IIRC.
When he walked of to find the paper I got ‘doc brown explaining things to Marty’ vibes
Also with regards to the “intellectual baggage (all the distinctions like essence and existence, hylemorphism, etc.) you acuse thomism of, for us it’s not baggage, we take it to be necessary for shedding light over common experience. We’d argue that without these distinctions some aspect of reality would remain unintelligible. And as you’d know Thomists are not fans of brute facts. They are committed to reality being fully intelligible. So I think the thomist would argue that having brute facts in one’s ontology is way more of baggage than classical metaphysical concepts that shed light on common experience and highlight the its intelligibility. On another note, thanks for hosting this discussions, though I may disagree I appreciate being able to hear one of todays greatest philosophers of religion offering criticism.
No you see you’re mistaken, no one made an argument about brute facts, the argument just appeared out of nowhere without a cause lol. But yeah brute facts are totally ad hoc and what happens when you just throw out metaphysics
This . . . is . . . so . . . COOL!!!
Wow! Super helpful and lucid, especially the parts on the PSR and contingency / necessity / bruteness.
Thomists (or at least the ones I've read) also agree that there are no non-existent things. The view that Dr. Oppy described about positing that non-existing things have some sort of being is a position of the Latin Avicena that Thomas explicitly rejects. So there's no disagreement there. There are no non-existent things because their existence is the very condition of their being there. What the Thomist does posit is that if everything that exists, existed in virtue of what it is (as I understand Dr. Oppy to he saying) then there would be no multiplicity and we would end up being just like Parmenides, there is just the One. That's what Thomas argues in de ente et essentia. That if something has being essentially, then it cannot ve subject to multiplication. Things in our experience are subject to multiplication, therefore in them essence and existence are really distinct. I know the Thomistic Corpus is vast, but this distinction is not one Thomists simply assume, but give arguments for.
Only really just come across Oppy, good to know we have some great thinkers/ philosophers here in Australia. I don't personally tend to side with naturalism or materialism but I appreciate this guys skeptism and intelligence..
What a wonderful discussion! Please do more!
Here's an interesting question that I would want to ask Graham: _How would one _*_know_*_ (i.e. in an epistemic sense) when one was in the presence of, or had discovered, a brute necessity _*_or_*_ a brute contingency?_
In other words, what *epistemic criteria* can be brought to bear on the question 'Is x necessary or is x brutely contingent?'
Do we just have modal intuitions? Are we within our epistemic rights to utilize *conceivability* as a _prima facie_ guide? Or is there some other source of justification or warrant?
From hearing him talk, it seems as if he's choosing what to make necessary based on something like abduction. Just, whether the theory that uses that thing as the necessary component has more intellectual and explanatory virtues than other theories that use other necessary components.
Is Graham Oppy ok? he shakes a lot
I should have taken more phil classes in college, interesting stuff
So when are you going to get Ed Feser on?
On the 'Imperfection Argument' for Atheism, the Philosopher *Nicholas Everitt* has written at least two papers on this argument (i) *' Why Only Perfection is Good Enough'* and (ii) *'The Argument from Imperfection: A Novel Argument for the Non-existence of God.'* You should be able to get them both online.
eronfas101
I wasn’t aware of these! Thanks!
Is that philosopher an atheist??
This is great. I run a channel with a friend called axioms on trial, id love to collaborate some day.
i’d be down that sounds fun!
What a great video
The more I learn, the less I know.
42:30 if there is only one Possible World, and hence everything is necessary, that seems to belie moral responsibility/culpability.
I don't really see why people say that. Whenever someone takes an action, it's their particular brain that transformed that history and set of inputs into that particular action. The inputs themsleves didn't have the action embedded in them by the intentionality of any of the other agents, and most of the process that turns the inputs into actions (the part that has the largest effect) happens within the person's brain. Moreover, if another person had been in their place, they wouldn't have taken the same action because their brains are different. Hence when someone takes an action, it's still them taking the action, and they're still at fault because they're the most important and intentional factor in what made things turn out that way.
@@alexisdumas84 they didn't have a choice though. The person who murders someone does so necessarily. By pointing out that someone else in their place would not have taken the same action is undercutting your own position, because it is the person's nature (choice is absent) that is responsible for their taking the action which they cannot change. And the nature of something is intrinsic, strictly incorrigible.
Oppy seems to be hardcore influenced by Quine, does anyone know if this is accurate?
Yes thats definitely correct, in his book Arguing About Gods, Oppy makes constant references to Quine regarding the epistemology of rationality and departure from perfect rationality. He even states "perhaps this view sound Neo-Quine".
Interesting and wide ranging discussion.
I didn't follow the part on needing God PLUS electrons PLUS cats (or whatever) to get the world going. I'd be grateful for some elaboration, or a pointer to where I could read a little more about it.
Why you remind me of Hayden Christensen
How is on Leibniz' view only one possible world? There are many, but one is the best. For him God is not a part of the possible world, but even if you look at it from a modern perspective where He is, still there is a possible world where only God exists, so there are at least two possible worlds.
Where you go wrong is that Leibniz thinks the actual world is the best possible world, and that God, as a perfect being, must actualize the best possible world. This implies that the actual world is necesssary, since it is necessarily actualized by a necessary being. God cannot actualize a world in which he exists alone since that is not the best possible world.
@@FruitGod then the very frase "the best possible world" doesn't make sense, since if only one possible world exists, it can't be called 'best', because that's a relational property. I think that if Leibniz had contemporary terminology, he'd say that there are many possible worlds, but only one feasible world. I agree that this gets into the necessitarian issue, but am still unsure as to what is the correct interpretation of Leibniz. For example, in his letters to Arnauld, he describes mulitply notions of Adams as different free decisions of God's, etc.
@@orelazarevic2796 There need not be more than one thing in a class for that class to contain a best thing. As long as value can be properly ascribed to the thing, let's say X, then X can be the best, even if X is the only item of the reference class. For example, you might ask someone which is the best house they own, and even if that person only owns one house, he can properly respond: "This is the best house I own."
Anyway, all that is beside the point, because even if there are other possible worlds, God must actualize the best and therefore it is necessary that the best possible world be actualized. So, yes, Leibniz' Best Possible World Theodicy commits him to necessitarianism.
Omegalul
Still not sure why you people discuss "god" as if it's something real. It's merely a hypothesis. And a stupid one a that. Same goes for fantasy concepts such as omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness. Not seeing how this advances our understanding of reality at all.