I actually wondered recently how the German generals later on in World War II must have felt, knowing that the tactics that Hitler was insisting on were completely nuts at that point, but also knowing that they didn't dare say so to his face!
@@joshuadesautels Certain German Officers tried to Assassinate Hitler in 1944...& it almost worked! If it had worked, the War would've ended there, and the German People would've been a lot better off. Near the end of World War Two, ol' scramblebrains (Hitler) had young Children of Pre-Teen ages fighting in the German Ranks! How desperate did a Tyrant like Hitler have to be, to put Children in Uniform, and make them fight a War that was already a lost cause? Look at just how much of a Mass Murderer Hitler already was, by murdering at least 6,000,000 Jewish People...and millions of his own Countrymen and Women, by having them fight a War over wanting to have World Domination, whish was actually his ultimate goal. Hitler will have a huge load of Blood on his hands, when he has to face God, on the day of his judgement!
Lee is right, it's Longstreet that's wrong. If they move now, Vicksburg surrenderes before they can secure a battlefield of their choosing. The whole point of the Pennsylania campaign is a hope that Congress will panic and recall Grant's army to defend the capital. They have to fight now, while that order can come in time to do any good. If Grant comes east but Vicksburg is already in Union hands, theyre doomed anyway. Its' literally now or never. And it was probably already too late. Certainly there was no time for fancy maneuvers. It's fight and win, right now on this battlefield, or your country dies forever. And it may do so anyway, but at least a win might give them one last hope.
You can really see Longstreet's growing frustration in this scene. "It wasn't that close." But still wanted to believe in him the next day, even though he felt it was suicide.
This movie went a long way in rehabilitating Longstreet’s reputation that was damaged due to him being a scallywag during reconstruction. While it is true Longstreet was moody and disagreeable, he was completely right about wanting to have disengaged the army of the Potomac and find more favorable ground. Think he understood the most that they drew the short stick for manpower and resources and it needed to be used sparingly. Orders are orders and a soldier must obey but you can see how justifiably pessimistic he was about action in the third day.
I liked him a lot in 'Last of the Dog Soldiers' as well, but this is definitely one of his Top 5 that's for sure. The one role he WASN'T very good in and I thought he would be was 'Rough Riders'. A poor script there.
@@carlhicksjr8401 Interesting how perceptions differ. I though Rough Riders had one of Berenger's best performances. He evoked Teddy Roosevelt with gusto.
Sorry for the late reply to you, but I'm a historian and Civil War reenactor and I might be able to shed some light on this for you. There are some documents that infer [but do not clearly state outright] that Lee suffered from a recurring illness early in his career. The best guesses are either Yellow Fever or intestinal malaria. Either one of these diseases have symptoms of fevers, chills, and a low energy level. It has been speculated that the abnormally hot summer of 1863 brought about a flare up of the disease and that these symptoms contributed to many of Lee's decisions during the Gettysburg campaign.
You can feel Longstreet's frustration that Lee wasn't taking his suggestions into consideration when they ended there meeting. I hate how the Lost Cause people tried to destroy Longstreet and blame him for Gettysburg.
Longstreet was really good. Lee was, unfortunately, for the sake of all those poor dead and maimed Southerners, just wrong. Hindsight is 20/20, but it may be that he was just too worn out and sick for the job. And a small part of me can't discount the crazy notion that the cancer at the heart of the Confederacy- its reliance on unpaid black labor and cruel "peculiar institution" (DAMNED peculiar!) - was its downfall. Rational people are sometimes loathe to see the hand of Providence; I know that I sometimes feel like an superstitious person when I do.
Lost Cause people hate Longstreet because post-war he really tried to help Reconstruction and was still friends with Ulysses Grant. White folk calling each other "traitor" is always funny.
Almost every victory by the South came as a result of being on the defense and counterattacking. The attacks by Lee Antietam, Gettysburg were disasters. Longstreet understood the defensive advantage.
Yes thats true however at Antietam Lee was on defense because McClellan attacked Lee. The campaign Lee conducted was offensive but he conducted a defensive battle at Antietam, something he should of done again in July 1863. Offensive campaigns with defensive battles like what Longstreet wanted.
@@truthteller9154, the battle was supposed to be defensive. Once Lee knew Meade was coming north, he choose to concentrate at Gettysburg...hoping to win the race to take the town and present Reynold's with an unfavorable meeting battle where Lee's concentrated army could defeat the Union Corps piecemeal as they came up the Emmitsburg and Taneytown Roads. Unfortunately for the plan, Reynolds arrived in Gettysburg first. However, fortunately, Lee was able to defeat the Union Left Wing and had a potential advantage. He was not able to decisively close the battle on the first day... ...but just like at Chancellorsville just weeks earlier, he had the opportunity to crush a Union army and force it to withdraw. So he attacked the flanks of the Union on day 2 (because supply considerations and a mostly favorable tactical context). FYI, Chancellorsville is another battle where Lee did NOT fight defensively.
@@dclark142002 I'm not implying Lee didn't or never won battles when he was on the offensive but calling Antietam a battle where Lee was the attacker is wrong. Aside from Chancellorsville another battle that Lee won on the offensive is at Gaines's Mill.
Longstreet was arguably the most able commander on both sides during the war. He was the rare general who understood both the overall tactical situation as well as understanding the strategic situation during battle. Lee I think gets too much credit. The chances he took while on defense (often by necessity) worked well against his Union opposition early in the war, but often hindered him on the offensive (Antietam, Gettysburg). As for Jackson, he was a brilliant tactical General, but his grasp on strategy was...lacking. His poor performance during Seven Days in particular is notable, given how bagging a much larger portion of McClennan's army could have affected things (assuming Lee still beats Pope, which is probably a safe assumption).
Jackson and Longstreet made a good team because Lee like to use the Hammer and Anvil technique. Longstreet was the Anvil because he was solid in defense, Jackson was the Hammer because he was excellent at maneuvers.@@toryquinton2677
Somewhat disagree. Longstreet was definitely the best general on the Confederate side, the best general in both sides was Grant. It is widely known he had an excellent grasp of the big picture, but I would argue he was tactically brilliant as well. Most people look at his Overland Campaign in 1864 when the U.S. forces under his command suffered horrific casualties. However, his Vicksburg Campaign and his relief of Chattanooga in 1863 saw him at his best. Yes, the most of the commanders he faced in the west sucked (with the exception of Albert Sydney Johnston and Van Dorn) but the point still stands. His Vicksburg Campaign is still studied today by military academies across the world on how to conduct a campaign to cut off a nation from a major river port city. As for 1864, as battered as Grant’s armies were, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia suffered far worse. Couple that with the fact that he pinned the Army of Northern Virginia in around Petersburg and Richmond, while Sherman cut a vast swath of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas, while simultaneously closing Lee’s back door. Meanwhile, P.G.T. Beureguard and Joseph E. Johnston were doing their best to prevent that trap from swinging shut, but despite their efforts, when Lee tried to unite with them, Grant cut him off at Appomattox, forcing his surrender.
They wore wool uniforms in the summer heat and humidity! This must have had a drastic effect on their abilities. Dehydration and heat stroke destroys clear thinking.
I can attest to the sheer fact that those wool uniforms were a blessing in disguise, when after a day in the hot sun, the moment you unbuttoned your uniform coat and took a drink from a canteen, the slightest breeze felt like an arctic wind upon ones chest and relief was had. (a civil war re-enactor i am,lol)
@@Shatamx id like to believe that the outcome could have been different had Stonewall still been around, but The south was never gonna win the War... It was always just a matter of time.. they circled the south and put them under ",seige" tactics.. by doing that and having superior numbers it was always just a matter of time... in my most humble opinion
There was a meeting in Richmond after Chancellorsville on what to do about the Vickburg situation. Joe Johnston wanted Bragg's army to march west and join him in attacking Grant's rear (guarded by Sherman). PGT Beauregard wanted Johnston to join him in SE Tennessee and they would march north into Kentucky and threaten to cross the river into Ohio. Lee proposed getting Longstreet back (after Chickamauga) and invading the north again. Lee's idea was that invading Pennsylvania would convince Washington to order Grant to move his army out of Mississippi and defend the capitol. This sounds ridiculous, but Lee had convinced Jeff Davis and all but one of his cabinet. Such was the faith those men had in Lee. Source: Shelby Foote
At 1:10, Longstreet says "Sir?" after Lee remarks about how close they were. Throughout the movie, there are moments where Longstreet appears not to hear someone at first. In real life, Longstreet was slightly deaf in one ear. Nice subtle attention to detail by the filmmakers.
He definitely let Gen. Stuart have it, when Gen. Stuart, instead of owning up to not following Gen. Lee's specific orders, started making excuses for not following orders, and for even trying to quit the Confederate Army!
I always felt that Longstreet came across as the tactically superior officer, while Lee had the daring and intangibles. They complimented each other very well.
If you read about the Battle of Second Manassas, it was Longstreet's triumph. Jackson's corps was holding off the Federal advance and was hard pressed to hold on to the ground. Longstreet arrived in time and in the right place and threw 60,000 men at the Federal flank, breaking them and scattering their forces.
Be aware that Lee was believed to have had a mild heart attack a week or so earlier and likely was not fully recovered. Lee was probably a better strategist than tactician, and he was used to letting Jackson handle the actual battle, so he was out of practice.
You do know Longstreet finished near the bottom of his class..... he was known to be a pouter we he didn’t get way. The comment about the attacks not being timed properly was a result of Longstreet delaying his attacks until late in the day. Look up Hood’s account of that day and how Longstreet behaved. He believed (and based on previous behavior) Longstreet was proving a point instead of giving his full measure.
I would argue it caused him a loss. Given the situation on the second day, they should've gone with Longstreet's plan (or whoever suggested it in reality) and withdrawn to a better position.
Actually, Lee was forced to attack after 1 July. Longstreet's idea of a tactical level maneuver around the Union left was a dead end. Meade's orders were to protect Washington D.C. and Baltimore. Other than that, he had no obligation to attack the AoNV. Because of the layout of the local road net, the AotP had no problem keeping pace with the AoNV and remaining between it and D.C. Additionally, the road net would have forced the AoNVs supply train to make a wide movement away from the battlefield- in an area in which Lee was operating blind. He had no idea what was five miles beyond either flank. As if that were not enough, Lee was out of time. His army was living off the land and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days, and it hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Lastly, the strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign even got underway. Lee had to attack or abandon the campaign in failure.
Strange how even good Generals can get so fixated about a plan. Longstreet spelled it out to him - It is possible but we've got to do it another way. yet still he went ahead.
It would have been a shit show. Longstreet was given independent command in the fall of 1863 and it was a disaster. Longstreet has a propensity to bicker with fellow generals (like he did with Lee at Gettysburg, or after Seven Pines), he also had a propensity to seek scape goats for his own shortcomings. He ordered unimaginative frontal assault against prepared Union positions... The same Longstreet that gained a reputation for being a defensive minded mastermind, commonly cited with Gettysburg... he wasn't. Given his own command he showed he preferred ill planned frontal assaults and blamed his generals for its failure. He levied charges against subbortanant generals and arrested Gen McClaws. The thing Longstreet did best (as at Gettysburg) was bicker with people. He proved without a doubt that he was not up to independent command and eventually returned to Lee's Army... which is where he belonged. Gen. Lee had as his greatest strength the ability to get the most out of his men. He also was a capable leader able to control the egos of his Generals like Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart. He was able to plan and execute complex battle plans and give his commanders just enough freedom to adjust attacks on the fly. But when unsuccessful he stepped up and took responsibility and put the issue to bed and moved on.... something Longstreet could not do. Longstreet would scheme, scapegoat and bicker with people when he was unsuccessful.
@@eNosArmory Name me one other rebel Corp commander who had as many hard hitting assaults as Longstreet. 2nd Manassas (one of the closest times the rebels came to bagging a U.S. Army), 2nd Day Gettysburg (inflicted more casualties and chewed up the better portion of three AotP corps), Chickamauga (even if the gap didn't open that assault was a sledge hammer and was one of the other three times a rebel army almost bagged an U.S. Army), and his assault at the Wilderness (rolled up Hancock and his men like a blanket and saved Lee's bacon for the time being). While he may not have been the best at independent command, he was by far the best Corp commander the rebels had and Lee thought so as well as he made Longstreet senior to Jackson.
James S I have a question for you my question is if Longstreet was the confederate army at Gettysburg do you think he would have moved to the right and redeploy the confederate army at Gettysburg
My great great grandfather served in the Union Arrmy of the Potomac. but I hate to see a tremendous Soldier like James Longstrret get vilified. The Guy was way ahead militarily in his thinking. North ans South
Longstreet thought like Wellington. All through the Peninsula and on to Belgium Wellington made Napoleon come to him on ground of his choosing. Lee was still fighting the Mexican-American War- attack! Attack! Attack!
A big chunk of the book the movie is based on is taken from Longstreet's account of the battle and up until pretty recently that was the go to account from the Confederate point of view. Historians have been finding that Longstreet's account is rather biased. Hood's account of the battle seems to indicate that Longstreet was purposely moving slow on the 2nd because he didn't believe the plan would work.
@@TheBerylknight Yes, he was. But he was human and as such was as vulnerable to tunnel vision as anyone else. He had tunnel vision at Gettysburg. He's not alone in history, but he had it all the same.
Lee, talking in the actual context of the day. Longstreet, talking thoughts he would not have for decades...that are entirely divorced from the context of the ground and the supply state of the CSA artillery. Look at a map. Read the supply stocks of artillery ammunition. There was not enough to do more than one attack. There is no road structure to support an army moving to the right. That road is in the Federals hands.
@@dclark142002 yes. The confederates could not compete against the North with supplies and reinforcements Since they are in union territory. Also in the matter of production they say where one Confederate cannon is produced, 10 union cannons are produced..and Lee knew this. He knew that waiting it out won't help because every moment they wait, the Union army gets stronger and stronger. So time is not in their hands. Lee wanted to secure a quick Victory before the union could amass a undefeatable army, which is why he invaded the North in the first place. Wanted a fast win and Convince the north to give up.
one of the big things missing from the movie was Wilcox and Wright's Brigades of Anderson's Division nearing the crest of Cemetary Ridge. Wilcox's Brigade steam rolling up through the remnants of the III Corps only being slowed down by half of the 1st Minnesota, while Wright's Brigade made it to the same stone wall just south of the Angle that Armistead reached the next day that was weakened due to all of the reinforcements being moved south. With that context Lee's reaction, from his perspective was mostly correct. From his perspective they did nearly break the Union line and if Posey's Brigade doesn't balk, and joins the assault. More damage could have been done to the Union center especially if Johnson's attack went off as it was supposed to. However as we know today, Lee couldn't see over the hills and most likely didn't know that the VI Corps which was only lightly engaged after a long forced march was on the Round Tops and would have just moved north going down hill and rolled up Anderson's division. Longstreet, in real life at this time would have been pushing more for a strategic withdrawal after the second day instead of a redeploment south between Meade and Washington since doing so would have put the Army of Northern Virginia between two armies that would have grossly outnumbered it Army of the Potomac and defenses around Washington which would have left their fortifications and acted as the hammer to Meade's anvil.
One of the crucial differences between the best of the Confederate commanders and the best of the Union commanders was in who practiced tactics and who practiced strategy. Generals like Lee and Jackson tend to eschue logistics over battlefield maneuver, seeking that one knockout punch that would end the Union. Generals like Sherman and Grant (and for that matter, Meade) however, prioritized the larger picture of operations. Individual battles, to them, were far less important than what that battle mattered in the larger campaign. Further, they understood that the key to victory was through logistics. Often reading the accounts of Confederate leaders, a lot of focus is on trying to break Union lines or beat them from the field, but Union commanders tended to prioritize food, fodder, ammunition, and how to get it to where it needed to be (and to deny it to the enemy). What I like about this scene is that it shows a hint of that disparity. Longstreet is thinking strategically here. It's not worth fighting a battle in this area, where conditions do not favor them, when they could move to a superior location and be better reinforced. Further, his earlier concerns about fighting defensively are slightly echoed here, in the sense that the attacking army almost always take greater casualties than the defending one. Winning the battle at Gettysburg could still cost the Confederates the next battle through losing too many soldiers on victory. Longstreet is thinking about the next battle and the next step beyond this one. Lee, however, is a tactition. He is an excellent tactician, but it means he is so focused on the battle at hand that the furthest ahead he can think is just what the next day will bring (which was very true to life to the actual Robert E. Lee, whose focus of the war was almost entirely regarding Virginia and the Army of Northern Virginia, and resulted in him opposing efforts to reinforce other theaters of war to focus on his own command). It's nice to see that conflict in play here: the strategist wanting to leave the field to try and find a better position even if it looks like defeat, versus the tactician who knows that if he can just find the right weak spot, he can snatch victory out of a hopeless situation.
It's a paradox. The film centers around high ranking generals, the highest ranking generals. Very little of Brigadiers are seen, or Colonels, or Major, Captains, LT's, etc. The real field command is not show here. Instead you get two generals who never stray towards a fight, and it appears that General Lee really has no information on the battle. Yeah, Stuart was absent. However you don't have to have Stuart on hand to scout the field. There 's still horses, and there's still troops who can maneuver elusive enough to find info. Lee was so upset with Stuart and felt stressed. Uhhhh, he's stressed. Brigadier's and lower actually are on the field and can usually see everything. How could Lee feel them breaking when he was in the rear, and really not in a place to lead. They're maybe a mile or two from the front, but they might as well be in another state. The movie acts dorky, slow and lethargic for a reason. It's to prove a point about what the two armies were really combatting. All the action is never on the screen. Instead it's just old guys playing dress and in shock and awe over the sabers they get to carry. The scene where Longstreet briefs his brigadiers on the battle is hilarious. Like they're so serious, yet so simple. Same when Lee's briefs divisional command. Divisional command who again never really stray close to a scrap. Of all Generals, Brigadiers get the closest. Yet, not nearly as close as colonels, majors, captains, LT's. Officers like that. Particularly middle rank officers. The film shows the 2nd day of fighting as centering around Little Round Top and the 20th Maine's stand against Hood's right flank. Well, I would say that this was not even close to the toughest fight on the 2nd day. The fighting around the peace orchard was way worse, or the wheatfield. Culp's Hill is not even named in the movie and is only briefly described by General Trimble. Culp's Hill's had hard fighting. Why does the film center around the extreme right flank? For a reason, and you can see how Chamberlain promotes himself in the years after the war. Chamberlain..... you weren't even close to the worst of it, and you had a pretty easy assignment when compared to the other regions of the battle. Personally I think the fighting around the peach orchard and wheatfield was the toughest struggle of the battle. Lee was obviously not thinking clear. Even if you take the high ground and win a pyric victory like Chickamauga, you still have to lay siege to DC.
@@johnrobinson1762 "... it appears that General Lee really has no information on the battle. Yeah, Stuart was absent. However you don't have to have Stuart on hand to scout the field. There 's still horses, and there's still troops who can maneuver elusive enough to find info." Lee's anger at Stuart was due to Stuart not providing the information he was task to provide before the onset of battle. By this point in the battle, Lee knew what was in front of him. Stuart's failure was that he did not provide early intel and the Army of Northern Virginia stumbled into a fight without knowing what it was facing and Lee had to make decisions blindly. Had Lee known that he was facing 80,000 federal troops perhaps he would have occupied Cemetary Ridge himself at the end of the first day, or perhaps he would have avoided moving into Gettysburg at all and maneuvered his army around the Army of the Potomac to ground of his choosing. Instead, he was pulled into a fight with an enemy of unknown strength because he had no eyes and ears. Having said that, after the first day and after Ewell failed to attack Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill and prevent the Federals from entrenching artillery on them, Lee should have pulled back and followed Longstreet's suggestion. "How could Lee feel them breaking when he was in the rear, and really not in a place to lead. They're maybe a mile or two from the front, but they might as well be in another state." Senior commanders do not lead from the front. Even Napoleon did not lead from the front. On several occasions, Lee admonishes Longstreet for getting too close to the front. Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lts, ect., are expendable, senior commanders are not.
@@johnrobinson1762 " Why does the film center around the extreme right flank? For a reason, and you can see how Chamberlain promotes himself in the years after the war. Chamberlain..... you weren't even close to the worst of it, and you had a pretty easy assignment when compared to the other regions of the battle." Because Chamberlain's actions that day saved the Federal position. Had Chamberlain not acted as he did, the Federal position would have become untenable and the Army of the Potomac would have had to withdraw or be destroyed.
I've been thinking about this for awhile I've come to the following concusions: HIs victory on the first day of battle set the stage for things to come. Lee's primary difficulty was the new hole in his command left by the departure of Jackson. It wasn't that longstreet was wrong in his thinking or that lee was wrong in his. It was because the two commanders thought about strategy and tactics differently, they simply weren't on the same page on July 2nd, and that creates problems. Jackson/Lee did so well together because they were practically of one mind. single-mindedness of purpose at the command level - there is simply no replacement for that on the battlefield. Dick Ewell was also cautious - so you have two cautious commanders at the Corps level trying to impliment lees aggressive strategy. an equation frought with problems. On the other hand you have the Union, Meade being cautious where cautiousness is needed - they are facing confederate commanders that don't have experience being aggressive trying to act as such and seize entrenched positions. Does this mean Lee takes blame? yes and no. Lee was on the verge of victory on the first day. trying to "finish the job" makes sense, albeit with commanders who are less enthusiastic about his aggressive strategy. thus, I think lee can arguably be forgiven somewhat for failures of the second day. His real fault comes with the third day of fighting - "picketts charge." Longstreets waring should have been heeded - Lee was asking for a victory with Fredricksburg in reverse - and Lee knew how it played out for the Union. Lee had enough military experience to know that a mile charge over open ground with a fence blocking his way - was suicidal. At that juncture I think a combination of pride and impatience took over - clouding Lee's otherwise good judgement.
And making a mistake is far from out of the ordinary for generals in that war. Unfortunately for Lee his position did not allow for the recovery from a great mistake. Lee's challenge was that he had a much smaller population to draw from, dramatically less manufacturing, far fewer railroads to move his soldiers, and even in terms of supplies much of the consumable crops were in the Union. He knew that he could now win a long drawn out war and had to force the Union to capitulate sooner rather than later. I think that played into his decisions here.
it is not clear from the literature if ewell could take the hill. supposedly, the federals had artillery there.....that is one version. I'm not sure which version is the truth. I would have disciplined Jeb like lee did but not relieving him or arresting him. the guy was tough, experienced.... he made a mistake. he's human. he also served lee well until he was ultimately killed. to get rid of him would be to rmove an officer impossible to replace. Have to think rationally. And from what I could tell, Jeb never made a mistake like that again until his death. Picketts charge from what I could tell was lees ultimate mistake. He simply overestimated his troops, underestimated his opponent, and his own military training and his experience at Fredericksburg should have been enough to talk him out of such rash action. I do understand the pressure he was under..... but then lees human too.
but then the ultimate question is: okay, we know what lee should not have done, but what should he have done. Perhaps Longstreets flanking march (read Newt Gingriches Gettysburg for the famous answer to the what if scenario if lee took longstreets advice and actually did the flank march) or something else? if so, what is that else.
My Great-great grandfather served in the 8th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He was at Gettysburg, he survived the war but came home with a taste for alcohol that ruled his life til the end of his days.
My six times great grandfather was with the 3rd Alabama and was wounded at Gettysburg. He survived the war too, but came home to his family farm being burned to the ground. He ended up running a general store after the war.
@@Mugdorna He was , from all accounts, a headstrong young man. His family was relatively well-to-do, and he apparently enlisted because his domineering mother forbade him to do so.
My wife's great-great granfather was mortally wounded at Gettysburg; died about a month after the battle in a field hospital in Gettysburg. His regimental commander, Junius Daniel is a distant cousin of mine.
I love this movie for its portrayal of Longstreet. Man could have led the Confederacy into an honorable peace if Lee's cult of personality hadn't led it into ruin.
Yes, I have too. It really was quite moving to think of the 2nd day from that vantage point. You could see how difficult a climb up the hill it was for the Confedrates, and how critical it was for the Union to defend it. Also, the charge by Chamberlain's 20th Maine must have been incredible knowing they were low on ammuntion.
General Lee should have listened to General Longstreet advice. Swung around the Union army, and forced the Union to attack on ground of the Confederates chosen. Lee failed to realize. When his army had not achieved victory on the first day, that he had lost the initiative. He should have disengaged, and redeployed.
Moving Lee's army to the right: Gettysburg was important because 10 roads converged there from all directions, only 2 to the southwest. Taking the Emmitsburg Road in full view of the federals would surrender the advantage of surprise. Taking the Fairfield Road would extend an already lengthy march. Making the shift a cross-country move sounds simple until you recall that there were necessary things like artillery, supply wagons and other vehicles that weren't made for off-road, and through forested terrain, travel. Shifting Ewell's corps would not happen in a single day and might require the entire Army of Northern Virginia to try to disengage and hope Meade wouldn't attack and leaving their wounded behind.
Just for an example, Dick Anderson's division was immediately behind Pender's division on the road July 1. But Allegheny Johnson's division of Ewell's corp moved to Cashtown (per order) rather than Gettysburg and was allowed to pass in front of Anderson. Rather than just move his men, Johnson allowed his whole train to follow. By the time either division reached Gettysburg, it was too dark to utilize them. Now imagine the whole ANV trying to march around the AoP with 40 miles of wagons and 50,000 men. There's no way they could've done it without getting their strung-out units cut to pieces.
If only Lee had studied Wellington's Peninsula Campaign, he would have learned how a small army could tie up a much larger enemy. Alas they all studied Napoleon
The technology of the day outstripped the Napoleonic tactics that these men (senior commanders) had all been trained in. Lined marches against rifled muskets. Artillery with shell, cannister, landmines, repeater rifles. telegraph signaling.
@@anthonylegore1517 Wellington's tactics showed how a much smaller British army kept larger French armies tied up for months, while he marched, counter marched, advanced, retreated and fought the occasional battle. He eventually drove the French out off Spain and followed them into Franch. These are the tactics the Lee should have adopted.
Stuart sure oughta have seen both Generals while approaching them (0:26) with his Cavalry surveillance skills. One of those "I'll pretend I don't see them looking right at me, avert my gaze."
We're never really shown how far apart they are. Stuart is a striking figure on that horse with his aides, but Lee and Longstreet are on the ground and from a distance in the fading light, probably look like two random officers. Also, he was not under the impression that he was in trouble yet, so he had no reason to want to avoid Lee outright.
The whole endeavour was insane. March into foreign territory while being outnumbered where the enemy could resupply much faster than you could. Lee had to feel he needed a knock out punch.
@@Darbokst it was about making the North lose support for the war from the people and Congress. The north could have outlasted them easily. Lee's only chance was to take away their will to fight. Winning a victory on Northern soil so close to Washington had a good chance of achieving that.
Longstreet was never good at being ordered to attack, like Jackson. Longstreet was a defensive - counterattack officer. It was exhibited in his history of the civil war up to that point: 1.) Seven Days - performed very well, much better than Jackson. Did not want to attack Malvern Hill, which they were soundly repulsed. Probably the only time Longstreet did well maneuvering for attacks. 2.) Seven Pines - Probably one of his worst performances of the war. Ordered to attack, took the wrong road and caused massive delays. 3.) Second Manasses - Massive counter attack on the second day wins the battle, cripples Popes army. Was prodded repeatedly by Lee to attack, but waited for the enemy to expend its strength (this was good insight into how he behaved in this battle). 4.) Antietam - Defensive stand against superior numbers. Holds the line and saves the confederate army from certain defeat (largely due to McClellan's cautiousness). 5.) Fredericksburg - Superior defensive stand, inflicts heavy casualties upon the enemy in a resounding victory. 6.) Chickamauga - After being heavily attacked, counter attacks, exploits a hole in the Union lines and routes their army. 7.) Knoxville - In command, but botches the attack and loses to, of all people, Burnside. 8.)The Wilderness - Stops Hancock's successful assault dead. Counter attacks by flanking Hankock, rolling him up like a "wet blanket." Gettysburg did not suit Longstreet's abilities. He was hounded by Lee to attack when not ready and hemmed and hawed throughout the second day. He never wanted to fight at Gettysburg anyway, thought is was pointless to fight there. Longstreet's plan was the most sound one, but unfortunately for Lee, he needed Stonewall at Gettysburg.
shrapnel77 so very true Jackson was the hammer and Longstreet the anvil put them both at Lee's disposal they make a hell of a team in major battles. Take one away and your army is made lesser, and against a materially and numerically superior Army that was something they could not afford.
It's a misconception that Longstreet is a defensive officer, and mind you that a counterattack is still a form of attack so, not defensive. Longstreet, when commanding a substantial force, won more battles attacking then defending (Seven Days and Seven Pines can be removed, since he commanded but a division). Second Manassas was not a counterattack, but an assault launched after a long march. He prepared for a long period of time, performing lengthy reconnaissance before finally launching his entire wing against the flank of the Union Army. At Chickamauga, his forces smashed through the weakly defended Union Center. Longstreet's forces were not part of the heavy fighting to the right of the Confederate Army, so this was not a counterattack in that sense. Finally, the battle of the Wilderness was an assault launched following a lengthy march. He managed to allow AP Hill's 3rd Corps through his lines, and launch an attack which rolled up the Union line. The misconception of his defensiveness comes from his performance at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Petersburg, as in all of those battles he performed superbly, and then of course his failure at Gettysburg. But his failure can mainly be attributed to the fact that Longstreet, for lack of a better word; sulked. Even though he did personally coordinate the attack of Mclaws' Division along the Peach Orchard and the Wheat Field, he did not launch any reconnaissance, which was mainly because he sulked, as he did not agree with the plan. Gettysburg, overall; can be considered Longstreet's worst performance during his time on campaign, as his lack of cautiousness caused the Confederate forces to be surprised heavily by the positioning of the Union III Corps. If you want to learn more about Longstreet's performance, read this fantastic thesis: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a299311.pdf
Benjamin, you're correct about everything except Longstreet's performance on the second day at Gettysburg. Faulty early morning reconnaissance revealed to Lee and Longstreet that there were no Federals on the Round Tops (the movie gets that right). Going with that intel, Lee ordered Longstreet to roll up the perceived Union line that they figured sat along the Emmittsburg Road just north of the Peach Orchard (the movie gets that wrong). Plus, assuming that Lee's engineering officer (who conducted the recon) knew an undetected route to the jump off point for the attack, Longstreet would have seen Sickles' advanced position anyway. Also, Sickles created an easily smashed salient, which is what Longstreet's men did. The Federals had to rush up between 35,000 men to save the III Corps. I'd agree that Longstreet's third day performance was not up to snuff, but much of the second day was not his fault. Finally, Anderson's division was not fully engaged as they should have been.
@@tomdefranco816 Longstreet did not allow Mclaws to launch his own recon of the attack path, this can only be attributed to his sulking as Longstreet had been careful and cautious going into engagements all before that. Lee's plan was poor, but Longstreet performed poorly no getting around it. The attack on the second day wasn't his fault, the Union were bringing in reinforcements from all over their line to hold his Corps, it's just that he performed rather poorly in the attack is all.
Benjamin Lee, McLaws’ recon wouldn’t have mattered. They were ordered by Lee to roll up the perceived line that was thought to be along the Emmittsburg Road (or Cemetery Ridge, they weren’t sure). I don’t think he truly sulked on July 2; July 3rd was another thing. The thing is that he still followed orders. Not only that, but the attack went in with about 20,000 men and the Federals eventually had 50,000 men engaged on their left (40,000 Feds were heavily engaged) and they still inflicted 2,000 more casualties. That was seldom in in the ACW. Finally, so what if he was careful; he was usually successful in the attack. Longstreet wanted to flank the left but was repeatedly rebuffed by Lee.
Longstreet was correct. Had they moved off the battlefield towards Washington, Mead would have had to follow and then the Southern Army could have chosen the best ground for engagement.
Nah the supply situation for the confederates was to dangerous and waiting for the federal to attack a hypothetical strong position in federal territory is to dangerous. Federals would just cut them off from escape and supply south and wipe them out
@@manilajohn0182 Stuart didn't obey the mission , he took the best cavalry and went on silly raids away from the battle site. No shock that the Union cavalry, led by Buford spotted Heth first and managed to both inform the main Army of the Potomac and detain Hill's Corps on the first day. Stuart's job was to feed recon information to Lee and advise on Federal activity in the area, which he did not do. Had he sent word to Lee that Meade's troops were in the vicinity the column would have slowed up and collected itself before taking any action. Instead Heth blundered right into Buford's cavalry and battle ensued
@@SantomPh Lee authorized Stuart's movement, and his instructions to Stuart were to gather both "information and provisions". In doing this, Lee violated the basic military axiom of "one force, one objective". Lee tasked Stuart with gathering information- a task requiring mobility which only cavalry could provide- while at the same time tasking Stuart with gathering provisions- a task which would invariably impede the very mobility required to carry out the first task. Furthermore, Lee didn't order Stuart to simply forage for himself; Lee instructed Stuart to "gather all the supplies that you can for the use of the army". Worse still was the fact that these two objectives coincided in time- so that Stuart's small force could never do both adequately. Yet this is exactly what happened in the campaign. Topping this off was the fact that Lee never told Stuart which of the two was the priority task- information (critical to Lee's plan of campaign)- or provisions (the operational objective of the campaign). What compounded this was the movement of the AotP northward- an action anticipated by neither Lee not Stuart. Stuart's only error was that he wasted some time paroling prisoners. This was the critical mistake of the campaign, and it was made by Lee. His entire plan of campaign hinged on timely and accurate information on the location and strength of the AotP, because he wanted to maneuver so as to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. The resulting lack of information led to the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July- disastrous because it saddled him with a tactical initiative which he had never wanted and all but ruined any chance that the AotP would attack the AoNV.
good news to everyone, the directors cut of gettysburg and gods and generals will finally be released in may. its official and not some bs, the gods and generals version will have everything in it including the famed Antietam scene. the gettysburg one im not sure on but i know it will include the scenes you can see here on youtube.
" the first day was so promising, and the second day came within an inch of doing it, and by this time Lee's blood was up .. and when his blood was up there was no stopping him"... Shelby Foote...
@@StreetFighter2010 A lot of them are Civil War Re-enactors, who supplied their own uniforms, weapons and even cannon ! It saved the producers a huge amount of money.
@@maggiesmith856 That’s why I don’t complain that the soldiers don’t look like “authentic” emaciated malnourished young men. The actors on the battlefield are Civil War enthusiasts.
@@tomdefranco816 yes, but refugeeca is correct. It looks like they wanted to portray both events so put them in the same scene by moving the talk to the same time as Stuart's arrival.
Longstreet never wanted to invade Pennsylvania. I believe after the second day of hard fighting with no important objective attained, the ANV needed to retire back to Virginia. Instead, Lee wrecked one of his best divisions by attacking the Union center the next day.
After the war, Porter Alexander thought that the ANV should hunker down and let the Union attack, which they likely would have on the third day. The pressure was on Meade to get Lee out of the United States, and nobody was better at defending a line than the ANV.
@@indy_go_blue6048 Interesting point. I recall that at Meade's staff meeting the second night, the vote was to remain in position the next day, but if Lee didn't attack then the Union Army would. I was unaware that Colonel Alexander had made that comment.
Had the army of Northern Virginia had prevailed at Gettysburg, it would have been to depleted of men, weapons,ammuniion, horses, food, etc. to have marched on Washington D.C., much less seize that city.
Not wrong. The defensive entrenchments around Washington were nothing to scoff at. The real threat wasn't against Washington itself, but instead forcing Grant to relieve his siege on Vicksburg (which wouldn't have worked given he took the town the next day.) Lee would have found out after about a week or so, then pulled back. Pretty much nothing would have changed either way.
The problem would be leaving a force at ur rear. Never leave a numerically superior force at ur rear especially since they would have to take Washington and immediately start making defense works to stop the federal army pursuing them once they knew they left. They could've lost their rear guard and a very large portion of their army ignoring a larger force at their rear.
Well the initial Union infantry assault was with the Iron Brigade but they didn't specify any particular unit. I would've liked to have seen more battle scenes as well; watching this for the hundredth time, the speechifying gets pretty tedious.
Lee would have been the right general to lead an army that had the resources to fight like the North. Longstreet was the right general to lead a smaller rag tag army that had the resources of the South. Lee was in a demolition derby but he drove his car like he was in the Indy 500.
It took decades for Longstreet to have a statue put up at Gettysburg. He was blamed for what happened at Gettysburg by all those lost-cause people out there who believed Lee was some divine being. Not so by the time of Gettysburg, Lee was in pretty poor health at that point.
I get a chuckle out of those "the winners write the history" people. With the ACW a hell of a lot of its history is written by the losers, that history collectively known as "the Lost Cause."
After the first day, he should have maneuvered. However, his feeling for the morale of his army was very accurate and delicate, and it would have been hard to keep the troops positive under such circumstances. He was rolling the dice against heavy, heavy odds the whole war, and thank the Good Lord he failed, for his cause was not just.
Love how they have been on campaign for a couple years and all thier cloths just looked like they came out the dry cleaners. Not even sweat on thier hats and lovely clean gloves
The Gettysburg campaign began in June....so. While your comment is way off base. You do realize there were new issues of all kinds of things at the commencement of new campaigns right? Hahaha
Mr. Vinegaroon, which would likely not have been an ideal situation altogether. The Europeans would have been happy and could have used the division in the continent to reclaim their colonies.
Very interesting thought. I see it as had there been an independent Confederacy, they would likely have made an alliance with UK, seeking to have the British military help them hold onto their (supposed) country. There would still have been a viable Confederate Army as well, which might have been able to provide strong resistance to any attempts to re-colonize the southern states. I am not sure they would have easily submitted to foreign rule after just having beaten the Yankees.
That way around the right really wasn’t open. Mead had several brigades of Calvary on the flank and the Union corps who arrived later on the 2nd had concentrated there. So it really wasn’t quite was Longstreet and Hood were hoping for. And even if the my pushed through the Calvary, there would have been a lot of time for the Unions forces to organize their defense. It isn’t exactly a 5 minute march around the south.
Confederate Army sorely missed Stonewall Jackson. He had this aptitude for a more mobile warfare which was far ahead of the time. Losing him meant the impetus for victory had grounded to a halt.
It didn't matter if they had of won at Gettysburg. Washington was heavily defended. Lincoln would have never just gave up. And with the loss at Vicksburg at the same time, would have kind of been hollow. Thing is Lee's supply line was so thin, it was never attacked. He would have had to go home
A Union loss at Gettysburg would not have been the tactical blow militarily, so you are correct. The problem would have been politically. Before Gettysburg, Lincoln's popularity as well as the war itself was losing favor in a big way. No matter what happened at Vicksburg, a loss at Gettysburg would have likely cost Lincoln the election and a peace candidate installed in the White House. Lee's supply lines were irrelevant -- he was gunning for a victory that would ensure a political outcome and end the war at that moment. It was a gamble, and he lost.
@@carltonreese4854 the only part I disagree with is the supply lines statement. As a person who spent most of his military career behind enemy lines or going in first. I can tell you this, the first thing I will do is see what you have, like Stuart should have been doing. He should have burned the supplies in place. That said, I will let command know, then I will cut communications, supplies and reinforcements. Like destroying choppers and jets, mostly the fuel. I think Lee was in their heads living rent free. Even Grant said that at the Wilderness I think. That said, I would have circled around and blew up his ordnance, burned any food, killed any horses, I could find. At this time in history, if your horses were gone, so was your commination, transportation etc. Who every I sent, would have been between Lee and VA. Mead should have pushed hard once Lee attacked hard or found out he had no supplies, he would have to retreat. It would have been like a big clap motion. When defending, the math is it takes about 3 to dislodge a defender.
I guess General Longstreet and Hood was talking about little round top the same one that Colonel Chamberlain was defending,to be taking from the right ?
Moving the entire army to the right in front of a entrenched enemy is asinine. Yet nobody really thinks about it. It was a pipe dream. Lee couldn't move the army around to the right and it's miles of supply. He couldn't even retreat at the moment. There was nothing to do but attack
A careful shifting of forces from the Confederate left to their right was doable. The drawback involved was that: 1) Lee was all but out of time by 3 July; 2) there was no logical reason why Meade would have to attack, when all he had to do was to ensure that the AotP remained between the AoNV and Washington D.C., and; 3) the disastrous meeting engagement (for the AoNV) had already made clear that Lee had assumed the tactical as well as the strategic offensive.
Your point is very well taken. Though he was aggressive to a fault. Which when it is only him and the pieces he left of himself on battlefield is one thing, but what he did to his army at Franklin in 64 should have seen his court-martial. Though Davis never would have stood still for that. But your overarching point is correct
iirc (could be im misremembering WHO) he was shot like 3-4 times, lost and arm and a leg, an eventually even had to be afixed to his horse's saddle (what i mean is he continued to fight despite losing several pieces of himself. what a badass). rights and wrongs aside, that is true dedication and bravery in the face of battle.
@@cannedpiss5178 Twice seriously. Shrapnel from an exploding shell mangled his arm at Gettysburg; it was saved but was useless from then on. He was shot in the hip at Chickamauga and his leg was amputated at the thigh (usually a fatal injury); after he recovered he had to be strapped onto his horse. Without researching it further, I'm not sure but I think it was his right arm and left leg.
SMH the confederates really were hit hard on July of 63 they lost Gettysburg and lost Vicksburg it was all over from there and they took severe losses they never recovered from
Allow me to get some input here,if Lee had of broken Meade I don't think Washington would have been his next move because the most fortified city in the world was Washington I think A) Lee would have been so damaged in victory that have that victory on union soil he would simply hold tight and wait for political pressure to come to bear on Lincoln to sue for peace or retire in good order and redeploy in good defensive positions on the Virginia side of the river where he would be well supplied or even wait for foriegn intervention or B) move on and occupy Philadelphia. I Believe that grant taking vicksburg while a blow to the confederacy would not have been the death blow that a Southern victory at Gettysburg would have politically for Lincoln. Thoughts
Next time my wife is nagging me about something, I will say, “I am very glad to see you well. We will speak again in the morning.”
Perfect. But, if your wife is anything like mine..... oh boy. LOL
Steve Stringer that’s easy. Just snap, “There is no time!”
That is a great idea!!!! LOL 😂. Then like the other commenter said if she yells back at you just snap and say “ there is no time!!”
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
@@JohnnyRebKy 😂😂😂😂😂😂
The hardest part of being a soldier, is being a soldier when you know your commander is wrong.
Gen. Lee looked to be very fatigued here. He definitely needed rest...or at least a Snicker's Bar!
I actually wondered recently how the German generals later on in World War II must have felt, knowing that the tactics that Hitler was insisting on were completely nuts at that point, but also knowing that they didn't dare say so to his face!
@@joshuadesautels Certain German Officers tried to Assassinate Hitler in 1944...& it almost worked! If it had worked, the War would've ended there, and the German People would've been a lot better off. Near the end of World War Two, ol' scramblebrains (Hitler) had young Children of Pre-Teen ages fighting in the German Ranks! How desperate did a Tyrant like Hitler have to be, to put Children in Uniform, and make them fight a War that was already a lost cause? Look at just how much of a Mass Murderer Hitler already was, by murdering at least 6,000,000 Jewish People...and millions of his own Countrymen and Women, by having them fight a War over wanting to have World Domination, whish was actually his ultimate goal. Hitler will have a huge load of Blood on his hands, when he has to face God, on the day of his judgement!
Lee is right, it's Longstreet that's wrong. If they move now, Vicksburg surrenderes before they can secure a battlefield of their choosing. The whole point of the Pennsylania campaign is a hope that Congress will panic and recall Grant's army to defend the capital. They have to fight now, while that order can come in time to do any good. If Grant comes east but Vicksburg is already in Union hands, theyre doomed anyway.
Its' literally now or never. And it was probably already too late. Certainly there was no time for fancy maneuvers. It's fight and win, right now on this battlefield, or your country dies forever. And it may do so anyway, but at least a win might give them one last hope.
@@hagamapama shut up vicksburg fell on the morning of the 4th officially but was already doomed at this point. Nothing could have stopped it
My Great Grandfather fell at Gettysburg. He tripped over that monument they have there.
Lol
I salute him.
@@ihatewhitey6689 It's a joke.
Lol
F
You can really see Longstreet's growing frustration in this scene. "It wasn't that close." But still wanted to believe in him the next day, even though he felt it was suicide.
This movie went a long way in rehabilitating Longstreet’s reputation that was damaged due to him being a scallywag during reconstruction. While it is true Longstreet was moody and disagreeable, he was completely right about wanting to have disengaged the army of the Potomac and find more favorable ground. Think he understood the most that they drew the short stick for manpower and resources and it needed to be used sparingly. Orders are orders and a soldier must obey but you can see how justifiably pessimistic he was about action in the third day.
Tom Berenger's best role hands down in my opinion. You could really see Longstreet's frustration and reluctance in this performance.
I liked him a lot in 'Last of the Dog Soldiers' as well, but this is definitely one of his Top 5 that's for sure.
The one role he WASN'T very good in and I thought he would be was 'Rough Riders'. A poor script there.
@@carlhicksjr8401 Interesting how perceptions differ. I though Rough Riders had one of Berenger's best performances. He evoked Teddy Roosevelt with gusto.
He was good here...and believable...but his BEST role was as SFC Barnes in "Platoon"...that was lightning in a bottle...truly fantastic.
I thought most of the principal parts were well cast and well played. Made the movie seem more realistic.
Nice touch hearing "Rock of Ages" as Stuart rides in. It was his favourite hymn and requested it sung around his bed on the night of his death.
I think this is one of Sheen's best scenes in the film. Portrait of a tired, deflated man.
He was playing a guy who in that moment was having a heart attack
Sorry for the late reply to you, but I'm a historian and Civil War reenactor and I might be able to shed some light on this for you.
There are some documents that infer [but do not clearly state outright] that Lee suffered from a recurring illness early in his career. The best guesses are either Yellow Fever or intestinal malaria. Either one of these diseases have symptoms of fevers, chills, and a low energy level. It has been speculated that the abnormally hot summer of 1863 brought about a flare up of the disease and that these symptoms contributed to many of Lee's decisions during the Gettysburg campaign.
Lee isn't deflated in this scene. He still thinks he's gonna win. Which is exactly why he didn't take Longstreet's advice.
You can feel Longstreet's frustration that Lee wasn't taking his suggestions into consideration when they ended there meeting. I hate how the Lost Cause people tried to destroy Longstreet and blame him for Gettysburg.
No doubt. Longstreet was one hell of a soldier. Clearly ahead of his time. This is coming from a Buckeye bred Yankee.
Longstreet was correct. Lee was wrong.
Longstreet was really good. Lee was, unfortunately, for the sake of all those poor dead and maimed Southerners, just wrong. Hindsight is 20/20, but it may be that he was just too worn out and sick for the job. And a small part of me can't discount the crazy notion that the cancer at the heart of the Confederacy- its reliance on unpaid black labor and cruel "peculiar institution" (DAMNED peculiar!) - was its downfall. Rational people are sometimes loathe to see the hand of Providence; I know that I sometimes feel like an superstitious person when I do.
Lost Cause people hate Longstreet because post-war he really tried to help Reconstruction and was still friends with Ulysses Grant. White folk calling each other "traitor" is always funny.
Well yeah. You can feel it because it's the obvious point of the scene.
Almost every victory by the South came as a result of being on the defense and counterattacking. The attacks by Lee Antietam, Gettysburg were disasters. Longstreet understood the defensive advantage.
Longstreet was a student of Wellington's. Lee was a student of Napoleon's.
The attack at Chickamauga was not...
...though it succeeded by accident.
Yes thats true however at Antietam Lee was on defense because McClellan attacked Lee. The campaign Lee conducted was offensive but he conducted a defensive battle at Antietam, something he should of done again in July 1863. Offensive campaigns with defensive battles like what Longstreet wanted.
@@truthteller9154, the battle was supposed to be defensive. Once Lee knew Meade was coming north, he choose to concentrate at Gettysburg...hoping to win the race to take the town and present Reynold's with an unfavorable meeting battle where Lee's concentrated army could defeat the Union Corps piecemeal as they came up the Emmitsburg and Taneytown Roads.
Unfortunately for the plan, Reynolds arrived in Gettysburg first. However, fortunately, Lee was able to defeat the Union Left Wing and had a potential advantage. He was not able to decisively close the battle on the first day...
...but just like at Chancellorsville just weeks earlier, he had the opportunity to crush a Union army and force it to withdraw. So he attacked the flanks of the Union on day 2 (because supply considerations and a mostly favorable tactical context).
FYI, Chancellorsville is another battle where Lee did NOT fight defensively.
@@dclark142002 I'm not implying Lee didn't or never won battles when he was on the offensive but calling Antietam a battle where Lee was the attacker is wrong. Aside from Chancellorsville another battle that Lee won on the offensive is at Gaines's Mill.
Longstreet was arguably the most able commander on both sides during the war. He was the rare general who understood both the overall tactical situation as well as understanding the strategic situation during battle.
Lee I think gets too much credit. The chances he took while on defense (often by necessity) worked well against his Union opposition early in the war, but often hindered him on the offensive (Antietam, Gettysburg).
As for Jackson, he was a brilliant tactical General, but his grasp on strategy was...lacking. His poor performance during Seven Days in particular is notable, given how bagging a much larger portion of McClennan's army could have affected things (assuming Lee still beats Pope, which is probably a safe assumption).
Jackson and Longstreet made a good team because Lee like to use the Hammer and Anvil technique. Longstreet was the Anvil because he was solid in defense, Jackson was the Hammer because he was excellent at maneuvers.@@toryquinton2677
Somewhat disagree. Longstreet was definitely the best general on the Confederate side, the best general in both sides was Grant. It is widely known he had an excellent grasp of the big picture, but I would argue he was tactically brilliant as well. Most people look at his Overland Campaign in 1864 when the U.S. forces under his command suffered horrific casualties.
However, his Vicksburg Campaign and his relief of Chattanooga in 1863 saw him at his best. Yes, the most of the commanders he faced in the west sucked (with the exception of Albert Sydney Johnston and Van Dorn) but the point still stands. His Vicksburg Campaign is still studied today by military academies across the world on how to conduct a campaign to cut off a nation from a major river port city.
As for 1864, as battered as Grant’s armies were, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia suffered far worse. Couple that with the fact that he pinned the Army of Northern Virginia in around Petersburg and Richmond, while Sherman cut a vast swath of destruction through Georgia and the Carolinas, while simultaneously closing Lee’s back door. Meanwhile, P.G.T. Beureguard and Joseph E. Johnston were doing their best to prevent that trap from swinging shut, but despite their efforts, when Lee tried to unite with them, Grant cut him off at Appomattox, forcing his surrender.
They wore wool uniforms in the summer heat and humidity! This must have had a drastic effect on their abilities. Dehydration and heat stroke destroys clear thinking.
House Framer here---> Truth brother....
I can attest to the sheer fact that those wool uniforms were a blessing in disguise, when after a day in the hot sun, the moment you unbuttoned your uniform coat and took a drink from a canteen, the slightest breeze felt like an arctic wind upon ones chest and relief was had. (a civil war re-enactor i am,lol)
@@Framer_Mike When I say thank you for your service, I have a friend who does the same thing, and I mean it.
That’s almost funny seeing that their main cash crop was cotton.
General Lee was suffering from dysentry or diarrhoea during the battle - this might have affected his judgement
Meanwhile, in the west, at Vicksburg, a real nail was being hammered into the South's coffin.
Lee wanted to re enforce Vicksburg after Chancellorsville. I honestly think losing Jackson sealed it for the South.
@Lawrence Westby - Indeed.
@@Shatamx id like to believe that the outcome could have been different had Stonewall still been around, but The south was never gonna win the War... It was always just a matter of time.. they circled the south and put them under ",seige" tactics.. by doing that and having superior numbers it was always just a matter of time... in my most humble opinion
You're bold, I'll GRANT you that, and I'm not taking you for GRANTed, now GRANT me my wish
There was a meeting in Richmond after Chancellorsville on what to do about the
Vickburg situation. Joe Johnston wanted Bragg's army to march west and join
him in attacking Grant's rear (guarded by Sherman). PGT Beauregard wanted
Johnston to join him in SE Tennessee and they would march north into Kentucky
and threaten to cross the river into Ohio. Lee proposed getting Longstreet
back (after Chickamauga) and invading the north again.
Lee's idea was that invading Pennsylvania would convince Washington to order
Grant to move his army out of Mississippi and defend the capitol. This sounds
ridiculous, but Lee had convinced Jeff Davis and all but one of his cabinet.
Such was the faith those men had in Lee.
Source: Shelby Foote
At 1:10, Longstreet says "Sir?" after Lee remarks about how close they were. Throughout the movie, there are moments where Longstreet appears not to hear someone at first.
In real life, Longstreet was slightly deaf in one ear. Nice subtle attention to detail by the filmmakers.
What great acting, that look in Lee's eyes when Stuart rides in...
He definitely let Gen. Stuart have it, when Gen. Stuart, instead of owning up to not following Gen. Lee's specific orders, started making excuses for not following orders, and for even trying to quit the Confederate Army!
I always felt that Longstreet came across as the tactically superior officer, while Lee had the daring and intangibles. They complimented each other very well.
If you read about the Battle of Second Manassas, it was Longstreet's triumph. Jackson's corps was holding off the Federal advance and was hard pressed to hold on to the ground. Longstreet arrived in time and in the right place and threw 60,000 men at the Federal flank, breaking them and scattering their forces.
Longstreet attacked with 5 Divisions, not nearly 60,000 men considering the entire strength of the Army of Northern Virginia wasn't but 50,000 men.
The real tragedy was the loss of stonewall jackson. Had he not been shot by his own men things would have been different
Be aware that Lee was believed to have had a mild heart attack a week or so earlier and likely was not fully recovered. Lee was probably a better strategist than tactician, and he was used to letting Jackson handle the actual battle, so he was out of practice.
You do know Longstreet finished near the bottom of his class..... he was known to be a pouter we he didn’t get way. The comment about the attacks not being timed properly was a result of Longstreet delaying his attacks until late in the day. Look up Hood’s account of that day and how Longstreet behaved. He believed (and based on previous behavior) Longstreet was proving a point instead of giving his full measure.
The dynamic between Berenger and Sheen in this scene is powerful.
Lee was not overmatched,but his unwillingness to listen to his subordinates cost him a victory
I would argue it caused him a loss. Given the situation on the second day, they should've gone with Longstreet's plan (or whoever suggested it in reality) and withdrawn to a better position.
Actually, Lee was forced to attack after 1 July. Longstreet's idea of a tactical level maneuver around the Union left was a dead end. Meade's orders were to protect Washington D.C. and Baltimore. Other than that, he had no obligation to attack the AoNV. Because of the layout of the local road net, the AotP had no problem keeping pace with the AoNV and remaining between it and D.C. Additionally, the road net would have forced the AoNVs supply train to make a wide movement away from the battlefield- in an area in which Lee was operating blind. He had no idea what was five miles beyond either flank.
As if that were not enough, Lee was out of time. His army was living off the land and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days, and it hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Lastly, the strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign even got underway.
Lee had to attack or abandon the campaign in failure.
He needed Stonewall!
Longstreet’s stare at the end after the salute was awesome
0:35 - that feeling you get when you arrive at work after missing the past two days without telling anybody…
Strange how even good Generals can get so fixated about a plan. Longstreet spelled it out to him - It is possible but we've got to do it another way. yet still he went ahead.
Had longstreet been in charge the battle of Gettysburg might have come out differently
It would have been a shit show. Longstreet was given independent command in the fall of 1863 and it was a disaster. Longstreet has a propensity to bicker with fellow generals (like he did with Lee at Gettysburg, or after Seven Pines), he also had a propensity to seek scape goats for his own shortcomings. He ordered unimaginative frontal assault against prepared Union positions... The same Longstreet that gained a reputation for being a defensive minded mastermind, commonly cited with Gettysburg... he wasn't. Given his own command he showed he preferred ill planned frontal assaults and blamed his generals for its failure. He levied charges against subbortanant generals and arrested Gen McClaws. The thing Longstreet did best (as at Gettysburg) was bicker with people. He proved without a doubt that he was not up to independent command and eventually returned to Lee's Army... which is where he belonged. Gen. Lee had as his greatest strength the ability to get the most out of his men. He also was a capable leader able to control the egos of his Generals like Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart. He was able to plan and execute complex battle plans and give his commanders just enough freedom to adjust attacks on the fly. But when unsuccessful he stepped up and took responsibility and put the issue to bed and moved on.... something Longstreet could not do. Longstreet would scheme, scapegoat and bicker with people when he was unsuccessful.
@@eNosArmory
Name me one other rebel Corp commander who had as many hard hitting assaults as Longstreet. 2nd Manassas (one of the closest times the rebels came to bagging a U.S. Army), 2nd Day Gettysburg (inflicted more casualties and chewed up the better portion of three AotP corps), Chickamauga (even if the gap didn't open that assault was a sledge hammer and was one of the other three times a rebel army almost bagged an U.S. Army), and his assault at the Wilderness (rolled up Hancock and his men like a blanket and saved Lee's bacon for the time being). While he may not have been the best at independent command, he was by far the best Corp commander the rebels had and Lee thought so as well as he made Longstreet senior to Jackson.
Doubt it hatred and treasonous behavior are never rewarded in this life.
James S I have a question for you my question is if Longstreet was the confederate army at Gettysburg do you think he would have moved to the right and redeploy the confederate army at Gettysburg
@@chasemurraychristopherdola7108 I do.and I dont think there would have been a pickets charge.longstreet knew that was gonna be a slaughter
My great great grandfather served in the Union Arrmy of the Potomac. but I hate to see a tremendous Soldier like James Longstrret get vilified. The Guy was way ahead militarily in his thinking. North ans South
Longstreet thought like Wellington. All through the Peninsula and on to Belgium Wellington made Napoleon come to him on ground of his choosing. Lee was still fighting the Mexican-American War- attack! Attack! Attack!
@@frankverdino477 That's not true. Lee was very skilled at defense.
A big chunk of the book the movie is based on is taken from Longstreet's account of the battle and up until pretty recently that was the go to account from the Confederate point of view. Historians have been finding that Longstreet's account is rather biased. Hood's account of the battle seems to indicate that Longstreet was purposely moving slow on the 2nd because he didn't believe the plan would work.
@@TheBerylknight Yes, he was. But he was human and as such was as vulnerable to tunnel vision as anyone else. He had tunnel vision at Gettysburg. He's not alone in history, but he had it all the same.
@@jimholmes5395 Lee lost at Gettysburg because he didn't have Jackson. It's not because he had tunnel vision.
The hymn "Rock of Ages"
ua-cam.com/video/3hjY03fsnMs/v-deo.html
Lee......wishful thinking
Longstreet.......reality
Lee, talking in the actual context of the day.
Longstreet, talking thoughts he would not have for decades...that are entirely divorced from the context of the ground and the supply state of the CSA artillery.
Look at a map. Read the supply stocks of artillery ammunition. There was not enough to do more than one attack. There is no road structure to support an army moving to the right. That road is in the Federals hands.
@@dclark142002 yes. The confederates could not compete against the North with supplies and reinforcements Since they are in union territory. Also in the matter of production they say where one Confederate cannon is produced, 10 union cannons are produced..and Lee knew this. He knew that waiting it out won't help because every moment they wait, the Union army gets stronger and stronger. So time is not in their hands. Lee wanted to secure a quick Victory before the union could amass a undefeatable army, which is why he invaded the North in the first place. Wanted a fast win and Convince the north to give up.
one of the big things missing from the movie was Wilcox and Wright's Brigades of Anderson's Division nearing the crest of Cemetary Ridge. Wilcox's Brigade steam rolling up through the remnants of the III Corps only being slowed down by half of the 1st Minnesota, while Wright's Brigade made it to the same stone wall just south of the Angle that Armistead reached the next day that was weakened due to all of the reinforcements being moved south. With that context Lee's reaction, from his perspective was mostly correct. From his perspective they did nearly break the Union line and if Posey's Brigade doesn't balk, and joins the assault. More damage could have been done to the Union center especially if Johnson's attack went off as it was supposed to.
However as we know today, Lee couldn't see over the hills and most likely didn't know that the VI Corps which was only lightly engaged after a long forced march was on the Round Tops and would have just moved north going down hill and rolled up Anderson's division. Longstreet, in real life at this time would have been pushing more for a strategic withdrawal after the second day instead of a redeploment south between Meade and Washington since doing so would have put the Army of Northern Virginia between two armies that would have grossly outnumbered it Army of the Potomac and defenses around Washington which would have left their fortifications and acted as the hammer to Meade's anvil.
One of the crucial differences between the best of the Confederate commanders and the best of the Union commanders was in who practiced tactics and who practiced strategy. Generals like Lee and Jackson tend to eschue logistics over battlefield maneuver, seeking that one knockout punch that would end the Union. Generals like Sherman and Grant (and for that matter, Meade) however, prioritized the larger picture of operations. Individual battles, to them, were far less important than what that battle mattered in the larger campaign. Further, they understood that the key to victory was through logistics. Often reading the accounts of Confederate leaders, a lot of focus is on trying to break Union lines or beat them from the field, but Union commanders tended to prioritize food, fodder, ammunition, and how to get it to where it needed to be (and to deny it to the enemy).
What I like about this scene is that it shows a hint of that disparity. Longstreet is thinking strategically here. It's not worth fighting a battle in this area, where conditions do not favor them, when they could move to a superior location and be better reinforced. Further, his earlier concerns about fighting defensively are slightly echoed here, in the sense that the attacking army almost always take greater casualties than the defending one. Winning the battle at Gettysburg could still cost the Confederates the next battle through losing too many soldiers on victory. Longstreet is thinking about the next battle and the next step beyond this one.
Lee, however, is a tactition. He is an excellent tactician, but it means he is so focused on the battle at hand that the furthest ahead he can think is just what the next day will bring (which was very true to life to the actual Robert E. Lee, whose focus of the war was almost entirely regarding Virginia and the Army of Northern Virginia, and resulted in him opposing efforts to reinforce other theaters of war to focus on his own command). It's nice to see that conflict in play here: the strategist wanting to leave the field to try and find a better position even if it looks like defeat, versus the tactician who knows that if he can just find the right weak spot, he can snatch victory out of a hopeless situation.
"Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
@@minizimi3790 I have never heard that quote before, but I very much appreciate you sharing it!
@@minizimi3790 Ah yes, Sun Tzu. It's a wonderful quote.
@@NorthForkFisherman whoops. Guess I should hace cited that.
@@minizimi3790 Nah. It's good. Google is still free. And it was a damn fine quote.
This scene should've been filmed after nightfall. The fighting on the second did not end until well after dark.
Except that Longstreet’s attack ended around 8:30 which was just about sunset. The attack on Culp’s Hill that night lasted till about 10:00 pm.
It's a paradox. The film centers around high ranking generals, the highest ranking generals. Very little of Brigadiers are seen, or Colonels, or Major, Captains, LT's, etc. The real field command is not show here. Instead you get two generals who never stray towards a fight, and it appears that General Lee really has no information on the battle. Yeah, Stuart was absent. However you don't have to have Stuart on hand to scout the field. There
's still horses, and there's still troops who can maneuver elusive enough to find info. Lee was so upset with Stuart and felt stressed. Uhhhh, he's stressed. Brigadier's and lower actually are on the field and can usually see everything. How could Lee feel them breaking when he was in the rear, and really not in a place to lead. They're maybe a mile or two from the front, but they might as well be in another state. The movie acts dorky, slow and lethargic for a reason. It's to prove a point about what the two armies were really combatting. All the action is never on the screen. Instead it's just old guys playing dress and in shock and awe over the sabers they get to carry. The scene where Longstreet briefs his brigadiers on the battle is hilarious. Like they're so serious, yet so simple. Same when Lee's briefs divisional command. Divisional command who again never really stray close to a scrap. Of all Generals, Brigadiers get the closest. Yet, not nearly as close as colonels, majors, captains, LT's. Officers like that. Particularly middle rank officers.
The film shows the 2nd day of fighting as centering around Little Round Top and the 20th Maine's stand against Hood's right flank. Well, I would say that this was not even close to the toughest fight on the 2nd day. The fighting around the peace orchard was way worse, or the wheatfield. Culp's Hill is not even named in the movie and is only briefly described by General Trimble. Culp's Hill's had hard fighting. Why does the film center around the extreme right flank? For a reason, and you can see how Chamberlain promotes himself in the years after the war. Chamberlain..... you weren't even close to the worst of it, and you had a pretty easy assignment when compared to the other regions of the battle. Personally I think the fighting around the peach orchard and wheatfield was the toughest struggle of the battle. Lee was obviously not thinking clear. Even if you take the high ground and win a pyric victory like Chickamauga, you still have to lay siege to DC.
@@johnrobinson1762 "... it appears that General Lee really has no information on the battle. Yeah, Stuart was absent. However you don't have to have Stuart on hand to scout the field. There
's still horses, and there's still troops who can maneuver elusive enough to find info."
Lee's anger at Stuart was due to Stuart not providing the information he was task to provide before the onset of battle. By this point in the battle, Lee knew what was in front of him. Stuart's failure was that he did not provide early intel and the Army of Northern Virginia stumbled into a fight without knowing what it was facing and Lee had to make decisions blindly. Had Lee known that he was facing 80,000 federal troops perhaps he would have occupied Cemetary Ridge himself at the end of the first day, or perhaps he would have avoided moving into Gettysburg at all and maneuvered his army around the Army of the Potomac to ground of his choosing. Instead, he was pulled into a fight with an enemy of unknown strength because he had no eyes and ears. Having said that, after the first day and after Ewell failed to attack Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill and prevent the Federals from entrenching artillery on them, Lee should have pulled back and followed Longstreet's suggestion.
"How could Lee feel them breaking when he was in the rear, and really not in a place to lead. They're maybe a mile or two from the front, but they might as well be in another state."
Senior commanders do not lead from the front. Even Napoleon did not lead from the front. On several occasions, Lee admonishes Longstreet for getting too close to the front. Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lts, ect., are expendable, senior commanders are not.
@@johnrobinson1762 " Why does the film center around the extreme right flank? For a reason, and you can see how Chamberlain promotes himself in the years after the war. Chamberlain..... you weren't even close to the worst of it, and you had a pretty easy assignment when compared to the other regions of the battle."
Because Chamberlain's actions that day saved the Federal position. Had Chamberlain not acted as he did, the Federal position would have become untenable and the Army of the Potomac would have had to withdraw or be destroyed.
I wonder if Martin Sheen, a Democrat, would support the removal or Lee statues throughout the country.
I've been thinking about this for awhile I've come to the following concusions: HIs victory on the first day of battle set the stage for things to come. Lee's primary difficulty was the new hole in his command left by the departure of Jackson. It wasn't that longstreet was wrong in his thinking or that lee was wrong in his. It was because the two commanders thought about strategy and tactics differently, they simply weren't on the same page on July 2nd, and that creates problems. Jackson/Lee did so well together because they were practically of one mind. single-mindedness of purpose at the command level - there is simply no replacement for that on the battlefield. Dick Ewell was also cautious - so you have two cautious commanders at the Corps level trying to impliment lees aggressive strategy. an equation frought with problems. On the other hand you have the Union, Meade being cautious where cautiousness is needed - they are facing confederate commanders that don't have experience being aggressive trying to act as such and seize entrenched positions. Does this mean Lee takes blame? yes and no. Lee was on the verge of victory on the first day. trying to "finish the job" makes sense, albeit with commanders who are less enthusiastic about his aggressive strategy. thus, I think lee can arguably be forgiven somewhat for failures of the second day. His real fault comes with the third day of fighting - "picketts charge." Longstreets waring should have been heeded - Lee was asking for a victory with Fredricksburg in reverse - and Lee knew how it played out for the Union. Lee had enough military experience to know that a mile charge over open ground with a fence blocking his way - was suicidal. At that juncture I think a combination of pride and impatience took over - clouding Lee's otherwise good judgement.
And making a mistake is far from out of the ordinary for generals in that war. Unfortunately for Lee his position did not allow for the recovery from a great mistake. Lee's challenge was that he had a much smaller population to draw from, dramatically less manufacturing, far fewer railroads to move his soldiers, and even in terms of supplies much of the consumable crops were in the Union. He knew that he could now win a long drawn out war and had to force the Union to capitulate sooner rather than later. I think that played into his decisions here.
it is not clear from the literature if ewell could take the hill. supposedly, the federals had artillery there.....that is one version. I'm not sure which version is the truth. I would have disciplined Jeb like lee did but not relieving him or arresting him. the guy was tough, experienced.... he made a mistake. he's human. he also served lee well until he was ultimately killed. to get rid of him would be to rmove an officer impossible to replace. Have to think rationally. And from what I could tell, Jeb never made a mistake like that again until his death. Picketts charge from what I could tell was lees ultimate mistake. He simply overestimated his troops, underestimated his opponent, and his own military training and his experience at Fredericksburg should have been enough to talk him out of such rash action. I do understand the pressure he was under..... but then lees human too.
but then the ultimate question is: okay, we know what lee should not have done, but what should he have done. Perhaps Longstreets flanking march (read Newt Gingriches Gettysburg for the famous answer to the what if scenario if lee took longstreets advice and actually did the flank march) or something else? if so, what is that else.
4713Caine I saw a lecture that stated that Lee had other calvary at his disposal but they were militia so Lee did not have confidence in them
I agree had Jackson been still alive he would have taken the heights day one sweeping down from the north where as Ewell stopped.
My Great-great grandfather served in the 8th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He was at Gettysburg, he survived the war but came home with a taste for alcohol that ruled his life til the end of his days.
My six times great grandfather was with the 3rd Alabama and was wounded at Gettysburg. He survived the war too, but came home to his family farm being burned to the ground. He ended up running a general store after the war.
It may not have been "a taste for alcohol" but rather a desire to escape the demons caused by the slaughter he witnessed.
@@Mugdorna He was , from all accounts, a headstrong young man. His family was relatively well-to-do, and he apparently enlisted because his domineering mother forbade him to do so.
My wife's great-great granfather was mortally wounded at Gettysburg; died about a month after the battle in a field hospital in Gettysburg. His regimental commander, Junius Daniel is a distant cousin of mine.
This movie is on my all-time top 10 list!
Was always something funny about the 2 majors in the light jackets @ 0:53. They are just standing there being NPCs.
I love this movie for its portrayal of Longstreet. Man could have led the Confederacy into an honorable peace if Lee's cult of personality hadn't led it into ruin.
Utter nonsense.
lee was a fool.
Lee was the intellect behind the movement, his cult of personality was simply the result of being the only confederate worth hearing.
I've been up on little round top, it's quite moving.
Me, too.
Yes, I have too. It really was quite moving to think of the 2nd day from that vantage point. You could see how difficult a climb up the hill it was for the Confedrates, and how critical it was for the Union to defend it. Also, the charge by Chamberlain's 20th Maine must have been incredible knowing they were low on ammuntion.
I can't believe I could not recognize the tune as the hymn "Rock of Ages" when I first saw this scene.
+Dima's Girl what psalm. ??????
ua-cam.com/video/3hjY03fsnMs/v-deo.html
People back then tended to be deeply religious. Much more so than people today.
The Def Leppard song?
@@tomcarl8021 No, it's an old traditional hymn.
Lee: "Dear God, I couldn't spare Genaral Hood..."
Longstreet: "Am I a joke to you?"
"And General Longstreet."
"Sir?"
"Please do something about that beard. I can abide it no longer."
General Lee should have listened to General Longstreet advice. Swung around the Union army, and forced the Union to attack on ground of the Confederates chosen. Lee failed to realize. When his army had not achieved victory on the first day, that he had lost the initiative. He should have disengaged, and redeployed.
Moving Lee's army to the right: Gettysburg was important because 10 roads
converged there from all directions, only 2 to the southwest. Taking the
Emmitsburg Road in full view of the federals would surrender the advantage of
surprise. Taking the Fairfield Road would extend an already lengthy march.
Making the shift a cross-country move sounds simple until you recall that
there were necessary things like artillery, supply wagons and other vehicles
that weren't made for off-road, and through forested terrain, travel. Shifting
Ewell's corps would not happen in a single day and might require the entire
Army of Northern Virginia to try to disengage and hope Meade wouldn't attack
and leaving their wounded behind.
Just for an example, Dick Anderson's division was immediately behind Pender's division on the road July 1. But Allegheny Johnson's division of Ewell's corp moved to Cashtown (per order) rather than Gettysburg and was allowed to pass in front of Anderson. Rather than just move his men, Johnson allowed his whole train to follow. By the time either division reached Gettysburg, it was too dark to utilize them. Now imagine the whole ANV trying to march around the AoP with 40 miles of wagons and 50,000 men. There's no way they could've done it without getting their strung-out units cut to pieces.
If only Lee had studied Wellington's Peninsula Campaign, he would have learned how a small army could tie up a much larger enemy. Alas they all studied Napoleon
The technology of the day outstripped the Napoleonic tactics that these men (senior commanders) had all been trained in. Lined marches against rifled muskets. Artillery with shell, cannister, landmines, repeater rifles. telegraph signaling.
@@anthonylegore1517 Wellington's tactics showed how a much smaller British army kept larger French armies tied up for months, while he marched, counter marched, advanced, retreated and fought the occasional battle. He eventually drove the French out off Spain and followed them into Franch. These are the tactics the Lee should have adopted.
Stuart sure oughta have seen both Generals while approaching them (0:26) with his Cavalry surveillance skills. One of those "I'll pretend I don't see them looking right at me, avert my gaze."
We're never really shown how far apart they are. Stuart is a striking figure on that horse with his aides, but Lee and Longstreet are on the ground and from a distance in the fading light, probably look like two random officers.
Also, he was not under the impression that he was in trouble yet, so he had no reason to want to avoid Lee outright.
The whole endeavour was insane. March into foreign territory while being outnumbered where the enemy could resupply much faster than you could. Lee had to feel he needed a knock out punch.
I think after gettysburg, Lee knew how it was going to end eventually.
Actually it made complete sense from a military point of view
@@Darbokst it was about making the North lose support for the war from the people and Congress. The north could have outlasted them easily. Lee's only chance was to take away their will to fight. Winning a victory on Northern soil so close to Washington had a good chance of achieving that.
Lee's intent was to live off the land. He didn't expect to hold supply lines from Virginia.
@@dextercochran4916 Pennsylvania militia would have hindered Lee’s attempt to live off the land.
Thanks!!
There are more dramatic salutes in this movie, than in all other movies put together
Isnt that the most cheerful band ive ever heard.
Longstreet was never good at being ordered to attack, like Jackson. Longstreet was a defensive - counterattack officer. It was exhibited in his history of the civil war up to that point:
1.) Seven Days - performed very well, much better than Jackson. Did not want to attack Malvern Hill, which they were soundly repulsed. Probably the only time Longstreet did well maneuvering for attacks.
2.) Seven Pines - Probably one of his worst performances of the war. Ordered to attack, took the wrong road and caused massive delays.
3.) Second Manasses - Massive counter attack on the second day wins the battle, cripples Popes army. Was prodded repeatedly by Lee to attack, but waited for the enemy to expend its strength (this was good insight into how he behaved in this battle).
4.) Antietam - Defensive stand against superior numbers. Holds the line and saves the confederate army from certain defeat (largely due to McClellan's cautiousness).
5.) Fredericksburg - Superior defensive stand, inflicts heavy casualties upon the enemy in a resounding victory.
6.) Chickamauga - After being heavily attacked, counter attacks, exploits a hole in the Union lines and routes their army.
7.) Knoxville - In command, but botches the attack and loses to, of all people, Burnside.
8.)The Wilderness - Stops Hancock's successful assault dead. Counter attacks by flanking Hankock, rolling him up like a "wet blanket."
Gettysburg did not suit Longstreet's abilities. He was hounded by Lee to attack when not ready and hemmed and hawed throughout the second day. He never wanted to fight at Gettysburg anyway, thought is was pointless to fight there. Longstreet's plan was the most sound one, but unfortunately for Lee, he needed Stonewall at Gettysburg.
shrapnel77 so very true Jackson was the hammer and Longstreet the anvil put them both at Lee's disposal they make a hell of a team in major battles. Take one away and your army is made lesser, and against a materially and numerically superior Army that was something they could not afford.
It's a misconception that Longstreet is a defensive officer, and mind you that a counterattack is still a form of attack so, not defensive. Longstreet, when commanding a substantial force, won more battles attacking then defending (Seven Days and Seven Pines can be removed, since he commanded but a division). Second Manassas was not a counterattack, but an assault launched after a long march. He prepared for a long period of time, performing lengthy reconnaissance before finally launching his entire wing against the flank of the Union Army. At Chickamauga, his forces smashed through the weakly defended Union Center. Longstreet's forces were not part of the heavy fighting to the right of the Confederate Army, so this was not a counterattack in that sense. Finally, the battle of the Wilderness was an assault launched following a lengthy march. He managed to allow AP Hill's 3rd Corps through his lines, and launch an attack which rolled up the Union line.
The misconception of his defensiveness comes from his performance at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Petersburg, as in all of those battles he performed superbly, and then of course his failure at Gettysburg. But his failure can mainly be attributed to the fact that Longstreet, for lack of a better word; sulked. Even though he did personally coordinate the attack of Mclaws' Division along the Peach Orchard and the Wheat Field, he did not launch any reconnaissance, which was mainly because he sulked, as he did not agree with the plan. Gettysburg, overall; can be considered Longstreet's worst performance during his time on campaign, as his lack of cautiousness caused the Confederate forces to be surprised heavily by the positioning of the Union III Corps.
If you want to learn more about Longstreet's performance, read this fantastic thesis: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a299311.pdf
Benjamin, you're correct about everything except Longstreet's performance on the second day at Gettysburg. Faulty early morning reconnaissance revealed to Lee and Longstreet that there were no Federals on the Round Tops (the movie gets that right). Going with that intel, Lee ordered Longstreet to roll up the perceived Union line that they figured sat along the Emmittsburg Road just north of the Peach Orchard (the movie gets that wrong). Plus, assuming that Lee's engineering officer (who conducted the recon) knew an undetected route to the jump off point for the attack, Longstreet would have seen Sickles' advanced position anyway. Also, Sickles created an easily smashed salient, which is what Longstreet's men did. The Federals had to rush up between 35,000 men to save the III Corps. I'd agree that Longstreet's third day performance was not up to snuff, but much of the second day was not his fault. Finally, Anderson's division was not fully engaged as they should have been.
@@tomdefranco816 Longstreet did not allow Mclaws to launch his own recon of the attack path, this can only be attributed to his sulking as Longstreet had been careful and cautious going into engagements all before that. Lee's plan was poor, but Longstreet performed poorly no getting around it. The attack on the second day wasn't his fault, the Union were bringing in reinforcements from all over their line to hold his Corps, it's just that he performed rather poorly in the attack is all.
Benjamin Lee, McLaws’ recon wouldn’t have mattered. They were ordered by Lee to roll up the perceived line that was thought to be along the Emmittsburg Road (or Cemetery Ridge, they weren’t sure). I don’t think he truly sulked on July 2; July 3rd was another thing. The thing is that he still followed orders. Not only that, but the attack went in with about 20,000 men and the Federals eventually had 50,000 men engaged on their left (40,000 Feds were heavily engaged) and they still inflicted 2,000 more casualties. That was seldom in in the ACW.
Finally, so what if he was careful; he was usually successful in the attack. Longstreet wanted to flank the left but was repeatedly rebuffed by Lee.
Longstreet was correct. Had they moved off the battlefield towards Washington, Mead would have had to follow and then the Southern Army could have chosen the best ground for engagement.
The problem with Longstreet's suggestion was that the Rebs did not have sufficient trained cavalry to cover the movement.
Don't know about that but they wouldn't have needed it.
Thomas Snapp, To the contrary; they would have needed the cavalry to screen their movement with Union cavalry in the area.
Nah the supply situation for the confederates was to dangerous and waiting for the federal to attack a hypothetical strong position in federal territory is to dangerous.
Federals would just cut them off from escape and supply south and wipe them out
“General Stuart has returned!”
Longstreet’s thoughts: Fat lot of good you’ll be able to do us now junior.
But that was Lee's fault.
@@manilajohn0182 Stuart didn't obey the mission , he took the best cavalry and went on silly raids away from the battle site. No shock that the Union cavalry, led by Buford spotted Heth first and managed to both inform the main Army of the Potomac and detain Hill's Corps on the first day.
Stuart's job was to feed recon information to Lee and advise on Federal activity in the area, which he did not do. Had he sent word to Lee that Meade's troops were in the vicinity the column would have slowed up and collected itself before taking any action. Instead Heth blundered right into Buford's cavalry and battle ensued
@@SantomPh Lee authorized Stuart's movement, and his instructions to Stuart were to gather both "information and provisions". In doing this, Lee violated the basic military axiom of "one force, one objective". Lee tasked Stuart with gathering information- a task requiring mobility which only cavalry could provide- while at the same time tasking Stuart with gathering provisions- a task which would invariably impede the very mobility required to carry out the first task.
Furthermore, Lee didn't order Stuart to simply forage for himself; Lee instructed Stuart to "gather all the supplies that you can for the use of the army". Worse still was the fact that these two objectives coincided in time- so that Stuart's small force could never do both adequately. Yet this is exactly what happened in the campaign. Topping this off was the fact that Lee never told Stuart which of the two was the priority task- information (critical to Lee's plan of campaign)- or provisions (the operational objective of the campaign). What compounded this was the movement of the AotP northward- an action anticipated by neither Lee not Stuart. Stuart's only error was that he wasted some time paroling prisoners.
This was the critical mistake of the campaign, and it was made by Lee. His entire plan of campaign hinged on timely and accurate information on the location and strength of the AotP, because he wanted to maneuver so as to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. The resulting lack of information led to the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July- disastrous because it saddled him with a tactical initiative which he had never wanted and all but ruined any chance that the AotP would attack the AoNV.
Rented this off amazon, Great Movie and Great Actors
2:25 Lee gets an idea in his head. Love the music at that point.
The room's interior painting matches the uniforms.....
It's those little touches to headquarters that made Walter Taylor the greatest staff officer the South ever had. LOL
I have always wondered how realistic is it that you always seemed to have a brass band nearby when some famous Confederate general rode up on a horse.
I'd love to have a recording of that band playing Rock of Ages. I can't find it anywhere.
The movie's "The Bonny Blue Flag" is a great performance as well.
Def Leppard did a cover of it in 1984
It's on one of the Homespun Songs of the CSA albums
ua-cam.com/video/3hjY03fsnMs/v-deo.html
After a long day at the office, you sit wearily down at the kitchen table and say "Good God, so many good men were lost this day".
I can't imagine the burdens these men carried
General Longstreet would be good at CinemaSins
This scene did not contain a lap dance
good news to everyone, the directors cut of gettysburg and gods and generals will finally be released in may. its official and not some bs, the gods and generals version will have everything in it including the famed Antietam scene. the gettysburg one im not sure on but i know it will include the scenes you can see here on youtube.
" the first day was so promising, and the second day came within an inch of doing it, and by this time Lee's blood was up .. and when his blood was up there was no stopping him"... Shelby Foote...
1:30 that part is so funny like he talking to his senile father
Berenger's Fake beard is the best thing about this movie.
1. Fake beards everywhere
2. Way to many fat soldiers (both sides)
@@Sam-ed8kk And soldiers and officers too old.
@@StreetFighter2010 A lot of them are Civil War Re-enactors, who supplied their own uniforms, weapons and even cannon ! It saved the producers a huge amount of money.
@@maggiesmith856 That’s why I don’t complain that the soldiers don’t look like “authentic” emaciated malnourished young men. The actors on the battlefield are Civil War enthusiasts.
Longstreet shot him a look when Lee suggested the attacks were not properly coordinated.
"I do not know why"
Lee, wearing a hotdog costume: "We're all trying to find the guy who did this"
Just to nitpick a little...it was way after dark when this happened. It's daylight in the movie
You are not nitpicking, you are showing you have read and understand the battle. Thank you! :-)
I'd imagine this meeting would have happened after daylight. The fighting on Cemetary hill went until dark.
refugeeca, I believe that Stuart arrived about 4:30 in the afternoon on July 2.
@@tomdefranco816 yes, but refugeeca is correct. It looks like they wanted to portray both events so put them in the same scene by moving the talk to the same time as Stuart's arrival.
Longstreet never wanted to invade Pennsylvania. I believe after the second day of hard fighting with no important objective attained, the ANV needed to retire back to Virginia. Instead, Lee wrecked one of his best divisions by attacking the Union center the next day.
After the war, Porter Alexander thought that the ANV should hunker down and let the Union attack, which they likely would have on the third day. The pressure was on Meade to get Lee out of the United States, and nobody was better at defending a line than the ANV.
@@indy_go_blue6048 Interesting point. I recall that at Meade's staff meeting the second night, the vote was to remain in position the next day, but if Lee didn't attack then the Union Army would. I was unaware that Colonel Alexander had made that comment.
Had the army of Northern Virginia had prevailed at Gettysburg, it would have been to depleted of men, weapons,ammuniion, horses, food, etc. to have marched on Washington D.C., much less seize that city.
Not wrong. The defensive entrenchments around Washington were nothing to scoff at. The real threat wasn't against Washington itself, but instead forcing Grant to relieve his siege on Vicksburg (which wouldn't have worked given he took the town the next day.) Lee would have found out after about a week or so, then pulled back. Pretty much nothing would have changed either way.
At this point I think they were looking for foreign recognition of the confederacy by Britain, and dream of dreams; an alliance.
There was a clear road to Washington. All Lee had to do was withdraw his Army away from Gettysburg and move towards Washington.
The problem would be leaving a force at ur rear. Never leave a numerically superior force at ur rear especially since they would have to take Washington and immediately start making defense works to stop the federal army pursuing them once they knew they left. They could've lost their rear guard and a very large portion of their army ignoring a larger force at their rear.
Kinda weird this was recommended to me during the evening of July 2nd
Such a great movie so many good sceans wish they would have included the wheat field and the Michigan Iron brigade.
Well the initial Union infantry assault was with the Iron Brigade but they didn't specify any particular unit. I would've liked to have seen more battle scenes as well; watching this for the hundredth time, the speechifying gets pretty tedious.
Lee would have been the right general to lead an army that had the resources to fight like the North. Longstreet was the right general to lead a smaller rag tag army that had the resources of the South. Lee was in a demolition derby but he drove his car like he was in the Indy 500.
Amazing scene in my favorite movie.
It took decades for Longstreet to have a statue put up at Gettysburg. He was blamed for what happened at Gettysburg by all those lost-cause people out there who believed Lee was some divine being. Not so by the time of Gettysburg, Lee was in pretty poor health at that point.
I get a chuckle out of those "the winners write the history" people. With the ACW a hell of a lot of its history is written by the losers, that history collectively known as "the Lost Cause."
Longstreet had a delayed countermarch day 2. He was slow, indecisive.
It is a shame they never made the 3rd film in the series.
They still can make it!
Lesson: Have the best ground. Either the high ground or the flank.
I want to know too!
Were they referring to the failure to take Little Round Top?
Yes, I believe so.
After the first day, he should have maneuvered. However, his feeling for the morale of his army was very accurate and delicate, and it would have been hard to keep the troops positive under such circumstances. He was rolling the dice against heavy, heavy odds the whole war, and thank the Good Lord he failed, for his cause was not just.
"Good Lord he failed, for his cause was not just." Sure about that?
@@zackthebongripper7274 According to Grant, the Confederates fought for the worst cause ever.
Love how they have been on campaign for a couple years and all thier cloths just looked like they came out the dry cleaners. Not even sweat on thier hats and lovely clean gloves
Brian M Fieldwic
The Gettysburg campaign began in June....so. While your comment is way off base. You do realize there were new issues of all kinds of things at the commencement of new campaigns right? Hahaha
whats the bacjround music?
Nothing like a 58 caliber bullet trearing through ones leg from thirty yards
A .762 X 39 Russian isn't that much fun either, friend. Much more velocity, but at least it didn't expand much.
Long time ago. I feel lots better now.
What's the song at the beginning of the video?
Rock of Ages by Reverend Augustus Toplady
Too bad. Had Lee taken this excellent advice the Southern people today would have their own nation.
Mr. Vinegaroon, which would likely not have been an ideal situation altogether. The Europeans would have been happy and could have used the division in the continent to reclaim their colonies.
Very interesting thought. I see it as had there been an independent Confederacy, they would likely have made an alliance
with UK, seeking to have the British military help them hold onto their (supposed) country. There would still have been a viable Confederate Army as well, which might have been able to provide strong resistance to any attempts to re-colonize the southern states. I am not sure they would have easily submitted to foreign rule after just having beaten the Yankees.
Absolutely so true and correct indeed, Donie xxx
That way around the right really wasn’t open. Mead had several brigades of Calvary on the flank and the Union corps who arrived later on the 2nd had concentrated there. So it really wasn’t quite was Longstreet and Hood were hoping for. And even if the my pushed through the Calvary, there would have been a lot of time for the Unions forces to organize their defense. It isn’t exactly a 5 minute march around the south.
Confederate Army sorely missed Stonewall Jackson. He had this aptitude for a more mobile warfare which was far ahead of the time. Losing him meant the impetus for victory had grounded to a halt.
It didn't matter if they had of won at Gettysburg. Washington was heavily defended. Lincoln would have never just gave up. And with the loss at Vicksburg at the same time, would have kind of been hollow. Thing is Lee's supply line was so thin, it was never attacked. He would have had to go home
A Union loss at Gettysburg would not have been the tactical blow militarily, so you are correct. The problem would have been politically. Before Gettysburg, Lincoln's popularity as well as the war itself was losing favor in a big way. No matter what happened at Vicksburg, a loss at Gettysburg would have likely cost Lincoln the election and a peace candidate installed in the White House. Lee's supply lines were irrelevant -- he was gunning for a victory that would ensure a political outcome and end the war at that moment. It was a gamble, and he lost.
@@carltonreese4854 the only part I disagree with is the supply lines statement. As a person who spent most of his military career behind enemy lines or going in first. I can tell you this, the first thing I will do is see what you have, like Stuart should have been doing. He should have burned the supplies in place. That said, I will let command know, then I will cut communications, supplies and reinforcements. Like destroying choppers and jets, mostly the fuel. I think Lee was in their heads living rent free. Even Grant said that at the Wilderness I think. That said, I would have circled around and blew up his ordnance, burned any food, killed any horses, I could find. At this time in history, if your horses were gone, so was your commination, transportation etc. Who every I sent, would have been between Lee and VA. Mead should have pushed hard once Lee attacked hard or found out he had no supplies, he would have to retreat. It would have been like a big clap motion. When defending, the math is it takes about 3 to dislodge a defender.
0:37. I guess Gen. Stuart didn’t notice Lee or Longstreet from 100 feet away.
Ballsy of you to assume it wasn't 500 and that the dusk hadn't set in.
I guess General Longstreet and Hood was talking about little round top the same one that Colonel Chamberlain was defending,to be taking from the right ?
Yes, he mentions Devil's Den. That's just below Little Round Top.
My great great grand father was in 2nd maine company d . second in comp
Any particular reason why a guard would have a scope on their rifle? Wouldn't they be more suited with long distance?
How the hell would you get an entire army around to the right of those heights?
"Fall in!"
"Right-face!"
"Forward march!"
With three commands.
0:03. The song being played is Rock of Ages. And unfortunately I can’t find a version as beautiful as that. I could use someone’s help
ua-cam.com/video/3hjY03fsnMs/v-deo.html
@@heartofvirginia4877 Most certainly a step in the right direction. Thank you for your help.
@@internetstrangerstrangerofweb You are most welcome! With your tone you sound like a sophisticated Antebellum Southerner! Have a good day
Moving the entire army to the right in front of a entrenched enemy is asinine. Yet nobody really thinks about it. It was a pipe dream. Lee couldn't move the army around to the right and it's miles of supply. He couldn't even retreat at the moment. There was nothing to do but attack
A careful shifting of forces from the Confederate left to their right was doable. The drawback involved was that: 1) Lee was all but out of time by 3 July; 2) there was no logical reason why Meade would have to attack, when all he had to do was to ensure that the AotP remained between the AoNV and Washington D.C., and; 3) the disastrous meeting engagement (for the AoNV) had already made clear that Lee had assumed the tactical as well as the strategic offensive.
This movie doesn't really convey what a bad ass and a great and brave General Hood was. And I am no confederate apologist by any means.
Your point is very well taken.
Though he was aggressive to a fault. Which when it is only him and the pieces he left of himself on battlefield is one thing, but what he did to his army at Franklin in 64 should have seen his court-martial. Though Davis never would have stood still for that.
But your overarching point is correct
iirc (could be im misremembering WHO) he was shot like 3-4 times, lost and arm and a leg, an eventually even had to be afixed to his horse's saddle (what i mean is he continued to fight despite losing several pieces of himself. what a badass). rights and wrongs aside, that is true dedication and bravery in the face of battle.
@@cannedpiss5178 Twice seriously. Shrapnel from an exploding shell mangled his arm at Gettysburg; it was saved but was useless from then on. He was shot in the hip at Chickamauga and his leg was amputated at the thigh (usually a fatal injury); after he recovered he had to be strapped onto his horse. Without researching it further, I'm not sure but I think it was his right arm and left leg.
Longstreet don't come off to me as a major Southerner.
James Longstreet was a fine commander.
General hood survived to get his whole army wiped out at the battle of Franklin…
SMH the confederates really were hit hard on July of 63 they lost Gettysburg and lost Vicksburg it was all over from there and they took severe losses they never recovered from
Does anyone know the name of the song that the band is playing during the beginning of this scene?!
James Thrash rock of ages I think
"Rock of Ages"
General Lee: " General, I have decided to cancel our insane, suicidal infantry attack scheduled for tomorrow " !
General Pickett: " Suits me. "
Allow me to get some input here,if Lee had of broken Meade I don't think Washington would have been his next move because the most fortified city in the world was Washington I think A) Lee would have been so damaged in victory that have that victory on union soil he would simply hold tight and wait for political pressure to come to bear on Lincoln to sue for peace or retire in good order and redeploy in good defensive positions on the Virginia side of the river where he would be well supplied or even wait for foriegn intervention or B) move on and occupy Philadelphia. I Believe that grant taking vicksburg while a blow to the confederacy would not have been the death blow that a Southern victory at Gettysburg would have politically for Lincoln. Thoughts
Lee is visibly pissed off that Stuart comes strolling in like nothing is wrong.
20th Maine!
Vishnujana Dasa, Huh? What are you talking about? Sounds like nonsense.