Prof. Evans, a very prominent British historian, has argued that Waterloo was NOT important. If Wellington had lost, the other armies converging on Napoleon would have beaten him, since he had been so severely weakened by the battle as well as his previous destructive efforts.
@@jaywinters2483 Dude, you're arguing that Napoleon's battle genius which failed at Waterloo would have beaten even larger armies of Russia and Austria. That just does not follow.
No, in the ACW as in the Napoleonic wars, cavalry did reconnaissance. Rather famously Stuart's ride around McClellan and discovery of the open flank of XI Corps at Chancellorsville provided intelligence. Guelzo can say that didn't happen, but it did. And there was much more. Where cavalry beat infantry at recce is in being faster, so able to range ahead of an army and and being able to skedaddle if they ran into something tough while infantry couldn't withdraw from anything much stronger than themselves without routing and outright running for it. Where ACW cavalry really was weaker than Napoleonic cavalry was that there was no trained 'heavy cavarly', at least until near the end of the war when the much delayed Union cavalry was finally trained up enough for charging troops not al ready in disarray. Sheridan in the Valley gave a good example of this. Even then, that cavalry was simply not as well trained and officered as Napoleonic cavalry that included men who'd been training and operating for a decade or more. Classically, heavy cavalry had always been the hardest arm to equip and train into usefulness.
@mikehjt - It is not surprising that reconnaissance which is essential for any army is totally ignored by the Confederates when they are in enemy territory. The wild goose chase of Stuart should have never happened. We can argue who failed most if it was Lee, Stuart, or both equally. There was no common standard how an army worked so a lot relied on individual leadership. There was no common culture of how to operate and a huge lack of trained officers.
The professor/speaker really trivializes Meade’s performance at Gettysburg and afterwards. His arguments seemingly derive from the same views as Dan Sickles and the rest of the Hooker group that remained during the Battle of Gettysburg. Reynold’s plan on the morning of the 1st initially wasn’t to hold the Rebels off until the rest of the army could be brought up, but to fight a running retreat southward until they were back on the Pipe Creek line as seen by the original positioning of the XI Corps closer to the Emmitsburg road as well as those of the III and XII Corps further south on the flanks of the XI. However, after Reynold’s death and the subsequent plan revisions by Howard and later Hancock, the decision was made to make a fight just south of town on the Cemetery Hill line. Otherwise with the time of day at the time I Corps made contact with Heth’s division, III Corps was just north of the Emmitsburg and XII Corps slightly closer, both close enough that had they been ordered to march to the battle would have had plenty of time to reach Cemetery Hill in time to receive Lee’s assault on the retreating I and XI Corps. We see this in the reports of Extra Billy Smith’s who saw the arrival of the XII Corps despite getting the direction slightly off. His quotes’ attributed to Reynolds can’t be corroborated because they were only remembered by enemies of Meade (Sickles, Doubleday, Pleasonton, Butterfield) after the battle so that they could use them to bash Meade to Lincoln and Congress because their egos were bruised. Meade’s councils of war were more to determine whether the army was still strong enough to hold that position after the damage the first day. Following the battle and Meade’s slow response to Lee’s retreat, there was little more that he could feasibly do. VI Corps and possibly V Corps were the only ones which could have made a serious pursuit of Lee. And attacking the entrenched positions at Williamsport probably would have been more costly than the Battle of Gettysburg itself. I really wonder if he still holds these views today, or if he has changed his beliefs.
Heck of an orator. Sounds like Kelsey Grammer. Too bad he said "Rosencrans" at 1:15:06, and "cavalry NEVER does intelligence gathering in the Civil War."
I'm confused by Guelzo on the matter of intelligence gathering. I understand the overall battle of Gettysburg not being a failure of intelligence, since Lee was aware where the Army of The Potomac was, but his actions on July 2nd were based on an absence of intelligence as to the specific locations of the forces on the US left. Guelzo, if memory serves, in 'The Last Invasion' (a book which I LOVE) goes to great length talking about Samuel Johnston's rather poor job of scouting. Is his contention that Stuart possessed no scouts in his division that could have done a better job?
When he said Calvary does not do intelligence then he is kind of right. Calvary do reconnaissance which is not intelligence as such. So be interesting to ask the fellow another time if he is right on this
Reconnaissance is the exploration of an area by military forces to obtain information about enemy forces, the terrain, and civil activities in the area of operations. Obtaining information = intelligence gathering, even when done at the tactical level.
Guelzo is wrong when he claims that civil war cavalry did not perform intelligence functions for their respective armies.. Proof? John Buford Brigadier general of Northern Cavalry, again and again sent messages to John Reynolds telling him that he had discovered which confederate forces were moving toward Gettysburg. He was able to do this because in his role as intelligence gatherer i.e. a scout he had ridden his horses up to the close proximity of said confederate forces and found out who they were and where they most likely going. He also told Reynolds of the nature of the terrain near Gettysburg making it a fine place for the Army of the Potomac to make a stand. No charge Allen for providing you with information you have chosen to ignore, in order to grind your stone of extolling infantry at the cost of reporting the truth. best Bruce Peek
Great presentation. I know this was a few years ago, however, does anyone know the name and relationship status of the woman with dark hair and yellow blouse happens to be? She is the one handing out out the index cards during the Q&A session?
The trouble is the battle of Gettysburg didn't matter. Hooker and Meade were not great fighters but they knew how to move an army and once the Army of the Potomac was between Lee and Washington the campaign was over. If Lee had unhinged the union line and driven the union army off in a rout Meade would have simply withdrawn into the lines around Washington (which at that time were impregnable) and Lee could have done nothing about it. The Army of Northern Virginia couldn't have laid siege to a corn crib. Lee could not then have moved on north because that would have left Meade in his rear, between himself and Richmond, on his communications and on his line of retreat. He could not have gone anywhere, as it were, because any line of advance would have exposed his marching flank to the federals. Longstreet saw all this and tried to talk Lee out of the campaign but the old man wouldn't listen. He wanted to play Napoleon (they all did). Gettysburg was an irrelevant battle despite the hype that surrounds it. Meanwhile, out in the west, one of the most important battles in history was going on at a place you never heard of. Champions' Hill. Look it up.
Dr. Guelzo is overstating the battle of Gettysburg's importance. Tactically Gettysburg was almost a draw; the AOP never would have collapsed and deserted if defeated (that didn't happen in the Civil War, for a number of reasons; if the Confederate Army of Tennessee didn't desert en masse after Nashville I can't see the AOP doing it). Lee had limited food and only enough ammo for 4 days heavy fighting, even if Pickett's charge had been successful but the Union army retreats intact then Lee still has to retreat due to ammo and food shortages.
You are not seeing big picture. Lee needed a victory so the North will quit. The South can't win militarily but they can win if the North quit. So a big defeat at Gettysburg and defeat of the Army of the Potomac could tip the balance in favour of a peace treaty and recognition of the confederacy. It's the best the South can hope for.
@@johnlander4635 We're not sure of Lee's plans; he never described them and the second- and third-hand accounts of Lee imagining a crushing victory in a meeting engagement battle don't square with the orders given on July 1st of telling everyone not to bring up a general engagement. Winning a battle on Northern soil brings what exactly? Anything less than an Austerlitz or Jena where the Army of the Potomac is destroyed as a fighting force will just exhaust Lee's ammunition and also his food supply. Napoleonic-style victories like that just didn't happen in the Civil War, usually the beaten army was able to retreat as an intact army, like Second Bull Run. If Lee wins battle like Second Bull Run, he has to retreat back to Virginia for resupply despite his victory, as his army will be depleted of ammunition and can't risk another battle (as it was, after Pickett's Charge Lee was left with just enough ammo for one more day's fighting). Lee's logistical realities never seem to get mentioned in the Gettysburg campaign. It's something that no good commander can ignore. If you army runs out of food, just take a look at the Appomattox Campaign for the result---1000s of men a day dropping out from the ranks due to hunger and exhaustion, and horses not able to pull guns and wagons anymore. If you want to see the result of running out of ammo, look no further than John Hunt Morgan's disastrous end to his raid in Cynthiana, KY, when in the midst of battle his command ran out of ammo and his force overrun and destroyed (losing 80 %). So while it's true an Austerltiz-style victory, as unlikely as that might be, might turn the war in the South's favor, it's also very true that a catastrophic defeat on northern soil would end the South's hopes for independence. And the latter result is more likely a result than the former, and even the former doesn't militarily guarantee the Confederacy victory (like the Russians in 1812, even the loss of Washington doesn't stop the Lincoln administration from raising more armies). It could have been that to seek that 'political victory' results you speak of, Lee needed to do nothing more than stay on Union soil as long as he could, avoiding pitched battle and living off the heretofore-untouched Pennsylvania countryside, threatening Harrisburg or Philadelphia or Baltimore in turn, but not trying to seek pitched battle, as anything but the most decisive of victories imaginable forces him back to Virginia.
Then why invade in the first place? Lee was under the clock which meant he had to do stuff and couldn't wait for ideal circumstances. So if he could 'defeat' the North and make them quit then that's a win. He doesn't have to win militarily just win politically. Whether it was a good idea or could work is up for debate. But at least it was an idea. The South was going to run out of men and guns well before the North so maybe push the issue before the issue pushes you?
@@stewartmillen7708 Nevertheless, much of his reasoning can be for the most part ascribed if not perfectly ascertained, while the political ramifications held a major importance in the risky move, Lee was surely considering the fresh resources of the northern regions as he was so depleted. His inherent desperation in this regard is fairy obvious even if he overestimated the resulting gains in the process.
Yes Lee and his outnumbered army lost at Gettysburg. the union army stay on those hills and would not come off them to fight Lee on open ground even after Pickett charge and they let Lee get away what a great victory.
@@danielkitchens4512 Meade's forces actually maneuvered well and charged back if you will recall or study the battles more closely. This was no 'great victory' for Lee. Far from it, but the Union failed immediately afterwards by casually allowing his army to remove back to Virginia. There is no loss and victory anyway; Lee's was a dicey and ill-conceived plan and the recon was poorly executed. Under the circumstances Pickett's Charge was nothing less than foolhardy decision making. It is very unlikely, and Lee should have been aware, that he was ever going to be able to 'pounce on the Army of the Potomac' without timely speed he couldn't muster as it appears he was simply outclassed in underestimating the willpower of the outraged northern forces in their own backyard.
Unfortunately, the microphone problem needed to be dealt with early on and fixed. Very distracting for me.
Prof. Evans, a very prominent British historian, has argued that Waterloo was NOT important. If Wellington had lost, the other armies converging on Napoleon would have beaten him, since he had been so severely weakened by the battle as well as his previous destructive efforts.
I don’t buy that: Napoleon’s battle genius was constantly amazing his foes.
@@jaywinters2483 Dude, you're arguing that Napoleon's battle genius which failed at Waterloo would have beaten even larger armies of Russia and Austria. That just does not follow.
No, in the ACW as in the Napoleonic wars, cavalry did reconnaissance. Rather famously Stuart's ride around McClellan and discovery of the open flank of XI Corps at Chancellorsville provided intelligence. Guelzo can say that didn't happen, but it did. And there was much more. Where cavalry beat infantry at recce is in being faster, so able to range ahead of an army and and being able to skedaddle if they ran into something tough while infantry couldn't withdraw from anything much stronger than themselves without routing and outright running for it. Where ACW cavalry really was weaker than Napoleonic cavalry was that there was no trained 'heavy cavarly', at least until near the end of the war when the much delayed Union cavalry was finally trained up enough for charging troops not al ready in disarray. Sheridan in the Valley gave a good example of this. Even then, that cavalry was simply not as well trained and officered as Napoleonic cavalry that included men who'd been training and operating for a decade or more. Classically, heavy cavalry had always been the hardest arm to equip and train into usefulness.
@mikehjt - It is not surprising that reconnaissance which is essential for any army is totally ignored by the Confederates when they are in enemy territory. The wild goose chase of Stuart should have never happened. We can argue who failed most if it was Lee, Stuart, or both equally. There was no common standard how an army worked so a lot relied on individual leadership. There was no common culture of how to operate and a huge lack of trained officers.
Excellent presentation
The professor/speaker really trivializes Meade’s performance at Gettysburg and afterwards. His arguments seemingly derive from the same views as Dan Sickles and the rest of the Hooker group that remained during the Battle of Gettysburg. Reynold’s plan on the morning of the 1st initially wasn’t to hold the Rebels off until the rest of the army could be brought up, but to fight a running retreat southward until they were back on the Pipe Creek line as seen by the original positioning of the XI Corps closer to the Emmitsburg road as well as those of the III and XII Corps further south on the flanks of the XI. However, after Reynold’s death and the subsequent plan revisions by Howard and later Hancock, the decision was made to make a fight just south of town on the Cemetery Hill line. Otherwise with the time of day at the time I Corps made contact with Heth’s division, III Corps was just north of the Emmitsburg and XII Corps slightly closer, both close enough that had they been ordered to march to the battle would have had plenty of time to reach Cemetery Hill in time to receive Lee’s assault on the retreating I and XI Corps. We see this in the reports of Extra Billy Smith’s who saw the arrival of the XII Corps despite getting the direction slightly off. His quotes’ attributed to Reynolds can’t be corroborated because they were only remembered by enemies of Meade (Sickles, Doubleday, Pleasonton, Butterfield) after the battle so that they could use them to bash Meade to Lincoln and Congress because their egos were bruised. Meade’s councils of war were more to determine whether the army was still strong enough to hold that position after the damage the first day. Following the battle and Meade’s slow response to Lee’s retreat, there was little more that he could feasibly do. VI Corps and possibly V Corps were the only ones which could have made a serious pursuit of Lee. And attacking the entrenched positions at Williamsport probably would have been more costly than the Battle of Gettysburg itself. I really wonder if he still holds these views today, or if he has changed his beliefs.
Heck of an orator. Sounds like Kelsey Grammer. Too bad he said "Rosencrans" at 1:15:06, and "cavalry NEVER does intelligence gathering in the Civil War."
Amen amendment 64 👍✅
Sounds very polished and somewhat theatrical.
I'm confused by Guelzo on the matter of intelligence gathering. I understand the overall battle of Gettysburg not being a failure of intelligence, since Lee was aware where the Army of The Potomac was, but his actions on July 2nd were based on an absence of intelligence as to the specific locations of the forces on the US left. Guelzo, if memory serves, in 'The Last Invasion' (a book which I LOVE) goes to great length talking about Samuel Johnston's rather poor job of scouting. Is his contention that Stuart possessed no scouts in his division that could have done a better job?
A great and very moving, in parts, lecture! Thank you, sir.
what's wrong with CCNY?
Just Guelzo being clever.
Jesus died on Calvary. The army had the cavalry
Still does!
Amen...
But what if Jesus had the cavalry?
interesting, how to be a union rep. for whats being implemented on behave of the ones unaware?
When he said Calvary does not do intelligence then he is kind of right.
Calvary do reconnaissance which is not intelligence as such.
So be interesting to ask the fellow another time if he is right on this
Reconnaissance is the exploration of an area by military forces to obtain information about enemy forces, the terrain, and civil activities in the area of operations. Obtaining information = intelligence gathering, even when done at the tactical level.
Cavalry...
I would assume when he means intelligence he means more like spying. James Bond stuff. So cavalry don't do James Bond stuff.
@@johnlander4635Maybe that's what he means, but that is but one way to collect intelligence.
good
Has someone said that the Battle of Gettysburg was not important?
Guelzo is wrong when he claims that civil war cavalry did not perform intelligence functions for their respective armies.. Proof? John Buford Brigadier general of Northern Cavalry, again and again sent messages to John Reynolds telling him that he had discovered which confederate forces were moving toward Gettysburg. He was able to do this because in his role as intelligence gatherer i.e. a scout he had ridden his horses up to the close proximity of said confederate forces and found out who they were and where they most likely going. He also told Reynolds of the nature of the terrain near Gettysburg making it a fine place for the Army of the Potomac to make a stand. No charge Allen for providing you with information you have chosen to ignore, in order to grind your stone of extolling infantry at the cost of reporting the truth.
best
Bruce Peek
Great presentation. I know this was a few years ago, however, does anyone know the name and relationship status of the woman with dark hair and yellow blouse happens to be? She is the one handing out out the index cards during the Q&A session?
The trouble is the battle of Gettysburg didn't matter. Hooker and Meade were not great fighters but they knew how to move an army and once the Army of the Potomac was between Lee and Washington the campaign was over. If Lee had unhinged the union line and driven the union army off in a rout Meade would have simply withdrawn into the lines around Washington (which at that time were impregnable) and Lee could have done nothing about it. The Army of Northern Virginia couldn't have laid siege to a corn crib. Lee could not then have moved on north because that would have left Meade in his rear, between himself and Richmond, on his communications and on his line of retreat. He could not have gone anywhere, as it were, because any line of advance would have exposed his marching flank to the federals. Longstreet saw all this and tried to talk Lee out of the campaign but the old man wouldn't listen. He wanted to play Napoleon (they all did). Gettysburg was an irrelevant battle despite the hype that surrounds it. Meanwhile, out in the west, one of the most important battles in history was going on at a place you never heard of. Champions' Hill. Look it up.
Good lecture, I think the best result in the west was the rise of Grant. He got the necessary job done.
Sort of - some might say the split is just as wide today.
Dr. Guelzo is overstating the battle of Gettysburg's importance. Tactically Gettysburg was almost a draw; the AOP never would have collapsed and deserted if defeated (that didn't happen in the Civil War, for a number of reasons; if the Confederate Army of Tennessee didn't desert en masse after Nashville I can't see the AOP doing it). Lee had limited food and only enough ammo for 4 days heavy fighting, even if Pickett's charge had been successful but the Union army retreats intact then Lee still has to retreat due to ammo and food shortages.
You are not seeing big picture. Lee needed a victory so the North will quit.
The South can't win militarily but they can win if the North quit. So a big defeat at Gettysburg and defeat of the Army of the Potomac could tip the balance in favour of a peace treaty and recognition of the confederacy. It's the best the South can hope for.
@@johnlander4635 We're not sure of Lee's plans; he never described them and the second- and third-hand accounts of Lee imagining a crushing victory in a meeting engagement battle don't square with the orders given on July 1st of telling everyone not to bring up a general engagement.
Winning a battle on Northern soil brings what exactly? Anything less than an Austerlitz or Jena where the Army of the Potomac is destroyed as a fighting force will just exhaust Lee's ammunition and also his food supply. Napoleonic-style victories like that just didn't happen in the Civil War, usually the beaten army was able to retreat as an intact army, like Second Bull Run. If Lee wins battle like Second Bull Run, he has to retreat back to Virginia for resupply despite his victory, as his army will be depleted of ammunition and can't risk another battle (as it was, after Pickett's Charge Lee was left with just enough ammo for one more day's fighting).
Lee's logistical realities never seem to get mentioned in the Gettysburg campaign. It's something that no good commander can ignore. If you army runs out of food, just take a look at the Appomattox Campaign for the result---1000s of men a day dropping out from the ranks due to hunger and exhaustion, and horses not able to pull guns and wagons anymore. If you want to see the result of running out of ammo, look no further than John Hunt Morgan's disastrous end to his raid in Cynthiana, KY, when in the midst of battle his command ran out of ammo and his force overrun and destroyed (losing 80 %). So while it's true an Austerltiz-style victory, as unlikely as that might be, might turn the war in the South's favor, it's also very true that a catastrophic defeat on northern soil would end the South's hopes for independence. And the latter result is more likely a result than the former, and even the former doesn't militarily guarantee the Confederacy victory (like the Russians in 1812, even the loss of Washington doesn't stop the Lincoln administration from raising more armies).
It could have been that to seek that 'political victory' results you speak of, Lee needed to do nothing more than stay on Union soil as long as he could, avoiding pitched battle and living off the heretofore-untouched Pennsylvania countryside, threatening Harrisburg or Philadelphia or Baltimore in turn, but not trying to seek pitched battle, as anything but the most decisive of victories imaginable forces him back to Virginia.
Then why invade in the first place?
Lee was under the clock which meant he had to do stuff and couldn't wait for ideal circumstances.
So if he could 'defeat' the North and make them quit then that's a win.
He doesn't have to win militarily just win politically.
Whether it was a good idea or could work is up for debate.
But at least it was an idea. The South was going to run out of men and guns well before the North so maybe push the issue before the issue pushes you?
@@johnlander4635 Moving north was a loose loose gambit. It is going all in Poker while you have not even five cards.
@@stewartmillen7708 Nevertheless, much of his reasoning can be for the most part ascribed if not perfectly ascertained, while the political ramifications held a major importance in the risky move, Lee was surely considering the fresh resources of the northern regions as he was so depleted. His inherent desperation in this regard is fairy obvious even if he overestimated the resulting gains in the process.
Am amen amendment 64 👍✅
Thompson Richard Johnson Charles Young Christopher
Clark Lisa Robinson Mary Johnson Steven
Funny 🤣🤣🤣
I'm such a nerd 😂
Lee lost! Confederates lost!
Yes Lee and his outnumbered army lost at Gettysburg.
the union army stay on those hills and would not come off them to fight Lee on open ground even after Pickett charge and they let Lee get away what a great victory.
@@danielkitchens4512 Meade's forces actually maneuvered well and charged back if you will recall or study the battles more closely. This was no 'great victory' for Lee. Far from it, but the Union failed immediately afterwards by casually allowing his army to remove back to Virginia. There is no loss and victory anyway; Lee's was a dicey and ill-conceived plan and the recon was poorly executed. Under the circumstances Pickett's Charge was nothing less than foolhardy decision making. It is very unlikely, and Lee should have been aware, that he was ever going to be able to 'pounce on the Army of the Potomac' without timely speed he couldn't muster as it appears he was simply outclassed in underestimating the willpower of the outraged northern forces in their own backyard.
Very boring. Not very good.
Tuma duma:}
Maybe ur boring!
Should not have admitted student to saunter in late.
corzen //nd.D