Can you compare the 15in guns of the Vittorio class, QE class and the Bismarck class in terms of ballistic performance, shell shell penetration and range and which would you take home as a trophy mount assuming you had space?
Do you think capture of the franch navy, by the Germans, in world war II, would have Changed the Outcome of the Battle of the antlantic and Operation Seelöwe? Thx for getting me interessted in naval warfare, keep Up the great Work
Vince Cuevas The Italian 15” gun all the way (when it has non-defective shells). Reasonably accurate, and hits harder than every other battleship gun except the 16”/50 and the 18.1”.
Drach: "Attention now focused to the last remaining major threat to the Japanese interests in the western Pacific..." My Thoughts: "The Japanese army?" Drach: "The United States." My Thoughts: "Oh, I guess that makes sense too."
The Australian coat of arms has an emu and a kangaroo in it as they can't move backward. Perhaps that is what the defense system was aspiring to....the vicious emu....(what, behind the rabbit?)
I'm sure that Japan is grateful that they never had a wool or mutton shortage requiring them to invade that crocodile and emu infested venomous creature incubator you genuinely lovely, crazy, people call home.
Kangaroos use their claws to tear open people while balancing on their tail.. Even Koala's are dangerous. When I was young I saw a Koala get pissed at a person and tear their leg open with its claws.. The person had to be rushed to hospitol due to the blood loss.. Don't fight wildlife in Australia, Even the cute ones kill you if annoyed..
@@zakofrx ... and that was just talking about the land! Only mad people (like me) went in the water! There even the little octopus that live in tidal pools are deadly.
The fundamental problem with decisive battle is the assumption that the US would give in upon losing that battle despite knowing that Japan would not give in if it lost. Same with Germany thinking Britain would give in after the fall of France despite knowing Germany would not give in in the same situation. If your strategy relies on wishful thinking about the enemies moral weakness compared to your own its doomed from the start.
Well, if the US was seen to be pissing away good ships and men just to defend European colonial possessions, the American people might have had something to say about it. Then the Japanese went and did the one thing that guaranteed the US would fight a war to the finish.
@@halfassedfart True, but the Phillipines was a US possession not European. Personally I don't get why the Japanese felt the need to attack the Phillipines at the same time as attacking the European possessions, I doubt the US would have intervened.
Even if the US lost a large "decisive" battle, they had such massive industrial capability that they could make up for however many military units they lost in a matter of months, while countries like Japan would have taken years to cover similar losses.
@@VersusARCH Yup! :-D Especially Philippine Sea I think... From there on out it was just 1-way tickets for every single Japanese ship and plane, literally
Philippine Sea was the real decisive battle. Leyte was just cleanup-even at Samar the Americans were in a much better position than usually made out to be.
@@bkjeong4302 Yes, completely agree there. And Leyte was admitting to the fact they got pretty desperate (on the IJN side) and basically, the operation already carried a semi-kamikaze undertone in it (sacrifice of remaining carriers as pure bait) like Ten-Ho would be the next year. Yes, it was more a cleanup, and also shows the incredibly weakened state of the IJN, even when outnumbering and outgunning a foe in every department (I´m referring to Kurita´ś Debacle vs Task Force 65, was it 65? You know, the Miracle Fleet :P). Philippine Sea was the last ´conventional´ operation anyways.
A quote attributed to a German officer during World War II shows the persistence of the Army’s ambivalence towards doctrine: “One of the serious problems in planning the fight against American doctrine, is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.”
Reminds me of a Soviet Officer being quoted as saying "The reason the US Army does so well in war is that war is chaos, and the American army practices chaos on a daily basis"
This goes a long way to explain the COVID-19 response in the US. Americans by and large do not like being told what to do. Especially by agents of government. Of course at their workplace they are being payed so that's different
Americans never do what we're told. They told us "colonies cant be super powers" and "extremely ethnically and politically diverse countries cant work together" and "you have to wear a mask" and we did the polar opposite of all those things, and that's why we're number 1, Canada never landed on the moon, and Japan doesn't even have a real military anymore.
I always like to say that the Japanese didn't really have a *strategy* for how to win a war with the US. They had a bunch of fantastic operational and tactical plans for how to defeat US military formations, but never a plan to defeat the US. This tends to go all the way to the top as well, as the Japanese at the highest levels never really had a grand strategy for national defense. They just effectively had the Army and Navy each planning their own private wars against the Russians/Soviets and US respectively, and then fighting for resources to do so. Probably the biggest advantage Japan gets in grand strategy games like HoI4 is just having a unified strategic vision and coalescing all their resources to implement that vision.
The downside is that HoI4 is a massive downgrade from HoI3, and in HoI3 you have to deal with the very complex and very messy supply system. Which works REALLY POORLY as an island nation.
One can even argue that their operational vision, like the Germans, was not that great - especially when you compare with Russians who learnt (with lotta pain, Vatoutin can attest to that ...) how to prepare an operation, execute it and most importantly stop it at the right moment to begin the next one. See what happened in China, they got properly sucked into a neverending battle ; see how bad they were at logistics, the bread and butter of operations (carriers striking Pearl Harbour not even able to go there at first ...) Japanese were the second victims of the XIXth vision of war, after Germans. And before Americans after WW2.
Of course the IJN liked the French jeune ecole at first. Just look at those incredible torpedo boats they had, sailing the North Sea and blending in with British fishing trawlers to confuse the Russians. If you had MTBs that could manage to operate on the far side of the globe without any kind of logistics support you'd be pretty confident in them too.
@Katyusha They had a pretty good estimate of the US' industrial power. What they horribly underestimated was just how badly Pearl Harbor would piss the US public off. They expected that americans would take a look at their initial losses, tally up how much it would cost them to keep this up and decide it wasn't worth it. What they didn't expect but really should have was that Pearl Harbor would drive the american public into a frenzy that would not allow the war to end in anything but an unconditional surrender, no matter the cost. Their reading of economic and military power was decent. It was their appreciation of their enemies' _psychology_ that was way off. (This went the other way too, by the way. Japanese forces' preference for suicidal charges over surrender caught the US completely by surprise.)
Summary of Japan fishing for decisive battles during WWII. Japan: Oi come fight us on our turf on our terms in the perfect circumstances for our advantage. USA: No.
@@Maverick-gg2do The Japanese won several huge victories around Guadacanal. But in the end, they couldn't fight the war of attrition that was the Solomons campaign. Each side lost about 30 warships during the campaign. The Americans replaced their losses with newer, more modern ships. The Japanese could only stretch themselves thinner and pull back.
@@richardm3023 I'm familiar with these. That's why I brought up Guadacanal. They won several victories but failed to capitalize on a few of them. They were never gonna win the war. But they had their chances to have the "decisive battle" they were looking for and they didn't really make the most of it.
Japan: "Shit we've lost our fleet, But we'll never surrender!" USA: "We'll bomb the crap out of you!" Japan "We will never surrender" Boom! Hiroshima, USA: "Surrender you started this!" Japan: Never! (Emperor was assured USA didn't have another atomic bomb) three days later Nagasaki BOOM! USA: "Surrender!" Japan "Why can't we all just get along?" (The USA had one more atomic bomb all ready to drop on Japan. It's a shame they didn't drop another) Hirohito cost the lives of millions of innocents and treated prisoners like animals. He should have been strung up.
Decisive battle doctrine is never really madness. It's quite sensible in symmetrical conflicts actually, since it both shortens the war, reduces the impact on civilians and the economy , and for all intends and purposes, makes wars less bloody. The issue is that decisive battle basically stopped being a sensible strategy in Warfare once nations with vast populations, areas and resources came about which could kinda just keep churning out men and material for prolonged wars. And that basically started in europe in the 17th century. When Mahan wrote his book about decisive battle, he was writing during a unique time period during the late 19th century when most major navies just so happened to have had most of their navies obsoleted, while building viable and powerful warships was both so expensive and time consuming that not even the royal navy could field a full battle line of them. A naval war during the 1880's or 1890's would indeed have been decided by pretty much just a single battle, no matter the participants, since no nation was capable of replacing battle line units at a fast pace at that point. And the Spanish american war pretty much proved that. The Russo Japanese war then cemented this sentiment, and the First World war with its battle of Jutland which was by all means decisive, must have set it in stone in the eyes of the supporters of decisive battle doctrine. It just so happened that the Major navies of the second world war had by then developed the capability to swiftly replace losses again, which completely invalidates decisive battle.
Which is ironic that the Japanese used Mahan's naval strategy against the Americans whom Mahan himself is an American. The Americans used Corbett's strategy which was the opposite of Mahan and that proved far more effective than Mahan's doctrine during WW2.
Mahan never wrap his head around the idea of true total war with almost unlimited resources and manpower US and Soviet brought to bear in WW2? Come to think of it, did he wrote the book for the world WITHOUT U.S.? Similar to how NAFTA and WTO was designed for the world without China some say.
@@thanakonpraepanich4284 He wrote his book for a world im which the US where these US, I.e.not a nation but a collection of aomewhat independant nations with united foreign policy.
@@ravenknight4876 More that Mahan was writing for a world where the US was just exiting, and would quickly re-enter after WWI, a phase of Isolationism. Also, up until WWII the US had maintained a pretty consistent tendency towards Isolationism, and avoidance of major international conflicts.
@@thanakonpraepanich4284 NAFTA without China is like the EU without China. It's in the name. Hong Kong has been a member of WTO since 1995, the year after its inception, and the whole of the PRC since 2001
Tōjō now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the army would lead the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist: Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices
@@Ron52G attacking the Americans was pretty much a Navy idea, Army was rooting more for a Soviet Union attack. Except the Army got spanked by uncle Zhukov, and Germans trampled the Anti Komintern pact with the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement ruining the prospect of a war against the Soviet. That's when the Navy could impose their own ideas that happen to favour the Navy by mere coincidence. ... Reminds me of the Air Force creation, to be honest. "We'll go full nuclear and blast the world because NO WAY WE GO UNDER ARMY JURIDICTION AGAIN !"
@@mickaeldelatre3320 No, it was the high command (aka Tojo and his friends) wish to attack Pearl. Yamamoto intently against it as he's one of the few naval officer who actually spend time in US and know her capability to keep pumping the war machines. Heck most navy general was against the war against US. They're sure Japan can get all the resources on China and there's no point attacking allies colonies in SEA. But the high command insist on attacking allies and its colonies. Yamamoto and other naval officers can't defy high command order.
1) Build fleet of battleships to beat up enemy battleships in flashy Jutland/Tsushima fashion. 2) Sink said enemy battleships in port, forcing them to use carriers. 3) ???? 4) PROF-where did our ships go?
@@jimmyseaver3647 The Japanese DID care about the American carriers (albeit for semi-wrong reasons). Which actually makes their doctrine self-contradictory.
1) Launch surprise attacks on the two largest industrial and military powers in the world. 2) Assume there will be no response due to overwhelming success of said attacks. 3) ??? 4) Mushroom cloud.
1. Construct the largest naval power in the Pacific and most of the world as you know it. 2. Force your now catching up Army and your increasingly expanding Navy to fight for resources and political power. 3. Piss off 90% of the world and spit on the biggest economical power near you. 4. Profit
Imperial Japan: "Here's our plan to beating the USA." Yamamoto: "Uh, there's a big blank spot between 'Destroy the US fleet' and 'US surrenders.' Do we have a plan for that?" Imperial Japan: "..." Yamamoto: "..." Imperial Japan: "..." Yamamoto: "Alright let's do this then."
Apparently Yamamoto's political enemies among the Japanese ultranationalists and the Imperial Japanese Army (but I repeat myself) in the late 1930's thought he was a traitor in cahoots with the Americans and British and wanted to assassinate him: www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/opinion/a-reluctant-enemy.html
Well done and particularly well researched! Talking to veterans of the IJN I was often surprised by the resentment of naval officers towards the army. They felt that often their hand was forced and that the IJN lacked an independent policy.
@@glennsimpson7659 I don't think thats really a fair comparison. Break downs on communication is not quite the same as the US Army deciding to invade Truk in force, while the USMC goes island hopping and the Navy hates both and never wants to support them. The Americans had a unified strategic plan and the military carried it out. The Japanese had two strategic plans and each precluded the other as much as possible being carried out by their own branches.
When you think about it.... this plan was so bad, it even resulted in Germany's downfall. Japan see's Germany's plight. Tojo "I'm helping" /bombs Pearl Harbor Hitler "Why would you do that!?"
it's kind of stupidly outdated, yeah. could've cool and awesome in WWI where you can have a cool jutland thing, but can't do that now where Aircraft Carriers and escort ships = boom boom enemy fleet gone where BBs just cough up the funds, if yamato would face BBs then she could've been great but not against planes
@@wrayday7149 Let's face it, it was Stalin who kicked Germany's butt. We did our part, but it was mostly by giving the USSR the material it needed to do the job and by distracting the Germans in Africa, France and Italy. And if the US learned anything from the US Civil War, it was that losing a few "decisive battles" did not mean that we could not win the war, especially when we could employ a blockading Anaconda Strategy similar to what was used to strangle the Confederacy. Timely development of the Atomic bomb just speeded up the time line and caused Japan to surrender ahead of previous plans at less cost in men and material.
@@wrayday7149 no, Germany's downfall was when they declared war on Poland and later the USSR, they had started a war that they had no proper strategy to win against multiple enemies with more of literally everything that they had
@@enterprism5298 Do note that while Japan was stupid enough to think battleships had strategic value in WWII, so was everyone else, hence why everyone else also wasted resources on battleships around the same time. The Germans were actually significantly worse in this aspect; they were less able to afford battleship construction than Japan, and shouldn’t have bothered with large surface ships (or carriers), period, given their geography and strategic situation.
Hidden away at 46:58 and 47:42 are two of the best Pearl Harbor attack photos I've ever seen, one blurry and the other sharp and clear, each telling a story as if it were still December 7, 1941. Your narration leading up to these photos kept me happily up long into the night, and gave me a comprehensive overview of events leading up to and following this attack. Thanks much.
The Japanese DBD seemed to best reflect reality when the enemy was incompetent technically and administratively (e.g. Imperial China and Russia), and who tended to regard war as a game played at a distance by elites moving their pawns around for relatively limited goals, and not as existential conflicts between nations in their social and economic entirety. That is to say, much like wars between European powers prior to 1914, landing a single heavy blow against your enemy could convince its monarch and ministers--the only players who mattered--that a face-saving treaty and a few concessions of territory were preferable to a long drawn-out conflict that could eventually move even the peasant rabble against you. Nobody in Japan with influence--or who wasn't afraid of getting slaughtered by "patriotic" subordinates--could believe or admit that the "mongrel" United States was willing to overlook the effective destruction of its Pacific Fleet and the occupation of the Philippines and its other Pacific outposts, to create a new battle fleet and fight an extremely bloody retaking of its lost assets, much less threaten directly the Home Islands.
Keep in mind that what Japan destroyed at Pearl Harbor were the weapons of the previous war, and that the decisive weapons for this war would be aircraft carriers, submarines, bombers, and amphibious assaults.
@@gkelly941 Yes. Also keep in mind they never allowed Japanese fleet submarines the authority to hunt U.S. merchant shipping as regularly as U.S. submariners did. Had they, the war would have been much harder.
@@thanatosstorm US in the pacific used convoys with many escorts including carriers. It also broke the Japanese codes so they sent out hunter-killer groups to hunt down the Japanese sumbarines whose positions were known. It would not have worked.
Some of the defenses Australia could muster in case of invasion: Koala drop-troops Roos' cavalry brigades Huntsmen spider minefields Saltwater crocodile torpedo boats Setting entire continent on fire
Tōjō now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the army would lead the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist: Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices
Yamamoto: “The Americans won’t just surrender to us like that. Why, we would need to dictate peace terms in the bloody White House to make them quit!” US Media: “OUTRAGE! YAMAMOTO PLANS TO DICTATE PEACE TERMS IN WHITE HOUSE” Yamamoto: “What? No, wait, I said-“ *gets cut off by P-38s shooting down his G4M*
@@gameandgamer1479 Y'know... He probably would NOT have enjoyed living long enough to find out how right he had been about the outcome of a long war with the US.
yup Y demoted Takagi for poor KK after The Battle of Java Sea T sank 3 ships and damaged a dozen others, with no losses in his own 20 ships the amount of allied losses necessary to view each engagement as a victory for Y was; impossibly high. it's a ridiculous scene for a battle that isn't self defense
Interesting memo.. War on two fronts is oft cited as a major Hitler blunder. China was unsubdued,war with Russia a real possibility ; even conquest of Australia was judged by IJ leadership to be..not possible. US dwarfed Britain in capacity, population, strategic position . IJ Pacific empire was a series of marginally mutually supportive garrisons, (dependent on air & sea forces to cover the gaps ) vulnerable to envelopement/total defeat in detail. Possibly IJ leaders realized that going on the defensive would signal the beginning of the end.
Thanks for covering this, Drach! You've helped me patch two of the biggest holes with an alt-hist project I've been working on. The answer is quite simple: Don't make attritional warfare when the opponent has the materiel advantage, and also don't expect the enemy to do something you wouldn't.
I like the analogy of the dog trying to catch the car, that they hadn't thought the plan all the way through. But putting it in the perspective of the Russo-Japanese war and the battle of Tsushima shows that the Japanese naval command were also making the mistake common to so many military strategists: they were planning to fight the previous war.
The primary weakness of the Decisive Battle doctrine (by any nation) is the concept of risk; it is win or die. If that battle is joined, there is no guarantee it will be won, and a loss will be catastrophic. The fate of the combatant hangs on one roll of the dice. Attritional warfare, on the other hand, has much less risk. The concept of the decisive battle dates back, in the West, at least to classical Greek times, possibly to get the fighting over with so everyone could go back to their fields and flocks so their communities don't starve.
The problem with Japan's decisive battle doctrine was the enemy. The US wasn't the clusterf#$k that was late imperial China and Russia. The US was far to big, and stable to be put down by a few key battles. Essentially, Japan picked up bad habits from kicking the tar out of China and Russia during their lowest points.
By the end of the war the US had 151 aircraft carriers, I 29 were full sized fleet carriers. Could you explain how the US managed the shipping logistics of how the US not only managed to make up for losses in military and civilian shipping to the UK and enough cargo tonnage to supply over 285,000 naval personnel and over 168,000 soldiers???
That's a good summary, actually. Japan's plans after the First World War do come across as 'whatever worked before, but BIGGER', always betting the Americans would assemble for the awaited Decisive Battle, because why _wouldn't_ they?
To be fair, the Pacific Fleet's pre-war plan pretty much (unknowingly) played along with the Japanese Navy's plans. Then Pearl Harbor sunk all the BBs and only the carriers were left, so the USN had to adopt a completely different strategy.
@@TheSchultinator Very true, but it strikes me that Japan still thought that even after losing their battleships the Americans would still act exactly the same way, as if the Pearl Harbour attack never happened, just with the Atlantic Fleet. Essentially by assuming the Americans were doctrinally rigid, Japan made itself likewise.
Even though you answered the "what were they thinking" question on Japanese strategic planning, it's still a valid question: What they heck were they thinking! Fascinating stuff. It demonstrates the importance of understanding the character of your opponent, not just their capacity: Of course the 'Merkins would prepare their heaviest boots for a kick-back after Pearl Harbour. I wish we had this resource when I did O-level history...
Ascribing character to a nation in attempting to predict its histprical decisions is a massive flaw I feel. For example numerous planners were expecting nations to swiftly crumble in war, and the historical evidence points to almost without fail all belligerents fighting until their capacity to make war is totally exhausted in total war.
@ Shaun Salter They were thinking that the Germans had defeated the Red Army and that America would have to ficus its resources on the European conflict,
Yapneez: "Hah! We have sunk your fleet! Will you now kowtow to us in recognition of our sublime superiority?" Merkins: "We will not stop until you are just a greasy stain on our fist."
It's a flow chart: 1. ATTACK! | 2. They suffer hideous casualties .--------------------------------------------------- They don't, and we are now losing. | | 3. They lose the will to fight. Wait, that can't happen, we're racially superior. | | 4. They sue for peace. WHY DO WE KEEP LOSING?!? WE'RE RACIALLY SUPERIOR!
Bite and hold. It worked more often than not: the First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War and the Invasion of Manchuria... Hindsight is a wonderful thing but it was not unreasonable at the time. In fact the WW2-style unconditional surrenders happened rarely in history.
"As for the Japanese, they will be ground to powder. All that is left is the proper application of overwhelming force." Winston did not mince words....he more or less hurled them at objects that irked him. I would argue that the Kantai Kessen happened despite Japanese losses in 1942-3 at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. It was viewed that way by Japanese planners and their preparation for it was the main reason why 1943 had no major carrier battles. The Japanese were able to force a battle of favorable terms, but the tactical changes in the US navy in 1942-43 vastly outstripped those in the IJN. US air defence doctrine had crystallized since the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands into a coordinated system that little resembled its efforts at any prior engagement. The addition of proximity fuzed AAA helped, but the fleet level coordination of destroyer radar pickets combined with constant CAP meant that incoming aerial attacks would be met with furious opposition starting over one hundred miles from the carriers. I would thus argue that while your criticism of the strategic flaws in the Kantai Kessen doctrine are sound, it was also severely hindered by a failure to address evolving tactics.
Hmm, well put sir. I can't deny your accuracy of the events but I don't think there was kantai Kessel style Battle through the entire war with the possible exception of midway. My reading of the kantai Kessen is that both sides are going to take all thier best war ships, gather them together in big formations and ram them down the other sides facehole. Kantai kessen hadn't been achieved since Jutland, because midway had no gun duel and every other campaign you mention is a loose bunch of skirmishes and night actions, not the bushido style ass kicking the IJN wanted.
The most important tactical change was a result from Pearl Harbor: Carriers as the lead capital ship. The US had to do it because they were the only capital ship they had following the attack as their battleships were out of the picture. Given how the carrier’s air group can kill a battleship before it can get in range, they proved to be the new flagship of any fleet. Japan didn’t make the change until 2 years later.
The Battle in the Pacific were literally who could see enemy first. While ships had advanced guns and reloading systems, the radar weren't mature enough and scout plane were not maturing in doctrine either
@@VersusARCHyes. Most of the time, the IJN were practically blind during critical battle. Hence they seem to do the overly impractical planning. Naval battles in a region as big as Pacific require vision as wide as the globe. When you can see your enemy while your enemy can't, you can out maneuver them to hell. It would give carrier its rise not merely for their aerial strike but also its capability to spot enemy in a vast ocean where the enemy and friends couldn't hide.
Didn't discover your channel until about a year ago, so still some catching up to do. I have to say, the level of detail combined with your articulation and passion concerning the subject matter is brilliant. Thank you so much for all you teach.
Not to mention that if you sink a large number of ships in their harbor then it’s that much easier to re-float and repair them. Whereas the open ocean will typically claim what sinks.
I'm a little concerned with any characterization of Isoroku Yamamoto as "aggressive." Yamamoto was a supporter of the unpopular "treaty faction" at a time in Japanese political history when many other members were being assassinated by war hawks in the IJA (he further risked murder by opposing the imperial invasion of China AND the Tripartite pact). He even insisted that the US be advised of Japan's declaration of war no less than one hour before his attack on Pearl harbor, and was appalled when he learned that decoding delays in Washington had prevented this. I think that his decision to take the offensive whenever possible came from a desire to preserve strategic initiative as long as possible, which was the best implementation of what he knew to be a hopeless and foolish strategy.
Well, even the ADF tried to rein in the E.M.U in 1932, but the E.M.U were having none of that & thumbed their noses at the ADF by increasing their numbers despite Government protests.
That is Drach confusing the operational naval doctrine with overall national policy. Japan won 2 major wars against stronger opponents before WW2 (1.st SIno-Japanese and Russo Japanese war... WW1 was a skirmish insofar the Japanese participation was concerned) with exactly the same doctrine. But during those two wars nobody intervened against them, in fact they had a mutual defense pact with UK during the latter of the two...
@@phbrinsden Not really. The whole thing about 1991 was that the objectives were limited to defeating the Iraqi military and liberating Kuwait; objectives that military force was entirely capable of accomplishing, and did. More complex ideas like overthrowing Saddam or occupying Iraq were avoided in 1991 precisely because those went well beyond military objectives and there wasn't a clear plan for accomplishing them. The second go-round in 2003 was another story entirely.
@@Wolfeson28 The Americans were a bit like that in WWII before and after Overlord as they wanted a quick in and out victory. Montgomery thought that things would be different and that a massive build up to allow momentum to be maintained once the ball was rolling was necessary. Similarly, in the run up to GW II the British advised the Americans that they needed a continuation and an occupation plan after the invasion, and that far greater forces would be needed, but were ignored. The American war planners didn't understand - they found it convenient not to understand - that they needed to steamroller the entire country into total submission.
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@@puskascat Idk where you got your info from, but occupation forces in Iraq were satisfactory initially. The issue was that over time many troops would leave and then heavy fighting would occur again, requiring a surge of troops, I believe in 2007. It was successful, and major issues os insurgency would die down until 2012 or so when the US withdrew from Iraq.
@@phbrinsden sounds like a pack of idiots that recently attacked the U.S. Capitol. Once they got in it all fell apart 'cause nobody thought that part out. Maybe it's just human nature.
20:26, Omaha Cruisers with all the protection of an "Ambitious" sheet of paper... o_0 LMAO at that, I dearly love your dry English wit Sir Drachinifel... >_
Given that in 2020 here in the states being "pearl harbor'd" is still a metaphor for a sneak attack. You were spot on with Japan pretty much removing any chance of a negotiated peace.
@@scottyfox6376 the message that was sent to washington was not a declaration of war, it was simply a ceasing of negotiations and a diplomatic breaking of relation. Nowhere in it was there a message of japan declaring war on the US, just that japan was breaking off relations with the united states, and while that message did arrive late, it did not qualify as a declaration of war, even if it was delivered on time.
Don't forget the fleet had set sailed in late November so regardless of when the message was delivered it was a planned sneak attack without a declaration of war
Invading Australia apart from the EMU system you also have to take into account the lots and lots and lots of nothing barrier between the Australian coast closest Japan and the bulk of Australian cities
What the Japanese failed to take into account was that the U.S. Navy would keep advancing its forward bases. San Diego to Pearl Harbor (Midway for submarines). Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Islands. The Marshall Islands to the Mariana Islands. And add in refueling / resupplying at sea. Never a long, long supply line. The contribution of the Sea Bees cannot be underestimated.
This absolutely cannot be understated-it undermined the Japanese logic behind causing the enemy to extend their supply lines, rendering the whole doctrine invalid.
Those bases are nice targets for the Japanese carrier aircraft (see Pearl Harbor). Unless they are beaten back in a... DECISIVE BATTLE: Coral Sea - target Port Moresby Midway - target Midway Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz - target Henderson Field on Guadalcanal Philippine Sea - target US invasion fleet off the Mariana Islands Leyte Gulf - target US invasion fleet off the Philippines... So how wrong was the Kantai Kessen doctrine really?
@@VersusARCH Because the Japanese were counting in losses taken on the way to battle, hence their emphasis on night fighting. If those same targets have a continuously reduced travel time to get to the actual battle, the odds of engaging and reducing the size of that force go down dramatically, meaning much worse odds in the big decisive battle.
Amazing video. Although I'm quite familiar with the details of the strategy I never made the connection between this and the Japanese's refusal to deploy its battleships. It all make sense now. Your breakdown of its faults and the overall operational change help me further understand why it didn't work. it sounds pretty good on paper yet when asked why it failed, the most common explanation is pretty unsatisfying and simplistic. You definitely explained this topic wonderfully. It is definitely one of my favorite episodes, along with your armor and boiler development episodes.
Even in total defeat and in retreat the IJN Admirals convinced themselves they were 'luring' the US Navy into a decisive battle. Admiral Kusaka candidly admitted later 'we were running'.
Dog chasing the car - i love the metaphor. The one time my dog (when i was 12) caught up with a car, she decided it was a good idea to maneuver in front of it, at which point she was run over. (She survived but was scuffed up a bit).
I'd like to see a video on the development of the USN's replenishment of ships underway techniques and doctrine which was superior to every other nation in WWII. From what little I know, the beginings seem to date to WW1 when it had to get shorter range destroyers to Europe. It's interesting to see a young officer named Nimitz involved to a small extent.
@Sean Nordeen. Try this vid. It’s pretty good but a bit misleading. The vid doesn’t account for the huge head start the IJN has and it doesn’t split the vessels used for Atlantic and Pacific. It’s not a fair comparison. Example. All the escort carriers were already promised to Britain. ua-cam.com/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/v-deo.html
"Hah! We still outgun your puny tin cans! So, mighty Yankees, how well will you do when you cannot bring overkill?" "Hey, man -- honey badger don't care."
You know, I used to think people who could reliably make UA-cam videos every month or so. Then I saw you, saying you made three videos a week (and each generally about 30 mins, which is impressive in its own right) and it blew my mind. Also I never had a naval historian, there are always your land historians and some air power historians. But I never had a naval guy to listen to. All in all, thank you so much for doing this.
I really needed a naval historian back when I was about to play SPI's War in the Pacific. I collected some books, but didn't get far. What the hell is a "fleet in being?"
Excellent evaluation of an example of IJN doctrine in execution with an eye on examining the effectiveness of the naval doctrines that were utilized. They developed over time and their significance is for history to judge and this video presentation does a nice job of evaluation of IJN doctrine.
If your opponent is scraping the bottom of the barrel (or seeing if the barrel itself will float): Method. If your opponent can build two more navies: Madness.
I think one major aspect is missing... in the late 1930, the USA had started a massive shipbuilding program with 6 fast battleships and 6 (or 8?) fleet carriers. Meaning that they doubled their strength! No matter what strategy Japan adopted, you cannot fight such numerical superiority. The first 2 new battleships had been launched before Pearl Harbor, and were ready to fight at the Solomon's . By the time of the Marianas and Philipine campaign, the US Navy consist of all new carriers and battleships. The USA was building ships quicker than Japan could destroy them. When Yamato was sunk, it was attacked by 7 fleet carriers, which is more than the entire pre-war carrier fleet. Had this ship building program started in 1942, instead of 1936, the war would have looked very different.
Kurita and Nishimura checking in... (interesting to compare Nishimura - Shima team to Jellicoe - Beatty. All in reverse, and in totally different strategic situation).
On one hand god i would love to see that, on the other hand that could potentially actually extend the war since there would be less German sailors to form the nucleus of the 1919 German revolution
>The Japanese simply didn't have that many ships with the range to go all the way across Pacific and back again, and their torpedo boats definitely didn't Kamchatka: *press X to doubt*
Drach, this almost rivals your consummate and brilliant engineering analysis of the reasons for HMS HOODS sinking as your very, very best opus in what is a continuous and always excellent content! Bravo Zulu!
Come on guys, the reeeeework wasn’t THAT bad. Carriers were cancer before and they’re cancer now, but at least now they can only be cancer to one ship at a time. On average, it isn’t really harder or easier to fight against them (with the notable exception of DDs trying to kill them and getting their shit kicked in), but now it’s arguably more fun to actually play them on the whole. Carriers now have a much easier time doing SOMETHING in the battle but have to work just as hard and play just as well as other classes for a monster game. I just wish they hadn’t gotten rid of the V, VII, and IX carriers. Like come on, no Taihou or Hiryuu? No Bogue or Essex? For shame. I understand why they did it though, with cv gameplay being more fun and accessible to new players the game would be too saturated with them.
A new school of thought coming out of France. If one simply puts the most luxurious hotels possible to sea the enemy will feel the immediate urge to drop all hostile activity and check in for a spa day. Then you escort them to their 4 star accomadations in the ships brig. For the British one must never conduct gunnery practice as it musses the paintwork. Simply won't do old chap.
mpetersen6 of course France improved on that strategy, and what the French navy is doing now is escort the enemy to British waters, and they are put up in hotels there.
I have to say your videos are great. I’ve had a love of ww2 era ships (particularly the pacific theater since I was hopelessly addicted to a game called P.T.O).
The Kantai Kessen is pretty much the definitive expression of, "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Another nail in the plan's coffin I feel is that by the outbreak of war, the US had learned the importance of logistics. With the Great White Fleet and WWI still in memory, the US made sure to build plenty of well-escorted supplies and transportation as well. This would keep the war at Japan's doorstep even despite Pearl Harbor.
Between this video and Mark Felton's recent one on Japanese brutality in WWII, I feel like I've gained more insight into the Japanese mindset of the period than I ever had before.
Another quality naval video Drach. It's always a pleasure to listen and watch your posts. oh, and by the way...your pronunciation of Kantai Kessen is fine.
The Kantai Kessen doctrine reminds me of the dreadful battle at Verdun in the First World War. To oversimplify it greatly, the German army planned to bleed the French by forcing them to defend the city and then, not to put too fine a point on it, shelling the shit out of them. However, over time, the campaign shifted from causing casualties to taking the city. After several months and nearly a million casualties, despite a very promising beginning, the operation was very much a failure.
The Battle of Verdun was one the German Army did not want to partake in. But due to the Strategic Location and Power of Verdun, they didn’t really have a choice. And Both sides knew that.
@@americankid7782 What on earth? Are you learning history from some map game? Verdun was a strategic irrelevance, taking it would have not facilitated any German advantage. Conversely, inflicting the heavy casualties intended would have considerable effect on the French army.
The photos of the ships with the bridge structures seemingly made of Legos by a 6 year old makes me think a history of the battleship mast from 1750 or so to 1945 might be almost as interesting as the Hotels Go To War video you did on French battleships. From mast with sails and crow's nest to lattice mast to tripod etc. with the changes in steering/propulsion and targeting seems worth a recounting. If this was covered in another presentation, I'll hunt it down on my quest for seeing every video you have done. 21 gun salute for this latest, Drachinifel.
Hear hear! Just identifying what all those levels on Nagato’s bridge were used for, for example, would take its own 5 Minute Guide to Warships (lasting the traditional 30 minutes, of course). You can tentatively identify the admiral’s bridge, navigating bridge, signal bridge, wheelhouse, conning tower, secondary directors, AA directors, air lookouts, sea lookouts, main battery directors, and there still seem to be a lot of windows and platforms unaccounted for. And the top weight and lever arm on the ship when rolling must have been frightening. And there is the fascinating question of evolving battleship design philosophy - forward conning tower/bridge backed by rear tower mast (Graf Spee, Iowa, Richelieu) vs tripod/quadrupod mast with hanging platforms (Nagano, Royal Oak, Marat) vs apartment block (Rodney, KGV). Definitely seems to be national preferences involved but an analysis of the thinking, and advantages/disadvantages, would seem a fertile field of inquiry, and I am sure Drach could bring his usual amazing insights to the issue. Few books on warships cover this question at all, let alone in any detail. The only discussion I can recall is by Raven & Roberts of the HMS London conversion from a stacked platform bridge to a ‘Queen Anne Mansions’ style bridge which badly overstrained the hull, but the discussion was in terms of effects rather than the design philosophy behind it.
Good assessment of Japanese strategy. I would have given a bit more attention to the industrial imbalance with America, American industry was ten times the size of Japanese industry, and a naval war is by definition industrial wars. The only reason that the Pacific War was even possible is that the United States severely limited naval construction while Japan built full out using their full industrial capacity and much of their financial capacity. Your point about Kantai Kessen keeping the Japanese back from committing their full strength is spot-on. Had they done so, they almost surely would have retaken Guadalcanal and done considerable damage to what was left of the Pacific War. One point you do not consider is that Pearl Harbor was launched with the belief that Operation Barbarossa had succeeded. Only on virtually the same day, the Red Army launched a massive winter counter-offensive before Moscow. Had Barbarossa actually succeeded, war with America would have made a lot more sense.
The Anglo Japanese alliance nearly led to a war between Great Britain and France due to alliances. It also advanced Japanese carrier aviation massively.
Japan has forgotten the Vladivostok - squadron doing considerable damage to their troop transports in 1904 and the lessons learned in the Mediterranean during WWI concerning escorts by just looking at the big gun battles. So their greatest victory at Tsushima haunted them 4 decates later, they totally ignored the threat to their own shipping from subs. Perhaps the transition from Samurai feudalism to Great Power with first class navy went to fast...
one of your best videos yet. I have never thought about the flaws of KK so deeply, and especially all at once. Well done. I'm hitting replay and going back to WoWs BTW when is next armchair admirals coming out?
Interesting, I think, and I am not a particularly good thinker, that if the American carriers were in pearl harbor for the sneak attack and were subsequently destroyed, it would have achieved nothing more than the war taking a bit longer to culminate with the outcome very, very similar to that which did occur, And that ends this remark thank you for reading
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Can you compare the 15in guns of the Vittorio class, QE class and the Bismarck class in terms of ballistic performance, shell shell penetration and range and which would you take home as a trophy mount assuming you had space?
Do you think capture of the franch navy, by the Germans, in world war II, would have Changed the Outcome of the Battle of the antlantic and Operation Seelöwe?
Thx for getting me interessted in naval warfare, keep Up the great Work
When would a video about DD development during WW2 and post war come out?
Do you think that a strategy like this could have worked for the HSF in WW1?
Vince Cuevas
The Italian 15” gun all the way (when it has non-defective shells). Reasonably accurate, and hits harder than every other battleship gun except the 16”/50 and the 18.1”.
Drach: "Attention now focused to the last remaining major threat to the Japanese interests in the western Pacific..."
My Thoughts: "The Japanese army?"
Drach: "The United States."
My Thoughts: "Oh, I guess that makes sense too."
The Japanese Navy? The two branches of the Imperial Military were almost as big a threat to each other as the US military.
*SENPEI DO MORE KANTAI NO MORE HENTAI!*
"The Americans are our opponents; the Army is our enemy." - IJN staff officer, probably
"The Australians had the E.M.U. defense system" oh dear God. I see why Japan never dared to set foot there
The Australian coat of arms has an emu and a kangaroo in it as they can't move backward. Perhaps that is what the defense system was aspiring to....the vicious emu....(what, behind the rabbit?)
I'm sure that Japan is grateful that they never had a wool or mutton shortage requiring them to invade that crocodile and emu infested venomous creature incubator you genuinely lovely, crazy, people call home.
Kangaroos use their claws to tear open people while balancing on their tail..
Even Koala's are dangerous.
When I was young I saw a Koala get pissed at a person and tear their leg open with its claws..
The person had to be rushed to hospitol due to the blood loss..
Don't fight wildlife in Australia, Even the cute ones kill you if annoyed..
Japan did technically land a dozen troops on the Australian mainland, they didn't stick around though.
@@zakofrx ... and that was just talking about the land! Only mad people (like me) went in the water! There even the little octopus that live in tidal pools are deadly.
The fundamental problem with decisive battle is the assumption that the US would give in upon losing that battle despite knowing that Japan would not give in if it lost. Same with Germany thinking Britain would give in after the fall of France despite knowing Germany would not give in in the same situation. If your strategy relies on wishful thinking about the enemies moral weakness compared to your own its doomed from the start.
That’s not even the biggest problem here. This doctrine actively contradicts its own assumptions.
Well, if the US was seen to be pissing away good ships and men just to defend European colonial possessions, the American people might have had something to say about it. Then the Japanese went and did the one thing that guaranteed the US would fight a war to the finish.
@@halfassedfart True, but the Phillipines was a US possession not European. Personally I don't get why the Japanese felt the need to attack the Phillipines at the same time as attacking the European possessions, I doubt the US would have intervened.
@@DoddyIshamel Because Yamamoto badly misjudged US intentions.....
Even if the US lost a large "decisive" battle, they had such massive industrial capability that they could make up for however many military units they lost in a matter of months, while countries like Japan would have taken years to cover similar losses.
Japan: We will end this in one single battle!
USA: OK.
*Leyte Gulf happens*
Japan: No not like that.
Midway and Philippine Sea helped too...
You got me there, was thinking ´Mariannas Turkey Shoot?´ LMAO
@@VersusARCH Yup! :-D Especially Philippine Sea I think... From there on out it was just 1-way tickets for every single Japanese ship and plane, literally
Philippine Sea was the real decisive battle. Leyte was just cleanup-even at Samar the Americans were in a much better position than usually made out to be.
@@bkjeong4302 Yes, completely agree there. And Leyte was admitting to the fact they got pretty desperate (on the IJN side) and basically, the operation already carried a semi-kamikaze undertone in it (sacrifice of remaining carriers as pure bait) like Ten-Ho would be the next year. Yes, it was more a cleanup, and also shows the incredibly weakened state of the IJN, even when outnumbering and outgunning a foe in every department (I´m referring to Kurita´ś Debacle vs Task Force 65, was it 65? You know, the Miracle Fleet :P). Philippine Sea was the last ´conventional´ operation anyways.
IJN: "Can't I kessen?"
USN: "No."
I'll show myself out.
😅
brrrrr
IJN: We're the fleet that made the Kessen run in 12 parsecs
@@ivanthemadvandal8435 lol... that was pretty good
A quote attributed to a German officer during World War II shows the persistence of the Army’s ambivalence towards doctrine: “One of the serious problems in planning the fight against American doctrine, is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.”
Reminds me of a Soviet Officer being quoted as saying "The reason the US Army does so well in war is that war is chaos, and the American army practices chaos on a daily basis"
This goes a long way to explain the COVID-19 response in the US. Americans by and large do not like being told what to do. Especially by agents of government. Of course at their workplace they are being payed so that's different
"Instructions are for women!" My father, 1979. Also, "I feel fi........ugh" my father 2004. RIP
@@richardm3023 And COVID-19 may just kill 500,000 Americans. Many Americans have already sworn to not take any vaccines that will be developed.
@@richardm3023 This would've been over by now had people shut up and worn the goddamn masks.
"The enemy will surrender after a single decisive blow because we cannot sustain a long fight with them!"
Narrator: "They did not."
Americans never do what we're told. They told us "colonies cant be super powers" and "extremely ethnically and politically diverse countries cant work together" and "you have to wear a mask" and we did the polar opposite of all those things, and that's why we're number 1, Canada never landed on the moon, and Japan doesn't even have a real military anymore.
@@arthas640 agree with u until u said not to wear mask 😂
@@arthas640 America 90% white lmao.
*SENPEI DO MORE KANTAI NO MORE HENTAI!*
@@arthas640 If you still think the US is number 1, you're delusional.
I always like to say that the Japanese didn't really have a *strategy* for how to win a war with the US. They had a bunch of fantastic operational and tactical plans for how to defeat US military formations, but never a plan to defeat the US. This tends to go all the way to the top as well, as the Japanese at the highest levels never really had a grand strategy for national defense. They just effectively had the Army and Navy each planning their own private wars against the Russians/Soviets and US respectively, and then fighting for resources to do so. Probably the biggest advantage Japan gets in grand strategy games like HoI4 is just having a unified strategic vision and coalescing all their resources to implement that vision.
The downside is that HoI4 is a massive downgrade from HoI3, and in HoI3 you have to deal with the very complex and very messy supply system. Which works REALLY POORLY as an island nation.
@@polygondwanaland8390 which tbh is probably the reason for the downgrade.
One can even argue that their operational vision, like the Germans, was not that great - especially when you compare with Russians who learnt (with lotta pain, Vatoutin can attest to that ...) how to prepare an operation, execute it and most importantly stop it at the right moment to begin the next one. See what happened in China, they got properly sucked into a neverending battle ; see how bad they were at logistics, the bread and butter of operations (carriers striking Pearl Harbour not even able to go there at first ...)
Japanese were the second victims of the XIXth vision of war, after Germans. And before Americans after WW2.
Their idea of grand strategy was, "maybe if we hurt them, they'll go away."
Just to clarify, "fantastic" here means "unrealistic; based in fantasy" rather than "excellent."
Of course the IJN liked the French jeune ecole at first. Just look at those incredible torpedo boats they had, sailing the North Sea and blending in with British fishing trawlers to confuse the Russians. If you had MTBs that could manage to operate on the far side of the globe without any kind of logistics support you'd be pretty confident in them too.
Rich McGee plus they didn’t really have the money or capability to run big warships yet, so might as well just go for the cheaper method
But if you had a dyslexic French admiral the bottom of the North Sea would littered with LeClerc Main Battle Tanks instead of Motor Torpedo Boats.
In contrast to the others, I appreciate the Kamchatka joke.
@@PalleRasmussen We need an emoticon for "angrily hurled binoculars" around here. :)
Ahhh the Infamous Dogger Bank Torpedo Boat Squadron..yes a most Darstadly plan indeed.
"End in a single battle, you say? Sorry, I can't hear you over the sound of our shipyards pumping out ships."
-US Navy
@Katyusha They had a pretty good estimate of the US' industrial power. What they horribly underestimated was just how badly Pearl Harbor would piss the US public off. They expected that americans would take a look at their initial losses, tally up how much it would cost them to keep this up and decide it wasn't worth it.
What they didn't expect but really should have was that Pearl Harbor would drive the american public into a frenzy that would not allow the war to end in anything but an unconditional surrender, no matter the cost.
Their reading of economic and military power was decent. It was their appreciation of their enemies' _psychology_ that was way off.
(This went the other way too, by the way. Japanese forces' preference for suicidal charges over surrender caught the US completely by surprise.)
great screen name also!
*Haha shipyards go brrrr*
You mean like this?
ua-cam.com/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/v-deo.html
Pacific Ocean? Did u mean American Pond lol
Summary of Japan fishing for decisive battles during WWII.
Japan: Oi come fight us on our turf on our terms in the perfect circumstances for our advantage.
USA: No.
To be fair, they had oppurtunities during the battles around Guadacanal. They just flubbed them.
Maverick Raphael H. Sebastian *cough* *cough* Powerful Battleships not being used *cough* *cough*
@@madwolf0966 Fuel shortages plus the fact they'd be bombed from Henderson Field on the way back....
@@Maverick-gg2do The Japanese won several huge victories around Guadacanal. But in the end, they couldn't fight the war of attrition that was the Solomons campaign. Each side lost about 30 warships during the campaign. The Americans replaced their losses with newer, more modern ships. The Japanese could only stretch themselves thinner and pull back.
@@richardm3023 I'm familiar with these. That's why I brought up Guadacanal. They won several victories but failed to capitalize on a few of them.
They were never gonna win the war. But they had their chances to have the "decisive battle" they were looking for and they didn't really make the most of it.
As Mike Tyson so eloquently spoke, “Everybody has a plan, ‘til they get punched in the face.”
One of the few times he made sense
Or a good ear munching if the face punch doesn't get desired results.👂😉👊
This sounds like an echo from the past...
“No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy.”
― Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
In this case, Japan tried to punch America in the face, whiffed it, and just pissed America off.
Japan: "Shit we've lost our fleet, But we'll never surrender!" USA: "We'll bomb the crap out of you!" Japan "We will never surrender" Boom! Hiroshima, USA: "Surrender you started this!" Japan: Never! (Emperor was assured USA didn't have another atomic bomb) three days later Nagasaki BOOM! USA: "Surrender!" Japan "Why can't we all just get along?" (The USA had one more atomic bomb all ready to drop on Japan. It's a shame they didn't drop another) Hirohito cost the lives of millions of innocents and treated prisoners like animals. He should have been strung up.
Japan: We aren't using the Jeune Ecole and will seek decisive battle.
Kamchatka: Its a trick! The Japanese torpedo boats are everywhere!
Decisive battle doctrine is never really madness. It's quite sensible in symmetrical conflicts actually, since it both shortens the war, reduces the impact on civilians and the economy , and for all intends and purposes, makes wars less bloody.
The issue is that decisive battle basically stopped being a sensible strategy in Warfare once nations with vast populations, areas and resources came about which could kinda just keep churning out men and material for prolonged wars. And that basically started in europe in the 17th century.
When Mahan wrote his book about decisive battle, he was writing during a unique time period during the late 19th century when most major navies just so happened to have had most of their navies obsoleted, while building viable and powerful warships was both so expensive and time consuming that not even the royal navy could field a full battle line of them.
A naval war during the 1880's or 1890's would indeed have been decided by pretty much just a single battle, no matter the participants, since no nation was capable of replacing battle line units at a fast pace at that point.
And the Spanish american war pretty much proved that. The Russo Japanese war then cemented this sentiment, and the First World war with its battle of Jutland which was by all means decisive, must have set it in stone in the eyes of the supporters of decisive battle doctrine.
It just so happened that the Major navies of the second world war had by then developed the capability to swiftly replace losses again, which completely invalidates decisive battle.
Which is ironic that the Japanese used Mahan's naval strategy against the Americans whom Mahan himself is an American. The Americans used Corbett's strategy which was the opposite of Mahan and that proved far more effective than Mahan's doctrine during WW2.
Mahan never wrap his head around the idea of true total war with almost unlimited resources and manpower US and Soviet brought to bear in WW2?
Come to think of it, did he wrote the book for the world WITHOUT U.S.? Similar to how NAFTA and WTO was designed for the world without China some say.
@@thanakonpraepanich4284 He wrote his book for a world im which the US where these US, I.e.not a nation but a collection of aomewhat independant nations with united foreign policy.
@@ravenknight4876 More that Mahan was writing for a world where the US was just exiting, and would quickly re-enter after WWI, a phase of Isolationism. Also, up until WWII the US had maintained a pretty consistent tendency towards Isolationism, and avoidance of major international conflicts.
@@thanakonpraepanich4284 NAFTA without China is like the EU without China. It's in the name.
Hong Kong has been a member of WTO since 1995, the year after its inception, and the whole of the PRC since 2001
Japan: No, we destroyed a significant section of your fleet in the surprise attack! Why aren't you giving up?
The US: Hahaha, slipway go BRRRRR!
ua-cam.com/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/v-deo.html
Tōjō now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the army would lead the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist:
Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices
@@Ron52G
So it was either bomb the Pearl Harbour or Tojo launch the coup and shoot Yamamoto himself, then bomb Pearl Harbour anyway?
@@Ron52G attacking the Americans was pretty much a Navy idea, Army was rooting more for a Soviet Union attack. Except the Army got spanked by uncle Zhukov, and Germans trampled the Anti Komintern pact with the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement ruining the prospect of a war against the Soviet. That's when the Navy could impose their own ideas that happen to favour the Navy by mere coincidence.
... Reminds me of the Air Force creation, to be honest. "We'll go full nuclear and blast the world because NO WAY WE GO UNDER ARMY JURIDICTION AGAIN !"
@@mickaeldelatre3320 No, it was the high command (aka Tojo and his friends) wish to attack Pearl. Yamamoto intently against it as he's one of the few naval officer who actually spend time in US and know her capability to keep pumping the war machines. Heck most navy general was against the war against US. They're sure Japan can get all the resources on China and there's no point attacking allies colonies in SEA. But the high command insist on attacking allies and its colonies. Yamamoto and other naval officers can't defy high command order.
I feel like there is a
3) ???
4) PROFIT
joke in here somewhere
1) Build fleet of battleships to beat up enemy battleships in flashy Jutland/Tsushima fashion.
2) Sink said enemy battleships in port, forcing them to use carriers.
3) ????
4) PROF-where did our ships go?
@@jimmyseaver3647 The Japanese DID care about the American carriers (albeit for semi-wrong reasons). Which actually makes their doctrine self-contradictory.
1. Sink the American fleet in a decisive battle.
2. Seize the Pacific territories your empire needs.
3. ???
4. Profit.
1) Launch surprise attacks on the two largest industrial and military powers in the world.
2) Assume there will be no response due to overwhelming success of said attacks.
3) ???
4) Mushroom cloud.
1. Construct the largest naval power in the Pacific and most of the world as you know it.
2. Force your now catching up Army and your increasingly expanding Navy to fight for resources and political power.
3. Piss off 90% of the world and spit on the biggest economical power near you.
4. Profit
Can't help but wonder how many torpedo boats the IJN had around 1905...
...and their range.
Do you see torpedo boats?
@@vladfedonkin4731 *throws binoculars*
According to the Russian navy, they had about 8. And they had 3,000 mile range. One way.
@@vladfedonkin4731 heck, driving to work here in the midwest I still occasionally see Japanese torpedo boats. Its why I drive too fast.
@Popup Target
“Do you know how fast you were going?”
“Allow me to answer that question with another question. Do you see torpedo boats?”
Imperial Japan: "Here's our plan to beating the USA."
Yamamoto: "Uh, there's a big blank spot between 'Destroy the US fleet' and 'US surrenders.' Do we have a plan for that?"
Imperial Japan: "..."
Yamamoto: "..."
Imperial Japan: "..."
Yamamoto: "Alright let's do this then."
So it would have went like:
*Japan: "..."
Yamamoto: "..."
Japan: "Make it happen."
Yamamoto: "Alright, let's do this then"
Apparently Yamamoto's political enemies among the Japanese ultranationalists and the Imperial Japanese Army (but I repeat myself) in the late 1930's thought he was a traitor in cahoots with the Americans and British and wanted to assassinate him: www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/opinion/a-reluctant-enemy.html
I have to both respect and pity Yamamoto. Respect him for doing his duty to the best of his ability and pity him for what that duty was.
@Gen. JFH "If 'common sense' were actually so common, people would not adjure each other to use it so much." - Samuel Johnson
Don’t worry, we will patch in that part of the plan post launch - Japanese war planner, probably.
Last time I was this early, Rozhestvensky still had at least half a crate of binoculars
Well done and particularly well researched! Talking to veterans of the IJN I was often surprised by the resentment of naval officers towards the army. They felt that often their hand was forced and that the IJN lacked an independent policy.
Which could never happen between USN and the US Army. Or the USMC and the USN (think Guadalcanal and RADM Kelly Turner).
@@glennsimpson7659 I don't think thats really a fair comparison. Break downs on communication is not quite the same as the US Army deciding to invade Truk in force, while the USMC goes island hopping and the Navy hates both and never wants to support them. The Americans had a unified strategic plan and the military carried it out. The Japanese had two strategic plans and each precluded the other as much as possible being carried out by their own branches.
"66% is less than 70%"
Okay - his maths checks out.
Subscribed.
Source?
To be fair, this doctrine led to *several* decisive battles. Unfortunately for the Japanese, none went as planned.
When you think about it.... this plan was so bad, it even resulted in Germany's downfall.
Japan see's Germany's plight.
Tojo "I'm helping"
/bombs Pearl Harbor
Hitler "Why would you do that!?"
it's kind of stupidly outdated, yeah.
could've cool and awesome in WWI where you can have a cool jutland thing, but can't do that now where Aircraft Carriers and escort ships = boom boom enemy fleet gone where BBs just cough up the funds, if yamato would face BBs then she could've been great but not against planes
@@wrayday7149 Let's face it, it was Stalin who kicked Germany's butt. We did our part, but it was mostly by giving the USSR the material it needed to do the job and by distracting the Germans in Africa, France and Italy.
And if the US learned anything from the US Civil War, it was that losing a few "decisive battles" did not mean that we could not win the war, especially when we could employ a blockading Anaconda Strategy similar to what was used to strangle the Confederacy. Timely development of the Atomic bomb just speeded up the time line and caused Japan to surrender ahead of previous plans at less cost in men and material.
@@wrayday7149 no, Germany's downfall was when they declared war on Poland and later the USSR, they had started a war that they had no proper strategy to win against multiple enemies with more of literally everything that they had
@@enterprism5298 Do note that while Japan was stupid enough to think battleships had strategic value in WWII, so was everyone else, hence why everyone else also wasted resources on battleships around the same time.
The Germans were actually significantly worse in this aspect; they were less able to afford battleship construction than Japan, and shouldn’t have bothered with large surface ships (or carriers), period, given their geography and strategic situation.
Hidden away at 46:58 and 47:42 are two of the best Pearl Harbor attack photos I've ever seen, one blurry and the other sharp and clear, each telling a story as if it were still December 7, 1941. Your narration leading up to these photos kept me happily up long into the night, and gave me a comprehensive overview of events leading up to and following this attack. Thanks much.
@30:00 that is an EXCELLENT analysis of Mahan. My military history professor was of the same school of thought.
The Japanese DBD seemed to best reflect reality when the enemy was incompetent technically and administratively (e.g. Imperial China and Russia), and who tended to regard war as a game played at a distance by elites moving their pawns around for relatively limited goals, and not as existential conflicts between nations in their social and economic entirety. That is to say, much like wars between European powers prior to 1914, landing a single heavy blow against your enemy could convince its monarch and ministers--the only players who mattered--that a face-saving treaty and a few concessions of territory were preferable to a long drawn-out conflict that could eventually move even the peasant rabble against you.
Nobody in Japan with influence--or who wasn't afraid of getting slaughtered by "patriotic" subordinates--could believe or admit that the "mongrel" United States was willing to overlook the effective destruction of its Pacific Fleet and the occupation of the Philippines and its other Pacific outposts, to create a new battle fleet and fight an extremely bloody retaking of its lost assets, much less threaten directly the Home Islands.
Keep in mind that what Japan destroyed at Pearl Harbor were the weapons of the previous war, and that the decisive weapons for this war would be aircraft carriers, submarines, bombers, and amphibious assaults.
@@gkelly941 Yes. Also keep in mind they never allowed Japanese fleet submarines the authority to hunt U.S. merchant shipping as regularly as U.S. submariners did. Had they, the war would have been much harder.
@@thanatosstorm US in the pacific used convoys with many escorts including carriers. It also broke the Japanese codes so they sent out hunter-killer groups to hunt down the Japanese sumbarines whose positions were known. It would not have worked.
Has anyone written "The Influence of the Influence of Sea Power Upon History Upon History" yet?
Probably, that was essentially my thesis for my Bachelor's in History.
Entire Japanese naval strategy gets RAILED by carrier-ignorant historian’s book (graphic, NSFW, 18+)
Now I'm probably going to for my Military History class.
@@gameandgamer1479 "iya, onii-chan!"
Yes
Some of the defenses Australia could muster in case of invasion:
Koala drop-troops
Roos' cavalry brigades
Huntsmen spider minefields
Saltwater crocodile torpedo boats
Setting entire continent on fire
Taking scorched earth to its logical conclusion!
You forgot their greatest asset. Emus.
And most importantly Emu tank division
The drop bears alone would massacre any army foolish enough to invade!
Emu mounted shock infantry, their deadliest asset.
"If it sails, it will be alert and active."
HMS Glorious: "Huh?"
Thanks! Always learn something, about time I started doing my part. Here's a "Beverage" on me
Tōjō now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the army would lead the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist:
Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices
Yamamoto: “The Americans won’t just surrender to us like that. Why, we would need to dictate peace terms in the bloody White House to make them quit!”
US Media: “OUTRAGE! YAMAMOTO PLANS TO DICTATE PEACE TERMS IN WHITE HOUSE”
Yamamoto: “What? No, wait, I said-“ *gets cut off by P-38s shooting down his G4M*
@@gameandgamer1479 Y'know... He probably would NOT have enjoyed living long enough to find out how right he had been about the outcome of a long war with the US.
yup
Y demoted Takagi for poor KK after The Battle of Java Sea
T sank 3 ships and damaged a dozen others, with no losses in his own 20 ships
the amount of allied losses necessary to view each engagement as a victory for Y was; impossibly high.
it's a ridiculous scene for a battle that isn't self defense
*_"Give me a FED from who I can borrow billions and billions to finance this war..!"_*
Interesting memo..
War on two fronts is oft cited as a major Hitler blunder. China was
unsubdued,war with Russia a real possibility ; even conquest of Australia was judged by IJ leadership to be..not possible. US
dwarfed Britain in capacity, population, strategic position .
IJ Pacific empire
was a series of marginally mutually
supportive garrisons, (dependent on air & sea forces to cover the gaps ) vulnerable to envelopement/total defeat in detail. Possibly IJ leaders realized that going on the defensive would signal the beginning of the end.
Thanks for covering this, Drach! You've helped me patch two of the biggest holes with an alt-hist project I've been working on. The answer is quite simple: Don't make attritional warfare when the opponent has the materiel advantage, and also don't expect the enemy to do something you wouldn't.
It was decisive
Rarely ever for their forces however
Oh no, quite decisive for their forces. Just not in the way they hoped.
I like the analogy of the dog trying to catch the car, that they hadn't thought the plan all the way through. But putting it in the perspective of the Russo-Japanese war and the battle of Tsushima shows that the Japanese naval command were also making the mistake common to so many military strategists: they were planning to fight the previous war.
The primary weakness of the Decisive Battle doctrine (by any nation) is the concept of risk; it is win or die. If that battle is joined, there is no guarantee it will be won, and a loss will be catastrophic. The fate of the combatant hangs on one roll of the dice. Attritional warfare, on the other hand, has much less risk.
The concept of the decisive battle dates back, in the West, at least to classical Greek times, possibly to get the fighting over with so everyone could go back to their fields and flocks so their communities don't starve.
The problem with Japan's decisive battle doctrine was the enemy. The US wasn't the clusterf#$k that was late imperial China and Russia. The US was far to big, and stable to be put down by a few key battles.
Essentially, Japan picked up bad habits from kicking the tar out of China and Russia during their lowest points.
By the end of the war the US had 151 aircraft carriers, I 29 were full sized fleet carriers.
Could you explain how the US managed the shipping logistics of how the US not only managed to make up for losses in military and civilian shipping to the UK and enough cargo tonnage to supply over 285,000 naval personnel and over 168,000 soldiers???
That's a good summary, actually. Japan's plans after the First World War do come across as 'whatever worked before, but BIGGER', always betting the Americans would assemble for the awaited Decisive Battle, because why _wouldn't_ they?
To be fair, the Pacific Fleet's pre-war plan pretty much (unknowingly) played along with the Japanese Navy's plans. Then Pearl Harbor sunk all the BBs and only the carriers were left, so the USN had to adopt a completely different strategy.
@@TheSchultinator So basically, Japan lost the war the moment the bombs fell in Pearl Harbor.........
@@TheSchultinator Very true, but it strikes me that Japan still thought that even after losing their battleships the Americans would still act exactly the same way, as if the Pearl Harbour attack never happened, just with the Atlantic Fleet. Essentially by assuming the Americans were doctrinally rigid, Japan made itself likewise.
Even though you answered the "what were they thinking" question on Japanese strategic planning, it's still a valid question: What they heck were they thinking! Fascinating stuff. It demonstrates the importance of understanding the character of your opponent, not just their capacity: Of course the 'Merkins would prepare their heaviest boots for a kick-back after Pearl Harbour. I wish we had this resource when I did O-level history...
Ascribing character to a nation in attempting to predict its histprical decisions is a massive flaw I feel.
For example numerous planners were expecting nations to swiftly crumble in war, and the historical evidence points to almost without fail all belligerents fighting until their capacity to make war is totally exhausted in total war.
@ Shaun Salter They were thinking that the Germans had defeated the Red Army and that America would have to ficus its resources on the European conflict,
Yapneez: "Hah! We have sunk your fleet! Will you now kowtow to us in recognition of our sublime superiority?"
Merkins: "We will not stop until you are just a greasy stain on our fist."
Seems like all Japanese strategic plans end with
Step n: ???
Step n+1: They sue for peace
Step n+2: Profit
Yes, but when do they collect underpants? They left out that crucial step, and... well, we all know what happened.
@@ztoob8898 *THE PANTY RAID*
It's a flow chart:
1. ATTACK!
|
2. They suffer hideous casualties .--------------------------------------------------- They don't, and we are now losing.
| |
3. They lose the will to fight. Wait, that can't happen, we're racially superior.
| |
4. They sue for peace. WHY DO WE KEEP LOSING?!? WE'RE RACIALLY SUPERIOR!
@@bubbasbigblast8563 You think the USA might have been able to see how that worked before VietNam, but no.....
Bite and hold. It worked more often than not: the First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War and the Invasion of Manchuria... Hindsight is a wonderful thing but it was not unreasonable at the time. In fact the WW2-style unconditional surrenders happened rarely in history.
"As for the Japanese, they will be ground to powder. All that is left is the proper application of overwhelming force." Winston did not mince words....he more or less hurled them at objects that irked him.
I would argue that the Kantai Kessen happened despite Japanese losses in 1942-3 at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. It was viewed that way by Japanese planners and their preparation for it was the main reason why 1943 had no major carrier battles. The Japanese were able to force a battle of favorable terms, but the tactical changes in the US navy in 1942-43 vastly outstripped those in the IJN. US air defence doctrine had crystallized since the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands into a coordinated system that little resembled its efforts at any prior engagement. The addition of proximity fuzed AAA helped, but the fleet level coordination of destroyer radar pickets combined with constant CAP meant that incoming aerial attacks would be met with furious opposition starting over one hundred miles from the carriers.
I would thus argue that while your criticism of the strategic flaws in the Kantai Kessen doctrine are sound, it was also severely hindered by a failure to address evolving tactics.
Very much true, but you failed to mention 2:1 advantage in numbers for the US, more advanced aircraft and radar as well as signals intelligence.
Hmm, well put sir. I can't deny your accuracy of the events but I don't think there was kantai Kessel style Battle through the entire war with the possible exception of midway.
My reading of the kantai Kessen is that both sides are going to take all thier best war ships, gather them together in big formations and ram them down the other sides facehole. Kantai kessen hadn't been achieved since Jutland, because midway had no gun duel and every other campaign you mention is a loose bunch of skirmishes and night actions, not the bushido style ass kicking the IJN wanted.
The most important tactical change was a result from Pearl Harbor: Carriers as the lead capital ship.
The US had to do it because they were the only capital ship they had following the attack as their battleships were out of the picture. Given how the carrier’s air group can kill a battleship before it can get in range, they proved to be the new flagship of any fleet. Japan didn’t make the change until 2 years later.
The Battle in the Pacific were literally who could see enemy first. While ships had advanced guns and reloading systems, the radar weren't mature enough and scout plane were not maturing in doctrine either
@@VersusARCHyes. Most of the time, the IJN were practically blind during critical battle. Hence they seem to do the overly impractical planning. Naval battles in a region as big as Pacific require vision as wide as the globe. When you can see your enemy while your enemy can't, you can out maneuver them to hell. It would give carrier its rise not merely for their aerial strike but also its capability to spot enemy in a vast ocean where the enemy and friends couldn't hide.
This is one of my favorite channels. In depth, funny and interesting topics. If you keep making videos, I'll keep watching them.
Didn't discover your channel until about a year ago, so still some catching up to do. I have to say, the level of detail combined with your articulation and passion concerning the subject matter is brilliant. Thank you so much for all you teach.
Not to mention that if you sink a large number of ships in their harbor then it’s that much easier to re-float and repair them. Whereas the open ocean will typically claim what sinks.
I'm a little concerned with any characterization of Isoroku Yamamoto as "aggressive." Yamamoto was a supporter of the unpopular "treaty faction" at a time in Japanese political history when many other members were being assassinated by war hawks in the IJA (he further risked murder by opposing the imperial invasion of China AND the Tripartite pact). He even insisted that the US be advised of Japan's declaration of war no less than one hour before his attack on Pearl harbor, and was appalled when he learned that decoding delays in Washington had prevented this. I think that his decision to take the offensive whenever possible came from a desire to preserve strategic initiative as long as possible, which was the best implementation of what he knew to be a hopeless and foolish strategy.
Either Kodoha or Tojo were leeches of Japanese Empire's treasury. They seek to preserve their status by pushing Japan toward unnecessary aggression.
E.M.U. Defence system. Clearly the biggest flaw of the Japanese strategy was not to negotiate a limitation to that during the Naval Treaties.
Well, even the ADF tried to rein in the E.M.U in 1932, but the E.M.U were having none of that & thumbed their noses at the ADF by increasing their numbers despite Government protests.
The writing is getting progressively better with every episode. Thumbs up!
“Like a dog chasing a car”. Love the analogy. Love the channel.
That is Drach confusing the operational naval doctrine with overall national policy. Japan won 2 major wars against stronger opponents before WW2 (1.st SIno-Japanese and Russo Japanese war... WW1 was a skirmish insofar the Japanese participation was concerned) with exactly the same doctrine. But during those two wars nobody intervened against them, in fact they had a mutual defense pact with UK during the latter of the two...
Rather interesting. The whole "And then what?" question that was never really answered by the Japanese planners.
A bit like the Gulf war to evict Iraq from Kuwait and crush Sadams forces. US had no follow up plan and we know here that led.
@@phbrinsden Not really. The whole thing about 1991 was that the objectives were limited to defeating the Iraqi military and liberating Kuwait; objectives that military force was entirely capable of accomplishing, and did. More complex ideas like overthrowing Saddam or occupying Iraq were avoided in 1991 precisely because those went well beyond military objectives and there wasn't a clear plan for accomplishing them. The second go-round in 2003 was another story entirely.
@@Wolfeson28 The Americans were a bit like that in WWII before and after Overlord as they wanted a quick in and out victory. Montgomery thought that things would be different and that a massive build up to allow momentum to be maintained once the ball was rolling was necessary. Similarly, in the run up to GW II the British advised the Americans that they needed a continuation and an occupation plan after the invasion, and that far greater forces would be needed, but were ignored. The American war planners didn't understand - they found it convenient not to understand - that they needed to steamroller the entire country into total submission.
@@puskascat Idk where you got your info from, but occupation forces in Iraq were satisfactory initially. The issue was that over time many troops would leave and then heavy fighting would occur again, requiring a surge of troops, I believe in 2007. It was successful, and major issues os insurgency would die down until 2012 or so when the US withdrew from Iraq.
@@phbrinsden sounds like a pack of idiots that recently attacked the U.S. Capitol. Once they got in it all fell apart 'cause nobody thought that part out.
Maybe it's just human nature.
Another brilliant, in-depth analysis. At this point the "like" is automatic, subscribed months ago.
20:26, Omaha Cruisers with all the protection of an "Ambitious" sheet of paper... o_0 LMAO at that, I dearly love your dry English wit Sir Drachinifel... >_
They were hoping for a War Thunder “No armor = best armor” strategy.
@@wrayday7149 Yep! if it passes through with no boom, simply patch, rinse and repeat.
Ironic that not a single Omaha was lost in the war
@@snakes3425 That was a bit of a small miracle considering their opponents.
Given that in 2020 here in the states being "pearl harbor'd" is still a metaphor for a sneak attack. You were spot on with Japan pretty much removing any chance of a negotiated peace.
To be fair, the failure to decrypt the embassy Declaration of War msg in time before the attack wasn't deliberate, just a huge f#ck up tbh.
@@scottyfox6376 the message that was sent to washington was not a declaration of war, it was simply a ceasing of negotiations and a diplomatic breaking of relation. Nowhere in it was there a message of japan declaring war on the US, just that japan was breaking off relations with the united states, and while that message did arrive late, it did not qualify as a declaration of war, even if it was delivered on time.
Don't forget the fleet had set sailed in late November so regardless of when the message was delivered it was a planned sneak attack without a declaration of war
@@scottyfox6376 They had sent away the regular staff for extra security reasons
Drach. This was a good presentation (as always). The quality of the presentation shows through. Thank you for all the hard work.
Invading Australia apart from the EMU system you also have to take into account the lots and lots and lots of nothing barrier between the Australian coast closest Japan and the bulk of Australian cities
Which is why they didn’t bother.
Damn I love this channel. The in depth information, the way its told, the romance... Cheers from the Belgian navy 👍
Thanks for all your content I never knew I was interested in Navel history, but I’m now thanks to you.
MONUMENTAL!!! Excellent job, Drach!! Thank you very much for making such an illustrating video!!
Mahan to the IJN if he could comment anything: “guys next time READ THE ENTIRE thing what I wrote smh”
What the Japanese failed to take into account was that the U.S. Navy would keep advancing its forward bases. San Diego to Pearl Harbor (Midway for submarines). Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Islands. The Marshall Islands to the Mariana Islands. And add in refueling / resupplying at sea. Never a long, long supply line. The contribution of the Sea Bees cannot be underestimated.
This absolutely cannot be understated-it undermined the Japanese logic behind causing the enemy to extend their supply lines, rendering the whole doctrine invalid.
Those bases are nice targets for the Japanese carrier aircraft (see Pearl Harbor). Unless they are beaten back in a... DECISIVE BATTLE:
Coral Sea - target Port Moresby
Midway - target Midway
Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz - target Henderson Field on Guadalcanal
Philippine Sea - target US invasion fleet off the Mariana Islands
Leyte Gulf - target US invasion fleet off the Philippines...
So how wrong was the Kantai Kessen doctrine really?
@@VersusARCH Because the Japanese were counting in losses taken on the way to battle, hence their emphasis on night fighting. If those same targets have a continuously reduced travel time to get to the actual battle, the odds of engaging and reducing the size of that force go down dramatically, meaning much worse odds in the big decisive battle.
Amazing video. Although I'm quite familiar with the details of the strategy I never made the connection between this and the Japanese's refusal to deploy its battleships. It all make sense now. Your breakdown of its faults and the overall operational change help me further understand why it didn't work. it sounds pretty good on paper yet when asked why it failed, the most common explanation is pretty unsatisfying and simplistic. You definitely explained this topic wonderfully. It is definitely one of my favorite episodes, along with your armor and boiler development episodes.
Even in total defeat and in retreat the IJN Admirals convinced themselves they were 'luring' the US Navy into a decisive battle. Admiral Kusaka candidly admitted later 'we were running'.
Americans still think they can win in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. They have great strategy too.
I'm reading through "Kaigun" right now and this is an excellent companion piece to it. Well done.
Dog chasing the car - i love the metaphor. The one time my dog (when i was 12) caught up with a car, she decided it was a good idea to maneuver in front of it, at which point she was run over. (She survived but was scuffed up a bit).
One could say the same for Japan....
I'd like to see a video on the development of the USN's replenishment of ships underway techniques and doctrine which was superior to every other nation in WWII. From what little I know, the beginings seem to date to WW1 when it had to get shorter range destroyers to Europe. It's interesting to see a young officer named Nimitz involved to a small extent.
@Sean Nordeen. Try this vid. It’s pretty good but a bit misleading.
The vid doesn’t account for the huge head start the IJN has and it doesn’t split the vessels used for Atlantic and Pacific. It’s not a fair comparison.
Example. All the escort carriers were already promised to Britain.
ua-cam.com/video/l9ag2x3CS9M/v-deo.html
READ "BEANS,BULLETS AND BLACK OIL" IN KINDLE
What is greatly ignored is the US fast development of naval and air bases.
These allowed the projection of all other forms of power.
@@donaldbowen5423 Outstanding book, I never thought logistics could be so interesting and complex.
IJN: Brings world's largest battleship to have decisive battle.
USN: SWARM OF FLETCHERS
Swarm of ANGRY Fletchers. ;-)
A battleship that did literally nothing useful but cost money at that
More like SWARM OF ESSEXES! =D
"Hah! We still outgun your puny tin cans! So, mighty Yankees, how well will you do when you cannot bring overkill?" "Hey, man -- honey badger don't care."
French school of thought AKA Kamchatka's worst nightmare
...do you see torpedo boats?
@Marc Joeseff G. Lajara Somewhere off the coast of Madagascar, a handful of binoculars are still waiting to be found
You know, I used to think people who could reliably make UA-cam videos every month or so. Then I saw you, saying you made three videos a week (and each generally about 30 mins, which is impressive in its own right) and it blew my mind.
Also I never had a naval historian, there are always your land historians and some air power historians. But I never had a naval guy to listen to.
All in all, thank you so much for doing this.
I really needed a naval historian back when I was about to play SPI's War in the Pacific. I collected some books, but didn't get far.
What the hell is a "fleet in being?"
Excellent evaluation of an example of IJN doctrine in execution with an eye on examining the effectiveness of the naval doctrines that were utilized. They developed over time and their significance is for history to judge and this video presentation does a nice job of evaluation of IJN doctrine.
If your opponent is scraping the bottom of the barrel (or seeing if the barrel itself will float): Method.
If your opponent can build two more navies: Madness.
I think one major aspect is missing... in the late 1930, the USA had started a massive shipbuilding program with 6 fast battleships and 6 (or 8?) fleet carriers. Meaning that they doubled their strength! No matter what strategy Japan adopted, you cannot fight such numerical superiority. The first 2 new battleships had been launched before Pearl Harbor, and were ready to fight at the Solomon's .
By the time of the Marianas and Philipine campaign, the US Navy consist of all new carriers and battleships. The USA was building ships quicker than Japan could destroy them.
When Yamato was sunk, it was attacked by 7 fleet carriers, which is more than the entire pre-war carrier fleet.
Had this ship building program started in 1942, instead of 1936, the war would have looked very different.
U
I was totally expecting the Blackadder approach when he said, "there was one massive for with the kantai kessen strategy... It was bollocks"
I am constantly amazed at your ability to put these out week after week. BZ!
War room fans love this channel, keep up the good work Drac. Love the content
Kantai Kessen: Jutland off Sydney heads without Beatty
Kurita and Nishimura checking in... (interesting to compare Nishimura - Shima team to Jellicoe - Beatty. All in reverse, and in totally different strategic situation).
On one hand god i would love to see that, on the other hand that could potentially actually extend the war since there would be less German sailors to form the nucleus of the 1919 German revolution
@@deeznoots6241 Maybe a little, but the German army was falling apart in late 1918. Luendorff had wanted an armistice in October.
@@VersusARCH I think Nishimura knew he was on a suicide mission from the get go.
But how will we manage without Beaty...
>The Japanese simply didn't have that many ships with the range to go all the way across Pacific and back again, and their torpedo boats definitely didn't
Kamchatka: *press X to doubt*
A very thorough explanation. A classic case of fixating on one thing while all around is changing.
The really big one being that the US wasn't going to bring the fight to Japan quickly as the Japanese planned for.
Drach, this almost rivals your consummate and brilliant engineering analysis of the reasons for HMS HOODS sinking as your very, very best opus in what is a continuous and always excellent content! Bravo Zulu!
Drachinfel ; Everyone tried to forget the Ryujo.
Me, watching this while playing the Ryujo in world of warships; wow rude
Ryujo was my favourite carrier before the carrier rework (stopped playing CVs after that)
I'm gonna have to sail my World of Warships Ryujo, now. 😎
Come on guys, the reeeeework wasn’t THAT bad. Carriers were cancer before and they’re cancer now, but at least now they can only be cancer to one ship at a time. On average, it isn’t really harder or easier to fight against them (with the notable exception of DDs trying to kill them and getting their shit kicked in), but now it’s arguably more fun to actually play them on the whole. Carriers now have a much easier time doing SOMETHING in the battle but have to work just as hard and play just as well as other classes for a monster game.
I just wish they hadn’t gotten rid of the V, VII, and IX carriers. Like come on, no Taihou or Hiryuu? No Bogue or Essex? For shame. I understand why they did it though, with cv gameplay being more fun and accessible to new players the game would be too saturated with them.
Pretty sure he said Ryuuhou no?
poor ryujo
A new school of thought coming out of France. If one simply puts the most luxurious hotels possible to sea the enemy will feel the immediate urge to drop all hostile activity and check in for a spa day. Then you escort them to their 4 star accomadations in the ships brig. For the British one must never conduct gunnery practice as it musses the paintwork. Simply won't do old chap.
mpetersen6 of course France improved on that strategy, and what the French navy is doing now is escort the enemy to British waters, and they are put up in hotels there.
That "..." between "win the decisive battle" and "Americans give up" has the IJN resembling the Underpants Gnomes of South Park.
Thank you, Drach. That was a very nice precis of a very expansive subject. Well done, sir. As always. I enjoyed ever second of it.
I have to say your videos are great. I’ve had a love of ww2 era ships (particularly the pacific theater since I was hopelessly addicted to a game called P.T.O).
The Kantai Kessen is pretty much the definitive expression of, "No plan survives contact with the enemy."
Another nail in the plan's coffin I feel is that by the outbreak of war, the US had learned the importance of logistics. With the Great White Fleet and WWI still in memory, the US made sure to build plenty of well-escorted supplies and transportation as well. This would keep the war at Japan's doorstep even despite Pearl Harbor.
Its raining so hard here I'm expecting the IJN to hove into view at any moment.
Between this video and Mark Felton's recent one on Japanese brutality in WWII, I feel like I've gained more insight into the Japanese mindset of the period than I ever had before.
Really excellent synthesis! Learned a few things and had a few things I'd forgotten refreshed. Well done.
Another quality naval video Drach.
It's always a pleasure to listen and watch your posts.
oh, and by the way...your pronunciation of Kantai Kessen is fine.
To quote Blackadder, there was a tiny flaw with the plan:
It was bollocks.
The Kantai Kessen doctrine reminds me of the dreadful battle at Verdun in the First World War. To oversimplify it greatly, the German army planned to bleed the French by forcing them to defend the city and then, not to put too fine a point on it, shelling the shit out of them. However, over time, the campaign shifted from causing casualties to taking the city. After several months and nearly a million casualties, despite a very promising beginning, the operation was very much a failure.
The Battle of Verdun was one the German Army did not want to partake in.
But due to the Strategic Location and Power of Verdun, they didn’t really have a choice.
And Both sides knew that.
@@americankid7782 What on earth? Are you learning history from some map game? Verdun was a strategic irrelevance, taking it would have not facilitated any German advantage. Conversely, inflicting the heavy casualties intended would have considerable effect on the French army.
The photos of the ships with the bridge structures seemingly made of Legos by a 6 year old makes me think a history of the battleship mast from 1750 or so to 1945 might be almost as interesting as the Hotels Go To War video you did on French battleships. From mast with sails and crow's nest to lattice mast to tripod etc. with the changes in steering/propulsion and targeting seems worth a recounting. If this was covered in another presentation, I'll hunt it down on my quest for seeing every video you have done. 21 gun salute for this latest, Drachinifel.
Hear hear! Just identifying what all those levels on Nagato’s bridge were used for, for example, would take its own 5 Minute Guide to Warships (lasting the traditional 30 minutes, of course). You can tentatively identify the admiral’s bridge, navigating bridge, signal bridge, wheelhouse, conning tower, secondary directors, AA directors, air lookouts, sea lookouts, main battery directors, and there still seem to be a lot of windows and platforms unaccounted for. And the top weight and lever arm on the ship when rolling must have been frightening. And there is the fascinating question of evolving battleship design philosophy - forward conning tower/bridge backed by rear tower mast (Graf Spee, Iowa, Richelieu) vs tripod/quadrupod mast with hanging platforms (Nagano, Royal Oak, Marat) vs apartment block (Rodney, KGV). Definitely seems to be national preferences involved but an analysis of the thinking, and advantages/disadvantages, would seem a fertile field of inquiry, and I am sure Drach could bring his usual amazing insights to the issue. Few books on warships cover this question at all, let alone in any detail. The only discussion I can recall is by Raven & Roberts of the HMS London conversion from a stacked platform bridge to a ‘Queen Anne Mansions’ style bridge which badly overstrained the hull, but the discussion was in terms of effects rather than the design philosophy behind it.
hi Drach, These Rum Ration videos are Bloody Marvelous! I hope you'll do a bunch more. All the best, David
Good assessment of Japanese strategy. I would have given a bit more attention to the industrial imbalance with America, American industry was ten times the size of Japanese industry, and a naval war is by definition industrial wars. The only reason that the Pacific War was even possible is that the United States severely limited naval construction while Japan built full out using their full industrial capacity and much of their financial capacity.
Your point about Kantai Kessen keeping the Japanese back from committing their full strength is spot-on. Had they done so, they almost surely would have retaken Guadalcanal and done considerable damage to what was left of the Pacific War.
One point you do not consider is that Pearl Harbor was launched with the belief that Operation Barbarossa had succeeded. Only on virtually the same day, the Red Army launched a massive winter counter-offensive before Moscow. Had Barbarossa actually succeeded, war with America would have made a lot more sense.
Like everything else, if it works, it's method, if it doesn't, madness.
Last time I was this early rokosovsky still had enough binoculars for Tsushima
nice allusion !!
Before or after Kamchatka reported torpedo boats the first time?
You mean Rozhestvenskiy?
How exactly is Rokossovsky related to the pre-WW1 naval warfare?
@@ithidt He commanded Russian ships in the Russian-Japanese war of the 1900s
The Anglo Japanese alliance nearly led to a war between Great Britain and France due to alliances. It also advanced Japanese carrier aviation massively.
But I'm LOVING it. Very good reading of Mahan and great analysis!
Great vid Drach! I really appreciate the amount of effort you put into your vids.
Japan has forgotten the Vladivostok - squadron doing considerable damage to their troop transports in 1904 and the lessons learned in the Mediterranean during WWI concerning escorts by just looking at the big gun battles. So their greatest victory at Tsushima haunted them 4 decates later, they totally ignored the threat to their own shipping from subs. Perhaps the transition from Samurai feudalism to Great Power with first class navy went to fast...
one of your best videos yet. I have never thought about the flaws of KK so deeply, and especially all at once. Well done. I'm hitting replay and going back to WoWs BTW when is next armchair admirals coming out?
Interesting, I think, and I am not a particularly good thinker, that if the American carriers were in pearl harbor for the sneak attack and were subsequently destroyed, it would have achieved nothing more than the war taking a bit longer to culminate with the outcome very, very similar to that which did occur,
And that ends this remark thank you for reading
Terrific analysis and discussion. Thanks!
Great presentation!