Bhantes, thank you very much for this talk. I have one question about the concept of intentionality of an arahant. At around 25:30 Ven. Anīgha mentions that it would be a misunderstanding to assume that for an arahant things are "just happening". I would like to contrast that with the letter of Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera to sister Vajirā from 10 January 1962 where he states the following: > You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure. Could you please clarify how these two viewpoints are compatible, or, as the case may be, if this is something unintelligible/unproductive for a puthujjana to dwell on?
Both statements are compatible. Consider a leaf blown around by the wind. The leaf certainly ‘moves’, but there is no intention involved in the movement. It just ‘happens’. But the same cannot be said about the arahat’s experience, which is, as Ven. Ñāṇavīra emphasizes throughout his later writings, characterized by a complex teleological structure. Action, which is intention, is not the same as movement. The arahat still decides to do things, but the vital difference is that there is no longer any craving involved. Thus, in the case of an illness, the arahat can decide to go and see a doctor. Again, he can decide to follow a prescribed treatment. But he is fully aware that the body can nevertheless succumb as a result of that illness. So the body has been established as a context and that context comes first, so to speak, while particular decisions come second (though not later). Experience functions automatically, but it is important to not deny the intentional structure. Otherwise there would be no fundamental difference between a smoke alarm going off and an arahat deciding to go to the toilet! (Regarding the question you asked at the end: fundamentally, the possibility of exerting intentions without craving needs to be understood concretely for oneself by getting the Right View. It cannot be grasped accurately in theory.)
Speaking of the self, why did the Buddha on several occasions refuse to answer the question whether there is a self? Is it because it's irrelevant to the goals of the practice (the answer to the question of whether there is a self as some sort of an absolute truth)? Or is it because it's impossible to give any answer that would be meaningful as part of the practice? Why couldn't he simply in such cases explain it similarly to what was being said in this talk, that is individuality / traits of character exist as something that endures but that what we take to be self is conditional on the five aggregates?
He refused to answer the question categorically, because no answer that could be given - regardless of how accurate it is - would guarantee the right understanding on the part of the listener. Without the right view one is still liable to fall into either annihilationism or eternalism, even while listening to the Buddha himself. So with all the details of the discussion here for example, there is still room for misinterpretation. That is why self-view can’t be overcome directly; the problem has to be approached indirectly by giving up greed, hatred, and delusion first.
@@SamanadipaHermitage Thank you Bhante. I wonder why he didn't say it openly, as in: I won't answer this question because you will not be able to understand the answer correctly. At any rate, it's true that the Cannon being a compilation where things were left out, added, simplified (by replacing individual instructions with stock passages for the sake of easier, error-free memorization) and mixed up at times, it's not always easy to fully grasp the context of this or that utterance. It is very possible that a brief rebuttal (it's neither this, nor that) without further elaboration was more than warranted given the context
@@Limemill He did openly refuse to answer the question of the existence of self when asked to for a categorical answer: see SN 44.10. In other Suttas like SN 22.22, the “individuality” explained in the talk is briefly mentioned, but if the Buddha were to present that concept as a reply to questions about the existence of self like the one posed by Vacchagotta, he would most likely be tragically misunderstood. Instead, he usually approached the question indirectly, by showing that whatever is impermanent and suffering is not worth _regarding_ as self. The sense of self is found in the way one’s _totality of experience_ - not this or that specific thing - is implicitly regarded. Therefore it cannot simply be “switched off” as a matter of choice, and any views and standpoints one acquires while learning the Dhamma, accurate as they may be, will be secondary to that underlying wrong way of regarding. It is indeed not always easy to grasp the context of certain statements in the Suttas based on one’s present understanding, but it is important to not casually assume that the Buddha omitted important things and that it’s necessary to “fill in the blanks” with one’s own ideas. If what’s said in the Suttas seems insufficient, that should be taken as a sign of further work to be done.
@@SamanadipaHermitage Thank you Bhante, it was very useful for my understanding of the Dhamma. When I mention omissions, etc., I don't mean that there's something lacking in the Canon per se. It's just a reflection on how the compilers of the Canon most likely replaced some of the actual nuanced explanations (probably very particular to the context and person present) with stock passages on the same topic (basically, the authoritative, rock solid explanation of the topic) to simplify memorization and minimize error. It's understandable, otherwise surely there would be a lot more divergences, blunders and other issues if, say, 300 different explanations of the dependent origination, as adjusted by the Buddha to the context and person faced, were to be all memorized and passed down. It would be impossible to reconcile them hundreds and thousands of years later. At times, it seems, the compilers also added stock passages from some suttas to other suttas where they don't really belong by accident of having (slightly?) misunderstood the original bit they were replacing with the more generic version. But all in all, it's just some additional "noise", whereas I'm absolutely certain that the Canon contains 100% of what is needed for the purpose of understanding the Dhamma (and with a great deal of overhead too, after all it's almost 50 years of Dhamma instruction we're talking about here). And of course my lack of understanding (and that of the scholars demonstrating the above) of the Dhamma, can also be the reason for sometimes seeing something as illogical and odd whereas it's actually logical, but simply not understood correctly (by me / scholars). Thank you once again Bhante!
@@SamanadipaHermitage Bhante, if I may ask again. Why did the Buddha say in SN 44.10, “And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.’”? What view is contextually referenced here? That one's self is constantly changing and, therefore, does not exist? That there's always "momentary" snapshots of "self" but they change from moment to moment?
Good afternoon Venerable Teacherx
Thanks Bhantes 😊
Bhantes, thank you very much for this talk. I have one question about the concept of intentionality of an arahant. At around 25:30 Ven. Anīgha mentions that it would be a misunderstanding to assume that for an arahant things are "just happening". I would like to contrast that with the letter of Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera to sister Vajirā from 10 January 1962 where he states the following:
> You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
Could you please clarify how these two viewpoints are compatible, or, as the case may be, if this is something unintelligible/unproductive for a puthujjana to dwell on?
Both statements are compatible. Consider a leaf blown around by the wind. The leaf certainly ‘moves’, but there is no intention involved in the movement. It just ‘happens’. But the same cannot be said about the arahat’s experience, which is, as Ven. Ñāṇavīra emphasizes throughout his later writings, characterized by a complex teleological structure. Action, which is intention, is not the same as movement. The arahat still decides to do things, but the vital difference is that there is no longer any craving involved. Thus, in the case of an illness, the arahat can decide to go and see a doctor. Again, he can decide to follow a prescribed treatment. But he is fully aware that the body can nevertheless succumb as a result of that illness. So the body has been established as a context and that context comes first, so to speak, while particular decisions come second (though not later). Experience functions automatically, but it is important to not deny the intentional structure. Otherwise there would be no fundamental difference between a smoke alarm going off and an arahat deciding to go to the toilet!
(Regarding the question you asked at the end: fundamentally, the possibility of exerting intentions without craving needs to be understood concretely for oneself by getting the Right View. It cannot be grasped accurately in theory.)
@@SamanadipaHermitage Thank you very much for the clarification, I think I understand the problem better now.
Living legends. Thank you
Speaking of the self, why did the Buddha on several occasions refuse to answer the question whether there is a self? Is it because it's irrelevant to the goals of the practice (the answer to the question of whether there is a self as some sort of an absolute truth)? Or is it because it's impossible to give any answer that would be meaningful as part of the practice? Why couldn't he simply in such cases explain it similarly to what was being said in this talk, that is individuality / traits of character exist as something that endures but that what we take to be self is conditional on the five aggregates?
He refused to answer the question categorically, because no answer that could be given - regardless of how accurate it is - would guarantee the right understanding on the part of the listener. Without the right view one is still liable to fall into either annihilationism or eternalism, even while listening to the Buddha himself. So with all the details of the discussion here for example, there is still room for misinterpretation. That is why self-view can’t be overcome directly; the problem has to be approached indirectly by giving up greed, hatred, and delusion first.
@@SamanadipaHermitage Thank you Bhante. I wonder why he didn't say it openly, as in: I won't answer this question because you will not be able to understand the answer correctly. At any rate, it's true that the Cannon being a compilation where things were left out, added, simplified (by replacing individual instructions with stock passages for the sake of easier, error-free memorization) and mixed up at times, it's not always easy to fully grasp the context of this or that utterance. It is very possible that a brief rebuttal (it's neither this, nor that) without further elaboration was more than warranted given the context
@@Limemill He did openly refuse to answer the question of the existence of self when asked to for a categorical answer: see SN 44.10. In other Suttas like SN 22.22, the “individuality” explained in the talk is briefly mentioned, but if the Buddha were to present that concept as a reply to questions about the existence of self like the one posed by Vacchagotta, he would most likely be tragically misunderstood.
Instead, he usually approached the question indirectly, by showing that whatever is impermanent and suffering is not worth _regarding_ as self. The sense of self is found in the way one’s _totality of experience_ - not this or that specific thing - is implicitly regarded. Therefore it cannot simply be “switched off” as a matter of choice, and any views and standpoints one acquires while learning the Dhamma, accurate as they may be, will be secondary to that underlying wrong way of regarding.
It is indeed not always easy to grasp the context of certain statements in the Suttas based on one’s present understanding, but it is important to not casually assume that the Buddha omitted important things and that it’s necessary to “fill in the blanks” with one’s own ideas. If what’s said in the Suttas seems insufficient, that should be taken as a sign of further work to be done.
@@SamanadipaHermitage Thank you Bhante, it was very useful for my understanding of the Dhamma. When I mention omissions, etc., I don't mean that there's something lacking in the Canon per se. It's just a reflection on how the compilers of the Canon most likely replaced some of the actual nuanced explanations (probably very particular to the context and person present) with stock passages on the same topic (basically, the authoritative, rock solid explanation of the topic) to simplify memorization and minimize error. It's understandable, otherwise surely there would be a lot more divergences, blunders and other issues if, say, 300 different explanations of the dependent origination, as adjusted by the Buddha to the context and person faced, were to be all memorized and passed down. It would be impossible to reconcile them hundreds and thousands of years later. At times, it seems, the compilers also added stock passages from some suttas to other suttas where they don't really belong by accident of having (slightly?) misunderstood the original bit they were replacing with the more generic version. But all in all, it's just some additional "noise", whereas I'm absolutely certain that the Canon contains 100% of what is needed for the purpose of understanding the Dhamma (and with a great deal of overhead too, after all it's almost 50 years of Dhamma instruction we're talking about here). And of course my lack of understanding (and that of the scholars demonstrating the above) of the Dhamma, can also be the reason for sometimes seeing something as illogical and odd whereas it's actually logical, but simply not understood correctly (by me / scholars). Thank you once again Bhante!
@@SamanadipaHermitage Bhante, if I may ask again. Why did the Buddha say in SN 44.10, “And if, when I was asked by him, ‘Is there no self?’ I had answered, ‘There is no self,’ the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater confusion, thinking, ‘It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now.’”? What view is contextually referenced here? That one's self is constantly changing and, therefore, does not exist? That there's always "momentary" snapshots of "self" but they change from moment to moment?