For what it's worth...I was a TWA 727 pilot in the 1990s. The rumored story there was.. flight engineer leaves to use restroom.. captain tells FO that we can get better performance by pulling slat circuit breaker and extending flaps to 1. Engineer comes back from lav, not knowing what's going on, noticed a circuit breaker out...pushes it in, immediately extending slats.. and all hell breaks loose... I've obviously heard of this incident for many years.. thanks for making a video about it.
This is the story I've heard as well. Dropping the flaps a "smidge" is an old bush pilot trick to lower the nose and gain a couple knots on an overloaded aircraft (As you probably know, if you're too high it's kinda like being overloaded). Gotta give him credit for the recovery though. As far as I know he isn't with us anymore. He's also well known in my world for this incident from the movie "Endless Summer 2". ua-cam.com/video/P-wTqIDgTQg/v-deo.html
former 727 pilot here......erasing the CVR was pretty common back then but it was done after landing. The reason was that certain people would use whatever was on it to 'discipline' the crews, almost always over stupid stuff that had no effect on safety. It made us feel like we were about 6 years old....... It was a common belief that extending the flaps a bit during cruise would result in fuel savings. Maybe it did, maybe it didn't. If you extended the flaps, the slats would automatically extend too. Extending slats at cruise speeds would be disastrous so you pulled the slat circuit breaker and only the flaps would extend. This practice was officially forbidden bur was done frequently anyway so you had to be sneaky about it. If the breaker was not pulled, the slats would extend, if it was pulled and later reset, they would extend. I n either case, bad news......... My own personal opinion is that the crew extended the flaps at cruise altitude and either forgot to pull the breaker or reset it after the flap extension and the #7 slat was weaker than the others. The #7 slat could have extended itself but I think it'd be nearly, but not completely, impossible.
If there was a way for the NTSB to investigate Gibson's prior flights and prove fuel savings/speed enhancement plus do extensive interviews with other pilots/flight crew this should be further evidence to their theory. I have just purchased the book Scapegoat, have not read it yet, remember this incident well when I was in high school. The late 70's were quite an era for air disasters.
@Feelin' FPV It can't be partially erased, when you erase it, it's all gone but it starts back up again from when it's erased. It's a 30 minute continuous loop, it only records what was said in the last 30 minutes.
@@robertzemko6590 This was back in the 'traffic cop' rat, companies and the FAA were operating in the negative, always looking for ways to bust us. No one would ever admit to breaking any rules so no one talked about using flaps during cruise. It was only pilot to pilot, never anyone else.
Something commenters are forgetting is the time frame of this incident. The Co-pilot was not 'permitted' to question the actions of the pilot for fear of being called out as a trouble maker by the pilot. Today it is encouraged to practice Crew Resource Manangement (CRM) where any member of the crew is permitted and encouraged to speak up if they feel something is not correct. But in 1979 speaking up would be an end to the career of any co-pilot.
When first introduced, pilots were very suspicious of management misusing the CVR to persecute them. As a result it was an unwritten SOP to erase the CVR upon shutdown. It may therefore have been an automatic but incorrect action from one of the crew. In modern airlines, this culture has gone away a little because airline management generally accept the unwritten rule of not listening to them for nefarious purposes although some poor engineer has to occasionally to confirm that recording equipment is functioning. It’s a shame the CVR was erased because based on other contemporary airliner defects (DC10 cargo doors, B737 rudder hardover) manufacturers were happy to not address the causes of accidents until forced by overwhelming evidence.
It didnt matter. The CVR only records the previous 30 minutes. The plane landed 43 minutes after the dive and the erase button hit 9 minutes after landing. So the CVR had already written over the entire incident. All you would have had was a recording that started 22 minutes after the plane went into a dive.
@@The_ZeroLineIf they had accidentally extended the leading edges you would have seen more than one damaged. One of the leading edges bent during take-off ,but the autopilot compensated for it until it bent further. They went into a dive, the extra speed ripped the leading edge off which allowed them to regain control. My personal favorite example of "let's blame the crew instead of Boeing or TWA " was the FAA saying the leading edge being stuck out should have sounded an alarm even though that alarm never sounded, even when the leading edge was laying in a field miles away but somehow the FAA determined the alarm must have been working properly. They seized on the pilot hitting the "bulk erase button" out of habit as an excuse for pushing the blame off on the crew instead of TWA or Boeing.
About the CVR. Pilots objected to their introduction in the 1970s. A negotiated agreement was that the recordings would only record the last 30 minutes. If an incident or accident occurred, the pilots were instructed to pull the CVR CB so as to preserve the 30 minute recording leading up to the incident. Modern airliners have digital CVRs and they record 90 or more minutes.
Mate modern CVRs store UPTO 2 weeks worth of flights, or put another way 172 Hours of dual channel audio, 172 hours of radio communications (this can go back DAYSSSS or WEEKS) of the tuned frequencys. Data for 16,000 + Sensors with a Sample rate of 60 Hz (60 data samples per second) In addition to this depending on the airline, this data is transmitted to the company cloud on engine shutdown OR after 6 hours of contuous use. In addition to this, all faults are sent to the airline as they happen, they can watch a CVR Report in REAL TIME. Quantus does it, Rolls Royces MONITORS EVERY ENGINE IN THE AIR IN REAL TIME, did you know that, they have a mission control showing every engine turning and its performance data, faults and more. Modern CVR's are so much more than recorders. They record, analize and broadcast in real time
I was told that the erase feature for the CVR was removed because of this incident. I worked as a mechanic on many 727s from the 100 series and 200 series and we never had a uncommanded slat deployment.
It was not an erase “feature”, it was a finite loop tape that only had a certain amount of time and if you didn’t pull the breaker it just kept going round and round and taped over. You had to STOP it from erasing by pulling the breaker.
Info from Wikipedia, The bulk erase button was on the CVR at that time and recording could be erased. The recording is only 30 minutes and loops. The big problem for us aircraft guys is, if an incident happened, why would you erase anything? We as the mechanics to the engineers want to know, what the hell happened and how do we keep it from happening again. The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild Industries Model A-100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR). However, 21 minutes of the 30-minute tape were blank.[1]: 6 Tests of the CVR in the aircraft revealed no discrepancies in the CVR's electrical and recording systems.[1]: 6 The CVR tape can be erased by means of the bulk-erase feature on the CVR control panel located in the cockpit. This feature can be activated only after the aircraft is on the ground with its parking brake engaged.[1]: 6 In a deposition taken by the Safety Board, the captain stated that he usually activates the bulk-erase feature on the CVR at the conclusion of each flight to preclude inappropriate use of recorded conversations. However, in this instance, he could not recall having done so.[1]: 6 The NTSB made the following statement in the accident report:
While the official theoretical sequence is possible, all of the crew involved steadfastly maintained they didn't try it. I have flown several sister ships to the one involved in the incident. They had identical autopilots and flight directors. On more than one occasion, I experience autopilot disconnect anomalies that caused temporary control issues. The 727 near it's service ceiling can be tricky to hand fly and is also prone to engine surge especially in the center engine. I consider it very possible that the events started just as reported by the pilots even if no one else believe them.
did u partake in the wiping of the cvr after a routine flight? was that standard at the time? today is there rules in place that the cvr can only be used in an accident investigation and not by company to spy on the crew?
@Feelin' FPV The Erase button would only activate a bulk erasure of the tape. Back in the days of reel to reel home tape recorders, many of us owned a bulk eraser. It's basically an electromagnetic coil. From the outset, CVRs were designed to aid in accident investigation and that's all. Too often, they also fail in a major event and provide little information. My thoughts; when I fly I don't think about the CVR at all.
Any really good 727 pilot or engineer knows damn well that pulling the LEADING EDGE CTRL VALVE circuit breaker on the P61 panel will not, I repeat not disable the leading edge slats from extending hydraulically when the flap lever is moved from UP to 2 degrees. There is a way to trick it using the ALTERNATE FLAP MASTER SWITCH, but other steps are involved that no one seems to know or discuss. I flew all 3 seats in the Trijet and taught in it too.
I certainly remember this incident way back then. The news media initially hailed them as heroes for recovery of the aircraft. And with the pilot's name being Hoot Gibson it made for a good story.
Once again, another undisciplined pilot almost killed everyone, and ironically is hailed as a hero For saving the day. Soon we will have automation and no more killer pilots, a day I am looking forward to, and, I’m a pilot myself
I remember this case, as I recall, Hoot and the FO were both fired. None of the major airlines would hire them. I don't recall the exact details, but I think Hoot ended out his career as a charter or cargo pilot, and the FO got an airline job somewhere in South America. I enjoyed, and "liked" the video. Although, there were a few "technical errors" in the script. Two of them in particular kind of stood out, I've made note of them below. "...reduced power in both engines..." The Boeing 727 has three (3) engines. "...plugged the holes in the hydraulic cables..." Hydraulic fluid [oil] is contaminated, under pressure, in hydraulic lines and hoses. A hydraulic line is a hollow tube, basically a pipe. The hose bit is pretty self explanatory. A cable transfers mechanical motion by means of tension (pulling) on one end, which in turn pulls on whatever is at the other end. A cable can also be an electrical path, by which power or control signals are transmitted. A cable cannot conduct, transfer, or transmit hydraulic pressure.
@@RogerPetersonMusic Thanks for sharing. That's very interesting. I had been (apparently mistakenly), lead to believe they'd been fired because of the "unsolved" nature of the case, ie. The discrepancy between the pilot statements and what the NTSB was asserting to be the case. I have to admit however, that I never confirmed that for myself. I'm not a big fan of the NTSB. I'm aware of too many cases (both commercial and GA) in which I believe they've drawn the wrong conclusions. His [Hoot's] "damming" action of habitually using the bulk erase, was used to cast a shadow of suspicion over him. I know though, that he was not alone in his use of this feature. When CVR's came on the scene, there was a fair bit of discontent among pilots and pilot unions. They did not like the "Eye in the sky" aspect of it. The fact that there was a bulk erase feature available was a result of this discontent. I was also aware of the 'technique' that the NTSB was strongly suggesting he had employed and thus caused the upset. Even if there was no real evidence, it was very convenient that the scenario seemed to match the event and the missing leading edge slat. I'm actually glad to hear that his career was able to continue as you've stated. Regardless of what, or who, caused the upset, the fact that he avoided ending up as a lawn dart was a good show of his piloting chops. I also was impressed with the plane itself. It held together (except for that slat), through the high altitude upset, the low altitude recovery, then performed a controlled landing. I'm aware it sustained damages, but it was repaired and went on to fulfill a full service life. The 727 was a good plane, still my favorite Boeing. Other than what I learned about him as a result of this case, I don't know about Hoot's history (as you have pointed out). I've read and learned a fair bit about the "non civilian" career of the 727. That is where I learned about the "High Altitude Cruise" flap setting. Now I'm wondering if Hoot had anything to do with those missions. Perhaps I need to look into this gentleman a little more closely. Thanks again for sharing your knowledge on this matter. I love learning new things.
At the time, it was considered accepted practice by most fight crews to erase the CVR upon parking the aircraft after landing. Although regulations stated the CVR recordings could only be used in accident investigation, many pilots viewed it as "management's spy on the crews."
@@ROBSHOTZ Yes, the cockpit conservations of the incident itself would have been erased because of the elapsed time, but some of the subsequent conservations when the CVR would normally have been overwriting the previous recording were also erased. But the point of my comment was to address the implication in the original comment that the captain erased the CVR to deliberately conceal that he did something improper.
Oh what a great story MACI. As a former B727 captain, I can attest as to the reliability and functionality of the B727 systems. The aircraft was very advanced for its era, and as far as the handling characteristics of the aircraft, it was a solid aircraft to fly. There was a saying in the aviation community that went like this; "Nothing flies like a 727" and it was true. It was a dream to fly. What went wrong with this particular aircraft only the crew and the airplane knows about it and neither of them will ever talk. As to the captain erasing the CVR, it is a common practice to do that after any flight, not because you did anything illegal or wrong, it's just done by some crewmembers, as to prevent any possible questioning from the feds for any reason. Think of it as leaving evidence for the police to find and be used against you if you were a criminal. By erasing the CVR after terminating a flight, the crew was pretty much clear to go on their way without leaving anything recorded that could be listened to by management or the feds. During our B727 ground school at my former airline, there were all sorts of discussions about exotics crewmembers doing crazy stuff with the flaps and slats in order to increase altitude and performance. However, all this information came in with a warning "Don't do it" as well as "It was tried by xyz crew and they were all fired". Years later I flew the MD-11 and again the same type of stories flowed and the recommendations were still the same "Be very careful with what you do around the flap control handle" as with the case of the Chinese crew. Btw, I flew that very same MD-11 on the story once it was converted to cargo and commented about the apparition and what happened to us during one of those flights. Good video as always, good job and two thumbs way up my friend.
The captain did land the plane safely thats the most important thing right,, you cant compare with a car crash or something similar, this is an aeroplane, it carries more than 100 people,, and moreover they are flying,, i still give credit to the amazing captian who save his passenger and crew..
Hello Humberto. You are right on. They survived to taxi to the gate and parked the breaks PUSH THE BUTTON. Pulling that breaker must have come out of flight test. It was widely known. When I came to work a few hours after the incident it was being talked about on the tie line. No one would admit doing it. It was also thought the AC could not climb that hi without a little extra.
@@MiniAirCrashInvestigation Both you and 3 Greens - Aviation Safety along with Delta\KennyDang are my favorite aviation incident YTbers. Kenny Dang puts air crash anniversary updates on his channel (not video though, just still images and a description), while 3 Greens explains stuff like you do.
The safety department at the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) also investigated this incident (published report is available) and found that the #7 slat had been retracting and extending in a misaligned condition. Wear marks were evident on the incident aircraft. APLA's conclusion was that the #7 slat uplock failed to engage due to the misalignment, and a subsequent failure of the A hydraulic system allowed the slat to extend. Further, they found no evidence of ANY flight crew intentionally extending trailing edge flaps at altitude. It is preposterous to think extending trailing edge flaps would improve aerodynamics at the service ceiling of a B-727. Lastly, the TWA Shutdown Checklist at the time included "Cockpit Voice Recorder...Erase". Facts matter.
The NTSB noted this issue, but their analysis of possible failure modes for the lockouts and extension (finding 11) comes to a very different conclusion. Though the analysis was conducted with the manufacturer, and both the manufacturer and the ALPA have a dog in the fight, so that has to be kept in mind. The shutdown checklist is interesting though, and if true it's curious that it wasn't included in the NTSB report given the weight they seemed to attribute to this action.
@@outtascope Good points, outtascope. NTSB and Boeing have colluded before and will again. Been too long to remember which piece of evidence the NTSB WITHHELD from the case because it didn't fit Boeing's narrative. Same with the CVR...Erase issue.
Some more interesting facts about this incident. The FE was a Navy test pilot. Tall, young, dark hair. His hair turned white within a few months, and he retired early. The captain and FO were reinstated after about 6 months and flew till the mandatory retirement age (60).
I am always hesitant to blame a person for an incident on base of 'suspicious actions' alone. The actions of the pilot were sketchy but I'm not going to place any measure of guilt on that. Especially not since the incident itself would not have been on the recording anymore but would only have contained the time before the landing. The fact that he was not able to recall if he had erased the CVR on that flight gives me the impression that it has become such a habit for him that he's not consciously thinking about the action. That's common with habits, I routinely can't remember if I locked my car or my front door only to find out that yes, I locked it without even thinking about it. I believe the same thing happened here. As someone else pointed out in the comments, it was apparently routine for pilots to delete the CVR after each flight and were actually encouraged to do so by pilot unions.
Interesting note is that the 787 does exactly like this at high altitude. It automatically extends the flaps without the slats to allow you to fly higher with a lower indicated airspeed. Remember that as you get higher with a constant mach speed your indicated airspeed will decrease. At some point you’ll be at MMO or max mach operating speed but you can’t go any slower because you’ll stall. That’s called coffin corner.
Great job again. I was pretty surprised to learn that the CVR recordings can be erased selectively. Don't think such a system exists now. Slats are operated by means of screwjacks, since they have to assume different degrees of extension according to the flight envelope. A slat operated by a piston can assume only two positions, extend or retract. Maybe this aircraft had such a configuration for the operation of slats.
The CVR uses a circular storage with a limited, but defined amount of minutes of storage. If the pilots do not pull the circuit breaker on the ground, it continuous to record over previous recordings. The longer you "forget" to pull the breaker, the less of the flight remains on tape.
Also, you can "bump" the circuit breaker in flight by "accident". Why such an "accidents" could regularly happen to a pilot that happens to loose a slate on one of those flight is hard to tell.
B727 slats are operated by hydraulic jacks and are either extended or retracted with no intermediate positions. Hydraulic pressure for the slats comes from Hydraulic system A or the standby hydraulic system.
Capt. Ron: I knew the pilot and the aircraft. I was a TWA Captain and Check Airman on the Boeing 727 when Capt. Gibson's event occured. My opinion of this YT Diatribe is the lowest possible.
Amen! While I appreciate most of the videos this UA-camr makes, this one has me less than impressed. The title of this video sickens me. No pilot, unless suicidal, is going to “cause a near fatal crash”. First off, there was NO crash, but a spectacular recovery from what could easily have been a horrendous event. Sorry son, but click bait cheapens your channel, and if you have a shred of integrity, you should take this video down, get your facts straight and then decide what to do. If you conclude that Gibson acted irresponsibly, that is your prerogative, but title your video accordingly.
What a fascinating story. Very very interesting. Truthfully, we will never really know whether the Captain and Crew lied about what happened or if they were being honest about the events that took place. Atleast they were able to land the plane before it could crash. No lives were lost, injuries yes, but no loss of life. Thanks for featuring this story.
It's pretty simple to deduce they were trying to pull a fast one. You don't erase the info like that, even if you're doing it routinely, after a near death experience like that. Nope.
this depiction shows the nose wheel extended at altitude....... I flew 727 in the 1980s .....it was somewhat common knowledge among 727 pilots that he had pulled the breaker to increase their cruise speed while the FE was in the bathroom, when he returned he saw the breaker out and pushed it back in and that's when they extended. Sounds like he lied to cover his ass and protect his career and pension.... the fact that he erased the CVR tape proves it was a cover up IMO. if he normally erased it, I could buy that on a normal flight.... but after an incident, NO PILOT would erase it unless he was trying to coverup wrongdoing... same as Nixon erased the tapes in the Oval Office. among 727 pilots that circuit breaker was known as the "Hoot Gibson switch". what does that tell you?.... there are enough unforeseen dangers in aviation without intensionally doing anything non-standard.
my pop was a Mechanic for TWA in those days and my buddy's pop was an Aero-Engineer also with TWA and this thing with extending the flaps but not the slats (by monkeying with circuit breakers) at high altitude was done ALL THE TIME ... which does NOT prove that is what happened on that flight but... yeah
@@kholmar Absolutely agree, many pilots used to do this. And even if it is far from being normal procedure the slats should have remained in but for some reason they didn't. Blaming the crew is always easy, they can't defend themselves. It is interesting that people judge the cpt's actions who don't know the difference between a main gear and an APU exhaust....
I'm an EE (Electronics engineer) by trade, since the slats can be disabled by a circuit breaker that must mean they are electronically actuated to some degree. (I'm guessing the lever has a switch turning on a hydraulic pump or open a solenoid valve) These planes use Teflon wire which is prone to cold flow incidents (the Teflon insulation if exposed to high tensile forces over time will separate from the copper wire causing shorts), I believe there is a real possibility that two wires unintentionally making contact could cause deployment. I would also like to note the only way to prove this would be an in depth examination of the wiring harnesses which would be a very noteworthy endeavor which was not mentioned in this video (so I'm assuming not performed). I believe that there is a real possibility that under some abnormal strain two Teflon wires could have barely made contact resulting in an intermittent partial slat deployment. Intermittent being the keyword here (since it would likely be weaker then a full slat deployment due to the time it takes for the hydraulic system to reach it's maximum pressure). Also, why was only one slat damaged? Every aluminum fracture I've seen is ductile so I would expect the other slats to have evidence of severe damage if one on them underwent enough mechanical strain to shear off. If that isn't the case then how did the slats pass basic metallurgy consistency standards required by the FAA? Because if they all deployed at the same time (by the crew's command) then they would have all underwent roughly the same mechanical strain! Frankly, After pausing and thinking about this I believe this video left me with an unreasonable amount of unanswered questions. I don't know shit about airplanes but I know electronics, and I know my metallurgy, I've never seen an aluminum alloy that undergoes brittle failure like the one described without first seriously deforming. Perhaps the stainless steel bolts sheared (as most aircraft grade bolts are made of fairly hard & brittle material), but somehow didn't leave a mark on the soft aluminum frame? I find that very hard to believe. I'm not spieling here to undermine the NTSB because they do some great work with many of the most top-notch people in the field. However the story given to me in this video just doesn't make any sense.
I would expect that the detailed NTSB report would address many of the issues you identify. The teflon wire theory is incredibly speculative though, and if at issue would likely have shown hundreds of times during the service operation of the 727. A complete report, if done competently, would have to have looked at this possibility given they were examining circumstances under which an unintentional deployment could occur. Something that I think you maybe discounting with respect to the slats is that deployment at cruise speed is beyond their service spec. They are required to not fail within some specified load + safety factor. They are almost certainly NOT required to fail at identical loads. That means a failure of the two systems may not happen coincidentally or at the same loading. The service history of the slats and actuators may also be very different from one side to the other. It's also worth noting the differences in the Hydraulic systems A and B on the 727 with respect to the slats. A hydraulic system A failure was noted. The slats can be extended and retracted with hydraulic system A, but they can only be extended with system B, not retracted. So regardless of why the slats were extended, if they were being retracted and one side was moving slower than the other due excessive load when the system A failure occurred (or if one side was able to extended under excessive load while the other wasn't) then it is reasonable to expect that the extended/non-retracted side experienced much greater loading and stress for a much longer duration than the side that either didn't deploy or managed to retract under excessive load. The yaw and roll described are evidence that only one side was deployed. Keep in mind, too, that with both slats deployed on both sides, the drag force would likely be split more or less evenly between the two and normal to their surface. If one side retracts before the other (or only one side deploys), the total load on the deployed side is now likely higher and due to yaw is no longer normal to the surface, so it is a very different loading than the "undamaged" side experienced if they were deployed simultaneously at some point during cruise.
@@outtascope You make some good points, I could be overestimating how consistent the metal is and falsely assuming that the load would be roughly consistent from side to side, because certainly if there is a harsh change in the drag forces that would compound any shear forces the slats experience. The deployment of cruise speed is definitely beyond their service spec, I didn't think about how retracting could damage the slats because I assumed they would be destroyed on deployment. Either way, it still surprises me that only that section of slat was damaged and the others further down the wing weren't. From an Aerofoil standpoint wouldn't the very trailing edge of the wing have the most torsional force applied to it if the plane was rolling? I think the service histories may have had a major role in deciding which one failed and how it failed. And yes my Teflon theory was very speculative but it has happened in other aircraft before hence why they stopped using it in military aircraft (not sure if it's still allowed in commercial). Either way I don't have the time to invest into reading the full report, I'm just speculating out of my ass. I just wish the video went into some more details though so I wouldn't have to speculate on trivial aspects that should've been mentioned.
@@linuxguy1199 Agree, the video could benefit from including some details that it omitted but were included in the report. I did just go speed read the report and it turns out the the #7 slat DID have pre-existing damage/wear and mis-alignment. So the NTSB analysis concludes that it was likely an intentional deployment outside of operating rules, but that the #7 failed to retract under load because of the pre-existing alignment issue. What surprises me in the report is that they are looking at margins that led to the failure/errors that are much tighter than the amount of slop (loaded terminology intended) in the tolerances allowed by the regulations at the time. So it's the old chain of errors. Flight crew breaking the rules was a significant factor, but it wasn't the ONLY factor, which I think the NTSB addressed to some degree but the video didn't adequately IMO. While I haven't worked in aviation is 30 some years, I feel that the report seems to brush over what appear to be overly loose tolerances. I was also surprised that a 1979 FDR seemed to only record (as implied by the report) position/attitude, velocity and G forces. The report makes no mention of any ancillary flight control inputs being recorded (at least that I noticed in my speed read, I may have missed it), which could have potentially answered or narrowed most of the bigger questions.
The captain apparently appealed twice, but the NTSB falls under 'unreviewable jurisdiction'; which means, at the time at least, no-one has any right to challenge whether or not they're mistaken.
The 'case' against the pilot seems flimsy, at best. It assumes that automated systems always act as designed. Just because you can't replicate something doesn't mean it did not happen. More recently, just think about MCAS/Max 8, wasn't that initially pilot error???
It's a very interesting case, I saw someone mention the possibility of a rudder hardover something Boeing encountered numerous times with the 73 in the 90s/ The MCAS thing was more lack of training about it i heard some pilots were unaware the system even existed
I am torn between the fact that the pilots showed incredible airmanship in recovering the aircraft, but the captain caused the upset in the first place.
@@BillPalmer I dunno man.... I was believing the captain until the CVR erasure stuff. Why do you think the book's conclusions are more credible than the accident report? I mean, here we have TWO very suspicious and very unlikely issues that both point to the captain. First, they can find no reason why the CVR just happened to 'fail' right when a one-in-a-million catastrophic malfunction supposedly happened to the slats. Second, they can find no reason why the slats would deploy on their own. I could take the captain's word if ONE of those issues occurred. But for both of them to happen simultaneously? And the second 'mystery' just HAPPENS to erase all the evidence of the first 'mystery?' It seems implausible to me.
Me and my wife were on this flight....it’s was awful. I was certain we were DEAD. Period. She thought so too. She prayed. I couldn’t even pray. I lost full control of everything including my bodily functions and I lost my bowels. Even my wife did not do that. But I honestly thought we were dead. And believe me. I wasn’t the first only man who had lost control of their urine and bowels during this horrifyingly awful experience. We sued. They gave me and my wife free airfare for life but I haven’t been able to get on a flight again. I still wake up crying like a baby in the middle of the night! It’s funny..... you think you have a basic understanding of fear? Trust me. You don’t.
I remember when this happened. Though I was young I couldn't understand the Capt comments about not remembering doing something due to force of habit. After 3 decades of military service I understand how easily you can do something out of constant force of habit and not remember doing it. Take for instance saluting an officer. It happens so instinctively no established soldier can tell you how many times they saluted or in some cases if they even did so. Just an example.
Even after a near death experience? Think about just surviving a major crash and now you're safe. The first thing you do is slink down exhausted. You don't do anything. You have no energy left to even do instinctual things.
@@Dayvit78 That's an extremely broad, sweeping statement, and is merely your expressed opinion, not established fact. Accordingly, it won't apply to everyone simply because no two human beings are the same, and certainly not at times of crisis.
The difference between speculation and fact is hard evidence and none is presented here. The CVR is a red herring - the FDR is the real judge of which commands were issued and it seems unlikely that the Pilot would have commanded such an action deliberately unless suicidal. That he worked hard to recover and land safely is to be applauded but we may never know the truth of this incident.
The FDR only records a regulated subset of the data of the planes systems. Not all details are recorded on the FDR and even if: A system detecting an input is not the same as a pilot issuing that command. The malfunction can very well be a switch it self or the wiring or the system reading the switch status. Yes, it is unlikely that the pilot make erroneous inputs intentionally. But: it is possible that the pilot deviated from the official procedure, made a mistake doing so and then ended up in an unsafe situation.
@@sarowie But even the primitive foil FDR’s of the time recorded flap positions, did they not? The accusation is that he pulled the slats circuit breaker so he could extend just the flaps. That act of flap extension would have shown on the FDR. And the pilots had no way of erasing that.
@@radioace318la It was briefly mentioned for being one of the older digital types. But they all, from when they came into use, until the digital age in the early 2000’s were required to have at least 18 data points.
Amazing video as always. Such a puzzling case. The captain very obviously did do something, why else would he have tampered with evidence? His habit of deleting the recordings is suspicious to say the least.
I suspect that he regularly messed with the circuit breakers. Why would you give the pilot the possibility to erase the CVR? The pilot knows a few things about the CVR that lead to lost recordings: The CVR is circular. You know after how many minutes your word gets overwritten. The CVR has a circuit breaker that you can pull on the ground, to prevent that from happening after landing after an incident. Now imagine the pilot wants to mess with the controls by pulling circuit breakers: Would he first pull the CVR breaker or the Breaker for the slat extension?
You are viewing this through the filter of 2021. In the 1970’s CVR’s were viewed with great suspicion by the Pilots and in particular the Pilots Unions, as intrusive surveillance tools prone to be misused by management. The existence of the “erase everything” button was a concession to the pilots unions, because at the time the pilots would have otherwise gone on strike. Pilots Union Rules, whether published or otherwise, were very clearly known to be “the CVR is only there in the event of catastrophe. If the plane makes it to the Gate, the erase button gets pushed”. The Pilot and Union concerns about CVR’s were not entirely unfounded. There were also still a lot of Civil Liberty concerns about them. So much of our lives today are baked around the presumption that everything is being recorded by someone or some thing, that we can’t always appreciate back when this was not the case. CVR’s have evolved into a critical, well understood, and fully supported piece of aircraft technology. Part of that was rules being put in place regarding who had access to them and how anything on them may be used. In 1979, following the energy crisis and it’s impact on the airlines, and airline management seeking any Avenue they could find to get around Union Seniority rules, there were a lot of concerns about the CVR’s. And a lot of possibilities for misuse and abuse.
I'm so glad you made a video on this accident before Air Crash Investigation airs their episode on it. You might make me skip two episodes on the new season of ACI because the Alaskan Airlines Flight 261 accident got a remake. Keep up the good work.
@@blatherskite9601 I actually found that channel because of this one. Very well explained and thorough. I like this one too as it's short and to the point, whereas mentour tells us more about the experience rhe pilots had and such.. both are epic in my opinion
Air Crash Investigation tends to skip most incidents that don’t end horribly, unless there is some compelling element such as a volcano, a transatlantic glider flight, or the Captain hanging out the cockpit window.
@@andrewtaylor940 They also tend to focus on the human interest side (ie, victims burning up). I prefer to see the human factors at work, and a practising pilot such as Mentour gives a good insight there.
There is a whole lot about this incident that is not covered here. The recorders automatically erase everything every half an hour and re-record over it. The incident would not have been on the tape when they landed because it had been over a half an hour since the incident began.
The narrator addressed that point. "Although the recorder woukd not have captured the start of the incident access to the end of the recording would have been very useful" yes indeed, especially the part where the Captain says "okay, I'm going to erase the CVR, or were all going to be fired or even lose our licenses over disobeying the rules on flap operation.
Great video. Just a question though from someone with no avaiation knowledge to those who would know. Is it still possible for a pilot to delete the CVR nowadays? It feels like a massive red flag to me that you could do that, I suspect you couldn't now, but would like to know. Thanks
In the early days of CVR’s pilots were very much against them and I believe if my memory serves me right that the pilots (read pilot unions) only agreed their use if the CVR could be erased once the flight had concluded I.e. on the ground. Therefore there was an erase button to enable this function. Modern aircraft do not have this function.
@@spoinkster1100 that makes sense. But how can they be allowed to do this unless there was a case of such emergency? And in this case it was obviously needed to conduct an investigation There should be a feature that sends the recording to a database so that even if you have to perform that procedure, the recording up to that point is still available to investigators
Yes it is, and the purpose for it is to test the CVR, it is part of the checklist/flows before flight. Modern aircraft do not have the option of deleting the CVR data while in the air however.
When I read about this accident years ago, the initial theory was that the captain had intentionally extended the slats for takeoff, per normal practice. When he went to retract the slats once airborne, the #7 slat did not retract due to a problem in the mechanism. At the time, this explaination was supported by the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), who cited past instances of problems with the slats on TWA 727s.
Why on earth would the captain have even been allowed to regularly erase the CVR? The seems like something that can only be abused… Is there any situation where that feature would actually need to be available?
In those days, the CVR used a 30 minute magnetic tape loop. After a normal landing and taxi in to the gate, conversations and comments might not be relevant and it was common practice to erase at the end of the shutdown check. Today, CVRs use digital data storage and can retain a whole flight. The value of CVR data to validate crew performance and even defend actions has become accepted by crews and has ended the preference to erase.
The cvr was a recording of only 30 minutes. The plane landed at Detroit after the tape had been recorded over (took longer than 30 minutes to land) so there was nothing to erase.
The FDR and CVR are not to spy on the crew. They are there to supply information if the crew does not survive. It was so in the original agreement. That is why there is the bulk erase.
The erased CVR tape is a Red Herring. The incident started at 9:48 pm. The plane landed at 10:31pm the tape was erased at 10:39 pm The CVR only records the previous 30 minutes. When the plane landed , the CVR had already taped over everything before 10:01pm which was 13 minutes after the plane went into a dive. Just to restate my point When the CVR erase button was hit the CVR had already deleted everything said before 10:10 pm , the plane went into a dive at 9:48 pm. My gut feeling is the Captain did it out of habit and when the FAA couldnt figure out how the slat extended they just fixated on the CVR being erased. Even if the FAA's theory was correct , the Captain would still have had no motivation to delete it except out of habit. I think the slat failed to retract fully after take off and the autopilot was able to compensate for it until it bent. The plane went into a dive , the excessive speed ripped off the slat and they were able to regain control.
Not unless the parts he erased recorded him discussing what had happened with the flight crew after they regained control of the plane. For someone who didn't want "inappropriate use of recorded conversarions" it seems kind of weird that he used the bulk erase feature when they were on the ground and then let it record nine more minutes of talk without activating the bulk erase feature again.
I watched a CBS special from 1983 on this. The reporter pointed out in an actual cockpit that to extend the flaps (the suspected cause of accident), yoy had 2 switches in front on the ceiling AND a 3rd in back by the engineer. There is no way the 3 men are to blame. It was an 13-14 year old plane. The actuator was cracked and failed under metal fatigue and stress.
With 727's back then there was frequent disabling of the slats in order to extend the flaps to the 2 degree setting. This enabled the aircraft to fly faster and many times reduce fuel consumption. My uncle who flew the 727 said it was a common procedure. After TWA 841 he never saw it done again. Erasure of the CVR after each flight is still a common practice after normal/uneventful flights.
This was not frequent or a common procedure in spite of what your uncle claims. The claims of flying faster and using less fuel have not been validated. Aft CG loading was just as effective.
It was indeed common, to the point of being routine, in the quest to ensure aircraft arrived at their destination on time, or earlier if possible. A great selling point to business passengers for whom time was money.
It was not a common procedure and it didn't allow the airplane to fly faster it allowed the airplane to fly at a higher altitude to maybe get out of the headwind with a little bit better stall protection. It was not allowed by the Boeing operating manual nor the FAA. When the airplane entered the right bank it probably stalled and they lost control of it.
The FE was new, he left the cockpit, the FO opens the L/E SLAT CB which allows you to extend trailing edge flaps only to one unit. This gives you greater wing area, smoother ride at higher altitudes. The FE returns to his station, scans the area and sees a CB open. Resetting the CB put pressure on the slats and they rip off extending at high speed. This flap trick was fairly common, but not taught in airline flight school.
Alright. But my question is: I would _think_ that an engineer would, or should, have the knowledge to know about the consequences of resetting said breaker under such conditions. Even if the engineer is not a pilot (I have no idea if flight engiineers are usually or always pilots), it just seems obvious that these are the types of things that he should definitely understand.
But Boeing’s own tests disproved this. Boeing claims that at that airspeed the 600 lbs of force being applied to the leading edge of the wing would have prevented slat deployment. Which would seem to run counter to the scuttlebutt about the FE finding the popped breaker and pushing it back in.
This is the story that I was told and believe. One of my instructors in A&P school was on the repair team for this aircraft and had a bunch of damage photos.
@@andrewtaylor940 I assume you mean 600 psi? Can you explain how a force on the _leading edge_ of the wing would prevent the slats from deploying, since the pistons and the slats deploy toward the aft, with the airflow? I'm not claiming that you're wrong, I just don't understand how that would be the case.
I do remember seeing footage of Boeing's evidence to the NTSB - to the effect that uncommanded flap actuation on the 727 was impossible because it had never happened before. Seriously, that is what they said. Rather telling really. BTW, I think you have your nav lights swapped in the animation. The port wing should carry red.
It makes me laugh yet frown at the same time at the pilots' objection to CVRs back then, and in the UK and Europe, tachographs were demonised as a spy in the cab yet now on humble buses there is a dashcam system , fitted of course for safety reasons etc, which records not just audio but HD video which can be analysed in Chicago and be at the bosses terminal within minutes to allow the boss to discipline the driver for daring to drive with only one hand on the steering despite there being absolutely no incident or chance of one.
Most transport jets over-achieve the performance books. If a B-757 or C-141 says you can cruise at FL390 and you try it'll work. Not so with the 727. If the book says you can do FL388 and you try FL390 it may not work. I flew the 72 for 7 1/2 year and the old heads talked about the rumors of extending the flaps to 2 degrees (the first detent) with no slats for more lift at high altitude although none I flew with ever tried it. At flaps 2, slats 2,3,6 & 7 extend. That's the center two of the outer wing section. If they attempted to prevent slat extension and failed the mishap scenario ensues. The subsequent hydraulic failure would be consistent with a broken actuator caused by aerodynamic loads causing failure. Thankfully "cowboy captains" are a thing of the past.
I don't know on this. I can see the skipper trying to save fuel and messing up and then later erasing the tape to cover the crew's ass. But, at the same time, erasing the tape wasn't uncommon back then and the 727 wasn't always the easiest plane to fly. And there have been times where a mechanical fault wasn't reproducible with regular testing. Like the rudder PCU issue on the 737. They had to put the unit under an extreme test to simulate conditions and only then did it lock up. But those same units, the ones from one of the crashed planes, performed as they were supposed to when they tested them without the other external conditions. That could have very easily happened here. But, at the same time, them just forgetting to pull the slat breaker when they extended flaps seems fairly logical.
It also sounds like they had a theory and didn't need to look too hard beyond that. To me it's not very convincing that they weren't able to replicate the error, and that therefore it must have been human error. Sounds like the sort of investigator theory that leads to a vacated conviction and an apology after 20 years in prison.
Consider the timing of this event: 1979 and DC-10's and 737's fall out of the sky due to ridiculous oversights from the designers, I absolutely think there might have been a hidden gotcha in this plane. The rudder hardovers in the 737's were unnoticeable after the crashes. Hell, even the 777 that fell down in Heathrow had a weird design flaw only encountered twice before (the heat exchanger had protruding pipes that allowed ice to block fuel delivery).
I would like to see MENTOUR PILOT investigate and obtain all available information and post a video about this incident - this is the first I have read about it.
There is an excellent book entitled "Scapegoat" that goes into great detail about this incident. The captain and crew were vindicated years afterwards following the production of evidence that demonstrated how the slat deployed of it's own accord. However, the captain suffered greatly emotionally and had also been dismissed from his job.
The captain is portrayed in this video as having the habit of erasing the CVR. He may have paved the way to his own dismissal at least partially due to this.
@@geoh7777, There are many topics of conversation during a day of work. Things might be said that are not meant to be heard by others. The motive to erase those spoken thoughts is genuine.
@@geoh7777 All Captain’s we’re in that habit back then. Stop applying modern standards and rules to 1979. They erased the CVR as soon as the parking brake was set. This was Pilot’s Union SOP in every major airline. The Erase Everything button was there for a reason, and that reason was without it there would have been a North American Pilots strike. Remember CVR’s were first put in in 1971. They were not a well accepted element of flight safety at that time. Many if not most pilots viewed them as intrusive surveillance devices that were often abused by management. Especially in the late 70’s as the Energy Crisis caused soaring fuel prices to drive all the airlines towards bankruptcy. Union Contracts had steep Seniority Rules. So you could not lay off Senior Pilots while keeping less Senior ones. But Senior Pilots we’re the most expensive pilots. So management would go hunting for excuses to terminate Senior people. It was a cruel and brutal industry at that time. With near open warfare between the airlines and the unions. The pilots had accepted the CVR’s only as things to be used in the event people didn’t walk away. They were not supposed to be used as tools against them. The use of CVR had some major unresolved legal and civil rights questions at the time. Did your employer have the right to record and review your private conversations with a co-worker not broadcast over open radio? We are so accepting of the digital surveillance state today that we forget this was not normal back then.
My grandparents used to live in the Saginaw area. They said they remember that night they woke up to a loud bang, their theory was the 727 breaking the sound barrier as it dove.
I also think the only possible explanation is the crew messing something up and then covering it up. But my question is: Why? Why would they care about the aircraft's performance and/or fuel consumption?
Fast car people want to be pilots? Fast car people are not the ones you get a lift with! My favourite pilot would be the one who has NEVER had a speeding ticket.. Peace be unto you.
If I had to make a guess, given the date this occurred, it was in the middle of the 70’s oil crisis, and I’d be willing to bet airlines were pushing pilots to save in any way possible.
Why do people do hypermile driving. They use difficult techniques to get a financial immaterial savings on gas. It is just to get status among a small group of enthusiast. I would expect pilot to have the same tendencies.
I think that also contributed to the Canary Island airport collision with the two 747's! Idling on the Tarmac burns a lot of fuel plus it messes up the "on time" performance of KLM which was one of their strong marketing points in their ads back then.
Maybe it's my hearing, half the time I couldn't tell if you were saying "slats" or "flaps",I found it confusing, it's entirely possible that it's my audio equipment, either way that plane had one hellova ride, sounds worse than the Max8 rollercoaster.
I believe TWA had severe cost cutting measures and pilots were rewarded for saving fuel. The pioneer may have been the Captain Snyder of TW 800 who was famous for saving a lot of fuel on transatlantic flights by a similar 2 degree flap deployment. This culture probably was imbibed into each and every pilot who flew for TWA.
He was famous for asking questions that he hoped you didn't know the answers to so he could tell you the answer and explain to you why you needed to know it. B-747's don't have 2 degrees flaps. You fly by following the flight plan made by a computer.
I wasn't a 727 pilot but I did stay in a Holiday Inn Express. Since we have so many pilots in here I do have a real question. How do pilots not know that the plane is banking only when they look at the gauges? I have flown in airplanes back and forth from the US to Germany since the early '70s. I can always tell when they start banking the plane left or right by the feel. Just curious because I see so many of these airline accident videos online that I can never figure out why the pilots don't notice this until they are dropping 32000 feet per minute?
Just an idea, maybe because they fly so much they get used to the feel of the plane banking, vertigo can come into play in nighttime flights Check out flash airlines flight 604 about that
I know someone that was on this flight very well.. I've heard this story for years.. he told me that they extended the flaps on purpose to improve airplane performance but then one of the co-pilots noticed the circuit breaker being off and he flipped one of them back on which pulled half of the flaps in and left number seven out leading to the accident
That would align with what I have heard about this incident for my entire airline career! And this story was used during flight engineer training at Piedmont Airlines.
"Hm, I survived by the skin of my teeth there." "Let me just nonchalantly erase the CVR as always because the guys will definitely not want to investigate any question" Or, "Oh I should definitely not forget to erase the CVR or else I'm effed."
2335 hrs GMT at 04:44 you said runway 03 but the floor shows runway 4R. Also at 07:07 the narrator says decending at 34,000 feet per minute. Surely not. Should it be 3,400 feet per minute Thanks
In most aircraft at that time including the incident aircraft here the CVR has a 30 min loop that is recorded over. The theory was that any accident requiring the CVR would be less than 30 min in duration. The time frame involved put the incident nearly 40 min before the CVR was shut down. There was no unexpected missing data on the recorder, this was just sensationalistic reporting in an attempt to put blame on something not fully understood. Subsequent investigations have considered more likely scenarios, most prevalent is that because of the operating envelope at that altitude is so narrow, plus or minus 10kts it was more likely an upset due to a jet stream gust. This holds with the captains testimony that the slats/flaps and gear were extended during the dive in an attempt to slow the aircraft below its max speed as during the dive the aircraft went trans sonic.
There was a common belief in the 70's that the 727 could fly higher, heavier without stalling if the flaps were just a few degrees out. Everyone did it then. Or at least many crews did. It's so obvious what happened in this case. The FE said, "we burned off XXX amount, captain". And the captain said, "OK let's go on up to three nine zero." He made a call about winds and upper n lower FL"s as a dodge. He needed a reason for going up early cause ENROUTE knew about when this flight should be expected to ask for higher as the PW-JT-8D's used up the Jet A. If anyone cared, they may have noticed he must still have been too heavy for FL390. Once the slats went out, one departed the ship stalling part of the starboard wing. This precipitated the roll and dive that probably exceeded Mach 1. I think the mains were pushed back two feet. The undercarriage doors and a lot of other parts missing or deformed. The hydraulics were fine until the fancy flying and stupid aircraft tricks began. I've been a pilot since 1973 and a lawyer since 1984. These guys are/were criminals and would be in a gulag if they had been pilots in the USSR. Way past reckless endangerment.
Yeah that’s what I’m wondering too. Wouldn’t the flaps increase drag thereby lowering performance rather than improve it? Could someone explain in full detail how it works?
@@MazenFallatah What matters is not so much the drag itself, but the lift/drag (L/D) ratio. It was believed by many pilots at the time (whether or not correctly) that extending the flaps on their own would cause more increase in lift than it caused increase in drag, so the overall L/D ratio would improve.
Sounds strange to me, too. Especially, if this would be the case, I see no reason that aircraft manufacturers wouldn't suggest to do so, too, in order to make their planes look better.
"boeing made an investigation and found nothing" - yeah: And a maneuvering characteristic argumentation system is not an antistall system and can not trim the air plane into a nose dive.
@@Sebb747 true that and the planes where very different system too. Yet I assume it would be very hard to find a fault directly related to a slat that was violently ripped of a flying air plane. I mean: It will be hard enough to find the slat and all related pieces - and finding a fault on a part that maybe was missing in the firstplace due to incorrect maintenance would be impossible. (Yeah, damage to mounting points can be analyzed, but the reconstruction would be very difficult due to secondary damages due to hiding the plane and ground)
In this case erasing the flight recorder meant nothing (no yelling last words before nosediving into a suicide flight, but maybe one of the crew members bumped against the flap lever and the high cruise speed made one slat brake off immediately as soon as the slats started to extend.) The captain´s habit of erasing the voice recorder (only the voice recorder tape not the flight recorder) had other harmless reasons: Probably they were telling each other dirty jokes, didn´t follow strictest rules like clean-cockpit not talking under 10.000 feet, or the cockpit crew were flirting with stewardesses, they probably laughed in the cockpit had a casual and easygoing mood discussed cars and stuff instead of ultra-strict business. The captain know he would get in trouble or even loose his license as soon as some over-correct nitpicker or some higher up would find anything out by chance, and that´s why he always erased the voice recording tape after the landing - just to be on the safe side and to have a feeling of "free speech" in his cockpit, being able to discuss everything in peace and freedom with his crew. :)
They could have been slagging off the company too. It was probably habit or something a bit risqué like flirting with a flight attendant and a married pilot. This was one shit hot captain who thought on his feet and used his instincts rather than checklists to avert a disaster. So based on that if they were chatting up.tje flight attendant we can surely forgive this
Remember that in those days most air-carrier pilots were ex-military types, where sex talk and discussions about sex desires with pretty women (including the cabin staff!) would have been de rigueur. Plus the relationship of the union pilots and management was consistently hostile and adversarial, pointed criticisms of management would have gone on for hours on end. That will get you fired; on the other hand, with the machine on autopilot, those what are termed to be "non-pertinent discussions" were common enough. so, consistently erasing the tapes would have been the predictable result. Today, but of course, nobody ever has "non-pertinent comments" in the cockpit. That's because pilots are so disciplined in their approach to the job. You folks do believe that, don't you?
@@jvaneck8991 Of course - pilots talk four hours only about navigation procedures and how to follow management rules-by-the-book, and otherwise always keep their mouth shut :D
Someone else commented that TWA's shut down checklist explicitly included erasing the CVR, and while I personally haven't fact-checked that, I see no reason to doubt it. If that's so, there's no need to reach for further explanations for erasing the CVR; the carrier's policy called for it to be done as normal procedure.
I think the Captain was correct because he at the end averted a catastrophe! The NSTB most likely due to their inability to solve the problem were quickly blaming the captain nd flight crew as the culprits in order to close the investigation! No offense meant - just being very honest! Bless U all!
A bulk eraser would have wiped the whole tape, not just the incriminating bits. Hence the "bulk" in the name. A captain using anything like this should be encouraged to move rapidly to another airline. It's hard to imagine an air transport pilot deciding to experiment with a ship's designed aerodynamics just for the hell of it. Not even one with a habit of erasing evidence. An air racer, perhaps. But racers would experiment in daylight. As for the official analysis, I don't believe NTSB about anything. Maybe when accompanied by ironclad physical evidence, but maybe not even then. FAA is perhaps not quite as bad, but still a government agency staffed with people disappointed that they couldn't land jobs with the Post Office. And it's notorious that when in doubt, the official finding is "pilot error". Even so far as accidents like hitting a flock of birds. Pilot error - the pilot is supposed to be familiar with the flight and migratory habits of the local avian community. Pretty silly, but that's the reward for flying by bureaucracy.
It's long past time for these to be redesigned. The technology to save data into protected memory space upon specific trigger events, has been around for a long time and should have already begun to be phased in. I fully understand that no one wants their locker room talk preserved and used to needlessly destroy careers and lives if it is completely irrelevant to an NTSB investigation. There's no reason we can't have a reasonable compromise that satisfies both pilot privacy and aviation safety. Specific to this incident, we have no idea exactly why the slat did what it did. The erasure of the CVR shouldn't have happened, but I can definitely see it being done out of habit, rather than malice. Ever had the power go out in your home, yet every time you enter a room you still flip the light switch despite knowing there's no power?
This event happened in 1979, during a time when CVR recordings were being used by airline management to harass crews over non safety related things, which is not what the CVR is supposed to be used for. Paranoid crews would erase it out of habit after every flight. The CVRs haven't used tape in years, nor have they had an erase button. They've probably been "redesigned" for longer than you have been alive.
Reminds me of the story of pilots spilling coffee all over the instrument panel, which forced them to land the plane. But after wards they had NO IDEA spilling a dark liquid all over electronics would ever glitch out the engine throttle controls, until after a lengthy investigation
Sorry, I have to chuckle at that one. First off, the controls should be waterproof, and second of all, why would anyone keep a hot beverage near the control panels? :) I know to keep my water or juice away from my computer.
@@thatguyalex2835 Two A350s, 1 in 2019 1 in 2020, each had just that happen. The cup holders were too small, so coffee was rested on the center console. It was subsequently spilled, and where ever it ended up it caused an engine to shut down. After the second incident the panel was made water resistant.
I'm struggling to understand how extending the flaps can boost performance at altitude. It just creates more drag so theoretically you should end up using more fuel
Yes, you are in principal right, It is said precisely "flap1", which the least possible flap you may get and without slats, also it is said at cruise. Read between the lines in cruising altitude where the air is much thinner. To sum up, a 727 at cruise altitude and cruise speed is "believed" ( not scientifically proven) to consume a tiny bit of less fuel with "flaps only" extended to 1. Even if this might be true , would only be valid for the 727 , in thin air and cruise speed. Only and only in this type of aircraft and under the described conditions, It's like 2x2=4 but also 3+1=4 ; 21-17=4 and 80/20 also makes 4. In the case of 727 overall aerodynamic design , It's like the flaps 1 without slats would creates more drag than lift in dense air and lower speed ( landing condition) but more lift than drag in thin air and higher speed. (cruise condition) . It's not impossible. Still to be proven though..........
Offtop: I think you're applying too much compression on your audio tracks. Some beginnings of the phrases are dipping in output. I assume that these tiny parts are just slightly below the threshold of the compressor.
I don't know ANYTHING about aviation except for watching these videos...but, doesn't the FDR tell them everything they would need to know? BTW, great video!
Isn't it great that they come up with a cause for the accident based purely on a lack of evidence? "We don't know why this happened, so it must be that the pilot did something wrong."
The extract on the screen at 11:30 (part of the NTSB report) refers to the captain's "putative report" not "punitive report". Reading between the lines, they don't believe he did that on every flight, otherwise why use the word "putative"?
Hi, Roland. No. Captain Harvey “Hoot” Gibson did not lie. As several have already noted on your UA-cam channel, the crew consistently maintained their innocence. And as others have righty noted, the NTSB does not come close to batting a thousand. We’re left with two polarizing claims about the trigger causing the rollover/nosedive. The law of noncontradiction asserts that both cannot be correct at the same time. So at least one of the two must be wrong. I contend it’s the NTSB, with the plane manufacturer in second place. (As Captain Gibson sagaciously noted early on into the investigation, putting [the plane manufacturer] in charge of this investigation was like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank.) Conflict of interest. While all post-event people here on your UA-cam channel are most certainly entitled to weigh in with their own opinion or theory about what may have happened, you included, I find it perplexing that everyone’s thoughts - whether a subjective gut feel, or an informed expert opinion - is devoid of any direct discussion with the flight crew members themselves: Captain Hoot Gibson (1934-2015), FO Scott Kennedy (d. 2017) and FE Gary Banks. Even the NTSB largely refused to consider what the crew had to say. During their 2-year investigation, they questioned the crew only twice - an impromptu mini-hearing at a Detroit hotel the day after; then during a televised depositional proceeding in Los Angeles seven days later. Beyond that, no one from the NTSB took time to follow up with the crew directly or made any attempt to clarify contradictory evidence. Requests for a public hearing were denied. Captain Gibson volunteered to take a polygraph test - that request was ignored. When one NTSB member did request the crew be allowed to answer questions related to the evidence brought against them, the lead investigator insisted the crew not be given that opportunity. At the final Sunshine meeting (June 1981), the crew was told not to attend. The crew ignored that request, and were physically barred from entering the meeting room. It’s always easy to crucify guys who can’t defend themselves (because you’ve prevented them from entering the room); further, both Hoot and Scott are now dead (I’m not sure about Gary). It’s easy to posit and isogete any purported ‘fact’ in order to ‘proof-text‘ whatever you want to say about the crew members. The not-welcome-at-the-table - and now-deceased - crew members can’t counter back. So if you’ll kindly permit me, I’m going to try and do so on their behalf. I spoke briefly with some of the crew on that cold Detroit runway immediately after the April 4, 1979 incident; and again more extensively in 1982 during the making of CBS Reports’ ”The Plane That Fell From the Sky” - a Peabody Award-winning investigative documentary re-creating Flight 841. The summary of my conversations with the crew? No - the crew was NOT messing with the flaps. Most recently, I spoke again with FO Scott Kennedy during a nice, long breakfast together in July 2016 (just prior to Scott’s death). Scott sincerely, simply, and humbly told me that even 37 years later, he absolutely did not know what caused the Flight 841 rollover/nosedive incident. Scott was NOT lying to me. Please let me repeat: the crew did NOT mess with the flaps. (Scott also told me the night prior to the incident, that he and FE Gary were discussing how to recover from stalls. Turned out to be a very timely conversation between the FO and FE - thank you, Lord Jesus! - since it was FO Scott who suggested to Captain Hoot they drop the gear to try and regain flight. It worked.) I have another friend and colleague who spent a GREAT deal of time talking with Hoot prior to Hoot’s death, and who has scoured every available piece of information on Flight 841. Emilio Corsetti III is a professional commercial pilot and author. Emilio has written for both regional and national publications (Chicago Tribune, Professional Pilot magazine, etc.). Emilio published his exhaustive research and findings on Flight 841 in “Scapegoat: A Flight Crew’s Journey from Heros to Villains to Redemption” (Odyssey, Aug 2016). May I humbly suggest that you and everyone following your UA-cam channel would do well to consider what Emilio reports in his extensively researched, fact-based, objective book. It appears the NTSB ignored some pretty important information that would have cleared the crew. The No. 7 slat extension was the RESULT of the dive - NOT the cause. Roger Peterson Passenger - Seat 21A TWA Flight 841 - April 4, 1979
I thank you for your detailed posting. The possibility of an accidental event leading to a mechanical failure also lurks in the background. I recall a flight to Aruba when, close to landing, as the starboard flaps rolled out, there in the right-side track some mechanic's tools appeared - lying right in the track! Now picture this: after take-off and retraction, the actuator jams with the big wrench and cannot retract further, causing one side's flaps to fully retract and the other to be partially extended. And with a jammed mechanism, there is no way to correct, except perhaps to extend all flaps (and even that might not work). When Mr. Boeing built that airplane, did they allow for the possibility that some mechanic would leave tools in the extension actuator track? I remain dubious of that proposition. Pilots tend to have to deal with all kinds of anomalies. Even with simple single-engine aircraft, there have been cases of the control cables accidentally reversed in direction upon replacement. You command left turn at the yoke, and the aircraft responds by feeding in right aileron. How about that? Makes for an interesting day upstairs (if you don't catch it at pre-flight).
@@jvaneck8991 What a story about mechanic tools laying in the track! Yeow! Back to 841, the trigger event appears to have been related to the 727’s split rudder. Hoot felt the first indication of the issue in his foot (rudder pedal) -- and a malfunction of ½ that rudder system makes plenty of sense (triggering the rollover).
Might sound like a stupid question but couldn't have this been caused by something similar to the hydraulic issue that some b737-200 and 300 had that caused their rudder to go right and caused 2 crashes and 1 near-crash? I mean, the 727 and 737 classics shared a lot of similar features and maybe they used a similar technology for the slats of the 727 for their extension and since nobody was aware of the issue at that time...
They dont? I dont know man.. After I learned what the FAA did with boeing and MD as a "gentleman agreement" I tend not to trust US american agencies when it comes to incidents with US made planes.. I am too lazy to google but at least one plane crashed because of a "gentleman agreement" (aka corruption) between the FAA and the manufacturer because of a faulty cargo door mechanism and we all know what happened with the 737 max 8 certification.. WHICH WAS ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO.
@@bepowerification ntsb isn't the faa but coincidentally enough what you're referring to (cargo door gentlemen's agreement) happened after another flight that involved Detroit. Turkish Airlines crash in France had the same fault and crashed horrifically. NTSB iirc recommended grounding all of those planes until the issue was resolved, FAA decided on the stupid "y'all got this right we trust you".
Cops lie, too. Presidents lie, too. So do priests. Since 1973, 186 former death-row prisoners have been exonerated of all charges related to the wrongful convictions that had put them on death row. They we’re gonna DIE because of “evidence”. Stan, they were all liars, right? I’ve worked with the NTSB and admire what they do, but they’re as imperfect as any organization of humans.
The medical field has a lot to learn about safety from aviation. Too often we see the medical community covering for sloppy doctor performance. Meanwhile airlines do a LOT of analysis of de-identified flight recordings looking for unsafe trends and then make those high priority safety items.
I think everyone is missing the bigger picture here - a pilot basically manipulating the aircraft in ways it was never designed. Flaps at 39,000’? Really? Screw all the v speeds and performance charts that the engineers tested and wrote, I guess they knew better. This kinda thing would never happen now lol. As soon as he said “requested FL390” I was like “what?!” 😳
This seems very dodgy. There is evidence needed to suspect pilot misbehavior. There is not evidence (to my mind) to prove pilot misbehavior. That is a very fine line. I think it worse to assume the guilt of an innocent man than the innocence of a guilty man. Is the pilot "dodgy?" Sure. Guilty? We don't know. None of us knows.
Obviously I don't know what actually happened but based on this videos findings, it looks like the NTSB probably got it right. The Captain was trying to save his ass! It's a damn good thing he saved All their asses. That could have been extremely ugly! Great Channel, great video! You do an awesome job!
Not a lot of people erase evidence that proves they're not guilty. My dad's best friend flew 727's for decades and I remember him talking about this one. As others have said the story that actually came out that most people seem to believe was that the flight engineer went to the can and was in there when they pulled the breaker. He came back and reset it and they were off to the races. At the end of the day they got everybody on the ground safely so call it a learning experience for everybody
The most incredible thing about this flight is that the pilot successfully recovered from a 34000 foot per minute dive!!
I agree as I was a passenger on the plane! Every few years I re-visit some of the info on the flight and remember it could have been different. 🙂
@@laynejensen8235 I suppose the strong forced made you stay in place? Based on the low amount of people hurt that is.
BOEING built is also what made this recoverable.
@@laynejensen8235 Really? Do tell more of the experience..?
No, the most incredible thing is that the plane did not fall apart with that rate of descent.
For what it's worth...I was a TWA 727 pilot in the 1990s. The rumored story there was.. flight engineer leaves to use restroom.. captain tells FO that we can get better performance by pulling slat circuit breaker and extending flaps to 1. Engineer comes back from lav, not knowing what's going on, noticed a circuit breaker out...pushes it in, immediately extending slats.. and all hell breaks loose...
I've obviously heard of this incident for many years.. thanks for making a video about it.
I was a B727 pilot then too, and that's the story I always "knew" as well.
This seems at least plausible, explaining the uncontrolled slat extension.
I heard the same story.
This is the story I've heard as well. Dropping the flaps a "smidge" is an old bush pilot trick to lower the nose and gain a couple knots on an overloaded aircraft (As you probably know, if you're too high it's kinda like being overloaded). Gotta give him credit for the recovery though. As far as I know he isn't with us anymore. He's also well known in my world for this incident from the movie "Endless Summer 2". ua-cam.com/video/P-wTqIDgTQg/v-deo.html
this comment section is full of 727 pilots. Lol
former 727 pilot here......erasing the CVR was pretty common back then but it was done after landing. The reason was that certain people would use whatever was on it to 'discipline' the crews, almost always over stupid stuff that had no effect on safety. It made us feel like we were about 6 years old.......
It was a common belief that extending the flaps a bit during cruise would result in fuel savings. Maybe it did, maybe it didn't. If you extended the flaps, the slats would automatically extend too. Extending slats at cruise speeds would be disastrous so you pulled the slat circuit breaker and only the flaps would extend.
This practice was officially forbidden bur was done frequently anyway so you had to be sneaky about it.
If the breaker was not pulled, the slats would extend, if it was pulled and later reset, they would extend. I n either case, bad news.........
My own personal opinion is that the crew extended the flaps at cruise altitude and either forgot to pull the breaker or reset it after the flap extension and the #7 slat was weaker than the others. The #7 slat could have extended itself but I think it'd be nearly, but not completely, impossible.
If there was a way for the NTSB to investigate Gibson's prior flights and prove fuel savings/speed enhancement plus do extensive interviews with other pilots/flight crew this should be further evidence to their theory. I have just purchased the book Scapegoat, have not read it yet, remember this incident well when I was in high school. The late 70's were quite an era for air disasters.
@Feelin' FPV It can't be partially erased, when you erase it, it's all gone but it starts back up again from when it's erased.
It's a 30 minute continuous loop, it only records what was said in the last 30 minutes.
@@robertzemko6590 This was back in the 'traffic cop' rat, companies and the FAA were operating in the negative, always looking for ways to bust us.
No one would ever admit to breaking any rules so no one talked about using flaps during cruise. It was only pilot to pilot, never anyone else.
@@rrknl5187 Thanks for the info!
Great info. Wish more people could understand what you’re saying. Seems like it’s going right over their heads.
Something commenters are forgetting is the time frame of this incident. The Co-pilot was not 'permitted' to question the actions of the pilot for fear of being called out as a trouble maker by the pilot. Today it is encouraged to practice Crew Resource Manangement (CRM) where any member of the crew is permitted and encouraged to speak up if they feel something is not correct. But in 1979 speaking up would be an end to the career of any co-pilot.
rog van : Likewise with the Tenerife disaster ?
True. I forgot about the date of the incident. Thanks for the heads up!👏👍🛬🛫✈
Point noted but with the extensive experience of the F/o and F/E don’t you think someone would say something?
Exactly. Same problem with United DC 8 that ran out of fuel a d crashed in Chicago.
F/E and co pilot made it abundantly clear of low fuel situation.
Hum!!I didn't know that American aviation was once a military dictatorship
When first introduced, pilots were very suspicious of management misusing the CVR to persecute them. As a result it was an unwritten SOP to erase the CVR upon shutdown. It may therefore have been an automatic but incorrect action from one of the crew. In modern airlines, this culture has gone away a little because airline management generally accept the unwritten rule of not listening to them for nefarious purposes although some poor engineer has to occasionally to confirm that recording equipment is functioning.
It’s a shame the CVR was erased because based on other contemporary airliner defects (DC10 cargo doors, B737 rudder hardover) manufacturers were happy to not address the causes of accidents until forced by overwhelming evidence.
It didnt matter.
The CVR only records the previous 30 minutes.
The plane landed 43 minutes after the dive and the erase button hit 9 minutes after landing.
So the CVR had already written over the entire incident.
All you would have had was a recording that started 22 minutes after the plane went into a dive.
@@glennchartrand5411 But they were likely commenting about what happened.
@@The_ZeroLineIf they had accidentally extended the leading edges you would have seen more than one damaged.
One of the leading edges bent during take-off ,but the autopilot compensated for it until it bent further.
They went into a dive, the extra speed ripped the leading edge off which allowed them to regain control.
My personal favorite example of "let's blame the crew instead of Boeing or TWA " was the FAA saying the leading edge being stuck out should have sounded an alarm even though that alarm never sounded, even when the leading edge was laying in a field miles away but somehow the FAA determined the alarm must have been working properly.
They seized on the pilot hitting the "bulk erase button" out of habit as an excuse for pushing the blame off on the crew instead of TWA or Boeing.
@@glennchartrand5411 It's certainly a credible explanation what about the rapid increase in speed and the evidence that the breaker had been pulled?
About the CVR. Pilots objected to their introduction in the 1970s. A negotiated agreement was that the recordings would only record the last 30 minutes. If an incident or accident occurred, the pilots were instructed to pull the CVR CB so as to preserve the 30 minute recording leading up to the incident. Modern airliners have digital CVRs and they record 90 or more minutes.
Mate modern CVRs store UPTO 2 weeks worth of flights, or put another way
172 Hours of dual channel audio, 172 hours of radio communications (this can go back DAYSSSS or WEEKS) of the tuned frequencys.
Data for 16,000 + Sensors with a Sample rate of 60 Hz (60 data samples per second)
In addition to this depending on the airline, this data is transmitted to the company cloud on engine shutdown OR after 6 hours of contuous use.
In addition to this, all faults are sent to the airline as they happen, they can watch a CVR Report in REAL TIME. Quantus does it, Rolls Royces MONITORS EVERY ENGINE IN THE AIR IN REAL TIME, did you know that, they have a mission control showing every engine turning and its performance data, faults and more.
Modern CVR's are so much more than recorders. They record, analize and broadcast in real time
I was told that the erase feature for the CVR was removed because of this incident. I worked as a mechanic on many 727s from the 100 series and 200 series and we never had a uncommanded slat deployment.
FAA SDR reports between 1970 & '73, 7 case's of slat extension and separation in flight were reported
We still had it in the 90's. This was in 1979.
It was not an erase “feature”, it was a finite loop tape that only had a certain amount of time and if you didn’t pull the breaker it just kept going round and round and taped over. You had to STOP it from erasing by pulling the breaker.
Info from Wikipedia, The bulk erase button was on the CVR at that time and recording could be erased. The recording is only 30 minutes and loops. The big problem for us aircraft guys is, if an incident happened, why would you erase anything? We as the mechanics to the engineers want to know, what the hell happened and how do we keep it from happening again.
The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild Industries Model A-100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR). However, 21 minutes of the 30-minute tape were blank.[1]: 6 Tests of the CVR in the aircraft revealed no discrepancies in the CVR's electrical and recording systems.[1]: 6 The CVR tape can be erased by means of the bulk-erase feature on the CVR control panel located in the cockpit. This feature can be activated only after the aircraft is on the ground with its parking brake engaged.[1]: 6 In a deposition taken by the Safety Board, the captain stated that he usually activates the bulk-erase feature on the CVR at the conclusion of each flight to preclude inappropriate use of recorded conversations. However, in this instance, he could not recall having done so.[1]: 6 The NTSB made the following statement in the accident report:
Ah yes, classic safety obsessed wuss society, a 1 in a million incident happens, therefore BAN EVERYTHING
While the official theoretical sequence is possible, all of the crew involved steadfastly maintained they didn't try it. I have flown several sister ships to the one involved in the incident. They had identical autopilots and flight directors. On more than one occasion, I experience autopilot disconnect anomalies that caused temporary control issues. The 727 near it's service ceiling can be tricky to hand fly and is also prone to engine surge especially in the center engine. I consider it very possible that the events started just as reported by the pilots even if no one else believe them.
did u partake in the wiping of the cvr after a routine flight? was that standard at the time? today is there rules in place that the cvr can only be used in an accident investigation and not by company to spy on the crew?
@@quasarsavage No, I never did. I only observed it done once. I retired after 35 years in commercial aviation.
@@ellischernoff8603 interesting. Thanks for the info
@Feelin' FPV The Erase button would only activate a bulk erasure of the tape. Back in the days of reel to reel home tape recorders, many of us owned a bulk eraser. It's basically an electromagnetic coil. From the outset, CVRs were designed to aid in accident investigation and that's all. Too often, they also fail in a major event and provide little information. My thoughts; when I fly I don't think about the CVR at all.
Unless they have 100% of the truth I would think 7 people would override a spuculative decision
Any really good 727 pilot or engineer knows damn well that pulling the LEADING EDGE CTRL VALVE circuit breaker on the P61 panel will not, I repeat not disable the leading edge slats from extending hydraulically when the flap lever is moved from UP to 2 degrees.
There is a way to trick it using the ALTERNATE FLAP MASTER SWITCH, but other steps are involved that no one seems to know or discuss.
I flew all 3 seats in the Trijet and taught in it too.
I certainly remember this incident way back then. The news media initially hailed them as heroes for recovery of the aircraft. And with the pilot's name being Hoot Gibson it made for a good story.
That was Hoot Gibson? Holy shmoly. He's known as a bit of a 'wild west' sort of pilot.
@@thedevilinthecircuit1414 With a name like that, how could he _not_ be?
@@thedevilinthecircuit1414, So, you know him? Pretty sure he's flown west. There are numerous "Hoot Gibsons". Could be someone else, the astronaut.
Ain’t that a hoot
Once again, another undisciplined pilot almost killed everyone, and ironically is hailed as a hero For saving the day. Soon we will have automation and no more killer pilots, a day I am looking forward to, and, I’m a pilot myself
I remember this case, as I recall, Hoot and the FO were both fired. None of the major airlines would hire them. I don't recall the exact details, but I think Hoot ended out his career as a charter or cargo pilot, and the FO got an airline job somewhere in South America.
I enjoyed, and "liked" the video. Although, there were a few "technical errors" in the script. Two of them in particular kind of stood out, I've made note of them below.
"...reduced power in both engines..." The Boeing 727 has three (3) engines.
"...plugged the holes in the hydraulic cables..."
Hydraulic fluid [oil] is contaminated, under pressure, in hydraulic lines and hoses. A hydraulic line is a hollow tube, basically a pipe. The hose bit is pretty self explanatory.
A cable transfers mechanical motion by means of tension (pulling) on one end, which in turn pulls on whatever is at the other end.
A cable can also be an electrical path, by which power or control signals are transmitted. A cable cannot conduct, transfer, or transmit hydraulic pressure.
Hi Bob -- neither Hoot nor Scott were fired. Both continued flying until retirement. Hoot retired as a 747 Captain by the way. Not exactly a demotion.
@@RogerPetersonMusic Thanks for sharing. That's very interesting. I had been (apparently mistakenly), lead to believe they'd been fired because of the "unsolved" nature of the case, ie. The discrepancy between the pilot statements and what the NTSB was asserting to be the case. I have to admit however, that I never confirmed that for myself.
I'm not a big fan of the NTSB. I'm aware of too many cases (both commercial and GA) in which I believe they've drawn the wrong conclusions.
His [Hoot's] "damming" action of habitually using the bulk erase, was used to cast a shadow of suspicion over him. I know though, that he was not alone in his use of this feature. When CVR's came on the scene, there was a fair bit of discontent among pilots and pilot unions. They did not like the "Eye in the sky" aspect of it. The fact that there was a bulk erase feature available was a result of this discontent.
I was also aware of the 'technique' that the NTSB was strongly suggesting he had employed and thus caused the upset. Even if there was no real evidence, it was very convenient that the scenario seemed to match the event and the missing leading edge slat.
I'm actually glad to hear that his career was able to continue as you've stated. Regardless of what, or who, caused the upset, the fact that he avoided ending up as a lawn dart was a good show of his piloting chops.
I also was impressed with the plane itself. It held together (except for that slat), through the high altitude upset, the low altitude recovery, then performed a controlled landing. I'm aware it sustained damages, but it was repaired and went on to fulfill a full service life. The 727 was a good plane, still my favorite Boeing.
Other than what I learned about him as a result of this case, I don't know about Hoot's history (as you have pointed out).
I've read and learned a fair bit about the "non civilian" career of the 727. That is where I learned about the "High Altitude Cruise" flap setting. Now I'm wondering if Hoot had anything to do with those missions. Perhaps I need to look into this gentleman a little more closely.
Thanks again for sharing your knowledge on this matter. I love learning new things.
If the dude was legit, he would have no need to always erase the CVR. Dodgy dude.
At the time, it was considered accepted practice by most fight crews to erase the CVR upon parking the aircraft after landing. Although regulations stated the CVR recordings could only be used in accident investigation, many pilots viewed it as "management's spy on the crews."
Thje incident was erased because it was on 30 minutes long and took crew longer than 30 minutes to land.
@@ROBSHOTZ Yes, the cockpit conservations of the incident itself would have been erased because of the elapsed time, but some of the subsequent conservations when the CVR would normally have been overwriting the previous recording were also erased. But the point of my comment was to address the implication in the original comment that the captain erased the CVR to deliberately conceal that he did something improper.
@@sct913 60 Minutes did a story on this and they stated that a maintenance person from TWA erased the data.
@@ROBSHOTZ First I've heard of this.
Oh what a great story MACI. As a former B727 captain, I can attest as to the reliability and functionality of the B727 systems. The aircraft was very advanced for its era, and as far as the handling characteristics of the aircraft, it was a solid aircraft to fly. There was a saying in the aviation community that went like this; "Nothing flies like a 727" and it was true. It was a dream to fly. What went wrong with this particular aircraft only the crew and the airplane knows about it and neither of them will ever talk. As to the captain erasing the CVR, it is a common practice to do that after any flight, not because you did anything illegal or wrong, it's just done by some crewmembers, as to prevent any possible questioning from the feds for any reason. Think of it as leaving evidence for the police to find and be used against you if you were a criminal. By erasing the CVR after terminating a flight, the crew was pretty much clear to go on their way without leaving anything recorded that could be listened to by management or the feds.
During our B727 ground school at my former airline, there were all sorts of discussions about exotics crewmembers doing crazy stuff with the flaps and slats in order to increase altitude and performance. However, all this information came in with a warning "Don't do it" as well as "It was tried by xyz crew and they were all fired".
Years later I flew the MD-11 and again the same type of stories flowed and the recommendations were still the same "Be very careful with what you do around the flap control handle" as with the case of the Chinese crew. Btw, I flew that very same MD-11 on the story once it was converted to cargo and commented about the apparition and what happened to us during one of those flights.
Good video as always, good job and two thumbs way up my friend.
The captain did land the plane safely thats the most important thing right,, you cant compare with a car crash or something similar, this is an aeroplane, it carries more than 100 people,, and moreover they are flying,, i still give credit to the amazing captian who save his passenger and crew..
Hello Humberto. You are right on. They survived to taxi to the gate and parked the breaks PUSH THE BUTTON. Pulling that breaker must have come out of flight test. It was widely known. When I came to work a few hours after the incident it was being talked about on the tie line. No one would admit doing it. It was also thought the AC could not climb that hi without a little extra.
What do you mean apparition on one of those flights??
Yeah, what apparition? You have to tell us THAT story.
@@WizxWx I'm not much impressed by airmanship demonstrated by a pilot who broke his plane. Cf Air Transit Atlantic Glider. No más.
Watching my favourite aviation UA-camr! What an amazing topic to end the year with a bang!
Agreed
HE DOES GOOD JOB
Thank you so much!
@@MiniAirCrashInvestigation Both you and 3 Greens - Aviation Safety along with Delta\KennyDang are my favorite aviation incident YTbers. Kenny Dang puts air crash anniversary updates on his channel (not video though, just still images and a description), while 3 Greens explains stuff like you do.
The safety department at the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) also investigated this incident (published report is available) and found that the #7 slat had been retracting and extending in a misaligned condition. Wear marks were evident on the incident aircraft. APLA's conclusion was that the #7 slat uplock failed to engage due to the misalignment, and a subsequent failure of the A hydraulic system allowed the slat to extend. Further, they found no evidence of ANY flight crew intentionally extending trailing edge flaps at altitude. It is preposterous to think extending trailing edge flaps would improve aerodynamics at the service ceiling of a B-727. Lastly, the TWA Shutdown Checklist at the time included "Cockpit Voice Recorder...Erase". Facts matter.
The NTSB noted this issue, but their analysis of possible failure modes for the lockouts and extension (finding 11) comes to a very different conclusion. Though the analysis was conducted with the manufacturer, and both the manufacturer and the ALPA have a dog in the fight, so that has to be kept in mind. The shutdown checklist is interesting though, and if true it's curious that it wasn't included in the NTSB report given the weight they seemed to attribute to this action.
@@outtascope Good points, outtascope. NTSB and Boeing have colluded before and will again. Been too long to remember which piece of evidence the NTSB WITHHELD from the case because it didn't fit Boeing's narrative. Same with the CVR...Erase issue.
Some more interesting facts about this incident. The FE was a Navy test pilot. Tall, young, dark hair. His hair turned white within a few months, and he retired early. The captain and FO were reinstated after about 6 months and flew till the mandatory retirement age (60).
I am always hesitant to blame a person for an incident on base of 'suspicious actions' alone. The actions of the pilot were sketchy but I'm not going to place any measure of guilt on that. Especially not since the incident itself would not have been on the recording anymore but would only have contained the time before the landing.
The fact that he was not able to recall if he had erased the CVR on that flight gives me the impression that it has become such a habit for him that he's not consciously thinking about the action. That's common with habits, I routinely can't remember if I locked my car or my front door only to find out that yes, I locked it without even thinking about it. I believe the same thing happened here.
As someone else pointed out in the comments, it was apparently routine for pilots to delete the CVR after each flight and were actually encouraged to do so by pilot unions.
If it's good for the commander in chief, then it's good for the captain,
I don't remember.🤔
I always love listening to your videos while I solve the Rubik's cube on my desk
Interesting note is that the 787 does exactly like this at high altitude. It automatically extends the flaps without the slats to allow you to fly higher with a lower indicated airspeed. Remember that as you get higher with a constant mach speed your indicated airspeed will decrease. At some point you’ll be at MMO or max mach operating speed but you can’t go any slower because you’ll stall. That’s called coffin corner.
Great job again.
I was pretty surprised to learn that the CVR recordings can be erased selectively. Don't think such a system exists now.
Slats are operated by means of screwjacks, since they have to assume different degrees of extension according to the flight envelope. A slat operated by a piston can assume only two positions, extend or retract. Maybe this aircraft had such a configuration for the operation of slats.
The CVR uses a circular storage with a limited, but defined amount of minutes of storage.
If the pilots do not pull the circuit breaker on the ground, it continuous to record over previous recordings.
The longer you "forget" to pull the breaker, the less of the flight remains on tape.
Also, you can "bump" the circuit breaker in flight by "accident".
Why such an "accidents" could regularly happen to a pilot that happens to loose a slate on one of those flight is hard to tell.
B727 slats are operated by hydraulic jacks and are either extended or retracted with no intermediate positions. Hydraulic pressure for the slats comes from Hydraulic system A or the standby hydraulic system.
@@lardyify Thanks for that. I thought so.
Christopher Land I agree the 727 leading edge slats were hydraulic, the trailing edge flaps were definitely jack screws, I remember that sound.
Capt. Ron: I knew the pilot and the aircraft. I was a TWA Captain and Check Airman on the Boeing 727 when Capt. Gibson's event occured. My opinion of this YT Diatribe is the lowest possible.
Amen! While I appreciate most of the videos this UA-camr makes, this one has me less than impressed. The title of this video sickens me. No pilot, unless suicidal, is going to “cause a near fatal crash”. First off, there was NO crash, but a spectacular recovery from what could easily have been a horrendous event.
Sorry son, but click bait cheapens your channel, and if you have a shred of integrity, you should take this video down, get your facts straight and then decide what to do. If you conclude that Gibson acted irresponsibly, that is your prerogative, but title your video accordingly.
What a fascinating story. Very very interesting. Truthfully, we will never really know whether the Captain and Crew lied about what happened or if they were being honest about the events that took place. Atleast they were able to land the plane before it could crash. No lives were lost, injuries yes, but no loss of life. Thanks for featuring this story.
It's pretty simple to deduce they were trying to pull a fast one. You don't erase the info like that, even if you're doing it routinely, after a near death experience like that. Nope.
this depiction shows the nose wheel extended at altitude....... I flew 727 in the 1980s .....it was somewhat common knowledge among 727 pilots that he had pulled the breaker to increase their cruise speed while the FE was in the bathroom, when he returned he saw the breaker out and pushed it back in and that's when they extended. Sounds like he lied to cover his ass and protect his career and pension.... the fact that he erased the CVR tape proves it was a cover up IMO. if he normally erased it, I could buy that on a normal flight.... but after an incident, NO PILOT would erase it unless he was trying to coverup wrongdoing... same as Nixon erased the tapes in the Oval Office. among 727 pilots that circuit breaker was known as the "Hoot Gibson switch". what does that tell you?.... there are enough unforeseen dangers in aviation without intensionally doing anything non-standard.
Thanks, you saved me from typing almost exactly the same thing! Spot on!
Flew the B 727 in the 80's.
That was the same story we were told .
Cheers
my pop was a Mechanic for TWA in those days and my buddy's pop was an Aero-Engineer also with TWA and this thing with extending the flaps but not the slats (by monkeying with circuit breakers) at high altitude was done ALL THE TIME ... which does NOT prove that is what happened on that flight but... yeah
That was the working theory I always heard when I worked for the FAA. But there was no proof.
@@kholmar Absolutely agree, many pilots used to do this. And even if it is far from being normal procedure the slats should have remained in but for some reason they didn't. Blaming the crew is always easy, they can't defend themselves. It is interesting that people judge the cpt's actions who don't know the difference between a main gear and an APU exhaust....
I'm an EE (Electronics engineer) by trade, since the slats can be disabled by a circuit breaker that must mean they are electronically actuated to some degree. (I'm guessing the lever has a switch turning on a hydraulic pump or open a solenoid valve) These planes use Teflon wire which is prone to cold flow incidents (the Teflon insulation if exposed to high tensile forces over time will separate from the copper wire causing shorts), I believe there is a real possibility that two wires unintentionally making contact could cause deployment. I would also like to note the only way to prove this would be an in depth examination of the wiring harnesses which would be a very noteworthy endeavor which was not mentioned in this video (so I'm assuming not performed). I believe that there is a real possibility that under some abnormal strain two Teflon wires could have barely made contact resulting in an intermittent partial slat deployment. Intermittent being the keyword here (since it would likely be weaker then a full slat deployment due to the time it takes for the hydraulic system to reach it's maximum pressure).
Also, why was only one slat damaged? Every aluminum fracture I've seen is ductile so I would expect the other slats to have evidence of severe damage if one on them underwent enough mechanical strain to shear off. If that isn't the case then how did the slats pass basic metallurgy consistency standards required by the FAA? Because if they all deployed at the same time (by the crew's command) then they would have all underwent roughly the same mechanical strain!
Frankly, After pausing and thinking about this I believe this video left me with an unreasonable amount of unanswered questions. I don't know shit about airplanes but I know electronics, and I know my metallurgy, I've never seen an aluminum alloy that undergoes brittle failure like the one described without first seriously deforming. Perhaps the stainless steel bolts sheared (as most aircraft grade bolts are made of fairly hard & brittle material), but somehow didn't leave a mark on the soft aluminum frame? I find that very hard to believe.
I'm not spieling here to undermine the NTSB because they do some great work with many of the most top-notch people in the field. However the story given to me in this video just doesn't make any sense.
I would expect that the detailed NTSB report would address many of the issues you identify. The teflon wire theory is incredibly speculative though, and if at issue would likely have shown hundreds of times during the service operation of the 727. A complete report, if done competently, would have to have looked at this possibility given they were examining circumstances under which an unintentional deployment could occur.
Something that I think you maybe discounting with respect to the slats is that deployment at cruise speed is beyond their service spec. They are required to not fail within some specified load + safety factor. They are almost certainly NOT required to fail at identical loads. That means a failure of the two systems may not happen coincidentally or at the same loading. The service history of the slats and actuators may also be very different from one side to the other.
It's also worth noting the differences in the Hydraulic systems A and B on the 727 with respect to the slats. A hydraulic system A failure was noted. The slats can be extended and retracted with hydraulic system A, but they can only be extended with system B, not retracted. So regardless of why the slats were extended, if they were being retracted and one side was moving slower than the other due excessive load when the system A failure occurred (or if one side was able to extended under excessive load while the other wasn't) then it is reasonable to expect that the extended/non-retracted side experienced much greater loading and stress for a much longer duration than the side that either didn't deploy or managed to retract under excessive load. The yaw and roll described are evidence that only one side was deployed.
Keep in mind, too, that with both slats deployed on both sides, the drag force would likely be split more or less evenly between the two and normal to their surface. If one side retracts before the other (or only one side deploys), the total load on the deployed side is now likely higher and due to yaw is no longer normal to the surface, so it is a very different loading than the "undamaged" side experienced if they were deployed simultaneously at some point during cruise.
@@outtascope You make some good points, I could be overestimating how consistent the metal is and falsely assuming that the load would be roughly consistent from side to side, because certainly if there is a harsh change in the drag forces that would compound any shear forces the slats experience. The deployment of cruise speed is definitely beyond their service spec, I didn't think about how retracting could damage the slats because I assumed they would be destroyed on deployment. Either way, it still surprises me that only that section of slat was damaged and the others further down the wing weren't. From an Aerofoil standpoint wouldn't the very trailing edge of the wing have the most torsional force applied to it if the plane was rolling? I think the service histories may have had a major role in deciding which one failed and how it failed. And yes my Teflon theory was very speculative but it has happened in other aircraft before hence why they stopped using it in military aircraft (not sure if it's still allowed in commercial).
Either way I don't have the time to invest into reading the full report, I'm just speculating out of my ass. I just wish the video went into some more details though so I wouldn't have to speculate on trivial aspects that should've been mentioned.
@@linuxguy1199 Agree, the video could benefit from including some details that it omitted but were included in the report. I did just go speed read the report and it turns out the the #7 slat DID have pre-existing damage/wear and mis-alignment. So the NTSB analysis concludes that it was likely an intentional deployment outside of operating rules, but that the #7 failed to retract under load because of the pre-existing alignment issue. What surprises me in the report is that they are looking at margins that led to the failure/errors that are much tighter than the amount of slop (loaded terminology intended) in the tolerances allowed by the regulations at the time. So it's the old chain of errors. Flight crew breaking the rules was a significant factor, but it wasn't the ONLY factor, which I think the NTSB addressed to some degree but the video didn't adequately IMO. While I haven't worked in aviation is 30 some years, I feel that the report seems to brush over what appear to be overly loose tolerances. I was also surprised that a 1979 FDR seemed to only record (as implied by the report) position/attitude, velocity and G forces. The report makes no mention of any ancillary flight control inputs being recorded (at least that I noticed in my speed read, I may have missed it), which could have potentially answered or narrowed most of the bigger questions.
The captain apparently appealed twice, but the NTSB falls under 'unreviewable jurisdiction'; which means, at the time at least, no-one has any right to challenge whether or not they're mistaken.
The 'case' against the pilot seems flimsy, at best. It assumes that automated systems always act as designed. Just because you can't replicate something doesn't mean it did not happen.
More recently, just think about MCAS/Max 8, wasn't that initially pilot error???
It's a very interesting case, I saw someone mention the possibility of a rudder hardover something Boeing encountered numerous times with the 73 in the 90s/
The MCAS thing was more lack of training about it i heard some pilots were unaware the system even existed
I am torn between the fact that the pilots showed incredible airmanship in recovering the aircraft, but the captain caused the upset in the first place.
Sure they exhibited incredible airmanship. Their own lives depended on it.
They didn’t cause the upset, read my reply
Like an arsonist who is also a fireman and arrives to put out his own fire.
No they didn’t. Read “Scapegoat.” It was most likely a rudder hard-over problem. Something Boeing had more frequent troubles later on with on the 737
@@BillPalmer I dunno man.... I was believing the captain until the CVR erasure stuff. Why do you think the book's conclusions are more credible than the accident report?
I mean, here we have TWO very suspicious and very unlikely issues that both point to the captain. First, they can find no reason why the CVR just happened to 'fail' right when a one-in-a-million catastrophic malfunction supposedly happened to the slats.
Second, they can find no reason why the slats would deploy on their own. I could take the captain's word if ONE of those issues occurred. But for both of them to happen simultaneously? And the second 'mystery' just HAPPENS to erase all the evidence of the first 'mystery?' It seems implausible to me.
Me and my wife were on this flight....it’s was awful. I was certain we were DEAD. Period. She thought so too. She prayed. I couldn’t even pray. I lost full control of everything including my bodily functions and I lost my bowels. Even my wife did not do that. But I honestly thought we were dead. And believe me. I wasn’t the first only man who had lost control of their urine and bowels during this horrifyingly awful experience. We sued. They gave me and my wife free airfare for life but I haven’t been able to get on a flight again. I still wake up crying like a baby in the middle of the night! It’s funny..... you think you have a basic understanding of fear? Trust me. You don’t.
They should have charged you extra for the amusement park ride.
@@user-tb7rn1il3q "What would it take for you to ever go flying again?"
"Depends."
@@OgamiItto70 😆
Hello fellow passenger! I was also on this flight. I was traveling alone with a small poodle on my lap and one in cargo.
How much $$ did you get? Can you give more of a description of how it was like back there?
Hi from Australia. Thanks for a great video.
I remember when this happened. Though I was young I couldn't understand the Capt comments about not remembering doing something due to force of habit. After 3 decades of military service I understand how easily you can do something out of constant force of habit and not remember doing it. Take for instance saluting an officer. It happens so instinctively no established soldier can tell you how many times they saluted or in some cases if they even did so. Just an example.
Even after a near death experience? Think about just surviving a major crash and now you're safe. The first thing you do is slink down exhausted. You don't do anything. You have no energy left to even do instinctual things.
@@Dayvit78 That's an extremely broad, sweeping statement, and is merely your expressed opinion, not established fact. Accordingly, it won't apply to everyone simply because no two human beings are the same, and certainly not at times of crisis.
@@Dayvit78 EXCEPT CYA
The difference between speculation and fact is hard evidence and none is presented here. The CVR is a red herring - the FDR is the real judge of which commands were issued and it seems unlikely that the Pilot would have commanded such an action deliberately unless suicidal. That he worked hard to recover and land safely is to be applauded but we may never know the truth of this incident.
The FDR only records a regulated subset of the data of the planes systems.
Not all details are recorded on the FDR and even if: A system detecting an input is not the same as a pilot issuing that command.
The malfunction can very well be a switch it self or the wiring or the system reading the switch status.
Yes, it is unlikely that the pilot make erroneous inputs intentionally.
But: it is possible that the pilot deviated from the official procedure, made a mistake doing so and then ended up in an unsafe situation.
@@sarowie But even the primitive foil FDR’s of the time recorded flap positions, did they not? The accusation is that he pulled the slats circuit breaker so he could extend just the flaps. That act of flap extension would have shown on the FDR. And the pilots had no way of erasing that.
@@andrewtaylor940 I find it strange there was no mention of the FDR in the whole video.
@@radioace318la It was briefly mentioned for being one of the older digital types. But they all, from when they came into use, until the digital age in the early 2000’s were required to have at least 18 data points.
@@radioace318la well the sensationalist fake airplane review channel cant put a clickbait title then can he?
Hey man hope you are doing good... Wishing you an advance happy new year 2022.. Awesome video
Thank you you as well!
Amazing video as always. Such a puzzling case. The captain very obviously did do something, why else would he have tampered with evidence? His habit of deleting the recordings is suspicious to say the least.
I suspect that he regularly messed with the circuit breakers.
Why would you give the pilot the possibility to erase the CVR?
The pilot knows a few things about the CVR that lead to lost recordings:
The CVR is circular. You know after how many minutes your word gets overwritten.
The CVR has a circuit breaker that you can pull on the ground, to prevent that from happening after landing after an incident.
Now imagine the pilot wants to mess with the controls by pulling circuit breakers: Would he first pull the CVR breaker or the Breaker for the slat extension?
You are viewing this through the filter of 2021. In the 1970’s CVR’s were viewed with great suspicion by the Pilots and in particular the Pilots Unions, as intrusive surveillance tools prone to be misused by management. The existence of the “erase everything” button was a concession to the pilots unions, because at the time the pilots would have otherwise gone on strike. Pilots Union Rules, whether published or otherwise, were very clearly known to be “the CVR is only there in the event of catastrophe. If the plane makes it to the Gate, the erase button gets pushed”. The Pilot and Union concerns about CVR’s were not entirely unfounded. There were also still a lot of Civil Liberty concerns about them. So much of our lives today are baked around the presumption that everything is being recorded by someone or some thing, that we can’t always appreciate back when this was not the case. CVR’s have evolved into a critical, well understood, and fully supported piece of aircraft technology. Part of that was rules being put in place regarding who had access to them and how anything on them may be used. In 1979, following the energy crisis and it’s impact on the airlines, and airline management seeking any Avenue they could find to get around Union Seniority rules, there were a lot of concerns about the CVR’s. And a lot of possibilities for misuse and abuse.
I'm so glad you made a video on this accident before Air Crash Investigation airs their episode on it. You might make me skip two episodes on the new season of ACI because the Alaskan Airlines Flight 261 accident got a remake. Keep up the good work.
Search out Mentour Pilot on UA-cam. A real pilot, he and his team make excellent aircrash reports, far better than the Discovery Channel versions.
They’re doing this as well? I didn’t know
@@blatherskite9601 I actually found that channel because of this one. Very well explained and thorough. I like this one too as it's short and to the point, whereas mentour tells us more about the experience rhe pilots had and such.. both are epic in my opinion
Air Crash Investigation tends to skip most incidents that don’t end horribly, unless there is some compelling element such as a volcano, a transatlantic glider flight, or the Captain hanging out the cockpit window.
@@andrewtaylor940 They also tend to focus on the human interest side (ie, victims burning up). I prefer to see the human factors at work, and a practising pilot such as Mentour gives a good insight there.
There is a whole lot about this incident that is not covered here. The recorders automatically erase everything every half an hour and re-record over it. The incident would not have been on the tape when they landed because it had been over a half an hour since the incident began.
The narrator addressed that point. "Although the recorder woukd not have captured the start of the incident access to the end of the recording would have been very useful" yes indeed, especially the part where the Captain says "okay, I'm going to erase the CVR, or were all going to be fired or even lose our licenses over disobeying the rules on flap operation.
Great video. Just a question though from someone with no avaiation knowledge to those who would know. Is it still possible for a pilot to delete the CVR nowadays? It feels like a massive red flag to me that you could do that, I suspect you couldn't now, but would like to know. Thanks
I'd like to know why this was ever even possible anyway?
In the early days of CVR’s pilots were very much against them and I believe if my memory serves me right that the pilots (read pilot unions) only agreed their use if the CVR could be erased once the flight had concluded I.e. on the ground. Therefore there was an erase button to enable this function. Modern aircraft do not have this function.
@@spoinkster1100 that makes sense. But how can they be allowed to do this unless there was a case of such emergency? And in this case it was obviously needed to conduct an investigation
There should be a feature that sends the recording to a database so that even if you have to perform that procedure, the recording up to that point is still available to investigators
You can - but company policy is that it's kept on.
Yes it is, and the purpose for it is to test the CVR, it is part of the checklist/flows before flight. Modern aircraft do not have the option of deleting the CVR data while in the air however.
When I read about this accident years ago, the initial theory was that the captain had intentionally extended the slats for takeoff, per normal practice. When he went to retract the slats once airborne, the #7 slat did not retract due to a problem in the mechanism. At the time, this explaination was supported by the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), who cited past instances of problems with the slats on TWA 727s.
I understand this did happen on other 727's as well
@@dwaynemcallister7231 Correct.
Why on earth would the captain have even been allowed to regularly erase the CVR?
The seems like something that can only be abused…
Is there any situation where that feature would actually need to be available?
In those days, the CVR used a 30 minute magnetic tape loop. After a normal landing and taxi in to the gate, conversations and comments might not be relevant and it was common practice to erase at the end of the shutdown check. Today, CVRs use digital data storage and can retain a whole flight. The value of CVR data to validate crew performance and even defend actions has become accepted by crews and has ended the preference to erase.
The cvr was a recording of only 30 minutes. The plane landed at Detroit after the tape had been recorded over (took longer than 30 minutes to land) so there was nothing to erase.
The FDR and CVR are not to spy on the crew. They are there to supply information if the crew does not survive. It was so in the original agreement. That is why there is the bulk erase.
This is a good one, everyone survived and they still had the complete plane to test
The erased CVR tape is a Red Herring.
The incident started at 9:48 pm.
The plane landed at 10:31pm the tape was erased at 10:39 pm
The CVR only records the previous 30 minutes.
When the plane landed , the CVR had already taped over everything before 10:01pm which was 13 minutes after the plane went into a dive.
Just to restate my point
When the CVR erase button was hit the CVR had already deleted everything said before 10:10 pm , the plane went into a dive at 9:48 pm.
My gut feeling is the Captain did it out of habit and when the FAA couldnt figure out how the slat extended they just fixated on the CVR being erased.
Even if the FAA's theory was correct , the Captain would still have had no motivation to delete it except out of habit.
I think the slat failed to retract fully after take off and the autopilot was able to compensate for it until it bent.
The plane went into a dive , the excessive speed ripped off the slat and they were able to regain control.
THANK YOU!
Not unless the parts he erased recorded him discussing what had happened with the flight crew after they regained control of the plane. For someone who didn't want "inappropriate use of recorded conversarions" it seems kind of weird that he used the bulk erase feature when they were on the ground and then let it record nine more minutes of talk without activating the bulk erase feature again.
I watched a CBS special from 1983 on this. The reporter pointed out in an actual cockpit that to extend the flaps (the suspected cause of accident), yoy had 2 switches in front on the ceiling AND a 3rd in back by the engineer.
There is no way the 3 men are to blame. It was an 13-14 year old plane. The actuator was cracked and failed under metal fatigue and stress.
With 727's back then there was frequent disabling of the slats in order to extend the flaps to the 2 degree setting. This enabled the aircraft to fly faster and many times reduce fuel consumption. My uncle who flew the 727 said it was a common procedure. After TWA 841 he never saw it done again. Erasure of the CVR after each flight is still a common practice after normal/uneventful flights.
This was not frequent or a common procedure in spite of what your uncle claims. The claims of flying faster and using less fuel have not been validated. Aft CG loading was just as effective.
It was indeed common, to the point of being routine, in the quest to ensure aircraft arrived at their destination on time, or earlier if possible. A great selling point to business passengers for whom time was money.
@@ellischernoff8603 Claims LOL. I know man former 727 pilots. They all knew about the procedure but only a few admitted to doing it.
It was not a common procedure and it didn't allow the airplane to fly faster it allowed the airplane to fly at a higher altitude to maybe get out of the headwind with a little bit better stall protection. It was not allowed by the Boeing operating manual nor the FAA. When the airplane entered the right bank it probably stalled and they lost control of it.
It’s always nice for Mini Air Crash Investigation when he uploads a new video. :)
The FE was new, he left the cockpit, the FO opens the L/E SLAT CB which allows you to extend trailing edge flaps only to one unit. This gives you greater wing area, smoother ride at higher altitudes. The FE returns to his station, scans the area and sees a CB open. Resetting the CB put pressure on the slats and they rip off extending at high speed. This flap trick was fairly common, but not taught in airline flight school.
They were flying within the jetstream and wanted to get to destination faster, so asked ATC to climb to 39K I think that increased their speed.
Alright. But my question is: I would _think_ that an engineer would, or should, have the knowledge to know about the consequences of resetting said breaker under such conditions. Even if the engineer is not a pilot (I have no idea if flight engiineers are usually or always pilots), it just seems obvious that these are the types of things that he should definitely understand.
But Boeing’s own tests disproved this. Boeing claims that at that airspeed the 600 lbs of force being applied to the leading edge of the wing would have prevented slat deployment. Which would seem to run counter to the scuttlebutt about the FE finding the popped breaker and pushing it back in.
This is the story that I was told and believe. One of my instructors in A&P school was on the repair team for this aircraft and had a bunch of damage photos.
@@andrewtaylor940 I assume you mean 600 psi? Can you explain how a force on the _leading edge_ of the wing would prevent the slats from deploying, since the pistons and the slats deploy toward the aft, with the airflow? I'm not claiming that you're wrong, I just don't understand how that would be the case.
I do remember seeing footage of Boeing's evidence to the NTSB - to the effect that uncommanded flap actuation on the 727 was impossible because it had never happened before. Seriously, that is what they said. Rather telling really.
BTW, I think you have your nav lights swapped in the animation. The port wing should carry red.
It makes me laugh yet frown at the same time at the pilots' objection to CVRs back then, and in the UK and Europe, tachographs were demonised as a spy in the cab yet now on humble buses there is a dashcam system , fitted of course for safety reasons etc, which records not just audio but HD video which can be analysed in Chicago and be at the bosses terminal within minutes to allow the boss to discipline the driver for daring to drive with only one hand on the steering despite there being absolutely no incident or chance of one.
Wow this is great. Sometimes I am skeptical of the video titles but reality can be stranger than fiction and these accidents really hold up to that…
HELLO ALL HAPPY NEW YEARS.
GOOD SHOW MAC.
Most transport jets over-achieve the performance books. If a B-757 or C-141 says you can cruise at FL390 and you try it'll work. Not so with the 727. If the book says you can do FL388 and you try FL390 it may not work. I flew the 72 for 7 1/2 year and the old heads talked about the rumors of extending the flaps to 2 degrees (the first detent) with no slats for more lift at high altitude although none I flew with ever tried it. At flaps 2, slats 2,3,6 & 7 extend. That's the center two of the outer wing section. If they attempted to prevent slat extension and failed the mishap scenario ensues. The subsequent hydraulic failure would be consistent with a broken actuator caused by aerodynamic loads causing failure. Thankfully "cowboy captains" are a thing of the past.
I don't know on this. I can see the skipper trying to save fuel and messing up and then later erasing the tape to cover the crew's ass. But, at the same time, erasing the tape wasn't uncommon back then and the 727 wasn't always the easiest plane to fly. And there have been times where a mechanical fault wasn't reproducible with regular testing. Like the rudder PCU issue on the 737. They had to put the unit under an extreme test to simulate conditions and only then did it lock up. But those same units, the ones from one of the crashed planes, performed as they were supposed to when they tested them without the other external conditions. That could have very easily happened here. But, at the same time, them just forgetting to pull the slat breaker when they extended flaps seems fairly logical.
It also sounds like they had a theory and didn't need to look too hard beyond that. To me it's not very convincing that they weren't able to replicate the error, and that therefore it must have been human error. Sounds like the sort of investigator theory that leads to a vacated conviction and an apology after 20 years in prison.
Consider the timing of this event: 1979 and DC-10's and 737's fall out of the sky due to ridiculous oversights from the designers, I absolutely think there might have been a hidden gotcha in this plane. The rudder hardovers in the 737's were unnoticeable after the crashes. Hell, even the 777 that fell down in Heathrow had a weird design flaw only encountered twice before (the heat exchanger had protruding pipes that allowed ice to block fuel delivery).
I would like to see MENTOUR PILOT investigate and obtain all available information and post a video about this incident - this is the first I have read about it.
I worked on this aircraft in 2003 in Roswell New Mexico.
There is an excellent book entitled "Scapegoat" that goes into great detail about this incident. The captain and crew were vindicated years afterwards following the production of evidence that demonstrated how the slat deployed of it's own accord. However, the captain suffered greatly emotionally and had also been dismissed from his job.
The captain is portrayed in this video as having the habit of erasing the CVR. He may have paved the way to his own dismissal at least partially due to this.
He retired at age 60 just as I did, he was not fired.
@@geoh7777, There are many topics of conversation during a day of work. Things might be said that are not meant to be heard by others. The motive to erase those spoken thoughts is genuine.
@@geoh7777 All Captain’s we’re in that habit back then. Stop applying modern standards and rules to 1979. They erased the CVR as soon as the parking brake was set. This was Pilot’s Union SOP in every major airline. The Erase Everything button was there for a reason, and that reason was without it there would have been a North American Pilots strike. Remember CVR’s were first put in in 1971. They were not a well accepted element of flight safety at that time. Many if not most pilots viewed them as intrusive surveillance devices that were often abused by management. Especially in the late 70’s as the Energy Crisis caused soaring fuel prices to drive all the airlines towards bankruptcy. Union Contracts had steep Seniority Rules. So you could not lay off Senior Pilots while keeping less Senior ones. But Senior Pilots we’re the most expensive pilots. So management would go hunting for excuses to terminate Senior people. It was a cruel and brutal industry at that time. With near open warfare between the airlines and the unions. The pilots had accepted the CVR’s only as things to be used in the event people didn’t walk away. They were not supposed to be used as tools against them. The use of CVR had some major unresolved legal and civil rights questions at the time. Did your employer have the right to record and review your private conversations with a co-worker not broadcast over open radio? We are so accepting of the digital surveillance state today that we forget this was not normal back then.
Thanks for the interesting historical context.
My grandparents used to live in the Saginaw area.
They said they remember that night they woke up to a loud bang, their theory was the 727 breaking the sound barrier as it dove.
I also think the only possible explanation is the crew messing something up and then covering it up.
But my question is: Why? Why would they care about the aircraft's performance and/or fuel consumption?
Boredom.
Fast car people want to be pilots? Fast car people are not the ones you get a lift with! My favourite pilot would be the one who has NEVER had a speeding ticket.. Peace be unto you.
If I had to make a guess, given the date this occurred, it was in the middle of the 70’s oil crisis, and I’d be willing to bet airlines were pushing pilots to save in any way possible.
Why do people do hypermile driving. They use difficult techniques to get a financial immaterial savings on gas. It is just to get status among a small group of enthusiast. I would expect pilot to have the same tendencies.
I think that also contributed to the Canary Island airport collision with the two 747's! Idling on the Tarmac burns a lot of fuel plus it messes up the "on time" performance of KLM which was one of their strong marketing points in their ads back then.
Maybe it's my hearing, half the time I couldn't tell if you were saying "slats" or "flaps",I found it confusing, it's entirely possible that it's my audio equipment, either way that plane had one hellova ride, sounds worse than the Max8 rollercoaster.
I believe TWA had severe cost cutting measures and pilots were rewarded for saving fuel. The pioneer may have been the Captain Snyder of TW 800 who was famous for saving a lot of fuel on transatlantic flights by a similar 2 degree flap deployment. This culture probably was imbibed into each and every pilot who flew for TWA.
He was famous for asking questions that he hoped you didn't know the answers to so he could tell you the answer and explain to you why you needed to know it. B-747's don't have 2 degrees flaps. You fly by following the flight plan made by a computer.
Makes me wonder why there isn't a dedicated "hypermiling" flap setting, so you don't have to mess with breakers to get that effect
@@specialopsdave Because the hypermiling setting puts undue stress on the airframe, which it was not designed for?
@@ratemisia In which case, the pilots should know this and avoid it, especially on long flights
My respects to all pilots.
They will keep flying regardless of the circumstances.
I believe anyone until there is a known lie , so pilot telling the truth here
I wasn't a 727 pilot but I did stay in a Holiday Inn Express. Since we have so many pilots in here I do have a real question. How do pilots not know that the plane is banking only when they look at the gauges? I have flown in airplanes back and forth from the US to Germany since the early '70s. I can always tell when they start banking the plane left or right by the feel. Just curious because I see so many of these airline accident videos online that I can never figure out why the pilots don't notice this until they are dropping 32000 feet per minute?
Just an idea, maybe because they fly so much they get used to the feel of the plane banking, vertigo can come into play in nighttime flights
Check out flash airlines flight 604 about that
Excellent sim, other than the nav light colours being reversed, red always on port ,green starboard.
sim?
Its Fsx
Still gold
I know someone that was on this flight very well.. I've heard this story for years.. he told me that they extended the flaps on purpose to improve airplane performance but then one of the co-pilots noticed the circuit breaker being off and he flipped one of them back on which pulled half of the flaps in and left number seven out leading to the accident
That would align with what I have heard about this incident for my entire airline career! And this story was used during flight engineer training at Piedmont Airlines.
"Hm, I survived by the skin of my teeth there." "Let me just nonchalantly erase the CVR as always because the guys will definitely not want to investigate any question"
Or,
"Oh I should definitely not forget to erase the CVR or else I'm effed."
2335 hrs GMT at 04:44 you said runway 03 but the floor shows runway 4R.
Also at 07:07 the narrator says decending at 34,000 feet per minute. Surely not. Should it be 3,400 feet per minute
Thanks
In most aircraft at that time including the incident aircraft here the CVR has a 30 min loop that is recorded over. The theory was that any accident requiring the CVR would be less than 30 min in duration. The time frame involved put the incident nearly 40 min before the CVR was shut down. There was no unexpected missing data on the recorder, this was just sensationalistic reporting in an attempt to put blame on something not fully understood.
Subsequent investigations have considered more likely scenarios, most prevalent is that because of the operating envelope at that altitude is so narrow, plus or minus 10kts it was more likely an upset due to a jet stream gust. This holds with the captains testimony that the slats/flaps and gear were extended during the dive in an attempt to slow the aircraft below its max speed as during the dive the aircraft went trans sonic.
There was a common belief in the 70's that the 727 could fly higher, heavier without stalling if the flaps were just a few degrees out. Everyone did it then. Or at least many crews did. It's so obvious what happened in this case. The FE said, "we burned off XXX amount, captain". And the captain said, "OK let's go on up to three nine zero." He made a call about winds and upper n lower FL"s as a dodge. He needed a reason for going up early cause ENROUTE knew about when this flight should be expected to ask for higher as the PW-JT-8D's used up the Jet A. If anyone cared, they may have noticed he must still have been too heavy for FL390. Once the slats went out, one departed the ship stalling part of the starboard wing. This precipitated the roll and dive that probably exceeded Mach 1. I think the mains were pushed back two feet. The undercarriage doors and a lot of other parts missing or deformed. The hydraulics were fine until the fancy flying and stupid aircraft tricks began. I've been a pilot since 1973 and a lawyer since 1984. These guys are/were criminals and would be in a gulag if they had been pilots in the USSR. Way past reckless endangerment.
Odd, flaps at altitude and speed improve fuel economy?
Yeah that’s what I’m wondering too. Wouldn’t the flaps increase drag thereby lowering performance rather than improve it?
Could someone explain in full detail how it works?
I would guess that that was unofficial company policy.
@@MazenFallatah
Very thin air at high speeds does odd things
@@MazenFallatah What matters is not so much the drag itself, but the lift/drag (L/D) ratio. It was believed by many pilots at the time (whether or not correctly) that extending the flaps on their own would cause more increase in lift than it caused increase in drag, so the overall L/D ratio would improve.
Sounds strange to me, too. Especially, if this would be the case, I see no reason that aircraft manufacturers wouldn't suggest to do so, too, in order to make their planes look better.
Humm, I’m about to rob a bank. I think I’ll just disable all security cameras.
"boeing made an investigation and found nothing" - yeah: And a maneuvering characteristic argumentation system is not an antistall system and can not trim the air plane into a nose dive.
To be fair, it was a different company 40 years ago.
@@Sebb747 true that and the planes where very different system too.
Yet I assume it would be very hard to find a fault directly related to a slat that was violently ripped of a flying air plane.
I mean: It will be hard enough to find the slat and all related pieces - and finding a fault on a part that maybe was missing in the firstplace due to incorrect maintenance would be impossible.
(Yeah, damage to mounting points can be analyzed, but the reconstruction would be very difficult due to secondary damages due to hiding the plane and ground)
@@Sebb747 totally different company!
128k subscribers! Soon to be 256k. 😉👍
In this case erasing the flight recorder meant nothing (no yelling last words before nosediving into a suicide flight, but maybe one of the crew members bumped against the flap lever and the high cruise speed made one slat brake off immediately as soon as the slats started to extend.) The captain´s habit of erasing the voice recorder (only the voice recorder tape not the flight recorder) had other harmless reasons: Probably they were telling each other dirty jokes, didn´t follow strictest rules like clean-cockpit not talking under 10.000 feet, or the cockpit crew were flirting with stewardesses, they probably laughed in the cockpit had a casual and easygoing mood discussed cars and stuff instead of ultra-strict business. The captain know he would get in trouble or even loose his license as soon as some over-correct nitpicker or some higher up would find anything out by chance, and that´s why he always erased the voice recording tape after the landing - just to be on the safe side and to have a feeling of "free speech" in his cockpit, being able to discuss everything in peace and freedom with his crew. :)
They could have been slagging off the company too. It was probably habit or something a bit risqué like flirting with a flight attendant and a married pilot. This was one shit hot captain who thought on his feet and used his instincts rather than checklists to avert a disaster. So based on that if they were chatting up.tje flight attendant we can surely forgive this
Remember that in those days most air-carrier pilots were ex-military types, where sex talk and discussions about sex desires with pretty women (including the cabin staff!) would have been de rigueur. Plus the relationship of the union pilots and management was consistently hostile and adversarial, pointed criticisms of management would have gone on for hours on end. That will get you fired; on the other hand, with the machine on autopilot, those what are termed to be "non-pertinent discussions" were common enough. so, consistently erasing the tapes would have been the predictable result.
Today, but of course, nobody ever has "non-pertinent comments" in the cockpit. That's because pilots are so disciplined in their approach to the job. You folks do believe that, don't you?
@@jvaneck8991 Of course - pilots talk four hours only about navigation procedures and how to follow management rules-by-the-book, and otherwise always keep their mouth shut :D
Someone else commented that TWA's shut down checklist explicitly included erasing the CVR, and while I personally haven't fact-checked that, I see no reason to doubt it.
If that's so, there's no need to reach for further explanations for erasing the CVR; the carrier's policy called for it to be done as normal procedure.
EXCELLENT JOB ON THIS VIDEO!!
7:04 A dive at 34000 fpm? Wouldn't that destroy the aircraft?
not a 727 or 707 they were way overbuilt.
Aren't the colours of the navigation lights mixed up in the simulation? If I remember correctly, starboard should be green.
I think the Captain was correct because he at the end averted a catastrophe! The NSTB most likely due to their inability to solve the problem were quickly blaming the captain nd flight crew as the culprits in order to close the investigation! No offense meant - just being very honest! Bless U all!
I do believe you are correct!
Thank U! Your reply is much appreciated! U n family have a blessed 2022!!
@@RogerPetersonMusic 🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻👍👍
A bulk eraser would have wiped the whole tape, not just the incriminating bits. Hence the "bulk" in the name. A captain using anything like this should be encouraged to move rapidly to another airline.
It's hard to imagine an air transport pilot deciding to experiment with a ship's designed aerodynamics just for the hell of it. Not even one with a habit of erasing evidence. An air racer, perhaps. But racers would experiment in daylight.
As for the official analysis, I don't believe NTSB about anything. Maybe when accompanied by ironclad physical evidence, but maybe not even then. FAA is perhaps not quite as bad, but still a government agency staffed with people disappointed that they couldn't land jobs with the Post Office. And it's notorious that when in doubt, the official finding is "pilot error". Even so far as accidents like hitting a flock of birds. Pilot error - the pilot is supposed to be familiar with the flight and migratory habits of the local avian community. Pretty silly, but that's the reward for flying by bureaucracy.
It's long past time for these to be redesigned. The technology to save data into protected memory space upon specific trigger events, has been around for a long time and should have already begun to be phased in.
I fully understand that no one wants their locker room talk preserved and used to needlessly destroy careers and lives if it is completely irrelevant to an NTSB investigation. There's no reason we can't have a reasonable compromise that satisfies both pilot privacy and aviation safety.
Specific to this incident, we have no idea exactly why the slat did what it did. The erasure of the CVR shouldn't have happened, but I can definitely see it being done out of habit, rather than malice. Ever had the power go out in your home, yet every time you enter a room you still flip the light switch despite knowing there's no power?
This event happened in 1979, during a time when CVR recordings were being used by airline management to harass crews over non safety related things, which is not what the CVR is supposed to be used for. Paranoid crews would erase it out of habit after every flight.
The CVRs haven't used tape in years, nor have they had an erase button. They've probably been "redesigned" for longer than you have been alive.
Reminds me of the story of pilots spilling coffee all over the instrument panel, which forced them to land the plane. But after wards they had NO IDEA spilling a dark liquid all over electronics would ever glitch out the engine throttle controls, until after a lengthy investigation
Sorry, I have to chuckle at that one. First off, the controls should be waterproof, and second of all, why would anyone keep a hot beverage near the control panels? :) I know to keep my water or juice away from my computer.
@@thatguyalex2835 Two A350s, 1 in 2019 1 in 2020, each had just that happen. The cup holders were too small, so coffee was rested on the center console. It was subsequently spilled, and where ever it ended up it caused an engine to shut down. After the second incident the panel was made water resistant.
I truly believe it was a mechanical failure of the hydraulic system. The NTSB and airlines always seem to look for pilot error.
I'm struggling to understand how extending the flaps can boost performance at altitude. It just creates more drag so theoretically you should end up using more fuel
Yes, you are in principal right, It is said precisely "flap1", which the least possible flap you may get and without slats, also it is said at cruise. Read between the lines in cruising altitude where the air is much thinner.
To sum up, a 727 at cruise altitude and cruise speed is "believed" ( not scientifically proven) to consume a tiny bit of less fuel with "flaps only" extended to 1.
Even if this might be true , would only be valid for the 727 , in thin air and cruise speed. Only and only in this type of aircraft and under the described conditions,
It's like 2x2=4 but also 3+1=4 ; 21-17=4 and 80/20 also makes 4.
In the case of 727 overall aerodynamic design , It's like the flaps 1 without slats would creates more drag than lift in dense air and lower speed ( landing condition) but more lift than drag in thin air and higher speed. (cruise condition) . It's not impossible. Still to be proven though..........
Offtop:
I think you're applying too much compression on your audio tracks. Some beginnings of the phrases are dipping in output. I assume that these tiny parts are just slightly below the threshold of the compressor.
It’s actually a background noise remover by by waves audio. Sometimes it gets a bit too excited 😂
I don't know ANYTHING about aviation except for watching these videos...but, doesn't the FDR tell them everything they would need to know?
BTW, great video!
Isn't it great that they come up with a cause for the accident based purely on a lack of evidence?
"We don't know why this happened, so it must be that the pilot did something wrong."
I think it’s Occam's razor, it was either an unexplainable technical issue or a human mistake. I know which way I’d lean.
The extract on the screen at 11:30 (part of the NTSB report) refers to the captain's "putative report" not "punitive report". Reading between the lines, they don't believe he did that on every flight, otherwise why use the word "putative"?
I don't feel qualified to hang someone after watching the 'evidence' of a UA-cam video.
Old red port is always left? (Check your nav lights.)
Hi, Roland. No. Captain Harvey “Hoot” Gibson did not lie.
As several have already noted on your UA-cam channel, the crew consistently maintained their innocence. And as others have righty noted, the NTSB does not come close to batting a thousand.
We’re left with two polarizing claims about the trigger causing the rollover/nosedive.
The law of noncontradiction asserts that both cannot be correct at the same time. So at least one of the two must be wrong.
I contend it’s the NTSB, with the plane manufacturer in second place. (As Captain Gibson sagaciously noted early on into the investigation, putting [the plane manufacturer] in charge of this investigation was like putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank.) Conflict of interest.
While all post-event people here on your UA-cam channel are most certainly entitled to weigh in with their own opinion or theory about what may have happened, you included, I find it perplexing that everyone’s thoughts - whether a subjective gut feel, or an informed expert opinion - is devoid of any direct discussion with the flight crew members themselves: Captain Hoot Gibson (1934-2015), FO Scott Kennedy (d. 2017) and FE Gary Banks.
Even the NTSB largely refused to consider what the crew had to say. During their 2-year investigation, they questioned the crew only twice - an impromptu mini-hearing at a Detroit hotel the day after; then during a televised depositional proceeding in Los Angeles seven days later. Beyond that, no one from the NTSB took time to follow up with the crew directly or made any attempt to clarify contradictory evidence. Requests for a public hearing were denied. Captain Gibson volunteered to take a polygraph test - that request was ignored. When one NTSB member did request the crew be allowed to answer questions related to the evidence brought against them, the lead investigator insisted the crew not be given that opportunity. At the final Sunshine meeting (June 1981), the crew was told not to attend. The crew ignored that request, and were physically barred from entering the meeting room.
It’s always easy to crucify guys who can’t defend themselves (because you’ve prevented them from entering the room); further, both Hoot and Scott are now dead (I’m not sure about Gary). It’s easy to posit and isogete any purported ‘fact’ in order to ‘proof-text‘ whatever you want to say about the crew members. The not-welcome-at-the-table - and now-deceased - crew members can’t counter back.
So if you’ll kindly permit me, I’m going to try and do so on their behalf.
I spoke briefly with some of the crew on that cold Detroit runway immediately after the April 4, 1979 incident; and again more extensively in 1982 during the making of CBS Reports’ ”The Plane That Fell From the Sky” - a Peabody Award-winning investigative documentary re-creating Flight 841. The summary of my conversations with the crew? No - the crew was NOT messing with the flaps.
Most recently, I spoke again with FO Scott Kennedy during a nice, long breakfast together in July 2016 (just prior to Scott’s death). Scott sincerely, simply, and humbly told me that even 37 years later, he absolutely did not know what caused the Flight 841 rollover/nosedive incident. Scott was NOT lying to me.
Please let me repeat: the crew did NOT mess with the flaps. (Scott also told me the night prior to the incident, that he and FE Gary were discussing how to recover from stalls. Turned out to be a very timely conversation between the FO and FE - thank you, Lord Jesus! - since it was FO Scott who suggested to Captain Hoot they drop the gear to try and regain flight. It worked.)
I have another friend and colleague who spent a GREAT deal of time talking with Hoot prior to Hoot’s death, and who has scoured every available piece of information on Flight 841. Emilio Corsetti III is a professional commercial pilot and author. Emilio has written for both regional and national publications (Chicago Tribune, Professional Pilot magazine, etc.). Emilio published his exhaustive research and findings on Flight 841 in “Scapegoat: A Flight Crew’s Journey from Heros to Villains to Redemption” (Odyssey, Aug 2016).
May I humbly suggest that you and everyone following your UA-cam channel would do well to consider what Emilio reports in his extensively researched, fact-based, objective book. It appears the NTSB ignored some pretty important information that would have cleared the crew.
The No. 7 slat extension was the RESULT of the dive - NOT the cause.
Roger Peterson
Passenger - Seat 21A
TWA Flight 841 - April 4, 1979
I thank you for your detailed posting. The possibility of an accidental event leading to a mechanical failure also lurks in the background. I recall a flight to Aruba when, close to landing, as the starboard flaps rolled out, there in the right-side track some mechanic's tools appeared - lying right in the track! Now picture this: after take-off and retraction, the actuator jams with the big wrench and cannot retract further, causing one side's flaps to fully retract and the other to be partially extended. And with a jammed mechanism, there is no way to correct, except perhaps to extend all flaps (and even that might not work). When Mr. Boeing built that airplane, did they allow for the possibility that some mechanic would leave tools in the extension actuator track? I remain dubious of that proposition.
Pilots tend to have to deal with all kinds of anomalies. Even with simple single-engine aircraft, there have been cases of the control cables accidentally reversed in direction upon replacement. You command left turn at the yoke, and the aircraft responds by feeding in right aileron. How about that? Makes for an interesting day upstairs (if you don't catch it at pre-flight).
@@jvaneck8991 What a story about mechanic tools laying in the track! Yeow! Back to 841, the trigger event appears to have been related to the 727’s split rudder. Hoot felt the first indication of the issue in his foot (rudder pedal) -- and a malfunction of ½ that rudder system makes plenty of sense (triggering the rollover).
Might sound like a stupid question but couldn't have this been caused by something similar to the hydraulic issue that some b737-200 and 300 had that caused their rudder to go right and caused 2 crashes and 1 near-crash? I mean, the 727 and 737 classics shared a lot of similar features and maybe they used a similar technology for the slats of the 727 for their extension and since nobody was aware of the issue at that time...
Believe the NTSB. They have no reason to lie. And pilots are notorious for lying. Great recovery of the airplane though, whatever happened.
They dont? I dont know man.. After I learned what the FAA did with boeing and MD as a "gentleman agreement" I tend not to trust US american agencies when it comes to incidents with US made planes.. I am too lazy to google but at least one plane crashed because of a "gentleman agreement" (aka corruption) between the FAA and the manufacturer because of a faulty cargo door mechanism and we all know what happened with the 737 max 8 certification.. WHICH WAS ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO.
@@bepowerification ntsb isn't the faa but coincidentally enough what you're referring to (cargo door gentlemen's agreement) happened after another flight that involved Detroit. Turkish Airlines crash in France had the same fault and crashed horrifically. NTSB iirc recommended grounding all of those planes until the issue was resolved, FAA decided on the stupid "y'all got this right we trust you".
Cops lie, too. Presidents lie, too. So do priests. Since 1973, 186 former death-row prisoners have been exonerated of all charges related to the wrongful convictions that had put them on death row. They we’re gonna DIE because of “evidence”. Stan, they were all liars, right? I’ve worked with the NTSB and admire what they do, but they’re as imperfect as any organization of humans.
This was just too weird to buy exactly what happened. The fact they survived is fortunate!
Imagine being able to read reviews of your pilots flight history before booking a flight like you can review a doctor or surgeon
The medical field has a lot to learn about safety from aviation. Too often we see the medical community covering for sloppy doctor performance. Meanwhile airlines do a LOT of analysis of de-identified flight recordings looking for unsafe trends and then make those high priority safety items.
He deserves a Medal if you ask me.
I think everyone is missing the bigger picture here - a pilot basically manipulating the aircraft in ways it was never designed. Flaps at 39,000’? Really? Screw all the v speeds and performance charts that the engineers tested and wrote, I guess they knew better.
This kinda thing would never happen now lol.
As soon as he said “requested FL390” I was like “what?!” 😳
This seems very dodgy. There is evidence needed to suspect pilot misbehavior. There is not evidence (to my mind) to prove pilot misbehavior. That is a very fine line. I think it worse to assume the guilt of an innocent man than the innocence of a guilty man. Is the pilot "dodgy?" Sure. Guilty? We don't know. None of us knows.
Utilizing Occam's Razor, it obvious the captain committed malfeasance. He should have been fired.
He wasn't fired after this?
This is terrifying!
All 727's need to be immediately grounded until this problem is sorted out.
Captain's odd behavior just smells cover-up.
Obviously I don't know what actually happened but based on this videos findings, it looks like the NTSB probably got it right. The Captain was trying to save his ass! It's a damn good thing he saved All their asses. That could have been extremely ugly!
Great Channel, great video! You do an awesome job!
I think most of us agree that the pilot lied, it's human nature to try and mitigate responsibility.
No do not agree.
Not a lot of people erase evidence that proves they're not guilty. My dad's best friend flew 727's for decades and I remember him talking about this one. As others have said the story that actually came out that most people seem to believe was that the flight engineer went to the can and was in there when they pulled the breaker. He came back and reset it and they were off to the races.
At the end of the day they got everybody on the ground safely so call it a learning experience for everybody