If you’re struggling or just want to improve, consider therapy with our sponsor BetterHelp 👉🏻 betterhelp.com/mentourpilot for a 10% discount on your first month of therapy with a licensed professional, specific to your needs.
Why do you keep shelling for the sponsorship. They've been proven in congressional hearings that they sold vulnerable people's data (without user consent) to advertisers and insurance companies. Therapy is fantastic, better help is not. Really disappointing. I get you have staff to pay, but there are more ethical options. Please practice the diligence you preach about in your videos.
LOL! that actually dovetails quite nicely with Alan Shepard's prayer before his first launch (before becoming the first American in space): "Dear Lord, please don't let me f**k up!"
One question that stood out to me watching this video was: Did the pilots ever know that the Boeing 777 would NOT call out "dual inputs" like an Airbus would? It's worth considering that they both operated on the assumption that they would hear a warning if they were fighting each other's control inputs. Communication breakdown was the key factor here. The Captain should have announced to the FO if he was in fact taking control of the plane. "Assisting" silently was exactly what made the FO continue over-controlling the plane.
@@MrNinjaman63 Just because these people fly airplanes doesn't mean they're superhuman. Things like this is where technology comes into play and maybe a "Dual input" warning could have resolved the issue entirely.
Remember that the emergent part of this flight happened in less than a minute. At that time, the captain was probably trying harder to stabilize the aircraft and forgot about communicating. It was a function of instinct. More training to increase the instinct of communication can surely help.
@@JustMe-fo4ev I can imagine a married couple flying a 777: "Flaps 15", "yes dear", "thrust to 50%", "yes dear", "landing gear down", "yes dear", "you're not listening to me, you never listen!" "What, what did you say, what did I miss"? "Everything, you weren't listening, you never listen!". "What's wrong", "nothing", "no, I can tell you're upset", "I'm fine", "no you're not, you're angry", "I'm angry because you never listen"..............BANG!!!.......... 350 die in aviation disaster.
well no, eventually the captain called "my controls", and upon hearing it the first officer immediately obeyed the callout. so a fair bit more than zero communication, altho certainly quite a lot less than there should have been
@@UnshavenStatue _Eventually_ being the operative word. And after 53 secs. They’re lucky they were still in the air by then. If you consider that communication, it’s good you’re not in charge of CRS training. Anyway, “zero” was meant to be rhetorical. Not literal.
I’m a current Boeing 777 pilot. The long 2-crew sectors are demanding. I personally find JFK very challenging. It is in very busy airspace and the ATC quality isn’t always fantastic. Taking controlled rest on the flight deck of a 777 does mitigate fatigue to some degree, but the seats don’t fully recline(and it’s uncomfortable sleeping sitting up) and the ACARS system frequently chimes, especially over non-oceanic airspace. It is absolutely better than nothing, but you still need to be fit to be able to manage, and you will be tired there is no doubt. Did this impact the First Officer? Something is surely going on in his head, because a go-around above flare altitude is normally mini-briefed. I agree with your discrete guarding of the controls as an LTC. I have always done this, to create a ‘limit’ should it be necessary. But I would not normally expect that to be the case line flying. I have flown the 777 throughout the 5G issue and never actually had an issue. The shear unnecessary panic has shades of AF447 and as a professional pilot is deeply worrying. Really excellent documentary and thought provoking. Thank you
Thank you for sharing. The AF447 disaster is one that I revisit on a regular basis because it still boggles me that a flight crew could ignore the obvious warnings they were hearing and that a trained pilot could continue to pull the nose up for the entire emergency and not verbalize what he's doing to the other crew member.
Thank you for the reply. I think a lot about AF447 too. As a commercial pilot instructor and check pilot I have had exposure to many responses and situations both in simulation and in the flight deck. One of the biggest weaknesses of humans in the flight deck is that fundamentally we are descended from primates. Our ability rationalise and use logic to resolve threats is what marks us out as a species, but it is highly dependent on retaining emotional control and not responding to the reactions of the autonomic nervous system. In high pressure, threat situations it requires strong discipline and well established training. Even then, our ability to trigger appropriate behaviour can be tremendously challenged by fatigue, very large jumps in alertness levels, startle and shock and capacity overload. It takes courage and cool head to work through a problem rationally when alarms are blaring, lights are flashing and your life is on the line. I believe that in both this case and in AF447, startle was a key element. The ‘chimp’ was let to run riot in the flight deck, and was only caged by cognition of the commander. This is not an inadequacy of the individuals, it is an inadequacy of our species unfortunately. Better exposure in training (in non-jeopardy situations) and flight deck design would mitigate this. Sadly, even with our modern technology, humans are still the best device for resolving a large number of factors on the flight deck. We just need to give them adequate rest. Yes, it’s a cost issue ultimately. A third crew member makes a huge difference to the rest the pilot can take, but costs that bit more
The FTLs is the elephant in the room. Both the AF 446 accident and this incident show a complete abandonment of SOPs which could be due to extreme fatigue. Pilots fly much more hours per year compared to previous generations. The MAX crashes were due to commercial pressure, not science. Are the FTLs based on science or on Industry pressure?
@@VIKINGFLYING this is such a thorny problem. FTLs were originally introduced prior to the efficiencies of modern, computerised, rostering systems. Aviation is inherently very safe, but it’s one of the few industries where we take humans and make them operate safety critical machinery in a fatigued state. I often wonder what would happen if I was stopped by the police driving home. Would they say I was too fatigued to drive? But I’ve just landed a 250T jet. Automation helps: by disconnecting the automation early in this case the FO increased workload in a period when in fact it wasn’t entirely necessary. The aircraft COULD have performed a CAT I autoland. Would I consider that with a 300’ cloud base at the end of an overnight JFK? Absolutely. Would I have flown a manual ILS in poor visibility at the end of that sector? No. At the end of the day, as much as it fun to ‘fly’ the airplane, we are professionals and have a job to do. Would I practice on a clear day? Yes. FTLs are one part of the equation
61 year old glider pilot and instructor, career ending because of cancer. I love these videos for what they teach us and also keeping me connected to flying. THANK YOU !
Sorry to hear about the cancer diagnosis. Hope it’s treatable and you’re doing ok. Grew up at an airfield with a few glider pilots and always amazed at their skill and how long and far they could fly.
I have a supposed terminal cancer which I was given a year for-almost twelve years ago now. Hope you do well, and find another aviation outlet-drones perhaps? Can one not fly GA once tx is over and remission achieved?
I don't know if you are religious, but I am praying for your health, for wisdom and compassion in the hearts of your medical care providers, and strength in the hearts of your loved ones as they support you.
Thanks for breaking this down. I was on this flight! Had to hold my breath & tell myself that this wasn’t my time to go, which got more difficult as the passenger behind me got hysterical! Worse was the thick cloud cover through which you could feel the speed & left-right, up-down motions. Was a relief to climb back up again as it was obvious that the pilots were not in control earlier
Keep in mind that as a passenger with no view of the horizon and no flight instruments, you are even more susceptible to spatial disorientation than the pilots are. I say this not to minimize your experience, but to reassure you that it probably felt a lot worse than it was.
I think the most amazing thing for me personally is that I watch your videos and you'll mention something ... like that the landing gear are still down... and I'll just immediately say to myself "that'll produce drag". I'm not a pilot, not even thinking of ever taking a flying lesson... just someone who has flown here and there...not even a well seasoned passenger. That's how much can be learned from your videos. Thank you!
@@screw_it_why_not What exactly is he doing by supporting better help? What makes you think your political beliefs should guide other people's actions? What does Petter preach which promoting "Better help" goes against?
@@OddityDK. Looks like the comment is gone. But thanks for saying something about people bringing up politics where it doesn’t belong. It’s so annoying. So thank you .
I had the exact same thought (landing gear down = drag) earlier this morning while watching a different incident video. I also am not a pilot nor do I have any plans to ever be one. I came here for his most recent MH370 video a month or so ago and have watched dozens since. This man just makes learning fun.
58 y/o woman & home-maker here, who enjoys your educational videos. You earned my subscription over a year ago because for some reason I like to learn a little bit of everything and I find fascinating the way you teach and voice your opinions about aviation & the importance of communication between pilots. In many cases, I can apply your lessons to daily life. Thank you so much, greetings from Chicago, IL.
Great example of why you always re-establish who has the flight controls when you get into an emergency situation. I am an airline pilot and a military helicopter pilot. Had a similar scenario under NVGs in the helicopter. Had an inexperienced co-pilot complain about the flight controls, I said “Let me see” instead of “I have the flight controls”. We both ended up fighting on the controls for about 15 seconds, I declared an emergency and as we were about to touch down I glanced over at my co-pilot and realized we were fighting each other. Keep up the good content brother!
Deference, particularly when two experienced professionals are working together for the first time, can be a dangerous thing. It was never a problem for my Chipmunk instructor many decades ago to say ‘I have control’ and as a novice I’d give it up instantly. Now I’m a surgeon, it’s much trickier to seemingly trample on a colleague’s skills and autonomy by declaring ‘stop please, I’m taking over’. But in the interests of safety that instinctive reluctance must be fought. It is fundamental that organisational culture fosters the permissions to be able to intervene assertively like this with no hard feelings on either side as well as the leadership to actually intervene when needed. I love how these videos often talk about the authority gradient. Too right!
I'm a nurse and an airplane geek. In general I think the healthcare sector still has a lot to learn from aviation, but it's changing for better. As from my experience, millenials and so on are much more prone to embrace the just culture and the authority gradient in nursing teams tends to be quite shallow. However I noticed, as you said, that between medical staff the deference to authority it's still quite pronounced. It's unfortunate, healthcare sector is stressful in itself, and that kind of relationship behaviour only exacerbate that (and can be potentially unsafe, of course). (English is not my first language, please have mercy)
I don't think it was deference that caused the communication chasm, if anything it was ego. There seemed to be a lot of passive aggressiveness going on. If they can't even ask the other one 'are you pulling back/pushing forward' when it is the most obvious thing to ask, it shows that there is some kind of ego/superiority thing going on.
777 Captain here, would just like to say “Thank you”. It’s always good to watch your videos and helps refresh system knowledge particularly on the 777. Your videos provide such an in depth analysis and offer great take away points to incorporate on the line. Fantastic work. All the best!
I think this is the first ever yt channel that actually uses captions correctly. Moving them to the top when information is displayed at the bottom, love it. Well done!
Yes, that is some great subtitles editing. However there are a few words in many episodes apparently put there in error, however sounding the same like the intended word (there must be a term for such same-sounding words), which makes me think it is a person listening to the audio and writing the script down instead of the actual script directly adapted for subs. I believe that's the only way to make that kind of mistake.
As an engineering professor on embedded systems, I love the nerdy part of your videos. Some solutions can be suggested for many of the problems reported in the incident reports, but these are situations that just were not imagined when the airlines were designed. And that's why it is so important to investigate these incidents thoroughly, even the ones without serious consequences.
Engineer creates a robot bartender. QA Tester walks into the bar and orders a drink. Then two drinks. Then five, zero, and minus one drinks. Robot gives all the appropriate responses. QA tester declares the robot bartender ready for production. Customer walks into the bar and asks where the bathroom is. The robot explodes. Situations that were not anticipated will always happen. They must be investigated and mitigations or fixes implemented before they can become problems.
Also, some potential solutions introduce new hardware which introduces new risks of failure, which you might be tempted to try to fix with more hardware, lights, training, what? Making a complex system more complex can't really make it safer.
@@CiaranMaxwellThis is exactly what the hacking world is all about. Few things are as fun as using someone’s security tools against them. One of the hardest things to detect is someone using a legitimate tool in an illegitimate way. I kinda envy the way airlines share data with each other and the manufacturers. The tech world has some sharing, but there is still too much ass cover that goes on. Most people are afraid to admit when they’ve screwed something up, especially when management doesn’t use it as a learning opportunity.
It is always easier to investigate near misses than actual catastrophes because people survive near misses to tell you about them. But you are right that a near accident warrants the same sort of investigation as an actual one.
Not wanting to cast aspersions on Air France, but to me this sounds strangely similar to AF447 - first officer, blind to his own mistake, making weird inputs and the captain making different inputs to counteract "the misbehaving aircraft", insufficient communication between the two about what they're doing, unknowingly fighting themselves and a perfectly flyable aircraft into a bad situation accompanied by spurious alarms and other unexpected aircraft feedback. It certainly shows a counterpoint to people claiming AF447 was solely the fault of Airbus' control design.
@@samy7013 Just took a look at the statistics and found out the two companies with the highest amount of deadly crashes are Air France and American Airlines. Would be interesting to know which company has the highest number of reported incidents.
@@marydecouvertes3789This is out of Western Airlines tho Air France is a very safe Airline if you compare it with actual unsafe airlines from 3rd world countries
It s not only the accuracy and the depth of your research , it s the way you tell things: the enthusiasm, the tone, the suspense,… You’re an amazing story teller, as a non aviation nerd i find everything clear and very interesting . And as a non native non fluent english speaker , i don’t even set the subtitles to understand your videos. You must be great at telling bedtime stories to your children . Keep up the quality work 👍
do. not. ever. use better help. their “therapists” are not licensed, and they have zero standard of care. their so-called providers can sign up to be a therapist without any qualifications, and are not obligated to confidentiality standards.
When I was in the U.S. Navy, on my first takeoff something similar happened. In the T-34C Mentor, the pilots sit one behind the other, unable to see each other's controls. The standard procedure for all pilots was to NEVER have both pilots attempting to control the plane at the same time, in order to prevent this same type of confusion. When control was to be taken or given, "You have the controls" and "I have the controls" was required of BOTH pilots. Another important rule was to never ascend above 600 feet on takeoff until well clear of the pattern, as the pattern altitude was 1,200 feet at North Whiting NAS. This would maintain adequate separation between arriving and departing aircraft. My instructor was particularly adamant about not breaking that rule. As we lifted off, my instructor reminded me NOT to climb above 600'. But my controls felt heavy, as if the plane wanted to nose down and descend. So I was pulling back on the stick and trimming up. The more I pulled back on the stick and trimmed, the louder my instructor warned me NOT to exceed 600 feet. The downward force was getting pretty severe, so I kept pulling back and trimming up. Eventually we cleared the pattern, and my instructor shouted a swear word and I felt the controls suddenly JERK BACK, giving me the impression that he had taken the controls from me. So I let go of the stick and put my hands in the air so he could see them, and said, "You have the controls!" It turns out that he had been PUSHING on the stick the entire time, while I was pulling back and trimming UP! When he finally stopped pushing, all of that trim I had put in caused the stick to fly back, feeling like my instructor had grabbed the stick and jerked it back! So for a few seconds we were a ROCKET headed into space! LOL! Neither one of us was flying the plane! LOL! I still got an okay grade on the flight - I think because my instructor wouldn't want anyone to know he had been pushing the controls while I was flying the plane. I probably shouldn't have told that story on him during my tie-cutting ceremony, but I did anyway. ;)
a totally non-flight mixup happened in our family when my aunt and uncle were sleeping at her parents' house one night. The controls on the electric blanket got switched, and the inevitable happened. He gets hot and turns his control down. She gets cold and turns her control up. Feedback loop ensues....
"Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" is the rule. Except within the cockpit, Communicate is a prerequisite to Aviate (i.e., who has the controls?). Good on the captain for finally verbalizing and commanding that he has the controls -- that fixed everything. BTW, nerdy is good! Thanks.
I'll be happy to do the Communicate portion, "Hallo ATC, my plane acts kinda weird! I think my mechanic forgot to topup the blinker fluid! Do you have any suggestion? Should I declare mayday?"
I guess here with all the detail when we play it back it feels like a long time until he said "my controls" but in reality it was less than a minute? It can often take me far longer than a minute to realise I am making my own problems worse!
It's the nerdy details that I love! They make sense of the situation and fill in the gaps of the story. 'dumbed down' documentaries are frustrating... thanks for taking time to cover the technical issues 😀
@@MentourPilotYes, I like it nerdy. I suppose a lot of us who watch your videos are nerds. The problem I see us the automation can't ever match what human mind may conceive - in other words, I understood your schematics. Well done.
Good for you! Far too many people don't want to learn the details and don't recognize the difference between knowledge and understanding. They read a news article about an event and get the knowledge about what happened. To do an analysis or to apply that knowledge to another event requires knowledge of the underlying phenomena and the rules of interaction between those phenomena, which is only obtained by substantial education in the subject. Trouble starts when, lacking that education, people use common sense to analyze that complex subject, the result typically being a flawed understanding and analysis. As the saying goes, "Little knowledge is a dangerous thing." A recent example was when the news media attempted to analyze the 737 MAX crashes and found out that initial flight tests had revealed that MCAS needed to operate at low airspeeds too, and Boeing had changed the programming so the computer would operate the stab trim motor at high RPM instead of low. Now, using common sense, most people would say that a system becomes more powerful if it is operated at high speed vs. low speed, and so the media accused Boeing of making MCAS much more powerful, too powerful for the pilots to handle. If they had an education in aerodynamics, they would have realized that the aerodynamic force varies directly with the square of the airspeed, so at low airspeed-lets say 1/2 the high airspeed-the aerodynamic force produced would be 1/4 the force produced at high speed. However the weight and inertia of the airplane hasn't changed, so, to compensate, the deflection of the stabilizer had to increase substantially, and that was achieved by speeding up the drive motor-to produce the SAME force as before. Many people learn this characteristic from looking at the ailerons on the wings move up/down to roll the airplane right/left, and noticing that they deflect much more at the low airspeeds during takeoff and on approach to land compared to the high airspeed during cruise. In fact, on larger airplanes with outboard and inboard ailerons, the outboard ailerons are locked out above a certain airspeed-otherwise they could cause dangerously high structural loads if they deflected abruptly-and only become active again when the airplane slows to approach speeds.
I was surprised that it took the Captain so long to call control of the aircraft. I was expecting him to do it when he began overtly and forcefully exerting control, even before the loss of synchronization.
Listing to the ATC-tape, you can hear both groaning from strain. This is one of the disadvantages of this being a Boeing. It's kind of hard to talk, if you use all your physical strength to fight a perceived flight control issue.
A great example of how we can get spooked by the ghosts in our heads, and convince ourselves that something catastrophic is happening when it's literally nothing. Follow the decision-making model, which has you first identifying the problem and gathering information about it, before acting. In this case, doing this would have shown that there actually was no problem to solve.
@@EvoraGT430 certainly, fatigue can cause all kinds of strange cognitive hiccups, like getting stressed up for no reason and drawing weird conclusions one wouldn't make when well-rested ("something feels off, could it be 5G interference??")
It would have been helpful if Petter had run through the application of PIOSEE as a practical example, because the root cause-the ghost in the head: 5G interference-would not be easy to identify as "no problem to solve" as such could not be ascertained while on final approach and without a proper understanding of the nature of 5G interference. Alternatively, "dual input" was a problem that DID need to be solved, but how does one identify it as the problem when one isn't expecting the pilot monitoring to be interfering with control without communicating? Speaking up and saying something like "I don't understand why it's so difficult to pitch up!" may have made the PM realize that the PF was trying to pitch up while he was trying to pitch down. A lack of trust by both of them caused each to do the other's job, neglect their own and make an embarrassing pudding of the flight. Dangerous too.
@@petep.2092 to me, the first ghost in the head seemed to be "the plane is veering off course", then "I have a flight control problem", which then lead to the conclusion "it must be 5G interference" and "must do a go-around", which then lead to the dual inputs. If the problem had been identified as "something feels off with the controls", it could have been identified as "actually, nevermind" pretty quickly. But jumping into conclusions and then actions without further consideration just made a non-issue into an actual problem. Granted, like you point out, there isn't much time to start problem-solving while on final approach, and if there was an actual flight control problem, a go-around would have been the correct response. Still, jumping straight to action without stopping for any kind of decision-making process was the critical issue here.
@@rogergalletti1609 you didn't see the comment I responded to and thus have no context for the necessity. Rest assured, I wouldn't be crass unless it was warranted. Have a good day!
I have worked as a paramedic for over two decades. When I am training new medics, I tell them we treat the patient, not the monitor. While that cardiac monitor is a huge help in diagnosis and ongoing care. If it is telling me something that doesn't correlate with my patients condition, I need to question its accuracy. Always treat the patient, not the monitor.
I'm also in the EMS and I was thought it the same and I thought it the same way. But I changed this. The monitor can be right. In the beginning of covid I've seen my first patient with SpO2 below 80% that showed us no sign of shortness of breath so I assumed that the monitor was wrong. In the Hospital a blood gas analysis was made as a standard procedure. That showed a massive lack of O2. I was wo damm sure the monitor musst be wrong, but it was right. Since these times we changed the education that of course the patient hat priority. But if the monitor shows something pathologic, it can be true also.
Re: FORDEC and PIOSEE Being a pilot under stress in an airplane reminds me being a pharmacist under stress in a pharmacy.dealing with problems. Even though pharmacists keep their feet on the ground,, the stress is continuous and overwhelming at times, FORDEC or PIOSEE can bring us back to the reality of the situation. Thank you, Mentour Pilot.
The captain went from "finger on the controls to moderate anything wild" to "hauling on the controls like a gorilla and ignoring his job" real fast there.
These videos are not only for aviation fans but also great lessons for crisis management under stressful conditions for everyday life. Thanks a lot for sharing!
This was like watching the 2009 Airfrance incident all over again. Your videos have probably prevented a few situations, everyone can learn to be better.
Thank you Peter, an excellent presentation as always! As a 28 year professional pilot, I really like that you cover “incident” flights as well as accidents. The information gained from the incident reports truly helps bring awareness to the traps that can occur on a standard flight. There is no substitute for knowledge and good CRM-CLR etc. Keep up the excellent work!
@@Capecodham CRM in aviation is Crew Resource Management, which is just fancy speaking to taliking to each other. Both pilot and first officers should have been more clear as to what was happening and what they where doing, instead of just trying to fix it on their own.
My biggest takeaway from my first flying lesson more than 30 years ago was vocalising ‘I’ve got control’ when the training pilot noticed me doing something stupid.
I used to work in a mobile phone shop in the early 2000's... We had some guys who worked in the local military control tower, who had major issues if they had a certain network and their phone went anywhere near the control tower... All the screens would go weird and fill with "snow" and/or "give false targets"... They had to leave their mobile phones outside the tower perimeter. This was on the old 2g One-2-One(now t-moblie) and Orange(now ee) 1800Mhz in the UK... The 2g 900Mhz (vodafone and O2) was fine. They never did figure out exactly why it happened, but their equipment changed a few years later - so no longer an issue, and in any case the 900 and 1800Mhz isn't used for mobiles any more.
I'm not a pilot, but I really enjoy watching your videos. I love how you explain all the "nerdy details" and I think the production level of your channel is fantastic! Thank you so much for your time and effort that you put into your content. I have been watching for quite a while and re-watch episodes frequently.
I guess that if the video had a real-time reconstruction, you would be surprised at the pace at which these events occur. At one moment the CPT has his hand lightly on the yoke, and in a blink of an eye they are very near an actual disaster.
There was no lack of communication. Petter explains the timeframe was only a minute before the captain got things normal again. Luckily both pilots communicated again and realized they both would be subject to an investigation.
I believe that this is how many relationships getting damaged too. One person introduce an issue, second reacts abruptly, they both are starting to fight with each other, thinking that they are helping. Communication, people.
I'm so glad to see more incidents that didnt end up with loss of life. Its impotant to know we can learn from from more than just accidents that leads to death. Thank Petter
I remember very well the strange Radio Communication from this Flight which VASAviation published on his Channel and how Blancolirio = Juan Browne, himself a 777-Pilot, pointed out how important clear communication in the Cockpit is - and how important the Callout: "My Controls!" This was a really embarrassing Incident for Air France in a whole, not only for the two involved Pilots. Thank you very much for picking this Incident up!🙂👍
Another quality video, from a quality pilot. I discovered your channel only a week ago and have managed to binge around 75% of your videos. Your documenting of these tragic events is of so much more quality and respect than the Mayday/Air Crash Investigation docs. Please keep up what you’re doing. Love from the UK 💛
This type of (dual input) issue was recently talked about in my company (i flew 737) as when the FO is PF theres a lot of instances where the CP makes input to the controls and makes the FO (specially younger ones) think that CP had taken full controll and relax his input causing unstabilized app and sometimes hard landings. Its been briefed to the whole pilots to make sure that when no "verbal" change of control happens to continue flying the plane. And for CP to communicate more clearly and revert to taking full over the controll when in doubt about the FO skills.
@@drive-channel1834 Pilot Monitoring. In a two person cabin one will be the PO and one the PM at any given time - the point of this video is that it needs to be clear who is which at all times. "Captain" and "First Officer" are permanent ranks, while PO and PM are temporary roles - most of the time the Captain will be the PF but by no means always and it is often swapped mid flight.
Proper procedure is for the pilot monitoring to call out the pitch and roll deviations. The pilot flying should call, "correcting." If the pilot flying does not correct, THEN the pilot monitoring verbally and physically takes control. The captain should not have been "helping" on the controls at anytime.
Part of what I love about this channel is getting to hear about aviation incidents that weren't necessarily disasters but are just as interesting. You won't find video like this on Mayday Air Investigation lol
Sometimes I'm imagining, Petter telling an aviation story in great details, with "everything is normal in the beginning.. ", in the correct sequences, very carefully, for about 30 minutes, or even 40 minutes is OK, I love his story-telling . . . , FDC was intact, CVR was preserved. With a conclusion : ".. for you that have not realized, this is a normal flight, no incident, no accident, no drama, nada ... "
I'd love a story like that 😁 Don't forget the "Please remember this detail, it will become very important later .." And the perfect technical explanations of a flight control system ".. for you to fully grasp the things going on.." I love his technical explanations, I am a heavy equipment mechanic.
Wow, I know you said it's going to be nerdy, but i didn’t think it was going to be THIS nerdy... That aside, after stumbling across this channel some time ago I've been admiring your videos, as in an ocean of misinformation and cheap opinions, there stand people like you, educating us with your extremely detailed explanations on clearly something you have a passion on. 100% facts no drama. Keep it up, Peter!
I do a lot (a lot) of flying for work as a passenger, and stumbled across this channel years ago. People in the seat next to me have asked me, "how the hell do you know all this stuff?!" Thank you MP!
Agreed. There is one apparent "armchair pilot" with a loud voice in another channel who always seems to blame pilots for everything. Meanwhile, Mentour Pilot's channel is the only one I find that treats everything and everyone with detailed and objective analysis.
They always do, the point of air crash investigations are to make things safer, sure, but another often overlooked reason is to convince people that flying is safe, propaganda-like.
The initial failure of the captain to explicitly take control is pointed out several times in the final report. Let me cite the concluding section of the analysis: "The PF should always be clearly identified at all times. Standardized aircraft control transfer procedures emphasising clear communication and positive transfer of responsibility for PF tasks are essential. The occurrence shows that the use of this standardised call-out, in a situation of stress and confusion, immediately re-established the division of tasks in the cockpit and cleared up the confusion that had arisen."
Its been a time since viewing this clip, look at it in its entirety. Comments were made no communication between the pilots, one or the other need to take charge.
So as the clip goes on, it appears both pilots were engaging dual input, so would not the system cancel each input out. No there would be no functionality in reference to flight. So you lose all your fail safes that were integrated in system.
I think you are an ace-pilot probably - but more than that you are an AMAZING story-teller. I feel pretty sure you could sit in front of a campfire with no animation recreations and just TELL us this and other stories and we be just as engaged and locked into suspense! It's fascinating how complicated aircraft have become in the effort to fly higher, farther and faster. The only time I've been in cockpit has been as a photographer in a light single engine aircraft about 25 years ago with a then 60-something Korean War pilot who was quite a character. I had played with flight sims in the 90s on Macintosh and those things like "F/A-18 Hornet" flew like lawn darts - no crosswind or atmospheric effects so crabbing in a crosswind in the real thing was a surprise to me and Cap'n Jack as we affectionately knew him would guard the yoke and let me try to fly the plane on approaches probably to convince me I knew ZIP about what I thought I knew. "MY CONTROLS!" and I put my hands under my thighs and let him gratefully have it back when he could see me sweating in over my head. There's a sea-man's saying I read in an old Arthur C. Clarke book that goes "When you've thought of everything, the sea will think of something else" which I take to mean no matter what you think can go wrong and have a plan for, something original and unexpected will happen. As a photographer I used to use a now defunct storage system called a SyQuest disk. In the days when every computer had a floppy and CD burners were in their infancy people used to use them for large files, but at some point there was a bug no one could figure out and you'd take the disk to another computer and it WOULD NOT MOUNT. The company took a huge hit from this and just as fast their reputation for unreliability spread like wildfire and everyone moved to the cheaper, bigger Zip Drives and SyQuest went into it's grave as a company and the bug was never resolved. Years later IIRC some kid playing with a defunct drive figured out the glitch that had eluded all the experts and engineers and it was that a custom desktop icon couldn't load on the Mac desktop then the disk couldn't mount and if it couldn't mount you couldn't fix the icon and so you had a bricked disk. The kid discovered a work around I remember reading, I hadn't thrown out my old drive and disks, followed the workaround and BOOM they all suddenly worked like new. I remember reading an article about this in some tech daily and the enormous amount of man-hours trying to fix those SyQuest disks was staggering and end-users like me and bog only knows how many others had deadlines crash and data and hours of work and money lost was staggering. And it was one little glitch that would go unsolved for years after the dust settled amazed me. So there's Starfleet Chief Engineer Montgomery Scott's axiom that the more complicated the plumbing the easier it is to stop up. Things like this control yoke design frighten me as a nervous flyer and yet we all continue to fly trusting that it won't happen on our flight - that everyone is well rested, our pilots steely-eyed missile man unflappable and all the bolts on door panels are tight as a tick!
I am not a pilot or even have any basic knowledge of flying an airplane, but I really watch your videos, they are so interesting and full of professional tactical aereo planning! Thank you so much for your work❤
These videos are unbelievably good, especially for enthusiasts like me. The work that goes into creating the recreation on flight sim, the drawings and renders of aircraft systems, and just the sheer accuracy of everything, including the speed tapes showing a downward trends when you speak about losing speed, is just fantastic. I cannot state how much I appreciate these videos and I recommend these to my pilot friends too! A big thank you and salute to your team and you for putting out these.
1:58 - Why were they in a Hotel an HOUR AND A HALF from the Airport just after a 7 hour flight and just before a return flight of another 7 hours? The Airline couldn't find them a Hotel closer to the Airport? A 90 minute drive shortly before a 7 hour flight, and just after having completed the same 7 hour flight a day earlier, has to be GRUELING and EXHAUSTING! I want my Pilots as well rested as possible before they fly me over the Atlantic OCEAN! There's no place to safely land if they screw up due to exhaustion!
Sometimes the traffic is bad in NY, but there are places to land£ when crossing the Atlantic there’s Goose and gander and Keflavik and the Azores and Shannon.
I am quite a fresh captain on B737. There is a lot of to learn from you videos. Thank you for that. I do not understand why they did not communicate to each other. If my FO tells me the controls feel weird I want to know in what way. I want to ask questions why is he turning. I can see the yoke displacement. I can tell him to turn right in this scenario. On the other hand I expect my FO to ask the same questions if I am in controls and deviating. Communication in the cockpit are crucial for the safe operations.
A lot of astronaut biographies talk about how when they became astronauts they felt really uncomfortable at first questioning the senior astronauts if they thought they made a mistake. They do a lot of flying in trainer aircraft and on simulators. Chris Hadfield said he makes sure he gets the younger astronauts to find out stuff he did suboptimally so that it creates an atmosphere for learning, instead of him just instructing. Because he said he made a major error in one demonstration but saved it and he realised that none of the watching astronauts had called him out for it, or maybe even understood that he had made a critical error.
Thanks for this one, Peter.. It's always a great ending when an aircraft lands safely and normally with no injuries on board.. Still, a wild ride for the cockpit crew, and much confusion in terms of what exactly was happening. ALWAYS COMMUNICATE !! This cannot be overemphasized !
This one brings back memories of when I learning to fly. On just my fourth flight, I was in a situation where the instructor failed to say "handing over". Consequently, no one was flying the plane for about four minutes. To make it worse we were only at 5000 feet. I never flew with him again.
Even if control breakouts were only indented for control jams, I think a "duel input" warning might have solved the issue. I get you don't need it when you can fully feel the other pilot's input (if any) but if the yoke isn't simulating a mechanical linkage, then there should be some indication.
Yes! Why isn't this the biggest takeaway? This isn't the first incident of dual‑inputs leading to mishandling of aircraft. The cockpit hardware should trigger automated audible warnings like "dual input" and "decoupled controls". Or imagine if the yolk controls were illuminated in some way such that the pilots wouldn't even need to verbalise their interference (e.g. Green-lit yolk indicates this yolk is delivering 100% of the inputs, yellow-lit yolk indicates the other pilot is also inputting with their yolk, red-lit yolks indicates decoupled yolks, unlit yolk indicates the yolk isn't inputting at all).
@@JKVeganAbroad Maybe the designers just thought it would be "obvious" when only one pilot is inputting so therefore the other guy wouldn't make an input... which makes no sense given Airbus's history.
@@alex_zetsu With Airbus you can't see what the other pilot is doing, the sidestick is out of view, hence the aural alert, whereas with Boeing the other pilot's hand(s) on the control(s) is easily seen. Yet, neither the aural alert nor the peripheral vision seems to ensure awareness in all cases. Maybe a drop down hammer from overhead?
I wanted to watch this video yesterday, but I fell asleep dead tired. Today I watched it, and it's so close to home to what happened today at work. Not exactly the 5G but involving MS Access, Customs brokerage, persistent but faulty info and diluted responsibilities. And I keep loving your Aviation lessons Petter, Tack!
They haven’t had a single fatal accident since Flight 447 lol in fact the only accident that has happened in Europe in the last 10 years is Germanwings I’m pretty sure which we all know wasn’t even an accident but a massive criminal act
@@Eruma_27 True but it's worse than many other carriers I can think of. Here are a few I can think of. 2005 AFR358 A340-300 overran the runway and the airplane burned out (pilot error) 2009 AFR447 A330 Crash into the Atlantic (pilot error) 2022 AFR011 777 Pilots fighting over the control of the airplane (pilot error) 2024 AFR356 A350 Tailstrike at Toronto (pilot error)
@@Eruma_27that is nothing to flex about, they still have multiple incidents because of their insufficient training. Just because people don't die, it doesn't mean what they're doing is good.
came home after a 12,5hour workday, sat down with popcorn and watched your whole video as so many times before :) I LOVE when you tell these stories, and I find them so interesting ! Keep up the good work :D
just wanted to quickly say I love your channel. I'm not a pilot nor am I ever likely to be in a cockpit barring a situation where I'm the only living soul on an airplane in flight, but the tech/engineering geek in me finds this stuff fascinating. Your presentation skills are also excellent and I can see why you are a trainer
I really like the control handover protocol I’ve observed in pilots eye video where the handing off pilot says “you have control” and the takeup pilot vocalises “I have control”, thereby eliminating uncertainty and putting the information on the CVR. There are mainly physical work situations where it is vital that just one person is calling the procedure. Situations where moving heavy loads on inclines are involved for instance. I like to play the game with the procedure for fun (and practice) when leaving someone else to continue a process. This comes into play with complex machinery, and I could bore you by relating a storey about a ship change that went wrong and cost a couple of hundred thousand dollars.
Great video as usual. Quite scary resemblance with the tragic AF 447 case, as far as pilots’ behavior and reactions are concerned: also in THAT case, all was basically self-induced (apart from an initial turbulence there, that did not happen here), with pilots fighting with the controls in opposite ways, each unbeknownst to the other. That one was an Airbus, so the actual, technical dynamics were different (as well as the aircraft initial situation and of course the outcome), but from a behavioral point of view, the key issue was basically identical. Is this a sign of more general attitude (and training) issues within Air France?
This site tends to be especially kind to …. human factors. The UK ATPL is/was? brutally challenging, it passed semi-test pilots! It was way over the top but it weeded out a lot of people, I wonder if the French equivalent was more like Pakistan’s?
TO/GA (the buttons to tell the flight guidance computers to initiate “guidance” for take off or go arround) plus an immediate turn may very well be possible. Either procedural, upon ATC instructions or for ex. thunderstorm/hail avoidance.
@@innocentanderson2830In my mother tongue, TOGA means a gorgeous, flowing white robe of office. One of best friends, sadly, was stabbed to death while wearing one.
Just wanted to say that I appreciate your content. I’m a healthcare executive in the US (and av geek) and my health system is in the process of training over 10,000 people on many of the concepts that you talk about in your videos. When I do my training sessions, I often refer to your lesson on Authority Gradient to clearly articulate the impact of poor CRM (poor CRM can extend itself to an operating room, leading to negative consequences). Many thanks and keep it going!
These videos are FANTASTIC! Another incident during to pilot error is the 2002 Überlingen mid-air collision. I would love to see it on this channel as I want to understand further how it happened.
As we keep finding out: "It's always the sh*t they don't tell you" It's Interesting that this crew's decisions were more influenced by some random article than actual knowledge of the machine containing the lives of mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, aunts and uncles. beloved friends and colleagues and even themselves. It could be said that Air France and Boeing failed them and treated them, and by default all their customers like fools by not telling them upfront that this was possible. A shortcoming in training IMO. MentourPilot, you're a star. Thank you for this amazing content. You present it in such a way that far from instilling fear instils confidence, and you are fair and mindful when commenting on people and companies. It says a lot about you. Wishing you much continued success..
As a 777 captain, I thought you did an excellent job explaining the aircraft systems, features and idiosyncrasies. And yes, it’s an excellent aircraft. Those pilots were, in my mind, overtired. I would never work a trans Atlantic flight without a third pilot! I am convinced that this would have prevented that ordeal.
i can only imagine from the title that the pilots were having a duel or something and beating the shit outa each other with the "pull up, PULL UP!" alarm playing
it was more like a tom and jerry skit where both pilots were inadvertently causing the problems that the other pilot perceived with the controls while thinking that they were helping each other with said problem
I had to pause and comment at the point you said that Boeing consciously decided not to implement a dual input warning because "it would be obvious if the other pilot is [doing something different.]" ... But it must clearly NOT be obvious if there was a need for that warning to be created in the first place (ever). I don't yet know if this plays into the scenario later, but it's that kind of mentality that often causes issues. It's based on an assumption by someone [Edit: engineer] sitting in a chair in a quiet room. Not someone jolted out of a routine flight and suddenly being bombarded with warnings and sensations.
How difficult can it be for Boeing to include a verbal and visual "Dual Control Input" warning into its systems. If a control column gets stuck you'll be expecting such a warning, in other cases it will provide pilots with missing information.
Well here’s the thing, the yokes are mechanically linked and on airbus, the flight sticks are not, so all you really have to do is threshold the sidesticks and see if they are different in a airbus, whereas in a Boeing, it’s a little more different since the yokes can’t be different
While listening to this video & what the pilots were or weren't doing as they should if following their training, I kept shaking my head thinking, "Petter would not be happy."
This sounds like it has a lot in common with the AF447 crash, where there was also confusion between the pilots (as a result of a frozen pitot tube), with rather worse results than on AF011.
There are also people who pin the 447 crash on the joystick controls, and claim the same would never happen on a Boeing, but here it did, albeit fortunately without ending in tragedy
I have a merch Idea. Offer a tee-shirt that says "Remember that. It will become important later." Petter says that seemingly at least once in every video! 😂
Good video, and an important one. It seems like the AF Captain was being polite by not communicating with the 1st Officer that his TOGA was pretty extreme, and so discretely and at first gently, then not so gently, intervened by making his own counter-active inputs. That's what actually caused the Dual Input situation in the first place. Had the First Officer executed a calmer TOGA there would have been no necessity for the Captain to intervene, as he obviously felt he had to, and so no Dual Input problem. What I'd like to know is why the 1st Officer nearly put the plane in a stall situation, setting it into a highly dangerous configuration during the TOGA. Personally I'd rather be on a flight with a pro-active Captain. The passive Captain Dubois on AF447 could and should have recognised the stall situation created by FO Bonin, and then intervened. But he did neither, and 228 people perished.
Very unfair on Captain Dubois. Mentour Pilot has done a video on Air France Flight 447 and the scene Dubois faced was indecipherable. He figured it out eventually but by then it was too late. Mentour Pilot placed very little blame on him.
@@thetruth7386 When Dubious re-entered the cockpit all systems were operational and portrayed the exact conditions. Low ground speed, high pitch up attitude and AoA, high descent rate. Not to mention the frequent Stall Stall warnings. For someone this experienced, what else could this be but a stall? Maybe the 1 hour sleep he got the night before did not help matters. But identifying the stall should be second nature to someone so experienced, and applying stall recovery himself (not directing a flying class from the jump seat) should have been his instant reaction, given the gravity of the situation. But he only recognised the situation at 10,000 feet when Bonin blurted out he'd been tugging the stick full back the whole while. The real hero was Robert. He correctly diagnosed the problem immediately when he told Bonin to go back down. It's just a shame he didn't persist.
@@yggdrasil9039you are of course speaking from the position that you 'know' it was a stall and we have had years of investigation into an incident that lasted four and a half minutes. You seem to suggest that Dubois should have entered the flight deck and immediately diagnosed a stall even when his co-Pilots were stating they had no valid indications. David Robert had been in the cockpit the whole time and didn't diagnose a stall- why do you suggest Dubois should have. It is disingenuous also to speak about the one hour sleep the night before. The crew had been in Rio for three days and it has been suggested that the Captain was referring to his pre flight nap that afternoon. One hour not being enough. Dubois didn't have much of a chance entering a flight deck in complete chaos with two co-Pilots stating they had no valid data, they didn't understand anything and had lost control of the plane. When Bonin asks at 20k feet- what do we have in alti? Dubois replies 'it's impossible'. Clearly he wasn't believing what he was seeing either. Also Bonin did not keep his sidestick yanked back the whole time. Please read the BEA report not just tabloid headlines. Bonin had multiple inputs pushing the nose forward or just side to side. I think Mentour Pilot was onto something when he suggested Bonin was so concentrated on controlling the roll of the plane he failed to see he was climbing- he then followed flight director commands above all else including listening to his co-Pilot.
@@thetruth7386 Granted. Hindsight is 20/20. But by the same token, those 4 and a half minutes didn't just happen out of thin air. As I understand it, Dubois had something like 11,000 hours of flight experience at both Air Inter and then at Air France. With that level of experience, diagnosing a stall should be routine - it's fundamental and basic to flying. It really doesn't matter who said what, or that the pilots claim that they had no valid speed indications. Discounting that, and going on the evidence of his own eyes and ears, the data needed to conclude that they were in a stall situation was overwhelmingly and clearly presented before him. His first port of call should be OBSERVATION, not what people say. In terms of Robert's thinking, I think deep down he knew it was a stall, but there were some things that prevented that awareness from being fully formed in his mind, namely that he hadn't flown for 3 months and so had a reduced level of confidence about his judgement. But he was the first to notice and correct Bonin's unsustainable climb (which Mentour Pilot acknowledges exceeded that used at sea level to perform TOGA never mind 35,000 feet), and later on in the upset, attempted to nose down (which Bonin secretly over-rode with a dual input), indicating through not his words but trhough his body language that intuitively he understood to some extent that they were too slow, and thus inside the parameters of a stall, without being able to fully form that thought in his mind. But Dubois coming into the cockpit was fresh. Discounting what the two FOs were telling him, he had all the evidence he needed before his own eyes to diagnose the stall situation. My understanding is Dubois spent the previous day and night touring Rio with a female colleague, and so had had very little sleep all night. His demeanour and willingness to go to bed right on schedule despite the plane just about to enter into the ITCZ, and despite a jumpy Bonin whose constant requests to climb should have set off a red flag in his mind, and indicates clearly that Dubois was desperate for sleep. His incoherent briefing of Robert that MP notes also indicates his fatigue. When Dubois says 'It's impossible' to me that shows the misuse of CRM, when CRM devolves into group think and no-one taking any independent position. He accepted the premise he's been fed, so he discounts the readings as 'impossible'. Certainly it's the captain's duty to consult with FOs in CRM, so as to avoid a repeat of Tenerife, but that doesn't mean they should divest their responsibility entirely. I'm sorry, but if you are a captain of an airplane with 227 other people's lives in your hands, just accepting what your FOs are saying at face value is not good enough. His decades long training should have prompted him to look at the situation afresh, and every single reading he saw should have led him to put 2 and 2 together and diagnose the stall. That is their job. You say it all took 4 and a half minutes - well that's the pilot's job! To make accurate split second decisions. Perhaps this flows to a wider problem about technology making everyone lazy, but the captain should remain the captain - he is supposed to be the one who takes final responsibility for the safety of the aircraft. Bonin's stick movements forward after he created the stall were of course useless by that point. He was trying to 'fly' a plane that was essentially dropping through the air like a brick. That he initiated these inputs in the first place is utterly extraordinary. I can only think that he was so used to Normal Law moderating such extreme inputs that he, too, grew lazy by the automation. Yes hindsight is 20/20. But pilots are supposed to know what they're doing so that they can understand what's going on immediately and take responsive action - not in 4 minutes, in 4 seconds at the most - especially pilots who've risen to the level of Captain after decades of experience. That's what decades of training is supposed to do, and it's what they're paid well for. Otherwise we might as well let robots fly the plane entirely.
@@yggdrasil9039 Pilots are taught not to trust their senses. Even at that it appears Bonin's senses were telling him that they were in an overspeed situation. How could have thought such a thing based on his own actions other than his senses. The first thing a Pilot should do is aviate when in a crisis. Dubois did that by attempting to get Bonin to fly the plane level. For all he knew they were going to enter a spin. When trying to work out exactly what the plane was doing with your FO's telling you there are no valid indications, there is severe buffeting, it is pitch black outside with no horizon in view and a tremendous aerodynamic noise- nigh on impossible. I agree with you that Robert was certainly much more in tune than Bonin for sure, although had he thought it was a stall he never verbalised that so we can't assume he thought so. I am not sure what he was thinking bar obviously being in complete panic and hoping that Dubois had the answer. His failure to complete any checklist or even attempt to use memory items also contributed to the lack of communication. It left Bonin swinging about wildly seemingly unaware he was no longer operating in Normal Law and it left Robert flailing about in panic giving the Captain no help whatsoever when he re entered the flight deck. We don't understand anything, we have tried everything. This was someone in full panic mode. The papers reported that the Captain had one hour sleep the night before but there are suggestions of mistranslation and that the Captain was referring to the afternoon nap before flight. In other words there is no definitive proof either way. Did Dubois make mistakes that night? Yes. But nothing that should in any way have been catastrophic to an A330. Did Robert make mistakes that night? Yes but again nothing that should have led to catastrophe. Bonin took actions that did lead to catastrophe and the flight computers and particularly the Flight Directors also caused Bonin to act this way- the Unreliable Airspeed checklist calls for the Flight Directors to be switched off. Had Robert ran that checklist the accident might not have happened. All had a part to play as is so often the case.
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Should I not have access to this? It was in your playlist of videos on Boeing incidents
Do they have anyone qualified to help with 'Trump Derangement Syndrome'? 🤔
His followers could certainly use some cult deprogramming.
Why do you keep shelling for the sponsorship. They've been proven in congressional hearings that they sold vulnerable people's data (without user consent) to advertisers and insurance companies. Therapy is fantastic, better help is not. Really disappointing.
I get you have staff to pay, but there are more ethical options.
Please practice the diligence you preach about in your videos.
@@MattyEngland regrettably most people affected by this do appear to be lost causes....its very sad.
This is one of the best example of this quote, made by NASA astronauts : There is no problem so bad that you can't make it worse.
Yes, indeed.
LOL! that actually dovetails quite nicely with Alan Shepard's prayer before his first launch (before becoming the first American in space):
"Dear Lord, please don't let me f**k up!"
well, to be fair, that's also a sign of human ingenuity... in this case, the ingenuity to get shit hit the fan...
A quote that our politicians decided to take as a challenge!
@@AmbuBadgerAnd they've succeeded!!! And keep succeeding at it.... Should I be impressed?
One question that stood out to me watching this video was: Did the pilots ever know that the Boeing 777 would NOT call out "dual inputs" like an Airbus would? It's worth considering that they both operated on the assumption that they would hear a warning if they were fighting each other's control inputs.
Communication breakdown was the key factor here. The Captain should have announced to the FO if he was in fact taking control of the plane. "Assisting" silently was exactly what made the FO continue over-controlling the plane.
To be fair, he did after like 50 seconds, which is a pretty short amount of time in reality. It's not like this went on for 20 minutes.
@@David-ud9juTo be fair, 50 seconds is enough time for 200 people to die in a plane.
@@David-ud9ju while that's true you have to remember this isnt like driving on the road, this is airplanes
@@MrNinjaman63 Just because these people fly airplanes doesn't mean they're superhuman. Things like this is where technology comes into play and maybe a "Dual input" warning could have resolved the issue entirely.
This is a design problem.
Shocking how 2 people working close together can be far apart mentally.
Seems like an appallingly regular occurrence for Air France....
Remember that the emergent part of this flight happened in less than a minute. At that time, the captain was probably trying harder to stabilize the aircraft and forgot about communicating. It was a function of instinct. More training to increase the instinct of communication can surely help.
@@howdan1985exactly my thoughts
Sounds like most marriages
@@JustMe-fo4ev I can imagine a married couple flying a 777: "Flaps 15", "yes dear", "thrust to 50%", "yes dear", "landing gear down", "yes dear", "you're not listening to me, you never listen!" "What, what did you say, what did I miss"? "Everything, you weren't listening, you never listen!". "What's wrong", "nothing", "no, I can tell you're upset", "I'm fine",
"no you're not, you're angry", "I'm angry because you never listen"..............BANG!!!.......... 350 die in aviation disaster.
ZERO communication in that cockpit. They were both flying their own planes with a gremlin messing with the controls in the other seat.
This is a custom in Air France.They had a lot of accidents and crashes caused by pilots giving different inputs simultaneously.
But the French have always been known for being easy to get along with and valuing team work over personal flair, right?..
well no, eventually the captain called "my controls", and upon hearing it the first officer immediately obeyed the callout. so a fair bit more than zero communication, altho certainly quite a lot less than there should have been
@@UnshavenStatue _Eventually_ being the operative word. And after 53 secs. They’re lucky they were still in the air by then. If you consider that communication, it’s good you’re not in charge of CRS training. Anyway, “zero” was meant to be rhetorical. Not literal.
I was waiting for the Captain to take controls as soon as FO started overpitching 😬
Thanks! I’m a military pilot that recently finished flight training. Watching your videos has definitely made me a better aviator.
I’m a current Boeing 777 pilot.
The long 2-crew sectors are demanding. I personally find JFK very challenging. It is in very busy airspace and the ATC quality isn’t always fantastic. Taking controlled rest on the flight deck of a 777 does mitigate fatigue to some degree, but the seats don’t fully recline(and it’s uncomfortable sleeping sitting up) and the ACARS system frequently chimes, especially over non-oceanic airspace. It is absolutely better than nothing, but you still need to be fit to be able to manage, and you will be tired there is no doubt. Did this impact the First Officer?
Something is surely going on in his head, because a go-around above flare altitude is normally mini-briefed.
I agree with your discrete guarding of the controls as an LTC. I have always done this, to create a ‘limit’ should it be necessary. But I would not normally expect that to be the case line flying.
I have flown the 777 throughout the 5G issue and never actually had an issue.
The shear unnecessary panic has shades of AF447 and as a professional pilot is deeply worrying.
Really excellent documentary and thought provoking. Thank you
I was also thinking of AF447 when seeing this video.
Thank you for sharing. The AF447 disaster is one that I revisit on a regular basis because it still boggles me that a flight crew could ignore the obvious warnings they were hearing and that a trained pilot could continue to pull the nose up for the entire emergency and not verbalize what he's doing to the other crew member.
Thank you for the reply. I think a lot about AF447 too.
As a commercial pilot instructor and check pilot I have had exposure to many responses and situations both in simulation and in the flight deck.
One of the biggest weaknesses of humans in the flight deck is that fundamentally we are descended from primates. Our ability rationalise and use logic to resolve threats is what marks us out as a species, but it is highly dependent on retaining emotional control and not responding to the reactions of the autonomic nervous system. In high pressure, threat situations it requires strong discipline and well established training. Even then, our ability to trigger appropriate behaviour can be tremendously challenged by fatigue, very large jumps in alertness levels, startle and shock and capacity overload. It takes courage and cool head to work through a problem rationally when alarms are blaring, lights are flashing and your life is on the line.
I believe that in both this case and in AF447, startle was a key element. The ‘chimp’ was let to run riot in the flight deck, and was only caged by cognition of the commander.
This is not an inadequacy of the individuals, it is an inadequacy of our species unfortunately. Better exposure in training (in non-jeopardy situations) and flight deck design would mitigate this.
Sadly, even with our modern technology, humans are still the best device for resolving a large number of factors on the flight deck. We just need to give them adequate rest.
Yes, it’s a cost issue ultimately. A third crew member makes a huge difference to the rest the pilot can take, but costs that bit more
The FTLs is the elephant in the room.
Both the AF 446 accident and this incident show a complete abandonment of SOPs which could be due to extreme fatigue.
Pilots fly much more hours per year compared to previous generations.
The MAX crashes were due to commercial pressure, not science.
Are the FTLs based on science or on Industry pressure?
@@VIKINGFLYING this is such a thorny problem.
FTLs were originally introduced prior to the efficiencies of modern, computerised, rostering systems.
Aviation is inherently very safe, but it’s one of the few industries where we take humans and make them operate safety critical machinery in a fatigued state.
I often wonder what would happen if I was stopped by the police driving home. Would they say I was too fatigued to drive? But I’ve just landed a 250T jet.
Automation helps: by disconnecting the automation early in this case the FO increased workload in a period when in fact it wasn’t entirely necessary. The aircraft COULD have performed a CAT I autoland. Would I consider that with a 300’ cloud base at the end of an overnight JFK? Absolutely.
Would I have flown a manual ILS in poor visibility at the end of that sector? No. At the end of the day, as much as it fun to ‘fly’ the airplane, we are professionals and have a job to do. Would I practice on a clear day? Yes.
FTLs are one part of the equation
61 year old glider pilot and instructor, career ending because of cancer. I love these videos for what they teach us and also keeping me connected to flying. THANK YOU !
That's the goal. Education. Thanks for being here and I hope you are doing ok Sir.
Sorry to hear about the cancer diagnosis. Hope it’s treatable and you’re doing ok. Grew up at an airfield with a few glider pilots and always amazed at their skill and how long and far they could fly.
I have a supposed terminal cancer which I was given a year for-almost twelve years ago now. Hope you do well, and find another aviation outlet-drones perhaps? Can one not fly GA once tx is over and remission achieved?
I don't know if you are religious, but I am praying for your health, for wisdom and compassion in the hearts of your medical care providers, and strength in the hearts of your loved ones as they support you.
hope you get well soon
Thanks for breaking this down. I was on this flight! Had to hold my breath & tell myself that this wasn’t my time to go, which got more difficult as the passenger behind me got hysterical! Worse was the thick cloud cover through which you could feel the speed & left-right, up-down motions. Was a relief to climb back up again as it was obvious that the pilots were not in control earlier
Wow, that sounds terrifying.
Keep in mind that as a passenger with no view of the horizon and no flight instruments, you are even more susceptible to spatial disorientation than the pilots are. I say this not to minimize your experience, but to reassure you that it probably felt a lot worse than it was.
Did you sue the airline for a new pair of underpants? 😂
Listening to this I was thinking it must have been horrifying in there.
yes with that pitch and a 27 degree roll...@@missequestrian3448
I am glad that this breakdown in communication was corrected in time and they landed safely.
Me to!
@@MentourPilottoo* ;)
I think the most amazing thing for me personally is that I watch your videos and you'll mention something ... like that the landing gear are still down... and I'll just immediately say to myself "that'll produce drag". I'm not a pilot, not even thinking of ever taking a flying lesson... just someone who has flown here and there...not even a well seasoned passenger. That's how much can be learned from your videos. Thank you!
Outstanding my friend!
@@screw_it_why_not
What exactly is he doing by supporting better help?
What makes you think your political beliefs should guide other people's actions?
What does Petter preach which promoting "Better help" goes against?
@@OddityDKwat
@@OddityDK. Looks like the comment is gone. But thanks for saying something about people bringing up politics where it doesn’t belong. It’s so annoying. So thank you .
I had the exact same thought (landing gear down = drag) earlier this morning while watching a different incident video.
I also am not a pilot nor do I have any plans to ever be one.
I came here for his most recent MH370 video a month or so ago and have watched dozens since.
This man just makes learning fun.
58 y/o woman & home-maker here, who enjoys your educational videos. You earned my subscription over a year ago because for some reason I like to learn a little bit of everything and I find fascinating the way you teach and voice your opinions about aviation & the importance of communication between pilots. In many cases, I can apply your lessons to daily life. Thank you so much, greetings from Chicago, IL.
This is very sweet. Thanks for writing
Yes, I feel the same. I imagine he has a lot of followers like us, interested because he makes it so interesting.
Great example of why you always re-establish who has the flight controls when you get into an emergency situation. I am an airline pilot and a military helicopter pilot. Had a similar scenario under NVGs in the helicopter. Had an inexperienced co-pilot complain about the flight controls, I said “Let me see” instead of “I have the flight controls”. We both ended up fighting on the controls for about 15 seconds, I declared an emergency and as we were about to touch down I glanced over at my co-pilot and realized we were fighting each other. Keep up the good content brother!
@@Capecodham Night vision goggles.
Deference, particularly when two experienced professionals are working together for the first time, can be a dangerous thing. It was never a problem for my Chipmunk instructor many decades ago to say ‘I have control’ and as a novice I’d give it up instantly. Now I’m a surgeon, it’s much trickier to seemingly trample on a colleague’s skills and autonomy by declaring ‘stop please, I’m taking over’. But in the interests of safety that instinctive reluctance must be fought. It is fundamental that organisational culture fosters the permissions to be able to intervene assertively like this with no hard feelings on either side as well as the leadership to actually intervene when needed. I love how these videos often talk about the authority gradient. Too right!
I'm a nurse and an airplane geek. In general I think the healthcare sector still has a lot to learn from aviation, but it's changing for better. As from my experience, millenials and so on are much more prone to embrace the just culture and the authority gradient in nursing teams tends to be quite shallow. However I noticed, as you said, that between medical staff the deference to authority it's still quite pronounced. It's unfortunate, healthcare sector is stressful in itself, and that kind of relationship behaviour only exacerbate that (and can be potentially unsafe, of course).
(English is not my first language, please have mercy)
I don't think it was deference that caused the communication chasm, if anything it was ego. There seemed to be a lot of passive aggressiveness going on. If they can't even ask the other one 'are you pulling back/pushing forward' when it is the most obvious thing to ask, it shows that there is some kind of ego/superiority thing going on.
I agree-good observation!@@rl7012
777 Captain here, would just like to say “Thank you”. It’s always good to watch your videos and helps refresh system knowledge particularly on the 777.
Your videos provide such an in depth analysis and offer great take away points to incorporate on the line. Fantastic work. All the best!
I think this is the first ever yt channel that actually uses captions correctly.
Moving them to the top when information is displayed at the bottom, love it.
Well done!
Yes! And actually put in a nice to look at manner.
YT caption examples:
the Gobi desert in Africa 🏜️ ;
image of sushi 🫔;
a Granny Smith apple 🫑
@@chateaumojogranny smith is the best
Indeed, I only ever watch these particular vids with the audio muted.
Yes, that is some great subtitles editing. However there are a few words in many episodes apparently put there in error, however sounding the same like the intended word (there must be a term for such same-sounding words), which makes me think it is a person listening to the audio and writing the script down instead of the actual script directly adapted for subs. I believe that's the only way to make that kind of mistake.
As an engineering professor on embedded systems, I love the nerdy part of your videos. Some solutions can be suggested for many of the problems reported in the incident reports, but these are situations that just were not imagined when the airlines were designed. And that's why it is so important to investigate these incidents thoroughly, even the ones without serious consequences.
Engineer creates a robot bartender. QA Tester walks into the bar and orders a drink. Then two drinks. Then five, zero, and minus one drinks. Robot gives all the appropriate responses. QA tester declares the robot bartender ready for production.
Customer walks into the bar and asks where the bathroom is. The robot explodes.
Situations that were not anticipated will always happen. They must be investigated and mitigations or fixes implemented before they can become problems.
Also, some potential solutions introduce new hardware which introduces new risks of failure, which you might be tempted to try to fix with more hardware, lights, training, what? Making a complex system more complex can't really make it safer.
Air France will reliably create such testing results for the designers.
@@CiaranMaxwellThis is exactly what the hacking world is all about. Few things are as fun as using someone’s security tools against them. One of the hardest things to detect is someone using a legitimate tool in an illegitimate way. I kinda envy the way airlines share data with each other and the manufacturers. The tech world has some sharing, but there is still too much ass cover that goes on. Most people are afraid to admit when they’ve screwed something up, especially when management doesn’t use it as a learning opportunity.
It is always easier to investigate near misses than actual catastrophes because people survive near misses to tell you about them. But you are right that a near accident warrants the same sort of investigation as an actual one.
Not wanting to cast aspersions on Air France, but to me this sounds strangely similar to AF447 - first officer, blind to his own mistake, making weird inputs and the captain making different inputs to counteract "the misbehaving aircraft", insufficient communication between the two about what they're doing, unknowingly fighting themselves and a perfectly flyable aircraft into a bad situation accompanied by spurious alarms and other unexpected aircraft feedback. It certainly shows a counterpoint to people claiming AF447 was solely the fault of Airbus' control design.
Is it just me or is Air France overrepresented when it comes to incidents and accidents?
they do seem to have a lot of communication issues between pilots in the cockpit @@marydecouvertes3789
@@marydecouvertes3789 : Air France definitely seems to have an aircrew training and communication problem. Avoid that “airline” if at all possible.
@@samy7013 Just took a look at the statistics and found out the two companies with the highest amount of deadly crashes are Air France and American Airlines. Would be interesting to know which company has the highest number of reported incidents.
@@marydecouvertes3789This is out of Western Airlines tho Air France is a very safe Airline if you compare it with actual unsafe airlines from 3rd world countries
It's always a massive relief when I hear you say, "at time xx:xx, Flight ABC123 landed safely..." 😥
I agree. I wasn’t sure if they were going to make it through this. I was relieved to hear when the captain took control.
Same here 😊
Yeah it's a relief.
My favourite line as well...
Yea I also watch those videos intentionally without knowing the outcome.
It s not only the accuracy and the depth of your research , it s the way you tell things: the enthusiasm, the tone, the suspense,…
You’re an amazing story teller, as a non aviation nerd i find everything clear and very interesting . And as a non native non fluent english speaker , i don’t even set the subtitles to understand your videos.
You must be great at telling bedtime stories to your children .
Keep up the quality work 👍
do. not. ever. use better help. their “therapists” are not licensed, and they have zero standard of care. their so-called providers can sign up to be a therapist without any qualifications, and are not obligated to confidentiality standards.
When I was in the U.S. Navy, on my first takeoff something similar happened. In the T-34C Mentor, the pilots sit one behind the other, unable to see each other's controls. The standard procedure for all pilots was to NEVER have both pilots attempting to control the plane at the same time, in order to prevent this same type of confusion. When control was to be taken or given, "You have the controls" and "I have the controls" was required of BOTH pilots.
Another important rule was to never ascend above 600 feet on takeoff until well clear of the pattern, as the pattern altitude was 1,200 feet at North Whiting NAS. This would maintain adequate separation between arriving and departing aircraft. My instructor was particularly adamant about not breaking that rule.
As we lifted off, my instructor reminded me NOT to climb above 600'. But my controls felt heavy, as if the plane wanted to nose down and descend. So I was pulling back on the stick and trimming up. The more I pulled back on the stick and trimmed, the louder my instructor warned me NOT to exceed 600 feet. The downward force was getting pretty severe, so I kept pulling back and trimming up. Eventually we cleared the pattern, and my instructor shouted a swear word and I felt the controls suddenly JERK BACK, giving me the impression that he had taken the controls from me. So I let go of the stick and put my hands in the air so he could see them, and said, "You have the controls!"
It turns out that he had been PUSHING on the stick the entire time, while I was pulling back and trimming UP! When he finally stopped pushing, all of that trim I had put in caused the stick to fly back, feeling like my instructor had grabbed the stick and jerked it back! So for a few seconds we were a ROCKET headed into space! LOL! Neither one of us was flying the plane! LOL!
I still got an okay grade on the flight - I think because my instructor wouldn't want anyone to know he had been pushing the controls while I was flying the plane. I probably shouldn't have told that story on him during my tie-cutting ceremony, but I did anyway. ;)
Good. Guy could get someone killed one day trying to fight their controls
a totally non-flight mixup happened in our family when my aunt and uncle were sleeping at her parents' house one night. The controls on the electric blanket got switched, and the inevitable happened.
He gets hot and turns his control down.
She gets cold and turns her control up.
Feedback loop ensues....
That's what I was taught as well.
Christ, I can understand his vigilance keeping the altitude, but making flight control inputs without voicing them is just asking for an accident.
You absolutely need to tell that story. Constantly. He should get others asking him about it
"Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" is the rule. Except within the cockpit, Communicate is a prerequisite to Aviate (i.e., who has the controls?). Good on the captain for finally verbalizing and commanding that he has the controls -- that fixed everything. BTW, nerdy is good! Thanks.
I'll be happy to do the Communicate portion,
"Hallo ATC, my plane acts kinda weird! I think my mechanic forgot to topup the blinker fluid! Do you have any suggestion? Should I declare mayday?"
I guess here with all the detail when we play it back it feels like a long time until he said "my controls" but in reality it was less than a minute? It can often take me far longer than a minute to realise I am making my own problems worse!
@@premchain A minute is almost an eternity when flying. Or just driving a car. It's more than enough time to destroy lives.
It's the nerdy details that I love!
They make sense of the situation and fill in the gaps of the story.
'dumbed down' documentaries are frustrating... thanks for taking time to cover the technical issues 😀
I’m happy to hear that!
Yes! keep it nerdy!
@@MentourPilotYes, I like it nerdy. I suppose a lot of us who watch your videos are nerds. The problem I see us the automation can't ever match what human mind may conceive - in other words, I understood your schematics. Well done.
Good for you! Far too many people don't want to learn the details and don't recognize the difference between knowledge and understanding. They read a news article about an event and get the knowledge about what happened. To do an analysis or to apply that knowledge to another event requires knowledge of the underlying phenomena and the rules of interaction between those phenomena, which is only obtained by substantial education in the subject. Trouble starts when, lacking that education, people use common sense to analyze that complex subject, the result typically being a flawed understanding and analysis. As the saying goes, "Little knowledge is a dangerous thing." A recent example was when the news media attempted to analyze the 737 MAX crashes and found out that initial flight tests had revealed that MCAS needed to operate at low airspeeds too, and Boeing had changed the programming so the computer would operate the stab trim motor at high RPM instead of low. Now, using common sense, most people would say that a system becomes more powerful if it is operated at high speed vs. low speed, and so the media accused Boeing of making MCAS much more powerful, too powerful for the pilots to handle. If they had an education in aerodynamics, they would have realized that the aerodynamic force varies directly with the square of the airspeed, so at low airspeed-lets say 1/2 the high airspeed-the aerodynamic force produced would be 1/4 the force produced at high speed. However the weight and inertia of the airplane hasn't changed, so, to compensate, the deflection of the stabilizer had to increase substantially, and that was achieved by speeding up the drive motor-to produce the SAME force as before. Many people learn this characteristic from looking at the ailerons on the wings move up/down to roll the airplane right/left, and noticing that they deflect much more at the low airspeeds during takeoff and on approach to land compared to the high airspeed during cruise. In fact, on larger airplanes with outboard and inboard ailerons, the outboard ailerons are locked out above a certain airspeed-otherwise they could cause dangerously high structural loads if they deflected abruptly-and only become active again when the airplane slows to approach speeds.
+1 definitely
I was surprised that it took the Captain so long to call control of the aircraft. I was expecting him to do it when he began overtly and forcefully exerting control, even before the loss of synchronization.
my thoughts exactly, does `grow a pair` cover it?
Listing to the ATC-tape, you can hear both groaning from strain. This is one of the disadvantages of this being a Boeing. It's kind of hard to talk, if you use all your physical strength to fight a perceived flight control issue.
Reminds me of the Air France Atlantic crash in 2009
I think Petr said 53secs. Not really that long!!
Remember: Petter mentions only 52 seconds have gone by. This regain of controls took less than a minute.
It always surprises me on how quickly things can go from being really good to really bad. It's just a matter of seconds . That's so strange.
No better timing to watch this than right before flying Air France into CDG lol
Appreciate the content!
Haha! Sorry about that
@@MentourPilot No worries, your videos make me feel safer when flying :)
Just make sure to force your way into the cockpit to warn them about this. I am guessing this will be well received.
I used to watch air crash investigation videos while flying long haul 😂
And probably on…
A Boeing!😳Lol
I can do the exact same by watching incident videos then jumping onboard! I just love flying!
A great example of how we can get spooked by the ghosts in our heads, and convince ourselves that something catastrophic is happening when it's literally nothing. Follow the decision-making model, which has you first identifying the problem and gathering information about it, before acting. In this case, doing this would have shown that there actually was no problem to solve.
Exacerbated by fatigue, no doubt. 2-man overnight long-haul flights should not be allowed.
@@EvoraGT430 certainly, fatigue can cause all kinds of strange cognitive hiccups, like getting stressed up for no reason and drawing weird conclusions one wouldn't make when well-rested ("something feels off, could it be 5G interference??")
The prejudiced mind is easily led astray.
It would have been helpful if Petter had run through the application of PIOSEE as a practical example, because the root cause-the ghost in the head: 5G interference-would not be easy to identify as "no problem to solve" as such could not be ascertained while on final approach and without a proper understanding of the nature of 5G interference. Alternatively, "dual input" was a problem that DID need to be solved, but how does one identify it as the problem when one isn't expecting the pilot monitoring to be interfering with control without communicating? Speaking up and saying something like "I don't understand why it's so difficult to pitch up!" may have made the PM realize that the PF was trying to pitch up while he was trying to pitch down. A lack of trust by both of them caused each to do the other's job, neglect their own and make an embarrassing pudding of the flight. Dangerous too.
@@petep.2092 to me, the first ghost in the head seemed to be "the plane is veering off course", then "I have a flight control problem", which then lead to the conclusion "it must be 5G interference" and "must do a go-around", which then lead to the dual inputs. If the problem had been identified as "something feels off with the controls", it could have been identified as "actually, nevermind" pretty quickly. But jumping into conclusions and then actions without further consideration just made a non-issue into an actual problem. Granted, like you point out, there isn't much time to start problem-solving while on final approach, and if there was an actual flight control problem, a go-around would have been the correct response. Still, jumping straight to action without stopping for any kind of decision-making process was the critical issue here.
I'm a hobby pilot and now understand the significance of my coach saying "I have controls"!! Excellent nerdy aviation video!
@@pinnacle1717 with all due respect, please shut up.
@@theKashConnoisseurno need for this kind of response!
@@rogergalletti1609 you didn't see the comment I responded to and thus have no context for the necessity. Rest assured, I wouldn't be crass unless it was warranted. Have a good day!
Thanks! Petter, another fascinating and right on the edge of my understanding video. I've learned so much here.
I have worked as a paramedic for over two decades. When I am training new medics, I tell them we treat the patient, not the monitor. While that cardiac monitor is a huge help in diagnosis and ongoing care. If it is telling me something that doesn't correlate with my patients condition, I need to question its accuracy. Always treat the patient, not the monitor.
The map is not the territory.
The metric is not the goal.
I'm also in the EMS and I was thought it the same and I thought it the same way.
But I changed this.
The monitor can be right.
In the beginning of covid I've seen my first patient with SpO2 below 80% that showed us no sign of shortness of breath so I assumed that the monitor was wrong. In the Hospital a blood gas analysis was made as a standard procedure. That showed a massive lack of O2.
I was wo damm sure the monitor musst be wrong, but it was right.
Since these times we changed the education that of course the patient hat priority.
But if the monitor shows something pathologic, it can be true also.
You should also question your perception of "your patient's condition". Physicians and nurses do.
@what8562 I don't quite understand what you mean.
Re: FORDEC and PIOSEE Being a pilot under stress in an airplane reminds me being a pharmacist under stress in a pharmacy.dealing with problems. Even though pharmacists keep their feet on the ground,, the stress is continuous and overwhelming at times, FORDEC or PIOSEE can bring us back to the reality of the situation. Thank you, Mentour Pilot.
The captain went from "finger on the controls to moderate anything wild" to "hauling on the controls like a gorilla and ignoring his job" real fast there.
Except that the fo was actually actively stalling the aircraft..
@@disguisedcat1750
Not to mention trying to flip it over like it was a burger on the grill. 😂
These videos are not only for aviation fans but also great lessons for crisis management under stressful conditions for everyday life. Thanks a lot for sharing!
This was like watching the 2009 Airfrance incident all over again. Your videos have probably prevented a few situations, everyone can learn to be better.
Thank you Peter, an excellent presentation as always! As a 28 year professional pilot, I really like that you cover “incident” flights as well as accidents. The information gained from the incident reports truly helps bring awareness to the traps that can occur on a standard flight. There is no substitute for knowledge and good CRM-CLR etc. Keep up the excellent work!
@@Capecodham CRM in aviation is Crew Resource Management, which is just fancy speaking to taliking to each other. Both pilot and first officers should have been more clear as to what was happening and what they where doing, instead of just trying to fix it on their own.
@@Capecodham he probably used it to memorize the CRM acronym... in aviation we LOVE acronyms, there are hundreds, and all sound the same.
My biggest takeaway from my first flying lesson more than 30 years ago was vocalising ‘I’ve got control’ when the training pilot noticed me doing something stupid.
I used to work in a mobile phone shop in the early 2000's...
We had some guys who worked in the local military control tower, who had major issues if they had a certain network and their phone went anywhere near the control tower... All the screens would go weird and fill with "snow" and/or "give false targets"... They had to leave their mobile phones outside the tower perimeter.
This was on the old 2g One-2-One(now t-moblie) and Orange(now ee) 1800Mhz in the UK... The 2g 900Mhz (vodafone and O2) was fine.
They never did figure out exactly why it happened, but their equipment changed a few years later - so no longer an issue, and in any case the 900 and 1800Mhz isn't used for mobiles any more.
Of course 900 and 1800 MHz are still used! 2G is used more than you think!
I'm retired, not a pilot, and I find these in-depth presentation most edifying. The lessons learned have myriad applications. Thank you!
As an aerospace designer, I really appreciate the details you go into in your videos !
Glad you like them! We try our best!
I'm not a pilot, but I really enjoy watching your videos. I love how you explain all the "nerdy details" and I think the production level of your channel is fantastic! Thank you so much for your time and effort that you put into your content. I have been watching for quite a while and re-watch episodes frequently.
The lack of communication in the cockpit during this incident is unreal. Fantastic video and explanation, I was glued to my seat watching this one!
I guess that if the video had a real-time reconstruction, you would be surprised at the pace at which these events occur. At one moment the CPT has his hand lightly on the yoke, and in a blink of an eye they are very near an actual disaster.
There was no lack of communication. Petter explains the timeframe was only a minute before the captain got things normal again. Luckily both pilots communicated again and realized they both would be subject to an investigation.
@@Dirk-van-den-Berg60 seconds is a lot of time to not use five of those to say “my controls”
Even Sully and Skiles needed about half a minute to oversee what happened and to take appopriate action. @@DeltaEntropy
I have a merch Idea: A tee-shirt with the phrase Petter always says in his videos: "Remember that. It will become important later." 😂
@@Capecodham Merchandise. For example T-shirts, mugs, caps etc.
"My Control!
said a passenger who has successfully forced his way into the cockpit ...
It might become popular among college professors.
How about: "TERRAIN!! PULL UP, PULL UP!!"
I'd buy that in an instant if that became available :D
I believe that this is how many relationships getting damaged too. One person introduce an issue, second reacts abruptly, they both are starting to fight with each other, thinking that they are helping. Communication, people.
Yes, indeed. A reaaly good example!
I'm so glad to see more incidents that didnt end up with loss of life. Its impotant to know we can learn from from more than just accidents that leads to death. Thank Petter
I remember very well the strange Radio Communication from this Flight which VASAviation published on his Channel and how Blancolirio = Juan Browne, himself a 777-Pilot, pointed out how important clear communication in the Cockpit is - and how important the Callout: "My Controls!"
This was a really embarrassing Incident for Air France in a whole, not only for the two involved Pilots.
Thank you very much for picking this Incident up!🙂👍
Thanks!
Isn't it normal procedure for the pilots to verbally confirm which pilot has the controls/aircraft?
Absolutely, especially if the roles changes
I was mentally screaming for the pilot to say "my controls" all the way through the video. Better late than never.
@@uclajd I was very surprised the captain took so long to take over.
Your control
asPetter sais, it happend is a vcery short time, so the question is; how fast can You reaxt on what is happening and call out?
Another quality video, from a quality pilot.
I discovered your channel only a week ago and have managed to binge around 75% of your videos.
Your documenting of these tragic events is of so much more quality and respect than the Mayday/Air Crash Investigation docs. Please keep up what you’re doing.
Love from the UK 💛
God bless you for the truth will lead to an increase in safety care which will benefit the travellers and the service providers.
AGREED.
This type of (dual input) issue was recently talked about in my company (i flew 737) as when the FO is PF theres a lot of instances where the CP makes input to the controls and makes the FO (specially younger ones) think that CP had taken full controll and relax his input causing unstabilized app and sometimes hard landings.
Its been briefed to the whole pilots to make sure that when no "verbal" change of control happens to continue flying the plane. And for CP to communicate more clearly and revert to taking full over the controll when in doubt about the FO skills.
@@Capecodham First Officer - Captain - Pilot Flying.
PM?
@@drive-channel1834 Pilot Monitoring. In a two person cabin one will be the PO and one the PM at any given time - the point of this video is that it needs to be clear who is which at all times. "Captain" and "First Officer" are permanent ranks, while PO and PM are temporary roles - most of the time the Captain will be the PF but by no means always and it is often swapped mid flight.
@@Capecodham A typo. I meant PF.
@@Capecodham🤣🤣🤣🤣
I hope you're doing well Petter. All of us out here, your fans, friends and family, wish you nothing but the best
I like Peter and enjoy his videos; but this comment is just parasocial attachment . He don't know you lil bro
Thanks
If just the Captain announced : I have control, all this chaos would not happen from the beginning.
Proper procedure is for the pilot monitoring to call out the pitch and roll deviations. The pilot flying should call, "correcting." If the pilot flying does not correct, THEN the pilot monitoring verbally and physically takes control. The captain should not have been "helping" on the controls at anytime.
Part of what I love about this channel is getting to hear about aviation incidents that weren't necessarily disasters but are just as interesting. You won't find video like this on Mayday Air Investigation lol
Sometimes I'm imagining, Petter telling an aviation story in great details, with "everything is normal in the beginning.. ", in the correct sequences, very carefully, for about 30 minutes, or even 40 minutes is OK, I love his story-telling . . . ,
FDC was intact, CVR was preserved.
With a conclusion : ".. for you that have not realized, this is a normal flight, no incident, no accident, no drama, nada ... "
I'd love a story like that 😁
Don't forget the "Please remember this detail, it will become very important later .."
And the perfect technical explanations of a flight control system ".. for you to fully grasp the things going on.."
I love his technical explanations, I am a heavy equipment mechanic.
😁
Yes. We're looking at H&S, and that's a big thing - near misses.
Thanks!
Another example of why communication is so important.
Wow, I know you said it's going to be nerdy, but i didn’t think it was going to be THIS nerdy...
That aside, after stumbling across this channel some time ago I've been admiring your videos, as in an ocean of misinformation and cheap opinions, there stand people like you, educating us with your extremely detailed explanations on clearly something you have a passion on. 100% facts no drama. Keep it up, Peter!
Thank you!!
Great comment.
@@MentourPilotNo thank you for making great content for us
I do a lot (a lot) of flying for work as a passenger, and stumbled across this channel years ago. People in the seat next to me have asked me, "how the hell do you know all this stuff?!" Thank you MP!
Agreed. There is one apparent "armchair pilot" with a loud voice in another channel who always seems to blame pilots for everything. Meanwhile, Mentour Pilot's channel is the only one I find that treats everything and everyone with detailed and objective analysis.
It seems like the investigation report ignored the real issue - that there was a complete breakdown of command and control.
They always do, the point of air crash investigations are to make things safer, sure, but another often overlooked reason is to convince people that flying is safe, propaganda-like.
Captain should have taken control long before he did!
@ did you actually read the investigation report? Honest question
The initial failure of the captain to explicitly take control is pointed out several times in the final report. Let me cite the concluding section of the analysis:
"The PF should always be clearly identified at all times. Standardized aircraft control transfer procedures emphasising clear communication and positive transfer of responsibility for PF tasks are essential. The occurrence shows that the use of this standardised call-out, in a situation of stress and confusion, immediately re-established the division of tasks in the cockpit and cleared up the confusion that had arisen."
Another great one...I kept waiting for one of these pilots to finally say "my airplane, my airplane" and was relieved when the Captain finally did!
Its been a time since viewing this clip, look at it in its entirety. Comments were made no communication between the pilots, one or the other need to take charge.
So as the clip goes on, it appears both pilots were engaging dual input, so would not the system cancel each input out. No there would be no functionality in reference to flight. So you lose all your fail safes that were integrated in system.
I think you are an ace-pilot probably - but more than that you are an AMAZING story-teller. I feel pretty sure you could sit in front of a campfire with no animation recreations and just TELL us this and other stories and we be just as engaged and locked into suspense!
It's fascinating how complicated aircraft have become in the effort to fly higher, farther and faster. The only time I've been in cockpit has been as a photographer in a light single engine aircraft about 25 years ago with a then 60-something Korean War pilot who was quite a character. I had played with flight sims in the 90s on Macintosh and those things like "F/A-18 Hornet" flew like lawn darts - no crosswind or atmospheric effects so crabbing in a crosswind in the real thing was a surprise to me and Cap'n Jack as we affectionately knew him would guard the yoke and let me try to fly the plane on approaches probably to convince me I knew ZIP about what I thought I knew. "MY CONTROLS!" and I put my hands under my thighs and let him gratefully have it back when he could see me sweating in over my head.
There's a sea-man's saying I read in an old Arthur C. Clarke book that goes "When you've thought of everything, the sea will think of something else" which I take to mean no matter what you think can go wrong and have a plan for, something original and unexpected will happen.
As a photographer I used to use a now defunct storage system called a SyQuest disk. In the days when every computer had a floppy and CD burners were in their infancy people used to use them for large files, but at some point there was a bug no one could figure out and you'd take the disk to another computer and it WOULD NOT MOUNT. The company took a huge hit from this and just as fast their reputation for unreliability spread like wildfire and everyone moved to the cheaper, bigger Zip Drives and SyQuest went into it's grave as a company and the bug was never resolved. Years later IIRC some kid playing with a defunct drive figured out the glitch that had eluded all the experts and engineers and it was that a custom desktop icon couldn't load on the Mac desktop then the disk couldn't mount and if it couldn't mount you couldn't fix the icon and so you had a bricked disk. The kid discovered a work around I remember reading, I hadn't thrown out my old drive and disks, followed the workaround and BOOM they all suddenly worked like new.
I remember reading an article about this in some tech daily and the enormous amount of man-hours trying to fix those SyQuest disks was staggering and end-users like me and bog only knows how many others had deadlines crash and data and hours of work and money lost was staggering. And it was one little glitch that would go unsolved for years after the dust settled amazed me.
So there's Starfleet Chief Engineer Montgomery Scott's axiom that the more complicated the plumbing the easier it is to stop up.
Things like this control yoke design frighten me as a nervous flyer and yet we all continue to fly trusting that it won't happen on our flight - that everyone is well rested, our pilots steely-eyed missile man unflappable and all the bolts on door panels are tight as a tick!
Classic signs of an excellent teacher. Though the content may be involved and dry, they can still hold the students interest.
A great story about old disk technology! Thanks. :)
I'm not in aviation, have flight anxiety, but THE SECOND mentor pilot videos come out ... CLICK! ah! love these videos!
Thanks as always for making "nerdy" stuff accessible to people who don't have any knowledge of the topic :D
I am not a pilot or even have any basic knowledge of flying an airplane, but I really watch your videos, they are so interesting and full of professional tactical aereo planning! Thank you so much for your work❤
These videos are unbelievably good, especially for enthusiasts like me. The work that goes into creating the recreation on flight sim, the drawings and renders of aircraft systems, and just the sheer accuracy of everything, including the speed tapes showing a downward trends when you speak about losing speed, is just fantastic. I cannot state how much I appreciate these videos and I recommend these to my pilot friends too! A big thank you and salute to your team and you for putting out these.
@@Capecodham I mean the re-enactment of the cockpit action using some kind of a flight simulator
@@abhayvenkatesh8934don't mind them, they hate abbreviations and always bitch about it 😂
The magic words "I have control" that bring order in a situation
1:58 - Why were they in a Hotel an HOUR AND A HALF from the Airport just after a 7 hour flight and just before a return flight of another 7 hours? The Airline couldn't find them a Hotel closer to the Airport? A 90 minute drive shortly before a 7 hour flight, and just after having completed the same 7 hour flight a day earlier, has to be GRUELING and EXHAUSTING! I want my Pilots as well rested as possible before they fly me over the Atlantic OCEAN! There's no place to safely land if they screw up due to exhaustion!
Sometimes the traffic is bad in NY, but there are places to land£ when crossing the Atlantic there’s Goose and gander and Keflavik and the Azores and Shannon.
I am quite a fresh captain on B737. There is a lot of to learn from you videos. Thank you for that.
I do not understand why they did not communicate to each other. If my FO tells me the controls feel weird I want to know in what way. I want to ask questions why is he turning. I can see the yoke displacement. I can tell him to turn right in this scenario. On the other hand I expect my FO to ask the same questions if I am in controls and deviating.
Communication in the cockpit are crucial for the safe operations.
The ego comes into play. The french especially can have very big ones as well.
A lot of astronaut biographies talk about how when they became astronauts they felt really uncomfortable at first questioning the senior astronauts if they thought they made a mistake. They do a lot of flying in trainer aircraft and on simulators. Chris Hadfield said he makes sure he gets the younger astronauts to find out stuff he did suboptimally so that it creates an atmosphere for learning, instead of him just instructing. Because he said he made a major error in one demonstration but saved it and he realised that none of the watching astronauts had called him out for it, or maybe even understood that he had made a critical error.
@@bilgzmcr7035 : Bingo! You nailed it, 100%.
Thanks for this one, Peter.. It's always a great ending when an aircraft lands safely and normally with no injuries on board.. Still, a wild ride for the cockpit crew, and much confusion in terms of what exactly was happening. ALWAYS COMMUNICATE !! This cannot be overemphasized !
This one brings back memories of when I learning to fly. On just my fourth flight, I was in a situation where the instructor failed to say "handing over". Consequently, no one was flying the plane for about four minutes. To make it worse we were only at 5000 feet. I never flew with him again.
Even if control breakouts were only indented for control jams, I think a "duel input" warning might have solved the issue. I get you don't need it when you can fully feel the other pilot's input (if any) but if the yoke isn't simulating a mechanical linkage, then there should be some indication.
Yes! Why isn't this the biggest takeaway? This isn't the first incident of dual‑inputs leading to mishandling of aircraft. The cockpit hardware should trigger automated audible warnings like "dual input" and "decoupled controls". Or imagine if the yolk controls were illuminated in some way such that the pilots wouldn't even need to verbalise their interference (e.g. Green-lit yolk indicates this yolk is delivering 100% of the inputs, yellow-lit yolk indicates the other pilot is also inputting with their yolk, red-lit yolks indicates decoupled yolks, unlit yolk indicates the yolk isn't inputting at all).
@@JKVeganAbroad Maybe the designers just thought it would be "obvious" when only one pilot is inputting so therefore the other guy wouldn't make an input... which makes no sense given Airbus's history.
@@alex_zetsu With Airbus you can't see what the other pilot is doing, the sidestick is out of view, hence the aural alert, whereas with Boeing the other pilot's hand(s) on the control(s) is easily seen. Yet, neither the aural alert nor the peripheral vision seems to ensure awareness in all cases. Maybe a drop down hammer from overhead?
I wanted to watch this video yesterday, but I fell asleep dead tired. Today I watched it, and it's so close to home to what happened today at work. Not exactly the 5G but involving MS Access, Customs brokerage, persistent but faulty info and diluted responsibilities. And I keep loving your Aviation lessons Petter, Tack!
oh for sure man. your spreadsheet situation was totally the same. really this video should have been about you. i mean, basically it was.
Tack!
Air France seems to have a serious training issue. They’ve had too many accidents/incidents the past 15 years. I’d avoid flying with them.
They haven’t had a single fatal accident since Flight 447 lol in fact the only accident that has happened in Europe in the last 10 years is Germanwings I’m pretty sure which we all know wasn’t even an accident but a massive criminal act
@@Eruma_27 True but it's worse than many other carriers I can think of. Here are a few I can think of.
2005 AFR358 A340-300 overran the runway and the airplane burned out (pilot error)
2009 AFR447 A330 Crash into the Atlantic (pilot error)
2022 AFR011 777 Pilots fighting over the control of the airplane (pilot error)
2024 AFR356 A350 Tailstrike at Toronto (pilot error)
@@Kaipeternicolas try Boeing and tell us... If you Can
@@Eruma_27that is nothing to flex about, they still have multiple incidents because of their insufficient training. Just because people don't die, it doesn't mean what they're doing is good.
came home after a 12,5hour workday, sat down with popcorn and watched your whole video as so many times before :) I LOVE when you tell these stories, and I find them so interesting ! Keep up the good work :D
just wanted to quickly say I love your channel. I'm not a pilot nor am I ever likely to be in a cockpit barring a situation where I'm the only living soul on an airplane in flight, but the tech/engineering geek in me finds this stuff fascinating. Your presentation skills are also excellent and I can see why you are a trainer
One of my favorite channels on UA-cam. Petter and crew, keep up the good work 👍
I really like the control handover protocol I’ve observed in pilots eye video where the handing off pilot says “you have control” and the takeup pilot vocalises “I have control”, thereby eliminating uncertainty and putting the information on the CVR. There are mainly physical work situations where it is vital that just one person is calling the procedure. Situations where moving heavy loads on inclines are involved for instance. I like to play the game with the procedure for fun (and practice) when leaving someone else to continue a process. This comes into play with complex machinery, and I could bore you by relating a storey about a ship change that went wrong and cost a couple of hundred thousand dollars.
Great video as usual. Quite scary resemblance with the tragic AF 447 case, as far as pilots’ behavior and reactions are concerned: also in THAT case, all was basically self-induced (apart from an initial turbulence there, that did not happen here), with pilots fighting with the controls in opposite ways, each unbeknownst to the other. That one was an Airbus, so the actual, technical dynamics were different (as well as the aircraft initial situation and of course the outcome), but from a behavioral point of view, the key issue was basically identical. Is this a sign of more general attitude (and training) issues within Air France?
100%. Even if 447 wasn't AF it's the same story basically, thanks god w/o the outcome. But it IS AF, so questions must be asked.
@@armynyus9123Indeed.
This site tends to be especially kind to …. human factors. The UK ATPL is/was? brutally challenging, it passed semi-test pilots! It was way over the top but it weeded out a lot of people, I wonder if the French equivalent was more like Pakistan’s?
Brilliant Petter, a complex situation beautifully and clearly explained. Thank you and the Mentour team yet again!
The excellence just continues, Petter. As you said, this video really highlights how important control communication is.
Absolutely! The point of all my videos is to highlight an important learning point of some sort. This one worked great for that!
you are the best... i can practically fly a plane now..
It’s always a good day when Mentour Pilot drops a new video
And it’s always nice to hear from you!
TOGA and banking at the same time is what you do in a jet fighter, not a commercial airplane.
Toga in my mother tongue means producing smoke. I am imagining that in a bank 🙂
TO/GA (the buttons to tell the flight guidance computers to initiate “guidance” for take off or go arround) plus an immediate turn may very well be possible. Either procedural, upon ATC instructions or for ex. thunderstorm/hail avoidance.
@@innocentanderson2830 what language is that?
@@innocentanderson2830In my mother tongue, TOGA means a gorgeous, flowing white robe of office. One of best friends, sadly, was stabbed to death while wearing one.
@@The_ZeroLine Et tu, Brute?
Just wanted to say that I appreciate your content. I’m a healthcare executive in the US (and av geek) and my health system is in the process of training over 10,000 people on many of the concepts that you talk about in your videos. When I do my training sessions, I often refer to your lesson on Authority Gradient to clearly articulate the impact of poor CRM (poor CRM can extend itself to an operating room, leading to negative consequences). Many thanks and keep it going!
@@CapecodhamIn an aviation context, CRM = Crew Resource Management.
These videos are FANTASTIC! Another incident during to pilot error is the 2002 Überlingen mid-air collision. I would love to see it on this channel as I want to understand further how it happened.
Calling an incident pilot error is like calling a car crash a steering failure because the car didn't steer around the other car
Well, the incident listed above is pilot error as the pilot did not listen to TCAS. And a car crash could be because the steering failed.
That wasn’t pilot error it was gross negligence on behalf of the ATC service provider company btw
@@kidcraft_aviationit’s more gross negligence than pilot error btw in fact the way the ATC centre in Zürich operated was absolutely shocking
@@Eruma_27 technically it was pilot error since one of the pilots put ATC priority over TCAS, but the swiss cheese model
As we keep finding out: "It's always the sh*t they don't tell you"
It's Interesting that this crew's decisions were more influenced by some random article than actual knowledge of the machine containing the lives of mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, aunts and uncles. beloved friends and colleagues and even themselves. It could be said that Air France and Boeing failed them and treated them, and by default all their customers like fools by not telling them upfront that this was possible. A shortcoming in training IMO.
MentourPilot, you're a star. Thank you for this amazing content. You present it in such a way that far from instilling fear instils confidence, and you are fair and mindful when commenting on people and companies. It says a lot about you. Wishing you much continued success..
This is one of the best example of this quote, made by NASA astronauts : There is no problem so bad that you can't make it worse.
lol
We learn, we learn. It's all we got. My quote.
And sometimes, you can invent a problem out of thin air.
😂😂😂
Truth!
Thank you Petter. That was one of your best.
As a 777 captain, I thought you did an excellent job explaining the aircraft systems, features and idiosyncrasies. And yes, it’s an excellent aircraft.
Those pilots were, in my mind, overtired. I would never work a trans Atlantic flight without a third pilot! I am convinced that this would have prevented that ordeal.
It's transatlantic, but it's only 7:05 hours.
This is one of the best channels on YT. Great work.
Thank you so much!
@@CapecodhamStop it 😂😂😂😂😂
i can only imagine from the title that the pilots were having a duel or something and beating the shit outa each other with the "pull up, PULL UP!" alarm playing
Not quite.. it’s way stranger
i havent watched the video yet
it was more like a tom and jerry skit where both pilots were inadvertently causing the problems that the other pilot perceived with the controls while thinking that they were helping each other with said problem
😂😂😂
I had to pause and comment at the point you said that Boeing consciously decided not to implement a dual input warning because "it would be obvious if the other pilot is [doing something different.]" ... But it must clearly NOT be obvious if there was a need for that warning to be created in the first place (ever).
I don't yet know if this plays into the scenario later, but it's that kind of mentality that often causes issues. It's based on an assumption by someone [Edit: engineer] sitting in a chair in a quiet room. Not someone jolted out of a routine flight and suddenly being bombarded with warnings and sensations.
When did he say that give me time stamp
How difficult can it be for Boeing to include a verbal and visual "Dual Control Input" warning into its systems. If a control column gets stuck you'll be expecting such a warning, in other cases it will provide pilots with missing information.
Well here’s the thing, the yokes are mechanically linked and on airbus, the flight sticks are not, so all you really have to do is threshold the sidesticks and see if they are different in a airbus, whereas in a Boeing, it’s a little more different since the yokes can’t be different
A notification stating control breakout sounds like a good idea, but I am no pilot.
He said why in the video, dumdum. That's not suppose to be possible in normal flight
Tbf, he’s got several videos where that output exists and is ignored.
@@samsonsoturian6013not sure the use of ‘dum dum’ is necessary to get your point across.
this is the kind of nerdy stuff that makes engineers happy
And me!!
And bogles the mind of those of us who are NOT nerds by nature. Had to watch three times to get it! Bravo!@@MentourPilot
What 😂
Ya
and sad b*****ds like me
While listening to this video & what the pilots were or weren't doing as they should if following their training, I kept shaking my head thinking, "Petter would not be happy."
This sounds like it has a lot in common with the AF447 crash, where there was also confusion between the pilots (as a result of a frozen pitot tube), with rather worse results than on AF011.
There are also people who pin the 447 crash on the joystick controls, and claim the same would never happen on a Boeing, but here it did, albeit fortunately without ending in tragedy
@@grassytramtrackswell this Boeing has a more unique design that is very similar to an airbus, maybe that's why this incident happened.
Standard Operating Procedures went right out the window at the simplest upset!
Thank you Petter, great job as always. Keep going. Love your both channels. Always looking forward to a new episode.
😍
That’s awesome to hear!
I have a merch Idea. Offer a tee-shirt that says "Remember that. It will become important later." Petter says that seemingly at least once in every video! 😂
I agree
I’ll remember that. 😉👍
Good video, and an important one.
It seems like the AF Captain was being polite by not communicating with the 1st Officer that his TOGA was pretty extreme, and so discretely and at first gently, then not so gently, intervened by making his own counter-active inputs. That's what actually caused the Dual Input situation in the first place. Had the First Officer executed a calmer TOGA there would have been no necessity for the Captain to intervene, as he obviously felt he had to, and so no Dual Input problem. What I'd like to know is why the 1st Officer nearly put the plane in a stall situation, setting it into a highly dangerous configuration during the TOGA.
Personally I'd rather be on a flight with a pro-active Captain. The passive Captain Dubois on AF447 could and should have recognised the stall situation created by FO Bonin, and then intervened. But he did neither, and 228 people perished.
Very unfair on Captain Dubois. Mentour Pilot has done a video on Air France Flight 447 and the scene Dubois faced was indecipherable. He figured it out eventually but by then it was too late. Mentour Pilot placed very little blame on him.
@@thetruth7386 When Dubious re-entered the cockpit all systems were operational and portrayed the exact conditions. Low ground speed, high pitch up attitude and AoA, high descent rate. Not to mention the frequent Stall Stall warnings. For someone this experienced, what else could this be but a stall?
Maybe the 1 hour sleep he got the night before did not help matters. But identifying the stall should be second nature to someone so experienced, and applying stall recovery himself (not directing a flying class from the jump seat) should have been his instant reaction, given the gravity of the situation.
But he only recognised the situation at 10,000 feet when Bonin blurted out he'd been tugging the stick full back the whole while.
The real hero was Robert. He correctly diagnosed the problem immediately when he told Bonin to go back down. It's just a shame he didn't persist.
@@yggdrasil9039you are of course speaking from the position that you 'know' it was a stall and we have had years of investigation into an incident that lasted four and a half minutes. You seem to suggest that Dubois should have entered the flight deck and immediately diagnosed a stall even when his co-Pilots were stating they had no valid indications. David Robert had been in the cockpit the whole time and didn't diagnose a stall- why do you suggest Dubois should have.
It is disingenuous also to speak about the one hour sleep the night before. The crew had been in Rio for three days and it has been suggested that the Captain was referring to his pre flight nap that afternoon. One hour not being enough.
Dubois didn't have much of a chance entering a flight deck in complete chaos with two co-Pilots stating they had no valid data, they didn't understand anything and had lost control of the plane. When Bonin asks at 20k feet- what do we have in alti? Dubois replies 'it's impossible'. Clearly he wasn't believing what he was seeing either.
Also Bonin did not keep his sidestick yanked back the whole time. Please read the BEA report not just tabloid headlines. Bonin had multiple inputs pushing the nose forward or just side to side. I think Mentour Pilot was onto something when he suggested Bonin was so concentrated on controlling the roll of the plane he failed to see he was climbing- he then followed flight director commands above all else including listening to his co-Pilot.
@@thetruth7386
Granted. Hindsight is 20/20. But by the same token, those 4 and a half minutes didn't just happen out of thin air. As I understand it, Dubois had something like 11,000 hours of flight experience at both Air Inter and then at Air France. With that level of experience, diagnosing a stall should be routine - it's fundamental and basic to flying. It really doesn't matter who said what, or that the pilots claim that they had no valid speed indications. Discounting that, and going on the evidence of his own eyes and ears, the data needed to conclude that they were in a stall situation was overwhelmingly and clearly presented before him. His first port of call should be OBSERVATION, not what people say.
In terms of Robert's thinking, I think deep down he knew it was a stall, but there were some things that prevented that awareness from being fully formed in his mind, namely that he hadn't flown for 3 months and so had a reduced level of confidence about his judgement. But he was the first to notice and correct Bonin's unsustainable climb (which Mentour Pilot acknowledges exceeded that used at sea level to perform TOGA never mind 35,000 feet), and later on in the upset, attempted to nose down (which Bonin secretly over-rode with a dual input), indicating through not his words but trhough his body language that intuitively he understood to some extent that they were too slow, and thus inside the parameters of a stall, without being able to fully form that thought in his mind.
But Dubois coming into the cockpit was fresh. Discounting what the two FOs were telling him, he had all the evidence he needed before his own eyes to diagnose the stall situation.
My understanding is Dubois spent the previous day and night touring Rio with a female colleague, and so had had very little sleep all night. His demeanour and willingness to go to bed right on schedule despite the plane just about to enter into the ITCZ, and despite a jumpy Bonin whose constant requests to climb should have set off a red flag in his mind, and indicates clearly that Dubois was desperate for sleep. His incoherent briefing of Robert that MP notes also indicates his fatigue.
When Dubois says 'It's impossible' to me that shows the misuse of CRM, when CRM devolves into group think and no-one taking any independent position. He accepted the premise he's been fed, so he discounts the readings as 'impossible'. Certainly it's the captain's duty to consult with FOs in CRM, so as to avoid a repeat of Tenerife, but that doesn't mean they should divest their responsibility entirely. I'm sorry, but if you are a captain of an airplane with 227 other people's lives in your hands, just accepting what your FOs are saying at face value is not good enough. His decades long training should have prompted him to look at the situation afresh, and every single reading he saw should have led him to put 2 and 2 together and diagnose the stall. That is their job. You say it all took 4 and a half minutes - well that's the pilot's job! To make accurate split second decisions. Perhaps this flows to a wider problem about technology making everyone lazy, but the captain should remain the captain - he is supposed to be the one who takes final responsibility for the safety of the aircraft.
Bonin's stick movements forward after he created the stall were of course useless by that point. He was trying to 'fly' a plane that was essentially dropping through the air like a brick. That he initiated these inputs in the first place is utterly extraordinary. I can only think that he was so used to Normal Law moderating such extreme inputs that he, too, grew lazy by the automation.
Yes hindsight is 20/20. But pilots are supposed to know what they're doing so that they can understand what's going on immediately and take responsive action - not in 4 minutes, in 4 seconds at the most - especially pilots who've risen to the level of Captain after decades of experience. That's what decades of training is supposed to do, and it's what they're paid well for. Otherwise we might as well let robots fly the plane entirely.
@@yggdrasil9039 Pilots are taught not to trust their senses. Even at that it appears Bonin's senses were telling him that they were in an overspeed situation. How could have thought such a thing based on his own actions other than his senses. The first thing a Pilot should do is aviate when in a crisis. Dubois did that by attempting to get Bonin to fly the plane level. For all he knew they were going to enter a spin. When trying to work out exactly what the plane was doing with your FO's telling you there are no valid indications, there is severe buffeting, it is pitch black outside with no horizon in view and a tremendous aerodynamic noise- nigh on impossible.
I agree with you that Robert was certainly much more in tune than Bonin for sure, although had he thought it was a stall he never verbalised that so we can't assume he thought so. I am not sure what he was thinking bar obviously being in complete panic and hoping that Dubois had the answer. His failure to complete any checklist or even attempt to use memory items also contributed to the lack of communication. It left Bonin swinging about wildly seemingly unaware he was no longer operating in Normal Law and it left Robert flailing about in panic giving the Captain no help whatsoever when he re entered the flight deck. We don't understand anything, we have tried everything. This was someone in full panic mode.
The papers reported that the Captain had one hour sleep the night before but there are suggestions of mistranslation and that the Captain was referring to the afternoon nap before flight. In other words there is no definitive proof either way.
Did Dubois make mistakes that night? Yes. But nothing that should in any way have been catastrophic to an A330. Did Robert make mistakes that night? Yes but again nothing that should have led to catastrophe. Bonin took actions that did lead to catastrophe and the flight computers and particularly the Flight Directors also caused Bonin to act this way- the Unreliable Airspeed checklist calls for the Flight Directors to be switched off. Had Robert ran that checklist the accident might not have happened. All had a part to play as is so often the case.