I do not follow Harman's argument against 'perspectivism' - the 'thing' is the sum of it's effects, or the totality of the perspectives taken upon it. He argues that if this were the case then we could not account for how the thing changes. But surely it changes by making new relationships, when new perspectives are taken on it. I wonder if he sees perpectivism as a kind of static totality? Surely not, because it's implicit in the idea of perspectivism that there is no static identity. He must be getting at something else but I don't understand what. Anyone like to clarify?
I also find this a point of some confusion. But I think it is necesarry for him that something is left over within any entity, outside of the relationships in which it is engaged at any specific moment in time. That there is always the possibility for new relationships in any future state of any entity then shows that there is some 'capacity' that can be engaged in the future and which was not engaged in a present state (because in his terms it is withdrawn). If any 'thing' is merely the sum of it's effects then what would cause any change in relationships (and thus effects?) I think the problem he has with this is that the engagement of a change would then have to come out of the relational network itself and this is the step he does not want to take in order to avoid the 'overmining'. This is of course not a completely correct articulation, just some thoughts
When you say 'thing', you're implying that our 'knowledge' of the thing is the totality of perspectives, and not the 'thing in itself'. He's talking about the ontology of the object and not the epistemological access to it. Even art or literature as an object has an ontological dimension which itself is subject to change because there is a potentiality implicit in the object that simply cannot be reduced to its perceptions or the social relations within which it is embedded (which is the the upward reduction or overmining as he calls it).. the word 'change' is meant here in the way Parmenides used it (who said that change is impossible since 'something' can't be produced from 'nothing' and therefore it's only the relations that shift). Aristotle attacks this by introducing the idea of potentialities, or that which is implicit but not yet actual. So, it's not merely the perspectival shifts that bring about the change, even in arts. Change is already implicit objectively in the art work which ofcourse can only be perceived (or understood/seen) through subjective mediation and thereby relations that actualize this new meaning. But the object and its trajectory of evolution has a semi-autonomous existence on its own, and in this sense, the new meaning is just as much discovered as it is invented or constructed.. It's closely connected with the concept of emergence. Harman rehashes some of the ideas from the works of Roy Bhaskar, who has provided a better analytical account of realism. Hope that helps
He never, ever, mentions 'philosophical hermeneutics', but the fact is that almost all the points he makes here are made by Gadamer. So, one must ask, 'what are the similarities and differences between OOO and philosophical hermeneutics?
Fantastic.
I do not follow Harman's argument against 'perspectivism' - the 'thing' is the sum of it's effects, or the totality of the perspectives taken upon it. He argues that if this were the case then we could not account for how the thing changes. But surely it changes by making new relationships, when new perspectives are taken on it. I wonder if he sees perpectivism as a kind of static totality? Surely not, because it's implicit in the idea of perspectivism that there is no static identity. He must be getting at something else but I don't understand what. Anyone like to clarify?
I also find this a point of some confusion. But I think it is necesarry for him that something is left over within any entity, outside of the relationships in which it is engaged at any specific moment in time. That there is always the possibility for new relationships in any future state of any entity then shows that there is some 'capacity' that can be engaged in the future and which was not engaged in a present state (because in his terms it is withdrawn). If any 'thing' is merely the sum of it's effects then what would cause any change in relationships (and thus effects?) I think the problem he has with this is that the engagement of a change would then have to come out of the relational network itself and this is the step he does not want to take in order to avoid the 'overmining'.
This is of course not a completely correct articulation, just some thoughts
When you say 'thing', you're implying that our 'knowledge' of the thing is the totality of perspectives, and not the 'thing in itself'. He's talking about the ontology of the object and not the epistemological access to it. Even art or literature as an object has an ontological dimension which itself is subject to change because there is a potentiality implicit in the object that simply cannot be reduced to its perceptions or the social relations within which it is embedded (which is the the upward reduction or overmining as he calls it).. the word 'change' is meant here in the way Parmenides used it (who said that change is impossible since 'something' can't be produced from 'nothing' and therefore it's only the relations that shift). Aristotle attacks this by introducing the idea of potentialities, or that which is implicit but not yet actual. So, it's not merely the perspectival shifts that bring about the change, even in arts. Change is already implicit objectively in the art work which ofcourse can only be perceived (or understood/seen) through subjective mediation and thereby relations that actualize this new meaning. But the object and its trajectory of evolution has a semi-autonomous existence on its own, and in this sense, the new meaning is just as much discovered as it is invented or constructed.. It's closely connected with the concept of emergence. Harman rehashes some of the ideas from the works of Roy Bhaskar, who has provided a better analytical account of realism. Hope that helps
@@lokayatavishwam9594 That does help. Nietzsche's perspectivism has problems with self reference.
@@lokayatavishwam9594 Thanks.
A good talk, I think I'm actually starting to understand OOO.
He never, ever, mentions 'philosophical hermeneutics', but the fact is that almost all the points he makes here are made by Gadamer. So, one must ask, 'what are the similarities and differences between OOO and philosophical hermeneutics?
One problem with Harman is that he talks about the same stuff n examples in almost of his talks.. it is like a ‘comedian touring’ with the same script
Dude ... He is introducing a new worldview that not everybody is familiar with.
What a load of nonsense