From Nigel Hamilton’s three volume biography of Montgomery: ”To help illustrate his presentation Monty had asked his MA - Lt Colonel Dawnay, to ink colluded phases onto the maps - as Dawnay later remebered: ’I had the maps prepared and drew on them the D-Day targets for the troops along the invasion front. And the dropping zones of the paratroopers. And the after consulting with Monty I drew the D plus 90 line - showing where he felt we should get by D plus 90 - which included Paris and a line back along the Loire. *And I asked Monty how I should draw the lines in between. And he said*, *Well it doesn’t matter Kit, draw them as you like.’* *So I said, ‘ Shall I draw them equally, sir?’* *And he said ‘Yes, that’ll do,’* In his opinion it was not of any importance where he would be groundwise between D plus 1 and D plus 90, because he felt sure he could capture the line D plus 90 by the end of 3 months, and he was not going to capture ground, he was going to destroy enemy forces. Using Monty’s presentation notes, Dawnay drew in the arbitrary lines, never dreaming that they would be used in evidence against Monty when the campaign did not go ‘according to plan’……. In his later memoirs, Tedder reported the same Eisenhower allegation that would so infuriate Monty: ‘When a week had passed since D-Day without the capture of Caen it became clear to us at SHAEF that the hopes of a road breakthrough on the left were now remote.’ Yet Monty had *never* suggested or intended a *break-through* on the left; only a battle around Caen that would permit him to establish and extend the shield behind which Bradley could take Cherbourg and breakout via St Lo and Avranches to Brittany. Some of the misunderstanding was undoubtedly caused by Monty himself, as his MA, Lt Colonel Dawnay, later recognised: *I think he had given the RAF a totally false impression, at St Paul’s and elsewhere, as to when he was going to get the airfields, south of Caen - a totally false impression. Because when we got there [to Normandy] we realized quite quickly that he didn’t care a damn about those airfields, as long as he could draw all the German armour on to the [eastern] side and give a chance for his right swing to break out!”* -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. *”As he explained in a letter that evening to Major-General Simpson at the war Office, Caen was only a name; he did not want to waste British and Canadians lives a la Stalingrad:* *The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to CAEN. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place; so I have ordered Second Army to keep up a good pressure at CAEN, and to make its main effort towards VILLERS BOCAGE and EVRECY and thence S.E. towards FALAISE.”* -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. But this had been stated in an address he had given *before* D-Day. *”Monty’s actual address, never published before, makes it quite clear that, with the exception of ports, the battle for Normandy would not be conducted with object of capturing towns, but of step by step building up of men and resources until the moment when the Americans would be strong enough to drive south into Brittany and to the Loire. It was a strategy that Monty unfolded with absolute conviction, two months before the new date set for the invasion: the first full moon in June. As in the address to senior officers before Alamein the calm authority with which Monty outlined his plan, the likely enemy response, and the phases through which the battle would go, was almost incredible to those present who did not already know Montgomery.* *At no point in this military lecture to Brooke, Churchill and Smuts, did Monty ever suggest that Dempsey was to do more than bring the German forces to battle around Caen,* however - and when after the war, Eisenhower wrote that ‘in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine’, Monty was furious, for this was a complete travesty of the facts. To Churchill Monty had made it quite clear that there was no question of wild break-outs. How could there be when the Allies had only fourteen divisions ashore, many of which, particularly the parachute and first assault divisions, were inevitably running out of steam? As Churchill pointed out to Stalin the battle for Normandy would be a slow and deliberate one: ‘I should think it quite likely that we should work up to a battle of about a million a side, lasting throughout June and July. We plan to have about two million there by mid-August. Eisenhower’s unfortunate obfuscation has coloured the military accounts ever since, polarizing chroniclers into nationalistic camps. This was, Monty felt, a tragedy in view of the fact that the battle for Normandy was, at all stages, an Allied battle, in which Allied soldiers gave their lives, conforming to an Allied plan to defeat the German armies in the West - not to ‘break out towards the Seine’ in some mythical Lancelot charge. *...Dempsey’s brief then was not to ‘break out towards Seine’, but to play his part in a truly Allied undertaking, bringing to battle the mobile German forces that would otherwise - as Rommel wished - destroy the American assault on Cherbourg.”* -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical. _”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment _*_the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission._*_ For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout._ _In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. _*_Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself,_*_ and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._ _While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. _*_For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg._*_ Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them._ _The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks _*_it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout._*_ With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“_ -The American LIFE Magazine 1951.
Defence Research, Thanks for this lecture from Professor Buckley on Montgomery, this complex character whose personal traits affected the course of the conflict so much.
Bradley’s army group was all American troops. Monty had an international command and couldn’t just dismiss Canadian and Polish Generals without consultation of their home countries. Nor could Monty spend lives as freely as Bradley. Monty couldn’t count on additional Divisions or enough new personnel as replacements into combat units. Bradley could expect additional American Divisions and was getting replacements coming in from America.
Doug Bevins The capture of Caen was a category B goal. Over and above all the initial D-Day goals were (a) to get ashore, peg our territory for effective defence, (b) to make room for the arriving forces/material and (c) to link up to create a united front. Montgomery presented his alternative strategy for Normandy at St Paul's school on 7th April and 15th May 1944. Omar Bradley was there and wrote: _”The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”_ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Order No. 1 was issued on April 21, I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258. _’The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business.’_
Doug Bevins Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical. _”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment _*_the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission._*_ For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout._ _In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. _*_Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself,_*_ and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._ _While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. _*_For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg._*_ Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them._ _The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks _*_it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout._*_ With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“_ -The American LIFE Magazine 1951.
Doug Bevins _”If Eisenhower had criticisms of the way his Ground Forces Commander was directing the battle, Brooke therefore stated, he should go to Normandy and put them to Monty, not cavil behind his back. The suggestion was even made that Brooke accompany Eisenhower; but as General Simpson later recalled, the notion ‘was a little worrying to Ike. He knew jolly well that if he went to Monty, Monty would run circles round him with a clear exposition of his strategy and tactic.’ No visit was thus arranged._ _Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’:_ _’My dear Monty_ _The trouble between you and the P.M. has been satisfactorily settled for the present, but the other trouble I spoke to you about is looming large still and wants watching very carefully._ _Ike lunched with P.M. again this week and as a result I was sent for by P.M. and told that Ike was worried at the outlook taken by the American Press that the British were not taking their share of the fighting and of the casualties. There seems to be more in it than that and Ike himself seemed to consider that the British Army could and should be more offensive. The P.M. asked me to meet Ike at dinner with him which I did last night, Bedel was there also._ _It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!_ *_Idrew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British._* *_He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2 ½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of opening up Brest by swinging forward Western Flank.’”_* _To Brooke, Monty’s strategy was so clear that he could not understand Eisenhower’s apparent obsession with side issues, such as accusations in the American press that the British were leaving all the fighting up to the Americans:_ *_’The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’_* Brooke noted in his diary. -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Doug Bevins _”The sudden ripening of Monty’s Normandy strategy had transformed the moment. At last the doubters, belly-achers, grumblers and men of faint heart were silenced, and those armchair strategists who wanted ‘gains’ could mark up their atlases once more. _*_Von Kluge was mesmerised, and in his weekly report on 31 July believed that the Canadian diversionary attacks from the area of Caen had been the primary Allied break-out attempt. ‘After hard fighting and counter-attacks, 1st SS armoured corps gained a complete defensive victory,’ he claimed. Not only had Monty thus succeeded in keeping the German ‘Armoured Group West’ away from the American breakout, but he had kept it east of Noyers. When on 30 July Dempsey launched the start of his full-scale armoured attack from Caumont, von Kluge was therefore doubly mispositioned. He was still certain that Monty would make directly for Paris, expecting Montgomery first to enlarge the bridgehead and then to ‘make the thrust towards Paris’ from the British sector._* *_Like Rommel, von Kluge was playing straight into Montgomery’s hands._*_ Within hours of the 30 July kick-off, Dempsey had a British armoured division nearing Le Beny Bocage, thus shielding the left flank of Bradley’s new salient - which in turn had reached Avranches, at the base of the Cherbourg peninsula._ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 _Operation Cobra and the American breakout, which American historians have tried to appropriate the credit to US generals like Patton and Bradley, had been planned by Monty some time before._ _”The plan upon which the Americans were to uncurl and deliver their great thrust southwards towards Brittany and the Loire was set out before Brooke and General Simpson (the DMO, to whom a copy was sent), in simple, clear English, a month and a half before it was enacted. ‘The First US Army,’ Monty declared under the heading: ‘Para 14. Future intentions’, was:_ _e) To hold on firmly to Caumont; to recapture CARENTAN and to hold it firmly._ _f) To capture ST LO and then COUTANCE_ _g) To thrust southwards from CAUMONT towards VIRE and MORTAIN; and from ST LO towards VILLEDIEU and AVRANCHES_ _h) All the time to exert pressure towards LA HAYE DU PUITS and VOLOGNES, and to capture CHERBOURG._ _A glance at the map will show that this was, _*_town for town, the layout of Operation ‘Cobra’_*_ -the great American offensive that paved the way for Patton to be unleashed into Brittany and the Loire in August 1944.”_ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. _”PLAN IN OUTLINE_ _To hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between CAEN and VILLERS BOCAGE, and to swing the [American] western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of PARIS._ _Later historians, particularly the American Official Historian Dr Martin Blumenson, would try to appropriate the credit for this plan for their heroes General Patton and to a lesser extent, General Bradley. In his edition of Patton’s papers, Dr Blumenson quoted Patton’s diary entry of 2 July 1944, in which Patton noted his own new ‘Schlieffen’ plan for a ‘rear attack on the Germans confronting the First U.S. Army, and then driving on to the line Alençon-Argentan, and thereafter on on Evreux or Chartres, depending on circumstances, we will really pull a coup’. Commenting, Blumenson remarked on Patton’s ‘remarkable’ intuition and stated that some weeks later ‘Bradley would come up with an interesting idea’ for such a coup, ‘an operation called Cobra’._ _That ‘Cobra’ was in fact the plan given out by Montgomery at his headquarters on 30 June 1944 was to become a fact which some American historians hated to credit, preferring to take at face value Patton’s misrepresentation, penned in frustration in his English headquarters, that the Allies were merely pursuing ‘phase lines’ and that ‘we will die of old age before we finish’. However unpalatable to such writers, the fact remains that Bradley, Dempsey and Crerar all attended Monty’s conference on 30 June, all concurred in Monty’s strategy, and that Eisenhower, Brooke, the War Office and Main Headquarters of 21st Army Group at Portsmouth all had copies of Monty’s plan. Nor was it some vague notion, for Monty laid down at the conference how he wished the plan to be executed in the coming weeks. _*_Originally, in England before D-Day, he had intended to push the British Second Army south of Caen to secure space for airfields and provide the shield he needed for Bradley’s southern thrust to Brittany. Rommel’s fierce reaction at Caen had, however, made this unnecessary. Indeed a British thrust too far from it’s present sector would open up Second Army to a German counter-thrust by extending the front to be defended, whereas although it was greatly congested, the British front was currently almost impregnable._* *_......Bradley’s break-out via Brittany had originally been conceived in England before D-Day, and throughout the long bitter weeks of fighting in June and July, Dempsey had been instructed to lock in combat the main enemy formations. Six thousand British and Canadian soldiers had fallen, even before ‘Goodwood’, to make possible the expansion of the American sector behind them, first to Cherbourg, and now towards Brittany.”_* -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Doug Bevins In Normandy Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby. Result? Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted. _Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy……._ _......By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent._ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944. Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80. Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89. Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90. In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb: “By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.
Have to wonder about any British historian that calls the battle of the Ardennes, the battle of the Bulge. I agree with what he said about Monty either falling in love with you right away or hating you. I think it caused more problems then it should have including with Harry Crerar. Monty loved Crocker and hated Crerar and both men knew it. When Monty gave Crerar an order, which Crerar in turn gave to Crocker, and Crocker did not like it, he told Crerar there was no chance he would ever follow it, period! So Crerar, being Crocker's boss, said "fine, you are fired". The result was Monty had to clean up the mess, and Crocker ended up following Crerar's orders from then on.
@John Cornell Monty had this thing where you were a favourite until you were a threat to him or he needed a fall guy...then you gone. He often loved divisional/corp commanders until either they became too successful or he needed someone to blame.
Monty should have been fired for letting the spent Africa Corps escape due to his slow pursuit. I wonder how many allies died because of that one blunder?
@John Cornell Rommel had 20 tanks left and no ammo. The old fool had a 15 to 1 edge and hundreds of tanks yet he sat there until he was threatened to be sacked. A couple hundred Germans escaped as a result. That was his only big win and it was a really a failure.
Montgomery had made a shit of Marketing Garden. About 14.000 dutch people has died because his arrogance , ptide and own honour. He doesnot receive a hero status. Certanly not in Holland. Chris Stroo Holland
No. Market Garden would be responsible for those deaths if it usurped or replaced another plan to liberate the Netherlands at that time. It did not, if Maket Garden had not taken place then the allies would have bypassed the Netherlands apart from the Scheldt. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than were killed in the remainig part of the war.
Too much theory and armchair phyco-babal...Monty started to win battles, even going back to N.Africa, when Monty finally figured out he could get a never ending supply of US equipment and supplies....well maybe except for Market Garden....
@@johndawes9337 Really look at the numbers and you’ll see it’s a fact He was getting his ass kicked by Romell over and over again with a fraction of the men and tanks Montgomery had. Romell took so many of his men prisoner, they couldn’t even guard them properly So you see, your comment is the foolish one. Montgomery only won because Romell ran out of fuel and supplies and Montgomery had sheer numbers, not talent as a general
@@fortisfortunaadiuvat9262 hahaha Monty bashed Rommel 5 times.Battle of Alam El Halfa Second Battle of El Alamein El Agheila (called Mersa el Brega by the Germans in their accounts) Operation Capri (Medenine) Operation Pugilist (Mareth and was getting bashed in Normandy for number 6
From Nigel Hamilton’s three volume biography of Montgomery:
”To help illustrate his presentation Monty had asked his MA - Lt Colonel Dawnay, to ink colluded phases onto the maps - as Dawnay later remebered:
’I had the maps prepared and drew on them the D-Day targets for the troops along the invasion front. And the dropping zones of the paratroopers. And the after consulting with Monty I drew the D plus 90 line - showing where he felt we should get by D plus 90 - which included Paris and a line back along the Loire.
*And I asked Monty how I should draw the lines in between. And he said*, *Well it doesn’t matter Kit, draw them as you like.’* *So I said, ‘ Shall I draw them equally, sir?’* *And he said ‘Yes, that’ll do,’*
In his opinion it was not of any importance where he would be groundwise between D plus 1 and D plus 90, because he felt sure he could capture the line D plus 90 by the end of 3 months, and he was not going to capture ground, he was going to destroy enemy forces.
Using Monty’s presentation notes, Dawnay drew in the arbitrary lines, never dreaming that they would be used in evidence against Monty when the campaign did not go ‘according to plan’…….
In his later memoirs, Tedder reported the same Eisenhower allegation that would so infuriate Monty: ‘When a week had passed since D-Day without the capture of Caen it became clear to us at SHAEF that the hopes of a road breakthrough on the left were now remote.’
Yet Monty had *never* suggested or intended a *break-through* on the left; only a battle around Caen that would permit him to establish and extend the shield behind which Bradley could take Cherbourg and breakout via St Lo and Avranches to Brittany.
Some of the misunderstanding was undoubtedly caused by Monty himself, as his MA, Lt Colonel Dawnay, later recognised:
*I think he had given the RAF a totally false impression, at St Paul’s and elsewhere, as to when he was going to get the airfields, south of Caen - a totally false impression. Because when we got there [to Normandy] we realized quite quickly that he didn’t care a damn about those airfields, as long as he could draw all the German armour on to the [eastern] side and give a chance for his right swing to break out!”*
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
*”As he explained in a letter that evening to Major-General Simpson at the war Office, Caen was only a name; he did not want to waste British and Canadians lives a la Stalingrad:*
*The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to CAEN. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place; so I have ordered Second Army to keep up a good pressure at CAEN, and to make its main effort towards VILLERS BOCAGE and EVRECY and thence S.E. towards FALAISE.”*
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
But this had been stated in an address he had given *before* D-Day.
*”Monty’s actual address, never published before, makes it quite clear that, with the exception of ports, the battle for Normandy would not be conducted with object of capturing towns, but of step by step building up of men and resources until the moment when the Americans would be strong enough to drive south into Brittany and to the Loire. It was a strategy that Monty unfolded with absolute conviction, two months before the new date set for the invasion: the first full moon in June. As in the address to senior officers before Alamein the calm authority with which Monty outlined his plan, the likely enemy response, and the phases through which the battle would go, was almost incredible to those present who did not already know Montgomery.*
*At no point in this military lecture to Brooke, Churchill and Smuts, did Monty ever suggest that Dempsey was to do more than bring the German forces to battle around Caen,* however - and when after the war, Eisenhower wrote that ‘in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine’, Monty was furious, for this was a complete travesty of the facts. To Churchill Monty had made it quite clear that there was no question of wild break-outs. How could there be when the Allies had only fourteen divisions ashore, many of which, particularly the parachute and first assault divisions, were inevitably running out of steam? As Churchill pointed out to Stalin the battle for Normandy would be a slow and deliberate one: ‘I should think it quite likely that we should work up to a battle of about a million a side, lasting throughout June and July. We plan to have about two million there by mid-August.
Eisenhower’s unfortunate obfuscation has coloured the military accounts ever since, polarizing chroniclers into nationalistic camps. This was, Monty felt, a tragedy in view of the fact that the battle for Normandy was, at all stages, an Allied battle, in which Allied soldiers gave their lives, conforming to an Allied plan to defeat the German armies in the West - not to ‘break out towards the Seine’ in some mythical Lancelot charge.
*...Dempsey’s brief then was not to ‘break out towards Seine’, but to play his part in a truly Allied undertaking, bringing to battle the mobile German forces that would otherwise - as Rommel wished - destroy the American assault on Cherbourg.”*
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical.
_”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment _*_the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission._*_ For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout._
_In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. _*_Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself,_*_ and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._
_While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. _*_For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg._*_ Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them._
_The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks _*_it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout._*_ With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“_
-The American LIFE Magazine 1951.
An excellent find.
what a find!
It would be good if Cody Carlson could read this
Defence Research,
Thanks for this lecture from Professor Buckley on Montgomery,
this complex character whose personal traits affected the course of the conflict so much.
Very interesting. Right amount of detail. Thank you!
The audio is periodically glitch and it’s enough to piss me off.
Bradley’s army group was all American troops. Monty had an international command and couldn’t just dismiss Canadian and Polish Generals without consultation of their home countries. Nor could Monty spend lives as freely as Bradley. Monty couldn’t count on additional Divisions or enough new personnel as replacements into combat units. Bradley could expect additional American Divisions and was getting replacements coming in from America.
Doug Bevins
The capture of Caen was a category B goal. Over and above all the initial D-Day goals were (a) to get ashore, peg our territory for effective defence, (b) to make room for the arriving forces/material and (c) to link up to create a united front.
Montgomery presented his alternative strategy for Normandy at St Paul's school on 7th April and 15th May 1944. Omar Bradley was there and wrote:
_”The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”_
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Order No. 1 was issued on April 21, I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258.
_’The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business.’_
Doug Bevins
Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical.
_”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment _*_the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission._*_ For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout._
_In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. _*_Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself,_*_ and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._
_While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. _*_For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg._*_ Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them._
_The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks _*_it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout._*_ With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“_
-The American LIFE Magazine 1951.
Doug Bevins
_”If Eisenhower had criticisms of the way his Ground Forces Commander was directing the battle, Brooke therefore stated, he should go to Normandy and put them to Monty, not cavil behind his back. The suggestion was even made that Brooke accompany Eisenhower; but as General Simpson later recalled, the notion ‘was a little worrying to Ike. He knew jolly well that if he went to Monty, Monty would run circles round him with a clear exposition of his strategy and tactic.’ No visit was thus arranged._
_Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’:_
_’My dear Monty_
_The trouble between you and the P.M. has been satisfactorily settled for the present, but the other trouble I spoke to you about is looming large still and wants watching very carefully._
_Ike lunched with P.M. again this week and as a result I was sent for by P.M. and told that Ike was worried at the outlook taken by the American Press that the British were not taking their share of the fighting and of the casualties. There seems to be more in it than that and Ike himself seemed to consider that the British Army could and should be more offensive. The P.M. asked me to meet Ike at dinner with him which I did last night, Bedel was there also._
_It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!_
*_Idrew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British._*
*_He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2 ½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of opening up Brest by swinging forward Western Flank.’”_*
_To Brooke, Monty’s strategy was so clear that he could not understand Eisenhower’s apparent obsession with side issues, such as accusations in the American press that the British were leaving all the fighting up to the Americans:_
*_’The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’_*
Brooke noted in his diary.
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Doug Bevins
_”The sudden ripening of Monty’s Normandy strategy had transformed the moment. At last the doubters, belly-achers, grumblers and men of faint heart were silenced, and those armchair strategists who wanted ‘gains’ could mark up their atlases once more. _*_Von Kluge was mesmerised, and in his weekly report on 31 July believed that the Canadian diversionary attacks from the area of Caen had been the primary Allied break-out attempt. ‘After hard fighting and counter-attacks, 1st SS armoured corps gained a complete defensive victory,’ he claimed. Not only had Monty thus succeeded in keeping the German ‘Armoured Group West’ away from the American breakout, but he had kept it east of Noyers. When on 30 July Dempsey launched the start of his full-scale armoured attack from Caumont, von Kluge was therefore doubly mispositioned. He was still certain that Monty would make directly for Paris, expecting Montgomery first to enlarge the bridgehead and then to ‘make the thrust towards Paris’ from the British sector._*
*_Like Rommel, von Kluge was playing straight into Montgomery’s hands._*_ Within hours of the 30 July kick-off, Dempsey had a British armoured division nearing Le Beny Bocage, thus shielding the left flank of Bradley’s new salient - which in turn had reached Avranches, at the base of the Cherbourg peninsula._
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
_Operation Cobra and the American breakout, which American historians have tried to appropriate the credit to US generals like Patton and Bradley, had been planned by Monty some time before._
_”The plan upon which the Americans were to uncurl and deliver their great thrust southwards towards Brittany and the Loire was set out before Brooke and General Simpson (the DMO, to whom a copy was sent), in simple, clear English, a month and a half before it was enacted. ‘The First US Army,’ Monty declared under the heading: ‘Para 14. Future intentions’, was:_
_e) To hold on firmly to Caumont; to recapture CARENTAN and to hold it firmly._
_f) To capture ST LO and then COUTANCE_
_g) To thrust southwards from CAUMONT towards VIRE and MORTAIN; and from ST LO towards VILLEDIEU and AVRANCHES_
_h) All the time to exert pressure towards LA HAYE DU PUITS and VOLOGNES, and to capture CHERBOURG._
_A glance at the map will show that this was, _*_town for town, the layout of Operation ‘Cobra’_*_ -the great American offensive that paved the way for Patton to be unleashed into Brittany and the Loire in August 1944.”_
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
_”PLAN IN OUTLINE_
_To hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between CAEN and VILLERS BOCAGE, and to swing the [American] western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of PARIS._
_Later historians, particularly the American Official Historian Dr Martin Blumenson, would try to appropriate the credit for this plan for their heroes General Patton and to a lesser extent, General Bradley. In his edition of Patton’s papers, Dr Blumenson quoted Patton’s diary entry of 2 July 1944, in which Patton noted his own new ‘Schlieffen’ plan for a ‘rear attack on the Germans confronting the First U.S. Army, and then driving on to the line Alençon-Argentan, and thereafter on on Evreux or Chartres, depending on circumstances, we will really pull a coup’. Commenting, Blumenson remarked on Patton’s ‘remarkable’ intuition and stated that some weeks later ‘Bradley would come up with an interesting idea’ for such a coup, ‘an operation called Cobra’._
_That ‘Cobra’ was in fact the plan given out by Montgomery at his headquarters on 30 June 1944 was to become a fact which some American historians hated to credit, preferring to take at face value Patton’s misrepresentation, penned in frustration in his English headquarters, that the Allies were merely pursuing ‘phase lines’ and that ‘we will die of old age before we finish’. However unpalatable to such writers, the fact remains that Bradley, Dempsey and Crerar all attended Monty’s conference on 30 June, all concurred in Monty’s strategy, and that Eisenhower, Brooke, the War Office and Main Headquarters of 21st Army Group at Portsmouth all had copies of Monty’s plan. Nor was it some vague notion, for Monty laid down at the conference how he wished the plan to be executed in the coming weeks. _*_Originally, in England before D-Day, he had intended to push the British Second Army south of Caen to secure space for airfields and provide the shield he needed for Bradley’s southern thrust to Brittany. Rommel’s fierce reaction at Caen had, however, made this unnecessary. Indeed a British thrust too far from it’s present sector would open up Second Army to a German counter-thrust by extending the front to be defended, whereas although it was greatly congested, the British front was currently almost impregnable._*
*_......Bradley’s break-out via Brittany had originally been conceived in England before D-Day, and throughout the long bitter weeks of fighting in June and July, Dempsey had been instructed to lock in combat the main enemy formations. Six thousand British and Canadian soldiers had fallen, even before ‘Goodwood’, to make possible the expansion of the American sector behind them, first to Cherbourg, and now towards Brittany.”_*
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
Doug Bevins
In Normandy Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby.
Result?
Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted.
_Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy……._
_......By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent._
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944.
Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80.
Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89.
Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90.
In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb:
“By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.
Sorry got to the 19:38 mark before I bailed!
Miles Graham was my grandfather if you would like to get in touch ...
tincoffin - did anyone ask you for info?
Well John Buckley does in the video !
But nobody's seen your comment and tried to contact you?
No but that's fine. I am not sure I can help a great deal though I might be able to get something together.
It's very commendable of you to reach out, though it's a shame nothing's come of it.
Have to wonder about any British historian that calls the battle of the Ardennes, the battle of the Bulge.
I agree with what he said about Monty either falling in love with you right away or hating you. I think it caused more problems then it should have including with Harry Crerar. Monty loved Crocker and hated Crerar and both men knew it. When Monty gave Crerar an order, which Crerar in turn gave to Crocker, and Crocker did not like it, he told Crerar there was no chance he would ever follow it, period! So Crerar, being Crocker's boss, said "fine, you are fired". The result was Monty had to clean up the mess, and Crocker ended up following Crerar's orders from then on.
@John Cornell More then likely.
@John Cornell Monty had this thing where you were a favourite until you were a threat to him or he needed a fall guy...then you gone. He often loved divisional/corp commanders until either they became too successful or he needed someone to blame.
Strange lecture. Could've been more interesting..... right to the end I hoped for a bit more insight, which never came.
I am a fan of sir Claude Auckinleck , despite Monty must be respected anyway
Monty should have been fired for letting the spent Africa Corps escape due to his slow pursuit. I wonder how many allies died because of that one blunder?
@John Cornell Rommel had 20 tanks left and no ammo. The old fool had a 15 to 1 edge and hundreds of tanks yet he sat there until he was threatened to be sacked. A couple hundred Germans escaped as a result. That was his only big win and it was a really a failure.
@@dougdenhamlouie
Try learning some history.
that ' toothless' German army gave Ije a beatibg at the Kasserine Pass. Sone teeth!
Dull as dishwasher!
Let me help everyone at the 1:112 mark. Monty didn't help, much!
Jeez what a boring presentation of a potentially interesting subject.
Montgomery had made a shit of Marketing Garden. About 14.000 dutch people has died because his arrogance , ptide and own honour. He doesnot receive a hero status. Certanly not in Holland.
Chris Stroo Holland
No.
Market Garden would be responsible for those deaths if it usurped or replaced another plan to liberate the Netherlands at that time. It did not, if Maket Garden had not taken place then the allies would have bypassed the Netherlands apart from the Scheldt.
Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than were killed in the remainig part of the war.
@John Cornell
A quick one:
Am I right in recalling that you have the text of Eisenhower's directive to Montgomery on the 4th September 1944?
@John Cornell
Ta.
Any chance you can post on here?
Monty had nothing to do with market garden..do not believe hollywood or wikebullpoo
Too much theory and armchair phyco-babal...Monty started to win battles, even going back to N.Africa, when Monty finally figured out he could get a never ending supply of US equipment and supplies....well maybe except for Market Garden....
The 'never ending supply of US equipment and supplies' you mentioned amounted to 11% of Britain's needs across the war years.
Frendenhall neither had the benefitsof ULTRA or the RAF,hey thanx
@John Cornell Loser we se what your up to
@John Cornell Your a turd that won't flush
He was a terrible general, he won by shear advantage in numbers, not by talent
Sorry, that’s my opinion
So who eas a good general?..
"Laughs in constant advance from el Alamein, Scicily, Italy, Northern France, The low countires, North Germany and Denmark"
Bitch.
foolish comment
@@johndawes9337
Really look at the numbers and you’ll see it’s a fact
He was getting his ass kicked by Romell over and over again with a fraction of the men and tanks Montgomery had. Romell took so many of his men prisoner, they couldn’t even guard them properly
So you see, your comment is the foolish one. Montgomery only won because Romell ran out of fuel and supplies and Montgomery had sheer numbers, not talent as a general
@@fortisfortunaadiuvat9262 hahaha Monty bashed Rommel 5 times.Battle of Alam El Halfa
Second Battle of El Alamein
El Agheila (called Mersa el Brega by the Germans in their accounts)
Operation Capri (Medenine)
Operation Pugilist (Mareth and was getting bashed in Normandy for number 6