I think we can provide counterarguments to many of Hume's objections. ‘A great number of men join in building a house or a ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?’ (Dialogues) Response: "And, to jump ahead a bit, there are two further problems with polytheism as an explanation of the existence of not merely a universe but a universe governed throughout space and time by the same natural laws . If this order in the world is to be explained by many gods, then some explanation is required for how and why they cooperate in producing the same patterns of order throughout the universe. This becomes a new datum requiring explanation for the same reason as the fact of order itself. The need for further explanation ends when we postulate one being who is the cause of the existence of all others, and the simplest conceivable such-I urge-is God. And, further, the power of polytheism to explain this order in the world is perhaps not as great as that of theism. If there were more than one deity responsible for the order of the universe, we would expect to see characteristic marks of the handiwork of different deities in different parts of the universe, just as we see different kinds of workmanship in the different houses of a city. We would expect to find an inverse square of law of gravitation obeyed in one part of the universe, and in another part a law that was just short of being an inverse square law-without the difference being explicable in terms of a more general law." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God") "If the physical universe is the product of intelligent design, rather than being a pure accident, it is more likely to be the handiwork of only one rather than more than one intelligence. This is so for two broad reasons. The first reason is the need for theoretical parsimony. In the absence of any evidence for supposing the universe to be the handiwork of more than one intelligence rather than only one, then, faced with a choice between supposing it the handiwork of one or of more than one intelligent designer, we should choose to suppose it to be the creation of only one. For it is not necessary to postulate more than one to account for the phenomena in question. The second reason for preferring the hypothesis of there being only one designer of the universe to supposing more than one is that the general harmony and uniformity of everything in the universe suggest that, should it be the product of design, it is more likely to be the handiwork of a single designer, rather than a plurality of designers who might have been expected to have left in their joint product some trace of their plural individualities." (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom") “But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.” (Dialogues) Response: "From time to time various writers have told us that we cannot reach any conclusions about the origin or development of the universe, since it is the only one of which we have knowledge, and rational inquiry can reach conclusions only about objects that belong to kinds, for example, it can reach a conclusion about what will happen to this bit of iron only because there are other bits of iron, the behaviour of which can be studied. This objection has the surprising, and to most of these writers unwelcome, consequence, that physical cosmology could not reach justified conclusions about such matters as the size, age, rate of expansion, and density of the universe as a whole (because it is the only one of which we have knowledge); and also that physical anthropology could not reach conclusions about the origin and development of the human race (because, as far as our knowledge goes, it is the only one of its kind). The implausibility of these consequences leads us to doubt the original objection, which is indeed totally misguided." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God") "By tracing the origin of the physical universe to a supposed 'Big Bang', modern cosmology places Hume in the following dilemma. Either, he must deny that the physical universe as a whole is singular and unique, on the grounds that it resembles other things besides it that explode, such as grenades. Or, alternatively, should he insist on the uniqueness of the physical universe, he must concede that there are some unique things which are capable of standing as terms of causal relations. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom") "[I]f we survey the universe ..., it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it ...: a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member ... operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole [I]t must be confessed, that... the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance [Y]et is the analogy also defective in many circumstances ...: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal." (Dialogues) Response: "Hume's argument seems weak. Hume's claim is that the physical universe - more specifically, our solar system - bears a closer resemblance to some animal or a vegetable than it does some machine or other artefact. The claim is unconvincing. In its manifest workings, the physical universe in general, and our own solar system in particular, exhibits a degree of regularity and predictability that far exceeds that which is exhibited by any animal or vegetable. After all, it is by the sun that we set our clocks and not by the comings and goings of sun-flowers or salamanders! That this is so suggests that the physical universe more closely resembles some regular and predictable machine or artefact, for example a clock, than it does any far less regular and predictable animal or vegetable. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
I'd go so far as to say that if there is a designer, it simply cannot be omnipotent and omniscient on account of the fact that the design is complex. People erroneously believe that the complexity of the design is proportional to the designer's intelligence and capabilities, but this is the opposite of the truth. The complexity of the design is INVERSELY proportional to the designer's intelligence and capabilities. If a design is complex, it is because the designer either couldn't think of a simpler design, or he had some limitation placed upon him that prevents him from actualizing the simpler design. These limitations could include the very properties of the materials that he has to work with. Such limitations couldn't apply to a God who created the very materials themselves ex nihilo and decided what properties they would have. Nobody seems concerned with assessing the teleological argument in the context of the cosmological argument, but we have no examples of design where the designer creates the materials he works with out of nothing. Nor can the concept of "design" even be intelligibly applied to such a scenario since design involves working within design constraints, which include the properties of the materials and the rules or laws that they obey. A creator ex nihilo would have complete control over these things. No design constraints = no design. Then there is the question of what purpose the universe serves to God. People design things because they desire to be fed, warm, safe and comfortable in an environment that does not automatically provide these things. But God, being spaceless and timeless, doesn't even have an environment to be at the mercy of. Besides, he's omnipotent. What does the maximally great being, who possesses all great-making properties, lack such that he needs to build a device that will give it to Him? He exists necessarily, is completely self-sufficient and self-sustaining, and couldn't cease to exist or cease to be perfect, even if He wanted to. How could any machine or device ever serve any meaningful purpose to Him? There is exponentially more mass tied up in black holes than there is in sentient beings. Did God for some reason have a desire for a whole bunch of black holes? If so, then why not just make them out of nothing, which would be the most elegant solution, rather than make a huge and unnecessarily complex machine for making them, also out of nothing. It amazes me that no one has ever pointed out the tension between the teleological argument and the ontological arguments.
Hello from the future, you perfectly described the issues that I have always had with the intelligent design argument, I just haven’t had the ability to express it so succinctly!
The trouble I have with design arguments is that design implies constraints. If I design a car I can't just put the wheels on the roof and make the windscreen a one centimetre square window on the side of the car. Physical constraints guide me to design a car to function the way it does. It is bizarre that a god should have physical constraints.
Tjaart Blignaut Interesting claim. There is a possible argument that a God would have some logical constraints coming from the solution to the omnipotence paradox (though I'm not sure that this solution is wholly successful ua-cam.com/video/2tEuDNsvS4c/v-deo.html). And if you think that God is all good, then he would be constrained by that as well. You might also imagine that God had to create the universe in a certain way (a la the cosmic fine tuning argument) to support life, and once he did that worked within those constraints to make life. He made the rules first and then worked within them.
Carneades.org " There is a possible argument that a God would have some logical constraints coming from the solution to the omnipotence paradox" Agreed. "if you think that God is all good, then he would be constrained by that as well." Depends on the resolution of what it means for god to be good. If good means anything that god wills then this will obviously not apply. "He made the rules first and then worked within them." Doesn't this method require the theist to double down on unjustified claims? There are a lot of bizarre problems that could arise out of this. What good reason would a god have to create a rational set of rules only to follow them himself? And given such a reason, can the theist demonstrate that this is god's actual reason?
Tjaart Blignaut Yeah, I'm not fully convinced that the theist can deal with the Euthyphro dilemma, which makes the goodness claim a problem. As to the rules, it would seem that a universe with rules is preferable to a universe without rules. And perhaps one could make an argument that a universe with absolute rules is better than one with rules that God can break, but I agree that this is a stretch. Cool objection.
Just to point out. Historically God's "omnipotence" has generally used to mean that God is all powerful but still within the bounds of metaphysical and logical laws. The stronger sense of "omnipotence" (that is, God is also not restrained by logical and metaphysical laws) has been used by some theists (some protestant denominations for example). Although I'm not quite sure how Paley used "omnipotence".
But aren’t you assuming Gods will is above his reason? To my mind, this is a circular argument because you are invoking nominalism. But the teleological argument is exactly pointing to this.
always a strain on my elementary synapses- but always a pleasure blowing them up. I'd like to think some of this is rubbing off on me- but as my wife likes to remind me on occasion- that just goes to show where thinking will get me.
I would be more apt to believe that there's an infinite regression of designers then creation was not designed and everything's by chance. The complexity isn't just about being complex, it's about it having utility and relationship with others. An organizing or a machine both have intelligent purposes behind their entire existence.
I have some queries with the tendency to use infinite regress as a counter-argument to teleological arguments. Why isn't it valid to suggest that human beings, nature, etc. that are unable to create new worlds, however are obviously able to intelligently design to a significant extent, are created by a being so great the he/she/it needs no designer? Does the watch argument really suggest that god also needs a designer? Is it not a possibility that god may have human qualities, whilst also having always existed outside of the realm of time as we know it, and thus had never required to be created and/or designed? Therefore, instead of needing to be designed, god instead designed creation in a reflection of him/her/itself?
+Laura Meulman The trick with design arguments is that they are generally making the case for best explanation. So if you agree that finding something sufficiently complicated is a good reason to believe it was designed, then it must follow that anything more complicated must be designed as well. If your argument is that something is likely to be designed if it is more complicated than one thing, but less than another, you will have a lot more work to do to convince anyone's intuition. Basically imagine you find a rock, a watch and an alien device on the ground. It seems strange to conclude the watch was designed, but the alien device was not. So it seems strange to think man was designed but God was not. The point is that if being complicated (out whatever trait you want to place here) is a reason to believe something has a designer, then we have reason to believe God has a designer. If it is not, then we have no reason to believe man was designed.
What makes you think God is complicated? God non physical and thus would not have any of the complexities associated with the complex physical environment he created. Actually a disembodied mind is pretty simple. It may think very complex thoughts but it is not really complex in and of itself.
his meta physical nature if anything makes him even more complex. A being with infinite power, all knowing and all present, that doesn't actually have a physical presence, must be extremely complex, in fact infinitely so.
I think I agree with your point to an extent Jeff. Specifically, how can we say whether we know the complete nature of God? If you look at every religion, there is an element of mystery about God's characteristics, therefore indicating that most people are in agreement that there is no way of knowing the complexity of God's constitution. What's more, who is to define complexity? What is it? And why is it that even if God were "simple" according to our limited human comprehension that he would not be able to create something "complex" (also according to human definition) such as our world and the humans within it. Whilst I agree that the teleological argument is flawed when human logic is applied to it, I don't personally believe that we are able to comprehend such things like the nature of God. Therefore, I do believe it is possible that God - whether simple or complex - with all of His 'omni'-characteristics could create complexity without requiring a creator.
His argument is wack in my opinion. His reason for denying the relation between cause and effect is anti-scientific, and while he is correct that even if this argument (one of many) can show that God is probable, that doesn't mean it's omnipotent and omniscient - but this argument isn't arguing for that... that is in other arguments; to be debated between the deist and theist position (or someone taking the position of either/or). To insert in an atheist rejection of theism is sort of absurd. The question is simply 'is there a God(s)?' so an argument between these two positions, no matter the personal position of the interlocutors, is atheism and deism.
One of Hume's objections is that an all-powerful God has to be infinitely complicated. What if God were the law above all laws of nature and logic. He might be omnipotent because there are no laws above him? (Since to be un-omnipotent, in our experience, usually means to be limited by some law.) As opposed to us, who are potent because of laws above us that limit us? I believe in natural causes of life, but I'm not sure if the universe can be more complicated than the sum of its causes, since the sum of its causes effectively act as a definition of it. Can something be more complicated than its definition? Extracting an image from a .zip file seems like a counter-example, but if you think about it the image has 2 causes: The zip file and the computer that makes sense of the zip file. Similarly, life has 2 causes: Dead matter and our equivalent of the computer (call it the laws of time and nature) which dictates how life comes to dead matter. Whatever the complete explanation is, can it be less complicated or amazing than the result, since it effectively *contains* a description of the result? Not sure if evolution (while true) eradicates the need for design or pushes it further up.
Tim Crinion This seems to twist the definition of omnipotence, which I deal with here: ua-cam.com/video/2tEuDNsvS4c/v-deo.html. Some people claim that something is more than the sum of it's parts. Some claim that it is not. The interesting argument about this is the philosophical zombies argument. More an argument for phenomenological consciousness, than God. But an interesting argument none the less.ua-cam.com/video/WPT8YKnL5kQ/v-deo.html
Hmmmm, what does Hume say now? He's been dead for the last couple of centuries. Dude, if Hume, could say anything to you right now, he would say ..... 😔😔😔😔😢
Hume is a fool , by the way he is now dead and according to his world view he is now insignificant therefore this insult is to an insignificant matter that once existed. Sometimes you think you have all the answers but forget that human knowledge is finite.
I think we can provide counterarguments to many of Hume's objections.
‘A great number of men join in building a house or a ship, in rearing a
city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?’ (Dialogues)
Response:
"And, to jump ahead a bit, there are two further problems with
polytheism as an explanation of the existence of not merely a universe but a universe governed throughout space and time by the same
natural laws .
If this order in the world is to be explained by many gods, then some
explanation is required for how and why they cooperate in producing
the same patterns of order throughout the universe. This becomes a
new datum requiring explanation for the same reason as the fact of
order itself. The need for further explanation ends when we postulate
one being who is the cause of the existence of all others, and the
simplest conceivable such-I urge-is God. And, further, the power
of polytheism to explain this order in the world is perhaps not as
great as that of theism. If there were more than one deity responsible
for the order of the universe, we would expect to see characteristic
marks of the handiwork of different deities in different parts of the
universe, just as we see different kinds of workmanship in the
different houses of a city. We would expect to find an inverse square
of law of gravitation obeyed in one part of the universe, and in
another part a law that was just short of being an inverse square
law-without the difference being explicable in terms of a more
general law." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God")
"If the
physical universe is the product of intelligent design, rather than
being a pure accident, it is more likely to be the handiwork of only
one rather than more than one intelligence. This is so for two broad
reasons. The first reason is the need for theoretical parsimony. In the
absence of any evidence for supposing the universe to be the handiwork of more than one intelligence rather than only one, then, faced
with a choice between supposing it the handiwork of one or of more
than one intelligent designer, we should choose to suppose it to be the
creation of only one. For it is not necessary to postulate more than
one to account for the phenomena in question. The second reason for
preferring the hypothesis of there being only one designer of the
universe to supposing more than one is that the general harmony and
uniformity of everything in the universe suggest that, should it be the
product of design, it is more likely to be the handiwork of a single
designer, rather than a plurality of designers who might have been
expected to have left in their joint product some trace of their plural
individualities." (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
“But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.” (Dialogues)
Response:
"From time to time various writers have told us that we cannot
reach any conclusions about the origin or development of the universe, since it is the only one of which we have knowledge, and
rational inquiry can reach conclusions only about objects that belong
to kinds, for example, it can reach a conclusion about what will
happen to this bit of iron only because there are other bits of iron,
the behaviour of which can be studied. This objection has the
surprising, and to most of these writers unwelcome, consequence,
that physical cosmology could not reach justified conclusions about
such matters as the size, age, rate of expansion, and density of the
universe as a whole (because it is the only one of which we have
knowledge); and also that physical anthropology could not reach
conclusions about the origin and development of the human race
(because, as far as our knowledge goes, it is the only one of its kind).
The implausibility of these consequences leads us to doubt the
original objection, which is indeed totally misguided." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God")
"By tracing the origin of
the physical universe to a supposed 'Big Bang', modern cosmology
places Hume in the following dilemma. Either, he must deny that the
physical universe as a whole is singular and unique, on the grounds
that it resembles other things besides it that explode, such as
grenades. Or, alternatively, should he insist on the uniqueness of the
physical universe, he must concede that there are some unique things
which are capable of standing as terms of causal relations. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
"[I]f we survey the universe ..., it bears a great resemblance to an
animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle
of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it ...: a
continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest
sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part
or member ... operates both to its own preservation and to that of
the whole [I]t must be confessed, that... the universe resembles
more a human body than it does the works of human art and
contrivance [Y]et is the analogy also defective in many circumstances ...: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one
precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a
stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal." (Dialogues)
Response:
"Hume's argument seems weak. Hume's claim is that the physical
universe - more specifically, our solar system - bears a closer resemblance to some animal or a vegetable than it does some machine or
other artefact. The claim is unconvincing.
In its manifest workings,
the physical universe in general, and our own solar system in particular, exhibits a degree of regularity and predictability that far exceeds
that which is exhibited by any animal or vegetable. After all, it is by
the sun that we set our clocks and not by the comings and goings of
sun-flowers or salamanders! That this is so suggests that the physical
universe more closely resembles some regular and predictable
machine or artefact, for example a clock, than it does any far less
regular and predictable animal or vegetable. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
I'd go so far as to say that if there is a designer, it simply cannot be omnipotent and omniscient on account of the fact that the design is complex. People erroneously believe that the complexity of the design is proportional to the designer's intelligence and capabilities, but this is the opposite of the truth. The complexity of the design is INVERSELY proportional to the designer's intelligence and capabilities. If a design is complex, it is because the designer either couldn't think of a simpler design, or he had some limitation placed upon him that prevents him from actualizing the simpler design. These limitations could include the very properties of the materials that he has to work with. Such limitations couldn't apply to a God who created the very materials themselves ex nihilo and decided what properties they would have. Nobody seems concerned with assessing the teleological argument in the context of the cosmological argument, but we have no examples of design where the designer creates the materials he works with out of nothing. Nor can the concept of "design" even be intelligibly applied to such a scenario since design involves working within design constraints, which include the properties of the materials and the rules or laws that they obey. A creator ex nihilo would have complete control over these things. No design constraints = no design.
Then there is the question of what purpose the universe serves to God. People design things because they desire to be fed, warm, safe and comfortable in an environment that does not automatically provide these things. But God, being spaceless and timeless, doesn't even have an environment to be at the mercy of. Besides, he's omnipotent. What does the maximally great being, who possesses all great-making properties, lack such that he needs to build a device that will give it to Him? He exists necessarily, is completely self-sufficient and self-sustaining, and couldn't cease to exist or cease to be perfect, even if He wanted to. How could any machine or device ever serve any meaningful purpose to Him? There is exponentially more mass tied up in black holes than there is in sentient beings. Did God for some reason have a desire for a whole bunch of black holes? If so, then why not just make them out of nothing, which would be the most elegant solution, rather than make a huge and unnecessarily complex machine for making them, also out of nothing. It amazes me that no one has ever pointed out the tension between the teleological argument and the ontological arguments.
"The complexity of the design is INVERSELY proportional to the designer's intelligence and capabilities" I liked this
Hello from the future, you perfectly described the issues that I have always had with the intelligent design argument, I just haven’t had the ability to express it so succinctly!
The trouble I have with design arguments is that design implies constraints. If I design a car I can't just put the wheels on the roof and make the windscreen a one centimetre square window on the side of the car. Physical constraints guide me to design a car to function the way it does. It is bizarre that a god should have physical constraints.
Tjaart Blignaut Interesting claim. There is a possible argument that a God would have some logical constraints coming from the solution to the omnipotence paradox (though I'm not sure that this solution is wholly successful ua-cam.com/video/2tEuDNsvS4c/v-deo.html). And if you think that God is all good, then he would be constrained by that as well. You might also imagine that God had to create the universe in a certain way (a la the cosmic fine tuning argument) to support life, and once he did that worked within those constraints to make life. He made the rules first and then worked within them.
Carneades.org " There is a possible argument that a God would have some logical constraints coming from the solution to the omnipotence paradox"
Agreed.
"if you think that God is all good, then he would be constrained by that as well."
Depends on the resolution of what it means for god to be good. If good means anything that god wills then this will obviously not apply.
"He made the rules first and then worked within them."
Doesn't this method require the theist to double down on unjustified claims? There are a lot of bizarre problems that could arise out of this. What good reason would a god have to create a rational set of rules only to follow them himself? And given such a reason, can the theist demonstrate that this is god's actual reason?
Tjaart Blignaut Yeah, I'm not fully convinced that the theist can deal with the Euthyphro dilemma, which makes the goodness claim a problem. As to the rules, it would seem that a universe with rules is preferable to a universe without rules. And perhaps one could make an argument that a universe with absolute rules is better than one with rules that God can break, but I agree that this is a stretch. Cool objection.
Just to point out. Historically God's "omnipotence" has generally used to mean that God is all powerful but still within the bounds of metaphysical and logical laws. The stronger sense of "omnipotence" (that is, God is also not restrained by logical and metaphysical laws) has been used by some theists (some protestant denominations for example). Although I'm not quite sure how Paley used "omnipotence".
But aren’t you assuming Gods will is above his reason? To my mind, this is a circular argument because you are invoking nominalism. But the teleological argument is exactly pointing to this.
Why don’t you show Paley’s answer to Hume’s objections? Besides, some arguments are not supposed to provide you with God’s attributes
always a strain on my elementary synapses- but always a pleasure blowing them up. I'd like to think some of this is rubbing off on me- but as my wife likes to remind me on occasion- that just goes to show where thinking will get me.
Hume-man-like intelligence.
Haha. :)
I would be more apt to believe that there's an infinite regression of designers then creation was not designed and everything's by chance. The complexity isn't just about being complex, it's about it having utility and relationship with others. An organizing or a machine both have intelligent purposes behind their entire existence.
Book recommendations please
+Mic Dundee For what? Logic? Philosophy of Religion? Philosophy in general?
Carneades.org
logic
I have some queries with the tendency to use infinite regress as a counter-argument to teleological arguments.
Why isn't it valid to suggest that human beings, nature, etc. that are unable to create new worlds, however are obviously able to intelligently design to a significant extent, are created by a being so great the he/she/it needs no designer?
Does the watch argument really suggest that god also needs a designer? Is it not a possibility that god may have human qualities, whilst also having always existed outside of the realm of time as we know it, and thus had never required to be created and/or designed? Therefore, instead of needing to be designed, god instead designed creation in a reflection of him/her/itself?
+Laura Meulman The trick with design arguments is that they are generally making the case for best explanation. So if you agree that finding something sufficiently complicated is a good reason to believe it was designed, then it must follow that anything more complicated must be designed as well. If your argument is that something is likely to be designed if it is more complicated than one thing, but less than another, you will have a lot more work to do to convince anyone's intuition. Basically imagine you find a rock, a watch and an alien device on the ground. It seems strange to conclude the watch was designed, but the alien device was not. So it seems strange to think man was designed but God was not.
The point is that if being complicated (out whatever trait you want to place here) is a reason to believe something has a designer, then we have reason to believe God has a designer. If it is not, then we have no reason to believe man was designed.
What makes you think God is complicated? God non physical and thus would not have any of the complexities associated with the complex physical environment he created. Actually a disembodied mind is pretty simple. It may think very complex thoughts but it is not really complex in and of itself.
his meta physical nature if anything makes him even more complex. A being with infinite power, all knowing and all present, that doesn't actually have a physical presence, must be extremely complex, in fact infinitely so.
how would that not be complex? how can something simple make something complex?
I think I agree with your point to an extent Jeff. Specifically, how can we say whether we know the complete nature of God? If you look at every religion, there is an element of mystery about God's characteristics, therefore indicating that most people are in agreement that there is no way of knowing the complexity of God's constitution. What's more, who is to define complexity? What is it? And why is it that even if God were "simple" according to our limited human comprehension that he would not be able to create something "complex" (also according to human definition) such as our world and the humans within it. Whilst I agree that the teleological argument is flawed when human logic is applied to it, I don't personally believe that we are able to comprehend such things like the nature of God. Therefore, I do believe it is possible that God - whether simple or complex - with all of His 'omni'-characteristics could create complexity without requiring a creator.
Thanks for the presentation and fine work you've done. Humbly, the drastic inflections throughout the video are a bit distracting.
chameleeon Thanks for watching!
Are you making money from these videos? I would hope so!
Yes. Some from ads, Patreon, and Zazzle. Most of it is reinvested in the channel, but it means that the channel can do more cool things.
Hume's objection is one of the many reasons I don't assent to a belief in gods.
His argument is wack in my opinion. His reason for denying the relation between cause and effect is anti-scientific, and while he is correct that even if this argument (one of many) can show that God is probable, that doesn't mean it's omnipotent and omniscient - but this argument isn't arguing for that... that is in other arguments; to be debated between the deist and theist position (or someone taking the position of either/or). To insert in an atheist rejection of theism is sort of absurd. The question is simply 'is there a God(s)?' so an argument between these two positions, no matter the personal position of the interlocutors, is atheism and deism.
objection
"Turtles all the way down."
One of Hume's objections is that an all-powerful God has to be infinitely complicated. What if God were the law above all laws of nature and logic. He might be omnipotent because there are no laws above him? (Since to be un-omnipotent, in our experience, usually means to be limited by some law.) As opposed to us, who are potent because of laws above us that limit us?
I believe in natural causes of life, but I'm not sure if the universe can be more complicated than the sum of its causes, since the sum of its causes effectively act as a definition of it. Can something be more complicated than its definition?
Extracting an image from a .zip file seems like a counter-example, but if you think about it the image has 2 causes: The zip file and the computer that makes sense of the zip file. Similarly, life has 2 causes: Dead matter and our equivalent of the computer (call it the laws of time and nature) which dictates how life comes to dead matter. Whatever the complete explanation is, can it be less complicated or amazing than the result, since it effectively *contains* a description of the result?
Not sure if evolution (while true) eradicates the need for design or pushes it further up.
Tim Crinion This seems to twist the definition of omnipotence, which I deal with here: ua-cam.com/video/2tEuDNsvS4c/v-deo.html. Some people claim that something is more than the sum of it's parts. Some claim that it is not. The interesting argument about this is the philosophical zombies argument. More an argument for phenomenological consciousness, than God. But an interesting argument none the less.ua-cam.com/video/WPT8YKnL5kQ/v-deo.html
Hmmmm, what does Hume say now?
He's been dead for the last couple of centuries.
Dude, if Hume, could say anything to you right now, he would say .....
😔😔😔😔😢
why?
@@GLo1991 Go ask Hume and he'll tell you ...
philosophy blows
What makes you say that?
Hume is a fool , by the way he is now dead and according to his world view he is now insignificant therefore this insult is to an insignificant matter that once existed.
Sometimes you think you have all the answers but forget that human knowledge is finite.