99.9% of the time the ships will not be pushing limits while in harbor, so 99.9% of the time the webcam video will not be useful to an adversary. However, the ship's maneuvering performance limits can be extrapolated from the video because the ships would have been pushing the limits in an effort to avoid collision. Knowledge of these limits can inform an adversary's strategy.
The US Navy has a long tradition of covering up FUBARs to protect screw-ups, especially admiral rank. I see nothing has changed since WW2. Absolutely inexcusable atmosphere that insures the turds rise to the top. Protect the Annapolis Golden Boys and hose the rest.
Sal, I spent 21 years in the Coast Guard on ships. My last 4 years was as a marine inspector / investigator. I have been on the bridge of many ships during transits just like this one. This transit is very much like Ever Forward in Baltimore. The bridge crews saw what was going on, but were afraid to speak up. One ship more than the other had a grasp of what was going on and took clear action, the other was a little slower to react. I have seen many many military ship evolutions and when they go south, it happens fast and they are usually averted by one person raising their voice over the others and taking command. Unfortunately, this seems to be a recurring situation where people are afraid of confrontation. The very way officers are advanced causes problems in situations like this. It is not a great career choice to second guess people in your chain of command, even when they welcome it, when they are the ones who write up your OER. I met so many great and competent leaders in the military, but the fear of even talking to them by juniors is real. Add a little social awkwardness for those who aren't outgoing and you have a problem. Social interaction between people these days is a real problem.
Sam I too spent 22 years (BM1/BMC) in the CG, I Worked on several construction tenders, last one was in NOLA on the Miss river, ICW, and if we were unsure we got back on the radio and verified passing arraignments! But we had no "O's" on board all enlisted. No big egos to bruise, had a great OINC!
Something still wrong with the system! I was in the US Army 2 years, 9 months and 6 hours ... I often wonder how many 2nd LTs kept their mouths shut, or worse, ignored the advice of their SFC, and many moms and dads got "the" telegram and folded flag!
Starting with the 1977 Tenerife airport disaster, commercial aviation has realized that the ability of a junior officer to correct a senior would prevent accidents. The result was CRM-Crew Resource Management, training which makes clear that anyone who sees a problem must speak up immediately and forcefully and that others must listen. The surface Navy seems in need of such training.
As a former OOD and JOOD on Perry class Frigates, I've been in both extremes of bridge climates. One had such a toxic atmosphere on the bridge and CIC that I doubt if anyone would have said anything if we were headed toward collision/grounding after an incident involving me, and the other a Bridge Management System was in place (before it was called that). On the latter, all bridge and CIC watch standers were encouraged to speak up if the situation didn't feel/look right without fear of reprisal.
Speaking as retired Navy who used to stand Conning Officer onboard a number of Navy ships: 1. Don't count on anything CIC says being followed on the bridge--generally the Piloting Officer in CIC is ignored by the bridge. 2. The moment the CO of a ship gives a direct order to the Conn, it is assumed that the CO has assumed the Conn and the Conning Officer is no longer responsible for directing the navigation of the ship. 3. The Conning Officer of the Harper's Ferry was put in an impossible situation by a completely screwed up chain of command. 4. Finally, even if Harper's Ferry had left the channel, she would still have been in 40 to 60 feet of water, she draws 21 (according to Wikipedia). Hadn't anyone studied the chart closely enough and planned for what to do in the case of an emergency i.e. propulsion or steering failure or, maybe, a destroyer taking a wide turn?
Is Surface Warfare Officers School still a thing? I know they closed Coronado a long time ago. That was more helpful for junior officers to get up to speed than OTJ training aboard ship.
On point 4, I think the OOD did know, second video of Prof. Sal's previous coverage [ua-cam.com/video/8s18O_iAlKE/v-deo.html ], at minute 11:15 the video of the incident continues, and the Harpers Ferry appears to be out of the channel.
Dad was in the Navy in 1960s, 70s, 80s, and the longer he was in the less impressed he was by the upper brass. A thing he said about being passed over for promotion to Captain a couple times could say quite a bit, "I'm okay with that, I signed up to drive ships, not engage in political shenanigans." And that then brings up the kinds of things the last couple COs he was XO for said, it went like, "XO, if I'm not bored you aren't doing your job." Dad ran the ship while the Captain did all the politicking and networking, and I think one was working on a research paper.
I was in in 80s-90s. Between the collision a few years ago, the _Bonhomme Richard_ fiasco, and this event, USN seems like a totally different organization. Very concerning.
Hmmm, I am ex-navy, during sea and anchor detail there are 10-15 people on the bridge with at least 8 of them talking and giving information/recommedations. When I switched over to the Merchant Marine we had 5 people on the bridge and only two of those talking or giving reports. They were the CO, Pilot, Helm, OOD, and Lookout.
I spent some time in UAE providing Port Security/FP services for U.S. Navy and Coalition force ships. I got to see how a lot of different Navies did business on the bridge. On U.S. Ships it was amazing to me how many people were on the bridge. All sorts of things going on. Then on other ships there are maybe 5, and yet these ships seemed to do just find getting in and out of ports like Jebel Ali and FUJ.
This is a great example of the FedGov's desire to over classify everything. From the webcam to the redactions the DOD and the Fedgov generally would much prefer to release no information that isn't PR poof pieces to anyone ever.
Excellent analysis. Busy port, narrow channel, student drivers, panic at the disco. IMHO the problem is peacetime Navy where career advancement goals drive short (usually two years or less) duty at any particular post. CYA is crucial to career advancement and drives limiting public communication including B2B comms - asking another ship about intentions is a sign of weakness. In wartime I hope that competence and experience will trump officer's potential upward mobility when making personnel decisions.
Absolutely incredible. The coverage and analysis you provide to the American people - at no cost - is of a calibre that is unavailable anywhere else. Your experience with years at sea and teaching the principles at University gives a unique (and in my opinion, correct) analysis of every aspect of this incident; right down to shaming "Gibbs"! Please keep your bag packed Dr. Sal; I know you're going to be doing some travelling and guest lectures but with great reviews like this, I think perhaps the Navy might want to get you in for a chat too - - I hope so! So - while you've got this analysis being written, (and coordination of video feed being synced) you also teach, full-time at University, you Chair the Department, you're a volunteer Fire Captain, accomplished UA-cam Creator - and family Man... I suspect - - you've actually got some Superhuman skills you're not sharing with us. It's okay Sal - we can keep a secret - we're just glad you're doing what you do!!
As an old OS, this composit video of yours with the harbor cam video, charts and the report narration, and your observations is an excellent training tool for all bridge/CIC folks to sit down and watch. It really puts things into perspective - as a real teachable moment. As always an excellent video.
What a total cluster F! The NCSI pulling the plug on this webcam is BS. San Diego, being a border city as well as having a large military presence, IS the most surveilled city in United States. Thank you for the honest commentary.
Great video! I’m safely retired now but as a Ships Master with what must be thousands of safe transits behind me, I’m stunned by the apparent lack of bridge team competence on Naval Vessels. Perhaps the USN should consider reinstating the old regime of “Professional Sailing Masters” to manage their watch standing and ship handling. In the sailing ship navies the “Sailing Master” usually did the ship handling while the Captain and his Line Officers managed and fought the ship. Basically experienced professional ship handlers assisting professional Naval Warfare Management Officers.
I can attest to the incompetence. But it is similar to being at a “teaching hospital” from a professional standpoint... Where the interns can’t easily be controlled… and most will opt out after 4 years. The bridge is so much more crowded on a Navy ship, because it is a learning/teaching environment… in order to train the most officers possible. Many didn’t get any substantive ship handling time before reporting to the ship… especially for Sea and anchor detail… It is just one big cluster if the CO lets it get away from him/her.
I am not going to reveal my background but I will say this a very large part of the problem is the absolutely stupid amount of people on the bridge on naval vessels (especially so when you consider they often man the CIC too as a ‘blind pilotage team’. In my experience if the OOW is on the bridge then he is the one ‘in charge’ and the only one to give commands to the bridge team. Bearing in mind the OOW is by definition earning his sea miles it is quite in order for the Navigator, the XO or the CO to provide ‘experienced input’ to the OOW. If the Navigator, XO or CO think the situation merits it, they should formally take over by announcing to the bridge team ‘I have the ship’ and the OOW should retire to the back of the bridge and await further instructions. For a warship, going into an unfamiliar harbour QM, Bosuns mate, Radio Operator, OOW and Navigator then either the XO or the CO (not both) so 6 maximum. I have been on a 3,000 ton frigate and 17 people on the bloody bridge - now that was a recipe for disaster.
@@normanboyes4983 I’m an ex-CIC guy (O.S.), Been in that narrow channel spot in San Diego many many times on Carriers, Amphibs, and a Cruiser. Have also been on the Bridge many times as Shipping Officer, who talks directly to CIC about the shipping he sees on the water. I agree it sounds like over kill, all these people on the Bridge, a bunch more people in the darkness of CIC looking at radar contacts to backup the bridge with info about oncoming ships and little boats too. CIC is also using radar navigation To back up the Bridge’s visual navigation. A lot of redundancy, a lot of teamwork, and also confusion. But there is reasons for all the extra stuff. These are fighting ships, war ships. They have to be able to sail and fight at the same time, like they are doing now in the fairly narrow Red Sea, protecting commercial shipping and protecting themselves against the hundreds of missiles & drones being lobbed their way out of Yemen. The Bridge, CIC/Sensors, Electronic Warfare, CIWS, Missile Systems, Engineering, firefighting, cooks, Comms, Data Gathering, Intelligence, and admin types have all got to work with each other. Their mission is complex, potentially life threatening. They all take swear an oath regarding the danger.
Having sailed on the USS Momsen DDG-92 many times in that same exact location I never saw the CO not be on the bridge once we hit buoy 1SD (first buoy coming into San Diego bay). He knew what was going on I guarantee you that!
Thanks for the great report Sal. Having grown up by the inlet of Rotterdam harbor, I am surprised to hear that San Diego waterway does not have a traffic control system in place. But the most surprising fact to me was that some of the people standing watch were not qualified to do so. Wow. In the end I am glad there was no collision, in spite of the confusion. But yeah folks, pick up the phone, sound the horn! Safety first!
Great job, Sal. Thanks for your comments on San Diego Web Cam, too. Hopefully your viewers will help us out by contacting the guys at the National Park Service and asking for cams back!
As an ex sqid and OS I can tell you how rare it is for the Bridge to take any advice from Combat. It's a culture thing and we ran down a small boat because the Bridge did not see the contact on their radar even though we had a track for about 10 minutes. That was thirty years ago and hasn't changed. Combat probably was used to being ignored in this instance.
I was on a CG that nearly ran aground in that same area. The Navigator and Combat were giving the OOD different positions. The OOD ignored Combat. The situation was resolved when the OSC came out on the Bridge and stood next to the Captain looking out the window. When the Captain asked what he was doing on the Bridge, he replied "I came out to watch us run aground". The Captain ordered emergency full stop, and told everyone that the ship was not going to move another inch until everyone agreed on our exact position. Combat's position was the correct one. USN(Ret)
@@n5uge12 That was a hilarious approach to take to the situation. Reminds me of my grandfather's attitude about things. (He was a Master Sgt in the Army Air Core in WWII, not Navy. He apparently refused a promotion to officer class because he didn't want to have to hang out with officers.)
This is the kind of video you want to watch on UA-cam. It's is a perfect example of what social media should be. Great explanations. I come from a family of three generations of Navy. You were right on the money.
Great analysis, Sal! Some notes from someone who earned his pin as a JO on an HFY class LSD and also served in the CRU/DES navy. • HFY is diesel powered with CPP (Not steam) • Even if HFY lost steerageway, she could have done a port or starboard twist to keep a complimentary attitude to MOM. Given her flat bottom and shallow draft, this works pretty well. The OOD pushing ahead at the key moment was considered decisive and good simply because it eliminated the chances of their sterns colliding. It’s good heads up execution… but calling for a twist with a Runner that doesn’t matter, was unnecessary as the attitude was favorable to where they would end up shooting ahead from. • HFY OOD was probably a LTJG…. Maybe a senior ENS. But It’s hard to imagine an ENS would have the balls to take the CONN when it was obviously confusing as to whether the CO had the CONN. Then again, a LTJG should have said “Captain has the CONN” Once his orders needed to be done timely. Does this suggest the CO froze? Maybe. The fact that the report is so negative towards HFY does suggest that this might’ve been the case. • MOM sure looked like she was going fast in the speed-restricted zone by Bravo (ammo) pier. • XO is in charge of training… and there is a training officer. That’s why there is the extra paragraph ripping on them. • Navigator (“gator”) on HFY is probably the most junior department head… usually a senior LTJG or recently promoted LT. They are often picked because they have an aptitude for ship driving/handling. The reason the CO and Nav were talking is likely because CO is communicating his style while the new(?) Nav is running the chart table and coordinating comms (instead of CIC which is pretty normal). • The bridge and bridge-wings on an LSD are massive. On Mom? The bridge is minuscule by comparison… So it makes sense to utilize CIC for some comms… adding to confusion, I’m sure. • The reason they didn’t do 5 whistles also is because it isn’t intentional… It isn’t indicative of a command or direction… One/two whistles for maneuvering to Starboard/Port (but most JO’s understand for P2P/S2S passing) is what you want to communicate in the channel. HFY did two whistles first, and whistles are the highest priority in the hierarchy. Everyone adapted accordingly. • Why the redactions? The report did not seem to rip on MOM as much for what looked like at-best an equally-his-fault scenario. (I’m guessing the HFY CO did not interview as well as the MOM CO, too. But that is a borderline wild accusation.) By redacting the course/speed, the protectors of those not fired keeps others from armchair quarterbacking… and black-balling the innocent… and the political favorites. (Though I’d take a gentleman’s bet that MOM’s CO is better connected politically.) HFY went to whistles which made their intentions clear at the highest rung of comms. The only mitigating factor that I can tell is that there was also reports of a fire coming on MOM… and they responded in time to the whistles correctly. • I’ve always had a bias for the Gator Navy, so take all criticisms of MOM with a grain of salt.
I’m a retired navy senior chief cook, one that never stood bridge watch in my career. Even I know who the helmsman should’ve obeyed, specifically the officer with the conn, whether it’s the captain , navigator or OOD. As I remember from boot camp in a world long long ago, the officer with conn is the only one with authority to direct ship movement. While the conn is the OOD under normal steaming, the captain can take conn at any time by stating, “I have the conn.”
As a retired civilian deck officer with an unlimited license who has discussed this problem at length with a close friend and graduate of Maine Maritime who holds an active, unlimited master's license and years of command at sea, this is not especially complicated. Deck officer cadets at the US Naval Academy simply do not receive enough of the proper training in one of the most basic and critical skills required of any deck officer, a thorough working knowledge of the rules of the road and the ability to apply them successfully, along with the requisite ship handling skills. Having come up through the hawspipe and learned many of my early navigation skills from the retired XO of a Fletcher Class destroyer, l was fortunate enough to have learned from one of the best and lucky enough to have avoided catastrophe when l made a blunder, which was often, but only by chance.
I agree as a Naval Academy graduate. During the normal ship-handling classes on the yard patrol (YP) craft, there isn't enough time for all to take charge as a conning officer. The only ones with great training are those that are part of the YP Squadron. During their cruise between Freshman and Sophomore years, midshipmen act as if they are enlisted and very few get ship control experience. Between Junior and Senior years, they have an additional ship cruise, but the conning experience is rare. The ships are rightfully more interested in qualifying their own officers on board.
The above remarks are patently false. I was Navigation Officer aboard a DDG. If a junior officer failed a COLREGS exam, they were taken off watch, remediated, and in extreme cases, removed. But I was an OCS guy, I don't know Annapolis stuffs. Probably why I was never in a mishap. Sail safe.
@@cheddar2648 Your comment is not entirely clear and seems to contradict itself. ln the first sentence you appear to disagree with my assertion and the concurrence of Bill Higgins and in the second, seemingly the opposite. Please explain.
this was the sea and anchor detail, which should be the more experience team, plus additional watch standers. Then again, entering Pearl Harbor, the Conning officer was spilling his guts (about girl problems?) to the helmsman, when Nav called for the turn before Ford Island.
Chuckled at your use in the summary of the appropriate descriptive term "Cluster" 😉 Your analysis is clear and much appreciated. Bottom line from BHR and this incident is "Competence, lack of".
Hey Sal, Harpers Ferry is diesel powered, not steam powered. If you've been on the bridge of US Navy ship for an evolution like this you'd know seamanship isn't the best. A perfect example of this is ordering back on the engines when you need to maneuver. But not really a surprise to anyone one that's been there. The NCIS was directed by someone to tell the Park Service to turn off the camera. They didn't do that on their own. They were probably told to do that by Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
@@wgowshipping And you are absolute correct about the OOD that took action and saved the ship, he is a hero. He will pay for this in his fitreps and be forced to leave the Navy. I know from firsthand experience as that is exactly what happen as it happened to me. The XO (O-5) reamed me a new one because of an action that I took while a lowly Ensign and a report had to be sent off Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa about the action I took. And when it came back down from the Commander, the Commander said that I took appropriate and timely action to prevent embarrassment of the US Navy in a foreign port and that the Navy needed more junior officers to take initiative with available resources. After that no matter what I did that XO found it to be wrong and my fitreps showed it. We had to do an unrep and I said that the water was too shallow (VA Capes, about 50' with a 32' draft ship), and that would impair control of the ship when close to an oiler with a similar draft, where they wanted us to do it he didn't listen even though I presented another area with water that was 9 fathoms deeper that met the rest of the requirements. That ended in us hitting the oiler and caused a lot of damage to both ships. Thankfully I was not the OOD, the JOOD and did not have the CONN when that happened and when I saw they couldn't keep the ship going straight said "I told you so" to myself. That collision ended both the XO's and the CO's careers.
That bridge resource management concept is mirrored in the cockpit of aircraft and studied in a similar fashion. The study of how people communicate and how to successfully manage attention in times of stressful situations has yielded great advances in aircraft, ship and even car safety...
Well that’s just two in discussion in a cockpit for the most part. Here you have four officers all with skin in the game. Seems this resource management was more of an issue for those that had to carry out four different directions(orders). Having a “committee” on the bridge? What so no one has responsibility if something goes wrong? The report literally is pointing fingers at four different people, is that what is intended by this resource management concept. Hey if we screw up they can’t pen it on one person, great! Let’s go with this concept, all our jobs are safe, just a little comment in our records, next promotion here we come.
I have followed this story since you first published it. I believe the most worrying aspect of the report is not the redaction but rather the whole thrust of the report which did not call out the total clusterfuck for what it was. How can the Navy hope to improve Bridge watchkeeping standards with this sort of obfuscation?
@What is Going on With Shipping? Liverpool Cammell Laird Update - RFA Tiderace was moved between dry docks last week. It was quite cool to watch the dock being flooded and the lock gate being lowered, before tugs pulled her out of the dry dock. Topaz Tangaroa has also been mostly repainted from the original dark blue to Navy grey . Both ships are now pretty much side by side and when in Birkenhead, you can drive past the shipyard and see the Tiderace bow above the street, and the Topaz helipad. I was lucky enough to be travelling across the river the past few days and got a good look. Liverpool has two large tunnels that run under the River Mersey, and they are connected to each other by a smaller tunnel complex. It's quite a cool and fairly unique city. I hope you and your family are well. Keep safe and keep on shipping!
Great review Sal. During my days as sea detail OOD, CIC did very little for the bridge, the bridge team has best situational awareness during tight maneuvering. Appears Momsen OOD had good situational awareness and maneuvered out of that situation. Both bridges should have been on radio confirming their intent long before getting that close.
Hey Sal. I'm a former US Navy Harbor Pilot with 24 years of Naval Service. In all of my years of piloting over 160 US Naval Ships, Submarines, USCG and commercial vessels in four US Ports have I've ever seen something like this. If communication fails via radio they can always use signalman to communicate with the other vessel. Whatever happened to common sense. Long before the two ships met the comms between the two ships should have been flowing and obviously there was a breakdown there. I'm just happy it wasn't a major incident in the channel because that would choke off all traffic flowing through there. I spent five years on a DDG in San Diego and we never had or come close to an incident like this. Well we all know what happened afterwards!
This gave me flashbacks to back 20+ years ago when I was piloting a 40 ft cruiser down the Livingston channel (southern Detroit river) in the fog and on my radar I see a freighter coming up the downbound channel (instead of the upbound Amherstburg channel). No five short horn blasts, nothing! Passed port to port in maybe a 120 ft wide channel.
COs of large amphibs are often not career shiphandlers but airdales in training for possible command of an aircraft carrier. That doesn't mean they aren't good but they aren't going to have the experience of a SWO with the same time in service. I was on a LPD in the 80s and both my COs were pilots. This isn't just the regular underway watch on duty. The crew on the bridge for special sea detail are the ones the CO trusts the most to handle the ship in difficult maneuvering situations. The OOD on the Harpers Ferry is most likely a Department Head, probably a Lieutenant Commander (O4) or senior Lieutenant (O3).
Sal again a super job by you. So much to cover. Although no paint exchanged it is still embarrassing. One thing, at least 40 years ago, when the CO gave a rudder order the conning officer would announce that "the Captain has the conn" so that the helm would know who is now conning the ship. If the CO was ready to relinquish it the Conning officer would announce "this is LTJG xxx I have the conn, LT yyyy has the deck". This bit of internal comms perhaps would have let the helm know who was calling the shots. Dont know if that is still the prescribed practice. Again great job Sal and to the poor JO, who would probably make a great wartime officer.
Retired Navy Chief here... 2 things... one, the 5 blasts in my day meant "WHAT ARE YOU FUCKING DOING?!", and two, the Captain (CO) ALWAYS has the CONN- thus, the confused Helmsman should of IGNORED the NAV and OOD and do what the CO ordered, PERIOD. "It's their ship (the CO's)- it's their ass if they're wrong, NOT YOU!" as I taught my Sea Pups many, many times.
Leave it to the Navy to have a hissy fit over embarrassment. I worked on a ship in San Diego. You can see, and be seen EVERYWHERE there. OPSEC my arse!! 😡 By the way, folks, if you write to the NPS point of contact listed on the SDWC page please by civil, be polite.
I never was in the Navy but this is a general example on the fact that 'communication is key'! It's almost never bad to ask or confirm twice for the extra bit of understanding. Luckily nobody was hurt and this was handled in a detailed report.
This could not happen in our Navy (OZ) There are only 2 things you have to remember in the absence of designated port exit and entry lanes. 1) The Officer of the Watch is responsible for the ship. The first thing he says when he arrives on the bridge is, "I have the Con". He is responsible unless the Captain says, "I am taking the Con." The helmsman only listens to one or the other. He acknowledges, "The Captain/First Officer has the Con." You do not consult the Nav or Tactical Officer. They are not in the chain of command for conning the ship. They only advise the Officer of the Watch or the Captain. There can never be confusion. This rule goes back 400 years. 2) In any moment of confusion, the ships must pass Port to Port by default if they are heading in opposite direction. If they are going in the same direction, the ship that had another on his starboard side, always has right of way. In the case of San Diego, in the absence of lanes, the first rule applies. If this had happened here, The officers conning both ships would be suspended from duty, there would be a Court Marshall and careers would be ended. The charge is failing to ensure the safety of the ship and not obeying the Laws of Navigation.
Thank you for another interesting and informative video. Including the important info on the camera that filmed the incident being cut. The more of us that support the San Diego Webcam, the better!
I am confused by a couple of things. After passing, Harpers Ferry seemed to give up attempting to stay in the channel (but fortunately had deep water). Is their maneuverability really that bad? Also confused why Momsen didn't decline the pilot at that location. Is that a thing that could have been done - simply say no, we will do it after passing? I also really wonder how these ships would perform under combat stress.
HFY had deep water to port after MOM poured in the throttle. But it is not desirable to leave the channel… Minor issue: there’s a lot of kelp, and Major issue: there was also a ship on the bravo/ammunition pier… and they don’t want to go hard left, run over the buoy, foul their screws/rudder and go crashing into the bravo, pier.
These ships are not designed, not do they train, for combat in restricted waters like that. But of course, even on the open ocean, if there is a formation of ships and a wave of missiles is coming in, there could easily be a collision.
Perhaps I missed it but you mentioned an incoming tide. That would have make MOM less responsive to rudder angle and HFY perhaps more. Hence another reason to initiate a two whistle STS passage once it became clear that a collision was possible.
Great Video Sal. Having watched the Momsen arrive in Panama City Beach, Florida for commissioning, this incident is sad to see. I am glad that everyone is okay
It should be SOP that ship to ship radio communications should be in continuous contact with each other while within visual maneuvering range. The lack of knowing what the other ship was up to contributed to this incident.
When communication breaks down it breaks down incredibly fast, we should all have learned this by now. I don't know what is going on with the military in general anymore, it's lost so much the last 20 years. I don't know if it's just lowering standards lower and lower, or what, but it sure seems like there is a lot of serious problems everywhere. Also how the hell do you not know who to take orders from? It's like these sailors have had a weekend course, and then they're thrown on the boat. Seriously wtf. Anyway I enjoyed the your breakdown and analysis of the situation thank you!
Greetings Sal, First and foremost, this whole affair could have been avoided had there been local harbor pilots aboard both ships, with the Momsen pilot having boarded before Momsen’s entry to San Diego. (I don’t know this for a fact but it’s possibly due to (1)Navy’s desire to avoid expenses on pilotage and (2)commanding officers’ egos that there weren’t pilots aboard early on.)This isn’t to say that pilots do not have accidents. They do, but they understand local conditions, know one another and are familiar with the harbor, reacting differently from the ship commander who makes an occasional harbor transit. The Momsen’s pilot transfer was poorly orchestrated, occurring at an in opportune moment. Both ships were in agreement to meet port to port. Momsen should have started her turn to starboard regardless of the tug alongside (It’s doubtful that tug was made up alongside in order to transfer pilot to Momsen (even if she were it’s up to the pilot boat(tug) to take care of herself. At 5 to 8 knots she could do so. ) One point of clarification, when ships approach each other head-to-head, or nearly so, they are said to be meeting, they will meet. When one ship comes up from astern, or nearly so, of another ship the overtaking ship is said to be the passing ship. I bring this up because the dialogue is in some places inconsistent. Obviously neither one of us has the full story but this is what it looks like from my armchair. Best regards from Come-by-Chance, Joe Homer
In aircraft cockpits we call it crew resource management. The best briefing I ever got was "if you see me doing something stupid sing out and I'll do the same". No bullshit CRM.
Great analysis, Professor Sal. All too often in 2023 we see "near disasters" (let's stop calling them "near misses") at airports, ports, and in less spectacular situations with local police, firefighting, railroads, etc. Too little training, too little accountability, too many non-focused thinking (playing with smart phones?), etc. Perhaps, "sterile cockpit" thinking must be reinforced in all industries when engaged in all high risk activities: paramedics pushing meds at 0-dark thirty after 72 hours on duty with minimal sleep, LEO's in the alley with the urban camper screaming at unseen Zombies, pilots turning onto/off of runways, etc. As to the NCIS ... "no comment."
One thing missed in the report, and largely missed by most of the commentators online, the initial port to port passage between TRIPOLI and HARPERS FERRY caused HARPERS FERRY to be significantly right of her navigation track. Given the flood tide and the fact that she was being set further right of track by the "set", her navigation team likely over corrected to port and drove her across the channel to MOMSEN's side. This set up an error chain which was then compounded by the pilot embarkation aboard MOMSEN causing the ship to maintain a course which took her past her normal turning point. Another point missed here is that the pilot who embarked MOMSEN "should" have used his significant expertise and recommended delaying his embarkation until after the ships had passed. But long standing culture in the San Diego area is that you don't critique the pilots......so we just give them a pass.
You noticed similar things that I pointed out in my comment but interpreted differently than you. Unless I'm misunderstanding the situation, the video shows the Momsen coming into port with an incoming tide pushing the Momsen forward. The Harper's Ferry is coming in the opposite direction exiting the port and is fighting an incoming tide that is also pushing it to starboard because of the severe curve of the channel. This should mean that Harper's Ferry is pointing to slightly to port to compensate for the tide's push to starboard. Unlike what you posted, I tend to view the ships not pushed around by the conditions but being piloted to compensate for the conditions. Because the Harper's Ferry is pointing to slightly to port, to the approaching Momsen visually it probably looked like the ships were on a collision course if Harper's Ferry was travelling at speed and speed is one thing you can never know when an object is approaching directly at you. Without verbal communication, neither side could know for sure what the other's intentions were.
Re: the first 3 minutes on the shutting off the webcams, forget NCIS, the Navy, period, has never liked its dirty laundry aired, and in this case, suddenly the private webcams showed a potential for showing things that the Navy higher-ups would rather not be featured on the 6PM news. Res ipse loquitur.
During sea and anchor detail, the CO puts watchstanders they trust the most during restricted maneuvering, this occurs when entering/leaving ports and unreps.
Sal, In combat situations, it makes sense to have a lot of people on the bridge. When coming in and out of port, you can easily have too many people on the bridge. If this was a commercial vessel, you would have had the Master, the watch officer, an able-bodied seaman, an ordinary seaman, and a pilot. Commercial vessels would pick up the pilot at the sea buoy, not during the start of the turn. It seems that there are so many people involved that using the radio was lost in the background noise. I am also curious as to why there's no mention of the ECDIS or the Collision Avoidance Radar. Certainly, our naval vessels are equipped with these moder navigation tools. The triangle area you mention is also where the marinas on Shelter Island and Harbor Island join San Diego Bay. Add a few pleasure craft to the mix, and you have the formula for a disaster. One question I have was the pilot that boarded the Momsen a Harbor Pilot? Or, was it a Navy Pilot? I assume it was a Navy Pilot since a fleet tug was used rather than a pilot boat. In either case, where was the pilot needed? Transiting under the Coronado Bridge and docking at Naval Base San Diego? Transit past Coronado Naval Air Station? Bob
@Formula Firebird I worked for 35 years with oil companies and their tankers. We always had 2 radars, a 3cm and a 10cm unit. One was connected to the ship's main switchboard and the other to the emergency switchboard. USCG and regulatory body rules require two separate power sources and separate wiring. The only place they are together is on the bridge. It would take an idiot to place all navigation radars on a single breaker, or single power source. I find it incomprehensible that the bridge team management relied on the CIC to monitor their radars. The Advanced Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) or Collision Avoidance System ((CAS), and the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) are designed as aids to the bridge team. They exist to aid in both the navigation and management of the vessel. They are so important harbor pilots carry their own ECDIS equipment. I have not worked with the ships directly for over a decade but at the turn of this century, we were training able-bodied seaman to use the ARPA radars. Bob
Everyone should setup their own webcams until they reinstate the webcam! Bunch of dopes! P.S. These Junior Officers should get MEDALS and PROMOTIONS for potentially saving lives and these expensive Naval assets!
Great video, I was on the edge of my seat. I used to go on sea trials on Navy ships and I was fortunate not to witness anything so near to a collision. Agree entirely that there was no justification for censoring the report or removing the video feed, especially with the report being in the public domain now.
Thanks for an excellent report. As a sailor who survived despite being trapped in an inferno that was the result of bad navigation decisions while at sea I appreciate your observations and commentary BZ
As I remember, with many years as an OOD on two cruisers, the second the CO issues a command to the helm, the CO has both the DECK and the CONN. Depending on ship class and standing orders the NAV (Navigator) may also have that authority but the CO definitely has that regardless of being enumerated by standing orders. Also, the CO retains both DECK and CONN until formerly turned over to the OOD/JOOD(CONN) who must announce NAME and “I HAVE THE DECK/CONN” to the bridge.
During General Quarters and any ships movements like leaving port, or coming into Port, my duty position was what was called a JL talker. I had a glass board . I spoke with the three lookouts forward and aft With CIC we would coordinate designation OF ALL targets / contacts designated by CIC or by name of vessels. My station and glass board was directly behind the Captains chair on the starboard side of the bridge. I've pulled into San Diego many times. This is an easy evolution. The OOD captain, and Harbor Pilot/ master ALWAYS knew what relative bearing and what the radar showed for distance. It's almost like San Diego is cursed. I'm still flabbergasted that that ship , port side, burnt to the ground essentially. Every soldier in the Army or Marines knows how to shoot a rifle and pistol. Every sailor is a fire fighter. Ships are metal. Metal doesn't burn very easy. Ship can be compartmentalized and General Quarters can starve a fire of O² just by isolation. Navy ships at war have been able to defend against fires that included fuel, explosives and Delta types of fires while underway even when injuries are being trialed simultaneously. But this ship port side has a fire that couldn't be taken care of even of the duty section of two or three other ships showed up to help. Ridiculous just like this potential collision.
I did not see anything indicating what sort of Pre-underway/Navigation brief was conducted along with identification of risk and how to deal with those risks. This all feels like like the pre-breif and planning was lacking.
If the pre-briefing was lacking, I am pretty sure they would’ve put it in the report. That being said: While the pre- briefings are exceptionally important, and almost as important as the “lessons learned“ debrief, I’m not sure the investigators would’ve included it in the scope of their investigation.
1980's ship movement was announced in the local paper. In the 80's, CIC is the XO's station and fights the ship. The CO is on the bridge for safe navigation of the ship, his responsibility.
Sal, could you give your opinion about the general state of Pacific Fleet, it seems like a lot of systematic issues there which are going uncorrected despite previous events.
Impressive last second evasive action by the destroyer, finally. The thing to remember while doing this evasive action is that while your bow start moving away from incoming traffic, your stern is going to turn right and even accelerate the collision risk. I guess the mitigating actions then is speed away on your avoidance course, and maybe even a turn right so that your stern is moving away from incoming traffic. Not easy to do in the last few seconds available.
As long as there are no consequences to those responsible these type of incidents will continue to happen. It seems like incompetence almost caused two more ships to collide. I guess you can expect that when they let an aircraft carrier burn at the pier for 4 days and no one was held accountable, what is a minor ship collision in comparison?
How do USA navy ships render honours between ships? In my day ( not on a navy ship but a private frigate ) from we would fire one of our port cannons at the stenna Liverpool - Ireland ferry in a kind of salute. Obvs he didn’t use actual cannons, we just packed it tight with rags. Made quite a show for the ferry passengers. I miss my days at sea ⚓️
Navy ship used to (maybe still?) follow a preferred track between west coast bases and San Diego. So, it is not uncommon for ships going to and from San Diego on exactly opposite tracks. Also, nighttime, just pass midnight, is when ships conduct drills. One night, we were returning to Alameda. An LSD was heading to San Diego. I got off watch just before midnight, the LSD was just under 30K yds on exactly opposite track. Out OOD suggested port-to-port passage. The other OOD did not acknowledge. The LSD was doing a (shaft) stop-and-lock drill, what you would if the reduction gear or shaft lost lube oil flow. I presume they were locking the port shaft, and did not want to adjust course to starboard. Presumably the LSD OOD was now communicating with their EOOW. Just after I got into my rack, our ship healed to right (turning port). The OOD did not want to talk about it, but the ships log show: CO on deck, CO has the conn, left full rudder.
Waiting to see what another vessel is going to do is a collision plan. I was ANav on two fast attack submarnes (Skipjack & Barb) and NEVER waited to "see" what another vessel was going to do - I ALWAYS queried, or strenuously urged query, by bridge to bridge radio well ahead of passing to find out the other vessel's intention; when/if they deviated, I had a Plan B which included bridge to bridge communications - the info was always timely in terms of informing the OOD/CO. And as often as possible, CO, OOD, and ANAv had their own radios. I ran a tight navigation watch: my watch standers were tops; always on the alert via radar presentation and visuals via periscope. I had a lot of confidence in their ability to always know when the boat had been, was, and will be per our planned track into any harbor. If we wkere straying off track, my watch standers wre vocal about it. Superb and professional Sailors. Submarines have very little surface navigation experience as most traversing is underwater using manual and electronic deduced reckoning ("dead" reckoning) with periodic electonic position fixing. But all USN vessels have visual navigation experience entering/leaving ports. What baffles me is no mention of visual positioning data which would be plotted on a harbor chart. The visual plot is absolutely valuable in that any/all ship's manuevering information which can be predicted and confirmed by radio. I would take visual bearings by periscope on navigation aids and manuevering ships of concern while transiting channels or any restrictied waters. I am rather surprised at what I perceive is amateur hour between these two vessel's bridge navigation watch of which the OOD is an integral leading part. I recall submarine OODs were constantly confirming and planning with visual plot and only relying on electronics like radar as a measure of electronic accuracy but not the primary information input. There is no substitute for direct bridge to bridge radio communication with manual plot navigation feeding actual and predictive - in the future - data. I agree with you about CIC being essentially interference when a manual plot, right behind the helm, could better serve navigation safety with a top-down big picture view of the area both vessels are sailing. WoW - to me the mistakes both ships made should result in watch standing de-certification and and re-certification of Officers and Enlisteds. I am embarassed, but nonetheless GO NAVY Thank you for the video, Sal. have a nice tenured day.
Hard to tell since the NAVY did not publish what each Navigation Team chartered the path out of the harbor. Usually, the would plot the chart dead center of the channel between the buoy versus of setting to the right of channel. Usually, CIC would be giving a recommendation to maintain center of the channel again unless the CO decides maintain the right side of the channel through a standing order for CIC.. I don't have clear picture why Ferry chose to be on the Port Side of the channel nor why the SAN DIEGO HARBOR did not replace the rights side bouy, YET. The ships did not collide due to maintaining communications.
So a few officers are probably facing at the least removal from command or worse case a probable courts martial. Not to mention crew re- training. Thankfully a junior officer had enough sense to make some good decisions.
The indecisivness of the Harper Ferry CO and the CONN indicated that they would not do well in a stressful war situation. The action of the Harper Ferry Lt. Indicate that he should be promoted to Lt Cmdr.
I know this may be seen as a cop out, but the greatest thing here is neither vessel requiring yard time for repairs, nor were people injured or killed, and crucially, as ever there are lessons we can all take away. Be it shipping, aviation, industrial plant etc, the reoccurring factor I note is that communication (lack off) is the start of the failure and many times too much communication is the part just before the end outcome. Ultimately, training is the key, and it has to be said, whilst it can be dull, repetitive, and above all tedious, that's what makes better teams, and stops the day-to-day becoming the big news of the day.
You can't let shit like this slide. That doesn't make others take it seriously. Someone's careers needed to be over for this if only to be an example to other officers in the fleet to take the navigation of their ships seriously. There are lives at stake as well as very expensive ships funded by U.S. taxpayers.
@@johnlee1297 John: I'd fully agree on one hand (and the number of collisions in all Navy's testifies to the danger), but also obtaining honest feedback about what happened could stop the larger accident and an open dialog has to exist to get that information, in my opinion. That can only come without the risk of major sanctions. This was close and the implications will, I'm sure vex many a future class when taught and walked through the situation. That said, I think some parties to this may already know that future promotions (may be even careers), are going to reflect that five minutes of their lives.
One thing that the Annapolis grads got right was Customs and Courtesies. They rendered honors to the Flag Officer embarked. How about less people on the bridge and basic piloting from now on?
Sal, great great job on laying out this very sorry report for us. Insightful as usual! Any idea where we can find the rest of it? I’m referring to the enclosures with the interviews and all the other information and data collected?
This happened right where I used to sail my Sabot back in the day (1957-1963). Back then the worry was being run down by Navy and Coast Guard Grumman Albatrosses!
It might be interesting to know how much actually bridge experience the CO actually had - was he a surface warfare officer, or did he spend much of his career in the aviation community? People forget that Navy Officers are net the technical specialists that Merchant Seamen are.
It might have changed since I was on an LSD, but I’m pretty sure the CO was a SWO. LSDs are the platform for gator SWOs. LPDs are the training ground for Aviators rotating to LHD/LHA commands… and they rotate so a SWO is always either XO or CO. LSDs don’t usually have an air detachment, and they specialize in LCAC/Amphibious operations and truck/tank storage. So the aviator would be a little unnecessary… and probably bored! LHA/LHD have a rotation of SWO/Aviator for XO/CO, too.
Removing the feed was not force protection, but face protection. Thanks for the great videos!
Arse Protection 😅
Lol, true, both comments!!
99.9% of the time the ships will not be pushing limits while in harbor, so 99.9% of the time the webcam video will not be useful to an adversary. However, the ship's maneuvering performance limits can be extrapolated from the video because the ships would have been pushing the limits in an effort to avoid collision. Knowledge of these limits can inform an adversary's strategy.
The US Navy has a long tradition of covering up FUBARs to protect screw-ups, especially admiral rank. I see nothing has changed since WW2. Absolutely inexcusable atmosphere that insures the turds rise to the top. Protect the Annapolis Golden Boys and hose the rest.
Tactic acknowledgement that it will likely happen again, and they don’t want another video showing off the navy’s mismanagement
Adm. Ernest J. King: “The mark of a great shiphandler is never getting into situations that require great shiphandling.”
Sal, I spent 21 years in the Coast Guard on ships. My last 4 years was as a marine inspector / investigator. I have been on the bridge of many ships during transits just like this one. This transit is very much like Ever Forward in Baltimore. The bridge crews saw what was going on, but were afraid to speak up. One ship more than the other had a grasp of what was going on and took clear action, the other was a little slower to react. I have seen many many military ship evolutions and when they go south, it happens fast and they are usually averted by one person raising their voice over the others and taking command. Unfortunately, this seems to be a recurring situation where people are afraid of confrontation. The very way officers are advanced causes problems in situations like this. It is not a great career choice to second guess people in your chain of command, even when they welcome it, when they are the ones who write up your OER. I met so many great and competent leaders in the military, but the fear of even talking to them by juniors is real. Add a little social awkwardness for those who aren't outgoing and you have a problem. Social interaction between people these days is a real problem.
Sam I too spent 22 years (BM1/BMC) in the CG, I Worked on several construction tenders, last one was in NOLA on the Miss river, ICW, and if we were unsure we got back on the radio and verified passing arraignments! But we had no "O's" on board all enlisted. No big egos to bruise, had a great OINC!
'Social interaction between people these days is a real problem.' Speaks volumes. 'Diversity'..... in action..
@@iainsanders4775 Spot on.
Something still wrong with the system! I was in the US Army 2 years, 9 months and 6 hours ... I often wonder how many 2nd LTs kept their mouths shut, or worse, ignored the advice of their SFC, and many moms and dads got "the" telegram and folded flag!
Starting with the 1977 Tenerife airport disaster, commercial aviation has realized that the ability of a junior officer to correct a senior would prevent accidents. The result was CRM-Crew Resource Management, training which makes clear that anyone who sees a problem must speak up immediately and forcefully and that others must listen. The surface Navy seems in need of such training.
As a former OOD and JOOD on Perry class Frigates, I've been in both extremes of bridge climates. One had such a toxic atmosphere on the bridge and CIC that I doubt if anyone would have said anything if we were headed toward collision/grounding after an incident involving me, and the other a Bridge Management System was in place (before it was called that). On the latter, all bridge and CIC watch standers were encouraged to speak up if the situation didn't feel/look right without fear of reprisal.
Speaking as retired Navy who used to stand Conning Officer onboard a number of Navy ships:
1. Don't count on anything CIC says being followed on the bridge--generally the Piloting Officer in CIC is ignored by the bridge.
2. The moment the CO of a ship gives a direct order to the Conn, it is assumed that the CO has assumed the Conn and the Conning Officer is no longer responsible for directing the navigation of the ship.
3. The Conning Officer of the Harper's Ferry was put in an impossible situation by a completely screwed up chain of command.
4. Finally, even if Harper's Ferry had left the channel, she would still have been in 40 to 60 feet of water, she draws 21 (according to Wikipedia). Hadn't anyone studied the chart closely enough and planned for what to do in the case of an emergency i.e. propulsion or steering failure or, maybe, a destroyer taking a wide turn?
My understanding of naval procedures is that when the CO gives a order to the helm he automatically has the con.
If I had a radio, I'd have called the other craft. All of the assumptions scare me.
Is Surface Warfare Officers School still a thing? I know they closed Coronado a long time ago. That was more helpful for junior officers to get up to speed than OTJ training aboard ship.
On point 4, I think the OOD did know, second video of Prof. Sal's previous coverage [ua-cam.com/video/8s18O_iAlKE/v-deo.html ], at minute 11:15 the video of the incident continues, and the Harpers Ferry appears to be out of the channel.
Sounds like the Navy is more worried about there public image rather than remedying the issues that allowed this to unfold.
Dad was in the Navy in 1960s, 70s, 80s, and the longer he was in the less impressed he was by the upper brass. A thing he said about being passed over for promotion to Captain a couple times could say quite a bit, "I'm okay with that, I signed up to drive ships, not engage in political shenanigans." And that then brings up the kinds of things the last couple COs he was XO for said, it went like, "XO, if I'm not bored you aren't doing your job." Dad ran the ship while the Captain did all the politicking and networking, and I think one was working on a research paper.
Their
What else is new!
I was in in 80s-90s. Between the collision a few years ago, the _Bonhomme Richard_ fiasco, and this event, USN seems like a totally different organization. Very concerning.
Like every incident in the last 20 years.
I have learned more from your videos about maritime shipping over the last year than I had in my prior 79 years of life.
Hmmm, I am ex-navy, during sea and anchor detail there are 10-15 people on the bridge with at least 8 of them talking and giving information/recommedations. When I switched over to the Merchant Marine we had 5 people on the bridge and only two of those talking or giving reports. They were the CO, Pilot, Helm, OOD, and Lookout.
I spent some time in UAE providing Port Security/FP services for U.S. Navy and Coalition force ships. I got to see how a lot of different Navies did business on the bridge. On U.S. Ships it was amazing to me how many people were on the bridge. All sorts of things going on. Then on other ships there are maybe 5, and yet these ships seemed to do just find getting in and out of ports like Jebel Ali and FUJ.
" You're not going to hurt my feelings, I'm a tenured professor". Love it.
This is a great example of the FedGov's desire to over classify everything. From the webcam to the redactions the DOD and the Fedgov generally would much prefer to release no information that isn't PR poof pieces to anyone ever.
It's never happened if no one saw it!
"The fighting posture of bureaucracy is secrecy."
Has nothing to do with the federal government. They just have certain tools.
Excellent analysis. Busy port, narrow channel, student drivers, panic at the disco. IMHO the problem is peacetime Navy where career advancement goals drive short (usually two years or less) duty at any particular post. CYA is crucial to career advancement and drives limiting public communication including B2B comms - asking another ship about intentions is a sign of weakness. In wartime I hope that competence and experience will trump officer's potential upward mobility when making personnel decisions.
Run like a corporation
"hold my beer,watch this!"
Absolutely incredible. The coverage and analysis you provide to the American people - at no cost - is of a calibre that is unavailable anywhere else. Your experience with years at sea and teaching the principles at University gives a unique (and in my opinion, correct) analysis of every aspect of this incident; right down to shaming "Gibbs"!
Please keep your bag packed Dr. Sal; I know you're going to be doing some travelling and guest lectures but with great reviews like this, I think perhaps the Navy might want to get you in for a chat too - - I hope so!
So - while you've got this analysis being written, (and coordination of video feed being synced) you also teach, full-time at University, you Chair the Department, you're a volunteer Fire Captain, accomplished UA-cam Creator - and family Man... I suspect - - you've actually got some Superhuman skills you're not sharing with us. It's okay Sal - we can keep a secret - we're just glad you're doing what you do!!
As an old OS, this composit video of yours with the harbor cam video, charts and the report narration, and your observations is an excellent training tool for all bridge/CIC folks to sit down and watch. It really puts things into perspective - as a real teachable moment. As always an excellent video.
Glad you enjoyed it!
What a total cluster F! The NCSI pulling the plug on this webcam is BS. San Diego, being a border city as well as having a large military presence, IS the most surveilled city in United States.
Thank you for the honest commentary.
Great video! I’m safely retired now but as a Ships Master with what must be thousands of safe transits behind me, I’m stunned by the apparent lack of bridge team competence on Naval Vessels. Perhaps the USN should consider reinstating the old regime of “Professional Sailing Masters” to manage their watch standing and ship handling. In the sailing ship navies the “Sailing Master” usually did the ship handling while the Captain and his Line Officers managed and fought the ship. Basically experienced professional ship handlers assisting professional Naval Warfare Management Officers.
I can attest to the incompetence. But it is similar to being at a “teaching hospital” from a professional standpoint... Where the interns can’t easily be controlled… and most will opt out after 4 years.
The bridge is so much more crowded on a Navy ship, because it is a learning/teaching environment… in order to train the most officers possible. Many didn’t get any substantive ship handling time before reporting to the ship… especially for Sea and anchor detail… It is just one big cluster if the CO lets it get away from him/her.
@@tadgriffith Thats so true, Crowded is the new Normal, and crowded is more confusing.
I am not going to reveal my background but I will say this a very large part of the problem is the absolutely stupid amount of people on the bridge on naval vessels (especially so when you consider they often man the CIC too as a ‘blind pilotage team’. In my experience if the OOW is on the bridge then he is the one ‘in charge’ and the only one to give commands to the bridge team. Bearing in mind the OOW is by definition earning his sea miles it is quite in order for the Navigator, the XO or the CO to provide ‘experienced input’ to the OOW. If the Navigator, XO or CO think the situation merits it, they should formally take over by announcing to the bridge team ‘I have the ship’ and the OOW should retire to the back of the bridge and await further instructions. For a warship, going into an unfamiliar harbour QM, Bosuns mate, Radio Operator, OOW and Navigator then either the XO or the CO (not both) so 6 maximum. I have been on a 3,000 ton frigate and 17 people on the bloody bridge - now that was a recipe for disaster.
@@normanboyes4983 :
"Too many 'cooks' . . . . "
vs. "many hands lighten the load.".
@@normanboyes4983
I’m an ex-CIC guy (O.S.), Been in that narrow channel spot in San Diego many many times on Carriers, Amphibs, and a Cruiser. Have also been on the Bridge many times as Shipping Officer, who talks directly to CIC about the shipping he sees on the water.
I agree it sounds like over kill, all these people on the Bridge, a bunch more people in the darkness of CIC looking at radar contacts to backup the bridge with info about oncoming ships and little boats too. CIC is also using radar navigation To back up the Bridge’s visual navigation.
A lot of redundancy, a lot of teamwork, and also confusion.
But there is reasons for all the extra stuff.
These are fighting ships, war ships. They have to be able to sail and fight at the same time, like they are doing now in the fairly narrow Red Sea, protecting commercial shipping and protecting themselves against the hundreds of missiles & drones being lobbed their way out of Yemen.
The Bridge, CIC/Sensors, Electronic Warfare, CIWS, Missile Systems, Engineering, firefighting, cooks, Comms, Data Gathering, Intelligence, and admin types have all got to work with each other.
Their mission is complex, potentially life threatening. They all take swear an oath regarding the danger.
Having sailed on the USS Momsen DDG-92 many times in that same exact location I never saw the CO not be on the bridge once we hit buoy 1SD (first buoy coming into San Diego bay). He knew what was going on I guarantee you that!
Thanks for the great report Sal. Having grown up by the inlet of Rotterdam harbor, I am surprised to hear that San Diego waterway does not have a traffic control system in place. But the most surprising fact to me was that some of the people standing watch were not qualified to do so. Wow. In the end I am glad there was no collision, in spite of the confusion. But yeah folks, pick up the phone, sound the horn! Safety first!
I enjoyed this video. Don't apologize for the length, it was perectly formed.
Great job, Sal. Thanks for your comments on San Diego Web Cam, too. Hopefully your viewers will help us out by contacting the guys at the National Park Service and asking for cams back!
👉🇺🇸👈
As an ex sqid and OS I can tell you how rare it is for the Bridge to take any advice from Combat. It's a culture thing and we ran down a small boat because the Bridge did not see the contact on their radar even though we had a track for about 10 minutes. That was thirty years ago and hasn't changed. Combat probably was used to being ignored in this instance.
I was on a CG that nearly ran aground in that same area. The Navigator and Combat were giving the OOD different positions. The OOD ignored Combat. The situation was resolved when the OSC came out on the Bridge and stood next to the Captain looking out the window. When the Captain asked what he was doing on the Bridge, he replied "I came out to watch us run aground". The Captain ordered emergency full stop, and told everyone that the ship was not going to move another inch until everyone agreed on our exact position. Combat's position was the correct one. USN(Ret)
@@n5uge12 Good officers KNOW when a Chief thinks things are getting FUBAR ... YOU LISTEN to the Chief!
@@n5uge12 That was a hilarious approach to take to the situation. Reminds me of my grandfather's attitude about things. (He was a Master Sgt in the Army Air Core in WWII, not Navy. He apparently refused a promotion to officer class because he didn't want to have to hang out with officers.)
This is the kind of video you want to watch on UA-cam. It's is a perfect example of what social media should be. Great explanations. I come from a family of three generations of Navy. You were right on the money.
Great analysis, Sal!
Some notes from someone who earned his pin as a JO on an HFY class LSD and also served in the CRU/DES navy.
• HFY is diesel powered with CPP (Not steam)
• Even if HFY lost steerageway, she could have done a port or starboard twist to keep a complimentary attitude to MOM. Given her flat bottom and shallow draft, this works pretty well. The OOD pushing ahead at the key moment was considered decisive and good simply because it eliminated the chances of their sterns colliding. It’s good heads up execution… but calling for a twist with a Runner that doesn’t matter, was unnecessary as the attitude was favorable to where they would end up shooting ahead from.
• HFY OOD was probably a LTJG…. Maybe a senior ENS. But It’s hard to imagine an ENS would have the balls to take the CONN when it was obviously confusing as to whether the CO had the CONN. Then again, a LTJG should have said “Captain has the CONN” Once his orders needed to be done timely. Does this suggest the CO froze? Maybe. The fact that the report is so negative towards HFY does suggest that this might’ve been the case.
• MOM sure looked like she was going fast in the speed-restricted zone by Bravo (ammo) pier.
• XO is in charge of training… and there is a training officer. That’s why there is the extra paragraph ripping on them.
• Navigator (“gator”) on HFY is probably the most junior department head… usually a senior LTJG or recently promoted LT. They are often picked because they have an aptitude for ship driving/handling. The reason the CO and Nav were talking is likely because CO is communicating his style while the new(?) Nav is running the chart table and coordinating comms (instead of CIC which is pretty normal).
• The bridge and bridge-wings on an LSD are massive. On Mom? The bridge is minuscule by comparison… So it makes sense to utilize CIC for some comms… adding to confusion, I’m sure.
• The reason they didn’t do 5 whistles also is because it isn’t intentional… It isn’t indicative of a command or direction… One/two whistles for maneuvering to Starboard/Port (but most JO’s understand for P2P/S2S passing) is what you want to communicate in the channel. HFY did two whistles first, and whistles are the highest priority in the hierarchy. Everyone adapted accordingly.
• Why the redactions? The report did not seem to rip on MOM as much for what looked like at-best an equally-his-fault scenario. (I’m guessing the HFY CO did not interview as well as the MOM CO, too. But that is a borderline wild accusation.) By redacting the course/speed, the protectors of those not fired keeps others from armchair quarterbacking… and black-balling the innocent… and the political favorites. (Though I’d take a gentleman’s bet that MOM’s CO is better connected politically.) HFY went to whistles which made their intentions clear at the highest rung of comms. The only mitigating factor that I can tell is that there was also reports of a fire coming on MOM… and they responded in time to the whistles correctly.
• I’ve always had a bias for the Gator Navy, so take all criticisms of MOM with a grain of salt.
@tad Roger that. BZ on your breakdown.
I’m a retired navy senior chief cook, one that never stood bridge watch in my career. Even I know who the helmsman should’ve obeyed, specifically the officer with the conn, whether it’s the captain , navigator or OOD. As I remember from boot camp in a world long long ago, the officer with conn is the only one with authority to direct ship movement. While the conn is the OOD under normal steaming, the captain can take conn at any time by stating, “I have the conn.”
That's right....retired Signalman First Class...bridge watches out the ying yang on 5 types of ships.
@@redball7362 SM2 here, bridge watches for SM???
Query: why would a captain be anywhere but on the bridge (or maybe CIC) when entering or leaving port? Just curious.
As a retired civilian deck officer with an unlimited license who has discussed this problem at length with a close friend and graduate of Maine Maritime who holds an active, unlimited master's license and years of command at sea, this is not especially complicated. Deck officer cadets at the US Naval Academy simply do not receive enough of the proper training in one of the most basic and critical skills required of any deck officer, a thorough working knowledge of the rules of the road and the ability to apply them successfully, along with the requisite ship handling skills. Having come up through the hawspipe and learned many of my early navigation skills from the retired XO of a Fletcher Class destroyer, l was fortunate enough to have learned from one of the best and lucky enough to have avoided catastrophe when l made a blunder, which was often, but only by chance.
I agree as a Naval Academy graduate. During the normal ship-handling classes on the yard patrol (YP) craft, there isn't enough time for all to take charge as a conning officer. The only ones with great training are those that are part of the YP Squadron. During their cruise between Freshman and Sophomore years, midshipmen act as if they are enlisted and very few get ship control experience. Between Junior and Senior years, they have an additional ship cruise, but the conning experience is rare. The ships are rightfully more interested in qualifying their own officers on board.
The above remarks are patently false. I was Navigation Officer aboard a DDG. If a junior officer failed a COLREGS exam, they were taken off watch, remediated, and in extreme cases, removed. But I was an OCS guy, I don't know Annapolis stuffs. Probably why I was never in a mishap.
Sail safe.
@@cheddar2648 Your comment is not entirely clear and seems to contradict itself. ln the first sentence you appear to disagree with my assertion and the concurrence of Bill Higgins and in the second, seemingly the opposite. Please explain.
this was the sea and anchor detail, which should be the more experience team, plus additional watch standers. Then again, entering Pearl Harbor, the Conning officer was spilling his guts (about girl problems?) to the helmsman, when Nav called for the turn before Ford Island.
Thank you Sal. This was a close call. You did a wonderful job of explaining so many things!! Thankfully, no one was injured and a collision avoided.
Chuckled at your use in the summary of the appropriate descriptive term "Cluster" 😉
Your analysis is clear and much appreciated. Bottom line from BHR and this incident is "Competence, lack of".
Hey Sal, Harpers Ferry is diesel powered, not steam powered.
If you've been on the bridge of US Navy ship for an evolution like this you'd know seamanship isn't the best. A perfect example of this is ordering back on the engines when you need to maneuver. But not really a surprise to anyone one that's been there.
The NCIS was directed by someone to tell the Park Service to turn off the camera. They didn't do that on their own. They were probably told to do that by Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
I slipped and was thinking of the Austin class LPDs. Stupid mistakes
@@wgowshipping And you are absolute correct about the OOD that took action and saved the ship, he is a hero. He will pay for this in his fitreps and be forced to leave the Navy. I know from firsthand experience as that is exactly what happen as it happened to me. The XO (O-5) reamed me a new one because of an action that I took while a lowly Ensign and a report had to be sent off Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa about the action I took. And when it came back down from the Commander, the Commander said that I took appropriate and timely action to prevent embarrassment of the US Navy in a foreign port and that the Navy needed more junior officers to take initiative with available resources. After that no matter what I did that XO found it to be wrong and my fitreps showed it.
We had to do an unrep and I said that the water was too shallow (VA Capes, about 50' with a 32' draft ship), and that would impair control of the ship when close to an oiler with a similar draft, where they wanted us to do it he didn't listen even though I presented another area with water that was 9 fathoms deeper that met the rest of the requirements. That ended in us hitting the oiler and caused a lot of damage to both ships. Thankfully I was not the OOD, the JOOD and did not have the CONN when that happened and when I saw they couldn't keep the ship going straight said "I told you so" to myself. That collision ended both the XO's and the CO's careers.
The best comment is right at the end: “you’re not going to hurt my feelings, I’m a tenured professor” 😂
I try!
@@wgowshipping Lucky Sal is starting to sound like Lucky Hank (the new tv show with Bob Odenkirk)
That bridge resource management concept is mirrored in the cockpit of aircraft and studied in a similar fashion. The study of how people communicate and how to successfully manage attention in times of stressful situations has yielded great advances in aircraft, ship and even car safety...
Well that’s just two in discussion in a cockpit for the most part. Here you have four officers all with skin in the game. Seems this resource management was more of an issue for those that had to carry out four different directions(orders). Having a “committee” on the bridge? What so no one has responsibility if something goes wrong? The report literally is pointing fingers at four different people, is that what is intended by this resource management concept. Hey if we screw up they can’t pen it on one person, great! Let’s go with this concept, all our jobs are safe, just a little comment in our records, next promotion here we come.
@@JohnSmith-gb5vg You can have more than two on some airliners on some routes. It's less common than it used to be but does still happen.
I have followed this story since you first published it. I believe the most worrying aspect of the report is not the redaction but rather the whole thrust of the report which did not call out the total clusterfuck for what it was. How can the Navy hope to improve Bridge watchkeeping standards with this sort of obfuscation?
As a former Operations Specialist that worked both on the bridge and in CIC during S&A details, this was a great watch for me.
@What is Going on With Shipping? Liverpool Cammell Laird Update - RFA Tiderace was moved between dry docks last week. It was quite cool to watch the dock being flooded and the lock gate being lowered, before tugs pulled her out of the dry dock. Topaz Tangaroa has also been mostly repainted from the original dark blue to Navy grey . Both ships are now pretty much side by side and when in Birkenhead, you can drive past the shipyard and see the Tiderace bow above the street, and the Topaz helipad. I was lucky enough to be travelling across the river the past few days and got a good look. Liverpool has two large tunnels that run under the River Mersey, and they are connected to each other by a smaller tunnel complex. It's quite a cool and fairly unique city. I hope you and your family are well. Keep safe and keep on shipping!
Great review Sal. During my days as sea detail OOD, CIC did very little for the bridge, the bridge team has best situational awareness during tight maneuvering. Appears Momsen OOD had good situational awareness and maneuvered out of that situation. Both bridges should have been on radio confirming their intent long before getting that close.
Hey Sal. I'm a former US Navy Harbor Pilot with 24 years of Naval Service. In all of my years of piloting over 160 US Naval Ships, Submarines, USCG and commercial vessels in four US Ports have I've ever seen something like this. If communication fails via radio they can always use signalman to communicate with the other vessel. Whatever happened to common sense. Long before the two ships met the comms between the two ships should have been flowing and obviously there was a breakdown there. I'm just happy it wasn't a major incident in the channel because that would choke off all traffic flowing through there. I spent five years on a DDG in San Diego and we never had or come close to an incident like this. Well we all know what happened afterwards!
This gave me flashbacks to back 20+ years ago when I was piloting a 40 ft cruiser down the Livingston channel (southern Detroit river) in the fog and on my radar I see a freighter coming up the downbound channel (instead of the upbound Amherstburg channel). No five short horn blasts, nothing! Passed port to port in maybe a 120 ft wide channel.
COs of large amphibs are often not career shiphandlers but airdales in training for possible command of an aircraft carrier. That doesn't mean they aren't good but they aren't going to have the experience of a SWO with the same time in service. I was on a LPD in the 80s and both my COs were pilots.
This isn't just the regular underway watch on duty. The crew on the bridge for special sea detail are the ones the CO trusts the most to handle the ship in difficult maneuvering situations. The OOD on the Harpers Ferry is most likely a Department Head, probably a Lieutenant Commander (O4) or senior Lieutenant (O3).
The CO at the time was a surface warfare officer.
Better call Sal! Another great report on a current maritime event.
When you abolish Top of class and bottom of the class making all equal, you no longer distinguish who is capable to drive a ship and who rides a desk.
Sal again a super job by you. So much to cover. Although no paint exchanged it is still embarrassing. One thing, at least 40 years ago, when the CO gave a rudder order the conning officer would announce that "the Captain has the conn" so that the helm would know who is now conning the ship. If the CO was ready to relinquish it the Conning officer would announce "this is LTJG xxx I have the conn, LT yyyy has the deck". This bit of internal comms perhaps would have let the helm know who was calling the shots. Dont know if that is still the prescribed practice. Again great job Sal and to the poor JO, who would probably make a great wartime officer.
Retired Navy Chief here... 2 things... one, the 5 blasts in my day meant "WHAT ARE YOU FUCKING DOING?!", and two, the Captain (CO) ALWAYS has the CONN- thus, the confused Helmsman should of IGNORED the NAV and OOD and do what the CO ordered, PERIOD. "It's their ship (the CO's)- it's their ass if they're wrong, NOT YOU!" as I taught my Sea Pups many, many times.
Thank you for talking about the feed cut
Leave it to the Navy to have a hissy fit over embarrassment. I worked on a ship in San Diego. You can see, and be seen EVERYWHERE there. OPSEC my arse!! 😡
By the way, folks, if you write to the NPS point of contact listed on the SDWC page please by civil, be polite.
I never was in the Navy but this is a general example on the fact that 'communication is key'! It's almost never bad to ask or confirm twice for the extra bit of understanding. Luckily nobody was hurt and this was handled in a detailed report.
As a Certified Landlubber… I enjoy these videos no matter how long they are.
Thank you Professor Sal
This could not happen in our Navy (OZ) There are only 2 things you have to remember in the absence of designated port exit and entry lanes. 1) The Officer of the Watch is responsible for the ship. The first thing he says when he arrives on the bridge is, "I have the Con". He is responsible unless the Captain says, "I am taking the Con." The helmsman only listens to one or the other. He acknowledges, "The Captain/First Officer has the Con." You do not consult the Nav or Tactical Officer. They are not in the chain of command for conning the ship. They only advise the Officer of the Watch or the Captain. There can never be confusion. This rule goes back 400 years. 2) In any moment of confusion, the ships must pass Port to Port by default if they are heading in opposite direction. If they are going in the same direction, the ship that had another on his starboard side, always has right of way. In the case of San Diego, in the absence of lanes, the first rule applies.
If this had happened here, The officers conning both ships would be suspended from duty, there would be a Court Marshall and careers would be ended. The charge is failing to ensure the safety of the ship and not obeying the Laws of Navigation.
Horatio Hornblower seen in a double face palm. Thanks for the video Sal!
Thank you for another interesting and informative video. Including the important info on the camera that filmed the incident being cut. The more of us that support the San Diego Webcam, the better!
I am confused by a couple of things. After passing, Harpers Ferry seemed to give up attempting to stay in the channel (but fortunately had deep water). Is their maneuverability really that bad? Also confused why Momsen didn't decline the pilot at that location. Is that a thing that could have been done - simply say no, we will do it after passing? I also really wonder how these ships would perform under combat stress.
All good questions.
By the way, this was another great episode. I put the quality of your incident analysis videos on par with CSB.
HFY had deep water to port after MOM poured in the throttle. But it is not desirable to leave the channel…
Minor issue: there’s a lot of kelp, and
Major issue: there was also a ship on the bravo/ammunition pier… and they don’t want to go hard left, run over the buoy, foul their screws/rudder and go crashing into the bravo, pier.
These ships are not designed, not do they train, for combat in restricted waters like that. But of course, even on the open ocean, if there is a formation of ships and a wave of missiles is coming in, there could easily be a collision.
I like your shirts, it gives a nice atmosphere to your videos, you are now the go to channel when there is a maritime related incident
Thank you!
Perhaps I missed it but you mentioned an incoming tide. That would have make MOM less responsive to rudder angle and HFY perhaps more. Hence another reason to initiate a two whistle STS passage once it became clear that a collision was possible.
Great Video Sal. Having watched the Momsen arrive in Panama City Beach, Florida for commissioning, this incident is sad to see. I am glad that everyone is okay
It should be SOP that ship to ship radio communications should be in continuous contact with each other while within visual maneuvering range. The lack of knowing what the other ship was up to contributed to this incident.
When communication breaks down it breaks down incredibly fast, we should all have learned this by now. I don't know what is going on with the military in general anymore, it's lost so much the last 20 years. I don't know if it's just lowering standards lower and lower, or what, but it sure seems like there is a lot of serious problems everywhere. Also how the hell do you not know who to take orders from? It's like these sailors have had a weekend course, and then they're thrown on the boat. Seriously wtf. Anyway I enjoyed the your breakdown and analysis of the situation thank you!
Greetings Sal,
First and foremost, this whole affair could have been avoided had there been local harbor pilots aboard both ships, with the Momsen pilot having boarded before Momsen’s entry to San Diego. (I don’t know this for a fact but it’s possibly due to (1)Navy’s desire to avoid expenses on pilotage and (2)commanding officers’ egos that there weren’t pilots aboard early on.)This isn’t to say that pilots do not have accidents. They do, but they understand local conditions, know one another and are familiar with the harbor, reacting differently from the ship commander who makes an occasional harbor transit.
The Momsen’s pilot transfer was poorly orchestrated, occurring at an in opportune moment. Both ships were in agreement to meet port to port. Momsen should have started her turn to starboard regardless of the tug alongside (It’s doubtful that tug was made up alongside in order to transfer pilot to Momsen (even if she were it’s up to the pilot boat(tug) to take care of herself. At 5 to 8 knots she could do so. )
One point of clarification, when ships approach each other head-to-head, or nearly so, they are said to be meeting, they will meet. When one ship comes up from astern, or nearly so, of another ship the overtaking ship is said to be the passing ship. I bring this up because the dialogue is in some places inconsistent.
Obviously neither one of us has the full story but this is what it looks like from my armchair.
Best regards from Come-by-Chance,
Joe Homer
The OOD decision reminds me of The Caine Mutiny from WW2...great vid Sal, thanks!!!
In aircraft cockpits we call it crew resource management. The best briefing I ever got was "if you see me doing something stupid sing out and I'll do the same". No bullshit CRM.
Great analysis, Professor Sal. All too often in 2023 we see "near disasters" (let's stop calling them "near misses") at airports, ports, and in less spectacular situations with local police, firefighting, railroads, etc. Too little training, too little accountability, too many non-focused thinking (playing with smart phones?), etc. Perhaps, "sterile cockpit" thinking must be reinforced in all industries when engaged in all high risk activities: paramedics pushing meds at 0-dark thirty after 72 hours on duty with minimal sleep, LEO's in the alley with the urban camper screaming at unseen Zombies, pilots turning onto/off of runways, etc. As to the NCIS ... "no comment."
One thing missed in the report, and largely missed by most of the commentators online, the initial port to port passage between TRIPOLI and HARPERS FERRY caused HARPERS FERRY to be significantly right of her navigation track. Given the flood tide and the fact that she was being set further right of track by the "set", her navigation team likely over corrected to port and drove her across the channel to MOMSEN's side. This set up an error chain which was then compounded by the pilot embarkation aboard MOMSEN causing the ship to maintain a course which took her past her normal turning point.
Another point missed here is that the pilot who embarked MOMSEN "should" have used his significant expertise and recommended delaying his embarkation until after the ships had passed. But long standing culture in the San Diego area is that you don't critique the pilots......so we just give them a pass.
Check out my earlier videos on this:
ua-cam.com/video/8s18O_iAlKE/v-deo.html
You noticed similar things that I pointed out in my comment but interpreted differently than you.
Unless I'm misunderstanding the situation, the video shows the Momsen coming into port with an incoming tide pushing the Momsen forward. The Harper's Ferry is coming in the opposite direction exiting the port and is fighting an incoming tide that is also pushing it to starboard because of the severe curve of the channel. This should mean that Harper's Ferry is pointing to slightly to port to compensate for the tide's push to starboard. Unlike what you posted, I tend to view the ships not pushed around by the conditions but being piloted to compensate for the conditions. Because the Harper's Ferry is pointing to slightly to port, to the approaching Momsen visually it probably looked like the ships were on a collision course if Harper's Ferry was travelling at speed and speed is one thing you can never know when an object is approaching directly at you. Without verbal communication, neither side could know for sure what the other's intentions were.
Re: the first 3 minutes on the shutting off the webcams, forget NCIS, the Navy, period, has never liked its dirty laundry aired, and in this case, suddenly the private webcams showed a potential for showing things that the Navy higher-ups would rather not be featured on the 6PM news. Res ipse loquitur.
Great analysis as always. Thanks for making the maneuvers simple to understand for a simple landlubber like me.
Never thought i would be interested in something like this. I must be getting old. Well presented!
With Sea and Anchor set, you would think the 'A' team would be on the Bridge. These Officers and Crew should be the most highly experienced on board.
During sea and anchor detail, the CO puts watchstanders they trust the most during restricted maneuvering, this occurs when entering/leaving ports and unreps.
Great video, I saw the first one and this was the explanation we all needed, thanks.
Glad you liked it!
Sal,
In combat situations, it makes sense to have a lot of people on the bridge. When coming in and out of port, you can easily have too many people on the bridge.
If this was a commercial vessel, you would have had the Master, the watch officer, an able-bodied seaman, an ordinary seaman, and a pilot. Commercial vessels would pick up the pilot at the sea buoy, not during the start of the turn. It seems that there are so many people involved that using the radio was lost in the background noise.
I am also curious as to why there's no mention of the ECDIS or the Collision Avoidance Radar. Certainly, our naval vessels are equipped with these moder navigation tools.
The triangle area you mention is also where the marinas on Shelter Island and Harbor Island join San Diego Bay. Add a few pleasure craft to the mix, and you have the formula for a disaster.
One question I have was the pilot that boarded the Momsen a Harbor Pilot? Or, was it a Navy Pilot? I assume it was a Navy Pilot since a fleet tug was used rather than a pilot boat. In either case, where was the pilot needed? Transiting under the Coronado Bridge and docking at Naval Base San Diego? Transit past Coronado Naval Air Station?
Bob
It was the Navy docking pilot.
HFY Radar in CiC was knocked out by a blown fuse..
@Formula Firebird I worked for 35 years with oil companies and their tankers. We always had 2 radars, a 3cm and a 10cm unit. One was connected to the ship's main switchboard and the other to the emergency switchboard. USCG and regulatory body rules require two separate power sources and separate wiring. The only place they are together is on the bridge.
It would take an idiot to place all navigation radars on a single breaker, or single power source.
I find it incomprehensible that the bridge team management relied on the CIC to monitor their radars. The Advanced Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) or Collision Avoidance System ((CAS), and the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) are designed as aids to the bridge team. They exist to aid in both the navigation and management of the vessel. They are so important harbor pilots carry their own ECDIS equipment. I have not worked with the ships directly for over a decade but at the turn of this century, we were training able-bodied seaman to use the ARPA radars.
Bob
When I was enlisted Radarman, that "triangle" was where you always lost track for a couple of minutes.
Everyone should setup their own webcams until they reinstate the webcam! Bunch of dopes!
P.S. These Junior Officers should get MEDALS and PROMOTIONS for potentially saving lives and these expensive Naval assets!
Sal, You should do a video on the USN's XO/CO Fleet up decision made about 10 years ago which was a huge cluster fluck.
Great video, I was on the edge of my seat. I used to go on sea trials on Navy ships and I was fortunate not to witness anything so near to a collision. Agree entirely that there was no justification for censoring the report or removing the video feed, especially with the report being in the public domain now.
Thanks for an excellent report. As a sailor who survived despite being trapped in an inferno that was the result of bad navigation decisions while at sea I appreciate your observations and commentary
BZ
As I remember, with many years as an OOD on two cruisers, the second the CO issues a command to the helm, the CO has both the DECK and the CONN. Depending on ship class and standing orders the NAV (Navigator) may also have that authority but the CO definitely has that regardless of being enumerated by standing orders.
Also, the CO retains both DECK and CONN until formerly turned over to the OOD/JOOD(CONN) who must announce NAME and “I HAVE THE DECK/CONN” to the bridge.
During General Quarters and any ships movements like leaving port, or coming into Port, my duty position was what was called a JL talker. I had a glass board . I spoke with the three lookouts forward and aft With CIC we would coordinate designation OF ALL targets / contacts designated by CIC or by name of vessels. My station and glass board was directly behind the Captains chair on the starboard side of the bridge. I've pulled into San Diego many times. This is an easy evolution. The OOD captain, and Harbor Pilot/ master ALWAYS knew what relative bearing and what the radar showed for distance. It's almost like San Diego is cursed. I'm still flabbergasted that that ship , port side, burnt to the ground essentially. Every soldier in the Army or Marines knows how to shoot a rifle and pistol. Every sailor is a fire fighter. Ships are metal. Metal doesn't burn very easy. Ship can be compartmentalized and General Quarters can starve a fire of O² just by isolation. Navy ships at war have been able to defend against fires that included fuel, explosives and Delta types of fires while underway even when injuries are being trialed simultaneously. But this ship port side has a fire that couldn't be taken care of even of the duty section of two or three other ships showed up to help. Ridiculous just like this potential collision.
I did not see anything indicating what sort of Pre-underway/Navigation brief was conducted along with identification of risk and how to deal with those risks. This all feels like like the pre-breif and planning was lacking.
If the pre-briefing was lacking, I am pretty sure they would’ve put it in the report.
That being said: While the pre- briefings are exceptionally important, and almost as important as the “lessons learned“ debrief, I’m not sure the investigators would’ve included it in the scope of their investigation.
1980's ship movement was announced in the local paper. In the 80's, CIC is the XO's station and fights the ship. The CO is on the bridge for safe navigation of the ship, his responsibility.
Sal, could you give your opinion about the general state of Pacific Fleet, it seems like a lot of systematic issues there which are going uncorrected despite previous events.
Impressive last second evasive action by the destroyer, finally. The thing to remember while doing this evasive action is that while your bow start moving away from incoming traffic, your stern is going to turn right and even accelerate the collision risk. I guess the mitigating actions then is speed away on your avoidance course, and maybe even a turn right so that your stern is moving away from incoming traffic. Not easy to do in the last few seconds available.
As long as there are no consequences to those responsible these type of incidents will continue to happen. It seems like incompetence almost caused two more ships to collide. I guess you can expect that when they let an aircraft carrier burn at the pier for 4 days and no one was held accountable, what is a minor ship collision in comparison?
How do USA navy ships render honours between ships? In my day ( not on a navy ship but a private frigate ) from we would fire one of our port cannons at the stenna Liverpool - Ireland ferry in a kind of salute. Obvs he didn’t use actual cannons, we just packed it tight with rags. Made quite a show for the ferry passengers. I miss my days at sea ⚓️
Navy ship used to (maybe still?) follow a preferred track between west coast bases and San Diego. So, it is not uncommon for ships going to and from San Diego on exactly opposite tracks. Also, nighttime, just pass midnight, is when ships conduct drills. One night, we were returning to Alameda. An LSD was heading to San Diego. I got off watch just before midnight, the LSD was just under 30K yds on exactly opposite track. Out OOD suggested port-to-port passage. The other OOD did not acknowledge. The LSD was doing a (shaft) stop-and-lock drill, what you would if the reduction gear or shaft lost lube oil flow. I presume they were locking the port shaft, and did not want to adjust course to starboard. Presumably the LSD OOD was now communicating with their EOOW. Just after I got into my rack, our ship healed to right (turning port). The OOD did not want to talk about it, but the ships log show: CO on deck, CO has the conn, left full rudder.
Waiting to see what another vessel is going to do is a collision plan. I was ANav on two fast attack submarnes (Skipjack & Barb) and NEVER waited to "see" what another vessel was going to do - I ALWAYS queried, or strenuously urged query, by bridge to bridge radio well ahead of passing to find out the other vessel's intention; when/if they deviated, I had a Plan B which included bridge to bridge communications - the info was always timely in terms of informing the OOD/CO. And as often as possible, CO, OOD, and ANAv had their own radios. I ran a tight navigation watch: my watch standers were tops; always on the alert via radar presentation and visuals via periscope. I had a lot of confidence in their ability to always know when the boat had been, was, and will be per our planned track into any harbor. If we wkere straying off track, my watch standers wre vocal about it. Superb and professional Sailors.
Submarines have very little surface navigation experience as most traversing is underwater using manual and electronic deduced reckoning ("dead" reckoning) with periodic electonic position fixing. But all USN vessels have visual navigation experience entering/leaving ports.
What baffles me is no mention of visual positioning data which would be plotted on a harbor chart. The visual plot is absolutely valuable in that any/all ship's manuevering information which can be predicted and confirmed by radio. I would take visual bearings by periscope on navigation aids and manuevering ships of concern while transiting channels or any restrictied waters.
I am rather surprised at what I perceive is amateur hour between these two vessel's bridge navigation watch of which the OOD is an integral leading part. I recall submarine OODs were constantly confirming and planning with visual plot and only relying on electronics like radar as a measure of electronic accuracy but not the primary information input. There is no substitute for direct bridge to bridge radio communication with manual plot navigation feeding actual and predictive - in the future - data.
I agree with you about CIC being essentially interference when a manual plot, right behind the helm, could better serve navigation safety with a top-down big picture view of the area both vessels are sailing. WoW - to me the mistakes both ships made should result in watch standing de-certification and and re-certification of Officers and Enlisteds.
I am embarassed, but nonetheless
GO NAVY
Thank you for the video, Sal. have a nice tenured day.
Hard to tell since the NAVY did not publish what each Navigation Team chartered the path out of the harbor. Usually, the would plot the chart dead center of the channel between the buoy versus of setting to the right of channel. Usually, CIC would be giving a recommendation to maintain center of the channel again unless the CO decides maintain the right side of the channel through a standing order for CIC.. I don't have clear picture why Ferry chose to be on the Port Side of the channel nor why the SAN DIEGO HARBOR did not replace the rights side bouy, YET. The ships did not collide due to maintaining communications.
Great stuff! Thanks for making it easier to understand. Love your work.
I love it when Sal calls out BS
Thank you Sal. Very good summary. Best.
Why would the guy on the helm not realise and take avoiding action without orders? Would he just wait till the ships ran into each other.
So a few officers are probably facing at the least removal from command or worse case a probable courts martial. Not to mention crew re- training. Thankfully a junior officer had enough sense to make some good decisions.
Great follow-up video! Thanks!!!
Glad you enjoyed it!
As an active and current professional aircraft pilot I can say with utmost certainty that a "near miss" is a hit and a "near hit" is a miss.
The indecisivness of the Harper Ferry CO and the CONN indicated that they would not do well in a stressful war situation.
The action of the Harper Ferry Lt. Indicate that he should be promoted to Lt Cmdr.
In WW Two, CIC was said to stand for "Christ I'm Confused". Seems like the bridge deserved that title in this case.
I know this may be seen as a cop out, but the greatest thing here is neither vessel requiring yard time for repairs, nor were people injured or killed, and crucially, as ever there are lessons we can all take away.
Be it shipping, aviation, industrial plant etc, the reoccurring factor I note is that communication (lack off) is the start of the failure and many times too much communication is the part just before the end outcome.
Ultimately, training is the key, and it has to be said, whilst it can be dull, repetitive, and above all tedious, that's what makes better teams, and stops the day-to-day becoming the big news of the day.
You can't let shit like this slide. That doesn't make others take it seriously. Someone's careers needed to be over for this if only to be an example to other officers in the fleet to take the navigation of their ships seriously. There are lives at stake as well as very expensive ships funded by U.S. taxpayers.
@@johnlee1297 John: I'd fully agree on one hand (and the number of collisions in all Navy's testifies to the danger), but also obtaining honest feedback about what happened could stop the larger accident and an open dialog has to exist to get that information, in my opinion. That can only come without the risk of major sanctions.
This was close and the implications will, I'm sure vex many a future class when taught and walked through the situation.
That said, I think some parties to this may already know that future promotions (may be even careers), are going to reflect that five minutes of their lives.
Thank you Sal for sharing info about San Diego Web Camera. I agree, its a sham by both the Navy NICS and Park Service. We want our camera back!
⚓️ Thanks Sal 😎 any mention of the Pilot’s action? 🎸
There was a brief mention, but he was a Navy Station docking pilot and not a San Diego Bay pilot.
One thing that the Annapolis grads got right was Customs and Courtesies. They rendered honors to the Flag Officer embarked. How about less people on the bridge and basic piloting from now on?
It was worth watching the whole video to get to: "You're not going to hurt my feelings; I'm a tenured professor."
I like the banner on your bookshelf.
Sal, great great job on laying out this very sorry report for us. Insightful as usual! Any idea where we can find the rest of it? I’m referring to the enclosures with the interviews and all the other information and data collected?
This happened right where I used to sail my Sabot back in the day (1957-1963). Back then the worry was being run down by Navy and Coast Guard Grumman Albatrosses!
It might be interesting to know how much actually bridge experience the CO actually had -
was he a surface warfare officer, or did he spend much of his career in the aviation community?
People forget that Navy Officers are net the technical specialists that Merchant Seamen are.
It might have changed since I was on an LSD, but I’m pretty sure the CO was a SWO.
LSDs are the platform for gator SWOs.
LPDs are the training ground for Aviators rotating to LHD/LHA commands… and they rotate so a SWO is always either XO or CO.
LSDs don’t usually have an air detachment, and they specialize in LCAC/Amphibious operations and truck/tank storage. So the aviator would be a little unnecessary… and probably bored!
LHA/LHD have a rotation of SWO/Aviator for XO/CO, too.
Very good explanation. Who or what determines where the pilot gets on board? cheeers.
Brings back memories