The collision was not because 2 trains were in the same block as this would of been permissive working which allows more than one train in each block and i have never seen a signal that displays a yellow with 2 white lights, it's usually red with white lights.
For anyone struggling to understand the poor description; 2 trains heading back to depot. HST infront of an Azuma. Running on permissive signalling which is 2 white lights, meaning track can be occupied by more than 1 train at a time. Must proceed at caution & be prepared to stop. 1 train is now following directly behind the other. Azuma train runs into the back of the HST as he was distracted by a fault on his train. (Side note; signal L772 at 1:18 would not show a single yellow main aspect AND the associated position lights together.....it will show either one or the other at any one time)
Found this quite difficult to listen to at times as your speech isn’t clear, so the video needs subtitles please. It is a good effort, not criticising but just making a point, thanks.
LNER were withdrawing all their HSTs before the end of 2019, but yes, it is a shame that this one's life ended this way. I managed to get a picture of it in New Southgate, just three months before the Neville Hill incident.
@@gregkiteos1936 it was the Craigentinny 100th one i think if i correctly remember think it was basically after written off used for spares most HSTs LNER had moved to EMR before they withdrew them as for the shitatchi that got sent away to be repaired for a fw months do believe there also gradually replacing the 91s also soon to go as not many left now
I do wonder if there's a point that, like planes, trains will get to the poinw where they require two in the cab to manage all the complex systems, it seems to me that a second pair of eyes, a first officer if you will, would have prevented this by being a second set of eyes and keeping a watch out the window while the driver was distracted. Makes me wonder at what point that will become a serious issue3
I think that is a fair suggestion. My view on it is that he should have gone to turn APCO off after he came to a full stop instead of taking his attention away, but that’s just my view on it.
To me, it sounds like the driver was distracted by how complex the system was to operate and that isn't solely on training or a bulletin at the depot though. I've seen some TWS4 footage of the 800/801 and even in that scaled down one, I've seen real train drivers playing it get overwhelemed by the system, and that's not the full TMS that is modeled there, so to me I feel like it's partly on the driver for being distracted during a critical phase of operation, partly on the people who designed, tested and signed off on the TMS Quoting the RAIB report: The RAIB found that the driver had been unable to set up the train management system because “ambiguous documentation” from manufacturer Hitachi led to LNER “misunderstanding the required process” when it developed its driving training programme. It also said that the train firm failed to recognise he needed more training than his peers. To me that screams of poor design for the software and documentation, as well as Hitachi not being rigorous enough with the testing, LNER failing to spot things and the driver not being able to catch his mistake quickly enough though. It goes back to my point of okay, but, how much more complex are trains going to get. How can train makers and operators account for that and mitigate that then?
@@jacekatalakis8316I think the other aspect to this, which the train designers really need to look at is why do they add complexity to what is in front of the driver and what they need to do? Human factors is a cruicial part of design and additional features should not be added because they can, but be challenged to see if they should. The driver needs to focus on the road ahead and controlling the speed ahead. Additional functionality, controls and features can overload the driver and distract their concentration. Keep things simple is the key, something older rolling stock does. There are lessons to be learned here for sure.
To me that's a double edged sword. I'm still wondering at what point things get too complex and we get a worse crash due to this? It's absolutely, 110% a safety issue. Training is one part of it, design is the other part of it, human factors is a part of it. To me, there needs to be clear splitting of driving duties, an train managing uties. Ideally, you'd have someone on the train crew whose sole job it is to manage the train, run the TMS, run the doors, et cetera, similar to how aircraft crews are with a pilot whose sole job it is to fly, an the other monitors what is going onm though airliners are suffering the same issue with entirely too much complexity. I don't think you can fairly compare earlier rolling stock with today's trains, though. You have to look at it in context. How much more complex were the trains when they were brought into service versus what was already in service however?
@@jacekatalakis8316 I guess the point I’m making is that the older rolling stock, which has less complexity in the driver’s cab still performs adequately. The fact that more modern trains are more ‘complex’ due to additional features, should not lead to them being more complex to drive. Those features that are not requiring driver operation whilst in motion, perhaps should be positioned out of the line of sight of the driver to reduce the information over load. As good as it would be to have a second person with the driver, I doubt the train companies will go for that as it will be another person to pay! The thing is, one person operation is ok. There was a time when HSTs operating at 125mph had a second person, but that reduced to one person in the end. I guess for me, it still boils down to understanding human factors and keeping things simple for the driver whilst the train is in motion. Having said that, even though I am a design engineer, I won’t profess to be knowledgable about todays newer rolling stock.
Have you done the incident where 2 First Great Western units collided at Exeter St Davids, being a class 150/2 and a class 43 HST, If not please can you do it.
Not trying to be funny or anything but whilst I found your short video really interesting I was struggling to understand what you were saying, partly because the sound levels didn't seem right but also, as someone not working in the industry and therefore not familiar with the jargon you were speaking to quickly and quietly. I look forward to watching more videos but hope you can take this feedback on board! 👍
Having no knowledge about how train systems work, I was unable to understand the meaning of what you were saying. But it was clearly explained by the 2 trains reading the same signals and had a bump, am I right.?
I don't feel bad now about coming of the road in Salisbury depot. There are spring points up by the head shunt. I had gone over them and changed ends to go back down towards the detanking section but didn't notice that they were half cooked and set for neither direction. Just the front bogie off. So tempting to stick it in reverse to see if it would rerail itself but I couldn't risk it. Lack of maintenance on the points was the outcome.
@@JTV84 Technically they could have said 'you didn't check the points' and I'm surprised they didn't. You turn the engines off at the top of the headshunt & roll back down under gravity. There is a light on a post over the points I was screened for drink & drugs though which is normal in the case of an incident. The depot manager had accused me of not going far enough over the points before setting back. A week later I was rolling back down and stopped in front of the points. They were half cocked again. This time I called the shunter up on the radio to witness it. THEN they decided it was a good idea to catch up on the maintenance of the points. No apology from the maintenance depot manager though for the false accusation.
@@derektaylor2941 The (Engineering) Depot Manager was well known for disliking drivers. Shame really because we got on really well with the rest of the depot staff. The 159s were well maintained at Salisbury and the depot won several railway industry Golden Spanner awards.
IET: not a loco HST: designed to work in fixed sets so didn't need buffers* *Shut up about the eight that had them fitted, it's because they ran as a stopgap due to delays in MK4 coach delivery
@@Danse_Macabre_125 why be so hostile. I only made a comment. So a HST is a upgraded DMU? Take a chill pill at least the older classes had style unlike the current crap designs. If Sir Nigel Gresley was watching the way design has gone he'd be ashamed.
@user-xh3lz9xt4l it was mostly satire to prevent people being pedants, didn't mean to offend, sorry. Yes, HSTs when new were called Class 253 and 254 as they were viewed to be DEMUs, which explains why, for example, a standard class HST MK3 carriage is labelled as 42xyz while a loco hauled MK3 standard class is labelled as 12xyz
1m24s shows signal clear,but you wouldn't get two white lights to proceed and a yellow signal together.Main signal remains at red and only white lights illuminates (call ahead signal,be prepared to stop short of any obstruction )
your graphic of L772 is wrong, position light signals do not clear with main aspects, there are many features in this accident and its causes that you have overlooked, did you read the RAIB report? Consider too the speed of creep control and the operation of the driver interface with the control system, there are many reasons why this was a trap for a driver to fall into which does not come out in your analysis. The behaviour of the train at such low speed is also very interesting but beyond the scope of your short video.
Thanks for the feedback, I’ll take it into consideration. Yes I did read the RAIB and it’s likely that some things would have been missed to pack all that info into a shorter length video. I don’t think the driver was at fault as he had a lot of things going on, but the base things I took from the RAIB reports to get short but informative videos but if I’ve missed something out that’s my fault and I’ll work on improving.
Original report said it was caused by not enough knowledge of the IET's fast acceleration in situations like this, to this day you can see GWR IETS speeding into depots, touch the power and it will fly crawling a 5 mph isn't their strong point you can see this at a regular signal stop before a station
Flying scotsman shunting incident that happened the other night happened at a faster speed and the scotsman got lucky with just small paint chips and a few dints on the buffers
Sounds like they should use the same mantra as pilots "first fly the plane" ie first drive the train and deal with other distractions only when able. If the distractions have to be dealt with urgently and can't be done simultaneously, with driving the train, then stop the train (something pilots can't do).
I'm really sorry but as you gabbled the commentary so much I could not concentrate. The script and presentation would be great if you could just re-record at an appropriate speed? Thansk ad I hopd you take the criticism as conconstructive. Basically: SLOW DOWN!
The importance of not getting distracted is all very well and good but sometimes things happen that are outwith the control of the driver. Anyway, which clown was it that sent them both along the same stretch of track at the same time? Luckily both trains were going as slow as what they were otherwise things would have been a lot worse.
Knowning the area and heading to the depot trains follow each other signal to signal under the rules you can have two trains in a section (Permissive Block) but the driver of the following train must be prepared to stop short of any obstruction ,, in this case he was distracted ..
You would of thourght if someone had years of experience they'd of known not to move the train if it's transmitting the wrong headcode, this could of easily of been avoided
Er dont think so first train passed a procced aspect.... train in rear gets 2 white lights that allows him to pass the red signal and it warns the driver that the section ahead maybe occupied and should be prepared to stop short of the obstruction
The collision was not because 2 trains were in the same block as this would of been permissive working which allows more than one train in each block and i have never seen a signal that displays a yellow with 2 white lights, it's usually red with white lights.
For anyone struggling to understand the poor description;
2 trains heading back to depot. HST infront of an Azuma.
Running on permissive signalling which is 2 white lights, meaning track can be occupied by more than 1 train at a time. Must proceed at caution & be prepared to stop.
1 train is now following directly behind the other.
Azuma train runs into the back of the HST as he was distracted by a fault on his train.
(Side note; signal L772 at 1:18 would not show a single yellow main aspect AND the associated position lights together.....it will show either one or the other at any one time)
Yes, wondered how 2 trains could have been signalled into the same block - if it was permissive signalling, that explains it.
Didn’t know you could get a yellow and two whites lights? Totally new to me being a signaller.
That’s what I thought. I’d be filling in an RT3185 if I saw that and wouldn’t have passed it until I’d spoken to the signaller
😂
nice video and detail into the situation!
IETs are GWR units. LNERs units are branded Azuma.
Hard to believe all this damage occurred at 5 mph 😮
Shitty hitachi built frame go brrrr
well it was 15mph if it was going 3x the speed limit/
@@LCSTrains I know that
I used to travel on nice old trains
Imagine it went 125mph 😂😂😂
Position light on red, not yellow. Red because it’s occupied, position light proceed past red expecting obstruction ahead.
Yes correct,red remains on and only call ahead (two white lights) illuminates while red is constant
Enjoyed watching your video, I'd never heard of this accident.
Found this quite difficult to listen to at times as your speech isn’t clear, so the video needs subtitles please. It is a good effort, not criticising but just making a point, thanks.
I did some work at Nevilhill train depot in Leeds and I saw the older 125 and it just had some damage at the front.
Really enjoying this content wish it was longer 🙏
wow quite a big impact but shame the hst 43 power car was written off good detail too least no one was injured thanks for this
LNER were withdrawing all their HSTs before the end of 2019, but yes, it is a shame that this one's life ended this way. I managed to get a picture of it in New Southgate, just three months before the Neville Hill incident.
@@gregkiteos1936 it was the Craigentinny 100th one i think if i correctly remember think it was basically after written off used for spares most HSTs LNER had moved to EMR before they withdrew them as for the shitatchi that got sent away to be repaired for a fw months do believe there also gradually replacing the 91s also soon to go as not many left now
@@harrymcandrew1447 It was indeed *Craigentinny 100* number 43300.
@derektaylor2941 Generic plastic "cutting edge tech" bimode multiple unit designed to look modern VS pointy brick of 70s engineering
You wouldn't get one yellow when the position lights pull off. The main aspect on the signal would remain at red with the position lights illuminated.
I do wonder if there's a point that, like planes, trains will get to the poinw where they require two in the cab to manage all the complex systems, it seems to me that a second pair of eyes, a first officer if you will, would have prevented this by being a second set of eyes and keeping a watch out the window while the driver was distracted. Makes me wonder at what point that will become a serious issue3
I think that is a fair suggestion. My view on it is that he should have gone to turn APCO off after he came to a full stop instead of taking his attention away, but that’s just my view on it.
To me, it sounds like the driver was distracted by how complex the system was to operate and that isn't solely on training or a bulletin at the depot though. I've seen some TWS4 footage of the 800/801 and even in that scaled down one, I've seen real train drivers playing it get overwhelemed by the system, and that's not the full TMS that is modeled there, so to me I feel like it's partly on the driver for being distracted during a critical phase of operation, partly on the people who designed, tested and signed off on the TMS
Quoting the RAIB report:
The RAIB found that the driver had been unable to set up the train management system because “ambiguous documentation” from manufacturer Hitachi led to LNER “misunderstanding the required process” when it developed its driving training programme.
It also said that the train firm failed to recognise he needed more training than his peers.
To me that screams of poor design for the software and documentation, as well as Hitachi not being rigorous enough with the testing, LNER failing to spot things and the driver not being able to catch his mistake quickly enough though. It goes back to my point of okay, but, how much more complex are trains going to get. How can train makers and operators account for that and mitigate that then?
@@jacekatalakis8316I think the other aspect to this, which the train designers really need to look at is why do they add complexity to what is in front of the driver and what they need to do?
Human factors is a cruicial part of design and additional features should not be added because they can, but be challenged to see if they should. The driver needs to focus on the road ahead and controlling the speed ahead. Additional functionality, controls and features can overload the driver and distract their concentration.
Keep things simple is the key, something older rolling stock does. There are lessons to be learned here for sure.
To me that's a double edged sword. I'm still wondering at what point things get too complex and we get a worse crash due to this? It's absolutely, 110% a safety issue. Training is one part of it, design is the other part of it, human factors is a part of it.
To me, there needs to be clear splitting of driving duties, an train managing uties. Ideally, you'd have someone on the train crew whose sole job it is to manage the train, run the TMS, run the doors, et cetera, similar to how aircraft crews are with a pilot whose sole job it is to fly, an the other monitors what is going onm though airliners are suffering the same issue with entirely too much complexity.
I don't think you can fairly compare earlier rolling stock with today's trains, though. You have to look at it in context. How much more complex were the trains when they were brought into service versus what was already in service however?
@@jacekatalakis8316 I guess the point I’m making is that the older rolling stock, which has less complexity in the driver’s cab still performs adequately. The fact that more modern trains are more ‘complex’ due to additional features, should not lead to them being more complex to drive. Those features that are not requiring driver operation whilst in motion, perhaps should be positioned out of the line of sight of the driver to reduce the information over load. As good as it would be to have a second person with the driver, I doubt the train companies will go for that as it will be another person to pay! The thing is, one person operation is ok. There was a time when HSTs operating at 125mph had a second person, but that reduced to one person in the end. I guess for me, it still boils down to understanding human factors and keeping things simple for the driver whilst the train is in motion. Having said that, even though I am a design engineer, I won’t profess to be knowledgable about todays newer rolling stock.
Have you done the incident where 2 First Great Western units collided at Exeter St Davids, being a class 150/2 and a class 43 HST, If not please can you do it.
I’ll certainly look into it!
I believe your thinking of an accident in Plymouth not Exeter
Can you do the Selby Rail Crash Please.
Hi, I already have
Oh sorry I have not been catching up with the videos I will watch it.
Not trying to be funny or anything but whilst I found your short video really interesting I was struggling to understand what you were saying, partly because the sound levels didn't seem right but also, as someone not working in the industry and therefore not familiar with the jargon you were speaking to quickly and quietly. I look forward to watching more videos but hope you can take this feedback on board! 👍
I will do, on my next one I’ve been tweaking with the audio lots and I’ll try and slow down my speech, thanks for the feedback.
Having no knowledge about how train systems work, I was unable to understand the meaning of what you were saying. But it was clearly explained by the 2 trains reading the same signals and had a bump, am I right.?
I don't feel bad now about coming of the road in Salisbury depot. There are spring points up by the head shunt. I had gone over them and changed ends to go back down towards the detanking section but didn't notice that they were half cooked and set for neither direction. Just the front bogie off. So tempting to stick it in reverse to see if it would rerail itself but I couldn't risk it.
Lack of maintenance on the points was the outcome.
no harm done and not your fault. wish i could say the same for this guy.
@@JTV84 Technically they could have said 'you didn't check the points' and I'm surprised they didn't. You turn the engines off at the top of the headshunt & roll back down under gravity. There is a light on a post over the points I was screened for drink & drugs though which is normal in the case of an incident. The depot manager had accused me of not going far enough over the points before setting back.
A week later I was rolling back down and stopped in front of the points. They were half cocked again. This time I called the shunter up on the radio to witness it. THEN they decided it was a good idea to catch up on the maintenance of the points. No apology from the maintenance depot manager though for the false accusation.
it was your fault. Always check these points when going over them, it take 1 second to make sure there's no gap. poor driving.
@@sw01ller Oh you're such an expert are you?
@@derektaylor2941 The (Engineering) Depot Manager was well known for disliking drivers. Shame really because we got on really well with the rest of the depot staff. The 159s were well maintained at Salisbury and the depot won several railway industry Golden Spanner awards.
Why dont locos have buffers these days. Surely this was a safety feature
IET: not a loco
HST: designed to work in fixed sets so didn't need buffers*
*Shut up about the eight that had them fitted, it's because they ran as a stopgap due to delays in MK4 coach delivery
@@Danse_Macabre_125 why be so hostile. I only made a comment.
So a HST is a upgraded DMU?
Take a chill pill at least the older classes had style unlike the current crap designs.
If Sir Nigel Gresley was watching the way design has gone he'd be ashamed.
@user-xh3lz9xt4l it was mostly satire to prevent people being pedants, didn't mean to offend, sorry.
Yes, HSTs when new were called Class 253 and 254 as they were viewed to be DEMUs, which explains why, for example, a standard class HST MK3 carriage is labelled as 42xyz while a loco hauled MK3 standard class is labelled as 12xyz
1m24s shows signal clear,but you wouldn't get two white lights to proceed and a yellow signal together.Main signal remains at red and only white lights illuminates (call ahead signal,be prepared to stop short of any obstruction )
Correct observation, you beat me to it.
Nice tone with 150281 on the back i saw them too there uploaded
Why blurred at 0:24?
Can’t they implement a radar system like on cars for automatic emergency stop?
what happened to these trains? were they repaired or removed altogether from service?
The HST power car was scrapped, the Azuma was fixed.
@@EliasSchmid0043300 still exists
@@Danse_Macabre_125physically yes but it's scrapped from a railway perspective
13th November is that unlucky
Can you do the Wimbledon derailment which involved the class 450
Was it due to point’s failure that derailed the train.
no. just the collision
I liked this video but I don't understand all the numbers and names u were saying so please make it simpler next time
I have difficulty understanding what is being said. The incident is badly explained and the speaker does not enunciate well enough.
Simply put, LOOK where you are bloody going,
Wasnt it 800107 that was involved
no. 800109
This is the first I have ever heard about this accident. Was it covered up?
Hi, it was not covered up although it’s not talked about much.
Not an IET
your graphic of L772 is wrong, position light signals do not clear with main aspects, there are many features in this accident and its causes that you have overlooked, did you read the RAIB report? Consider too the speed of creep control and the operation of the driver interface with the control system, there are many reasons why this was a trap for a driver to fall into which does not come out in your analysis. The behaviour of the train at such low speed is also very interesting but beyond the scope of your short video.
Thanks for the feedback, I’ll take it into consideration. Yes I did read the RAIB and it’s likely that some things would have been missed to pack all that info into a shorter length video. I don’t think the driver was at fault as he had a lot of things going on, but the base things I took from the RAIB reports to get short but informative videos but if I’ve missed something out that’s my fault and I’ll work on improving.
This might have been interesting, if I could make out what you were saying. either speak up or turn down the background music
OR sort out the voice 'recognition' which was partly in English and partly in Gibberish
Glottal stops as well, i.e. not sounding the letter T clearly.
Can you do southall train collision pls
Already on other YT videos
by the way your mic is very soft and muffled during the video but the video is good
Work on the way you speak,
become clear in all you say,
and your videos will improve!
Good luck!
Thank you, I will
Enjoy!
The week after this happened i saw the driver of the azuma at york and he explained it
RIP 43300
Original report said it was caused by not enough knowledge of the IET's fast acceleration in situations like this, to this day you can see GWR IETS speeding into depots, touch the power and it will fly crawling a 5 mph isn't their strong point you can see this at a regular signal stop before a station
Cant hear the commentary over the music, graphics very poor.
That god nobody was seriously injured, poor hst tho :(
Good video, but you speak a little fast at times which makes it hard to follow what you are saying.
Flying scotsman shunting incident that happened the other night happened at a faster speed and the scotsman got lucky with just small paint chips and a few dints on the buffers
Sounds like they should use the same mantra as pilots "first fly the plane" ie first drive the train and deal with other distractions only when able. If the distractions have to be dealt with urgently and can't be done simultaneously, with driving the train, then stop the train (something pilots can't do).
City of Newcastle Upon Tyne 43100 HST wrote off in that... would have made a good preservation candidate Shame..
Yep, first East Coast MTU powercar too.
43299 was the last one to be reengined, wonder if that could be preserved (it's on NMT duties rn)
I spot the passengers and crew and the class 801 main line train and my name is Rio
An IET derailment
Class 801 has scr engine
?
everything in SCR is copied from real life, not the other way around
Haud yer fucking wheesht lad
I'm really sorry but as you gabbled the commentary so much I could not concentrate. The script and presentation would be great if you could just re-record at an appropriate speed? Thansk ad I hopd you take the criticism as conconstructive. Basically: SLOW DOWN!
The importance of not getting distracted is all very well and good but sometimes things happen that are outwith the control of the driver.
Anyway, which clown was it that sent them both along the same stretch of track at the same time?
Luckily both trains were going as slow as what they were otherwise things would have been a lot worse.
Knowning the area and heading to the depot trains follow each other signal to signal under the rules you can have two trains in a section (Permissive Block) but the driver of the following train must be prepared to stop short of any obstruction ,, in this case he was distracted ..
You would of thourght if someone had years of experience they'd of known not to move the train if it's transmitting the wrong headcode, this could of easily of been avoided
Speak slowly, we have no visual cues ie your face etc. Kill the pointless music.
Hi, thanks for the feedback. From this video onward there is no music. Unfortunately I cannot go back and reverse that for older videos.
So you are a train enthusiast with no actual knowledge of the rules and regulations of the railway.
Yes and I do not claim to do so. I was following the information from the published RAIB Report on the incident.
not a very good explanation and talking way too fast
Signal box messed up that's what happened by the sounds of things.
Er dont think so first train passed a procced aspect.... train in rear gets 2 white lights that allows him to pass the red signal and it warns the driver that the section ahead maybe occupied and should be prepared to stop short of the obstruction
Gotcha, must of been a quick reaction to the hst when he saw it but wasn't quick enough though.
Basic distraction bust looking at the cab screens and only saw it late ..
Thought so was surprised at the damage at such a low speed did wonder if he was doing abit more than 5mph to do that type of damage to both.
AITCH
H A I T C H
Simple physics son