If she had it her way she would be speaking throughout the whole video, but because that can't happen she decided to get attention by randomly knitting. Her objections were noticeably weak and the rest of the panel agreed. Bizarre behavior.
@@reevertoun It's interesting to see this attention seeking behavior at such a supposedly high level of education from a female, it seems they are really different in mannerism
In fact, take *any* N&E "analysis of content" you like (if there is such a thing). The contents are not likely to be true under N&E. Say "causality" a lot if you like (it sounds scientific to N&E folks, and they want above all to sound scientific). The basic point is that truth is one property, adaptability is another, and there is no reason to suppose that truth is the least bit adaptive. "But isn't thinking that a rock is falling toward you adaptive because it's true ?" No. With a little imagination, an infinite number of beliefs will get you out of the way of the rock, where none of them entail a rock is falling toward you. If the beliefs get you out of the way (true, false, bizarre, or mundane), they stand a chance of being "selected".
Tooley thinks wide-functionalism constitutes an objection to the EAAN. As Plantinga points out, it does not. Take propositional content to be determined by whatever N&E causes you like, that does not entail that the contents so determined are true. Those causes can result in a system of beliefs about ghosts or witches, and the contents can all be false. The causes can determine all sorts of contents (even contents that have no, or negative, adaptive value, which might or might not cause them to be "weeded out"). Adaptation is not truth. It is not an alethic property. Falsehoods can be more adaptive than truths and truths could be "weeded out" just as easily. Evolution does not "care about" truth. As P. Churchland says, it cares about getting "the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive". If R is low on E&N, then we have a defeater for the conjunction. No doubt N is the best one to drop. Plantinga is not contesting R. He agrees with it. It is beside the point to say that the Naturalist can affirm R. The point is that R is incompatible with (or at least made improbable by) N&E.
Is the existence of gratuitous, pointless evil ubiquitously the responsibility of human agents? Quite obviously it is not. You're misrepresenting the argument. Even if all human evil is necessary for some libertarian free will (a dubious proposition at best) there remains a nigh infinite supply of natural evil waiting in the wings. Homo sapiens lived and died in pain and terror for countless generations before they contrived the notion of God. That seems to be the work of an omnisadistic being rather than an omnibenevolent one.
@@CDVerderben Only humans commit definitional evil. Tornados, house fires, dog bites, cancer, etc...these maladies can not logically be called evil. But evil is done by humans through our creatureally free will. God created us. He rules over all while allowing evil to be evil through us, His image, born under the curse of Adam.
The human brain evolved to survive. Once domesticated,the human brain speculated on More "abstract" notions such as whether "Is there is an Ontological teleology for the universe"? Such speculations imply,"Is there a transcendent(eternal) Purposer for the universe"? Asking daring questions such as these and whether human Consciousness survives death opens a Pandora's box of mysteries. 🎁
+Lane Georgeton Proportionality doesn't change the fact that one's belief forming faculties are unreliable as to revealing the truth about the world. Moreover, it doesn't apply to most beliefs. For example, if I believe that lions make great pets or seem cuddly, what would be the "proportional" belief? That zebras are dangerous? I hardly see any real proportionality there, and moreover I'm still making potentially life-ending choices on the basis of my mistaken impression about lions. Then, when you get into the realm of applying our cognitive faculties to metaphysics, abstract thinking, mathematics, and the sciences, we have absolutely no reason to think that our cognitive faculties (which evolved over millions of years of trying to *survive under pragmatic conditions and concrete threats*) would be at all reliable in these fields. Now, if someone carefully orchestrated our evolution with the intent that we might understand Him and His creation, then we do indeed have rational justification for thinking our cognitive faculties (even the higher order ones) are reliable. But, without that "guiding hand", so to speak, we have good reason to think that evolution's capricious methods would produce cognitive faculties that are unreliable with respect to truth of propositions (especially abstract or complex propositions). As to Plantinga bringing in a belief that is untestable, I would have to ask you: "What test exactly can you perform to justify your belief that there is an external world, and it's not all an illusion in your mind?" Another question: "What test could you perform to justify your belief that the past really existed, and that the world wasn't created a few minutes ago with a perfectly convincing appearance of age?" These are properly basic beliefs, which we are rational to hold, despite the fact that no empirical testing can ever justify them. Plantinga just adds to the list of properly basic beliefs the belief that God or something like Him exists, which is a belief held by most people in the world throughout all of history, the majority of these people presumably having well-functioning cognitive faculties (no severe impairment or dysfunction). Finally, with respect to discerning right from wrong, you don't see to be very familiar with the traditional theistic picture of the world. Traditionally, theism not only holds that God is the locus of moral value (and, by the way, "consensus and discussion" only yield subjective morals as diverse as the Nazi ethic vs. the ethic of Buddha vs. the ethic of Mother Theresa), but it also holds that God has created us to innately comprehend the basic moral truths. Granted, we can fail to do so. But even that admission of possible failure begs the question: *failing with respect to WHAT?* If there is no external, objective standard, then how can it ever be said that we failed to live up to it?? If we arrived at our ethic by consensus and discussion, and that makes it "good", then why were the Nazis not "good"?
_" Traditionally, theism not only holds that God is the locus of moral value (and, by the way, "consensus and discussion" only yield subjective morals as diverse as the Nazi ethic vs. the ethic of Buddha vs. the ethic of Mother Theresa), but it also holds that God has created us to innately comprehend the basic moral truths."_ How does this relate to the fact that Nazi Germany was overtly Christian and that the Nazi party explicitly recruited religious people and opposed atheism? Are you suggesting that whole nations can believe themselves to be doing the will of the Christian God and being mistaken? If so, what value does this innate property of yours have? _"Granted, we can fail to do so."_ Apparently so. _"But even that admission of possible failure begs the question: failing with respect to WHAT?"_ That's actually very easy to answer if you have a pragmatic view of morality. When you act immorally you are objectively failing to maintain voluntary cooperation with people around you(Or you are endangering the same if you, for example, steal) or the goals of cooperative societies such as increasing productivity, happiness, safety, health etc.(Which are the objective reasons why we value cooperation) _"If there is no external, objective standard, then how can it ever be said that we failed to live up to it??"_ Sure, but there is one, so that's not a problem. You're free to reject the fruits of cooperation as a value of course, but that doesn't make this standard any less objective than my rejection of obedience to Yahweh or heaven, as goods. Ultimately, you'd be objectively wrong about rejecting cooperation being far more beneficial to you than cooperating and this is why there's near universal consensus around the basics of reciprocal ethics(But only towards the in-group you're a member of). _"If we arrived at our ethic by consensus and discussion, and that makes it "good", then why were the Nazis not "good"?"_ Well, I don't use the word good like that at all, but your question is more usefully phrased in terms of whether the actions of the Nazis were compatible with coexistence with the Jews. If they were not, they're objectively immoral in a system that includes both the Nazis and the Jews and this is how we use the word "immoral" - to admonish people because they endanger cooperation and peace. Personally I only use good as a subjective word, sort of a synonym for "beneficial". Nobody are "good" in general. For example, we're both horribly destructive towards non-human animals on earth and are in that state even if we are vegans due to occupying territory and engaging in agriculture. It all depends on the values being discussed. Morality however, deals with interactions between people and starts out declaring that peaceful cooperation is a value( Really because of its demonstrable good results). When you start out from there your points simply vanish and there's not much in the way of criticism left. You'd have to make statements like "Well, how do you know that rape and murder is wrong?" and come across as a complete psychopath and the answer will simply be "Because I value cooperation and its fruits, and those things endanger that value, therefore the actions are bad". Such rational oughts are the only oughts anyone could possibly defend - even your god - because if I honestly reject all his values and don't care about the consequences, then his way is objectively not a good path for me.
Gnomefro [quote] Are you suggesting that whole nations can believe themselves to be doing the will of the Christian God and being mistaken? If so, what value does this innate property of yours have? [/quote] You are conflating the epistemological issue with the ontological one. People being mistaken has nothing to do with the objective truth of a set of values. [quote] ...the goals of cooperative societies... [/quote] You are taking cooperative society to be morally good as a brute fact. And you are stipulating that the things humans typically want (productivity, cooperation, happiness) are moral goods... again as brute fact. There is no account for why these are the objective moral goods, and not other things. Moreover, the pursuit of a particular kind of society becomes a sort of consequentialist/utilitarian morality, which has several problems. For one, we cannot know the ripple effect of particular actions, such that something which seems to increase happiness and productivity in the short-run may very well lead to the greatest possible misery in the long-run. Also, consequentialism makes the ends justify the means, such that, if killing off all the old and infirm would increase the sum total of happiness and productivity in the world, then that would be the morally right thing to do. Finally, you actually specify in-group reciprocity, without realizing that the Nazis were doing exactly that. Indeed, had they succeeded in what they were doing, their "in-group" would be the only set of people still in existence, and would be triumphant and happy. This is why Nietzche, Sartre, Mackie, Russell, and others have all worried about the lack of a higher authority which can adjudicate our competing in-group values. An objective plumb-line against which we are either right or wrong. You talk about coexistence with the Jews, but what about the Allied Forces that refused to coexist with the Nazis. It's a conflict of coexistences, and again it has to be judged on the basis of some objective standard. This is why many philosophers have favored a deontological view, where the virtues are virtues in and of themselves, and the consequences (including cooperative, productive societies) are secondary. But then the deontologist still has no objective ontological ground for the virtues, or what distinguishes them from the vices. The theist has a ready answer: God is an absolutely perfect being, and therefore His moral nature is "the Good". His nature just is the plumb-line against which our natures must be judged, and therefore the commands which issue forth from that perfect nature constitute our moral duties. And, since God is a metaphysically necessary being, we can even say that these moral values and duties are also metaphysically necessary truths (which most philosophers would want to affirm).
Mentat1231 "There is no account for why these are the objective moral goods, and not other things." So what? They are demonstrably beneficial for social species. Why isn't that enough? Why does there need to be an objective and external standard? Is it not possible that morality is more complex than a singular objective standard? Using God as an answer seems to be a crutch to me. It allows you to answer questions which may have no satisfactory answers with "x". It doesn't actually explain anything. In group/Out group conflicts certainly force us to ask how we can quantifiably determine higher morals than others. However this to me does not mean that an objective standard must exist, but rather that certain ideals are more beneficial than others.
Bo Aganaba The idea that it is good to maximize general human flourishing in the first place is one which would need justification. The individual's lot may not get any better, indeed it sometimes requires a bit of sacrifice or the curbing of certain desires. Why should anyone care whether humanity does well? After all, on the atheist worldview, we are probably going to go extinct at some point before the heat-death of the Universe. What difference does it make whether we live for pure self-interest?
Maximizing human flourishing is important because we necessarily depend on each other to survive. Societies simply would not function if everybody was only self-serving. If somebody wants to be completely self-serving then they may do so. However, they should not expect to receive the benefits of living in a healthy society that requires cooperation. In addition, the evolution of humans includes an empathetic nature, like many other social species. Performing altruistic acts literally make us feel good. Chimps often deprive themselves for the benefit of the group. Bonobos are matriarchal and have little to no violence, even when they come into contact with other bonobo groups. I'm sure you've heard plenty of anecdotal stories of dogs putting themselves in harm's way for their owners. We also have an intelligent brain, capable of building on our empathy to improve our morality as our knowledge increases. Why do people support the LGBT community in today's world? Because we know that it is completely natural and in fact millions of species have a minority number of homosexual members. I care about my friends and family and I recognize that we all help each other. I know that I want others to treat them well, and I choose to reciprocate that action to others. What does any of this have to do with the eventual heat death of the universe? What does any of this have to do with whether or not God exists?
Christian paranoia has unlimited potential as a human gold mine. If you can hold your nose while you fleece the gullible Christian suckers, the sky is the limit.... Knitting doth not payeth as well as Christian bottomfeededing. Right?
Well, Tooley has a hate boner for plantinga lol. I read Tooley on Plantinga's "the nature of necessity" and I was very disapointed though; outright misreadings abounded. For example, he criticised Plantinga for making an argument using premises relying of Stalnaker semantics, when he in the same chapter made another version of the argument without relyoing on them. I take it tooley is better on the EAAN?
Plantinga is truly brilliant, and he presents his incisive thoughts so clearly and plainly. He is an intellectual treasure.
Mentat1231
Amen! And agreed. His kind gentle spirit with which he communicates is also a treasure.
well said, i love hearing him speak....
Theism is irrational nonsense! There is no EVIDENCE for any deity!
@@GeoCoppens
That is an irrational comment.
@@gustavgus4545 Your argument is! We want EVIDENCE! Science! You are an irrational dodo!
Also see “Knowing with the Heart” by Roy Clouser 😊
1:46:00 The fact that the lady started knitting out of nowhere made my day! Philosophical disagreements aside you must agree.
Some sort of OCD?
If she had it her way she would be speaking throughout the whole video, but because that can't happen she decided to get attention by randomly knitting. Her objections were noticeably weak and the rest of the panel agreed. Bizarre behavior.
@@reevertoun It's interesting to see this attention seeking behavior at such a supposedly high level of education from a female, it seems they are really different in mannerism
In fact, take *any* N&E "analysis of content" you like (if there is such a thing). The contents are not likely to be true under N&E. Say "causality" a lot if you like (it sounds scientific to N&E folks, and they want above all to sound scientific). The basic point is that truth is one property, adaptability is another, and there is no reason to suppose that truth is the least bit adaptive. "But isn't thinking that a rock is falling toward you adaptive because it's true ?" No. With a little imagination, an infinite number of beliefs will get you out of the way of the rock, where none of them entail a rock is falling toward you. If the beliefs get you out of the way (true, false, bizarre, or mundane), they stand a chance of being "selected".
Tooley thinks wide-functionalism constitutes an objection to the EAAN. As Plantinga points out, it does not. Take propositional content to be determined by whatever N&E causes you like, that does not entail that the contents so determined are true. Those causes can result in a system of beliefs about ghosts or witches, and the contents can all be false. The causes can determine all sorts of contents (even contents that have no, or negative, adaptive value, which might or might not cause them to be "weeded out"). Adaptation is not truth. It is not an alethic property. Falsehoods can be more adaptive than truths and truths could be "weeded out" just as easily. Evolution does not "care about" truth. As P. Churchland says, it cares about getting "the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive". If R is low on E&N, then we have a defeater for the conjunction. No doubt N is the best one to drop. Plantinga is not contesting R. He agrees with it. It is beside the point to say that the Naturalist can affirm R. The point is that R is incompatible with (or at least made improbable by) N&E.
R cannot be defeated using R, therefore Plantinga's EANN forces you to reject N. Brilliant argument imo.
People incapable of actually interacting with an argument can always make comments like this to at least make themselves feel better.
how
Does God permit evil?
Not a fair question.
The choices belong to us, not God.
God gave us freewill, permission to fail.
This is a legal issue.
Is the existence of gratuitous, pointless evil ubiquitously the responsibility of human agents? Quite obviously it is not. You're misrepresenting the argument. Even if all human evil is necessary for some libertarian free will (a dubious proposition at best) there remains a nigh infinite supply of natural evil waiting in the wings. Homo sapiens lived and died in pain and terror for countless generations before they contrived the notion of God. That seems to be the work of an omnisadistic being rather than an omnibenevolent one.
@@CDVerderben Only humans commit definitional evil. Tornados, house fires, dog bites, cancer, etc...these maladies can not logically be called evil. But evil is done by humans through our creatureally free will. God created us. He rules over all while allowing evil to be evil through us, His image, born under the curse of Adam.
Trevor Hodge you are unbelievably stupid.
The human brain evolved to survive. Once domesticated,the human brain speculated on More "abstract" notions such as whether "Is there is an Ontological teleology for the universe"? Such speculations imply,"Is there a transcendent(eternal) Purposer for the universe"? Asking daring questions such as these and whether human Consciousness survives death opens a Pandora's box of mysteries. 🎁
56:30 (personal reference)
+Lane Georgeton
Proportionality doesn't change the fact that one's belief forming faculties are unreliable as to revealing the truth about the world. Moreover, it doesn't apply to most beliefs. For example, if I believe that lions make great pets or seem cuddly, what would be the "proportional" belief? That zebras are dangerous? I hardly see any real proportionality there, and moreover I'm still making potentially life-ending choices on the basis of my mistaken impression about lions.
Then, when you get into the realm of applying our cognitive faculties to metaphysics, abstract thinking, mathematics, and the sciences, we have absolutely no reason to think that our cognitive faculties (which evolved over millions of years of trying to *survive under pragmatic conditions and concrete threats*) would be at all reliable in these fields. Now, if someone carefully orchestrated our evolution with the intent that we might understand Him and His creation, then we do indeed have rational justification for thinking our cognitive faculties (even the higher order ones) are reliable. But, without that "guiding hand", so to speak, we have good reason to think that evolution's capricious methods would produce cognitive faculties that are unreliable with respect to truth of propositions (especially abstract or complex propositions).
As to Plantinga bringing in a belief that is untestable, I would have to ask you: "What test exactly can you perform to justify your belief that there is an external world, and it's not all an illusion in your mind?" Another question: "What test could you perform to justify your belief that the past really existed, and that the world wasn't created a few minutes ago with a perfectly convincing appearance of age?" These are properly basic beliefs, which we are rational to hold, despite the fact that no empirical testing can ever justify them. Plantinga just adds to the list of properly basic beliefs the belief that God or something like Him exists, which is a belief held by most people in the world throughout all of history, the majority of these people presumably having well-functioning cognitive faculties (no severe impairment or dysfunction).
Finally, with respect to discerning right from wrong, you don't see to be very familiar with the traditional theistic picture of the world. Traditionally, theism not only holds that God is the locus of moral value (and, by the way, "consensus and discussion" only yield subjective morals as diverse as the Nazi ethic vs. the ethic of Buddha vs. the ethic of Mother Theresa), but it also holds that God has created us to innately comprehend the basic moral truths. Granted, we can fail to do so. But even that admission of possible failure begs the question: *failing with respect to WHAT?* If there is no external, objective standard, then how can it ever be said that we failed to live up to it?? If we arrived at our ethic by consensus and discussion, and that makes it "good", then why were the Nazis not "good"?
_" Traditionally, theism not only holds that God is the locus of moral value (and, by the way, "consensus and discussion" only yield subjective morals as diverse as the Nazi ethic vs. the ethic of Buddha vs. the ethic of Mother Theresa), but it also holds that God has created us to innately comprehend the basic moral truths."_
How does this relate to the fact that Nazi Germany was overtly Christian and that the Nazi party explicitly recruited religious people and opposed atheism? Are you suggesting that whole nations can believe themselves to be doing the will of the Christian God and being mistaken? If so, what value does this innate property of yours have?
_"Granted, we can fail to do so."_
Apparently so.
_"But even that admission of possible failure begs the question: failing with respect to WHAT?"_
That's actually very easy to answer if you have a pragmatic view of morality. When you act immorally you are objectively failing to maintain voluntary cooperation with people around you(Or you are endangering the same if you, for example, steal) or the goals of cooperative societies such as increasing productivity, happiness, safety, health etc.(Which are the objective reasons why we value cooperation)
_"If there is no external, objective standard, then how can it ever be said that we failed to live up to it??"_
Sure, but there is one, so that's not a problem. You're free to reject the fruits of cooperation as a value of course, but that doesn't make this standard any less objective than my rejection of obedience to Yahweh or heaven, as goods. Ultimately, you'd be objectively wrong about rejecting cooperation being far more beneficial to you than cooperating and this is why there's near universal consensus around the basics of reciprocal ethics(But only towards the in-group you're a member of).
_"If we arrived at our ethic by consensus and discussion, and that makes it "good", then why were the Nazis not "good"?"_
Well, I don't use the word good like that at all, but your question is more usefully phrased in terms of whether the actions of the Nazis were compatible with coexistence with the Jews. If they were not, they're objectively immoral in a system that includes both the Nazis and the Jews and this is how we use the word "immoral" - to admonish people because they endanger cooperation and peace. Personally I only use good as a subjective word, sort of a synonym for "beneficial". Nobody are "good" in general. For example, we're both horribly destructive towards non-human animals on earth and are in that state even if we are vegans due to occupying territory and engaging in agriculture. It all depends on the values being discussed.
Morality however, deals with interactions between people and starts out declaring that peaceful cooperation is a value( Really because of its demonstrable good results). When you start out from there your points simply vanish and there's not much in the way of criticism left. You'd have to make statements like "Well, how do you know that rape and murder is wrong?" and come across as a complete psychopath and the answer will simply be "Because I value cooperation and its fruits, and those things endanger that value, therefore the actions are bad". Such rational oughts are the only oughts anyone could possibly defend - even your god - because if I honestly reject all his values and don't care about the consequences, then his way is objectively not a good path for me.
Gnomefro
[quote]
Are you suggesting that whole nations can believe themselves to be doing the will of the Christian God and being mistaken? If so, what value does this innate property of yours have?
[/quote]
You are conflating the epistemological issue with the ontological one. People being mistaken has nothing to do with the objective truth of a set of values.
[quote]
...the goals of cooperative societies...
[/quote]
You are taking cooperative society to be morally good as a brute fact. And you are stipulating that the things humans typically want (productivity, cooperation, happiness) are moral goods... again as brute fact. There is no account for why these are the objective moral goods, and not other things. Moreover, the pursuit of a particular kind of society becomes a sort of consequentialist/utilitarian morality, which has several problems. For one, we cannot know the ripple effect of particular actions, such that something which seems to increase happiness and productivity in the short-run may very well lead to the greatest possible misery in the long-run. Also, consequentialism makes the ends justify the means, such that, if killing off all the old and infirm would increase the sum total of happiness and productivity in the world, then that would be the morally right thing to do.
Finally, you actually specify in-group reciprocity, without realizing that the Nazis were doing exactly that. Indeed, had they succeeded in what they were doing, their "in-group" would be the only set of people still in existence, and would be triumphant and happy. This is why Nietzche, Sartre, Mackie, Russell, and others have all worried about the lack of a higher authority which can adjudicate our competing in-group values. An objective plumb-line against which we are either right or wrong.
You talk about coexistence with the Jews, but what about the Allied Forces that refused to coexist with the Nazis. It's a conflict of coexistences, and again it has to be judged on the basis of some objective standard. This is why many philosophers have favored a deontological view, where the virtues are virtues in and of themselves, and the consequences (including cooperative, productive societies) are secondary. But then the deontologist still has no objective ontological ground for the virtues, or what distinguishes them from the vices. The theist has a ready answer: God is an absolutely perfect being, and therefore His moral nature is "the Good". His nature just is the plumb-line against which our natures must be judged, and therefore the commands which issue forth from that perfect nature constitute our moral duties. And, since God is a metaphysically necessary being, we can even say that these moral values and duties are also metaphysically necessary truths (which most philosophers would want to affirm).
Mentat1231 "There is no account for why these are the objective moral goods, and not other things."
So what? They are demonstrably beneficial for social species. Why isn't that enough? Why does there need to be an objective and external standard? Is it not possible that morality is more complex than a singular objective standard? Using God as an answer seems to be a crutch to me. It allows you to answer questions which may have no satisfactory answers with "x". It doesn't actually explain anything. In group/Out group conflicts certainly force us to ask how we can quantifiably determine higher morals than others. However this to me does not mean that an objective standard must exist, but rather that certain ideals are more beneficial than others.
Bo Aganaba
The idea that it is good to maximize general human flourishing in the first place is one which would need justification. The individual's lot may not get any better, indeed it sometimes requires a bit of sacrifice or the curbing of certain desires. Why should anyone care whether humanity does well? After all, on the atheist worldview, we are probably going to go extinct at some point before the heat-death of the Universe. What difference does it make whether we live for pure self-interest?
Maximizing human flourishing is important because we necessarily depend on each other to survive. Societies simply would not function if everybody was only self-serving. If somebody wants to be completely self-serving then they may do so. However, they should not expect to receive the benefits of living in a healthy society that requires cooperation. In addition, the evolution of humans includes an empathetic nature, like many other social species. Performing altruistic acts literally make us feel good. Chimps often deprive themselves for the benefit of the group. Bonobos are matriarchal and have little to no violence, even when they come into contact with other bonobo groups. I'm sure you've heard plenty of anecdotal stories of dogs putting themselves in harm's way for their owners. We also have an intelligent brain, capable of building on our empathy to improve our morality as our knowledge increases. Why do people support the LGBT community in today's world? Because we know that it is completely natural and in fact millions of species have a minority number of homosexual members. I care about my friends and family and I recognize that we all help each other. I know that I want others to treat them well, and I choose to reciprocate that action to others. What does any of this have to do with the eventual heat death of the universe? What does any of this have to do with whether or not God exists?
atheism just a nonsense faith.
Make knitting great again.
Christian paranoia has unlimited potential as a human gold mine. If you can hold your nose while you fleece the gullible Christian suckers, the sky is the limit.... Knitting doth not payeth as well as Christian bottomfeededing. Right?
That's a lot of talking without saying anything.
Sal C ...and your statement manages to say less than nothing. Amazing.
Tooley demonstrated that Plantinga's argument is inconclusive at best.
Well, Tooley has a hate boner for plantinga lol. I read Tooley on Plantinga's "the nature of necessity" and I was very disapointed though; outright misreadings abounded. For example, he criticised Plantinga for making an argument using premises relying of Stalnaker semantics, when he in the same chapter made another version of the argument without relyoing on them. I take it tooley is better on the EAAN?
Platinga is cognitively limited. No question.
Read one of his books on modal logic all the way through. Then summarize your findings on here in modal logic.
Let's see who's "cognitively limited".
@@Drigger95 🤣🤣
*Tooley
You thinking that can be chalked up to your cognitive limitations.