Hey New Testament Review team, Hope all is well. Do you know of any canonical books or articles on the topic of methodological naturalism? I want to make two points off the bat. 1. The way historians engage in history is to some degree different than how philosophers of history describe them. 2. Methodological naturalism is not the same as philosophical naturalism. However, in most forms of philosophical naturalism, there is a strong argument for removing any appeal to a priori reasoning or appeal to abstract truths. Both share the same qualities as supernatural objects, immateriality for example, so many argue that naturalists have to remove reference to them for the same reason as removing reference to supernatural beings in the discussion of scientific research. This would be because having any casual relationship with them, justification of them, would involve breaking the conservation laws. I do not see how methodological naturalism can escape this idea as well. This would lead to the strange conclusion that one cannot use normative judgements (moral, epistemic (simplicity and explanatory power are virtues), or aesthetic) or make reference to logical claims (truth of the law of identity or non contradiction) or make reference to mathematical claims as well as anything which relies on these three types of claims. That would mean that one could not include appeals to scientific research (meaning universal non local truths) in historical analysis. I dont know what history would look like if none of those things can be appealed to. I assume I am not the first one to notice this because this seems like too big of a problem. Can you point me to any folks who specialize in historical methodology who address these concerns?
It’s helpful to think through how our evaluations work... even if we don’t go through these steps explicitly every time we make a judgement or advance an argument.
ooo .... more insights on how actual scholars work. sweeping in the supernatural sweeps out (excludes, corrupts, vitiates, obstructs, blocks and confounds) all actual scholarship.
@@newtestamentreview9931 I just listened to this just now & I put this whole lecture in the context of your repartee with Randal Rauser, so I would read that as the original poster is agreeing with you. From your lectures to date I doubt anyone could reasonably conclude you are prone to magical thinking.
Ian, at 12:20 you say we can't determine the plausibility of claims of irregular experience. Are you familiar with John Earman's argument in Hume's Abject Failure? He argues that if we can't determine the plausibility of an irregular experience, then it logically follows that we can never learn any new facts about anything at all. The reason is we judge something to be irregular when it doesn't fit our model. So the only way to improve our model (i.e learn) is to explain new irregular experiences. What do you make of this argument?
Not sure if we mean the same thing by "irregular" here. First, I didn't use that term. I said that we use the regularities of our experience to evaluate relative plausability. And that objection is well-known in the literature (I forget its conventional name) and, I think, it is both completely wrong and reflects a misunderstanding of the problem. In someways every experience is new; and also nothing is. We evaluate explanations for all such stimuli on the basis of regularities. None of this prevents us from making new observations or learning. It does preclude the "supernatural" (defined in a particular way) from functioning as causal explanations.
It looks like the link to "Defending Methodological Naturalism" is private, I would love to watch that one.
Hey New Testament Review team,
Hope all is well. Do you know of any canonical books or articles on the topic of methodological naturalism? I want to make two points off the bat.
1. The way historians engage in history is to some degree different than how philosophers of history describe them.
2. Methodological naturalism is not the same as philosophical naturalism.
However, in most forms of philosophical naturalism, there is a strong argument for removing any appeal to a priori reasoning or appeal to abstract truths. Both share the same qualities as supernatural objects, immateriality for example, so many argue that naturalists have to remove reference to them for the same reason as removing reference to supernatural beings in the discussion of scientific research. This would be because having any casual relationship with them, justification of them, would involve breaking the conservation laws. I do not see how methodological naturalism can escape this idea as well. This would lead to the strange conclusion that one cannot use normative judgements (moral, epistemic (simplicity and explanatory power are virtues), or aesthetic) or make reference to logical claims (truth of the law of identity or non contradiction) or make reference to mathematical claims as well as anything which relies on these three types of claims. That would mean that one could not include appeals to scientific research (meaning universal non local truths) in historical analysis. I dont know what history would look like if none of those things can be appealed to. I assume I am not the first one to notice this because this seems like too big of a problem. Can you point me to any folks who specialize in historical methodology who address these concerns?
This was excellent. Truly excellent. Thank you !
Great conceptualisation. Takes grounded theory to a more accurate level which is what it needs. Thanks.
It’s helpful to think through how our evaluations work... even if we don’t go through these steps explicitly every time we make a judgement or advance an argument.
this was awesome u rock n thanks for the footnotes
ooo .... more insights on how actual scholars work.
sweeping in the supernatural sweeps out (excludes, corrupts, vitiates, obstructs, blocks and confounds) all actual scholarship.
In my previous reply, I think I misread your comment. You aren't accusing me of "sweeping in" the supernatural, are you? Sorry I came off defensive.
@@newtestamentreview9931 I just listened to this just now & I put this whole lecture in the context of your repartee with Randal Rauser, so I would read that as the original poster is agreeing with you.
From your lectures to date I doubt anyone could reasonably conclude you are prone to magical thinking.
@@newtestamentreview9931 I would do that if I wanted to troll you ;)
As the other commenter has it, that would be an unreasonable.
Ian, at 12:20 you say we can't determine the plausibility of claims of irregular experience. Are you familiar with John Earman's argument in Hume's Abject Failure? He argues that if we can't determine the plausibility of an irregular experience, then it logically follows that we can never learn any new facts about anything at all. The reason is we judge something to be irregular when it doesn't fit our model. So the only way to improve our model (i.e learn) is to explain new irregular experiences. What do you make of this argument?
Not sure if we mean the same thing by "irregular" here. First, I didn't use that term. I said that we use the regularities of our experience to evaluate relative plausability. And that objection is well-known in the literature (I forget its conventional name) and, I think, it is both completely wrong and reflects a misunderstanding of the problem. In someways every experience is new; and also nothing is. We evaluate explanations for all such stimuli on the basis of regularities. None of this prevents us from making new observations or learning. It does preclude the "supernatural" (defined in a particular way) from functioning as causal explanations.
Subtly flexing your height
Are you a Christian? I would understand if you chose not to answer
Yep. We've discussed it elsewhere on the chanel.
@@newtestamentreview9931 Where is this discussed?
We discuss it in our Lee Strobel ep. And also in our first mailbag episode on the podcast feed.