This is a fascinating discussion and if we consider the implications of veganism and the rights of other animals and we implement veganism and the rights of other animals into our society then what we have is a fundamental change in the world that would be unparalleled in the history of the world. This is a spiritual and social revolution that needs to happen if our species is going to have any chance of surviving into the future. This is our evolution . This is a new philosophy being created. Please do not consign the world to eternal ignorance for the taste of a sandwich. Thank you for the video.🌱
A fascinating discussion, especially in as much as it aligns with my earlier graduate work and my current doctoral work (viz. the nature of personhood and subjectivity as ontological categories, our treatment of other animals, etc.). That said, I do wish there had been a more substantive discussion vis-a-vis how we define "personhood" as an ontological category. What I am pointing to is that Profs. Peña-Guzmán and Anderson hinted at the ancient debates regarding the nature of personhood (in the Western canon a la Seneca and Plato, et al., though there are similar debates in non-Western traditions), but they failed to develop this further -- they jumped straight to modern Western interpretations of "personhood" (viz. Descartes and his followers). What about Greek and Roman definitions (viz. statements denoting the nature of a thing) of personhood? What about non-Western definitions? Defining rather than presuming the meaning of "personhood" would have made this episode better. For example, though she was writing from a Western perspective, philosopher Linda Zagzebski gave a lecture in 2001 where she discussed six Western definitions of "personhood": 1) 'naturae rationabilis individua substantia' ["an individual substance of a rational nature"] (Boethius); 2) "an individual [hypostatsis {ὑπόστασις}] distinct by reason of dignity" (Alan of Lille); 3) a self-conscious being (Locke); 4) a being with a capacity to act for ends (Kant); 5) a being with the capacity to act for another (Kant); 6) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla, a.k.a. John Paul II). Of course, she even neglected the roots of "person" in the Greek 'prosopon' (πρόσωπον -- "face" or "appearance" -- a term which was frequently used in reference to the mask worn and character portrayed by actors) and the Latin 'persona(e)'. (Zagzebski did not discuss personhood beyond that which is attributed to individual human animals.) In fact, much but not all of Western thought regarding "personhood" as an ontological category is derived from these sources, and they were significantly developed by the Cappadocians. For example, the Russian philosopher Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev (a "personalist") critiqued the ratiocentric position of Descartes and Kant -- and, by extension, the ratiocentric tendency of Western philosophy. I would even aver that the critique applies to much of modern personalist and personist thought (e.g. Wojtyla was a personalist and Singer is a personist, the fundamental difference being degrees and understandings of "autonomy" v. "relationality" regarding what constitutes a person). All of this is to say that "personhood" may be an outdated concept, especially since it is not clear that even human beings (qua 'homo sapiens sapiens') are "persons" in any strict sense -- this is due to the conflated, complicated, and convoluted debates about what constitutes a "person." Instead, we should be considering what it means to be a "subject"; from this we can determine more adequately what (or who?) possesses rights. What or who is a "subject" of rights? What is more: even if we determine that human animals are "persons" in some technical sense, this does not preclude non-human animals, who may not be ontological persons, from being guaranteed rights under the law (natural or otherwise). Though I side with Prof. Peña-Guzmán over and against Prof. Anderson's (admittedly sophomoric) approach to our fellow animals, the important point to derive from this grossly limited discussion is that the debate(s) regarding non-human personhood is complicated; moreover, it tends to be inherently anthropocentric, as one commenter has explicitly demonstrated below. What I suggest is that "personhood," sans a definitive definition, may be a meaningless concept which serves merely as a tool of oppression. In contrast, we should consider what it means to be a "subject," especially a "subject of rights." P.S.: I admit that I have yet to read Prof. Peña-Guzmán's book -- I plan to purchase it as soon as I receive my doctoral funding this semester -- so it is possible that he and his co-author's developed what I have discussed above; however, even if this is the case, it should have been discussed so as to preclude the dichotomous thoughts of at least one listener (and the un{der}developed position of another) who posted their conflation of "human" with "person." One issue which I think should have been discussed is the tendency to convert "person" and "personhood" into categories (qua the Aristotelian and larger wider Western sense) in such a way as to devolve them into 'reductio ad unum' -- reductions to the One (or, grossly, "uniformity"). (It should also be noted that Profs. Peña-Guzmán and Anderson, while well intended and brilliant philosophers, lack an understanding of theological history and interpretation: though there is a hegemonic form of theological and Judeo-Christian biblical interpretation, there are alternative interpretations throughout history and across cultures vis-a-vis our fellow creatures qua subjects.) P.P.S.: I would have written more, but I can only take so much time away from editing my dissertation and preparing job applications.
I've always thought that outdoor cats are having their autonomy respected by their human companions, but indoor cats are being confined against their will.
We can treat animals better without granting personhood. I feel like there sort of exists a false dichotomy of the situation that we can either give animals rights indistinguishable from humans or just permit any and all inhumane kinds of torture upon animals. No.
So... If a spider is a person, then when one bites me, I can't "murder" it in response? I don't think animals respect human rights the way we respect each other's. Pigeons poop on my deck. Rats eat food from my pantry. Wild dogs are a danger to people in developing countries. (Which is why we have animal control.) If a human violates my property, I have legal recourse. Not so with an animal person. We aren't going to give a rabid dog a day in court for attacking an infant, and if we find it guilty, put it in the penitentiary with the humans...
You have rats in your pantry? hahaha But in all seriousness, you are fundamentally correct in your assessment. The idea of Animal Personhood...what a farce!
This is a fascinating discussion and if we consider the implications of veganism and the rights of other animals and we implement veganism and the rights of other animals into our society then what we have is a fundamental change in the world that would be unparalleled in the history of the world. This is a spiritual and social revolution that needs to happen if our species is going to have any chance of surviving into the future. This is our evolution . This is a new philosophy being created. Please do not consign the world to eternal ignorance for the taste of a sandwich. Thank you for the video.🌱
A fascinating discussion, especially in as much as it aligns with my earlier graduate work and my current doctoral work (viz. the nature of personhood and subjectivity as ontological categories, our treatment of other animals, etc.).
That said, I do wish there had been a more substantive discussion vis-a-vis how we define "personhood" as an ontological category. What I am pointing to is that Profs. Peña-Guzmán and Anderson hinted at the ancient debates regarding the nature of personhood (in the Western canon a la Seneca and Plato, et al., though there are similar debates in non-Western traditions), but they failed to develop this further -- they jumped straight to modern Western interpretations of "personhood" (viz. Descartes and his followers). What about Greek and Roman definitions (viz. statements denoting the nature of a thing) of personhood? What about non-Western definitions?
Defining rather than presuming the meaning of "personhood" would have made this episode better.
For example, though she was writing from a Western perspective, philosopher Linda Zagzebski gave a lecture in 2001 where she discussed six Western definitions of "personhood":
1) 'naturae rationabilis individua substantia' ["an individual substance of a rational nature"] (Boethius);
2) "an individual [hypostatsis {ὑπόστασις}] distinct by reason of dignity" (Alan of Lille);
3) a self-conscious being (Locke);
4) a being with a capacity to act for ends (Kant);
5) a being with the capacity to act for another (Kant);
6) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla, a.k.a. John Paul II).
Of course, she even neglected the roots of "person" in the Greek 'prosopon' (πρόσωπον -- "face" or "appearance" -- a term which was frequently used in reference to the mask worn and character portrayed by actors) and the Latin 'persona(e)'. (Zagzebski did not discuss personhood beyond that which is attributed to individual human animals.) In fact, much but not all of Western thought regarding "personhood" as an ontological category is derived from these sources, and they were significantly developed by the Cappadocians. For example, the Russian philosopher Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev (a "personalist") critiqued the ratiocentric position of Descartes and Kant -- and, by extension, the ratiocentric tendency of Western philosophy. I would even aver that the critique applies to much of modern personalist and personist thought (e.g. Wojtyla was a personalist and Singer is a personist, the fundamental difference being degrees and understandings of "autonomy" v. "relationality" regarding what constitutes a person).
All of this is to say that "personhood" may be an outdated concept, especially since it is not clear that even human beings (qua 'homo sapiens sapiens') are "persons" in any strict sense -- this is due to the conflated, complicated, and convoluted debates about what constitutes a "person." Instead, we should be considering what it means to be a "subject"; from this we can determine more adequately what (or who?) possesses rights. What or who is a "subject" of rights? What is more: even if we determine that human animals are "persons" in some technical sense, this does not preclude non-human animals, who may not be ontological persons, from being guaranteed rights under the law (natural or otherwise).
Though I side with Prof. Peña-Guzmán over and against Prof. Anderson's (admittedly sophomoric) approach to our fellow animals, the important point to derive from this grossly limited discussion is that the debate(s) regarding non-human personhood is complicated; moreover, it tends to be inherently anthropocentric, as one commenter has explicitly demonstrated below. What I suggest is that "personhood," sans a definitive definition, may be a meaningless concept which serves merely as a tool of oppression. In contrast, we should consider what it means to be a "subject," especially a "subject of rights."
P.S.: I admit that I have yet to read Prof. Peña-Guzmán's book -- I plan to purchase it as soon as I receive my doctoral funding this semester -- so it is possible that he and his co-author's developed what I have discussed above; however, even if this is the case, it should have been discussed so as to preclude the dichotomous thoughts of at least one listener (and the un{der}developed position of another) who posted their conflation of "human" with "person."
One issue which I think should have been discussed is the tendency to convert "person" and "personhood" into categories (qua the Aristotelian and larger wider Western sense) in such a way as to devolve them into 'reductio ad unum' -- reductions to the One (or, grossly, "uniformity").
(It should also be noted that Profs. Peña-Guzmán and Anderson, while well intended and brilliant philosophers, lack an understanding of theological history and interpretation: though there is a hegemonic form of theological and Judeo-Christian biblical interpretation, there are alternative interpretations throughout history and across cultures vis-a-vis our fellow creatures qua subjects.)
P.P.S.: I would have written more, but I can only take so much time away from editing my dissertation and preparing job applications.
That Descartes quote about animals is like the ethology of equivalent of "God put fossiles in the ground to test our faith."
I've always thought that outdoor cats are having their autonomy respected by their human companions, but indoor cats are being confined against their will.
We can treat animals better without granting personhood. I feel like there sort of exists a false dichotomy of the situation that we can either give animals rights indistinguishable from humans or just permit any and all inhumane kinds of torture upon animals. No.
So... If a spider is a person, then when one bites me, I can't "murder" it in response? I don't think animals respect human rights the way we respect each other's. Pigeons poop on my deck. Rats eat food from my pantry. Wild dogs are a danger to people in developing countries. (Which is why we have animal control.) If a human violates my property, I have legal recourse. Not so with an animal person. We aren't going to give a rabid dog a day in court for attacking an infant, and if we find it guilty, put it in the penitentiary with the humans...
You have rats in your pantry? hahaha
But in all seriousness, you are fundamentally correct in your assessment. The idea of Animal Personhood...what a farce!