Thank you for this video! It will help me with writing my paper. I have a question: Is there a case where both epistemic closure AND sensitivity can be the case? Does "there is a barn" mean the exact same thing in both cases? I struggle a bit with the word "there" in epistemic closure vs. sensitivity Epistemic closure: (P): I know there is a red barn. (P entails Q) : When I know there is a red barn, I know there (where I see the red barn) is (at least one) a barn. (Q) : There (where I see the red barn) is a barn. Sensitivity: I know there is a red barn because I see and believe there is a red barn. There are also green fake barns that I don't know about. When I know there (where I saw the red barn) is a red barn, I know that there (where?) is a barn. I don't know that not everything that looks like a barn is a barn. Don't I have to specifiy where exactly I mean, and depending on that my knowledge would be sensitive or insensitive?
Good question! Some sensitivity theorists simply reject epistemic closure, while others try to give a more fine-grained analysis of sensitivity and then attempt to show that upon further analysis, sensitivity is actually compatible with closure. For example, if we get specific about the *relative method* under which a belief is produced, there might be a problem with the red barn vs. fake green barn case. If you form the belief "there is a barn on the hill" in virtue of seeming to see a red barn, your method of belief formation is truth-tracking--because all real barns are painted red. However, if you form the belief "there is a barn in the hill" in virtue of seeming to see a green barn, your method of belief formation is not truth-tracking because there is no barn on the hill. So, here if we focus on the specifics of the method of belief formation--seeming to see a red barn vs. seeming to see a green barn--epistemic closure can potentially be preserved.
Dialetheism is a pretty hefty commitment for humdrum epistemological theses! You would need to accept a paraconsistent logic, and a great deal of other things before that becomes a prima facie reasonable solution. A better resolution, I think, is to deny that sensitivity violates closure or to say that a violation of closure (as it is traditionally stated) is not a problem, because the sensitivity theorist can easily restate closure in a new way!
you really helped me get a deeper grasp of the topic. hopefully my epistemology exam will go well now.
Thank you for this video! It will help me with writing my paper. I have a question: Is there a case where both epistemic closure AND sensitivity can be the case? Does "there is a barn" mean the exact same thing in both cases? I struggle a bit with the word "there" in epistemic closure vs. sensitivity
Epistemic closure:
(P): I know there is a red barn.
(P entails Q) : When I know there is a red barn, I know there (where I see the red barn) is (at least one) a barn.
(Q) : There (where I see the red barn) is a barn.
Sensitivity:
I know there is a red barn because I see and believe there is a red barn.
There are also green fake barns that I don't know about. When I know there (where I saw the red barn) is a red barn, I know that there (where?) is a barn. I don't know that not everything that looks like a barn is a barn. Don't I have to specifiy where exactly I mean, and depending on that my knowledge would be sensitive or insensitive?
Good question! Some sensitivity theorists simply reject epistemic closure, while others try to give a more fine-grained analysis of sensitivity and then attempt to show that upon further analysis, sensitivity is actually compatible with closure.
For example, if we get specific about the *relative method* under which a belief is produced, there might be a problem with the red barn vs. fake green barn case. If you form the belief "there is a barn on the hill" in virtue of seeming to see a red barn, your method of belief formation is truth-tracking--because all real barns are painted red. However, if you form the belief "there is a barn in the hill" in virtue of seeming to see a green barn, your method of belief formation is not truth-tracking because there is no barn on the hill. So, here if we focus on the specifics of the method of belief formation--seeming to see a red barn vs. seeming to see a green barn--epistemic closure can potentially be preserved.
What about dialetheic solution? Accepting both epistemic closure and sensitivity condition by accepting that premices can contradict each other?
Dialetheism is a pretty hefty commitment for humdrum epistemological theses! You would need to accept a paraconsistent logic, and a great deal of other things before that becomes a prima facie reasonable solution. A better resolution, I think, is to deny that sensitivity violates closure or to say that a violation of closure (as it is traditionally stated) is not a problem, because the sensitivity theorist can easily restate closure in a new way!