Modal Logic PROOF of God and Idealism

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  • Опубліковано 6 чер 2024
  • Based on the book:
    The Fourth Wall: Toward a Theology of the Ideal
    Copyright 2023© by Larry M. Van Hook. All rights reserved.
    Part one is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places, and incidents are the product of the author’s imagination or are used fictitiously. Any connection between actual people or places is either satire or purely coincidental. The views expressed in this book are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinion of any current or future publisher.
    All biblical quotes are from the King James Version unless WEB (World English Bible) is specified or another is listed with the citation.
    Editing was done by Canvas.com, and many illustrations by Nightcafe.com. Voice-over by ElevenLabs.

КОМЕНТАРІ • 20

  • @leocilliers4346
    @leocilliers4346 24 дні тому +2

    This is pretty good content already, can't wait for the style and quality to develop over time.

  • @EarnestApostate
    @EarnestApostate 21 день тому +2

    This is an interesting argument, or set of arguments. Though I will say, it might be good to slow down a bit for those of us that don't speak modal logic as a first language.
    I find it interesting, but it is somewhat difficult to wrap my head around, so perhaps some examples to let my mind better see what the general point is.
    Overall, I do come to a similar conclusion (though perhaps in confidences rather than certainty) that idealism would lend credence to God's existence and matterism would detract from it, and that dualism seems less likely than either monism.
    I do also find it interesting that Plantinga and I seem to have converged of the same definition of God, that is a conscious necessary being.
    Overall, I think this was a pretty interesting video and wish you well in the future.

    • @unknowntexan4570
      @unknowntexan4570  20 днів тому +1

      Yes, that first point was what my wife said. I feel like even if the arguments don't "prove" God, they do show that "if" there is a God, we are products and incorporeal. It puts the atheist at some disadvantage, I think to label mind as illusion. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is harder for them.

    • @EarnestApostate
      @EarnestApostate 20 днів тому

      @@unknowntexan4570 yes, obviously if my calling the mind illusory one needs to negate the Cogito. Typically, the method that I see is to call consciousness a verb, that it is an activity that brains do rather than a thing that is. In this way, consciousness is no more an illusion than running is.
      I am curious about your thoughts on the late Dennet's assertion that the Hard Problem has effectively been solved in part. The prediction of a new illusion based on study of brain structure, he posits as an understanding of mind based on brains that breaches the HP in a way he seemed to see as fatal.
      I am still, very much, a neophyte in the subjects of philosophy (and honestly I would likely say as much if I'd spent the last 4 decades studying it, but I haven't) so I am still a bit agnostic on how hard the hard problem is.

  • @DanniGadfly
    @DanniGadfly 24 дні тому +6

    Howdy! 🤠 I'm an amateur logician passing through and wanted to take a quick moment to dissect the argumentation presented in this video so as to combat the spread of misinformation. There are many problems with the argument and formula presented here but I'll only be discussing the most glaring flaw in the argument.
    The argument actually disproves itself when taken to its logical conclusion.
    Formal Representation:
    (◇¬U ∧ □G) → ¬(God is maximally great)
    Explanation:
    The modal ontological argument asserts that God is a maximally great being, necessarily existing in all possible worlds.
    A maximally great being is defined as possessing omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection in every possible world.
    If God is a maximally great being, then God's existence should be undeniable and self-evident in all possible worlds, including the actual world.
    Divine Hiddenness Premise:
    • God's existence is not undeniable and self-evident in the actual world.
    • ∃w (God's existence is not undeniable and self-evident in world w).
    Contradiction:
    • If God is a maximally great being, then God's existence is undeniable and self-evident in the actual world.
    • ∀w (If God is maximally great, then God's existence is undeniable and self-evident in world w).
    Resolution:
    • The Divine Hiddenness Premise contradicts the necessary existence and maximal greatness of God asserted by the modal ontological argument.
    • ¬◇G → ¬□G (If possibly God's existence is not undeniable, then God does not necessarily exist).
    Conclusion:
    • The modal ontological argument's definition of God as a necessarily existent and maximally great being is inconsistent with the actual state of divine hiddenness.
    • ¬□G (God does not necessarily exist in the actual world).
    Formal Representation:
    ◇¬U → ¬□G
    This counterargument aims to show that the presence of divine hiddenness in the actual world (◇¬U) undermines the modal ontological argument's conclusion that God necessarily exists as a maximally great being in all possible worlds (□G). If God's existence is not undeniable and self-evident in the actual world, then the argument's definition of God as necessarily existent and maximally great is called into question.

    • @DanniGadfly
      @DanniGadfly 24 дні тому

      Logical Implication:
      • If the modal ontological argument is sound, then God necessarily exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world.
      • □G → (God exists in the actual world).
      Contradiction with Divine Hiddenness:
      • The actual world exhibits divine hiddenness, contradicting the necessary existence and maximal greatness of God asserted by the modal ontological argument.
      • (God exists in the actual world) → ¬(divine hiddenness in the actual world).
      • (Divine hiddenness in the actual world) ∧ (God exists in the actual world) = Contradiction.
      Conclusion:
      • By the modal ontological argument's own logic, the existence of divine hiddenness in the actual world implies that God does not exist in the actual world.
      • (Divine hiddenness in the actual world) → ¬(God exists in the actual world).
      Maximal Greatness Implication:
      • If God does not necessarily exist in all possible worlds, then God is not a maximally great being.
      • ¬□G → ¬(God is maximally great)
      Conclusion on Maximal Greatness:
      • Divine hiddenness in the actual world implies that God is not a maximally great being, contradicting the modal ontological argument's definition of God.
      • (Divine hiddenness in the actual world) → ¬(God is maximally great)

    • @DanniGadfly
      @DanniGadfly 24 дні тому +1

      TL;DR This argument completely flounders and fails when taken to its logical conclusion. This is because if by its own admission this argument discusses all worlds then that necessarily includes the real, physical one as the argument states. A maximally great being in the real physical world would be undeniable if the "maximally great" label were true. However when divine hiddenness (or the fact that God is invisible, intangible, and can't be physically interacted with via any of the senses) is taken into account it becomes apparent that God can be and is regularly denied on a consistent and growing basis. This maximally great God would need to exist in the material, physical world in order for the "all worlds" claim to be true. Since She doesn't exist in the material, physical world then by this arguments own premise God doesn't exist. But don't worry I don't think She minds. 😊

    • @unknowntexan4570
      @unknowntexan4570  24 дні тому +1

      Thanks! This is exactly what I wanted to happen! I hope others will read your comments and respond. I for one need to think about it for future incarnations of the argument.

    • @unknowntexan4570
      @unknowntexan4570  24 дні тому +1

      BTW, I always had a hunch that both arguments may, in the end, be question begging. My hope was to show how idealism was more likely the case because both arguments seemed valid and I could see how both sides would imply some larger Metaphysics. If one is true, then… etc.

    • @DanniGadfly
      @DanniGadfly 24 дні тому +1

      @@unknowntexan4570 🤠Thanks for the response. To be forthright all arguments you've provided seem to beg the question. If you ever want to reformulate the argument I wouldn't mind checking it out. I pass through videos like this from time to time to analyze argumentation. Have a great week and thanks for the conversation.

  • @kpllc4209
    @kpllc4209 23 дні тому +2

    I am not a philosopher but what about monism?

    • @unknowntexan4570
      @unknowntexan4570  23 дні тому +1

      . Ithink it is essentially idealism or materialism. But I may have misunderstood it.

    • @unknowntexan4570
      @unknowntexan4570  23 дні тому +1

      In fact I argued for a form of it but the common substance is mind. I use substance as a synonym of physical stuff, you know.

    • @kpllc4209
      @kpllc4209 23 дні тому +1

      I thought that was probably the case but wasn't sure because I only have a limited knowledge of the terminology and ideas.