Dang, such a coincidence! On my way back home I was looking for something good to listen to on MOA to refresh my memory just two hours ago and I was hopeless. Great job Joe, both for the vid and for your mind-reading ability!
I have just begun looking into this. It was hard to evaluate if my self education was working or not. It is good to hear some of my questions are the questions the experts themselves bring up. Guess I am on the right track and I am sure to review this again and other related videos as my own knowledge grows. 🔍
Hello, very nice presentation. Please, could you tell me what is this book/article youre quoting from? This 'Draper 2020' thing. I like to read about mystical experiences. Thanks
Plantinga’s modal ontological argument defines a MGB and makes assumptions about the nature of possibility so that the proposition “It is impossible a MGB exists” becomes a logical consequence of “No MGB exists.” It then correctly observes that given these assumptions, if it is possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists. The problem with Plantinga’s MOA comes when trying to support the first premise of the argument. Given that the argument works in S5, it only makes sense if we are interpreting possibility as metaphysical possibility. Nevertheless, people continue to try to support S5 using epistemic arguments for the possibility of a MGB’s existence, even though we are working in an axiom system where interpreting possibility as epistemic possibility results in nonsense. They will argue that the concept of a MGB appears to be coherent. They will argue that no one has proven no MGB exists. They will argue it is impossible in principle to derive a contradiction from the definition of a MGB. They will argue that there are symmetry breakers, epistemic reasons for believing it is possible a MGB exists that do not have corresponding reasons for believing it is possible no MGB exists. All of this is a waste of time. Even if these assertions are all true, they are all arguments for the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing. They do nothing to support the first premise of the MOA. We can see this clearly by more carefully analyzing the MOA. Assume for the sake of argument that no MGB exists. The MOA tells us it will then be impossible a MGB exists. Why? Why will it be impossible a MGB exists, if in reality no MGB exists? For exactly three reasons. (A) No MGB exists, (B) We’ve defined a MGB to be a necessary being, and (C) We are working in S5. So, if no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB exists. Therefore, it follows if it is metaphysically possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists. But there is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. For example, there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MOA exists, then the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, purely as an idea. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant the idea of a MGB is perfectly conceptually coherent, we cannot use the MOA together with that to conclude a MGB exists. There is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be possible in principle to prove no MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because it will become possible in principle to prove no MGB exists, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant it is impossible even in principle to prove no MGB exists, we cannot use that together with the MOA to show a MGB exists. There is nothing In the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, then there will fail to be epistemic symmetry breakers that favor the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing over the epistemic possibility of no MGB existing. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if there are epistemic symmetry breakers in favor of the possibility of a MGB existing, we cannot use that together with the MOA to conclude a MGB exists. Any attempt to justify the first premise of the MOA using epistemic arguments is a waste of time, because there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB purely because no MGB exists, because of the definitions and axiom system we have chosen, and for no other reason.
How do you show that the independent arguments for P1 (God is metaphysically possible) or the symmetry breakers are epistemic instead of metaphysical? Correct me if I'm wrong, but the reason for why: if no MGB exists, given MOA, it will still be epistemically possible for MGB to exist, is because the MOA is a metaphysical argument? However, critics may argue that given S5 (what we know to be true), if no MGB exists, then it is epistemically impossible for MGB to exist, since the epistemic possibility of MGB is epistemically inconsistent with S5. That is, given the non-existence of MGB, it would contradict our knowledge of S5 for an MGB to exist. @roderictaylor
One question Joe on your rebuttal to pruss's SP using the atheistic experiences of evil & concluding that they are positive experiences of intrinsic impermissibility of anyone allowing such evils. But the problem here is that you are already assuming that a particular event is evil that gives you such experiences. On an atheistic view defining evil itself is not possible. And what if someone gets a good experience of the supposed 'evil' event? Could you explain?
Have you read Biłat’s 2021 MOA paper? He outlines an ontological argument that doesn’t use modality among other unique versions that all work in T or a lower modality.
You mentioned Maydole’s argument in the questions towards the end. I’ve read it. It has exactly the same problem as Plantinga’s argument, but it hides it by stating the argument in second order predicate logic. I much prefer Plantinga’s argument, as he makes things as simple as possible, using only propositional logic, not hiding what’s going on in technicalities. In Maydole’s argument we talk about great making properties. The argument assumes two important things about them. First, properties or combinations of properties that are impossible to have cannot be great making properties. The argument doesn’t say this explicitly, but it assumes it in a way that is obvious if you are familiar with second order predicate logic. This is a reasonable assumption. When the skeptic argues that creating a rock so large you can’t lift it should be a great making property because it’s better to be able to do so than not, the one making Maydole’s argument can reply that that is not a possible property (at least not given the other great making properties this being is supposed to have), and therefore is not a great making property. Again, this makes sense. Surely a property or a combination of properties that makes it impossible for one to exist can’t be one that is better to have than not. But there is a price for this requirement. From now on, before we grant that any proposed property (or combinations of properties) is a great making property, we must show it is a property that is possible for an entity to have. The second assumption Maydole’s argument makes is that omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and existing necessarily are all great making properties. From what we’ve just said, before we can grant this, we must show that it is not impossible for a being to possess all these properties. In the language of second order predicate calculus, this means we must show it is possible a necessarily existing omniscient omnipotent omnibenevolent being exists. In other words, to support the premises of Maydole’s argument, we must show it is possible a MGB exists. But of course if we could do that, we would not need Maydole’s argument; we could just move on to Plantinga’s argument, having shown the first premise is true.
I think you’re spot on here. Wonderful comment. The argument, as you’ve eloquently and simply stated it here, is very similar to Gödel’s OA. I criticize a simplified version of Gödel’s OA in my video “Four OA’s in 12 minutes”🙂❤️
@@MajestyofReason Thank you very much. I’ll have to look at that video, though it may be a while before I find time. Godel’s argument is very difficult. Did you see my other longer post? The one that argued it was impossible to independently support the first premise of the MOA? To be honest, your video is a bit baffling to me. On the one hand you obviously have a deep philosophical knowledge of the issues involved. And yet you spend so much time on symmetry breakers and so on that to me seem completely irrelevant to the MOA. It’s not that they’re not interesting. But instead of discussing them in the context of the MOA, why not just discuss if mystical experience or the problem of evil or whatever give us good reason to believe God exists or does not exist? Why transform it into a discussion of whether these issues give us reason to believe it is metaphysically possible a MGB exists? Normally, assuming a proposition is possibly true is weaker than assuming it is true (let alone necessarily true). But given the definition of a MGB and that we’re working in S5, assuming premise 1 of the MOA is assuming a MGB exists. Supporting premise 1 requires exactly the same arguments needed for supporting the proposition a MGB exists, and such arguments will be equally successful or unsuccessful for both. So why not just argue whether or not these other arguments give us good reason to believe God exists, and forget about the MOA? It seems to me the MOA is a red herring.
I have a problem with your definition. English is not my first language btw. When you state that mutually exclusive properties cannot be greater making, you don't solve any problem. Let's take the rock example. I can assume that the property of being capable of creating a rock so heavy it cannot lifted IS a great making property. From this first step, I include it into the pool of great-making properties. Now I encounter the "can lift everything" property. Because it contradicts what I already accepted as a great-making property, I discard THIS all-lifting property. Had I done that on the reverse order, I would have a different god. Both gods, the "can-lift-everything-but-cannot-create-an-unliftable-rock" and the god "can-lift-everything-but-an-unliftable-rock-it-can-create" are maximally great.
I have some issues about P1 but they might be difficult to articulate. When the modal ontological argument is presented, and the particular part of “is possible that a maximally great being exists” is evaluated it is done in a way that I find misleading. It is asked in a way that prompts the image of a possible world with a maximally great being existing in it but that can not really be conceptualized, by the provided definition, imagining a MGB would imply imagining it in all possible worlds. If we create another concept that has all of the same properties as the maximally great being except that it doesn’t have to exist in all possible worlds, let’s say mGB, then it seems that in order to prove that a MGB exists you would have either to prove that mGB exists in all possible worlds or that a mGB cannot exist without also being a MGB.
What you are describing is termed “maximal excellence” by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga claimed that the Hartshorne MOA only proved a MEB, so he offered the concept of MGB (A being that is maximally excellent in all possible worlds) as a response
Joe i'm really fascinating whit this vídeo, because i like de ontological argument since i have 15 years. i have one question that i be glad if You can answer. Do You Think yo appel to a posteori evidencie for God existence break de simetry problem, that Dr. Craig propose if i'm not wrong. Thanks an happy new year!!
I haven't dived into Ontological Arguments near as much as Kalam / LCA / Thomistic Arguments, but here are some thoughts which really kneecap the project in my opinion. 1. If it is logically possible that God is logically necessary, then God is logically necessary and so there should be some explicit contradiction if God doesn't exist. I haven't heard anyone point out such a contradiction which is why this is argued in metaphysical modality, fair enough. 2. How do we know what is and isn't metaphysically possible? The only categories of things I've seen are actual things (which are metaphysically possible in a narrow sense) and logically necessary things. I've never seen any broadly metaphysically possible things (confirmed to be metaphysically vs logically possible) and not a single example of a metaphysical necessity that doesn't just collapse into a logical necessity upon inspection. The closest I've seen is "Water is H20" which is just a statement of conditional logical necessity "In any possible world in which there is water, necessarily it is defined to be H20". Given that, I'd be very careful talking about "metaphysical possibility (I'm blackpilled on metaphysical modality in general at this point, seems pretty incoherent, logical account or bust). 3. Supposing we have a handle on the general kinds of things which are logically possible but metaphysically impossible to narrow down the set to what we're considering, the immediate problem is that we experience one metaphysically possible world. So whatever intuitions we'd have to justify P1 (literally WHATEVER intuitions we'd have) don't scale past this world. Any Godlike being we'd intuit as the source for some spiritual experience, at most, can be generalized to be some fundamental grounding or thing of this world and we have no basis to generalize past that. Further, let's just make it simple to say something like: "In every metaphysically possible world, I can conceive of beings intuiting God like I intuit God in this world". The problem with that is there's no guarantee that the God intuited in each world is the same God. While our intuition COULD get us to something like: "Necessarily, some God exists" they can't get us to "Some God necessarily exists". Moreover, the usual Occam's Razer objection isn't going to work here since each metaphysical world is locally monotheistic, thus each world is only positing one ontological entity, unique to that world, to explain that world. Thus the plurality of Gods aren't being offered as a plurality of beings to explain some fact or facts in any metaphysically possible world. Further, we see many problems in the literature trying to account for how a necessary being (metaphysically or logically) explains PARTICULAR contingent metaphysically possible worlds. To avoid modal collapse, God is indeterministic or even random (I've read papers which say that God creates some maximally great randomizer) but indeterminate / random explanations CANNOT by their very nature explain contingent outcomes. Indeed indeterminate mechanisms are what we use when we want to account for the inexplicability of particulars in a system. This system, where God is local to its metaphysically possible world only, solves that quite nicely. 4. Without a logical account of modality, I don't see how this version of S5 is justifiable in terms of the semantics. P(N(X)) -> N(X) This would say, on a non logical account, something to the effect of: If something could ground or cause it to be the case that (Let's call it Y) nothing need ground or cause it to be the case that X, then nothing need ground or cause it to be the case that X. But that just seems wrong. Given that Y grounds or causes X's not needing a grounding or cause, what happens to X's state of not needing a grounding or cause in the absence of Y? If it has it even in the absence of Y, then the first part of the implication is straightforwardly false. It's not Y's grounding or causing which results in X's state, since X's state is the way it is even in the absence of Y. So then it's not that P(N(X)) -> N(X), we just assumed N(X) to begin with. The P( ) operator semantically plays no role at all. On the other hand if X lacks its necessary state in the absence of Y, then X isn't necessary. In a reality absent cause/ground Y, there can be some other cause or ground, say W, such that absent that ground there is no X. Then in the reality such that Y and W are absent, X is absent so X isn't necessary. 5. immediate symmetry breaker (extending 3). While, even if we suppose God is possible based on our intuitions, we don't know if he has qualities that generalize him to being metaphysically necessary (just metaphysically powerful, maximally so relative to our world's physics) the same isn't true for the parody. If one has the opposite intuition, that there just isn't a Godlike thing in our world, and they just imagine that possibly all other worlds would be relevantly like this one sans local permutations on the physics (to create a maximal metaphysical system) then they are really intuiting the metaphysical possibility that necessarily there is no Godlike thing. That's a bold claim that takes unpacking based on what I've previously said, so I'll take a stab at it. Possibility here is grounded in any/all permutation of the physics in the metaphysical system. Necessity is grounded to the extent that we've exhausted all the permutations in the metaphysical system. So if you permute all the physical facts which could produce all the local metaphysically possible worlds and intuit that they'd be "relevantly like ours" in the sense that they "work" sans God, then this permutation calculus is itself a possibility grounding, which then, if exhaustive, truly ranges over all the possibilities resulting in a necessary conclusion. To deny this generalization is to deny metaphysical modal semantics itself, resulting in a "heads I win, tails you lose" scenario. So that's two advantages the parody has over the original. First, the intuition scales better (see 3). Second denial of the argument puts any talk of metaphysical semantics in grave jeopardy.
Would the argument be unsound if we reject the notion of metaphysical necessity? For example, you talk about water being H2O as being metaphysically necessary, but what if we granted that it’s metaphysically possible for water to be not-H2O. What problems could we run into if this were the case?
To add to the positive atheist experiences, I have had in my light spiritual experiences. A sense of cosmic oneness, bliss, union, the dissolving of self and profound understanding ... etc. This has been occurring for decades as I regularly meditate and other spiritual practices. It was not until I was confronted by a question from a theist something to the effect "Can athirst be spiritual?" or such, that I realized I never felt any god like presence. It reminds me of a paraphrased sentence for an Islamic Sufi "If you think yourself becoming more spiritual and do not find yourself being drawn closer to your fellow man, you are going the wrong way" This has been a guiding definition of spirituality for me since I heard it. Based on it too, my experiences were spiritual.
Joe, I remember I once asked you in a comment about whether atoms can't be necessary because they are dependent on space to exist, and you said that being "dependent" isn't the same as being "contingent" or "causally contingent" on space. Would you mind explaining what you meant in more details? I really appreciate it. :)
Couldn’t double inclusion be possible on a trinitarian conception of God? God himself being United to humanity through the divine son could allow for divinity to permeate a human being without that creating an infinite ingress
This argument just begs the question in P1. Affirming that "There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness." is just to affirm that God exists in our world. Nobody that is not already convinced that God exists in our world should be convinced by this argument. I have honestly no idea how this argument is making it this far in academia.
That's why we explore symmetry breakers! :) Without giving independent justification for P1, you are absolutely correct that it's question-begging. But philosophers in the literature don't tend to blithely assert P1. Instead, they offer independent reasons or justifications in support of P1 -- that is, they offer symmetry breakers. So by my lights, the charge of question-begging seems misguided. I think you'll benefit especially from 36:15 onwards, since therein I survey some different proposed independent justifications for P1
How my teacher used to say me : Don't to understand something doesn't mean What this specific thing be absurd or silly . You Should spend your Time to understand and be able to object or refute it
@@MajestyofReason I thought that begging the question was when someone affirms the conclusion in the premises. Even if they have a reason for accepting the premise, the argument would still have a question-begging form. Also, if one accepts P1 because of whatever symmetry breaker, they accept that God exists. So why would they continue on with making the MOA ?
@@veganworldorder9394 Question-begging is super super complex, and there are many competing theories about what it is. E.g., some prominent theories hold that question-begging occurs when one's *reason* or *justification* for accepting a premise relies on a prior acceptance of the conclusion. On such theories, MOA -- at least for those who proffer symmetry breakers -- doesn't beg the question. But it's all quite complex, since there's no settled view about what constitutes question-begging.
@@MajestyofReason Well, regardless of how we stretch that, if one accepts P1 of the MOA, then one affirms that God exists. So if someone uses the MOA, they use the fact that God exists in order to argue for the conclusion that... God exists. Not sure what I am missing
Salute to the presenter for the best drscription of the OA that i have ever heard. But now i am even more convinced that OA is perhaps the worst of all the pholosophical arguments. The symmetry problem, imho, kills the argument
Heard about ya through Cameron Bertuzzi's "Capturing Christianity" Podcast. Any chance you could post your work on iTunes/Apple Podcasts, in addition to Spotify? Don't worry about it if it's a lot of work, I'll just enjoy your vids on YT 🙂
@@MajestyofReason Woo-hoo! I don't know if it's simple enough to upload your backlog of podcasts but I'll be sure to give a listen as soon as you're on iTunes 😁
Another way to state Plantinga's MOA is as follows. Premise 1. We have defined a MGB and made assumptions about the nature of metaphysical possibility in such a way that it cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists. Premise 2. Even given the definitions and assumptions we've made, it is possible a MGB exists. Conclusion. A MGB exists. The argument is valid. It is an example of the valid argument form: Premise 1. P cannot be true unless Q is true. Premise 2. P is true. Conclusion. Q is true. Premise 1 is indisputable: we have defined our terms and assumed an axiom system in such a way that it cannot be possible a MGB unless a MGB exists. Of course the problem is justifying the premise it is possible a MGB exists, when we've defined our terms in such a way it cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists. Most attempts to justify the argument end up using S5 and the definition of a MGB to support premise 1 of the above argument, and then ignore S5 and the definition of a MGB when trying to justify premise 2 (the possibility premise). In creating an argument, we can make any definitions and assume any axiom system we like. But then we must apply these consistently. We cannot invoke S5 and the definition of a MGB to justify one premise of the argument, and then ignore what they have to say when arguing for the other premise. We have to be consistent in the way we apply our assumptions. So it doesn't matter if the idea of a MGB purely as an idea is perfectly coherent. It doesn't matter if we can find symmetry breakers that favor the MOA over the reverse MOA. All of this is irrelevant. It could all be true, but then it would still not be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists, due to the definitions and axioms we have assumed. We cannot use our definitions and assumptions to justify one part of an argument, and then ignore them when attempting to justify another.
We can explore this further by examining a legitimate use of the above argument form: Premise 1. Peter cannot ride the train unless he has a ticket. Premise 2. Peter is riding the train. Conclusion. Peter has a ticket. Unlike the MOA, this argument could be useful. We can imagine a situation where we did not have direct knowledge that Peter had a ticket, then we see him on the train and conclude he has a ticket. So how does this differ in principle from the MOA? The answer is in the case of the train, premise 1 is not purely a matter of definition. “Peter cannot ride the train unless he has a ticket” is a synthetic statement. It is more than definitional; it has actual content. We can verify whether Peter is riding the train independently of whether he has a ticket. Consider the argument Premise 1. Peter cannot be a bachelor unless he is unmarried. Premise 2. Peter is a bachelor. Conclusion. Peter is unmarried. This argument is valid. But premise 1 is now an analytic statement that is purely a result of the definition of a bachelor and logic. Therefore, there is no way to verify Peter is a bachelor that is independent of verifying he is unmarried (and a man). We could try to get around this. Premise 1. Peter cannot be a bachelor unless he is unmarried. Premise 2. Only bachelors are happy. Premise 3. Peter is happy. Conclusion. Peter is unmarried. We no longer have to justify that Peter is unmarried to justify premise 3. But we’ve just shifted the problem to another premise 2. We now have to verify only unmarried men can be happy, because that is the definition of a bachelor. Back to the MOA: Premise 1. It cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists. Premise 2. It is possible a MGB exists. Conclusion. A MGB exists. Like the bachelor example, premise 1 is analytic. It is purely a matter of definition. As a result, we cannot independently verify premise 2. We cannot get on a “Possibility Space Ship”, go off to another possible universe, and verify, “Hey, a MGB exists here, I guess it exists in the actual world too!” (And even if we could do that, how would we verify that proposed MGB in that other world really was a MGB without verifying it existed in the actual world too?) But someone could argue that S5 is not just an axiom system. They could argue S5 has synthetic content, so that premise 1 is no longer purely analytic. They could argue we should interpret “It is possible P is necessarily true then P is true” to mean that “If we cannot prove P is not necessarily true, then P is true.” We can do this. But then we need to support it. The reason we typically grant axiom systems without argument is they are taken to be analytic, empty of synthetic content. But the moment we argue we should interpret our terms so that our axioms have synthetic content, then before we accept those axioms, we must verify that synthetic content is true. And in the case of S5, it is nearly universally accepted the axioms only make sense in the context of metaphysical possibility (S4 is commonly used for epistemic possibility, in particular it represents the modality of provability). The moment we interpret possibility as epistemic possibility, the S5 axiom “If P is possibly necessarily true then it is true” becomes “If we in principle can’t know or can’t prove or verify P Is not necessarily true then P is true,” which is nonsense. Typically, people attempting to support the MOA use S5 to justify the reasoning in it, and then go on to use epistemic possibility to justify the possibility premise, even though interpreting possibility as epistemic possibility results in nonsense in the context of S5.
Hey what’s joe i love your content I guess I’m curious but what’s your view on libertarian freewill like, Do you lean towards the existence or non existence of it? And lastly what’s your views on veganism ?
The argument if taken to actually entail its conclusion and have that mean something in the real world will never not be simply defining God into existence while proxying this effective claim through as sentences formulated purely in modal logical terms. The argument from its logical form reduces to accepting P1 and hence is equivalent to the weight of whatever independent justifications can be given for P1. Since “possibility” (of actuality in the real world) is a synthetic notion, justifying P1 is equivalent to showing that the words which P1 is formulated in terms of, actually have semantic references (as opposed to being vacuous). So really, the argument’s strength is equivalent to DEFINING P1 semantically. Otherwise, without defining the terms in P1 semantically, the entire argument is semantically vacuous as presented. It is not expressing any semantic meaning unless and until P1 is given some meaning by whoever is propounding this argument. But giving P1 meaning is no easier or harder than the initial problem, proving the existence of God. So the MOA is trivial.
Without giving independent justification for P1, I think you’re absolutely correct. But, of course, lots of philosophers have explored some interesting (though ultimately unsuccessful by my lights) paths for independently justifying P1❤️
I agree. If you understand modal logic, then possibly necessary is the same as necessary. So it certainly seems that the only purpose is to trick someone into accepting the "possibly" as a gotcha.
@@goldenalt3166 The more I think about it, the more I think it only looks like a good argument at first, because people confuse metaphysical and epistemic possibility. There are some attempts at symmetry breaking, but to me they just boil down to showing that God is more likely to exist than not, the modal part looks like an unnecessary add-on at some point.
If you're referring to my "Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs" monograph, that is completed and is currently under review at an academic press :) I don't cover the MOA therein, though; I cover Aquinas's first way, Feser's five proofs, Aquinas's and Kerr's and Nemes's De Ente argument from existence-existence composition; Anderson and Welty's argument from logic; the metaphysics of persistence; and much more. :)
Hi Joe, how does studying philosophy in a university work? Lets say you take a course on metaphysics or any other main branch of philosophy, do you read a couple of introductory works for that class and then in masters degree you specialize? How many books do you read per topic in bachelor? For example, I’m fine with reading 2-3 introductory works per topic, but more than that seems like a waste of time to me. And do you read some of the old philosophers too, like Plato or Kant? Would you recommend doing that? Sry that the questions have nothing to do with the video.
It all depends on the prof, the class, and the level (100-level, Eg, will be easier and less reading than 400-level). Usually, here’s how a typical class is: you’ll have one full book as class “textbook”; then you’ll also have a series of assigned readings of various lengths, usually between 5-25 pages, available online. Whether you read ancient philosophers or contemporary ones will depend on the class. If you’re taking a history of philosophy class, you’ll definitely be reading the primary material. If you’re taking a class on fate and free will, then you’ll almost certainly only be reading stuff from 1960s onward through the present. It all depends really🙂
@@MajestyofReason Thanks! I constructed a list of seemingly good books on each main branch of philosophy. I have 2 years till I finish high school so I can do some pre-study before I apply to uni. Maybe you can give me your opinion if these are good books and maybe you have some additions (only if you have the time, don't feel the need to reply). - Logic: "Logic: An Introduction" by Greg Restall; "Introduction to Logic" by Irving Copi and "Introduction to Logic" by Harry Gensler - Philosophy of language: "Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction" by William Lycan; "Philosophy of Language" by Alexander Miller and "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language" by Michael Morris - Epistemology (here I only have one book): "An Introduction to Epistemology" by Charles Landesman - Metaphysics: Both books by Robert Koons on Metaphysics; "Metaphysics" by Peter van Inwagen and "Beginning Metaphysics: An Introductory Text with Readings" by Heimir Geirsson Ethics is not in here because for now I'm not interested in that.
I disagree with the water statement. Water is defined as h2o just as a square is defined as having four equal sides and four right angles. By saying that it is logically possible for water to not be h2o is the same thing with the square. With this logic, it is logically possible for water to not only be H3O, but also C6H12O6, aka sugar, or CN, aka cyanide. I don’t see how it is logically possible for water to be any of these things, so your example for metaphysical possibility is confusing.
Thanks for comment!! Importantly, though, ‘water’ is not linguistically defined as H2O. We could easily imagine that, in a few years, scientists announce that we’ve been wrong all along about the chemical makeup of water, and that they have discovered through extensive laboratory tests that it’s actually H3O. This is obviously extremely improbable, but the point is just that it’s easily imaginable. But it wouldn’t make any sense at all, and wouldn’t be imaginable at all, if ‘water’ just linguistically means H2O. It would be like trying to imagine that some bachelor is married - it makes no sense, and can’t possibly be imagined. Moreover, there are many competent users of natural languages who think water is a simple element - eg, many people who haven’t learned the relevant science. They’re definitely mistaken, but they are not *confused about the use of a bit of language* - they are instead missing out only on something extra-linguistic.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks for the explanation. I agree now that it is logically possible for water to not be H2O, but I still think that using this as an example for metaphysical possibility is confusing. What does it mean that water in its nature is H2O? I understood it as that water is defined as H2O. Nothing in the rules of logic make water H2O, but it is essentially or defined as H2O. Could you elaborate on this? Also, can you provide another example on metaphysical possibility?
Great video Joe. Thanks! I would request you to connect with thought adventure podcast YT guys(I have requested them as well to reach out to you , hope they will see the request) and engage in a discussion. They are also deep into philosophy of religion specifically Islam. Would like you to understand the Islamic perspective as well and have a fruitful conversation.
Not sure I understand the difference between metaphysical and logical possibility at 7:00. "Water that is H30" seems like "a married bachelor", both logically impossible.
@@TimCrinion Great question! So, in my example, I assumed that water isn't simply defined as H2O. One reason we shouldn't define water this way is that even before the discovery that water=H2O, people knew how to use the term 'water', and they knew what it meant, despite not knowing that it is H2O.
I'm definitely open to this suggestion. It depends on how we demarcate and classify arguments. On one understanding, symmetry-breakers are justifications for premise (1) rather than altogether different arguments in their own right; but on another understanding, you're absolutely correct :)
I disagree with the premise / assertion god is neccessary. This is simply a presupposition. You could make a contigent argument if you want. One cannot make the claim IF something exists then it is necessary. If something by definition is necessary then it is true by definition and would not be a matter of "IF".
The problem with the argument is that being maximally great does not involve existing of necessity. On the contrary, a maximally great being would exist contingently. Why? Because a maximally great being would be omnipotent. However, someone who exists of necessity lacks the ability to cease existing and is therefore not omnipotent. Thus, an omnipotent person exists contingently. Indeed, if an omnipotent person exists, there are no necessary existences or necessary truths, as the omnipotent person has the ability to take anything and everything out of existence and to falsify any true proposition. Thus, if God exists, God exists contingently and so does everything else.
Hi I'm new to philosophy /philosophy of religion all this stuff I already watched your What is philosophy? Video and your books recommendation any More Suggestions,/Syllabus for me
Yes! Here are some additional ones: Rowe's introduction to philosophy of religion; Wainwright's introduction to philosophy of religion; and Davies' introduction to philosophy of religion :)
I'm not sure I'm getting the point at around ~42:00. Even if it's true that it's part of water's and iron's nature to be such and such, that iron bars should sink in water is a result of the laws of nature. And I don't see much reason to suppose that water or iron couldn't exist if the laws were different in a way that would allow bars of iron to float in water.
Water tight collections of iron certainly can float as can iron when water is frozen or under great pressure. It seems we already have examples of laws that allow this.
Why does anyone take this argument seriously? We intuitively know when some arguments are absolutely ridiculous. For example, when people hear B. S. Lewis version of the argument from desire, they know it is non-sense and doesn't even deserve thought.
In some sense, I agree with this sentiment. It is ridiculous merely to offer the argument as "it is metaphysically possible for God to exist, therefore [by S5] God exists." But what is certainly *not* ridiculous are the various potential moves philosophers offer to *justify* the claim that it is possible for God to exist [or, as the case may be, not exist]. Such moves attempt to employ our best epistemic tools for investigating possibility claims, and their not being absolutely ridiculous is indicated by the fact that they're actively being discussed in a blooming literature in top philosophy journals. So in one sense I agree with you, but in another sense I don't :)
If Premise 1 is true, then the argument follows. You are within your epistemic rights to disagree with premise one, but that does not make this argument ridiculous.
1.Because it has been proposed by someone respected in phil of religion and 2.because it is discussed by people respected in academia. But this argument just affirms its conclusion (in a hidden way), in P1. It is a school-book example of arguing in a circle : God exists because God exists.
@@MajestyofReason "Such moves attempt to employ our best epistemic tools for investigating possibility claims, and their not being absolutely ridiculous is indicated by the fact that they're actively being discussed in a blooming literature in top philosophy journals." 1) This implies that rediculous speculations are not entertained in philosophical journals. I would argue that this is not the case. 2) The "best epistemic tools" has proven to be science. Much of the efforts in philosophy could do with a greater understanding of the findings of science and less attention spent on the musings of intuitions.
The MOA argument is presented as a LOGICAL PROOF and can be used by both atheists and theists. At least how Alvin Plantinga uses this approach, the issue is to show that it is LOGICAL to believe in God. That is the whole purpose of the defense as I see it.
In all seriousness, many theists have created different ontological arguments for God's existence, but now that I'm thinking about it, there is nothing stopping atheists from doing the same. If you create a definition of God and prove that definition to be inconsistent/illogical with reality, then you prove God, or at least that definition of God, to be fake; this shouldn't be too hard since if there is at least one other metaphysically possible explanation in a theistic paradigm, then God doesn't exist. Idk mabye i'm asking too much.
You talk about symmetry breakers. But the actual symmetry breaker is reality. Reality precedes our attempts to reason about it. Reality precedes our choice of an axiom system and our definitions. The propositions we create will be true or false depending on reality, but reality won’t alter itself due to our definitions. In the MOA, we choose an axiom system and define our terms in such a way that if in reality a MGB exists, it will be possible a MGB exists, and if in reality no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists. That’s all there is to it. Reality is not going to change itself just because we’ve defined our terms and chosen an axiom system so that if in reality no MGB exists it will be impossible a MGB exists, and the idea of it being impossible a MGB exists appears counter-intuitive or distasteful. Reality doesn’t care about our attempts to reason about it. So it doesn’t matter if the idea of a MGB appears to be coherent, or if people have mystical experiences, or whatever. All of these arguments are red herrings. Even if the MGB appears to be completely coherent, even if people have all sorts of mystical experiences, if in reality no MGB exists then it will be impossible a MGB exists, purely because in reality no MGB exists, because of the axiom system we have chosen and the way we have defined our terms, and for no other reason. Therefore, given the axiom system we have chosen to work with and the way we have defined our terms, the _only_ way to support the proposition it is possible a MGB exists, is to argue that in reality a MGB exists. There is no way around this. Of course, if we can use the existence of mystical experience or whatever to successfully argue that in reality a MGB exists, we will have also shown with the same degree of confidence that it is possible a MGB exists. But this idea that we can somehow use the mere coherence of the idea of a MGB to conclude it is possible a MGB exists and then use the MOA to conclude a MGB exists is absurd. Defining one’s terms and choosing an axiom system in such a way that the impossibility of a MGB follows from the nonexistence of a MGB may be an interesting exercise. It might even be helpful in getting insight into what it might mean to be a necessarily existing being. But it literally does nothing.
To put it another way. Suppose we wanted to show that the apparent coherence of the idea of a MGB was good reason for concluding a MGB exists. To do this, we would need to show the proposition "If no MGB exists, then the idea of a MGB will appear to be incoherent" is true. This is _not_ what the MOA shows. The MOA shows that if no MGB exists, it will then be impossible a MGB exists, not because the idea of a MGB will then appear to be incoherent, but purely because (a) no MGB exists, (b) we have defined a MGB to be a necessary being, (c) we have chosen to work in S5, and for no other reason. There is absolutely nothing in the MOA that shows that if no MGB exists then the idea of a MGB will appear to be incoherent, or that people won't have mystical experiences, or won't be able to conceive of a divine being, or whatever.
the whole idea of a "maximally great God" is just that...an idea. a concept. God is as far away from an idea and a concept as you and I are. This is what Paul was saying when he said Gods ways are past finding out. St Theresa can write endless books describing her experiences with God but all those words fall short of the actual experiences...as far as the east is from the west. only God can make Himself known. Thats how great He is. And He does so through Christ alone--in us and with us... if we let Him. God proves Himself. We do not prove God. this is how great He is.
Joe, you should read about non-well-founded set theory. The falsity of "infinite regress" argument is not very good because of that. It's very easy to see by using an argument from non-well-founded set theory. Let's say we consider a particular mystic named "Theresa". GOD = { ..., THERESA_MYSTIC, ...} THERESA_MYSTIC = {..., GOD, ...} There are only 2 objects (and not an infinite number of "descending" objects, so no infinite regress in the ontological sense), GOD and MYSTIC, but each of them includes each other. There is no contradiction here. So it's true that: "(GOD in THERESA_MYSTIC) and (THERESA_MYSTIC in GOD) and there exists only one GOD and there exist only one THERESA_MYSTIC". Assuming finitary logic, there is also no infinite sentence expressing infinite regress, so no infinity here, therefore no infinite regress.
Anyone going into the argument will almost surely be neither certain that God exists (for whom the argument would be redundant) nor that God doesn't exist (they would reject the argument out of hand): they'll be unsure. That is, they'll assign some prior epistemic probability for the existence of God greater than 0 but less than 1. Given this, they will say it is possible both that God exists and possible that God doesn't exist. But this is death for the OA: if it is possible God doesn't exist, God can't be necessary. We can put this in a trilemma. The following three cannot all be true: 1) Possibly, God exists 2) Possibly, God doesn't exist 3) If possibly God exists, then necessarily God exists (logically equivalent to: If possibly God doesn't exist, then necessarily God doesn't exist) Anyone with a prior probability for the existence of God that isn't either 0 or 1 will accept 1 and 2 and so reject 3. But rejecting 3 is to reject the OA. So the OA only "works" if your prior probability for the existence of God is 1, that is, if you're a perfectly convinced theist going in. It's either preaching to the choir or to no one at all. And this makes clear why the argument is worthless: the key premise really is just a disguised form of the conclusion. However much theists want to dress it up and misdirect and move the parts around, anyone who thinks it's possible God doesn't exist will reject the OA. God simply isn't a necessary entity. Why? THERE CAN'T BE ANY NECESSARY ENTITIES WHATSOEVER. "Nothing exists" is possible, metaphysically, logically, however you want to put it. Inasmuch as the OA defines God as a necessary entity, then, it defines God as something impossible. Let this worthless trashfire of an argument die and remain dead. If I were a theist, I'd be embarassed at how often and confidently this argument and ones like it are offered. Theists, stop trying to define God as existing and work instead to offer some reason to believe he does rather than doesn't, since it's entirely possible that he doesn't.
Great, using logic it is impossible for the Christian god to exist. See according to Christians the god they believe in is all just all loving and all forgiving. But also according to Christians if one doesn’t believe they are condemned to eternal torture but if someone just believes all their evil and wicked deeds are forgiven . That’s not a just god. A god who punishes people just because they don’t believe and for goes justice and doesn’t punish people just because they believe. Therefore Christian god can’t logically exist as described by its followers.
What a convuluted mess of an argument. The amount of mental work/effort wasted on such unproductive silliness. One would think they would step back and pause...and look at their "project" and see what a waste of time it is. But the need to maintain their god-belief as rational is a powerful motivator as demonstrated by the extent they will go.
This is really cool; I learned a lot! Thanks! If anyone here's interested, I have my own take on the MOA, from a linguistic perspective: ua-cam.com/video/AlwuuUX90ik/v-deo.html. Within the context of this presentation, my critique focuses on the idea that logical/metaphysical modality is an inappropriate lens through which to view the argument, that epistemic modality is more appropriate, and that S5 is incompatible with this. Comments are most welcome!
ontomystical symmetry breaker... ffs why does anybody take that even as an argument? It's basically "well if you believe the ramblings of several madmen, this is true"! No, seriously, why would anyone take that argument and dignify it with a serious treatment as if it was actually a reasonable thing to argue? Why not start taking seriously "because I said so" as an argument at that point? Is there any argument bad enough NOT to be considered if this is deemed worhty of consideration?
No. If you are someone respected in academia and know how to speak in a sophisticated way, you can get a free pass for basically saying everything and it will be taken seriously.
@@veganworldorder9394 at this point it really looks like that to me but... you know, I don't think I'm ready to accept that actual academic philosophers just have no standards at all, so I hope for an actual answer that maybe I just missed.
@@paskal007r They definitely have standards, but sometimes, some nonsense make it through anyway. Happens in every field of academia. Also, a lot of philosophers don't have any respect for ontological arguments as they almost always commit, in an obvious way, one of the 2 following moves : 1. begging the question or 2. Defining God into existence.
I had a lot of fun with that Joe. Thanks again for coming on!
A *perfect* presentation!
So glad you enjoyed it🥰
I am a theist, still waiting for my Road to Damascus moment where the ontological argument makes any sense.
Dang, such a coincidence! On my way back home I was looking for something good to listen to on MOA to refresh my memory just two hours ago and I was hopeless. Great job Joe, both for the vid and for your mind-reading ability!
ahaha much love
I have just begun looking into this. It was hard to evaluate if my self education was working or not. It is good to hear some of my questions are the questions the experts themselves bring up. Guess I am on the right track and I am sure to review this again and other related videos as my own knowledge grows. 🔍
Very professional and well thought out presentation with an honest and likeable host. Smashing like
Epic video! Let’s hope that Alex O’Connor sees this. :)
I love this argument. Thank you, Joe. Much love and merry christmas. :)
Hello, very nice presentation. Please, could you tell me what is this book/article youre quoting from? This 'Draper 2020' thing. I like to read about mystical experiences. Thanks
So that’s actually just some of his lecture notes, which aren’t available for public use. But you can read the SEP entry on mystical experience!
Plantinga’s modal ontological argument defines a MGB and makes assumptions about the nature of possibility so that the proposition “It is impossible a MGB exists” becomes a logical consequence of “No MGB exists.” It then correctly observes that given these assumptions, if it is possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists.
The problem with Plantinga’s MOA comes when trying to support the first premise of the argument. Given that the argument works in S5, it only makes sense if we are interpreting possibility as metaphysical possibility. Nevertheless, people continue to try to support S5 using epistemic arguments for the possibility of a MGB’s existence, even though we are working in an axiom system where interpreting possibility as epistemic possibility results in nonsense. They will argue that the concept of a MGB appears to be coherent. They will argue that no one has proven no MGB exists. They will argue it is impossible in principle to derive a contradiction from the definition of a MGB. They will argue that there are symmetry breakers, epistemic reasons for believing it is possible a MGB exists that do not have corresponding reasons for believing it is possible no MGB exists. All of this is a waste of time. Even if these assertions are all true, they are all arguments for the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing. They do nothing to support the first premise of the MOA.
We can see this clearly by more carefully analyzing the MOA. Assume for the sake of argument that no MGB exists. The MOA tells us it will then be impossible a MGB exists. Why? Why will it be impossible a MGB exists, if in reality no MGB exists? For exactly three reasons. (A) No MGB exists, (B) We’ve defined a MGB to be a necessary being, and (C) We are working in S5. So, if no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB exists. Therefore, it follows if it is metaphysically possible a MGB exists, then a MGB exists.
But there is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. For example, there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MOA exists, then the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, purely as an idea. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because the idea of a MGB will somehow become conceptually incoherent, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant the idea of a MGB is perfectly conceptually coherent, we cannot use the MOA together with that to conclude a MGB exists.
There is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, it will then be possible in principle to prove no MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, not because it will become possible in principle to prove no MGB exists, but purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if we grant it is impossible even in principle to prove no MGB exists, we cannot use that together with the MOA to show a MGB exists.
There is nothing In the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists, then there will fail to be epistemic symmetry breakers that favor the epistemic possibility of a MGB existing over the epistemic possibility of no MGB existing. If no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists, purely because no MGB exists and the definitions and axioms we are assuming, and for no other reason. Therefore, even if there are epistemic symmetry breakers in favor of the possibility of a MGB existing, we cannot use that together with the MOA to conclude a MGB exists.
Any attempt to justify the first premise of the MOA using epistemic arguments is a waste of time, because there is nothing in the MOA to suggest that if no MGB exists it will then be epistemically impossible a MGB exists. If no MGB exists, it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB purely because no MGB exists, because of the definitions and axiom system we have chosen, and for no other reason.
How do you show that the independent arguments for P1 (God is metaphysically possible) or the symmetry breakers are epistemic instead of metaphysical?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the reason for why: if no MGB exists, given MOA, it will still be epistemically possible for MGB to exist, is because the MOA is a metaphysical argument? However, critics may argue that given S5 (what we know to be true), if no MGB exists, then it is epistemically impossible for MGB to exist, since the epistemic possibility of MGB is epistemically inconsistent with S5. That is, given the non-existence of MGB, it would contradict our knowledge of S5 for an MGB to exist.
@roderictaylor
One question Joe on your rebuttal to pruss's SP using the atheistic experiences of evil & concluding that they are positive experiences of intrinsic impermissibility of anyone allowing such evils.
But the problem here is that you are already assuming that a particular event is evil that gives you such experiences. On an atheistic view defining evil itself is not possible. And what if someone gets a good experience of the supposed 'evil' event?
Could you explain?
Have you read Biłat’s 2021 MOA paper? He outlines an ontological argument that doesn’t use modality among other unique versions that all work in T or a lower modality.
You mentioned Maydole’s argument in the questions towards the end. I’ve read it. It has exactly the same problem as Plantinga’s argument, but it hides it by stating the argument in second order predicate logic. I much prefer Plantinga’s argument, as he makes things as simple as possible, using only propositional logic, not hiding what’s going on in technicalities.
In Maydole’s argument we talk about great making properties. The argument assumes two important things about them. First, properties or combinations of properties that are impossible to have cannot be great making properties. The argument doesn’t say this explicitly, but it assumes it in a way that is obvious if you are familiar with second order predicate logic.
This is a reasonable assumption. When the skeptic argues that creating a rock so large you can’t lift it should be a great making property because it’s better to be able to do so than not, the one making Maydole’s argument can reply that that is not a possible property (at least not given the other great making properties this being is supposed to have), and therefore is not a great making property. Again, this makes sense. Surely a property or a combination of properties that makes it impossible for one to exist can’t be one that is better to have than not.
But there is a price for this requirement. From now on, before we grant that any proposed property (or combinations of properties) is a great making property, we must show it is a property that is possible for an entity to have.
The second assumption Maydole’s argument makes is that omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and existing necessarily are all great making properties. From what we’ve just said, before we can grant this, we must show that it is not impossible for a being to possess all these properties. In the language of second order predicate calculus, this means we must show it is possible a necessarily existing omniscient omnipotent omnibenevolent being exists. In other words, to support the premises of Maydole’s argument, we must show it is possible a MGB exists. But of course if we could do that, we would not need Maydole’s argument; we could just move on to Plantinga’s argument, having shown the first premise is true.
I think you’re spot on here. Wonderful comment. The argument, as you’ve eloquently and simply stated it here, is very similar to Gödel’s OA. I criticize a simplified version of Gödel’s OA in my video “Four OA’s in 12 minutes”🙂❤️
@@MajestyofReason Thank you very much. I’ll have to look at that video, though it may be a while before I find time. Godel’s argument is very difficult.
Did you see my other longer post? The one that argued it was impossible to independently support the first premise of the MOA?
To be honest, your video is a bit baffling to me. On the one hand you obviously have a deep philosophical knowledge of the issues involved. And yet you spend so much time on symmetry breakers and so on that to me seem completely irrelevant to the MOA. It’s not that they’re not interesting. But instead of discussing them in the context of the MOA, why not just discuss if mystical experience or the problem of evil or whatever give us good reason to believe God exists or does not exist? Why transform it into a discussion of whether these issues give us reason to believe it is metaphysically possible a MGB exists?
Normally, assuming a proposition is possibly true is weaker than assuming it is true (let alone necessarily true). But given the definition of a MGB and that we’re working in S5, assuming premise 1 of the MOA is assuming a MGB exists. Supporting premise 1 requires exactly the same arguments needed for supporting the proposition a MGB exists, and such arguments will be equally successful or unsuccessful for both. So why not just argue whether or not these other arguments give us good reason to believe God exists, and forget about the MOA? It seems to me the MOA is a red herring.
I have a problem with your definition. English is not my first language btw.
When you state that mutually exclusive properties cannot be greater making, you don't solve any problem.
Let's take the rock example.
I can assume that the property of being capable of creating a rock so heavy it cannot lifted IS a great making property.
From this first step, I include it into the pool of great-making properties.
Now I encounter the "can lift everything" property. Because it contradicts what I already accepted as a great-making property, I discard THIS all-lifting property.
Had I done that on the reverse order, I would have a different god.
Both gods, the "can-lift-everything-but-cannot-create-an-unliftable-rock" and the god "can-lift-everything-but-an-unliftable-rock-it-can-create" are maximally great.
OHO i've been waiting for this one!
Came for the hilarious thumbnail, stayed for the excellent content - well-played sir!
I just came across your channel, and remember your name from 425 with Cover. What a great listen!
Cover = my favorite prof❤️
@@MajestyofReason i’m scared…i still have to take one more w him in the fall
I have some issues about P1 but they might be difficult to articulate.
When the modal ontological argument is presented, and the particular part of “is possible that a maximally great being exists” is evaluated it is done in a way that I find misleading. It is asked in a way that prompts the image of a possible world with a maximally great being existing in it but that can not really be conceptualized, by the provided definition, imagining a MGB would imply imagining it in all possible worlds.
If we create another concept that has all of the same properties as the maximally great being except that it doesn’t have to exist in all possible worlds, let’s say mGB, then it seems that in order to prove that a MGB exists you would have either to prove that mGB exists in all possible worlds or that a mGB cannot exist without also being a MGB.
What you are describing is termed “maximal excellence” by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga claimed that the Hartshorne MOA only proved a MEB, so he offered the concept of MGB (A being that is maximally excellent in all possible worlds) as a response
That thumbnail belongs in the "Philosopher's thug life picture hall of fame"
Joe i'm really fascinating whit this vídeo, because i like de ontological argument since i have 15 years. i have one question that i be glad if You can answer. Do You Think yo appel to a posteori evidencie for God existence break de simetry problem, that Dr. Craig propose if i'm not wrong. Thanks an happy new year!!
I haven't dived into Ontological Arguments near as much as Kalam / LCA / Thomistic Arguments, but here are some thoughts which really kneecap the project in my opinion.
1. If it is logically possible that God is logically necessary, then God is logically necessary and so there should be some explicit contradiction if God doesn't exist. I haven't heard anyone point out such a contradiction which is why this is argued in metaphysical modality, fair enough.
2. How do we know what is and isn't metaphysically possible? The only categories of things I've seen are actual things (which are metaphysically possible in a narrow sense) and logically necessary things. I've never seen any broadly metaphysically possible things (confirmed to be metaphysically vs logically possible) and not a single example of a metaphysical necessity that doesn't just collapse into a logical necessity upon inspection. The closest I've seen is "Water is H20" which is just a statement of conditional logical necessity "In any possible world in which there is water, necessarily it is defined to be H20". Given that, I'd be very careful talking about "metaphysical possibility (I'm blackpilled on metaphysical modality in general at this point, seems pretty incoherent, logical account or bust).
3. Supposing we have a handle on the general kinds of things which are logically possible but metaphysically impossible to narrow down the set to what we're considering, the immediate problem is that we experience one metaphysically possible world. So whatever intuitions we'd have to justify P1 (literally WHATEVER intuitions we'd have) don't scale past this world. Any Godlike being we'd intuit as the source for some spiritual experience, at most, can be generalized to be some fundamental grounding or thing of this world and we have no basis to generalize past that. Further, let's just make it simple to say something like: "In every metaphysically possible world, I can conceive of beings intuiting God like I intuit God in this world". The problem with that is there's no guarantee that the God intuited in each world is the same God.
While our intuition COULD get us to something like: "Necessarily, some God exists" they can't get us to "Some God necessarily exists". Moreover, the usual Occam's Razer objection isn't going to work here since each metaphysical world is locally monotheistic, thus each world is only positing one ontological entity, unique to that world, to explain that world. Thus the plurality of Gods aren't being offered as a plurality of beings to explain some fact or facts in any metaphysically possible world. Further, we see many problems in the literature trying to account for how a necessary being (metaphysically or logically) explains PARTICULAR contingent metaphysically possible worlds. To avoid modal collapse, God is indeterministic or even random (I've read papers which say that God creates some maximally great randomizer) but indeterminate / random explanations CANNOT by their very nature explain contingent outcomes. Indeed indeterminate mechanisms are what we use when we want to account for the inexplicability of particulars in a system. This system, where God is local to its metaphysically possible world only, solves that quite nicely.
4. Without a logical account of modality, I don't see how this version of S5 is justifiable in terms of the semantics.
P(N(X)) -> N(X)
This would say, on a non logical account, something to the effect of: If something could ground or cause it to be the case that (Let's call it Y) nothing need ground or cause it to be the case that X, then nothing need ground or cause it to be the case that X.
But that just seems wrong. Given that Y grounds or causes X's not needing a grounding or cause, what happens to X's state of not needing a grounding or cause in the absence of Y? If it has it even in the absence of Y, then the first part of the implication is straightforwardly false. It's not Y's grounding or causing which results in X's state, since X's state is the way it is even in the absence of Y. So then it's not that P(N(X)) -> N(X), we just assumed N(X) to begin with. The P( ) operator semantically plays no role at all.
On the other hand if X lacks its necessary state in the absence of Y, then X isn't necessary. In a reality absent cause/ground Y, there can be some other cause or ground, say W, such that absent that ground there is no X. Then in the reality such that Y and W are absent, X is absent so X isn't necessary.
5. immediate symmetry breaker (extending 3).
While, even if we suppose God is possible based on our intuitions, we don't know if he has qualities that generalize him to being metaphysically necessary (just metaphysically powerful, maximally so relative to our world's physics) the same isn't true for the parody. If one has the opposite intuition, that there just isn't a Godlike thing in our world, and they just imagine that possibly all other worlds would be relevantly like this one sans local permutations on the physics (to create a maximal metaphysical system) then they are really intuiting the metaphysical possibility that necessarily there is no Godlike thing. That's a bold claim that takes unpacking based on what I've previously said, so I'll take a stab at it.
Possibility here is grounded in any/all permutation of the physics in the metaphysical system.
Necessity is grounded to the extent that we've exhausted all the permutations in the metaphysical system.
So if you permute all the physical facts which could produce all the local metaphysically possible worlds and intuit that they'd be "relevantly like ours" in the sense that they "work" sans God, then this permutation calculus is itself a possibility grounding, which then, if exhaustive, truly ranges over all the possibilities resulting in a necessary conclusion. To deny this generalization is to deny metaphysical modal semantics itself, resulting in a "heads I win, tails you lose" scenario. So that's two advantages the parody has over the original. First, the intuition scales better (see 3). Second denial of the argument puts any talk of metaphysical semantics in grave jeopardy.
I've long been aware metaphysical possibility, but I've always known it as nomological possibility, i.e. consistent with the laws of nature.
Would the argument be unsound if we reject the notion of metaphysical necessity?
For example, you talk about water being H2O as being metaphysically necessary, but what if we granted that it’s metaphysically possible for water to be not-H2O. What problems could we run into if this were the case?
To add to the positive atheist experiences, I have had in my light spiritual experiences. A sense of cosmic oneness, bliss, union, the dissolving of self and profound understanding ... etc. This has been occurring for decades as I regularly meditate and other spiritual practices. It was not until I was confronted by a question from a theist something to the effect "Can athirst be spiritual?" or such, that I realized I never felt any god like presence.
It reminds me of a paraphrased sentence for an Islamic Sufi "If you think yourself becoming more spiritual and do not find yourself being drawn closer to your fellow man, you are going the wrong way" This has been a guiding definition of spirituality for me since I heard it. Based on it too, my experiences were spiritual.
So are you a non thiest? Just curious
Joe, I remember I once asked you in a comment about whether atoms can't be necessary because they are dependent on space to exist, and you said that being "dependent" isn't the same as being "contingent" or "causally contingent" on space.
Would you mind explaining what you meant in more details? I really appreciate it. :)
Check out the first section of my video here :) ua-cam.com/video/o7041KrdXC8/v-deo.html
Couldn’t double inclusion be possible on a trinitarian conception of God? God himself being United to humanity through the divine son could allow for divinity to permeate a human being without that creating an infinite ingress
This argument just begs the question in P1.
Affirming that "There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness." is just to affirm that God exists in our world.
Nobody that is not already convinced that God exists in our world should be convinced by this argument.
I have honestly no idea how this argument is making it this far in academia.
That's why we explore symmetry breakers! :) Without giving independent justification for P1, you are absolutely correct that it's question-begging. But philosophers in the literature don't tend to blithely assert P1. Instead, they offer independent reasons or justifications in support of P1 -- that is, they offer symmetry breakers. So by my lights, the charge of question-begging seems misguided. I think you'll benefit especially from 36:15 onwards, since therein I survey some different proposed independent justifications for P1
How my teacher used to say me : Don't to understand something doesn't mean What this specific thing be absurd or silly . You Should spend your Time to understand and be able to object or refute it
@@MajestyofReason I thought that begging the question was when someone affirms the conclusion in the premises. Even if they have a reason for accepting the premise, the argument would still have a question-begging form.
Also, if one accepts P1 because of whatever symmetry breaker, they accept that God exists. So why would they continue on with making the MOA ?
@@veganworldorder9394 Question-begging is super super complex, and there are many competing theories about what it is. E.g., some prominent theories hold that question-begging occurs when one's *reason* or *justification* for accepting a premise relies on a prior acceptance of the conclusion. On such theories, MOA -- at least for those who proffer symmetry breakers -- doesn't beg the question. But it's all quite complex, since there's no settled view about what constitutes question-begging.
@@MajestyofReason Well, regardless of how we stretch that, if one accepts P1 of the MOA, then one affirms that God exists. So if someone uses the MOA, they use the fact that God exists in order to argue for the conclusion that... God exists. Not sure what I am missing
Salute to the presenter for the best drscription of the OA that i have ever heard. But now i am even more convinced that OA is perhaps the worst of all the pholosophical arguments. The symmetry problem, imho, kills the argument
Let’s go! New vid. Lemme brew a coffee
Heard about ya through Cameron Bertuzzi's "Capturing Christianity" Podcast. Any chance you could post your work on iTunes/Apple Podcasts, in addition to Spotify? Don't worry about it if it's a lot of work, I'll just enjoy your vids on YT 🙂
I plan on putting things on those platforms too!!! :)
@@MajestyofReason Woo-hoo! I don't know if it's simple enough to upload your backlog of podcasts but I'll be sure to give a listen as soon as you're on iTunes 😁
Joe Schmid, you are a beautiful mind I am happy to have discovered
Another way to state Plantinga's MOA is as follows.
Premise 1. We have defined a MGB and made assumptions about the nature of metaphysical possibility in such a way that it cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists.
Premise 2. Even given the definitions and assumptions we've made, it is possible a MGB exists.
Conclusion. A MGB exists.
The argument is valid. It is an example of the valid argument form:
Premise 1. P cannot be true unless Q is true.
Premise 2. P is true.
Conclusion. Q is true.
Premise 1 is indisputable: we have defined our terms and assumed an axiom system in such a way that it cannot be possible a MGB unless a MGB exists.
Of course the problem is justifying the premise it is possible a MGB exists, when we've defined our terms in such a way it cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists.
Most attempts to justify the argument end up using S5 and the definition of a MGB to support premise 1 of the above argument, and then ignore S5 and the definition of a MGB when trying to justify premise 2 (the possibility premise). In creating an argument, we can make any definitions and assume any axiom system we like. But then we must apply these consistently. We cannot invoke S5 and the definition of a MGB to justify one premise of the argument, and then ignore what they have to say when arguing for the other premise. We have to be consistent in the way we apply our assumptions.
So it doesn't matter if the idea of a MGB purely as an idea is perfectly coherent. It doesn't matter if we can find symmetry breakers that favor the MOA over the reverse MOA. All of this is irrelevant. It could all be true, but then it would still not be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists, due to the definitions and axioms we have assumed. We cannot use our definitions and assumptions to justify one part of an argument, and then ignore them when attempting to justify another.
We can explore this further by examining a legitimate use of the above argument form:
Premise 1. Peter cannot ride the train unless he has a ticket.
Premise 2. Peter is riding the train.
Conclusion. Peter has a ticket.
Unlike the MOA, this argument could be useful. We can imagine a situation where we did not have direct knowledge that Peter had a ticket, then we see him on the train and conclude he has a ticket. So how does this differ in principle from the MOA?
The answer is in the case of the train, premise 1 is not purely a matter of definition. “Peter cannot ride the train unless he has a ticket” is a synthetic statement. It is more than definitional; it has actual content. We can verify whether Peter is riding the train independently of whether he has a ticket.
Consider the argument
Premise 1. Peter cannot be a bachelor unless he is unmarried.
Premise 2. Peter is a bachelor.
Conclusion. Peter is unmarried.
This argument is valid. But premise 1 is now an analytic statement that is purely a result of the definition of a bachelor and logic. Therefore, there is no way to verify Peter is a bachelor that is independent of verifying he is unmarried (and a man). We could try to get around this.
Premise 1. Peter cannot be a bachelor unless he is unmarried.
Premise 2. Only bachelors are happy.
Premise 3. Peter is happy.
Conclusion. Peter is unmarried.
We no longer have to justify that Peter is unmarried to justify premise 3. But we’ve just shifted the problem to another premise 2. We now have to verify only unmarried men can be happy, because that is the definition of a bachelor.
Back to the MOA:
Premise 1. It cannot be possible a MGB exists unless a MGB exists.
Premise 2. It is possible a MGB exists.
Conclusion. A MGB exists.
Like the bachelor example, premise 1 is analytic. It is purely a matter of definition. As a result, we cannot independently verify premise 2. We cannot get on a “Possibility Space Ship”, go off to another possible universe, and verify, “Hey, a MGB exists here, I guess it exists in the actual world too!” (And even if we could do that, how would we verify that proposed MGB in that other world really was a MGB without verifying it existed in the actual world too?)
But someone could argue that S5 is not just an axiom system. They could argue S5 has synthetic content, so that premise 1 is no longer purely analytic. They could argue we should interpret “It is possible P is necessarily true then P is true” to mean that “If we cannot prove P is not necessarily true, then P is true.” We can do this. But then we need to support it. The reason we typically grant axiom systems without argument is they are taken to be analytic, empty of synthetic content. But the moment we argue we should interpret our terms so that our axioms have synthetic content, then before we accept those axioms, we must verify that synthetic content is true.
And in the case of S5, it is nearly universally accepted the axioms only make sense in the context of metaphysical possibility (S4 is commonly used for epistemic possibility, in particular it represents the modality of provability). The moment we interpret possibility as epistemic possibility, the S5 axiom “If P is possibly necessarily true then it is true” becomes “If we in principle can’t know or can’t prove or verify P Is not necessarily true then P is true,” which is nonsense.
Typically, people attempting to support the MOA use S5 to justify the reasoning in it, and then go on to use epistemic possibility to justify the possibility premise, even though interpreting possibility as epistemic possibility results in nonsense in the context of S5.
Hey what’s joe i love your content I guess I’m curious but what’s your view on libertarian freewill like, Do you lean towards the existence or non existence of it? And lastly what’s your views on veganism ?
The argument if taken to actually entail its conclusion and have that mean something in the real world will never not be simply defining God into existence while proxying this effective claim through as sentences formulated purely in modal logical terms. The argument from its logical form reduces to accepting P1 and hence is equivalent to the weight of whatever independent justifications can be given for P1. Since “possibility” (of actuality in the real world) is a synthetic notion, justifying P1 is equivalent to showing that the words which P1 is formulated in terms of, actually have semantic references (as opposed to being vacuous). So really, the argument’s strength is equivalent to DEFINING P1 semantically. Otherwise, without defining the terms in P1 semantically, the entire argument is semantically vacuous as presented. It is not expressing any semantic meaning unless and until P1 is given some meaning by whoever is propounding this argument. But giving P1 meaning is no easier or harder than the initial problem, proving the existence of God. So the MOA is trivial.
Without giving independent justification for P1, I think you’re absolutely correct. But, of course, lots of philosophers have explored some interesting (though ultimately unsuccessful by my lights) paths for independently justifying P1❤️
I agree. If you understand modal logic, then possibly necessary is the same as necessary. So it certainly seems that the only purpose is to trick someone into accepting the "possibly" as a gotcha.
@@goldenalt3166 The more I think about it, the more I think it only looks like a good argument at first, because people confuse metaphysical and epistemic possibility.
There are some attempts at symmetry breaking, but to me they just boil down to showing that God is more likely to exist than not, the modal part looks like an unnecessary add-on at some point.
@@MsJavaWolf Yeah, I don't buy the argument, but if you did and accepted that God possibly doesn't exist, then God is impossible.
Are you still working on your book, and if so, are these a part of said book?
If you're referring to my "Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs" monograph, that is completed and is currently under review at an academic press :)
I don't cover the MOA therein, though; I cover Aquinas's first way, Feser's five proofs, Aquinas's and Kerr's and Nemes's De Ente argument from existence-existence composition; Anderson and Welty's argument from logic; the metaphysics of persistence; and much more. :)
@@MajestyofReason Look forward to it!
How do u get access to the literature this vast?
Like most colleges purdue will pay for access to lots of philosophical papers. Though Many are free online
Hi Joe,
how does studying philosophy in a university work? Lets say you take a course on metaphysics or any other main branch of philosophy, do you read a couple of introductory works for that class and then in masters degree you specialize? How many books do you read per topic in bachelor? For example, I’m fine with reading 2-3 introductory works per topic, but more than that seems like a waste of time to me. And do you read some of the old philosophers too, like Plato or Kant? Would you recommend doing that? Sry that the questions have nothing to do with the video.
It all depends on the prof, the class, and the level (100-level, Eg, will be easier and less reading than 400-level). Usually, here’s how a typical class is: you’ll have one full book as class “textbook”; then you’ll also have a series of assigned readings of various lengths, usually between 5-25 pages, available online. Whether you read ancient philosophers or contemporary ones will depend on the class. If you’re taking a history of philosophy class, you’ll definitely be reading the primary material. If you’re taking a class on fate and free will, then you’ll almost certainly only be reading stuff from 1960s onward through the present. It all depends really🙂
@@MajestyofReason Thanks! I constructed a list of seemingly good books on each main branch of philosophy. I have 2 years till I finish high school so I can do some pre-study before I apply to uni. Maybe you can give me your opinion if these are good books and maybe you have some additions (only if you have the time, don't feel the need to reply).
- Logic: "Logic: An Introduction" by Greg Restall; "Introduction to Logic" by Irving Copi and "Introduction to Logic" by Harry Gensler
- Philosophy of language: "Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction" by William Lycan; "Philosophy of Language" by Alexander Miller and "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language" by Michael Morris
- Epistemology (here I only have one book): "An Introduction to Epistemology" by Charles Landesman
- Metaphysics: Both books by Robert Koons on Metaphysics; "Metaphysics" by Peter van Inwagen and "Beginning Metaphysics: An Introductory Text with Readings" by Heimir Geirsson
Ethics is not in here because for now I'm not interested in that.
@@MajestyofReason Joee
How do you ground analytical metaphysics? What do you response to the (later) wittgenstenian and rortian critics?
I disagree with the water statement. Water is defined as h2o just as a square is defined as having four equal sides and four right angles. By saying that it is logically possible for water to not be h2o is the same thing with the square. With this logic, it is logically possible for water to not only be H3O, but also C6H12O6, aka sugar, or CN, aka cyanide. I don’t see how it is logically possible for water to be any of these things, so your example for metaphysical possibility is confusing.
Thanks for comment!!
Importantly, though, ‘water’ is not linguistically defined as H2O. We could easily imagine that, in a few years, scientists announce that we’ve been wrong all along about the chemical makeup of water, and that they have discovered through extensive laboratory tests that it’s actually H3O. This is obviously extremely improbable, but the point is just that it’s easily imaginable. But it wouldn’t make any sense at all, and wouldn’t be imaginable at all, if ‘water’ just linguistically means H2O. It would be like trying to imagine that some bachelor is married - it makes no sense, and can’t possibly be imagined.
Moreover, there are many competent users of natural languages who think water is a simple element - eg, many people who haven’t learned the relevant science. They’re definitely mistaken, but they are not *confused about the use of a bit of language* - they are instead missing out only on something extra-linguistic.
@@MajestyofReason Thanks for the explanation. I agree now that it is logically possible for water to not be H2O, but I still think that using this as an example for metaphysical possibility is confusing. What does it mean that water in its nature is H2O? I understood it as that water is defined as H2O. Nothing in the rules of logic make water H2O, but it is essentially or defined as H2O. Could you elaborate on this? Also, can you provide another example on metaphysical possibility?
Please please do a video analysis on the philosophical idea of dependent origination in Buddhist cosmology
Great video Joe. Thanks!
I would request you to connect with thought adventure podcast YT guys(I have requested them as well to reach out to you , hope they will see the request) and engage in a discussion. They are also deep into philosophy of religion specifically Islam. Would like you to understand the Islamic perspective as well and have a fruitful conversation.
Not sure I understand the difference between metaphysical and logical possibility at 7:00. "Water that is H30" seems like "a married bachelor", both logically impossible.
(Here I'm defining water as H2O)
@@TimCrinion Great question! So, in my example, I assumed that water isn't simply defined as H2O. One reason we shouldn't define water this way is that even before the discovery that water=H2O, people knew how to use the term 'water', and they knew what it meant, despite not knowing that it is H2O.
@@MajestyofReason Most of the time what people call water (say bottled water) is not pure H2O. For example, H20 is deadly to drink.
Looking for a symmetry breaker just seems like another way to ditch the argument and look for a new one
I'm definitely open to this suggestion. It depends on how we demarcate and classify arguments. On one understanding, symmetry-breakers are justifications for premise (1) rather than altogether different arguments in their own right; but on another understanding, you're absolutely correct :)
@@MajestyofReason the need for the moa seems to disappear when we give up on its definitiveness.
I disagree with the premise / assertion god is neccessary. This is simply a presupposition. You could make a contigent argument if you want. One cannot make the claim IF something exists then it is necessary. If something by definition is necessary then it is true by definition and would not be a matter of "IF".
The problem with the argument is that being maximally great does not involve existing of necessity. On the contrary, a maximally great being would exist contingently. Why? Because a maximally great being would be omnipotent. However, someone who exists of necessity lacks the ability to cease existing and is therefore not omnipotent. Thus, an omnipotent person exists contingently. Indeed, if an omnipotent person exists, there are no necessary existences or necessary truths, as the omnipotent person has the ability to take anything and everything out of existence and to falsify any true proposition. Thus, if God exists, God exists contingently and so does everything else.
Hi
I'm new to philosophy /philosophy of religion all this stuff I already watched your What is philosophy? Video and your books recommendation any More Suggestions,/Syllabus for me
Yes! Here are some additional ones: Rowe's introduction to philosophy of religion; Wainwright's introduction to philosophy of religion; and Davies' introduction to philosophy of religion :)
Where can you get that modus pwnens shirt?
I made it myself haha
I'm not sure I'm getting the point at around ~42:00. Even if it's true that it's part of water's and iron's nature to be such and such, that iron bars should sink in water is a result of the laws of nature. And I don't see much reason to suppose that water or iron couldn't exist if the laws were different in a way that would allow bars of iron to float in water.
Water tight collections of iron certainly can float as can iron when water is frozen or under great pressure. It seems we already have examples of laws that allow this.
Why does anyone take this argument seriously? We intuitively know when some arguments are absolutely ridiculous. For example, when people hear B. S. Lewis version of the argument from desire, they know it is non-sense and doesn't even deserve thought.
In some sense, I agree with this sentiment. It is ridiculous merely to offer the argument as "it is metaphysically possible for God to exist, therefore [by S5] God exists." But what is certainly *not* ridiculous are the various potential moves philosophers offer to *justify* the claim that it is possible for God to exist [or, as the case may be, not exist]. Such moves attempt to employ our best epistemic tools for investigating possibility claims, and their not being absolutely ridiculous is indicated by the fact that they're actively being discussed in a blooming literature in top philosophy journals. So in one sense I agree with you, but in another sense I don't :)
Hey, that's kinda rude.
If Premise 1 is true, then the argument follows. You are within your epistemic rights to disagree with premise one, but that does not make this argument ridiculous.
1.Because it has been proposed by someone respected in phil of religion and 2.because it is discussed by people respected in academia.
But this argument just affirms its conclusion (in a hidden way), in P1. It is a school-book example of arguing in a circle : God exists because God exists.
@@MajestyofReason "Such moves attempt to employ our best epistemic tools for investigating possibility claims, and their not being absolutely ridiculous is indicated by the fact that they're actively being discussed in a blooming literature in top philosophy journals." 1) This implies that rediculous speculations are not entertained in philosophical journals. I would argue that this is not the case. 2) The "best epistemic tools" has proven to be science. Much of the efforts in philosophy could do with a greater understanding of the findings of science and less attention spent on the musings of intuitions.
The MOA argument is presented as a LOGICAL PROOF and can be used by both atheists and theists. At least how Alvin Plantinga uses this approach, the issue is to show that it is LOGICAL to believe in God. That is the whole purpose of the defense as I see it.
Christian philosophers 🤝 Atheist philosophers
Love Joe Schmid
❤️
Joe Schmid is One of the Best apologist on The internet , but he doesn't know yet
why does this guy have backwards books????
This world would be on the list of possible worlds, therefore it is set in stone. No doing otherwise.
In all seriousness, many theists have created different ontological arguments for God's existence, but now that I'm thinking about it, there is nothing stopping atheists from doing the same. If you create a definition of God and prove that definition to be inconsistent/illogical with reality, then you prove God, or at least that definition of God, to be fake; this shouldn't be too hard since if there is at least one other metaphysically possible explanation in a theistic paradigm, then God doesn't exist. Idk mabye i'm asking too much.
You talk about symmetry breakers. But the actual symmetry breaker is reality. Reality precedes our attempts to reason about it. Reality precedes our choice of an axiom system and our definitions. The propositions we create will be true or false depending on reality, but reality won’t alter itself due to our definitions.
In the MOA, we choose an axiom system and define our terms in such a way that if in reality a MGB exists, it will be possible a MGB exists, and if in reality no MGB exists, it will be impossible a MGB exists. That’s all there is to it. Reality is not going to change itself just because we’ve defined our terms and chosen an axiom system so that if in reality no MGB exists it will be impossible a MGB exists, and the idea of it being impossible a MGB exists appears counter-intuitive or distasteful. Reality doesn’t care about our attempts to reason about it.
So it doesn’t matter if the idea of a MGB appears to be coherent, or if people have mystical experiences, or whatever. All of these arguments are red herrings. Even if the MGB appears to be completely coherent, even if people have all sorts of mystical experiences, if in reality no MGB exists then it will be impossible a MGB exists, purely because in reality no MGB exists, because of the axiom system we have chosen and the way we have defined our terms, and for no other reason. Therefore, given the axiom system we have chosen to work with and the way we have defined our terms, the _only_ way to support the proposition it is possible a MGB exists, is to argue that in reality a MGB exists. There is no way around this.
Of course, if we can use the existence of mystical experience or whatever to successfully argue that in reality a MGB exists, we will have also shown with the same degree of confidence that it is possible a MGB exists. But this idea that we can somehow use the mere coherence of the idea of a MGB to conclude it is possible a MGB exists and then use the MOA to conclude a MGB exists is absurd.
Defining one’s terms and choosing an axiom system in such a way that the impossibility of a MGB follows from the nonexistence of a MGB may be an interesting exercise. It might even be helpful in getting insight into what it might mean to be a necessarily existing being. But it literally does nothing.
To put it another way. Suppose we wanted to show that the apparent coherence of the idea of a MGB was good reason for concluding a MGB exists. To do this, we would need to show the proposition "If no MGB exists, then the idea of a MGB will appear to be incoherent" is true. This is _not_ what the MOA shows. The MOA shows that if no MGB exists, it will then be impossible a MGB exists, not because the idea of a MGB will then appear to be incoherent, but purely because (a) no MGB exists, (b) we have defined a MGB to be a necessary being, (c) we have chosen to work in S5, and for no other reason. There is absolutely nothing in the MOA that shows that if no MGB exists then the idea of a MGB will appear to be incoherent, or that people won't have mystical experiences, or won't be able to conceive of a divine being, or whatever.
the whole idea of a "maximally great God" is just that...an idea.
a concept.
God is as far away from an idea and a concept as you and I are. This is what Paul was saying when he said Gods ways are past finding out.
St Theresa can write endless books describing her experiences with God but all those words fall short of the actual experiences...as far as the east is from the west.
only God can make Himself known. Thats how great He is. And He does so through Christ alone--in us and with us...
if we let Him.
God proves Himself. We do not prove God. this is how great He is.
1:08:00 hehe it was fun watching, ontological arguments are cringe.
Joe, you should read about non-well-founded set theory. The falsity of "infinite regress" argument is not very good because of that.
It's very easy to see by using an argument from non-well-founded set theory.
Let's say we consider a particular mystic named "Theresa".
GOD = { ..., THERESA_MYSTIC, ...}
THERESA_MYSTIC = {..., GOD, ...}
There are only 2 objects (and not an infinite number of "descending" objects, so no infinite regress in the ontological sense), GOD and MYSTIC, but each of them includes each other. There is no contradiction here.
So it's true that: "(GOD in THERESA_MYSTIC) and (THERESA_MYSTIC in GOD) and there exists only one GOD and there exist only one THERESA_MYSTIC".
Assuming finitary logic, there is also no infinite sentence expressing infinite regress, so no infinity here, therefore no infinite regress.
Gonna be stealing that thumbnail of Plantinga x
WOOO
The modal arguments are an oddity.
Trying to conceive of an atheist experience is fun.
Anyone going into the argument will almost surely be neither certain that God exists (for whom the argument would be redundant) nor that God doesn't exist (they would reject the argument out of hand): they'll be unsure. That is, they'll assign some prior epistemic probability for the existence of God greater than 0 but less than 1. Given this, they will say it is possible both that God exists and possible that God doesn't exist. But this is death for the OA: if it is possible God doesn't exist, God can't be necessary.
We can put this in a trilemma. The following three cannot all be true:
1) Possibly, God exists
2) Possibly, God doesn't exist
3) If possibly God exists, then necessarily God exists (logically equivalent to: If possibly God doesn't exist, then necessarily God doesn't exist)
Anyone with a prior probability for the existence of God that isn't either 0 or 1 will accept 1 and 2 and so reject 3. But rejecting 3 is to reject the OA. So the OA only "works" if your prior probability for the existence of God is 1, that is, if you're a perfectly convinced theist going in. It's either preaching to the choir or to no one at all.
And this makes clear why the argument is worthless: the key premise really is just a disguised form of the conclusion. However much theists want to dress it up and misdirect and move the parts around, anyone who thinks it's possible God doesn't exist will reject the OA. God simply isn't a necessary entity. Why? THERE CAN'T BE ANY NECESSARY ENTITIES WHATSOEVER. "Nothing exists" is possible, metaphysically, logically, however you want to put it. Inasmuch as the OA defines God as a necessary entity, then, it defines God as something impossible.
Let this worthless trashfire of an argument die and remain dead. If I were a theist, I'd be embarassed at how often and confidently this argument and ones like it are offered. Theists, stop trying to define God as existing and work instead to offer some reason to believe he does rather than doesn't, since it's entirely possible that he doesn't.
Great, using logic it is impossible for the Christian god to exist. See according to Christians the god they believe in is all just all loving and all forgiving. But also according to Christians if one doesn’t believe they are condemned to eternal torture but if someone just believes all their evil and wicked deeds are forgiven . That’s not a just god. A god who punishes people just because they don’t believe and for goes justice and doesn’t punish people just because they believe. Therefore Christian god can’t logically exist as described by its followers.
What a convuluted mess of an argument. The amount of mental work/effort wasted on such unproductive silliness. One would think they would step back and pause...and look at their "project" and see what a waste of time it is. But the need to maintain their god-belief as rational is a powerful motivator as demonstrated by the extent they will go.
Please speak slowly .. there are people who are not native english speaker
Good suggestion🙂
One thing that could potentially help is putting me on 0.75x speed❤️
@@MajestyofReason thanks but you tube has no such speed controlling option
@@shahhussainkhan4613 It does! :) Click the 'gear' icon in the bottom right, and it lets you alter the speed
@@shahhussainkhan4613 Also, cc and autogenerated transcripts are provided as well.
This is really cool; I learned a lot! Thanks! If anyone here's interested, I have my own take on the MOA, from a linguistic perspective: ua-cam.com/video/AlwuuUX90ik/v-deo.html. Within the context of this presentation, my critique focuses on the idea that logical/metaphysical modality is an inappropriate lens through which to view the argument, that epistemic modality is more appropriate, and that S5 is incompatible with this. Comments are most welcome!
ontomystical symmetry breaker... ffs why does anybody take that even as an argument? It's basically "well if you believe the ramblings of several madmen, this is true"!
No, seriously, why would anyone take that argument and dignify it with a serious treatment as if it was actually a reasonable thing to argue? Why not start taking seriously "because I said so" as an argument at that point? Is there any argument bad enough NOT to be considered if this is deemed worhty of consideration?
No. If you are someone respected in academia and know how to speak in a sophisticated way, you can get a free pass for basically saying everything and it will be taken seriously.
@@veganworldorder9394 at this point it really looks like that to me but... you know, I don't think I'm ready to accept that actual academic philosophers just have no standards at all, so I hope for an actual answer that maybe I just missed.
@@paskal007r They definitely have standards, but sometimes, some nonsense make it through anyway. Happens in every field of academia.
Also, a lot of philosophers don't have any respect for ontological arguments as they almost always commit, in an obvious way, one of the 2 following moves : 1. begging the question or 2. Defining God into existence.
@@veganworldorder9394 thanks for giving me hope but... what are the standards then?