Perhaps my view is colored by having a degree in engineering but I see a controllability problem. In control systems delays always increase the hazard of oscillation and a big ship responds slowly so you have huge delays. Too much control gain always leads to oscillation and the orders of hard to port or starboard indicate too much gain. Increased speed also added to that. Ship crews should be expected to have a better handle on this than a random pilot.
@@davidschultz3585i! Also an engineer (specifically a naval architect). I don’t think this was actually an issue with the controllability, for three reasons: 1. The rules required the Ever Given to transit the canal escorted by two tugboats to provide extra pulling power to help her keep steady in exactly this sort of situation. But she didn’t have them. 2. Many other ships of similar size have successfully navigated the Suez Canal, including in the same conditions as the Ever Given experienced. There are plenty of other very large container ships that have similar steering gear, similar handling characteristics, and similar windage. The ship ahead of Ever Given was roughly the same size and experienced exactly the same conditions at the same time on the same day in the same place, and she didn’t get stuck in the canal bank. So it’s clearly possible. 3. Pilots are supposed to be the best of the best in terms of ship handling, and they’re supposed to know every bit of the area that they’re working. It’s literally their job to be able to look at any ship’s pilot card and the conditions present and know how to successfully navigate it. Any competent pilot should have known the effect that the tailwind would have on the ship’s handling. Any competent pilot should have known not to just order the rudder hard over back and forth. Any competent pilot should have been able to anticipate the ship’s motion and use the correct amount of rudder to check the swing so she’d be heading straight down the channel. Any competent pilot would have known that the rules required the ship to transit with two tugs. Any competent pilot would not have crashed the Ever Given.
I agree with the report that there is a lot of blame to go around, especially considering that the master of the vessel is ultimately responsible for the vessel. But it is still difficult for me to get past the fact that the Suez Canal Authority put two seemingly incompetent pilots aboard the Ever Given.
@@derek6579 The Master has the authority to override the pilot and retake control at any point. Similar in aircraft (in the USA at least) the "pilot in command" has final legal authority and responsibility from engine start to shutdown, the second in command (copilot) and air traffic control are advisory in nature, strong advice for sure but they can be overruled where appropriate.
As a state-licensed pilot myself (and before that, transited the SC a handful of times as a deck officer), this report brings a lot of second-hand embarrassment of the broader profession, but not surprise given the reputation of SCA pilots even before this. The lack of fundamental piloting skills, risk assessment and BRM practices should cause a complete new look at how the SCA manages their pilots and standards for ULCVs… but it probably won’t. Re: the apportionment of blame given to the master… while in a legal sense it’s true that he’s ultimately the one responsible for his ship, it should be well known that in virtually no other part of the world would a captain of a ship that size, in confined waters, be tasked with having to save himself from that extreme of incompetence. The presumption at this level is that you’re going to be provided with competent, safe pilotage service that brings both local knowledge and expert shiphandling. For the SCA (and, frankly, the Panamanian investigators) to partially brush that off as “oh well, it’s your ship Capt!” is almost reprehensible. I’m also puzzled by the report’s questioning of the pilots giving direct helm and engine orders. That’s the default standard around the world (with some limited exceptions) and, in many places, mandatory. Again, goes back to the presumption of service the captain should expect when the pilot enters the bridge. As alluded to in the timeline, a lot of trust is placed on both sides in a very short amount of time, often between two strangers who have never met.
Well said. The pilots probably didn't give a chance for the captain to intervene and there was no time for the captain to decide and communicate that the pilots should shut up. It was a tense situation that escalated rapidly. In such moments intervention just makes the confusion worse. It's ridiculous that the report does not take into account the human factors of authority and the time pressure.
@@Gregorius421 The problem is the wind ,big ship needs big speed in high winds in order to keep the heading ,times higher than small ones . The ship's stable position is perpendicular to wind creating pendulum effect while in passage , pilots were not inexperienced just outmatched by this ship size to wind and needed speed ratio .Safe speed could have been much higher than 12 knots but that brings in lot more variables .Underestimating the power of the wind is the biggest issue here , ship lost steering due to high winds .
I think they ment "direct" to mean rudder angle and engine power, as opposed to heading/course and speed. Not that the pilot should relay everything through the master. It's the same in aviation, ATC doesn't tell the planes to "use 70% throttle and 20 degrees of bank", they say "turn left 30 degrees maintain 180 knots, cross XYZ at or above 5000 feet"
I was onboard a crusie ship that transitioned the SC. It was cute, we slaomed through the SC just like their Ever Given did. At least we didn't go a ground and from own experience with my 59 single catch J class cutter, the cruise ship, he wasn't doing the required 9 knots. Not with the bow wave he had heading through the SC. This with the Ever Given, is going to happen again. If it already does happen and we just don't hear about it.
Based on the transcript of the Bridge, particularly the Pilots, every company should have a conversation with each ship master, telling them to NEVER trust the pilots, going forward until the Suez Canal Authority can PROVE that their pilots know what they are doing. Almost ANYONE can pilot a ship with no wind, no current, clear visibility. What is the pilot's skillset when conditions are extreme? THAT is the biggest takeaway.
Sounds a lot like what caused the Skyway Bridge disaster. A micro burst storm caused the pilot to miss the pylon for completing the turn into the channel. This sounds like standards with pilots has moved up very little (or if at all) in the last 43 years
@@axelknutt5065 IIRC the Suez Canal Authority blamed the ship's crew, demanding a massive payment for blocking the canal. Turns out they were the culprits all along. No surprise they didn't support the investigation.
@@axelknutt5065Probably because a) they knew the pilots were at fault and b) the Suez Canal pilots are infamously corrupt. Like, spectacularly, mind-bogglingly corrupt. It’s common for the pilots to request a “gift” (really a bribe) of several cartons of cigarettes from the ships’ crews, which they then resell on shore for money, which allows them to make an amount close to their official salary over again based just on bribes. It’s a very lucrative job. There’s no guarantee that the pilots on board were actually competent to be Suez Canal pilots. They might have just known that if they had a master’s license and knew the right people, that they could get a nice cushy job that would get them a lot of money.
As a new 2nd mate on board a 3200 GWT passenger vessel heading into Las Paz, Baja Sur, Mexico, my job was to meet the pilot coming aboard. The pilot yelled to me, "Just follow our boat in, I am not coming aboard." Being a nice day and easy open water passage, our Captain agreed. All worked out well. The port got thier "Compulsive Pilotage" paycheck.
damn they really still made y'all pay the pilotage fee... I suppose it's just simpler for everybody than trying to make exceptions for situations like this, but still seems like something I would gripe about
Sorry to hear that. I don’t think is professional. I’m a harbour/River Pilot in Amazon River, Brazil. Here it”s impossible this situation. If a ship Captain enters Amazon without pilots, using crap Admiralty charts, he is going aground in ten minutes.
Seems to me that the reason the report was so long in coming out was the refusal of the Suez Canal Authority to provide requested information. As for the reason the incident happened, the lack of tugs fore and aft is critical. Without tugs, the wind conditions made navigation almost impossible for a vessel the size of the Ever Given. Yes, the pilots were not performing as expected, but again, the lack of tugs was critical.
@@gailmcnthe requirement for tugs is for "traction". The reason EG accellerated to 12 kt was because it needed the water over the rudder. If the tugs were there, it would not have needed to be at that speed since they would have acted as training wheels.
@@gailmcn The report stated that tugs large enough to perform salvage work were not available. Standard tugs are used for maintaining ship alignment in close quarters, such as in a harbor, with one leading and one astern.
Agree with the lack of tugs being a crucial issue. The amount of control that fore and aft tugboats have on a large vessel is remarkable. Without tugs the Ever Given was in large part at the mercy of the wind while being blown down the narrow channel. Yes the pilots could have and should have performed better and could likely avoided the grounding. But with the tugs that the Suez Canal policy requires for a ship of the Ever Given's size, this would have been a routine trip through the Suez.
good stuff, Sal! that report does seem to be awfully lenient to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA); as you mentioned, the SCA required tugs for that size vessel, so where were they and why didn't the pilots raise a flag about it? again, excellent follow-up, Sal, and thanks!
In the Suez Canal I’d not be surprised that the tug escort requirement is simply a method of running up the canal transit bill. If the tugs aren’t provided I’d bet the ship is still charged the cost of the phantom tugs.
Ok, 1. Why two pilots? was this a training cruise? 2. if the pilots are employees of the SCA, why didn't they seem to know what the hell they were doing? Don't they do this on a daily basis? 3. How does the SCA get to sue Evergreen? seems to me like it should be Evergreen suing the SCA for providing inept pilots that crashed their ship! Granted, the master is ultimately responsible, however, considering that the pilots were breaking bridge protocol by speaking to each other in Arabic, not English, I'd say that there's a good chance that the master had no idea what they were doing.
Well, if he was paying any attention at all, he must have had _some_ idea based on the helm and engine orders they were giving... (Speaking of which, modern ships surely don't work this way any more, but I can't shake the automatic mental image of the chief engineer and his mate down in the engine room, looking up from their morning tea as the bridge telegraph suddenly rings "all ahead full" and glancing at each other in consternation.)
The SCA is the Egyptian govt. In what court could the vessel's owners sue them? It's like asset forfeiture in various small towns in the US, without the ability to appeal the seizure up to a higher and (one hopes) less corrupt court.
SCA already got paid. My guess it's just risk assessment for transit company that every now and then they will pay to SCA. Just more profitable that going along Africa
Captain had me as the helmsman for the last part of the port exit on my first apprenticeship. Taught me how making big corrections only leads to more big corrections and that small rudder changes can keep you within 1 degree of the heading. Im thinking about that experience while watching this video
You know what this report sounds like = the way airline pilots used to work in the cockpit - The Captain had final say and responsibility, the first officer and flight engineer would never dare to question the Captains decision, for fear of internal repercussions within the company and from other Captains they would work for "treated as bad apples basically" and this type of thing caused many crashes for fear of correcting a mistake (s) the Captain made. Now, from what I understand, everyone in the cockpit is encouraged to speak up, and leave their egos at the gate so to speak. On a side note - while "under the hood" instrument training, flying a small Cessna in my pilot training, I just had a glimpse of some dark object directly in front of me on the windscreen....and I said "is there something in front of us" to my instructor all I heard was Oh S**t and he rolled the plane upside down and pulled the yolk into his gut I looked up and saw a twin engine Cessna underbelly disappearing away from us. The universe said it wasn't time for us to go yet. Instructor had his head buried in charts, no eyes out the windows. I had that hood on and couldn't see out except for that head tilt that let me glimpse a spot in the windscreen. I speak up when things are not clear. If things are clear as mud, speak up.
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) has been a significant part of pilot training for some time now and is part of every major air crash investigation. I think it was back in the 90s when investigators started seeing how crucial this was to safety outcomes. Also, how important use and understanding of English was, and using standardized terms in cockpit/controller communications.
I don't think that's quite the right analogy. In this case, the issue was that the navigator-analogue (the pilot) wasn't performing at the required level, and the captain-analogue (the master) didn't sufficiently assert his authority.
The question becomes, are pilots consults to the captain or temporary captains of the vessel? As I understand it is the latter, i.e., temporary captains, thus they have sole responsibility of the vessels.
@@niilespunkari8832 No, absolutely not. Pilots are consultants. The master remains in sole command of the vessel and remains responsible for safety. Remember that the key division is that the master knows how the ship responds to the controls but doesn't know the currents etc. in the location being navigated, and the pilot knows the location but doesn't know how the ship responds. Note that this doesn't mean that the master is the only person who's on the hook if things go wrong. One of the ways that the master enacts their responsibility is by delegating to competent people. For example, the master isn't required to know all the details of how the engine works, because that's delegated to the chief engineer. Likewise, the master doesn't have to know the details of how to navigate in pilotage waters, because that's delegated to the pilot. This is the same as with any company -- if an Amazon truck crashes into your house, that's not Jeff Bezos's responsibility personally, because he delegated the job of delivering those packages to a competent employee.
The entrance to Portsmouth Harbour in England is narrow. When the two new Royal Navy carriers enter or exit they have a tug connected at bow and stern. The warships will be at 'Harbour Stations', with designated watertight doors closed and the appropriate crewmen closed up in the machinery spaces to act as required in case of emergency, ie, manual control, start and use emergency equipment, etc.. The tugs are extra insurance just in case of something really unexpected. The lack of tugs going through the canal is nothing short of criminal.
When your two pilots are arguing in Arabic, things cannot be going well. The aerodynamic forces on this giant sail of a cargo ship must have been tremendous.
IMO, the SCA is primarily at fault. It seems to have failed at many levels here. So while the Captain is ultimately in command of his ship and he bears some responsibility, the SCA basically left the Captain with very limited options or time to maneuver (pun intended) around the disastrous actions of its incompetent pilots.
You could easily argue the Captain should never have conducted a suez transit in the prevailing conditions. Not that the company would ever thank him for the lost revenue and more than likely would have resulted with him being sacked
@@lukesdewhurstwhat about ship before him? Same size and no problems... He got bad pilots who fked his ship then blamed him. At the end SCA got nice paycheck and the master probably have a different job
You as 'Talk Show and News Host' just keeps getting better and better Sal. You're funny, entertaining as hell, super well-informed, passionate about this industry, (and life in general it seems!) I had zero knowledge of 'shipping stuff' and didn't know I was interested in that and all you talk about! Like over 100,000 people (and growing FAST!) It's YOU Dr. Sal. It's a pleasure to have such a fine instructor.
I started watching in the beginning of your show. Enjoy your style, and temperament and unbiased info. I have always enjoyed reading sailing stories, especially the tall ships that sailed from north Atlantic, around Africa to Asia.
Sounds like the “first pilot” may have been in training or the two pilots have interpersonal issues. Obviously lack of tug boats under those wind conditions for such a large ship seems foolish.
Seems like MV Ever Given was crabbing its way up the Suez Canal channel. It sounds like the weather noted in the report that morning; just taking the pilots out to the anchorage was hazardous. PS - Wonder of MV Costco Galaxy, which was immediately in front of MV Ever Given, was also having issues maintaining a track in the channel? PS2 - if you were to enter in all the perimeters into a ship simulation trainer would it have been possible to safely transit the canal? PS3 - Does Suez Canal Authority have access to a ships bridge simulator to train pilots or is training just OJT? PS4 - Is Suez Canal Authority pilot training document available to the public?
The Cosco Galaxy was the same size as the Ever Givens, and it made the transit just fine right in front of them, so obviously the answer to whether it was possible to safely transit was "yes".
It would be interesting to know what happened to the key players (pilots, ship captain, master, ect). Not to embarrass more, but to see how the industry looked at the incident. Have their futures in the shipping industry been changed, or allowed to continue.
You people really disappoint me. Spell it out. Major global players are actively working to DESTROY the global economy. Depopulate the earth. They locked down people from working and producing for no good reason (yes no good reason) and at the same time, "Oh look, a ship just randomly decided to block a major seaway." And you kids are all? "what caused this??????????????????"
This reminds me of a story recounted to me by a Chesapeake Bay pilot: he came aboard a Korean-crewed vessel. The Master was the only individual with even a word of English. Crew members kept running on and off the bridge with much jabbering and gesticulating, and the pilot’s attempts to figure out what might be going on was met only with a repeated stony “Everthing OK” from the Master.
As with other recent incidents with vessels under pilot it seems like the pilots exert control on the bridge rather than advise (if you're repeatedly shouting speed and helm corrections you're not an advisor you're in direct control of the vessel). The system of local "experts" you're required to have on board who aren't in control but act as if they are would seem to breed this type of incident over and over until something changes.
This is when I found the channel also, I was so pleased to find somebody who knew what they were talking about and to get away from all the ridiculous speculation and hyperbole in the mainstream media. So thank you Sam 🙏
These reports are inherently political and have legal ramifications. I think the report has been written to not upset the canal authorities or open anyone up to litigation; the costs were enormous.
@@kaymish6178 Not sure why I included the word "criminal" in my comment. Safety reports are not admissible as evidence in any trial, criminal or civil.
Very interesting. I'm retired merchant navy officer and my son has just started his career as OOW unlimited. The old debate about responsibility between a master and pilot. Thanks for your efforts. Very educational and a flag for those in command.
It would be interesting to see the 2D/3D re-creation for the ship in front and behind the EverGiven along with the EverGiven. Overall (from one who has never been closer than a mile or so from a cargo ship) it sounds like Bubba and Billy Bob somehow snuck on to the EverGiven as pilots. 😄
What I felt you were missing throughout is that Accident Reports are not designed to assign blame. In a UK MAIB report, such as the one I have just read, this is stated very clearly right at the start - in the very first paragraph of the report, before anything about the accident being reported on is mentioned. TLDR: The reason you can't work out who is being blamed is probably because nobody is being 'blamed'. The report is identifying what happened and how to prevent a similar outcome in the future. It is for the courts and regulatory authorities to assign blame, if there is any. This, for example, is why, in the UK, the MAIB is a separate body from the regulatory authorities, including our Coastguard. The objective of a (properly done) Accident Report is to come up with recommendations to avoid recurrence and, in some cases, to avoid occurrences that didn't, but could have, happened. Those recommendations might involve implied criticisms of all sorts of bodies in all sorts of ways. Accidents rarely have a single cause and endeavours like shipping have all sorts of layers of protection that might kick in to prevent a failure of one thing leading to an accident. Just because the 'Primary Cause' was person X's responsibility doesn't mean that organisation Y gets a free pass. Sometimes even completely uninvolved people, bodies or groupings might have recommendations addressed to them if it is felt that something that improves safety could be learnt by them from the accident, it's investigation or something noticed during the investigation.
@rickansell661 You are talking the difference between UK (democratic) and Egypt (authoritarian). In Egypt, bribes are the rule, jobs are awarded based on family/social connections, competence is secondary. SCA is Egypt....the cultural ethos/value system is completely different
@@koma-k the reasons why I put this in is because the commenter was talking about how things work in a system that doesn't operate like Egypt does. the Panama report isn't a complete report because SCA (Egypt) refused to honor any requests from them, refused to participate in the investigation. They had already assigned blame (the EverGiven Captain), and had already collected money from Ever Given's owners.They were never going to accept fault in their pilots...and this case would never have been adjucated in a court, in a culture like Egypt's.. See EgyptAir Flight 990 (1999) for a similar outcome to a disaster where the Egyptian ethos was also dominant in the outcome of the investigation. Wikipedia has a good summary. One thing they left out was that the pilot at fault (Batouti?) was also facing sanctions once they landed, involving inappropriate behavior towards females. To this day, Egypt denies any fault in him, just as they do with their ship pilots. they don't do real investigations, they do "whitewashes".
Dr. Sal A great presentation of the report, It occurs to me a vast portion of the maritime industry is rife with apathy, incompetence, corruption and a cavaller attitude towards safety ie. your videos on maritime firefighting. Thank you so much for making a complicated subject clear to a layperson.
Briefly, the owners/operators will not support the Master if s/he insists upon tugs (too expensive), or delays the passage for any reason. It costs vast sums of money to keep a Very Large Container ship operating every day, whether on passage or jilling around, and those costs go straight to the bottom line. I leave comments on the Suez Canal pilotage system to those who use the Canal; the little I know about it, and Egypt in general, makes me surprised that the system works as well as it does. The Panamanian report has to avoid offending anyone, or fueling (or suppressing) lawsuits, as Panama registers many ships, whose owners would go elsewhere if they felt unfriendliness.
That was my biggest question. If the master had called off the transit over the wind and lack of tugs, would there have been no consequences for him and the crew?
Really, the Suez is the only game in town....if they ignore their own standards, tolerate poorly trained pilots, tolerate graft and bribes, etc. what can the ship owners do? Call for a strike? Use the canal down the street? Let's hope that they lost enough revenue while Ever given was plugging the canal, to induce SCA to make improvements in their operations.
"The Panamanian report has to avoid offending anyone ..." No it doesn't. By international treaty, Egypt is obliged to allow passage for ships of any flag. Panama can piss off the SCA as much as it wants, and the SCA is breaking international law if they retaliate. "... or fueling (or suppressing) lawsuits ..." That has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Aside from anything else, maritime accident reports are not admissible as evidence in court. "... as Panama registers many ships, whose owners would go elsewhere if they felt unfriendliness." Evergreen isn't some cowboy company. They're a large company with good procedures and good training. The reason the report doesn't recommend much for the company is simply that there's not much to recommend.
Great to see how the Channel has progressed and your reach for informing lots of people about maritime issues. Thank you. I am much more informed by watching.
Sal, When the Polar Endeavour Class vessels were developed there was extensive amount of model testing done. Besides resistance and propulsion, there was an extensive amount of seakeeping, maneuverability and wind tunnel testing. From those tests models were developed for use in bridge simulation. Prior to delivery bridge team management training was carried out. As part of the training pilots from ports the the Endeavour Class tankers were invited to train with the ship's crews Without having read the report I would be willing to wager that the chances of the ship's officers, crew and the pilots training together are slim to none. I would also be willing to guess that the likelihood of the pilots having trained on a bridge simulator for a vessel similar to the Ever Given was slim to none. Every vessel is required to have a ship maneuverability poster. The poster should have all the information that was needed by the pilots regarding ship handling, including wind, bank effects and squat. The Ever Given Master should have given each pilot a Pilot Card for the vessel. Based on the information you have given there is no mention of the Bridge Poster or the Pilot Card. The issue of the role of the pilot and the ship's bridge management team continues to be a mystery. Pilots are supposed to be experts on local navigation. They also, except for the Panama Canal (I think?), have no responsibility. The ship's Master is supposed to have full responsibility, but how often are they willing to overrule a pilot's order? Without major changes to the system, occurrences like the grounding of the Ever Given and the Ever Forward will continue. Bob
"Based on the information you have given there is no mention of the Bridge Poster or the Pilot Card." You should check the report about that. Don't assume that something didn't happen just because it's not mentioned in a video summarizing the report. And, look, regardless of what documentation is present, every pilot should know that you don't control any ship by throwing the rudder from side to side. "The ship's Master is supposed to have full responsibility, but how often are they willing to overrule a pilot's order?" The difficulty there is that, if the master overrules a pilot's advice (pilots can't give orders) and grounds the ship, then the grounding is absolutely the master's fault.
@beeble2003 Your comment on reading the report is well taken. It has never been clear to me whether or not pilots study or even look at, the posters or the pilot card. I am not a ship's officer. I am a naval architect and marine engineer that has spent considerable time observing bridge teams both on vessels and simulators. I have had the opportunity to pilot vessels on simulators and I have grounded or struck obstructions more often than not. To address the issue of sudden helm changes or throttle changes, working with SSPA, Kamewa, and Raytheon the ECDIS on the Polar Endeavour Class have a feature that can show a projection of the vessel's path. As for Masters listening to and following pilot recommendations, I was on the bridge of a tanker when a fisherman had his boat and net out inside the traffic lane. The fishing boat was contacted by radio and it was stated that they were having issues retrieving the net. The pilot did not recommend a change of course or speed. The Master questioned the pilot and the pilot repeated his orders. I watched the master repeatedly check the Collision Avoidance Radar and his binoculars. He asked the pilot again about his recommendation and the pilot repeat his orders. The Master checked the radar and his binoculars. He then walked over to the throttle and put it full astern. Had he not taken action there would have been a collision. Several months later the same Master and a different pilot were taking a loaded single-hull tanker to anchor in al well-charted anchorage. All bridge equipment was in working order. The ship ran aground and the bottom was holed, 5,700 barrels of crude oil were spilled. One of the first laws of Naval architecture was violated: You can't drive a ship drawing 42' of water to an anchorage in 41' of water. Go figure.
Im not a sea man, but my son has steered a navy vessel through the Suez, most i did was a 200 ton barge on the river Humber, England. With the video simulation and the report it gave me very good detailed understanding of this event and grounding. Thank you for this informative video, well presented on a specialized subject.
I have begun watching many of your videos. This one, and the BHR, I honestly think as a human race we are relying on far to many computers and people who claim they have the expertise and experience, only to find *AFTER* a serious incident, the individuals had no authority to be in the positions they are or were in. I'm a paid/volunteer firefighter. 46 years civilian paid/volunteer firefighting with 30 years in the USMC reserves as 8404 and 7051 within that 30 years. I have 3 degrees all from Texas A & M for firefighting and is surrounding purposes. I have been a lowly basic firefighter and as high as a battalion chief. Currently semi-retired and teaching with A & M. I am seeing far to many people who think they know what they are doing to find out after an incident let alone a fatal incident, those people had no ability, training, expertise, or experience to be in the position they were in at the time of the incident. Or having multiple historical issues which should have elimanated them from ever achieving the positions they were in. Yet, somehow, these people remain were they are. Let alone how much we have become to rely on electronics that as we find, are not the best things to rely in when even dead recokening, experience or just plain common sense works far better.
I think a comparison of the (partial) transit of the EVER GIVEN with the corresponding course of the AL NASRIYAH would be extremely instructive since the AL NASRIYAH, being of comparable size, was just ahead of EVER GIVEN and experienced the same conditions.
I remember back in '71 on a U.S. Navy Munitions ship when we took liberty in Bermuda... coming out of port, with a Pilot directing the helm, there is a narrow channel you have to maneuver through... I'm presuming one ship in the channel at a time as there was an ocean liner/cruise ship anchored just outside the channel waiting to come in... I was manning my station on the bow at the anchor windless, ready if necessary to drop anchor in an emergency... anyway, long story short, the cruise ship was anchor with its stern very close to the channel opening... and my ship had a tendency to turn very slowly... as we go closer to the cruise ships stern we started to "talk"... shouldn't we be turning NOW?!!... and we kept getting closer with no turning... now the Bow Officer showed some concern and most of the bow crew were standing at the port railing watching us get closer and closer... and now we could see passengers standing on the stern looking back at us... finally we started to turn that we ALL felt was a bit late... Holy Crap... there was even a discussion about most of the crew abandoning the bow... well of course except me and the Deck Officer... well, no one left but when you can see the WHITES of persons eyeballs on a ship you're passing... that's a bit disconcerting... I wonder if THEY knew how close that was... we probably could have yelled across and made dates... 😱
Thanks for providing such a thurough analysis of this boondoggle (and the flashback to jr high school giggle 😂). I think there is enough blame to go around, but a lot of it is ultimately down to greed - corporate greed instills fear in the ship's Master of doing the right/required things and corporate personal greed of the Suez Canal authority and the pilots for keeping on pushing through big ships in bad weather and using piliots of questionable ability - I cant help but wonder if they were even qualified, or if they just bribed the right people? My uncle is Egyptian and the stories he has to tell of the level of normalized corruption makes me really appreciate living in a place where most of us would be hard pressed to bribe our way out of a parking ticket.
@@wgowshipping I totally get that. But if they were using bow thrusters to maintain a course, they wouldn't need to be going 13 KTS in the first place.
Sal at -4:06 you said a vessels maneuverability increases with an increase in speed. The Suez Canal ( not really) has an interesting design WRT the bottom characteristics, flat on the bottom then tapering upward toward a vertical wall. As a result of this configuration a vessel which increases speed to gain steerage has a result of squat which causes the vessel to actually lose steering. If you do a little digging you will note that a QFlex or a QMax LNG vessel ran aground in the canal (not really) prior to the Evergiven. Observing her AIS track and the data provided you will see the same maneuvering (increasing speed to help with turning in this case) which led to the grounding. At 17:50 in your presentation the vessel is experiencing bank cushion and bank suction on the bow and stern due to speed and a hard vertical wall of the canal. At 18:32 they are effectively losing the helm, there isn’t enough water under the hull so she starts squatting, pilot increases speed to gain steerage but fails and as you say at 18:54 the pilot is using hard over helm commands to try and regain control of the vessel without success. At 19:32 you see bank cushion and bank suction on the starboard wall of the canal. Looking at the display I would believe that the deep water channel ( flat part of the canal) is designated by the dotted lines in the center and outside of those two lines of demarcation the bottom characteristic changes and slopes towards the vertical walls of the canal. At 20:05 of your presentation we again see bank cushion and bank suction on the starboard side of the vessel. At 34:11 you correctly identify the failures of the pilots WRT weather and the canal characteristics of bank suction and bank cushion but most importantly the SCA and the pilots failed in their duty. Regarding the Master and his overall responsibility, end of day the responsibility is his whether he was on the bridge or not but again this incident was not caused by just one failure but rather a series of failures. Unfortunately, the SCA will not learn from this as it’s already happened previously so ships Masters who have command of these large vessels transiting the Suez will need to be on guard for any and all indications of loss of steering, lack of tugs and the inabilities of the SCA pilots and to be ready to take over the command as necessary to protect their crew, ship and cargo. Lastly you can do a lot better than konrad WRT a knowledgeable mariner who sails ships and not copies and pastes articles in his rag…….just sayin
Why have Rules of Navigation when they are not enforced. If the SCA RON’s demand two escort tugs for this size vessel then there is no decision to be made. Additionally, under certain weather conditions both escort tugs should be made fast aft with tug lines ready to give immediate response in the event of induced sheer. SCA have a lot to answer for in this instance.
the SCA a government-owned entity, it is Egypt. If SCA even has any liability insurers, they wouldn't be likely to do anything but defend the SCA. If ship insurers challenge the SCA on behalf of shipping, what good would that do? Ships have to use the Suez, whether it is run badly or not, whether they are insured while in the canal or not. There is no other option. Egypt/SCA is holding all the high cards here, and they have some mighty deep pockets. In the case of Ever Given, if their insurers filed against the SCA to recover lost money, it would be a case of spending far more than they could recover in a suit. A post script: right after the EverGiven was freed, it was impounded by the Egyptians (SCA). they demanded over 900 million dollars from the owner/operators of the ship. They kept it for over 100 days, until those owner/operators settled for an undisclosed amount, believed to be around 500 million. So not only did they recoup their loses, they made a profit. So why would they bother to accept fault, or even contribute to the investigation?
Great summary and presentation. Admiral James Stavridis, in his 2017 book "Sea Power", describes how early in his career in command of a US Navy destroyer, a local Egyptian pilot, pouting because he did not get a "gift" that met his expectations, tried to run the ship aground. His own navigator recognized the pilot's game and saved the ship from grounding. For us landlubbers who wonder how it all gets done, many thanks!
Sounds like the pilots never had control or even realised they never had control and they managed to park it into Asia before the captain realised he was in a spaghetti western and he had just handed control to a pair of cowboys. Still, it's always the Old Man's fault...
Beautifully said! - I was also thinking of Keystone Cops, or a bad opening action sequence to an Indiana Jones movie, besides the new 5th one, that has become a complete "shipwreck" or "train-wreck!
What a CYA report! Serious politics in play. I'm betting that this is revision 3 or 4 after "review". Now, the thing is could Evergreen sue the SCA? Would it backfire on them with future shipments? A real conundrum.
I believe it would be a fruitless strategy. First, the SCA is basically operated and controlled by Egypt. So the insurer would be suing Egypt, in a sense. Talk about delay and deny.....the insurer would spend far more money on the case than they would ever gain, even in the unlikely event they would eventually win. Unfortunately, all shipping that has to use the Suez to reach their markets, has no recourse......there is no other feasible option, so they have to tolerate whatever shoddy practices the SCA offers. Without significant global political pressure on Egypt, the SCA has no real stimulus for change.
No. Recognizing that multiple parties are to blame is not "covering your ass". The Panamanian authorities have no ass to cover: they're clearly not liable for anything. Remember that maritime safety reports are -- by design -- not about assigning blame. Their purpose is to increase safety by making recommendations on how to avoid a repeat occurrence.
@@beeble2003 What does Panama have to do with this? You forget that the SCA fined Evergreen $916 mill in 2021 including a "loss of reputation" charge of $300 mill! Totally bogus and even a soft pedaled report like this is damning. That's why I'm sure that this has gone through multiple revisions with the first one the harshest. Also why it's taken so long. Egypt is not happy right now.
@@alexandermckay8594 "What does Panama have to do with this?" Panama has _everything_ to do with it, because it's a Panamanian registered ship. So, please, don't tell me what I'm "forgetting", when you're apparently unaware of the most basic facts of the situation.
I signed on after tuning in to see what you had to say about the Key Bridge collapse. Now I’m checking back to see what I’ve missed! Thank you for showing me a corner of knowledge that I didn’t know I wanted to know about!
As a general aviation pilot, the pilot (or in this case, ship master) is still ultimately in control of the situation. The ship’s crew, helmsmen, and master must have been very frustrated by the two pilots massive miss management of the ship’s pilotage.
Yeah, but this is merchant marines. The pilot is temporary captain, not consult to the captain (as I understand). E.g., when pilot enter vessels who are crossing the English channel, some captains simply go to sleep in their beds: and it is absolutely legal.
Luck of the draw got them a rookie pilot. I understand that to get better at your job you need to do your job but maybe drop him on something smaller a couple times first.
Maybe qualified, but not competent and up to the task of providing suitable assistance to the Master to navigate his "behemoth" vessel through the eye of a needle in a howling gale!
layman's question: couldn't they have used their bow-thrusters to augment the maneuverability (at lower speeds)? Were the pilots aware of the existence of bow thrusters only after the grounding?
short answer- no. Pilots are aware of all thrusters since every ship has them now. If you read the full report it mentions how fast they were going (truly nuts) , and thrusters are used for low speed work.
@@konradcomrade4845 The rudder only works well when the engine/propeller is forcing water thru it. You would need thrusters on each of those forward rudders.
This is very common and happens often in Kiel Canal, they call it "Bande fahren" whoch translates to driving gutter, in Kiel Kanal you have way better Helmsmen whithout pilots interfereing tho
"2.5 years to generate the report", that's almost as bad as our own NTSB on fatal aircraft mishaps! Add to that, they often, after typically two years, do not find a "probable cause", just as in the case of this incident in the Suez.
@@elcastorgrande The Canal Authority charges an insane amount of money in transit fees. The trouble is that canal is a cash cow for Egypt. They suck off a lot of money that could be used to improve the canal. In other words, the money is there to widen if they want to. The canal has a revenue of 8 billion dollars a year. You can do a lot of things with that much cash.
@@Bill_N_ATX, yes, as I suspect middle eastern commerce, coercion, backhanders, greed and politics all plays a significant hand in the laundering of said income...
The best thing the pilot could have said to the helmsman would have been keep her in the centre of the channel, any good QM (Helmsman) could do that without interferance from the Pilot.
That's why most ships have two anchors in the bow. cut the fowled anchor loose with a line and a marked float and hire a workboat with crane and a diver to sort out the mess and recover it, anchors ain't cheap.
As an aircraft pilot we have CRM drummed into us to avoid this sort of cockpit management chaos. As a small boat owner I'm well aware of windage, prop effect and speed - I'm staggered ocean giants have the same problem! Great vid!
I remember when this channel first started. It may be hard to believe, but I subscribed when this channel first started, and I started to support very quickly.
Pilots switching to "local language" i.e. Arabic, with ship's bridge crew including helmsman only fluent in English as a secondary language denies the bridge crew situational awareness. Sal says, "knowing what's going on". Proper situational awareness (SA) enables the master and helmsman to anticipate subsequent commands and respond more quickly when that next rudder or heading command comes. It may be only a second or two, but can be crucial in situations like this. Good SA helps the helmsman and master build a coherent mental picture of current circumstances and appropriate actions to be taken in a timely manner.
I don't normally fall back on those moronic internet acronyms, but. . . ROFL! 🤣 to your prologue. The first pages of report, as presented, sounds like a description of a carload of young males losing control of their automobile on a Harnett County, NC sand road.
All through this video, i was remembering being taught how to sail our family's 30 ft catamaran downwind, wing and wing, or with the main on one side of the mast and the foresail on the other. Yeah, it kind of felt like trying to keep the aft and the bow on the same track. And that was a little bitty 30 ft boat in just a few knots of wind. I think there was plenty of blame to go around and it doesn't sound likely that the changes required to prevent a similar grounding are going to be implemented any time soon. I found this channel during the Ever Given grounding and i have come back because i am still fascinated by maritime news even now when sails are not in use. I read all the seagoing books in my grade school and local library before i hit 5th grade. Still fascinated.
Pilots were clearly not up to the level of training and experience required to support the navigation of the Ever Given through the Suez Canal. I find no fault with the Captain.
Vessels of this size regularly go through the Suez. Not uncommon either for winds to shift. The vessel in front of the Ever Given was a similar size, yet transitioned without issue. This incident clearly comes down to the incompetence of the 2 pilots.
Your giddiness and excitement for this, is precious and infectious. 😂 I don’t even know why I watched this but I loved your excitement in teaching me things 😂❤
There's some great pics of this grounding. I found your channel watching Titan vids. I know nothing of shipping but you're such a great narrator i could watch you explain how grass grows❤😂
Further to my remark. The report stated that the two pilots started had a 'heated' conversation in Arabic. I think that is the point when the pilots had lost control of the situation, and started to panic. When people panic, the tendency is to revert to your mother tongue.
So this report is non-binding, from a third party, and made without cooperation of the Suez Canal authorities. And it made no serious conclusions that I could not have made.
@@beeble2003 I get that. But how can they offer more than platitudes if they cannot compel testimony? Following the 2007 a 2x fatal sinking of the BC Ferry, MV Queen of the North, Canada's Transportation Safety Board got no cooperation from the three unionized bridge crew who were the most important witnesses. Their union closed ranks around them. Anyway, you are right - these investigations are not designed to to assign blame, which makes sense on the surface. But witnesses know that their testimony could be used against them in criminal or civil proceedings, so there is a strong disincentive around testifying. Thus, these investigations are doomed to say nothing more than the obvious.
27:00 You say because the pilot is Egyptian (aka inferred muslim) that alcohol consumption is not a problem. Why? I've served (U.S. Army) alongside and in a Joint capacity with many Arabic muslim allies. Nearly every one of them drank or used some sort of substance like caffeine pills, Pot, zanax, or ADHD meds or did both and most went to strip clubs and banged hookers too. (No, I did not instigate. I was the good boy always telling them to stop). Never assume someone wont do something just because their religion says they cant. Thats like assuming Catholic High School girls dont put out. Most do. (I know this also from experience growing up Catholic). That pilot should have been tested. His panic and erratic behavior leads me to believe he WAS under the influence. They probably knew it and didnt test him so they could lay blame on the Evergiven crew rather than their pilot. Theyre suing for billions after-all.
Given the weather conditions, length of vessel "unusual" exaggerated helm orders and lack of anyone on the bridge taking effective control, an experienced man at the wheel, I'm sure couldn't have done a worse job left to his own devices! Great and clear presentation as always!
It's PIO - Pilot Induced Oscillation, in aeronautical engineering parlance. There is a time lag between the input and the expected output. The pilots overcorrected when the response of the vessel is below his expectation.
"Pilot induced oscillation" is a good approximation of what happened.
Well said. Be good to see this scenario in Bridge Simulators.
PIO as a result of poor threat and error management
Perhaps my view is colored by having a degree in engineering but I see a controllability problem. In control systems delays always increase the hazard of oscillation and a big ship responds slowly so you have huge delays. Too much control gain always leads to oscillation and the orders of hard to port or starboard indicate too much gain. Increased speed also added to that.
Ship crews should be expected to have a better handle on this than a random pilot.
@@davidschultz3585i! Also an engineer (specifically a naval architect). I don’t think this was actually an issue with the controllability, for three reasons:
1. The rules required the Ever Given to transit the canal escorted by two tugboats to provide extra pulling power to help her keep steady in exactly this sort of situation. But she didn’t have them.
2. Many other ships of similar size have successfully navigated the Suez Canal, including in the same conditions as the Ever Given experienced. There are plenty of other very large container ships that have similar steering gear, similar handling characteristics, and similar windage. The ship ahead of Ever Given was roughly the same size and experienced exactly the same conditions at the same time on the same day in the same place, and she didn’t get stuck in the canal bank. So it’s clearly possible.
3. Pilots are supposed to be the best of the best in terms of ship handling, and they’re supposed to know every bit of the area that they’re working. It’s literally their job to be able to look at any ship’s pilot card and the conditions present and know how to successfully navigate it. Any competent pilot should have known the effect that the tailwind would have on the ship’s handling. Any competent pilot should have known not to just order the rudder hard over back and forth. Any competent pilot should have been able to anticipate the ship’s motion and use the correct amount of rudder to check the swing so she’d be heading straight down the channel. Any competent pilot would have known that the rules required the ship to transit with two tugs. Any competent pilot would not have crashed the Ever Given.
Spot on.
I agree with the report that there is a lot of blame to go around, especially considering that the master of the vessel is ultimately responsible for the vessel. But it is still difficult for me to get past the fact that the Suez Canal Authority put two seemingly incompetent pilots aboard the Ever Given.
Only because they didnt have 3 incompetent Pilots.
Suez Canal pilots don't have a reputation of competence, IIRC.
One pilot seems very competent but could not assert control.
In the UK the pilot has command of the ship as soon as he takes over? But I may be wrong, it was a fair time ago!
@@derek6579 The Master has the authority to override the pilot and retake control at any point.
Similar in aircraft (in the USA at least) the "pilot in command" has final legal authority and responsibility from engine start to shutdown, the second in command (copilot) and air traffic control are advisory in nature, strong advice for sure but they can be overruled where appropriate.
As a state-licensed pilot myself (and before that, transited the SC a handful of times as a deck officer), this report brings a lot of second-hand embarrassment of the broader profession, but not surprise given the reputation of SCA pilots even before this.
The lack of fundamental piloting skills, risk assessment and BRM practices should cause a complete new look at how the SCA manages their pilots and standards for ULCVs… but it probably won’t.
Re: the apportionment of blame given to the master… while in a legal sense it’s true that he’s ultimately the one responsible for his ship, it should be well known that in virtually no other part of the world would a captain of a ship that size, in confined waters, be tasked with having to save himself from that extreme of incompetence. The presumption at this level is that you’re going to be provided with competent, safe pilotage service that brings both local knowledge and expert shiphandling. For the SCA (and, frankly, the Panamanian investigators) to partially brush that off as “oh well, it’s your ship Capt!” is almost reprehensible.
I’m also puzzled by the report’s questioning of the pilots giving direct helm and engine orders. That’s the default standard around the world (with some limited exceptions) and, in many places, mandatory. Again, goes back to the presumption of service the captain should expect when the pilot enters the bridge. As alluded to in the timeline, a lot of trust is placed on both sides in a very short amount of time, often between two strangers who have never met.
Well said. The pilots probably didn't give a chance for the captain to intervene and there was no time for the captain to decide and communicate that the pilots should shut up. It was a tense situation that escalated rapidly. In such moments intervention just makes the confusion worse. It's ridiculous that the report does not take into account the human factors of authority and the time pressure.
It’s pretty standard from a Panama report
@@Gregorius421 The problem is the wind ,big ship needs big speed in high winds in order to keep the heading ,times higher than small ones . The ship's stable position is perpendicular to wind creating pendulum effect while in passage , pilots were not inexperienced just outmatched by this ship size to wind and needed speed ratio .Safe speed could have been much higher than 12 knots but that brings in lot more variables .Underestimating the power of the wind is the biggest issue here , ship lost steering due to high winds .
I think they ment "direct" to mean rudder angle and engine power, as opposed to heading/course and speed. Not that the pilot should relay everything through the master.
It's the same in aviation, ATC doesn't tell the planes to "use 70% throttle and 20 degrees of bank", they say "turn left 30 degrees maintain 180 knots, cross XYZ at or above 5000 feet"
I was onboard a crusie ship that transitioned the SC. It was cute, we slaomed through the SC just like their Ever Given did. At least we didn't go a ground and from own experience with my 59 single catch J class cutter, the cruise ship, he wasn't doing the required 9 knots. Not with the bow wave he had heading through the SC. This with the Ever Given, is going to happen again. If it already does happen and we just don't hear about it.
Based on the transcript of the Bridge, particularly the Pilots, every company should have a conversation with each ship master, telling them to NEVER trust the pilots, going forward until the Suez Canal Authority can PROVE that their pilots know what they are doing. Almost ANYONE can pilot a ship with no wind, no current, clear visibility. What is the pilot's skillset when conditions are extreme? THAT is the biggest takeaway.
Sounds a lot like what caused the Skyway Bridge disaster. A micro burst storm caused the pilot to miss the pylon for completing the turn into the channel. This sounds like standards with pilots has moved up very little (or if at all) in the last 43 years
Any ideas why the Suez Canal Authority wouldn’t take part in the enquiry? I’m coming up blank 😁
@@axelknutt5065 IIRC the Suez Canal Authority blamed the ship's crew, demanding a massive payment for blocking the canal. Turns out they were the culprits all along. No surprise they didn't support the investigation.
@@Gregorius421 AGREED!
@@axelknutt5065Probably because
a) they knew the pilots were at fault and
b) the Suez Canal pilots are infamously corrupt. Like, spectacularly, mind-bogglingly corrupt. It’s common for the pilots to request a “gift” (really a bribe) of several cartons of cigarettes from the ships’ crews, which they then resell on shore for money, which allows them to make an amount close to their official salary over again based just on bribes. It’s a very lucrative job. There’s no guarantee that the pilots on board were actually competent to be Suez Canal pilots. They might have just known that if they had a master’s license and knew the right people, that they could get a nice cushy job that would get them a lot of money.
As a new 2nd mate on board a 3200 GWT passenger vessel heading into Las Paz, Baja Sur, Mexico, my job was to meet the pilot coming aboard. The pilot yelled to me, "Just follow our boat in, I am not coming aboard." Being a nice day and easy open water passage, our Captain agreed. All worked out well. The port got thier "Compulsive Pilotage" paycheck.
damn they really still made y'all pay the pilotage fee... I suppose it's just simpler for everybody than trying to make exceptions for situations like this, but still seems like something I would gripe about
judging by your pic, that was not yesterday lol
Sorry to hear that. I don’t think is professional. I’m a harbour/River Pilot in Amazon River, Brazil. Here it”s impossible this situation. If a ship Captain enters Amazon without pilots, using crap Admiralty charts, he is going aground in ten minutes.
That's Mexico.
@@pedrojacome4106 BS...of course a pilot will say that
Seems to me that the reason the report was so long in coming out was the refusal of the Suez Canal Authority to provide requested information. As for the reason the incident happened, the lack of tugs fore and aft is critical. Without tugs, the wind conditions made navigation almost impossible for a vessel the size of the Ever Given. Yes, the pilots were not performing as expected, but again, the lack of tugs was critical.
If they didn't have any tugs large enough to prevent the grounding, would having 2 tugs have mattered during the transit?
@@gailmcnthe requirement for tugs is for "traction". The reason EG accellerated to 12 kt was because it needed the water over the rudder. If the tugs were there, it would not have needed to be at that speed since they would have acted as training wheels.
@@gailmcn The report stated that tugs large enough to perform salvage work were not available. Standard tugs are used for maintaining ship alignment in close quarters, such as in a harbor, with one leading and one astern.
Agree with the lack of tugs being a crucial issue. The amount of control that fore and aft tugboats have on a large vessel is remarkable. Without tugs the Ever Given was in large part at the mercy of the wind while being blown down the narrow channel. Yes the pilots could have and should have performed better and could likely avoided the grounding. But with the tugs that the Suez Canal policy requires for a ship of the Ever Given's size, this would have been a routine trip through the Suez.
thanks to all who clarified what the tugs would have done during transit.
good stuff, Sal! that report does seem to be awfully lenient to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA); as you mentioned, the SCA required tugs for that size vessel, so where were they and why didn't the pilots raise a flag about it? again, excellent follow-up, Sal, and thanks!
In the Suez Canal I’d not be surprised that the tug escort requirement is simply a method of running up the canal transit bill. If the tugs aren’t provided I’d bet the ship is still charged the cost of the phantom tugs.
Ok, 1. Why two pilots? was this a training cruise? 2. if the pilots are employees of the SCA, why didn't they seem to know what the hell they were doing? Don't they do this on a daily basis? 3. How does the SCA get to sue Evergreen? seems to me like it should be Evergreen suing the SCA for providing inept pilots that crashed their ship! Granted, the master is ultimately responsible, however, considering that the pilots were breaking bridge protocol by speaking to each other in Arabic, not English, I'd say that there's a good chance that the master had no idea what they were doing.
Well, if he was paying any attention at all, he must have had _some_ idea based on the helm and engine orders they were giving...
(Speaking of which, modern ships surely don't work this way any more, but I can't shake the automatic mental image of the chief engineer and his mate down in the engine room, looking up from their morning tea as the bridge telegraph suddenly rings "all ahead full" and glancing at each other in consternation.)
2. SCA pilots have a bad reputation in terms of competence.
3. SCA wanted to push all blame on Ever Given before the investigation.
Apparently, actions like this is possibly where the expression “A Drunken Sailor” came from!
The SCA is the Egyptian govt. In what court could the vessel's owners sue them?
It's like asset forfeiture in various small towns in the US, without the ability to appeal the seizure up to a higher and (one hopes) less corrupt court.
SCA already got paid. My guess it's just risk assessment for transit company that every now and then they will pay to SCA. Just more profitable that going along Africa
Captain had me as the helmsman for the last part of the port exit on my first apprenticeship. Taught me how making big corrections only leads to more big corrections and that small rudder changes can keep you within 1 degree of the heading.
Im thinking about that experience while watching this video
You know what this report sounds like = the way airline pilots used to work in the cockpit - The Captain had final say and responsibility, the first officer and flight engineer would never dare to question the Captains decision, for fear of internal repercussions within the company and from other Captains they would work for "treated as bad apples basically" and this type of thing caused many crashes for fear of correcting a mistake (s) the Captain made.
Now, from what I understand, everyone in the cockpit is encouraged to speak up, and leave their egos at the gate so to speak.
On a side note - while "under the hood" instrument training, flying a small Cessna in my pilot training, I just had a glimpse of some dark object directly in front of me on the windscreen....and I said "is there something in front of us" to my instructor all I heard was Oh S**t and he rolled the plane upside down and pulled the yolk into his gut I looked up and saw a twin engine Cessna underbelly disappearing away from us.
The universe said it wasn't time for us to go yet. Instructor had his head buried in charts, no eyes out the windows. I had that hood on and couldn't see out except for that head tilt that let me glimpse a spot in the windscreen. I speak up when things are not clear. If things are clear as mud, speak up.
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) has been a significant part of pilot training for some time now and is part of every major air crash investigation. I think it was back in the 90s when investigators started seeing how crucial this was to safety outcomes. Also, how important use and understanding of English was, and using standardized terms in cockpit/controller communications.
I don't think that's quite the right analogy. In this case, the issue was that the navigator-analogue (the pilot) wasn't performing at the required level, and the captain-analogue (the master) didn't sufficiently assert his authority.
The question becomes, are pilots consults to the captain or temporary captains of the vessel? As I understand it is the latter, i.e., temporary captains, thus they have sole responsibility of the vessels.
@@niilespunkari8832 No, absolutely not. Pilots are consultants. The master remains in sole command of the vessel and remains responsible for safety. Remember that the key division is that the master knows how the ship responds to the controls but doesn't know the currents etc. in the location being navigated, and the pilot knows the location but doesn't know how the ship responds.
Note that this doesn't mean that the master is the only person who's on the hook if things go wrong. One of the ways that the master enacts their responsibility is by delegating to competent people. For example, the master isn't required to know all the details of how the engine works, because that's delegated to the chief engineer. Likewise, the master doesn't have to know the details of how to navigate in pilotage waters, because that's delegated to the pilot. This is the same as with any company -- if an Amazon truck crashes into your house, that's not Jeff Bezos's responsibility personally, because he delegated the job of delivering those packages to a competent employee.
The entrance to Portsmouth Harbour in England is narrow. When the two new Royal Navy carriers enter or exit they have a tug connected at bow and stern. The warships will be at 'Harbour Stations', with designated watertight doors closed and the appropriate crewmen closed up in the machinery spaces to act as required in case of emergency, ie, manual control, start and use emergency equipment, etc.. The tugs are extra insurance just in case of something really unexpected. The lack of tugs going through the canal is nothing short of criminal.
When your two pilots are arguing in Arabic, things cannot be going well. The aerodynamic forces on this giant sail of a cargo ship must have been tremendous.
Love it when the approach is: "Let's wing it, and if anything goes wrong, we are gonna play the blame game"
sounds legit
I recall one of the Bond movies where they take over the ship as a Pilot and intentially drive it into the dock. This event reminds me of that scene.
That was in License To Kill.
IMO, the SCA is primarily at fault. It seems to have failed at many levels here. So while the Captain is ultimately in command of his ship and he bears some responsibility, the SCA basically left the Captain with very limited options or time to maneuver (pun intended) around the disastrous actions of its incompetent pilots.
You could easily argue the Captain should never have conducted a suez transit in the prevailing conditions. Not that the company would ever thank him for the lost revenue and more than likely would have resulted with him being sacked
@@lukesdewhurst True.
@@lukesdewhurstwhat about ship before him? Same size and no problems... He got bad pilots who fked his ship then blamed him. At the end SCA got nice paycheck and the master probably have a different job
And … The Capt’n Hazelwood Award for outstanding Ship Groundings .. Without a oil spill .. goes to ..
You as 'Talk Show and News Host' just keeps getting better and better Sal. You're funny, entertaining as hell, super well-informed, passionate about this industry, (and life in general it seems!) I had zero knowledge of 'shipping stuff' and didn't know I was interested in that and all you talk about! Like over 100,000 people (and growing FAST!) It's YOU Dr. Sal. It's a pleasure to have such a fine instructor.
Thanks.
I started watching in the beginning of your show. Enjoy your style, and temperament and unbiased info.
I have always enjoyed reading sailing stories, especially the tall ships that sailed from north Atlantic, around Africa to Asia.
Sounds like the “first pilot” may have been in training or the two pilots have interpersonal issues. Obviously lack of tug boats under those wind conditions for such a large ship seems foolish.
Seems like MV Ever Given was crabbing its way up the Suez Canal channel. It sounds like the weather noted in the report that morning; just taking the pilots out to the anchorage was hazardous.
PS - Wonder of MV Costco Galaxy, which was immediately in front of MV Ever Given, was also having issues maintaining a track in the channel?
PS2 - if you were to enter in all the perimeters into a ship simulation trainer would it have been possible to safely transit the canal?
PS3 - Does Suez Canal Authority have access to a ships bridge simulator to train pilots or is training just OJT?
PS4 - Is Suez Canal Authority pilot training document available to the public?
The Cosco Galaxy was the same size as the Ever Givens, and it made the transit just fine right in front of them, so obviously the answer to whether it was possible to safely transit was "yes".
It would be interesting to know what happened to the key players (pilots, ship captain, master, ect). Not to embarrass more, but to see how the industry looked at the incident. Have their futures in the shipping industry been changed, or allowed to continue.
You people really disappoint me. Spell it out. Major global players are actively working to DESTROY the global economy. Depopulate the earth. They locked down people from working and producing for no good reason (yes no good reason) and at the same time, "Oh look, a ship just randomly decided to block a major seaway."
And you kids are all? "what caused this??????????????????"
This reminds me of a story recounted to me by a Chesapeake Bay pilot: he came aboard a Korean-crewed vessel. The Master was the only individual with even a word of English. Crew members kept running on and off the bridge with much jabbering and gesticulating, and the pilot’s attempts to figure out what might be going on was met only with a repeated stony “Everthing OK” from the Master.
Oh man, I found the channel through the Evergreen ship and then you got tons of press during the Titan and here we are at Evergreen again. Time flies
As with other recent incidents with vessels under pilot it seems like the pilots exert control on the bridge rather than advise (if you're repeatedly shouting speed and helm corrections you're not an advisor you're in direct control of the vessel). The system of local "experts" you're required to have on board who aren't in control but act as if they are would seem to breed this type of incident over and over until something changes.
Any creature who says Trump was voted out of office deserves all the evil going on in this world.
I was there from the start! 💖 your channel and your shirts 😂
Thank you!
This is when I found the channel also, I was so pleased to find somebody who knew what they were talking about and to get away from all the ridiculous speculation and hyperbole in the mainstream media.
So thank you Sam 🙏
These reports are inherently political and have legal ramifications. I think the report has been written to not upset the canal authorities or open anyone up to litigation; the costs were enormous.
Ramifications. The word is ramifications.
@@babystacks Thanks thats the one.
Maritime safety reports are not admissible as evidence in criminal trials so, no, they don't have legal ramifications.
@@beeble2003 criminal trials are not the only legal venue. Civil law is more important because it costs governments and companies money.
@@kaymish6178 Not sure why I included the word "criminal" in my comment. Safety reports are not admissible as evidence in any trial, criminal or civil.
Very interesting. I'm retired merchant navy officer and my son has just started his career as OOW unlimited. The old debate about responsibility between a master and pilot. Thanks for your efforts. Very educational and a flag for those in command.
Like many, I found you during the Evergiven Suez canal blockage. I do appreciate your straightforward reporting style.
It would be interesting to see the 2D/3D re-creation for the ship in front and behind the EverGiven along with the EverGiven. Overall (from one who has never been closer than a mile or so from a cargo ship) it sounds like Bubba and Billy Bob somehow snuck on to the EverGiven as pilots. 😄
What I felt you were missing throughout is that Accident Reports are not designed to assign blame. In a UK MAIB report, such as the one I have just read, this is stated very clearly right at the start - in the very first paragraph of the report, before anything about the accident being reported on is mentioned.
TLDR: The reason you can't work out who is being blamed is probably because nobody is being 'blamed'. The report is identifying what happened and how to prevent a similar outcome in the future.
It is for the courts and regulatory authorities to assign blame, if there is any. This, for example, is why, in the UK, the MAIB is a separate body from the regulatory authorities, including our Coastguard.
The objective of a (properly done) Accident Report is to come up with recommendations to avoid recurrence and, in some cases, to avoid occurrences that didn't, but could have, happened. Those recommendations might involve implied criticisms of all sorts of bodies in all sorts of ways. Accidents rarely have a single cause and endeavours like shipping have all sorts of layers of protection that might kick in to prevent a failure of one thing leading to an accident.
Just because the 'Primary Cause' was person X's responsibility doesn't mean that organisation Y gets a free pass. Sometimes even completely uninvolved people, bodies or groupings might have recommendations addressed to them if it is felt that something that improves safety could be learnt by them from the accident, it's investigation or something noticed during the investigation.
EXACTLY!!
@rickansell661 You are talking the difference between UK (democratic) and Egypt (authoritarian). In Egypt, bribes are the rule, jobs are awarded based on family/social connections, competence is secondary. SCA is Egypt....the cultural ethos/value system is completely different
@@gailmcn how does Egypt and SCA enter into this, seeing as the report was written by the Panama Maritime Authority?
@@koma-k the reasons why I put this in is because the commenter was talking about how things work in a system that doesn't operate like Egypt does. the Panama report isn't a complete report because SCA (Egypt) refused to honor any requests from them, refused to participate in the investigation. They had already assigned blame (the EverGiven Captain), and had already collected money from Ever Given's owners.They were never going to accept fault in their pilots...and this case would never have been adjucated in a court, in a culture like Egypt's.. See EgyptAir Flight 990 (1999) for a similar outcome to a disaster where the Egyptian ethos was also dominant in the outcome of the investigation. Wikipedia has a good summary. One thing they left out was that the pilot at fault (Batouti?) was also facing sanctions once they landed, involving inappropriate behavior towards females. To this day, Egypt denies any fault in him, just as they do with their ship pilots. they don't do real investigations, they do "whitewashes".
@@koma-kI was thinking this also.
Until UA-cam suggested your channel, I did not know how interesting maritime content would be. I’m hooked.
Dr. Sal A great presentation of the report, It occurs to me a vast portion of the maritime industry is rife with apathy, incompetence, corruption and a cavaller attitude towards safety ie. your videos on maritime firefighting. Thank you so much for making a complicated subject clear to a layperson.
Thanks!
Thanks for keeping it going Sal. Your updates are appreciated!
You bet
Briefly, the owners/operators will not support the Master if s/he insists upon tugs (too expensive), or delays the passage for any reason. It costs vast sums of money to keep a Very Large Container ship operating every day, whether on passage or jilling around, and those costs go straight to the bottom line. I leave comments on the Suez Canal pilotage system to those who use the Canal; the little I know about it, and Egypt in general, makes me surprised that the system works as well as it does. The Panamanian report has to avoid offending anyone, or fueling (or suppressing) lawsuits, as Panama registers many ships, whose owners would go elsewhere if they felt unfriendliness.
That was my biggest question. If the master had called off the transit over the wind and lack of tugs, would there have been no consequences for him and the crew?
Really, the Suez is the only game in town....if they ignore their own standards, tolerate poorly trained pilots, tolerate graft and bribes, etc. what can the ship owners do? Call for a strike? Use the canal down the street? Let's hope that they lost enough revenue while Ever given was plugging the canal, to induce SCA to make improvements in their operations.
"The Panamanian report has to avoid offending anyone ..."
No it doesn't. By international treaty, Egypt is obliged to allow passage for ships of any flag. Panama can piss off the SCA as much as it wants, and the SCA is breaking international law if they retaliate.
"... or fueling (or suppressing) lawsuits ..."
That has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Aside from anything else, maritime accident reports are not admissible as evidence in court.
"... as Panama registers many ships, whose owners would go elsewhere if they felt unfriendliness."
Evergreen isn't some cowboy company. They're a large company with good procedures and good training. The reason the report doesn't recommend much for the company is simply that there's not much to recommend.
Great to see how the Channel has progressed and your reach for informing lots of people about maritime issues. Thank you. I am much more informed by watching.
As always...thanks Donald and I appreciate your continued support!
Sal,
When the Polar Endeavour Class vessels were developed there was extensive amount of model testing done. Besides resistance and propulsion, there was an extensive amount of seakeeping, maneuverability and wind tunnel testing. From those tests models were developed for use in bridge simulation. Prior to delivery bridge team management training was carried out. As part of the training pilots from ports the the Endeavour Class tankers were invited to train with the ship's crews
Without having read the report I would be willing to wager that the chances of the ship's officers, crew and the pilots training together are slim to none. I would also be willing to guess that the likelihood of the pilots having trained on a bridge simulator for a vessel similar to the Ever Given was slim to none.
Every vessel is required to have a ship maneuverability poster. The poster should have all the information that was needed by the pilots regarding ship handling, including wind, bank effects and squat. The Ever Given Master should have given each pilot a Pilot Card for the vessel. Based on the information you have given there is no mention of the Bridge Poster or the Pilot Card.
The issue of the role of the pilot and the ship's bridge management team continues to be a mystery. Pilots are supposed to be experts on local navigation. They also, except for the Panama Canal (I think?), have no responsibility. The ship's Master is supposed to have full responsibility, but how often are they willing to overrule a pilot's order?
Without major changes to the system, occurrences like the grounding of the Ever Given and the Ever Forward will continue.
Bob
"Based on the information you have given there is no mention of the Bridge Poster or the Pilot Card."
You should check the report about that. Don't assume that something didn't happen just because it's not mentioned in a video summarizing the report. And, look, regardless of what documentation is present, every pilot should know that you don't control any ship by throwing the rudder from side to side.
"The ship's Master is supposed to have full responsibility, but how often are they willing to overrule a pilot's order?"
The difficulty there is that, if the master overrules a pilot's advice (pilots can't give orders) and grounds the ship, then the grounding is absolutely the master's fault.
@beeble2003 Your comment on reading the report is well taken. It has never been clear to me whether or not pilots study or even look at, the posters or the pilot card.
I am not a ship's officer. I am a naval architect and marine engineer that has spent considerable time observing bridge teams both on vessels and simulators. I have had the opportunity to pilot vessels on simulators and I have grounded or struck obstructions more often than not. To address the issue of sudden helm changes or throttle changes, working with SSPA, Kamewa, and Raytheon the ECDIS on the Polar Endeavour Class have a feature that can show a projection of the vessel's path.
As for Masters listening to and following pilot recommendations, I was on the bridge of a tanker when a fisherman had his boat and net out inside the traffic lane. The fishing boat was contacted by radio and it was stated that they were having issues retrieving the net. The pilot did not recommend a change of course or speed. The Master questioned the pilot and the pilot repeated his orders. I watched the master repeatedly check the Collision Avoidance Radar and his binoculars. He asked the pilot again about his recommendation and the pilot repeat his orders. The Master checked the radar and his binoculars. He then walked over to the throttle and put it full astern. Had he not taken action there would have been a collision.
Several months later the same Master and a different pilot were taking a loaded single-hull tanker to anchor in al well-charted anchorage. All bridge equipment was in working order. The ship ran aground and the bottom was holed, 5,700 barrels of crude oil were spilled. One of the first laws of Naval architecture was violated: You can't drive a ship drawing 42' of water to an anchorage in 41' of water.
Go figure.
Im not a sea man, but my son has steered a navy vessel through the Suez, most i did was a 200 ton barge on the river Humber, England. With the video simulation and the report it gave me very good detailed understanding of this event and grounding. Thank you for this informative video, well presented on a specialized subject.
I have begun watching many of your videos. This one, and the BHR, I honestly think as a human race we are relying on far to many computers and people who claim they have the expertise and experience, only to find *AFTER* a serious incident, the individuals had no authority to be in the positions they are or were in. I'm a paid/volunteer firefighter. 46 years civilian paid/volunteer firefighting with 30 years in the USMC reserves as 8404 and 7051 within that 30 years. I have 3 degrees all from Texas A & M for firefighting and is surrounding purposes. I have been a lowly basic firefighter and as high as a battalion chief. Currently semi-retired and teaching with A & M. I am seeing far to many people who think they know what they are doing to find out after an incident let alone a fatal incident, those people had no ability, training, expertise, or experience to be in the position they were in at the time of the incident. Or having multiple historical issues which should have elimanated them from ever achieving the positions they were in. Yet, somehow, these people remain were they are. Let alone how much we have become to rely on electronics that as we find, are not the best things to rely in when even dead recokening, experience or just plain common sense works far better.
I think a comparison of the (partial) transit of the EVER GIVEN with the corresponding course of the AL NASRIYAH would be extremely instructive since the AL NASRIYAH, being of comparable size, was just ahead of EVER GIVEN and experienced the same conditions.
Better pilots....Mmm? Like: Not giving such extreme wheel inputs. Besides, not all ships behave the same under the same conditions.
I remember episode one. Love the channel and the marvelous and accurate information.
Thanks Larry!
I remember back in '71 on a U.S. Navy Munitions ship when we took liberty in Bermuda... coming out of port, with a Pilot directing the helm, there is a narrow channel you have to maneuver through... I'm presuming one ship in the channel at a time as there was an ocean liner/cruise ship anchored just outside the channel waiting to come in... I was manning my station on the bow at the anchor windless, ready if necessary to drop anchor in an emergency... anyway, long story short, the cruise ship was anchor with its stern very close to the channel opening... and my ship had a tendency to turn very slowly... as we go closer to the cruise ships stern we started to "talk"... shouldn't we be turning NOW?!!... and we kept getting closer with no turning... now the Bow Officer showed some concern and most of the bow crew were standing at the port railing watching us get closer and closer... and now we could see passengers standing on the stern looking back at us... finally we started to turn that we ALL felt was a bit late... Holy Crap... there was even a discussion about most of the crew abandoning the bow... well of course except me and the Deck Officer... well, no one left but when you can see the WHITES of persons eyeballs on a ship you're passing... that's a bit disconcerting... I wonder if THEY knew how close that was... we probably could have yelled across and made dates... 😱
Thanks for providing such a thurough analysis of this boondoggle (and the flashback to jr high school giggle 😂). I think there is enough blame to go around, but a lot of it is ultimately down to greed - corporate greed instills fear in the ship's Master of doing the right/required things and corporate personal greed of the Suez Canal authority and the pilots for keeping on pushing through big ships in bad weather and using piliots of questionable ability - I cant help but wonder if they were even qualified, or if they just bribed the right people? My uncle is Egyptian and the stories he has to tell of the level of normalized corruption makes me really appreciate living in a place where most of us would be hard pressed to bribe our way out of a parking ticket.
Nobody, and I do mean nobody can tell it like Dr Sal can👏👏👏
Not using the bow thrusters to maintain a course is a shocking omission. Whilst underway at slow speed, they work in conjunction with the rudder(s).
They were steaming at almost 13 knots and the bow thruster would not have worked.
@@wgowshipping I totally get that. But if they were using bow thrusters to maintain a course, they wouldn't need to be going 13 KTS in the first place.
@@idanceforpennies281 They would not be making much forward progress at less than 3 knots.
@@wgowshipping That's a good explaination. Bow thrusters no good above dead slow.
@@idanceforpennies281 dead slow on this ship ls likely 7-8 knots
Sal at -4:06 you said a vessels maneuverability increases with an increase in speed. The Suez Canal ( not really) has an interesting design WRT the bottom characteristics, flat on the bottom then tapering upward toward a vertical wall. As a result of this configuration a vessel which increases speed to gain steerage has a result of squat which causes the vessel to actually lose steering. If you do a little digging you will note that a QFlex or a QMax LNG vessel ran aground in the canal (not really) prior to the Evergiven. Observing her AIS track and the data provided you will see the same maneuvering (increasing speed to help with turning in this case) which led to the grounding. At 17:50 in your presentation the vessel is experiencing bank cushion and bank suction on the bow and stern due to speed and a hard vertical wall of the canal. At 18:32 they are effectively losing the helm, there isn’t enough water under the hull so she starts squatting, pilot increases speed to gain steerage but fails and as you say at 18:54 the pilot is using hard over helm commands to try and regain control of the vessel without success. At 19:32 you see bank cushion and bank suction on the starboard wall of the canal. Looking at the display I would believe that the deep water channel ( flat part of the canal) is designated by the dotted lines in the center and outside of those two lines of demarcation the bottom characteristic changes and slopes towards the vertical walls of the canal. At 20:05 of your presentation we again see bank cushion and bank suction on the starboard side of the vessel. At 34:11 you correctly identify the failures of the pilots WRT weather and the canal characteristics of bank suction and bank cushion but most importantly the SCA and the pilots failed in their duty. Regarding the Master and his overall responsibility, end of day the responsibility is his whether he was on the bridge or not but again this incident was not caused by just one failure but rather a series of failures. Unfortunately, the SCA will not learn from this as it’s already happened previously so ships Masters who have command of these large vessels transiting the Suez will need to be on guard for any and all indications of loss of steering, lack of tugs and the inabilities of the SCA pilots and to be ready to take over the command as necessary to protect their crew, ship and cargo. Lastly you can do a lot better than konrad WRT a knowledgeable mariner who sails ships and not copies and pastes articles in his rag…….just sayin
Why have Rules of Navigation when they are not enforced. If the SCA RON’s demand two escort tugs for this size vessel then there is no decision to be made. Additionally, under certain weather conditions both escort tugs should be made fast aft with tug lines ready to give immediate response in the event of induced sheer. SCA have a lot to answer for in this instance.
Have the insurers spoken? They are the one agency that could actually say NO! There will only be a limited number of insurers.
the SCA a government-owned entity, it is Egypt. If SCA even has any liability insurers, they wouldn't be likely to do anything but defend the SCA. If ship insurers challenge the SCA on behalf of shipping, what good would that do? Ships have to use the Suez, whether it is run badly or not, whether they are insured while in the canal or not. There is no other option. Egypt/SCA is holding all the high cards here, and they have some mighty deep pockets. In the case of Ever Given, if their insurers filed against the SCA to recover lost money, it would be a case of spending far more than they could recover in a suit. A post script: right after the EverGiven was freed, it was impounded by the Egyptians (SCA). they demanded over 900 million dollars from the owner/operators of the ship. They kept it for over 100 days, until those owner/operators settled for an undisclosed amount, believed to be around 500 million. So not only did they recoup their loses, they made a profit. So why would they bother to accept fault, or even contribute to the investigation?
"Samir, you're wrecking the boat!"
The Pilot, probably.
Great summary and presentation. Admiral James Stavridis, in his 2017 book "Sea Power", describes how early in his career in command of a US Navy destroyer, a local Egyptian pilot, pouting because he did not get a "gift" that met his expectations, tried to run the ship aground. His own navigator recognized the pilot's game and saved the ship from grounding.
For us landlubbers who wonder how it all gets done, many thanks!
Sounds like the pilots never had control or even realised they never had control and they managed to park it into Asia before the captain realised he was in a spaghetti western and he had just handed control to a pair of cowboys.
Still, it's always the Old Man's fault...
Beautifully said! - I was also thinking of Keystone Cops, or a bad opening action sequence to an Indiana Jones movie, besides the new 5th one, that has become a complete "shipwreck" or "train-wreck!
Great stuff Sal. So awesome to finally have this report.
Its the gift that keeps on given
Was just thinking about this yesterday….and saw this in my feed today-Thank you for the update!
What a CYA report! Serious politics in play. I'm betting that this is revision 3 or 4 after "review". Now, the thing is could Evergreen sue the SCA? Would it backfire on them with future shipments? A real conundrum.
Might be something better handled from the insurance company and the Suez canal authority.
I believe it would be a fruitless strategy. First, the SCA is basically operated and controlled by Egypt. So the insurer would be suing Egypt, in a sense. Talk about delay and deny.....the insurer would spend far more money on the case than they would ever gain, even in the unlikely event they would eventually win. Unfortunately, all shipping that has to use the Suez to reach their markets, has no recourse......there is no other feasible option, so they have to tolerate whatever shoddy practices the SCA offers. Without significant global political pressure on Egypt, the SCA has no real stimulus for change.
No. Recognizing that multiple parties are to blame is not "covering your ass". The Panamanian authorities have no ass to cover: they're clearly not liable for anything. Remember that maritime safety reports are -- by design -- not about assigning blame. Their purpose is to increase safety by making recommendations on how to avoid a repeat occurrence.
@@beeble2003 What does Panama have to do with this? You forget that the SCA fined Evergreen $916 mill in 2021 including a "loss of reputation" charge of $300 mill! Totally bogus and even a soft pedaled report like this is damning. That's why I'm sure that this has gone through multiple revisions with the first one the harshest. Also why it's taken so long. Egypt is not happy right now.
@@alexandermckay8594 "What does Panama have to do with this?"
Panama has _everything_ to do with it, because it's a Panamanian registered ship. So, please, don't tell me what I'm "forgetting", when you're apparently unaware of the most basic facts of the situation.
I signed on after tuning in to see what you had to say about the Key Bridge collapse. Now I’m checking back to see what I’ve missed! Thank you for showing me a corner of knowledge that I didn’t know I wanted to know about!
As a general aviation pilot, the pilot (or in this case, ship master) is still ultimately in control of the situation. The ship’s crew, helmsmen, and master must have been very frustrated by the two pilots massive miss management of the ship’s pilotage.
Yeah, but this is merchant marines. The pilot is temporary captain, not consult to the captain (as I understand). E.g., when pilot enter vessels who are crossing the English channel, some captains simply go to sleep in their beds: and it is absolutely legal.
Luck of the draw got them a rookie pilot.
I understand that to get better at your job you need to do your job but maybe drop him on something smaller a couple times first.
I know very little about ship handling. Your explanation of this incident expands my understanding immensely!
Great analysis Sal! Meanwhile, my layman’s opinion is the pilots were not qualified to do the job!
Maybe qualified, but not competent and up to the task of providing suitable assistance to the Master to navigate his "behemoth" vessel through the eye of a needle in a howling gale!
This is not the report, this is my Apple iTunes agreement! ha ha ha
Sal! Loving your humour 🤣
Can’t believe it was 2.5 years ago! Where did that go?
layman's question: couldn't they have used their bow-thrusters to augment the maneuverability (at lower speeds)? Were the pilots aware of the existence of bow thrusters only after the grounding?
short answer- no. Pilots are aware of all thrusters since every ship has them now. If you read the full report it mentions how fast they were going (truly nuts) , and thrusters are used for low speed work.
@@kingofcastlechaos Maybe big, long, ships should get tiny steerable rudders near the bow, too? like most fish have!
@@konradcomrade4845 The rudder only works well when the engine/propeller is forcing water thru it. You would need thrusters on each of those forward rudders.
What a good video Sal!
We can taste your enthusiasm for this subject! Wonderful.
This is very common and happens often in Kiel Canal, they call it "Bande fahren" whoch translates to driving gutter, in Kiel Kanal you have way better Helmsmen whithout pilots interfereing tho
"2.5 years to generate the report", that's almost as bad as our own NTSB on fatal aircraft mishaps! Add to that, they often, after typically two years, do not find a "probable cause", just as in the case of this incident in the Suez.
It seems the canal would function better if the canal was wider than the length of the ship.
Good idea. Now who will pay for the necessary work?
@@elcastorgrande The Canal Authority charges an insane amount of money in transit fees. The trouble is that canal is a cash cow for Egypt. They suck off a lot of money that could be used to improve the canal. In other words, the money is there to widen if they want to. The canal has a revenue of 8 billion dollars a year. You can do a lot of things with that much cash.
@@Bill_N_ATX, yes, as I suspect middle eastern commerce, coercion, backhanders, greed and politics all plays a significant hand in the laundering of said income...
The best thing the pilot could have said to the helmsman would have been keep her in the centre of the channel, any good QM (Helmsman) could do that without interferance from the Pilot.
Great episode. I definitely found you when you and John first covered this. Looking forward to that Barbie map episode.
🤬
Watching the ship ballet go on - I'm very curios if 2 ships have ever gotten anchor chains tangled - and what happens when that happens
They have and it takes time to untangle.
That's why most ships have two anchors in the bow. cut the fowled anchor loose with a line and a marked float and hire a workboat with crane and a diver to sort out the mess and recover it, anchors ain't cheap.
As an aircraft pilot we have CRM drummed into us to avoid this sort of cockpit management chaos. As a small boat owner I'm well aware of windage, prop effect and speed - I'm staggered ocean giants have the same problem! Great vid!
I remember when this channel first started. It may be hard to believe, but I subscribed when this channel first started, and I started to support very quickly.
Thanks Rita...I remember!
Binge watching your videos back to back- and adding comments for the algorithm~! 🌻👍 Keep up the great content!
Seems like the grounding happened only "yesterday".
I love this channel. I am so glad you started it. I look forward to your videos.
I saw that first video. How has it been 2 1/2 years already? What did I do with my life? Oh that's right I was stuck in my house.
Pilots switching to "local language" i.e. Arabic, with ship's bridge crew including helmsman only fluent in English as a secondary language denies the bridge crew situational awareness. Sal says, "knowing what's going on". Proper situational awareness (SA) enables the master and helmsman to anticipate subsequent commands and respond more quickly when that next rudder or heading command comes. It may be only a second or two, but can be crucial in situations like this. Good SA helps the helmsman and master build a coherent mental picture of current circumstances and appropriate actions to be taken in a timely manner.
Love the nautical theme shirt.
Did the pilots have a tantrum for not getting enough cigarette “gifts”.
Probably!
Highly informative and objective summary and analysis of what happened. Breaks it down in layman’s terms.
I don't normally fall back on those moronic internet acronyms, but. . . ROFL! 🤣 to your prologue. The first pages of report, as presented, sounds like a description of a carload of young males losing control of their automobile on a Harnett County, NC sand road.
All through this video, i was remembering being taught how to sail our family's 30 ft catamaran downwind, wing and wing, or with the main on one side of the mast and the foresail on the other. Yeah, it kind of felt like trying to keep the aft and the bow on the same track. And that was a little bitty 30 ft boat in just a few knots of wind.
I think there was plenty of blame to go around and it doesn't sound likely that the changes required to prevent a similar grounding are going to be implemented any time soon.
I found this channel during the Ever Given grounding and i have come back because i am still fascinated by maritime news even now when sails are not in use. I read all the seagoing books in my grade school and local library before i hit 5th grade. Still fascinated.
Pilots were clearly not up to the level of training and experience required to support the navigation of the Ever Given through the Suez Canal. I find no fault with the Captain.
Vessels of this size regularly go through the Suez. Not uncommon either for winds to shift. The vessel in front of the Ever Given was a similar size, yet transitioned without issue. This incident clearly comes down to the incompetence of the 2 pilots.
Ok, what did you discover during your dissection of the Apple iTunes agreement? That’s an alarmingly big document! I see copious markers sticking out.
Your giddiness and excitement for this, is precious and infectious. 😂 I don’t even know why I watched this but I loved your excitement in teaching me things 😂❤
Sal- I tried to buy the book. It’s only 10 euros, but the shipping to Virginia is 68 euros. Too steep for me.
Sorry to hear that.
Must be going through the Suez Canal.......;)
There's some great pics of this grounding. I found your channel watching Titan vids. I know nothing of shipping but you're such a great narrator i could watch you explain how grass grows❤😂
Wow, thank you!
Suez canal authorities avoiding the blame, how unusual..
Further to my remark. The report stated that the two pilots started had a 'heated' conversation in Arabic. I think that is the point when the pilots had lost control of the situation, and started to panic. When people panic, the tendency is to revert to your mother tongue.
Phenomenal report chockfulla KEY quality information, Sal.
Sharing already and can't thank you enough!
STELLAR 👍!
So this report is non-binding, from a third party, and made without cooperation of the Suez Canal authorities. And it made no serious conclusions that I could not have made.
That's how maritime accident reports work, yes. Air accident reports are exactly the same. Their purpose is solely to increase safety.
@@beeble2003 I get that. But how can they offer more than platitudes if they cannot compel testimony?
Following the 2007 a 2x fatal sinking of the BC Ferry, MV Queen of the North, Canada's Transportation Safety Board got no cooperation from the three unionized bridge crew who were the most important witnesses. Their union closed ranks around them.
Anyway, you are right - these investigations are not designed to to assign blame, which makes sense on the surface. But witnesses know that their testimony could be used against them in criminal or civil proceedings, so there is a strong disincentive around testifying. Thus, these investigations are doomed to say nothing more than the obvious.
What a dramatic reading! I've been on the edge of my seat.
27:00 You say because the pilot is Egyptian (aka inferred muslim) that alcohol consumption is not a problem. Why? I've served (U.S. Army) alongside and in a Joint capacity with many Arabic muslim allies. Nearly every one of them drank or used some sort of substance like caffeine pills, Pot, zanax, or ADHD meds or did both and most went to strip clubs and banged hookers too. (No, I did not instigate. I was the good boy always telling them to stop). Never assume someone wont do something just because their religion says they cant. Thats like assuming Catholic High School girls dont put out. Most do. (I know this also from experience growing up Catholic).
That pilot should have been tested. His panic and erratic behavior leads me to believe he WAS under the influence. They probably knew it and didnt test him so they could lay blame on the Evergiven crew rather than their pilot. Theyre suing for billions after-all.
Given the weather conditions, length of vessel "unusual" exaggerated helm orders and lack of anyone on the bridge taking effective control, an experienced man at the wheel, I'm sure couldn't have done a worse job left to his own devices!
Great and clear presentation as always!
If this happened in America the pilots would be named as Co- Secretary of Transportation.
0:50 That was a great sight gag.
13:50 Forgot about that part of the story. Nice to have an explanation for it.
It's PIO - Pilot Induced Oscillation, in aeronautical engineering parlance. There is a time lag between the input and the expected output. The pilots overcorrected when the response of the vessel is below his expectation.
Hi Sal, im here for the crew update. And waiting for you to hit 300,000.
Was sent to you from Aaron at SubBrief! Thank you for making this channel.
The mapping tech is amazing. Great video and commentary. New sub!
Ever Given is where i started watching you when I saw a retweet on your video when it happen.
Good run down on the report. I've downloaded the full file, and hoping to read it through soon. Thanks.