The thing that I seem to struggle with is, why do the ideas that secondary qualities produce not resemble the physical object? When I see a red ball, it is it's redness(colour) that I am percieving. When I smell a chocolate cake, it is it's smell that I am percieving. Just like when I see a round ball, it is it's shape I percieve. I keep coming across the claim that Locke never argued secondary qualities exist in the mind, but it feels like he is claiming that...please, if you could clear this up for me I'd be most greatful.
Only the size, shape, and motion (primary qualities) of physical objects can cause anything to happen in the world. So it's these primary qualities that cause our ideas of, say, redness. But my idea of the redness (secondary quality) of the ball does not resemble the size, shape, and motion of the ball. So my ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the physical causes of those ideas.
You seem to have a contradiction here, Nathan, when you say that roundness is a primary quality, but also that primary qualities are inseparable from an object. You can of course pop a rubber ball and it will no longer have roundness, and thus roundness can not be a primary quality as you say at 3:06 Rather, when Locke says that primary qualities are inseparable from the object, regardless of what you do to it, he seems to be saying that shape in general is a primary quality. I'm not sure.
Thanks for raising this point. I think we agree. What I meant at 3:06 was not that roundness is inseparable from the ball, but that shape in general is inseparable, and roundness is the particular shape which the ball happens to have. Perhaps I could have been more explicit about that.
You are an absolute king! super helpful and you have the sources as well so I can follow along!
Thank you so much for this! Ridiculously helpful.
The thing that I seem to struggle with is, why do the ideas that secondary qualities produce not resemble the physical object? When I see a red ball, it is it's redness(colour) that I am percieving. When I smell a chocolate cake, it is it's smell that I am percieving. Just like when I see a round ball, it is it's shape I percieve.
I keep coming across the claim that Locke never argued secondary qualities exist in the mind, but it feels like he is claiming that...please, if you could clear this up for me I'd be most greatful.
Only the size, shape, and motion (primary qualities) of physical objects can cause anything to happen in the world. So it's these primary qualities that cause our ideas of, say, redness. But my idea of the redness (secondary quality) of the ball does not resemble the size, shape, and motion of the ball. So my ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the physical causes of those ideas.
You seem to have a contradiction here, Nathan, when you say that roundness is a primary quality, but also that primary qualities are inseparable from an object. You can of course pop a rubber ball and it will no longer have roundness, and thus roundness can not be a primary quality as you say at 3:06
Rather, when Locke says that primary qualities are inseparable from the object, regardless of what you do to it, he seems to be saying that shape in general is a primary quality. I'm not sure.
Thanks for raising this point. I think we agree. What I meant at 3:06 was not that roundness is inseparable from the ball, but that shape in general is inseparable, and roundness is the particular shape which the ball happens to have. Perhaps I could have been more explicit about that.
@@nathansasser6252 thanks for the torpedo quick response, I appreciate the clarification