Some people in the tradition of Bernard Williams and others actually do differentiate ethics and morality. So while almost every discussion will use them interchangeably, that doesn't mean all philosophers do.
Great video! Let me also warn about the other top UA-cam videos about metaethics: they contain lots of errors, misleading analogies and other problems. In particular, many of them conflate normative ethics with metaethics!
Great overview! Personally I think that non-cognitivist quasi-realism resonnates most with me, sounds most plausible what I think to be true about meta-ethics. I think Alex O'Connor has a similar view. Though I think its important to nevertheless underatand other views, especially cognitivists since they're usually more developed
Thank you for making this series. Would you mind answering a question about noncognitivism? Presumably, the noncognitivist still lives in society and interacts with other people. How does he choose one set of behaviors (e.g. obeying the law) over another (breaking the law), when there is no ontological foundation for morality? And on what basis can he justify this choice? It seems to me that under noncognitivism, one is equally justified in doing anything.
Justified in the universe vs justified from one's own perspective or within a certain cultural frame or domain of agreement, one assumes. One might ask in the case of cognitivism: justified to whom?
Logically the Ought cannot be inferred from the Is. But value conclusions can be inferred from value premises as I understand from your discussion. But then we act upon value conclusions and this leadsto consequences that are factual. Iwish to know your views.
Could you explain me please: You said both parties (concerning the brain of foetus) are wrong. But how could both parties be wrong? Isn‘t it the case, that either these foetus have a functioning brain, or not? Btw really like your videos. I take a course at the university of bern about realism in science and moral and you completly covered the topics, NICE
Hi, thank you for the very precise introduction. It is very useful. Which is the program do you use for creating this type of presentations? Thank you!
Thank you for making these videos! I'm using them as a broad study before making videos arguing for my own position, which I think falls squarely within projectivism.
The is/ought gap seems a false problem insofar as it simply parallels the grue/bleen problem in science. "Observed crows are black, therefore all crows are (ought to be, or ought to be assumed) black. Obviously, a fact about observed X does not tell you a fact about unobserved X, but we take it as justification for assumptions about all X. This criticism of is/ought is more salient if you add more to the arguments about pain. "Suffering is evil. Evil is to be avoided. Therefore suffering is to be avoided." An argument that one ought not to cause suffering is not so difficult to see if we can identify or link evil with suffering. Just in case anyone doubts that this is reasonable, ask this: If you posit a universe in which suffering does not and cannot exist, just where or how do you find evil?
@@enlightenedturtle9507 I guess I should have been more clear about the example. This would be a universe in which suffering is not only not actual, but not possible, i.e. not a potential state.
Notes: Proposition = statement that is truth-apt (can be true/false) Cognitivism = moral statements are truth apt Noncognitivism = moral statements are not truth-apt and are instead expressing something else
20:30 Yes they have. Hormones determines what makes me feel good, consequences of actions can be reasoned, probability of both of the former combined. Reason: I don't want the child. Abortion is a posebility. I do the abortion. I want it to live I can do abortion I don't do the abortion. What makes something true ? A logical conclusion or a measure. What makes you choose the one over the other in this moral dilemma? Emotions. Emotion determines the first premise and thus makes the conclusion. There are two conclusions possible, both are logical right. Thus ehtics can't be right or wrong morally. They can only be right or wrong for something - and that is the second premise - wrong or right for abortion. And what makes that right is logical or irrational. Coast/benefite calculated in $ (Testosteron/pure reason again that calculates gains and loss of money) or empathy and thus emotional coast (oxycotin). What are the longterm consequences ? Testosteron makes money of value and oxycotin makes human beings of value. Among other sideeffects of those testo or oxycotin. Thats the truth.
Matthew Pritchard Yes, the distinction between them is purely technical in my view. However, they face quite different objections. For example, noncognitivists but not individualist subjectivists face the Frege-Geach problem, which I discuss in the video on emotivism.
The claim that arguments which derive moral statements from facts are invalid seems to be not always true. E.g.: The purpose of human life is to please God. God commanded human beings not to commit murder. God is displeased when human beings disobey his commands. Therefore murder is immoral. A true argument? Maybe not. But surely it's valid. And if you replaced the simplistic religious fundamentalism implicit in this argument with terms more amenable to reason, could you not create a valid and true argument? Surely it's worth considering.
Error theory seems invalid. 1. Abortions is wrong (false) ..........................................2. Not aborting is wrong (false) ...............................................Law of non-contradiction? .............................1. p .............................2.~p .............................C. p & ~p ...........................Have I missed something?
For the second premise to contradict the first, the scope of the negation would need to be the entire proposition, i.e.: "Not: abortion is wrong" or "It is not the case that abortion is wrong". You can see what's wrong with your argument by trying it with other properties. E.g. "Abortion is supernatural" and "Not aborting is supernatural". Since nothing is supernatural, both of these statements are false.
Sorry could you possibly elaborate on "the scope of the negation would need to be the entire proposition". I do think I somewhat understand what you are saying but I little more clarification would be wonderful :)
The scope of negation is what the negation ranges over. With "it is not the case that abortion is wrong", the negation ranges over the proposition "abortion is wrong"; i.e. we are negating "abortion is wrong". On the other hand, with "not-aborting is wrong", the negation ranges over only the word "aborting". This doesn't negate a proposition. A moral error theorist will claim that "not-aborting is wrong" is false, since error theorists hold that there are no moral properties. But he will claim that "it is not the case that abortion is wrong" is *true*. Since there are no moral properties, it is indeed not the case that abortion is wrong. Abortion can fail to be wrong either because it is permissible, or obligatory, etc - or because it simply has no moral properties whatsoever. Similarly, the error theorist will hold that "it is not the case that not-aborting is wrong" is also true.
+ Kane B An important question about error theory. I understand that it rejects morality as being a property in and of itself as part of existence. Hence you can't make moral prescriptions such as 'you ought to give to charity' or something but does error theory allow for 'ought not' prescriptions under certain circumstances. Say for example villagers are going to burn a women for witchcraft. Say that the villagers hold that magic is real and that the women is responsible for crop failure. Could an error theory be used to point out that magic is not real hence their prescription is in error? Hence they ought not burn the women due to their views being in error? I understand you can't say murder in and of itself is wrong but could you at least say that murder associated with beliefs such as 'kill witches' to be in error... if that makes sense. Basically can you use error theory to prescribe 'ought nots' when a belief in found to be in error - you ought not burn the women because your view are in error (i.e. wrong).
I've come back to this video time and time again. Excellent series. Thank you so much @Kane B (:
I love your videos because you are so clear and concise, thank you for making this series :)
Forgot to thank you for an excellent and succinct introduction on metaethics
Thank you so much for your videos! Everyone of them is a holy grail for me ❤️
12:22 second one should say moral non-naturalism instead of naturalism, I suggest there should be an annotation added.
Some people in the tradition of Bernard Williams and others actually do differentiate ethics and morality. So while almost every discussion will use them interchangeably, that doesn't mean all philosophers do.
Great video! Let me also warn about the other top UA-cam videos about metaethics: they contain lots of errors, misleading analogies and other problems. In particular, many of them conflate normative ethics with metaethics!
Excellent introduction to this Topic It was very informative and concise. Thank you!
Excellent video! Also, Cecil Taylor is a Top 5 pianist for me.
Great overview!
Personally I think that non-cognitivist quasi-realism resonnates most with me, sounds most plausible what I think to be true about meta-ethics. I think Alex O'Connor has a similar view. Though I think its important to nevertheless underatand other views, especially cognitivists since they're usually more developed
Thank you for making this series.
Would you mind answering a question about noncognitivism? Presumably, the noncognitivist still lives in society and interacts with other people. How does he choose one set of behaviors (e.g. obeying the law) over another (breaking the law), when there is no ontological foundation for morality? And on what basis can he justify this choice? It seems to me that under noncognitivism, one is equally justified in doing anything.
Justified in the universe vs justified from one's own perspective or within a certain cultural frame or domain of agreement, one assumes.
One might ask in the case of cognitivism: justified to whom?
Great presentation, thank you.
RIP Cecil Taylor
April 5, 2018
i love kane b. Also Edmund Hartley likes men
1 nil Will Grigg, up the tics , cmon
One little thing, though: the first emotivist was not Stevenson or Ayer, but Axel Hägerström, although he didn't influence the British emotivists.
Logically the Ought cannot be inferred from the Is. But value conclusions can be inferred from value premises as I understand from your discussion. But then we act upon value conclusions and this leadsto consequences that are factual. Iwish to know your views.
You;re saving me dude!
Could you explain me please:
You said both parties (concerning the brain of foetus) are wrong. But how could both parties be wrong? Isn‘t it the case, that either these foetus have a functioning brain, or not?
Btw really like your videos. I take a course at the university of bern about realism in science and moral and you completly covered the topics, NICE
How is subjectivism different from non cognitivism?
Thank you for these vids, when do you cover moral realism?
Lovely, thank you!
Hi, thank you for the very precise introduction. It is very useful. Which is the program do you use for creating this type of presentations? Thank you!
This is extremely late but he's using Screen-Cast O Matic which is a free software you can download.
Great video mate. Very informative
Thank you for making these videos! I'm using them as a broad study before making videos arguing for my own position, which I think falls squarely within projectivism.
very helpful, thankyou! :)
Welcome back!
hey Kane B, what videos do you discuss Blackburn's Quasi-Realm and Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism?
You are great man!
Thank you for the series
The is/ought gap seems a false problem insofar as it simply parallels the grue/bleen problem in science. "Observed crows are black, therefore all crows are (ought to be, or ought to be assumed) black. Obviously, a fact about observed X does not tell you a fact about unobserved X, but we take it as justification for assumptions about all X. This criticism of is/ought is more salient if you add more to the arguments about pain. "Suffering is evil. Evil is to be avoided. Therefore suffering is to be avoided." An argument that one ought not to cause suffering is not so difficult to see if we can identify or link evil with suffering. Just in case anyone doubts that this is reasonable, ask this: If you posit a universe in which suffering does not and cannot exist, just where or how do you find evil?
You find evil nowhere ... ?
@@enlightenedturtle9507 I guess I should have been more clear about the example. This would be a universe in which suffering is not only not actual, but not possible, i.e. not a potential state.
Notes:
Proposition = statement that is truth-apt (can be true/false)
Cognitivism = moral statements are truth apt
Noncognitivism = moral statements are not truth-apt and are instead expressing something else
Really cool. What's the program you use?
Can you do a video on relativism please?
+Oli Jones The video "Metaethics 4 - Subjectivism 1" covers relativist views.
+Kane B Excellent, thanks for the swift reply.
20:30
Yes they have. Hormones determines what makes me feel good, consequences of actions can be reasoned, probability of both of the former combined.
Reason:
I don't want the child.
Abortion is a posebility.
I do the abortion.
I want it to live
I can do abortion
I don't do the abortion.
What makes something true ? A logical conclusion or a measure. What makes you choose the one over the other in this moral dilemma? Emotions. Emotion determines the first premise and thus makes the conclusion. There are two conclusions possible, both are logical right. Thus ehtics can't be right or wrong morally. They can only be right or wrong for something - and that is the second premise - wrong or right for abortion. And what makes that right is logical or irrational. Coast/benefite calculated in $ (Testosteron/pure reason again that calculates gains and loss of money) or empathy and thus emotional coast (oxycotin). What are the longterm consequences ? Testosteron makes money of value and oxycotin makes human beings of value. Among other sideeffects of those testo or oxycotin.
Thats the truth.
Very helpfull
9:23 Moore
cemre
I was wondering if you could sent me the power point it would really help with studying.
+Starlena Harper I don't have it anymore I'm afraid - I delete both the power points and the scripts once the videos are finished.
Ah gee. Thank you for letting me know.
If you want you can try downloading the video from here using an onlione program that rips it from the website.
Thanks, however I'd have to ask my University on how to do so. Not very tech savvy.
A bit late, but why not full screen the video and screenshot each of the slides one by one and save the images?
Seems to me like individualist subjectivism is pretty much the same thing as noncognitivism.
Matthew Pritchard Yes, the distinction between them is purely technical in my view. However, they face quite different objections. For example, noncognitivists but not individualist subjectivists face the Frege-Geach problem, which I discuss in the video on emotivism.
The claim that arguments which derive moral statements from facts are invalid seems to be not always true. E.g.: The purpose of human life is to please God. God commanded human beings not to commit murder. God is displeased when human beings disobey his commands. Therefore murder is immoral.
A true argument? Maybe not. But surely it's valid. And if you replaced the simplistic religious fundamentalism implicit in this argument with terms more amenable to reason, could you not create a valid and true argument? Surely it's worth considering.
10:31
Error theory seems invalid. 1. Abortions is wrong (false) ..........................................2. Not aborting is wrong (false) ...............................................Law of non-contradiction? .............................1. p .............................2.~p .............................C. p & ~p ...........................Have I missed something?
For the second premise to contradict the first, the scope of the negation would need to be the entire proposition, i.e.: "Not: abortion is wrong" or "It is not the case that abortion is wrong".
You can see what's wrong with your argument by trying it with other properties. E.g. "Abortion is supernatural" and "Not aborting is supernatural". Since nothing is supernatural, both of these statements are false.
Sorry could you possibly elaborate on "the scope of the negation would need to be the entire proposition". I do think I somewhat understand what you are saying but I little more clarification would be wonderful :)
The scope of negation is what the negation ranges over. With "it is not the case that abortion is wrong", the negation ranges over the proposition "abortion is wrong"; i.e. we are negating "abortion is wrong".
On the other hand, with "not-aborting is wrong", the negation ranges over only the word "aborting". This doesn't negate a proposition.
A moral error theorist will claim that "not-aborting is wrong" is false, since error theorists hold that there are no moral properties. But he will claim that "it is not the case that abortion is wrong" is *true*. Since there are no moral properties, it is indeed not the case that abortion is wrong. Abortion can fail to be wrong either because it is permissible, or obligatory, etc - or because it simply has no moral properties whatsoever.
Similarly, the error theorist will hold that "it is not the case that not-aborting is wrong" is also true.
That was very clear, thank you for the response
+ Kane B
An important question about error theory. I understand that it rejects morality as being a property in and of itself as part of existence. Hence you can't make moral prescriptions such as 'you ought to give to charity' or something but does error theory allow for 'ought not' prescriptions under certain circumstances.
Say for example villagers are going to burn a women for witchcraft. Say that the villagers hold that magic is real and that the women is responsible for crop failure. Could an error theory be used to point out that magic is not real hence their prescription is in error? Hence they ought not burn the women due to their views being in error?
I understand you can't say murder in and of itself is wrong but could you at least say that murder associated with beliefs such as 'kill witches' to be in error... if that makes sense.
Basically can you use error theory to prescribe 'ought nots' when a belief in found to be in error - you ought not burn the women because your view are in error (i.e. wrong).
I Pm'd you
Cemre Demirel'den gelenler😅