-Expected -Hedonistic -Particular -Act (I've my own thoughts on the dynamics but act prevails) -Maximizing -Agent relative -Overall -if I understood correctly, evaluative (though i would need an example) -makes no difference whether it's egalitarian or hierarchical (this one ties a lot into universal/particular distinction) -makes no difference if it's additive or average, but let's say additive Signed, -Ethical egoist
I find it bothersome that it takes so much energy to classify philosophical stances. There should be some easier way to catalogue them. Could we not create standardized « philosophy trees » as hierarchies that detail stances by exactly which propositions are yes/no? Or something of that essence? Does this exist?
The problem I have with consequentialism is WHEN you aught to make a judgement. Which is also closely related with how you determine cause and effect to begin with, and how is one to know if something is the actual cause/effect of something else.
You might as well take that a step further back, and point out that not just cause/effect but _time itself_ is an imposed construct, rendering the whole WHEN question meaningless. It is a matter of fact that good and bad only refer to our momentary perception of reality, and that from something bad that happens to me now (for example, the loss of a leg), something good might come later (for example, my acquired disability prevents me from joining a fight in which I would have been killed, or it prevents me from doing great harm to someone else), and so on. We still recognize the good in one thing and the bad in another. We are _constantly_ making judgments; we never stop making judgments. I think the WHEN you should be looking for is not a single moment, but rather a continuum, which you experience moment by moment.
You can just look at the question of when as another choice, so you ought to make a judgement when it would maximize. Is normal epistemology not up to the task of determining when something is the cause/effect of something else? You said actual, so that leads me to believe you think that having certainty about the cause/effect is important. A consequentialist would argue that it's in the interest of maximization to be as certain about the cause and effect as reasonable.
Is there a type of consequentialism with a set of parameters? Kind of like how a republic is a democracy where the people vote on laws but with a constitution naming a bunch of things you cannot do under any circumstance, a type of veto. I think I would be closest to a system where you run off of a expected consequential system for most things but there are certain deontological rules that cannot be broken even if it leads to more happiness. I think this might be similar to a rule based moral system but let me know. Similar to the idea of a founding document, it seems like a good way to protect the individual from the "greater good".
I think actual consequentialism in general puts and unrealistically high epistemic burden on agents. He this is particularly true of actual, universal, maximizing consequentialism. For the costume example you would have to consider the people who produced and sold that costume, the people who produced and sold other costumes you could have worn, all the ways you could have used that money if you went without a costume or in a cheaper costume, and if there are pictures how those pictures will affect every person who sees them until the end of time. If an actual consequentialist is willing to bite the bullet and say that yes this is an epistemic burden no one could realistically meet, but that's just the way it is then they would be committed to taking on extreme epistemic burdens. In this context a desire consequentialist would not have good grounds for exempting the desires of those who are not present or who won't find out. Simplifying epistemic burdens just isn't much of an argument when you're already committed to an epistemic burden you can never actually meet.
From a scale 0-10 the amount of care I give to most people is like 0.001, because most people have a very insignificant impact on my life, but it's never completely 0. So by definition I agree with the Universal and not the Particular? I'm an egoist btw. Edit: I might have exaggerated a bit, it's probably not most people, but I think at least some people have next to no impact to my life, so it makes no difference to my question.
What would the type be of consequentialism that makes a distinction between maximizing utility and minimizing suffering? I can't accurately classify them, because I don't understand their distinction.
littlebigphil I think it would fall under the 'pluralistic' consequentialism - it would be a sub-variety/varieties that give each type of consequences (utility and suffering) different weight. Also, it would be a maximising consequentialism, because it deals with extremes (maximal and minimal). However, that might depend on specific definitions of maximal/minimal - if they are non-literal, then it might be improvement consequentialism.
I don't know shit about this topic, but if maximizing is the opposite of minimizing and utility is the opposite of suffering, then wouldn't it be as simple as drawing a number line and conclude that there's no distinction to be made between the two? When you say they have different weights, does that mean that losing $1 is worse than gaining $1 or vice versa? But to me it seems obvious that one would already take all those things into account when creating these "hyper" abstract concepts like utility and suffering.
there is negative consequentialism that cares only about minimizing suffering. from wiki: Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism requires that we avoid bad ones
What's the difference between Rule and Expected? What's the difference between Actual and Direct? It seems to me that one could not say they care about the Expected outcomes and the Direct results of the outcomes at the same time as well as one could not say that they care about the Rules that claim something is generally good and at the same time look only at what's Actually good.
The diff between rule and expected is that rule consequentialism says 1) an action is right iff it conforms to a moral rule, 2) A rule is a moral rule iff (actual/expected) good is maximised. So it might be right to follow a rule that we predict will maximise utility but actually won't, or it might only be right to follow a rule that actually maximises utility. Similarly act consequentialism is the view that 1) An action is right iff it maximises the (actual/ expected) good . So here there is no reference to rules, but we can either value expected or actual outcomes more. So it could either be that the act is right if it will have the best outcome in the agents calculation, or if it actually has the best outcome. There's also a distinction here which I think is useful between the guide to action and the source of value. For example 'sophisticated act utilitarianism' (Crisp), is the view that what is ultimately good is the actual consequences, but as many of these consequences are unforeseeable we can use rules nonetheless as a guide to action. These rules do not have moral worth, only social/emotional, they do not in themselves beget rightness/ wrongness they are just guides. I think this is where the confusion comes in, that valuing expected consequences sounds a lot like a rule based guide to action, and actual sounds a lot like having specific calculations- but actually really the distinction between act/rule is if moral worth is placed in the guide to action, and actual/expected is if the source of value is anticipated or actual consequences.
Also and perhaps more importantly, the original video misses that the distinction isn't just direct/rule but direct/indirect. Some views state that what matters is the motive of virtue, and wether that motive or virtue is right depends on wether it maximises the good
I think you should be more careful about saying a certain moral theory's verdict is either "good" or "bad". Good and bad are terms used to describe a value theory. But in normative ethics, especially consequentialism, the verdicts are classified as "right" or "wrong."
Very good video, but can you explain a little bit more how average would actually differ from total. If you are considering the same amount of affect and the same number of parties that the effect is distributed over, then they should come out to be the same. Is it median rather than mean or something like that?
eammonful it depends on the decision or action took that influences the party to create an effect. The mean result would include every member and the median would find the neutrality of the effect to make a judgement of consequence
You are correct that when concerning the same amount of parties the average and the total are just a ratio of each other. However, there are decisions where the number of parties affected are different. If the choices have to do with birth or death, then the two produce very different results. See abortion, natalism, population ethics, euthanasia, death sentence, and murder.
Why did you choose the moniker "Carneades"? 11:10 "Any of these criteria can be taken independently, you don't... that none of these particular criteria entail each other.'' ->>>>> SO, this is NOT a map, but a checklist of criteria. You're welcome.
You can also add minimising if thats better semantically to your mind- I agree with the above comment that minimising the bad and maximising the good are in many ways different sides of the same coin. But I do also think there's weight to the thought that if you are lowering the net or average utility your action has perhaps maximised the good given the circumstance but it seems odd to say you've maximised the good overall as you've brought it down overall.
Thank you for making this video. My personal idea of consequentialism would be a combination of Particular and privileged consequentialism. In particular consequentialism i would be concerned with my nation and folk and whats best for both however i add privileged consequentialism as a means of hierarchy based on intellect and contribution to said nation and folk.
Which kind of absolutism are you referring to? But under the idea that statements, particularly moral statements are all either objectively true or false, then yes, at least "agent neutral" or objective consequentialism seems to be consistent.
Carneades.org I'm referring to an absolutist position that states there are some things that are always wrong under any circumstances. For example, Kant would probably say killing babies is always wrong no matter what, but some virsions of utilitarianism might say that killing Hitler as a baby is morally permissible. Could a consequentialist say that killing babies, even a baby Hitler, is always wrong?
I love this channel, ever so dearly.
-Expected
-Hedonistic
-Particular
-Act (I've my own thoughts on the dynamics but act prevails)
-Maximizing
-Agent relative
-Overall
-if I understood correctly, evaluative (though i would need an example)
-makes no difference whether it's egalitarian or hierarchical (this one ties a lot into universal/particular distinction)
-makes no difference if it's additive or average, but let's say additive
Signed,
-Ethical egoist
I find it bothersome that it takes so much energy to classify philosophical stances. There should be some easier way to catalogue them. Could we not create standardized « philosophy trees » as hierarchies that detail stances by exactly which propositions are yes/no? Or something of that essence? Does this exist?
@@aidanmcclomy8024 And what do you think?
Yes! One universal issue and then explain how each moral theory would address it.
Thats a record number of likes in this channel in first day, LOL. Thanks for the video )
The problem I have with consequentialism is WHEN you aught to make a judgement. Which is also closely related with how you determine cause and effect to begin with, and how is one to know if something is the actual cause/effect of something else.
You might as well take that a step further back, and point out that not just cause/effect but _time itself_ is an imposed construct, rendering the whole WHEN question meaningless. It is a matter of fact that good and bad only refer to our momentary perception of reality, and that from something bad that happens to me now (for example, the loss of a leg), something good might come later (for example, my acquired disability prevents me from joining a fight in which I would have been killed, or it prevents me from doing great harm to someone else), and so on. We still recognize the good in one thing and the bad in another. We are _constantly_ making judgments; we never stop making judgments. I think the WHEN you should be looking for is not a single moment, but rather a continuum, which you experience moment by moment.
You can just look at the question of when as another choice, so you ought to make a judgement when it would maximize.
Is normal epistemology not up to the task of determining when something is the cause/effect of something else? You said actual, so that leads me to believe you think that having certainty about the cause/effect is important. A consequentialist would argue that it's in the interest of maximization to be as certain about the cause and effect as reasonable.
Is there a type of consequentialism with a set of parameters? Kind of like how a republic is a democracy where the people vote on laws but with a constitution naming a bunch of things you cannot do under any circumstance, a type of veto.
I think I would be closest to a system where you run off of a expected consequential system for most things but there are certain deontological rules that cannot be broken even if it leads to more happiness. I think this might be similar to a rule based moral system but let me know. Similar to the idea of a founding document, it seems like a good way to protect the individual from the "greater good".
I think actual consequentialism in general puts and unrealistically high epistemic burden on agents. He this is particularly true of actual, universal, maximizing consequentialism. For the costume example you would have to consider the people who produced and sold that costume, the people who produced and sold other costumes you could have worn, all the ways you could have used that money if you went without a costume or in a cheaper costume, and if there are pictures how those pictures will affect every person who sees them until the end of time. If an actual consequentialist is willing to bite the bullet and say that yes this is an epistemic burden no one could realistically meet, but that's just the way it is then they would be committed to taking on extreme epistemic burdens.
In this context a desire consequentialist would not have good grounds for exempting the desires of those who are not present or who won't find out. Simplifying epistemic burdens just isn't much of an argument when you're already committed to an epistemic burden you can never actually meet.
This was so useful.
From a scale 0-10 the amount of care I give to most people is like 0.001, because most people have a very insignificant impact on my life, but it's never completely 0. So by definition I agree with the Universal and not the Particular? I'm an egoist btw.
Edit: I might have exaggerated a bit, it's probably not most people, but I think at least some people have next to no impact to my life, so it makes no difference to my question.
What would the type be of consequentialism that makes a distinction between maximizing utility and minimizing suffering? I can't accurately classify them, because I don't understand their distinction.
littlebigphil I think it would fall under the 'pluralistic' consequentialism - it would be a sub-variety/varieties that give each type of consequences (utility and suffering) different weight.
Also, it would be a maximising consequentialism, because it deals with extremes (maximal and minimal). However, that might depend on specific definitions of maximal/minimal - if they are non-literal, then it might be improvement consequentialism.
I don't know shit about this topic, but if maximizing is the opposite of minimizing and utility is the opposite of suffering, then wouldn't it be as simple as drawing a number line and conclude that there's no distinction to be made between the two? When you say they have different weights, does that mean that losing $1 is worse than gaining $1 or vice versa? But to me it seems obvious that one would already take all those things into account when creating these "hyper" abstract concepts like utility and suffering.
there is negative consequentialism that cares only about minimizing suffering.
from wiki:
Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism requires that we avoid bad ones
What's the difference between Rule and Expected? What's the difference between Actual and Direct? It seems to me that one could not say they care about the Expected outcomes and the Direct results of the outcomes at the same time as well as one could not say that they care about the Rules that claim something is generally good and at the same time look only at what's Actually good.
The diff between rule and expected is that rule consequentialism says 1) an action is right iff it conforms to a moral rule, 2) A rule is a moral rule iff (actual/expected) good is maximised. So it might be right to follow a rule that we predict will maximise utility but actually won't, or it might only be right to follow a rule that actually maximises utility.
Similarly act consequentialism is the view that 1) An action is right iff it maximises the (actual/ expected) good . So here there is no reference to rules, but we can either value expected or actual outcomes more. So it could either be that the act is right if it will have the best outcome in the agents calculation, or if it actually has the best outcome.
There's also a distinction here which I think is useful between the guide to action and the source of value. For example 'sophisticated act utilitarianism' (Crisp), is the view that what is ultimately good is the actual consequences, but as many of these consequences are unforeseeable we can use rules nonetheless as a guide to action. These rules do not have moral worth, only social/emotional, they do not in themselves beget rightness/ wrongness they are just guides. I think this is where the confusion comes in, that valuing expected consequences sounds a lot like a rule based guide to action, and actual sounds a lot like having specific calculations- but actually really the distinction between act/rule is if moral worth is placed in the guide to action, and actual/expected is if the source of value is anticipated or actual consequences.
Also and perhaps more importantly, the original video misses that the distinction isn't just direct/rule but direct/indirect. Some views state that what matters is the motive of virtue, and wether that motive or virtue is right depends on wether it maximises the good
I think you should be more careful about saying a certain moral theory's verdict is either "good" or "bad". Good and bad are terms used to describe a value theory. But in normative ethics, especially consequentialism, the verdicts are classified as "right" or "wrong."
Bureaucrat here, great stuff!
Very good video, but can you explain a little bit more how average would actually differ from total. If you are considering the same amount of affect and the same number of parties that the effect is distributed over, then they should come out to be the same. Is it median rather than mean or something like that?
eammonful it depends on the decision or action took that influences the party to create an effect. The mean result would include every member and the median would find the neutrality of the effect to make a judgement of consequence
You are correct that when concerning the same amount of parties the average and the total are just a ratio of each other. However, there are decisions where the number of parties affected are different. If the choices have to do with birth or death, then the two produce very different results. See abortion, natalism, population ethics, euthanasia, death sentence, and murder.
Why did you choose the moniker "Carneades"? 11:10 "Any of these criteria can be taken independently, you don't... that none of these particular criteria entail each other.'' ->>>>> SO, this is NOT a map, but a checklist of criteria. You're welcome.
Is there a transcript of this video ?
+Christian Quinones You might check out the closed captions. But no, I don't have a transcript. Feel free to make one. :)
I think I disagree with both improvement and maximizing. Sometimes both options are bad and one has to pick one's poison.
Wouldn't "picking one's poison" be maximizing the consequences?
You can also add minimising if thats better semantically to your mind- I agree with the above comment that minimising the bad and maximising the good are in many ways different sides of the same coin. But I do also think there's weight to the thought that if you are lowering the net or average utility your action has perhaps maximised the good given the circumstance but it seems odd to say you've maximised the good overall as you've brought it down overall.
Thank you for making this video. My personal idea of consequentialism would be a combination of Particular and privileged consequentialism. In particular consequentialism i would be concerned with my nation and folk and whats best for both however i add privileged consequentialism as a means of hierarchy based on intellect and contribution to said nation and folk.
Yikes !
Could a consequentialist philosophy also be absolutist?
Which kind of absolutism are you referring to? But under the idea that statements, particularly moral statements are all either objectively true or false, then yes, at least "agent neutral" or objective consequentialism seems to be consistent.
Carneades.org I'm referring to an absolutist position that states there are some things that are always wrong under any circumstances. For example, Kant would probably say killing babies is always wrong no matter what, but some virsions of utilitarianism might say that killing Hitler as a baby is morally permissible. Could a consequentialist say that killing babies, even a baby Hitler, is always wrong?
That would be rule consequentialism with a clarifier added: strong rule consequentialism.