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Hi mate, can you do the battles of Changsha. The ones in charge in China now completely obliterate from history, but massive in WW2. The Taliban obliterated their history too. Changsha was one of their biggest triumphs in WW2 at and exceptional sacrifice like the Russians at Stalingrad. Maybe Chinese people should do it.
If I'm mistaken so be it but I think what you spoke about in this video is really never discussed. I have always been under the impression that the Northern Force had escaped and that the Japanese carriers were sunk at later dates. Thank you for educating me today but then, that's what I get for not diving deeper into the subject matter.
To be fair, Halsey was _really_ lucky that Taffy 3 fought a _spectecular_ action against the main force and managed to score an improbable strategic win. Because if center force would've been successfull in rolling up the rear of the landing operations as planned, his departure to the north (against orders, it has to be said!) would not have gone over as smoothly as they did. The navy was ready to overlook the problem because on balance the IJN lost big time - but let's face the post facto truth of this: it was Taffy 3's exceptional performance who earned this victory, not anything Halsey did or didn't do. And I think he himself knew this best as indicated by his breakdown when faced with what was happening to Taffy 3 and his inability to take back his mistake.
That sounds about right. I think the messages from Taffy 3 had already made his mistake clear to him and he was probably already holding in absolute horror at his own mistake, then he gets a message from Nimitz that reads basically like "what the *&^% are you doing?" and it finally breaks his composure altogether.
Fabulous Monday morning quarterbacking. A more reasonable way of looking at it is that Halsey did exactly what he was mandated and ordered to do, in light of the information he had available to him at the time. Halsey was informed that the Japanese center force was retreating after they had been mauled the day before. So there was no reason to leave Task Force 34 behind, as far as any American officer knew at the time. The US Navy was laser focused on destroying the Japanese fleet carriers, and that was Halsey's priority mission. No one in the Navy, not Halsey, not Nimitz, nor anyone else knew that the Japanese Norther force was a toothless decoy. None of then knew Center Force had turned around and would attack Taffy 3. Not until it was too late.
Mitscher relied on carrier air power to destroy the Japanese carriers at the Phillipines Sea, holding back Lee and his fast battleships. It's likely that Halsey was taking no such chances at Leyte Gulf.
While we can criticise him for leaving the San Bernardino straight unguarded, I think he should be criticised for not leaving even a picket ships. 2 destroyers patrolling the area will be enough to spot all the BB fleet coming.
Honestly what baffles me the most are the Halsey after battle “excuses” for not leaving ships behind patrolling the strait: 1.That he feared that the Japanese could rearm their carriers with land base aircrafts making them worth all their ships attention🤦🏻♂️, yeah just like how the Americans could slap mustangs and thunderbolts in their carriers duh. 2. That he not deployed task force 34 alone because the lack of air support since he was gathering all the planes, low key saying that he didn’t believe Iowa and co could defeat yamato and friends without air support🙄, fact that obviously gained the angry stare of some of the battleships admirals.
@@d.olivergutierrez8690 on no. 2 I think it was referred to as "lacking air cover" of having those capital ships out there without fighter support. But for that there's a certain 3 fleets of Taffy who I'm sure could spare a wild cat or two to avoid having to fight the IJN capital units if it only required them to protect the bigger ships from enemy aircraft.
@@legoeasycompanyNot just Wildcats, the Taffys had Avengers to throw at Center Force! It's this action and the two (TWO!) typhoons he took 3rd Fleet through that make me question his ability as a fleet admiral.
Funny how both the Americans and Japanese got a chance to have at least one very stubborn destroyer facing off against a vastly superior enemy force and sacrificing itself to save the rest of the fleet, and on the same day at that.
@@RCAvhstape The US cruiser commander was a veteran of the night fighting in the Solomons (he was in command of USS Portland during the Naval Battle of Guadacanal) so had first hand knowledge of how lethal Japanese torpedoes were.
Interesting thing about Zuikaku, in nearly every battle she participated in, the outcome was the same: Her sister Shōkaku was damaged, Zuikaku escapes without so much as a scratch on her. It happened at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz Islands. Zuikaku only took battle damage for the first time in her career after Shōkaku was sunk at Philippine Sea, and was sunk the first time she went into a battle without Shōkaku here at Cape Engaño. Her name, meaning Auspicious Crane, ended up being rather fitting. Also thanks for mentioning Hatsuzuki, she's long been one of my favorite Japanese destroyers for her actions during this battle. Almost like Japan's USS Johnston in a way, and on the same day as well.
Yes, the Hatsuzuki deserves a spot at the table of WW2’s madlad destroyers alongside Gloworm, Ardent, Acasta, Edsall, Laffey, Johnston, Hoel, Heerman, and Laffey reincarnated.
Phenomenal insights. Being a linguist, I especially like that knowledge. The Japanese were fighting for evil ends, and often hobbled themselves with limited thinking and internecine warfare (a virtual civil war between IJA and IJN, ffs (which FAR predated WWII, and extended to the assassination of cabinet members and candidates for PM)), but there was still a twisted sense of honor there. So very, very sad. Nor am I certain that their peculiar cruelty, manifested throughout their entire history, is gone. How could it be? It had to go SOMEwhere…
Imagine being Admiral Ozawa; being the decoy force to find out you're the only one to have successfully pulled off your mission, everyone else being wiped out (Nishimura) or quitting at one point or another (Shima and Kurita). It had to have been frustrating to have found that out, whether in the days/weeks/months after the battle or in the years following the war.
How about all the dead sailors? All for nothing. It was a plan that shouldn't have worked, but it did and the opportunity was refused. A quick look at the map shows that there wouldn't be another opportunity.
The things that must suck the most was that we was basically the decoy. And whilst his mission worked he did no damage whatsoever. Because all the other failed he had nothing to show for this vain-less sacrifice.
As I recall, not only is "The World Wonders" a seeming reprimand by itself, but I think as a phrase it's part of a few lines from "The Charge of the Light Brigade," wherein it's in tandem with another phrase: "Someone had blundered." So assuming Halsey knew his Tennyson (he probably did), one phrase would also have recalled the other, and would have thus seemed even more damning. He would have interpreted it as a message from Nimitz saying, in metaphor, "you have made a terrible and costly mistake."
Which isn't wrong. You do have to wonder if the radio man purposely left it in. Halsey had been getting increasingly dire and desperate situation reports and pleas for help, which he kept ignoring. The radio room had to have known this.
After this series of battles, Halsey got mocked by various journalists for taking Ozawa’s bait and neglecting Samar, calling the battle series ‘Bull’s Run’, in comparison with American Civil War’s major Union defeat at Battle of Bull Run. ‘Bull’ of course was Halsey himself.
If you've watched the video on the 2nd Pacific Squadron, that was just another Tuesday for Admiral Rozhestvensky. (yes, I googled his name. No way I was trying to spell that without help.)
If you visit USS New Jersey in Camden, NJ. The tour guide would tell you exactly where Halsey threw temper tantrum, also his navy cap to the floor, plus when one of his staff tried to calm him down.
My only consolation about this mess is the fact that at least for a brief moment the guy realized the absolute bs that he just orchestrated, and not other than Nimitz to scold him, one of the only people that could make him cry from his own cringe.
US admirals throughout the entire war caused the deaths of thousands of sailors due to their own egos. Admiral King in the Atlantic with his refusal to listen to the British about how to counter submarines is an excellent example. The Kriegsmarine's most successful 6 months are entirely because King was a stuck up cunt.
@@Mrhalligan39oh I always thought it literally meant going down with the ship and not all lost sailors after the sinking to. That makes a lot more sense now
@@Mrhalligan39 I'm pretty sure the number lost also includes all of those killed by the actual impacts of bombs, shells and torpedoes, etc. Many (in some cases most) of those lost were already dead before the order was given.
@@McCracken216 The number of crew lost in a sinking is basically the mustered crew at the time of the battle minus the number of survivors recovered. Whether they were killed during the battle, were trapped inside the vessel as it sank, or died of exposure or wounds before being rescued is not usually captured by that information. Unless a vessel undergoes a catastrophic explosion like HMS Hood, it can usually be assumed that at least some crew members will survive to make it into the water. Japanese sailors frequently refused rescue by American ships, and even American sailors were often abandoned by badly damaged task forces or in fear of submarine attack. Look up the survivors of USS Juneau, USS Indianapolis, or of Taffy 3 at Samar. Many ships were “lost with all hands” because literally nobody was sent to rescue survivors.
You do realize the Americans rescued not one of the Japanese Sailors at Engano and the Japanese fleet was already in full retreat. Those Japanese ships that did return to help rescue their survivors were mostly prevented from doing so by American forces. Also, they are in the middle of the ocean, with no land in sight for hundreds and hundreds of miles away. When they say ''there were no Japanese survivors'', etc. they mean they died days and weeks later at sea because they were never rescued. Think, why did 600 Americans die in a period of 3 days after Indianapolis sank?
It's incredible that essentially every ship in task force 38 had been built in the past 2 and a half years. The manufacturing capacity of the US back then was truly on another level
Except you’re wrong because this was a semi-temporary state since this was during a war time economy that had been in place for 3 years. Should a war time economy again be started up the U.S. will still reach a level of manufacturing equal to or greater than the levels achieved in WWII due to greater levels of automation and technological advancement. Remember that during this time the public greatly supported and backed the war effort. People bought bonds when they could, they recycled and donated anything they didn’t need, and rations were put in place. It’s still an amazing level of manufacturing capacity but not one that’s no longer unachievable. Especially since this increase in production was only possible due to more naval ports, shipyards, military bases, factories, and production facilities were all being built from the ground up. Hence why said manufacturing capacity was so large as well.
@@Mgl1206 I don't see how I'm 'wrong' by stating US military manufacturing in WW2 was on other level which was objectively true. Sure if we were in another total war scenario today we could expand manufacturing again but that doesn't have anything to do with my statement. But I frankly find your analysis of our potential to reach these lofty manufacturing heights again pretty naive. Sure automation can help but we are in much much worse position today than we were in 1940. We are now a service economy with most manufacturing limited to high end systems. We live in a globalized time with incredibly complicated military systems that require very difficult construction at specially built factories/shipyards. The US is no longer a major steel producer, we have almost no rare earth production needed for missiles, planes, tanks, ships, etc. We can barely staff our existing shipyards with enough tradeworkers like welders. Our non military shipyards at this point are functionally non existent. In WW2 we had a huge pool of manufacturing, labor, and raw inputs that made the expansion into a wartime economy a fast proposition. Today, we would struggle to ramp up because we don't have the inputs, the labor, or the factories at the start. And production lines for military equipment today are so much harder to build with tons of specialized machinery needed. In a present day pacific war scenario with china, they are much more similar to how we were in WW2. They have the huge trained labor pool, the massive number of factories, and exponentially more commercial shipyards that can be converted to military use if need be, plus a vice grip on rare earth refinement and steel production. Experts both outside and within the US military have acknowledged as much. There are concerted efforts to onshore more of our supply chains, expand shipyards, increase stockpiles of critical inputs, etc. But the fact remains it will be china majorly outproducing us not the other way around if a total war scenario happened today.
@@Mgl1206well you are right in the sense that the U.S. still maintains a big industrial base, a modern conflict with other big nations can easily escalate to a global nuclear war in which military production plays no role for obvious reasons
No matter the side, when someone storms head on into their fate to buy time for their survivors to escape is an admirable thing. The few times that human decency can still shine through in the horrors of war.
She still has a seat at Valhalla. No different from destroyers like Ardent and Acasta which charged the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They could not save the Glorius, and most of the survivors died, but their bravery will not be forgotten.
It's really nothing short of a miracle that Ise and Hyuga got through Leyte without being destroyed as they were already obsolete and their conversion to partial carriers effectively just made them less capable in both categories.
What's weird is that although everybody knew conversions were half-assed and useless, there were plans floated around to do the same to the Montana hulls.
As part of that conversion a significant number of AA guns were put on the two ships while eliminating two of the main battery turrets. As the war had taught, air power was more potent than surface power, so the new armament of the two battleships gave it an advantage over its old configuration, though not a significant one. It was because the Americans where hyper concerned with the threats the Aircraft Carriers posed that saved the Battleships survived, due to the fact that the Americans concentrated overwhelming force on destroying those carriers in lieu of attacking a other vessels equally. If the attacks by American aircraft had more equally divided between the ships of the Japanese fleet it is more likely that a number of other vessels of that fleet would have been sunk, or so seriously damaged as to be unable to retreat from the battle zone before additional attacks arrived to finish them off. It was the Americans navy inability to understand how utterly devastated the Japanese carrier fleet had become and its inability to pose a real threat, that allowed the rest of the Japanese navy to escape. This allowed the survival of not just the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of the Japanese carrier force, but also those ships that survived the battle with Taffy 3.
Notice that throughout the Pacific War, most Battleships took considerable amounts of punishment by aircraft before being sunk or not, as well as having large amounts of AA and artillery firepower. Fleet carriers never had these aspects, which is why the hybrid battleship with aircraft was an ingenious invention by the Japanese. Not only being massive armored tanks they could assist in CAP around the battleships and provide the ASW role that the Japanese so desperately needed in the Pacific war. Sadly this never turned into reality, as they embarked on no aircraft.
At this point of the war, Halsey was out of his element and no longer needed. The war had passed him by. The fact that he took Admiral Lee from a final battleship battle is a historical war crime.
TWICE, too-had Halsey not broke his nerve after "the world wonders" Lee would've run up against the Japanese carrier-battleships and sunk them. Halsey's two critical decisions at Leyte, not just the first to commit the "bull run", robbed Lee.
Halsey, like so many commanders and admirals before him, was chasing glory. He wanted his glorious, decisive victory and it left him blind to the real objectives. The Japanese were always going to target the landings at Leyte because the goal was to prevent the US from retaking the Philippines. Halsey fell for the Japanese ruse because he lost sight of what their true target really was.
At this point in the war, American material superiority was such that they needed a game manager and not somebody who would bet it all on nothing. Just take the islands, hold off any naval help, go on to the next target. But King wanted an aggressive admiral. I feel like Fletcher would have been good here if King wasn't so dead set on getting rid of him.
@@recoil53Agreed, Fletcher seemed to have this pragmatic 'resist the urge to go for glory, lest it bite you in the face' attitude that most admirals/commanders don't have. Indeed, they're often discredited for having restraint, as he was, most unfortunately if you ask me.
History treats Halsey far better than he deserves. His blunders are monumental, From Taffey 3 to Typhoon Cobra. If there was a blunder to be made Halsey was there to make it.
I can even accept falling for a trap in the heat of the moment. But leaving nobody behind to just keep an eye on the strait boggles the mind. A single ship or even PT boat could have made the difference by just giving additional heads up.
@@NotTheCIA1961imo even worse he didn’t inform the other commanders of what he was doing. He should have know his move would have resulted in leaving the northern flank completely fucking open. An opening that leads straight into their supply lines. If he had at the very least informed the other they themselves could have placed a destroyer to watch and inform the fleet of incoming enemy fleet.
He was the right man for the job when he oversaw the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942-1943. It's just that by the time October of 1944 rolled around, the war had changed. That he was a glory hound didn't help matters, so the glory went to Evans rather than Halsey.
this channel has created a great blend of describing strategic concerns, applications of tactics, and narrative engagement with descriptions of actions on the human scale. fantastic work as always
“Japan ceases to be a naval power, that dream is over. The once magnificent imperial fleet is no more, it dies in the battle of Leyte Gulf and it dies in vain” - victory at sea
While is true that neither Nimitz, his staff, Halsey himself or US Naval Intelligence in the Pacific knew about the state of the IJN carrier aviation at that point of the war, and the fact that the Japanese plan was succesful in using its remaining carriers as bait. The failure of Admiral Halsey will be always his lack of precaution in not leave a squadron/picket force to protect San Bernardino and his subsequent lack of clear communication towards 7th Fleet and Honolulu.
If he had clearly communicated his intention to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded, his orders would have been countermanded. Halsey’s problem was that he was a carrier admiral flying his flag on a battleship for comfort’s sake. Moving his staff at sea was impossible, detaching New Jersey would take him away from the battle he wanted to fight, and not detaching New Jersey would leave his picket force at a disadvantage. Halsey knew exactly what he was doing. He convinced himself Kurita was in retreat and thought no more of it.
As mentioned in a previous video, The split command of the battle of Leyte Gulf was a major flaw all around and could be partially to blame. Halsey was definitely to blame as he wanted to complete his personal goal of destroying the japanese fleet instead of defending Leyte. I think him missing he Battle of Midway(he was ill) plays a strong part in this since he did not get his massive victory he was hunting for
Japan's plan to get its last carriers sunk was a brilliant success. Good for them. One can argue with perfect hindsight that the Japanese carriers were useless at that point, and strategically there was no reason to destroy them, but destroying the Yamato at San Bernardino would not have mattered to the outcome of the war either. Would not have changed the timeline for the Philippines, or any other future battle. It might have resulted in a few less American deaths off Samar, maybe saved a couple destroyers and an escort carrier, but the US at that point had so much of everything. It was naval pilots that mattered most, and naval pilots were almost completely unaffected by Leyte Gulf, except gaining a bit more experience. It's easy to say that Halsey should've left some ships at San Bernardino, and that Kurita would turn around, but there was really no reason to think he would, and ships cannot be everywhere. If naval commanders guard every strait all the time, there won't be enough forces to win decisive battles when it matters. Everything Halsey knew, everything the US Navy knew, said that the Japanese were extremely cautious about committing their biggest battleships and that carriers would win the war. After we sank one big battleship, and the other retreated, that should have been it. At any other time, it would have been it, and the biggest threat in the Pacific at that point should have been the Zuikaku. If Japan had been a lot smarter about rotating experienced aircrews to train new ones the way Americans did, the Zuikaku would have been the biggest threat in the Pacific. But the fog of war is a very real thing, war is not a complete information game. With the limited information Halsey had, and with the directives he had been given by his superiors as a matter of theater strategy, his choice was correct. Failing to leave even just one guy behind with a rowboat and a radio might have been a tactical mistake, and it certainly got men killed, but even if he made the perfect hindsight decision it would have probably gotten other men killed. Maybe not as many. Maybe more. Unexpected things happen in war. It isn't reasonable to expect commanders to make perfect hindsight decisions in every situation.
@@fakecubed “Hindsight is 20/20” is no defense of a military commander. It is literally their job to see more clearly, to understand more clearly, to plan more carefully than the enemy. The Navy’s primary job at Leyte was to protect the landing fleet. Halsey failed to do so. If not for Ernest Evans’ bravery and Kurita’s failure of nerve, the Center Force’s attack would have gone through and at the very least disrupted the landings if not causing a complete catastrophe. It is important to note that all these questions and criticisms were well known at the time, and that is those who make excuses for Halsey who are the revisionists in this case.
@@Mrhalligan39 Hypothetical losses are not an indictment of a military commander. The landings were already completed and Japan's ships never got in sight of the shore where they happened. The Americans won at Leyte Gulf. Could it have been an even bigger victory? Perhaps, but Japan was already beat. The additional surface combatants the Americans might have hypothetically sunk were irrelevant to the outcome of the war, as were the small number of escort ships that the Japanese did sink. Halsey's primary mission in the Pacific was to sink Japanese carriers, which he did, and the land war in the Philippines was not in any way affected by anything the Japanese accomplished that day. Ultimately, Sprague had the forces he needed to turn back the Center Force. After any battle there is always lessons learned and room for improvement. Always. But military commanders are not gods, they are not omniscient or omnipotent, and anyone expecting them to be is as crazy as the Japanese when they thought there was ever any possibility of victory at Leyte Gulf.
This battle doesn't get enough recognition. It's honestly so poetic how Lexington gets her revenge and finishes off the last of the original 6. Edit: Even further into the art of revenge, the sinking of the Tama is exactly what happened to Juneau all the way back in '42.
I understand the sentiment. The original USS Lexington, CV2, was lost during the Battle of Coral Sea. The USS Lexington, CV16, the museum ship in Corpus Christie, is an Essex class carrier. Are you saying revenge for the ship she named after or Pearl Harbor? Just curious.
IJN Hatsuzuki. A single Akikuzi class destroyer going up against an entire fleet with just 5 torpedoes and a whole load of 100mm high explosive shells meant for air defense. Though I have few good words for the Japanese Empire of her time. Credit must be given to the bravery of her last stand, doubtlessly saving many lives
@@LauPaSat-plThe Navy still committed war crimes too. Besides killing plenty of Allied prisoners of war, the Special Naval Landing forces also took part in killings such as the Manila Massacre in 1944-45. Doesn’t necessarily change the fact that we can appreciate the bravery of this crew in taking on such high odds to save their comrades though.
One minor thing that doesn't get mentioned a lot is that Adm. Ozawa also detached and sent Ise and Hyuga, his two BB-Vs, south another 50 miles further the day before (Oct. 24th), ostensibly to act as a vanguard for his main force, but it could also be interpreted as Ozawa wanting to make doubly-sure that 3rd Fleet noticed him. Both the detachment and the main force were spotted by American scout planes, and the BB-Vs returned overnight to rejoin the main force before the main battle on the 25th. It's mainly a commentary on how both Ise and Hyuga were regarded as extra-expendable assets among a bait force in the IJN battle plan...which makes it kind of ironic that they both survived the battle, while the four Japanese carriers were all sunk.
Halsey, like so many commanders and admirals before him, was chasing glory. He wanted his glorious, decisive victory and it left him blind to the real objectives. The Japanese were always going to target the landings at Leyte because the goal was to prevent the US from retaking the Philippines. Halsey fell for the Japanese ruse because he lost sight of what their true target really was.
@19:35 ..."but the battle is still not over:...i half expected to hear "AND HERE COMES THE U.S.S. JOHNSTON WITH A STEEL CHAIR!!" and i wouldn't have doubted it lol
Hats off to the brave men of IJN Hatsuzuki. It’s too bad her men couldn’t have had a post war beer with men of USS Johnston, USS Hoel, and USS Samuel B Roberts. No shortage of courage aboard these tin can destroyers on both sides.
Kind of wish that Halsey had left some of the fast battleship in the strait. Would have been interesting to see which faired better in a battleship to battleship engagement. But it's all history now.
Honestly, leaving NOTHING there at all is a very major blunder. He had something like 60 destroyers, and the San Bernardino Strait is very narrow. 5 DDs would have guaranteed that 7th Fleet would have had hours of warning when Center Force navigated the Strait. It is one thing to not cover it with heavy units, but quite another to leave it completely unmonitored.
Whoah, the production value of this video feels like a huge step up, I love the different layers of airplanes and the tilts and pans add a lot, too. And just in general, the animations have gotten so detailed, you're videos have become such a pleasure to look at! Keep up the good work!
Drachinifel has an interesting war game video about that what if battle, although he actually buff kurita in that video so he actually fights to the end instead of pulling an 180 like in samar.
Cmdr. Winters is example of great leader, he stayed behind alone above IJN fleet to document the enemy formation also at the beginning directing his planes to focus on Zuikaku instead of crippled and easy target Chiyoda. Imo targeting the larger and still functional carrier is more of a priority than the easier and crippled one.
Fun fact: Many of the names in the Philippines are from spanish origin. "Engaño" means "deceit", so cabo engaño can be translated as cape deceit. A foreshadowing name for things to come! [btw: Ñ is pronounced GN as in "lasaGNa"]
As an amateur WW2 naval historian for decades, to this day I still don't understand why Halsey sent his most powerful unit, TF 38.1, to Ulithi for rest and replenishment. Under McCain there were 2 CV and 2 CVL. There was a significant amount of firepower in TF 38.1 but Halsey just sent them away from the battle. Would you for a second believe Spruance would send Jockco Clark away from Saipan when the marines were still landing on Saipan and fighting for their lives? Halsey probably did not regain the full firepower of TF 38 until the last day of the battle. Curiously, no historian ever talked about the negative effect of TF 38.1 not with Halsey during the Battle of Cape Engano.
At the time, Halsey was convinced the Japanese navy would not sortie to contest Leyte, so after McCain had pounded the land defenses Halsey sent them off. This is also why he was so out of positon when USS Darter and Dace radioed in their report of the Center force.
Wikipedia on Halsey says that what made Halsey good at the beginning of the war was his ability to take calculated risks, but that this worked against him later. He was on the cover of Look magazine in February 1943. Once they do that to you, you have some plot armor.
11:37 Did you guy's know The Battleship New Jersey receives operating support from the New Jersey Department of State also from a number of business's and private individuals like yourselves. They really appreciate your support 😎 (That's our boy, he is right there.)
On Dec. 2, 1941 when the words were sent to Adm. Nagumo, "Climb Mount Niitaka" (Jade mountain, in what was then Formosa), the call to start the Kido Butai towards Pearl Harbor, I doubt that no-one guessed that in 2 years, 10 months and 25 days the IJN would be a completely spent force
Tiny clarification: he remained in command of the third fleet, which was the designation of that fleet when commanded by Halsey. When commanded by Spruance it was 5th fleet. So Spruance was in command of that same fleet for parts of the war after
I think the people who can repair ships in the middle of the ocean after being hit by bombs and torpedos are the craziest magicians this world has ever seen.
To be fair, Montemayor covers the same Pacific War material, though going much more in depth (and hence the videos take much longer). Regardless, I do like that TOR covered Leyte Gulf; not a bad depiction by any means.
Glad that you included Hatsuzuki's final battle, that's so often missed, which was every bit as heroic as the tin cans at Samar. Also, minor nitpick, but there were 3 destroyers and 1 light cruiser in addition to Hatsuzuki.
After finishing this series, I’m convinced the US Navy required a clinical insanity diagnosis for officer promotions. The things they managed to pull off successfully are just wild.
I’d say Halsey’s greatest blunder was not necessarily not leaving ships behind (it can be forgiven for falling for an enemy trap). But that when he took every single ship, He didn’t inform the other fleet WHEN HE TOOK THEM because he should have fucking known that he was purposefully leaving the northern flank open. Even if he believed it was safe. You don’t just leave a flank completely exposed. If he had at the very least informed the other fleets they could have been made aware of their undefended flank and place someone to keep an eye out for possible enemy fleet. While it still wouldn’t fully excuse Halsey, it would have greatly mitigated the disaster of Taffy 3.
You forgot a important detail. The battleships of TF 34 were almost within gun range of the decoy force. It is then he ordered them to turn around and head back south. Two hours were spent refueling the destroyers.
I think you will find that Lee’s force was about 4 hours away from the Surago Strait and Kurita still had over 2 hours steaming to get to the landing beaches. It is a very interesting war game to keep Kurita going after the Taffy 3 fight. The aircraft from other Taffy groups, Oldendorff’s old battle line and possibly aircraft from the fast carriers are fun counters.
@@davidhimmelsbach557I forget how long Drach was allowing for Lee to return to the strait and then continue onto gun range of Kurita. I do not recall him mentioning the need to refuel the destroyers for 2 hours. That delay would definitely give Kurita a good time to attack the landing beaches and ships there before Lee would arrive. Then there is the question of when Kinkade would tell the support vessels to move away from Leyte gulf (south or scatter?) and how long it would take Oldendorff to move his battle line with its depleted ammunition stocks to the northern entrance to the Gulf. 125 klms from the head of Surago Strait to Candulo Island at the northern end of the Gulf. 40 klms from Candulo to the position of Kurita at 09:20 (according to wiki so caution) so he would be in gun range within an hour or two if the support vessels stay where they are in the gulf. However if they retreat towards Oldendorff that might add some minutes to Kurita’s time to get to gun range. Oldendorf needs only to get to gun range of Kurita and has radar. In addition Taffys 1 and 2 could be armed properly for attacking Kurita as he closes in. Entering the gulf he has limited room to manoeuvre and a couple of hours of aerial attack on him would do some damage one would think. Seth said the total available aircraft was akin to a few Essexes, and Kurita had lost a few cruisers already to the Taffy 3 escorts and aircraft. One would imagine that in the hour or so to get to gun range the damage might look like Sibuyan Sea with significant damage to the battleships, if not one sunk. As for the fast carriers, they could well be out of range at the start of the Taffy 3 battle, but how by long it would take to get their aircraft to Philippines Sea distance is a question. But could they shuttle to a Taffy flight deck to refuel for their return to home carrier? If so, they would be in range almost wherever they were. So many what ifs in the counterfactual! That’s what makes it fascinating.
Looks like Captain Amano of the Hatsuzuki felt that he could do one better than captain Ernest Evans and that Samuel B. Roberts. A commendable effort. And one that did have it's intended purpose. Nicely done Captain Amano.
i am so happy i found this channel several years back! You bring a whole new dimension to my 50+ years studying WWII. Thank You for proving there is always more to be learned !:-)
We’re getting all these fantastic episodes on the Pacific War, I hope we get Santa Cruz islands. Out of the six aircraft carrier battles it and Coral Sea are the only tactical Japanese victories, but like at Coral Sea they fail to gain any kind of strategic advantage. It was also where Enterprise lost her last sister, Hornet.
I'd love to see a replay of Murata and his experienced flyers as they execute what was probably the finest carrier attack of WW2 off Santa Cruz. Some of the books describing he and his dedicated airgroup are sad but wonderful to read. Pure luck saved a badly damaged Enterprise when Takahashi's airgroup missed the formation by 50 miles. Still, the Japanese should have done better...the sudden shock of flying into pulverising levels of AA fire from the carriers and escorts must have been dreadful.
The people here trying to excuse Halsey's moves...Yamamoto was expecting Halsey to be in charge of the US aircraft carriers at Midway and would use his impetuousness and recklessness to lure him into the ambush. Instead they got the cool-thinking Spruance.
Imagine you're the commander of the battleship division Task Force 34 (Lee) and received an order to run towards the enemy carriers for a surface action, then later, you are told 'Where is Lee!? Send Lee!' (Back, Back 500 miles south). LMAO 🤧😆🤣
Some of USS Washington's crew expressed their dissapointment with this turn of event. From the book "Battleship At War", the story of the USS Washington.
The chance for every type of warship in the us fleet to shine in battle, just for the most overrated admiral on us history to be there and handle the whole task force like a kid that didn’t want to share his toys.
It's hard to imagine the amount of grief Halsey was dealing with, knowing that he was the reason so many lives in Taffy 3 were sacrificed to achieve victory.
This is what I find more than a bit baffling. Didn't the USN have some idea of the size of the remaining IJN order of battle in October 1944? Why did Halsey think he needed all six BBs, 6 CAs, 9 CLs and 58 DDs in addition to 16 CV/CVLs? Surely, some of these assets could have been left behind. Yes, BB-62 would have to stay with TF 38 as she carried the Admiral himself. Just one third of Halsey's surface force in San Bernardino Strait would have been overkill. Not questioning the pursuit of Ozawa, just the failure to reasonably assess enemy strength. Maybe Willis realized this when he wanted to stay behind to protect Kincaid.
Halsey could've also just transferred his flag, or modified TF34 so that Iowa and NJ are along for the ride with Mitscher (and given they are 5 knots faster than every other TF34 capital vessel it would make sense). The excuses brought up to try and absolve halsey of his first blunder are incredible, especially when one considers that officers in 3rd fleet had Intel that Kurita was heading east. It probably stems from Halsey's idea of not splitting forces to avoid defeat in detail-but as you said the previous battles (Solomons, Philippine sea and Formosa) should've brokered some indication of the IJN's diminished air and sea power, and magically Halsey's compunction against splitting force disappears as soon as he makes his second blunder and turns lee back just 40 miles from Ozawa. Truly baffling.
Operations room kind of made a error here. Halsey was missing one of his task groups, 38.1 under VADM McCain. It had Hornet, Wasp, Hancock, Cowpens and Monterey. Effectively 40 percent of his strength was off refueling. What he had was still a powerful force, be not nearly as much as it could have been.
Then Halsey compounded his arrogance by sailing directly into a typhoon which sank at least one destroyer. I guess the Hero of Dolittle's Tokyo raid kept extending his fifteen minutes of fame.
Take no prisoners We had a cool old guy was a ship’s navigator in WW2 WIA Coral Sea USS Lexington Lost a leg and hand his war was over He was a post man after the war for 52 years
Ah yes, that time Halsey got deceived by a decoy force. Still, worth covering because it finishes off the IJN's vaunted carriers, which would've been a real pain in the ass if they were allowed to hang around for the rest of the war.
He should’ve just pursued them with the carrier fleet and it’s escorts and left task force 34 behind. They had more than enough surface ships to cover the carriers without the need for the fast battleships.
No, they wouldn't have been, because after this engagement Japan was out of fuel and pilots. And even if that were true Halsey could've easily split his force to take both Kurita and Ozawa-while people will point out he didn't want to do this, he wasn't above it as proven by his second blunder of turning south just 15 minutes out of main battery range.
What strikes me in this video is how wave after wave of USN planes are launched, find the enemy, attack, return and are recovered, seamlessly. It shows a marked improvement over Midway and the early war by men who had become practiced professionals
24:20 This is Operation Ten Go.. Its wasn't even a battle, it was suicide mission. A fleet without any Air Cover. The Yamato didnt even stood a chance.
As well as an Essex class carrier on the American side. I do believe it meant ship losses INCLUDING those too damaged to continue fighting and being sent home for repairs
@@sayhallo3769 I actually missed the Essex! :D But I don't think it includes those damaged, because for the Japanese the three battleships lost were Musashi, Fuso, and Yamashiro. The graphic has (correctly) three battleships in the losses category, they're just not the correct visual model.
@@michaelusswisconsin6002 Knowing less about the US ships here, I completely missed that! Thank you :D I saw the Essex but thought it was USS Franklin, not remembering when she was hit by bombs or if the severe damage was enough to classify the ship as a loss.
Bruh Halsey sounds like such an egotistical baby boy.. dude was in command of probably the most powerful naval force on the planet at the time and he gets urgent messages that people he was meant to be protecting were in danger and he tells them "its too late for you" lol and then when his commander unintentionally tells him off he starts crying like a kid while people are dying because of him... i havent finished the vid yet but i really hope there was consequences for his actions
Halsey received no consequences for his double-blundering at Leyte, and incredibly escaped consequences for getting ~700 men killed by blundering into 2 typhoons in early-mid 1945. He was too heavily lauded by the US public for that to be done in a graceful manner.
I know it's not necessarily humorous in context, but the image in my mind upon hearing of Admiral Halsey throwing his cap and crying made me just bust out laughing
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The animations have gotten much better, the sinking effects were a nice touch.
Where are the sources? 1mil subs and not citing even one source?
Hi mate, can you do the battles of Changsha. The ones in charge in China now completely obliterate from history, but massive in WW2. The Taliban obliterated their history too. Changsha was one of their biggest triumphs in WW2 at and exceptional sacrifice like the Russians at Stalingrad. Maybe Chinese people should do it.
The silhouette used to represent _Princeton_ at 22:47 is wrong. Looks like an Essex-class rather than an Independence-class CVL
If I'm mistaken so be it but I think what you spoke about in this video is really never discussed. I have always been under the impression that the Northern Force had escaped and that the Japanese carriers were sunk at later dates. Thank you for educating me today but then, that's what I get for not diving deeper into the subject matter.
To be fair, Halsey was _really_ lucky that Taffy 3 fought a _spectecular_ action against the main force and managed to score an improbable strategic win. Because if center force would've been successfull in rolling up the rear of the landing operations as planned, his departure to the north (against orders, it has to be said!) would not have gone over as smoothly as they did. The navy was ready to overlook the problem because on balance the IJN lost big time - but let's face the post facto truth of this: it was Taffy 3's exceptional performance who earned this victory, not anything Halsey did or didn't do. And I think he himself knew this best as indicated by his breakdown when faced with what was happening to Taffy 3 and his inability to take back his mistake.
To be faaaaaair
That sounds about right. I think the messages from Taffy 3 had already made his mistake clear to him and he was probably already holding in absolute horror at his own mistake, then he gets a message from Nimitz that reads basically like "what the *&^% are you doing?" and it finally breaks his composure altogether.
Fabulous Monday morning quarterbacking. A more reasonable way of looking at it is that Halsey did exactly what he was mandated and ordered to do, in light of the information he had available to him at the time. Halsey was informed that the Japanese center force was retreating after they had been mauled the day before. So there was no reason to leave Task Force 34 behind, as far as any American officer knew at the time. The US Navy was laser focused on destroying the Japanese fleet carriers, and that was Halsey's priority mission. No one in the Navy, not Halsey, not Nimitz, nor anyone else knew that the Japanese Norther force was a toothless decoy. None of then knew Center Force had turned around and would attack Taffy 3. Not until it was too late.
With aircrafts from taffy 1 and 2 🙂
Mitscher relied on carrier air power to destroy the Japanese carriers at the Phillipines Sea, holding back Lee and his fast battleships.
It's likely that Halsey was taking no such chances at Leyte Gulf.
While we can criticise him for leaving the San Bernardino straight unguarded, I think he should be criticised for not leaving even a picket ships. 2 destroyers patrolling the area will be enough to spot all the BB fleet coming.
Or even leave 4 light Cruisers and 2 Hevey Cruisers
@@danielpetrucci8952 heck even 4 torpedo boats could have snuck in and done damage in that strait.
Honestly what baffles me the most are the Halsey after battle “excuses” for not leaving ships behind patrolling the strait:
1.That he feared that the Japanese could rearm their carriers with land base aircrafts making them worth all their ships attention🤦🏻♂️, yeah just like how the Americans could slap mustangs and thunderbolts in their carriers duh.
2. That he not deployed task force 34 alone because the lack of air support since he was gathering all the planes, low key saying that he didn’t believe Iowa and co could defeat yamato and friends without air support🙄, fact that obviously gained the angry stare of some of the battleships admirals.
@@d.olivergutierrez8690 on no. 2 I think it was referred to as "lacking air cover" of having those capital ships out there without fighter support. But for that there's a certain 3 fleets of Taffy who I'm sure could spare a wild cat or two to avoid having to fight the IJN capital units if it only required them to protect the bigger ships from enemy aircraft.
@@legoeasycompanyNot just Wildcats, the Taffys had Avengers to throw at Center Force!
It's this action and the two (TWO!) typhoons he took 3rd Fleet through that make me question his ability as a fleet admiral.
Funny how both the Americans and Japanese got a chance to have at least one very stubborn destroyer facing off against a vastly superior enemy force and sacrificing itself to save the rest of the fleet, and on the same day at that.
I think it demonstrates how scary torpedoes had become to surface commanders. One destroyer with a well-aimed salvo can ruin your whole day.
An unfortunately common feature for the entire war, to be fair. DD captains were built different.
@@astratan2238 Ardent and Acasta charging Scharnhorst and Gneisnau trying to protect Glorius be like:
@@RCAvhstape The US cruiser commander was a veteran of the night fighting in the Solomons (he was in command of USS Portland during the Naval Battle of Guadacanal) so had first hand knowledge of how lethal Japanese torpedoes were.
This right here. It's not the size of the dog in the fight, and all that.
Interesting thing about Zuikaku, in nearly every battle she participated in, the outcome was the same: Her sister Shōkaku was damaged, Zuikaku escapes without so much as a scratch on her. It happened at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz Islands. Zuikaku only took battle damage for the first time in her career after Shōkaku was sunk at Philippine Sea, and was sunk the first time she went into a battle without Shōkaku here at Cape Engaño. Her name, meaning Auspicious Crane, ended up being rather fitting.
Also thanks for mentioning Hatsuzuki, she's long been one of my favorite Japanese destroyers for her actions during this battle. Almost like Japan's USS Johnston in a way, and on the same day as well.
i find it shallow and pedantic
Yes, the Hatsuzuki deserves a spot at the table of WW2’s madlad destroyers alongside Gloworm, Ardent, Acasta, Edsall, Laffey, Johnston, Hoel, Heerman, and Laffey reincarnated.
@@wolftamer5463+ Samuel B. Roberts
Small boy attack!
Phenomenal insights. Being a linguist, I especially like that knowledge. The Japanese were fighting for evil ends, and often hobbled themselves with limited thinking and internecine warfare (a virtual civil war between IJA and IJN, ffs (which FAR predated WWII, and extended to the assassination of cabinet members and candidates for PM)), but there was still a twisted sense of honor there. So very, very sad.
Nor am I certain that their peculiar cruelty, manifested throughout their entire history, is gone. How could it be? It had to go SOMEwhere…
Imagine being Admiral Ozawa; being the decoy force to find out you're the only one to have successfully pulled off your mission, everyone else being wiped out (Nishimura) or quitting at one point or another (Shima and Kurita). It had to have been frustrating to have found that out, whether in the days/weeks/months after the battle or in the years following the war.
id be like "WTF bro?!"
Though as far as I know Ozawa and Kurita remained good friends for the rest of their lives. Kurita openly wept at Ozawa’s funeral.
How about all the dead sailors? All for nothing.
It was a plan that shouldn't have worked, but it did and the opportunity was refused. A quick look at the map shows that there wouldn't be another opportunity.
The things that must suck the most was that we was basically the decoy. And whilst his mission worked he did no damage whatsoever. Because all the other failed he had nothing to show for this vain-less sacrifice.
@@failtolawl *Kurita
As I recall, not only is "The World Wonders" a seeming reprimand by itself, but I think as a phrase it's part of a few lines from "The Charge of the Light Brigade," wherein it's in tandem with another phrase: "Someone had blundered." So assuming Halsey knew his Tennyson (he probably did), one phrase would also have recalled the other, and would have thus seemed even more damning. He would have interpreted it as a message from Nimitz saying, in metaphor, "you have made a terrible and costly mistake."
And coincidentally, Cape Engaño and Samar both happened on the 90th anniversary of the Charge of the Light Brigade
Which isn't wrong. You do have to wonder if the radio man purposely left it in.
Halsey had been getting increasingly dire and desperate situation reports and pleas for help, which he kept ignoring. The radio room had to have known this.
What's more hilarious is that every other ship in his fleet correctly removed that padding. *only* Halsey's flagship forgot to delete the padding.
You wouldn't believe this if it was written in fiction. And it happened in fact, incredible.
"All nature is but art, unknown to thee; all chance, direction, which thou canst not see" @@_Wombat
I can’t explain the hype I feel when a new operations room ww2 navy video comes out.
The hype is real
Yeah these vids are incredible & especially the annunciation of all the flowing naval terms and names of admirals etc
This year, I read Neptunes Inferno, Shattered Sword, and Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. I’m stoked when these videos debut.
After this series of battles, Halsey got mocked by various journalists for taking Ozawa’s bait and neglecting Samar, calling the battle series ‘Bull’s Run’, in comparison with American Civil War’s major Union defeat at Battle of Bull Run. ‘Bull’ of course was Halsey himself.
The superlative Pacific Trilogy by Ian Toll actually calls Cape Engano "The Bull Run" instead of "Cape Engano" on its diagram page lol
A truly fantastic series @@thenumbah1birdman.
Admiral Halsey did not like the nick name Bull and never used it himself.
@@captainclone1367 yes, because a bull is a powerful, aggressive animal that gets distracted by a decoy before the real threat comes in from behind.
Admiral Halsey really threw an actual temper tantrum on the bridge of a warship
If you've watched the video on the 2nd Pacific Squadron, that was just another Tuesday for Admiral Rozhestvensky. (yes, I googled his name. No way I was trying to spell that without help.)
@@RadioactiveSherbetDrach's re-telling the epic saga of the 2nd Pacific Squadron is my favorite episode! i've watched it at least 3 times !:-)
If you visit USS New Jersey in Camden, NJ. The tour guide would tell you exactly where Halsey threw temper tantrum, also his navy cap to the floor, plus when one of his staff tried to calm him down.
My only consolation about this mess is the fact that at least for a brief moment the guy realized the absolute bs that he just orchestrated, and not other than Nimitz to scold him, one of the only people that could make him cry from his own cringe.
US admirals throughout the entire war caused the deaths of thousands of sailors due to their own egos. Admiral King in the Atlantic with his refusal to listen to the British about how to counter submarines is an excellent example. The Kriegsmarine's most successful 6 months are entirely because King was a stuck up cunt.
I’m always surprised at how many crewmen are killed when the ship sinks 1-2 hours after the captain orders them to abandon ship.
Nobody around to do search and rescue between the time the Japanese leave and the Americans arrive. Japanese sailors often refused rescue efforts.
@@Mrhalligan39oh I always thought it literally meant going down with the ship and not all lost sailors after the sinking to. That makes a lot more sense now
@@Mrhalligan39 I'm pretty sure the number lost also includes all of those killed by the actual impacts of bombs, shells and torpedoes, etc. Many (in some cases most) of those lost were already dead before the order was given.
@@McCracken216 The number of crew lost in a sinking is basically the mustered crew at the time of the battle minus the number of survivors recovered. Whether they were killed during the battle, were trapped inside the vessel as it sank, or died of exposure or wounds before being rescued is not usually captured by that information. Unless a vessel undergoes a catastrophic explosion like HMS Hood, it can usually be assumed that at least some crew members will survive to make it into the water. Japanese sailors frequently refused rescue by American ships, and even American sailors were often abandoned by badly damaged task forces or in fear of submarine attack. Look up the survivors of USS Juneau, USS Indianapolis, or of Taffy 3 at Samar. Many ships were “lost with all hands” because literally nobody was sent to rescue survivors.
You do realize the Americans rescued not one of the Japanese Sailors at Engano and the Japanese fleet was already in full retreat. Those Japanese ships that did return to help rescue their survivors were mostly prevented from doing so by American forces. Also, they are in the middle of the ocean, with no land in sight for hundreds and hundreds of miles away. When they say ''there were no Japanese survivors'', etc. they mean they died days and weeks later at sea because they were never rescued. Think, why did 600 Americans die in a period of 3 days after Indianapolis sank?
"The world wonders"
The world's greatest coincidental accidental burn.
It's incredible that essentially every ship in task force 38 had been built in the past 2 and a half years. The manufacturing capacity of the US back then was truly on another level
Except you’re wrong because this was a semi-temporary state since this was during a war time economy that had been in place for 3 years. Should a war time economy again be started up the U.S. will still reach a level of manufacturing equal to or greater than the levels achieved in WWII due to greater levels of automation and technological advancement. Remember that during this time the public greatly supported and backed the war effort. People bought bonds when they could, they recycled and donated anything they didn’t need, and rations were put in place. It’s still an amazing level of manufacturing capacity but not one that’s no longer unachievable. Especially since this increase in production was only possible due to more naval ports, shipyards, military bases, factories, and production facilities were all being built from the ground up. Hence why said manufacturing capacity was so large as well.
@@Mgl1206 I don't see how I'm 'wrong' by stating US military manufacturing in WW2 was on other level which was objectively true. Sure if we were in another total war scenario today we could expand manufacturing again but that doesn't have anything to do with my statement.
But I frankly find your analysis of our potential to reach these lofty manufacturing heights again pretty naive. Sure automation can help but we are in much much worse position today than we were in 1940. We are now a service economy with most manufacturing limited to high end systems. We live in a globalized time with incredibly complicated military systems that require very difficult construction at specially built factories/shipyards. The US is no longer a major steel producer, we have almost no rare earth production needed for missiles, planes, tanks, ships, etc. We can barely staff our existing shipyards with enough tradeworkers like welders. Our non military shipyards at this point are functionally non existent.
In WW2 we had a huge pool of manufacturing, labor, and raw inputs that made the expansion into a wartime economy a fast proposition. Today, we would struggle to ramp up because we don't have the inputs, the labor, or the factories at the start. And production lines for military equipment today are so much harder to build with tons of specialized machinery needed. In a present day pacific war scenario with china, they are much more similar to how we were in WW2. They have the huge trained labor pool, the massive number of factories, and exponentially more commercial shipyards that can be converted to military use if need be, plus a vice grip on rare earth refinement and steel production.
Experts both outside and within the US military have acknowledged as much. There are concerted efforts to onshore more of our supply chains, expand shipyards, increase stockpiles of critical inputs, etc. But the fact remains it will be china majorly outproducing us not the other way around if a total war scenario happened today.
@@Mgl1206well you are right in the sense that the U.S. still maintains a big industrial base, a modern conflict with other big nations can easily escalate to a global nuclear war in which military production plays no role for obvious reasons
"I've read this book. Your conclusions were all wrong, Ryan. Halsey acted stupidly."
I think you mean "Halshey acted eshtupidly."
@@Victor-bl2ge Hahaha! Sean Connery had a tendency to chew on his words!
What a brave last stand by the Hatsuzuki, it wasn't meant to be like Taffy 3 though.
I wouldn’t say that; ultimately, her sacrifice allowed the survivors to escape
Thats is called " the world is round sometimes time is yours and sometimes time is not yours" 😭😭😭😭
No matter the side, when someone storms head on into their fate to buy time for their survivors to escape is an admirable thing. The few times that human decency can still shine through in the horrors of war.
She still has a seat at Valhalla. No different from destroyers like Ardent and Acasta which charged the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They could not save the Glorius, and most of the survivors died, but their bravery will not be forgotten.
It's really nothing short of a miracle that Ise and Hyuga got through Leyte without being destroyed as they were already obsolete and their conversion to partial carriers effectively just made them less capable in both categories.
That may very well have been what saved them, as there were more important targets to go after.
Those redesigns are the warship epitome of “it looks cool but is absolutely worthless”. Kinda like cheetahs.
What's weird is that although everybody knew conversions were half-assed and useless, there were plans floated around to do the same to the Montana hulls.
As part of that conversion a significant number of AA guns were put on the two ships while eliminating two of the main battery turrets. As the war had taught, air power was more potent than surface power, so the new armament of the two battleships gave it an advantage over its old configuration, though not a significant one. It was because the Americans where hyper concerned with the threats the Aircraft Carriers posed that saved the Battleships survived, due to the fact that the Americans concentrated overwhelming force on destroying those carriers in lieu of attacking a other vessels equally. If the attacks by American aircraft had more equally divided between the ships of the Japanese fleet it is more likely that a number of other vessels of that fleet would have been sunk, or so seriously damaged as to be unable to retreat from the battle zone before additional attacks arrived to finish them off. It was the Americans navy inability to understand how utterly devastated the Japanese carrier fleet had become and its inability to pose a real threat, that allowed the rest of the Japanese navy to escape. This allowed the survival of not just the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of the Japanese carrier force, but also those ships that survived the battle with Taffy 3.
Notice that throughout the Pacific War, most Battleships took considerable amounts of punishment by aircraft before being sunk or not, as well as having large amounts of AA and artillery firepower. Fleet carriers never had these aspects, which is why the hybrid battleship with aircraft was an ingenious invention by the Japanese. Not only being massive armored tanks they could assist in CAP around the battleships and provide the ASW role that the Japanese so desperately needed in the Pacific war. Sadly this never turned into reality, as they embarked on no aircraft.
At this point of the war, Halsey was out of his element and no longer needed. The war had passed him by. The fact that he took Admiral Lee from a final battleship battle is a historical war crime.
TWICE, too-had Halsey not broke his nerve after "the world wonders" Lee would've run up against the Japanese carrier-battleships and sunk them. Halsey's two critical decisions at Leyte, not just the first to commit the "bull run", robbed Lee.
Halsey, like so many commanders and admirals before him, was chasing glory. He wanted his glorious, decisive victory and it left him blind to the real objectives. The Japanese were always going to target the landings at Leyte because the goal was to prevent the US from retaking the Philippines. Halsey fell for the Japanese ruse because he lost sight of what their true target really was.
At this point in the war, American material superiority was such that they needed a game manager and not somebody who would bet it all on nothing. Just take the islands, hold off any naval help, go on to the next target.
But King wanted an aggressive admiral. I feel like Fletcher would have been good here if King wasn't so dead set on getting rid of him.
@@recoil53Agreed, Fletcher seemed to have this pragmatic 'resist the urge to go for glory, lest it bite you in the face' attitude that most admirals/commanders don't have. Indeed, they're often discredited for having restraint, as he was, most unfortunately if you ask me.
@@skullsaintdead And it's not like Fletcher didn't know when to take a risk, it's just that in the Solomons he was let down by Naval Intelligence.
History treats Halsey far better than he deserves. His blunders are monumental, From Taffey 3 to Typhoon Cobra. If there was a blunder to be made Halsey was there to make it.
I can even accept falling for a trap in the heat of the moment. But leaving nobody behind to just keep an eye on the strait boggles the mind. A single ship or even PT boat could have made the difference by just giving additional heads up.
@@NotTheCIA1961imo even worse he didn’t inform the other commanders of what he was doing. He should have know his move would have resulted in leaving the northern flank completely fucking open. An opening that leads straight into their supply lines. If he had at the very least informed the other they themselves could have placed a destroyer to watch and inform the fleet of incoming enemy fleet.
He was the right man for the job when he oversaw the Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942-1943. It's just that by the time October of 1944 rolled around, the war had changed. That he was a glory hound didn't help matters, so the glory went to Evans rather than Halsey.
this channel has created a great blend of describing strategic concerns, applications of tactics, and narrative engagement with descriptions of actions on the human scale. fantastic work as always
“Japan ceases to be a naval power, that dream is over. The once magnificent imperial fleet is no more, it dies in the battle of Leyte Gulf and it dies in vain” - victory at sea
Great classic series
It’s always a good day whenever operation room uploads
Fkn brilliant ❤😂
So say we all….
While is true that neither Nimitz, his staff, Halsey himself or US Naval Intelligence in the Pacific knew about the state of the IJN carrier aviation at that point of the war, and the fact that the Japanese plan was succesful in using its remaining carriers as bait. The failure of Admiral Halsey will be always his lack of precaution in not leave a squadron/picket force to protect San Bernardino and his subsequent lack of clear communication towards 7th Fleet and Honolulu.
If he had clearly communicated his intention to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded, his orders would have been countermanded.
Halsey’s problem was that he was a carrier admiral flying his flag on a battleship for comfort’s sake. Moving his staff at sea was impossible, detaching New Jersey would take him away from the battle he wanted to fight, and not detaching New Jersey would leave his picket force at a disadvantage. Halsey knew exactly what he was doing. He convinced himself Kurita was in retreat and thought no more of it.
As mentioned in a previous video, The split command of the battle of Leyte Gulf was a major flaw all around and could be partially to blame. Halsey was definitely to blame as he wanted to complete his personal goal of destroying the japanese fleet instead of defending Leyte. I think him missing he Battle of Midway(he was ill) plays a strong part in this since he did not get his massive victory he was hunting for
Japan's plan to get its last carriers sunk was a brilliant success. Good for them. One can argue with perfect hindsight that the Japanese carriers were useless at that point, and strategically there was no reason to destroy them, but destroying the Yamato at San Bernardino would not have mattered to the outcome of the war either. Would not have changed the timeline for the Philippines, or any other future battle. It might have resulted in a few less American deaths off Samar, maybe saved a couple destroyers and an escort carrier, but the US at that point had so much of everything. It was naval pilots that mattered most, and naval pilots were almost completely unaffected by Leyte Gulf, except gaining a bit more experience.
It's easy to say that Halsey should've left some ships at San Bernardino, and that Kurita would turn around, but there was really no reason to think he would, and ships cannot be everywhere. If naval commanders guard every strait all the time, there won't be enough forces to win decisive battles when it matters. Everything Halsey knew, everything the US Navy knew, said that the Japanese were extremely cautious about committing their biggest battleships and that carriers would win the war. After we sank one big battleship, and the other retreated, that should have been it. At any other time, it would have been it, and the biggest threat in the Pacific at that point should have been the Zuikaku. If Japan had been a lot smarter about rotating experienced aircrews to train new ones the way Americans did, the Zuikaku would have been the biggest threat in the Pacific.
But the fog of war is a very real thing, war is not a complete information game. With the limited information Halsey had, and with the directives he had been given by his superiors as a matter of theater strategy, his choice was correct. Failing to leave even just one guy behind with a rowboat and a radio might have been a tactical mistake, and it certainly got men killed, but even if he made the perfect hindsight decision it would have probably gotten other men killed. Maybe not as many. Maybe more. Unexpected things happen in war. It isn't reasonable to expect commanders to make perfect hindsight decisions in every situation.
@@fakecubed “Hindsight is 20/20” is no defense of a military commander. It is literally their job to see more clearly, to understand more clearly, to plan more carefully than the enemy. The Navy’s primary job at Leyte was to protect the landing fleet. Halsey failed to do so. If not for Ernest Evans’ bravery and Kurita’s failure of nerve, the Center Force’s attack would have gone through and at the very least disrupted the landings if not causing a complete catastrophe.
It is important to note that all these questions and criticisms were well known at the time, and that is those who make excuses for Halsey who are the revisionists in this case.
@@Mrhalligan39 Hypothetical losses are not an indictment of a military commander. The landings were already completed and Japan's ships never got in sight of the shore where they happened. The Americans won at Leyte Gulf. Could it have been an even bigger victory? Perhaps, but Japan was already beat. The additional surface combatants the Americans might have hypothetically sunk were irrelevant to the outcome of the war, as were the small number of escort ships that the Japanese did sink. Halsey's primary mission in the Pacific was to sink Japanese carriers, which he did, and the land war in the Philippines was not in any way affected by anything the Japanese accomplished that day. Ultimately, Sprague had the forces he needed to turn back the Center Force.
After any battle there is always lessons learned and room for improvement. Always. But military commanders are not gods, they are not omniscient or omnipotent, and anyone expecting them to be is as crazy as the Japanese when they thought there was ever any possibility of victory at Leyte Gulf.
This battle doesn't get enough recognition. It's honestly so poetic how Lexington gets her revenge and finishes off the last of the original 6.
Edit: Even further into the art of revenge, the sinking of the Tama is exactly what happened to Juneau all the way back in '42.
The Lady Lex Strikes Back!
@@nursestoyland. Hence her nickname "The Blue Ghost".
There's the old Klingon Proverb that I think it's perfect here and that's "Revenge is a dish best served cold".
@@andrewmontgomery5621 yep
I understand the sentiment. The original USS Lexington, CV2, was lost during the Battle of Coral Sea. The USS Lexington, CV16, the museum ship in Corpus Christie, is an Essex class carrier. Are you saying revenge for the ship she named after or Pearl Harbor? Just curious.
Ahh yes, Halsey's empty victory. I still despise him for leaving Taffy 3 on their own during the onslaught of Center Force
IJN Hatsuzuki. A single Akikuzi class destroyer going up against an entire fleet with just 5 torpedoes and a whole load of 100mm high explosive shells meant for air defense. Though I have few good words for the Japanese Empire of her time. Credit must be given to the bravery of her last stand, doubtlessly saving many lives
Whatever else you can say about the Imperial Japanese, they weren't cowards.
@@RCAvhstape they were also really good at catching babies on their bayonets
@@matthewp9156 Wasn't that army's (not navy's) thing?
@@LauPaSat-plThe Navy still committed war crimes too. Besides killing plenty of Allied prisoners of war, the Special Naval Landing forces also took part in killings such as the Manila Massacre in 1944-45. Doesn’t necessarily change the fact that we can appreciate the bravery of this crew in taking on such high odds to save their comrades though.
@@matthewp9156See my above comment for a bit of historical context.
One minor thing that doesn't get mentioned a lot is that Adm. Ozawa also detached and sent Ise and Hyuga, his two BB-Vs, south another 50 miles further the day before (Oct. 24th), ostensibly to act as a vanguard for his main force, but it could also be interpreted as Ozawa wanting to make doubly-sure that 3rd Fleet noticed him. Both the detachment and the main force were spotted by American scout planes, and the BB-Vs returned overnight to rejoin the main force before the main battle on the 25th. It's mainly a commentary on how both Ise and Hyuga were regarded as extra-expendable assets among a bait force in the IJN battle plan...which makes it kind of ironic that they both survived the battle, while the four Japanese carriers were all sunk.
Oh yeah, those conversions were basically useless.
Halsey, like so many commanders and admirals before him, was chasing glory. He wanted his glorious, decisive victory and it left him blind to the real objectives. The Japanese were always going to target the landings at Leyte because the goal was to prevent the US from retaking the Philippines. Halsey fell for the Japanese ruse because he lost sight of what their true target really was.
Is anyone else reminded of the old school Nintendo game "1942" when seeing the formations of fighters animations?!?! Great work as always!
That would make a great April fools video
Played it on arcade machine
Big hugs to the Operations Room team from Paraguay, amazing stuff as always
@19:35 ..."but the battle is still not over:...i half expected to hear "AND HERE COMES THE U.S.S. JOHNSTON WITH A STEEL CHAIR!!" and i wouldn't have doubted it lol
Hats off to the brave men of IJN Hatsuzuki. It’s too bad her men couldn’t have had a post war beer with men of USS Johnston, USS Hoel, and USS Samuel B Roberts. No shortage of courage aboard these tin can destroyers on both sides.
Now you have me wondering if you can make a boilermaker with Beer and Sake as I could see those crews trying it.
@@scottgiles7546 That's an outstanding idea!!
@@scottgiles7546 You absolutely can. It's called a sake bomb.
Kind of wish that Halsey had left some of the fast battleship in the strait. Would have been interesting to see which faired better in a battleship to battleship engagement. But it's all history now.
I've always been curious if he had left a half dozen submarines patrolling the straits, but we'll never know.
Honestly, leaving NOTHING there at all is a very major blunder. He had something like 60 destroyers, and the San Bernardino Strait is very narrow. 5 DDs would have guaranteed that 7th Fleet would have had hours of warning when Center Force navigated the Strait.
It is one thing to not cover it with heavy units, but quite another to leave it completely unmonitored.
Whoah, the production value of this video feels like a huge step up, I love the different layers of airplanes and the tilts and pans add a lot, too. And just in general, the animations have gotten so detailed, you're videos have become such a pleasure to look at! Keep up the good work!
To think New Jersey and Yamato were so close to throw hands with their friends.
Drachinifel has an interesting war game video about that what if battle, although he actually buff kurita in that video so he actually fights to the end instead of pulling an 180 like in samar.
Cmdr. Winters is example of great leader, he stayed behind alone above IJN fleet to document the enemy formation also at the beginning directing his planes to focus on Zuikaku instead of crippled and easy target Chiyoda. Imo targeting the larger and still functional carrier is more of a priority than the easier and crippled one.
"Halsey acted stupidly."
One ping only
I understood these references!
Your conclusions were all wrong, Ryan!
Still of the view that Cape Engano should’ve been a one on one battle between Enterprise and Zuikaku.
Fun fact:
Many of the names in the Philippines are from spanish origin.
"Engaño" means "deceit", so cabo engaño can be translated as cape deceit. A foreshadowing name for things to come!
[btw: Ñ is pronounced GN as in "lasaGNa"]
Cheers, I’m a huge fan of words and suchlike. Best wishes from Liverpool.👍☘️📚
As an amateur WW2 naval historian for decades, to this day I still don't understand why Halsey sent his most powerful unit, TF 38.1, to Ulithi for rest and replenishment. Under McCain there were 2 CV and 2 CVL. There was a significant amount of firepower in TF 38.1 but Halsey just sent them away from the battle.
Would you for a second believe Spruance would send Jockco Clark away from Saipan when the marines were still landing on Saipan and fighting for their lives?
Halsey probably did not regain the full firepower of TF 38 until the last day of the battle. Curiously, no historian ever talked about the negative effect of TF 38.1 not with Halsey during the Battle of Cape Engano.
At the time, Halsey was convinced the Japanese navy would not sortie to contest Leyte, so after McCain had pounded the land defenses Halsey sent them off. This is also why he was so out of positon when USS Darter and Dace radioed in their report of the Center force.
Those boys had been at sea for eighteen-months. That's why.
Wikipedia on Halsey says that what made Halsey good at the beginning of the war was his ability to take calculated risks, but that this worked against him later. He was on the cover of Look magazine in February 1943. Once they do that to you, you have some plot armor.
11:37
Did you guy's know The Battleship New Jersey receives operating support from the New Jersey Department of State also from a number of business's and private individuals like yourselves. They really appreciate your support 😎
(That's our boy, he is right there.)
this video sure has helped me to understand Ryan and Ramius' conversation aboard the Red October - thank you!
When Ramius said "Halsey acted stupidly"...
Me too
On Dec. 2, 1941 when the words were sent to Adm. Nagumo, "Climb Mount Niitaka" (Jade mountain, in what was then Formosa), the call to start the Kido Butai towards Pearl Harbor, I doubt that no-one guessed that in 2 years, 10 months and 25 days the IJN would be a completely spent force
Tiny clarification: he remained in command of the third fleet, which was the designation of that fleet when commanded by Halsey. When commanded by Spruance it was 5th fleet. So Spruance was in command of that same fleet for parts of the war after
9:35 Zuikaku in english, means "Lucky Crane". So no wonder...
And if you ask me, with the sinking of the Zuikaku, it avenges pearl harbor...
The constraints YT puts your content is sad. Yet you’re producing some of the most concise stuff. Thank you.
I think the people who can repair ships in the middle of the ocean after being hit by bombs and torpedos are the craziest magicians this world has ever seen.
Thank you for tackling this massive cluster of a battle with your usual professionalism!
This is hand's down the best channel on UA-cam, By far! Keep it up mate!
To be fair, Montemayor covers the same Pacific War material, though going much more in depth (and hence the videos take much longer). Regardless, I do like that TOR covered Leyte Gulf; not a bad depiction by any means.
Glad that you included Hatsuzuki's final battle, that's so often missed, which was every bit as heroic as the tin cans at Samar. Also, minor nitpick, but there were 3 destroyers and 1 light cruiser in addition to Hatsuzuki.
After finishing this series, I’m convinced the US Navy required a clinical insanity diagnosis for officer promotions. The things they managed to pull off successfully are just wild.
I’d say Halsey’s greatest blunder was not necessarily not leaving ships behind (it can be forgiven for falling for an enemy trap). But that when he took every single ship, He didn’t inform the other fleet WHEN HE TOOK THEM because he should have fucking known that he was purposefully leaving the northern flank open. Even if he believed it was safe. You don’t just leave a flank completely exposed. If he had at the very least informed the other fleets they could have been made aware of their undefended flank and place someone to keep an eye out for possible enemy fleet. While it still wouldn’t fully excuse Halsey, it would have greatly mitigated the disaster of Taffy 3.
You forgot a important detail. The battleships of TF 34 were almost within gun range of the decoy force. It is then he ordered them to turn around and head back south. Two hours were spent refueling the destroyers.
I think you will find that Lee’s force was about 4 hours away from the Surago Strait and Kurita still had over 2 hours steaming to get to the landing beaches.
It is a very interesting war game to keep Kurita going after the Taffy 3 fight. The aircraft from other Taffy groups, Oldendorff’s old battle line and possibly aircraft from the fast carriers are fun counters.
@@mkaustralia7136 I don’t think you understand what I said. But I do understand what you are saying.
@@mkaustralia7136 The sea state was so sweet that BB62 reached 35 knots on a sustained basis... which is astounding.
@@davidhimmelsbach557I forget how long Drach was allowing for Lee to return to the strait and then continue onto gun range of Kurita. I do not recall him mentioning the need to refuel the destroyers for 2 hours. That delay would definitely give Kurita a good time to attack the landing beaches and ships there before Lee would arrive.
Then there is the question of when Kinkade would tell the support vessels to move away from Leyte gulf (south or scatter?) and how long it would take Oldendorff to move his battle line with its depleted ammunition stocks to the northern entrance to the Gulf. 125 klms from the head of Surago Strait to Candulo Island at the northern end of the Gulf. 40 klms from Candulo to the position of Kurita at 09:20 (according to wiki so caution) so he would be in gun range within an hour or two if the support vessels stay where they are in the gulf. However if they retreat towards Oldendorff that might add some minutes to Kurita’s time to get to gun range.
Oldendorf needs only to get to gun range of Kurita and has radar.
In addition Taffys 1 and 2 could be armed properly for attacking Kurita as he closes in. Entering the gulf he has limited room to manoeuvre and a couple of hours of aerial attack on him would do some damage one would think.
Seth said the total available aircraft was akin to a few Essexes, and Kurita had lost a few cruisers already to the Taffy 3 escorts and aircraft. One would imagine that in the hour or so to get to gun range the damage might look like Sibuyan Sea with significant damage to the battleships, if not one sunk.
As for the fast carriers, they could well be out of range at the start of the Taffy 3 battle, but how by long it would take to get their aircraft to Philippines Sea distance is a question. But could they shuttle to a Taffy flight deck to refuel for their return to home carrier? If so, they would be in range almost wherever they were.
So many what ifs in the counterfactual! That’s what makes it fascinating.
Looks like Captain Amano of the Hatsuzuki felt that he could do one better than captain Ernest Evans and that Samuel B. Roberts. A commendable effort. And one that did have it's intended purpose. Nicely done Captain Amano.
i am so happy i found this channel several years back! You bring a whole new dimension to my 50+ years studying WWII. Thank You for proving there is always more to be learned !:-)
We’re getting all these fantastic episodes on the Pacific War, I hope we get Santa Cruz islands. Out of the six aircraft carrier battles it and Coral Sea are the only tactical Japanese victories, but like at Coral Sea they fail to gain any kind of strategic advantage. It was also where Enterprise lost her last sister, Hornet.
I'd love to see a replay of Murata and his experienced flyers as they execute what was probably the finest carrier attack of WW2 off Santa Cruz.
Some of the books describing he and his dedicated airgroup are sad but wonderful to read.
Pure luck saved a badly damaged Enterprise when Takahashi's airgroup missed the formation by 50 miles.
Still, the Japanese should have done better...the sudden shock of flying into pulverising levels of AA fire from the carriers and escorts must have been dreadful.
"I know thish book, Ryan. Your conclusionsh were all wrong; Halshey acted shtupidly."
ua-cam.com/users/shortsBmc9NFfhx74?si=7Y3zfjXuHYfP1Rp-
19:46, fun fact, the USS Jallao was a submarine built and on the Great Lakes, it was also side launched, Great Lakes style.
The people here trying to excuse Halsey's moves...Yamamoto was expecting Halsey to be in charge of the US aircraft carriers at Midway and would use his impetuousness and recklessness to lure him into the ambush. Instead they got the cool-thinking Spruance.
A suggestion: Edit and put together all the parts into a single video. Would make for a great YT documentary :)
Small detail: the silhouette counter for 3rd fleet uses South Dakota class battleships to describe heavy cruisers.
I am thankful for The Operations Room!
Hes dropping a hint at 24:22 hes going to do Operation Ten Go(The last battle of the Yamato) cant wait!!!!!!!!!!
I'll bet it ends with a bang!
Imagine you're the commander of the battleship division Task Force 34 (Lee) and received an order to run towards the enemy carriers for a surface action, then later, you are told 'Where is Lee!? Send Lee!' (Back, Back 500 miles south). LMAO 🤧😆🤣
Some of USS Washington's crew expressed their dissapointment with this turn of event.
From the book "Battleship At War", the story of the USS Washington.
The chance for every type of warship in the us fleet to shine in battle, just for the most overrated admiral on us history to be there and handle the whole task force like a kid that didn’t want to share his toys.
It's hard to imagine the amount of grief Halsey was dealing with, knowing that he was the reason so many lives in Taffy 3 were sacrificed to achieve victory.
All those ships deployed against Northern Force seems like overkill.
Man... Halsey's tantrum will always be the funniest part of the Leyte Gulf battle. 😂
The gloryhound "Bullshit" Halsey should never have been placed in command of any formation larger than a squadron.
Thank you for all the videos telling the story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. All of them are excellent. WELL DONE!
This is what I find more than a bit baffling. Didn't the USN have some idea of the size of the remaining IJN order of battle in October 1944? Why did Halsey think he needed all six BBs, 6 CAs, 9 CLs and 58 DDs in addition to 16 CV/CVLs? Surely, some of these assets could have been left behind. Yes, BB-62 would have to stay with TF 38 as she carried the Admiral himself. Just one third of Halsey's surface force in San Bernardino Strait would have been overkill. Not questioning the pursuit of Ozawa, just the failure to reasonably assess enemy strength. Maybe Willis realized this when he wanted to stay behind to protect Kincaid.
Halsey could've also just transferred his flag, or modified TF34 so that Iowa and NJ are along for the ride with Mitscher (and given they are 5 knots faster than every other TF34 capital vessel it would make sense). The excuses brought up to try and absolve halsey of his first blunder are incredible, especially when one considers that officers in 3rd fleet had Intel that Kurita was heading east. It probably stems from Halsey's idea of not splitting forces to avoid defeat in detail-but as you said the previous battles (Solomons, Philippine sea and Formosa) should've brokered some indication of the IJN's diminished air and sea power, and magically Halsey's compunction against splitting force disappears as soon as he makes his second blunder and turns lee back just 40 miles from Ozawa. Truly baffling.
Operations room kind of made a error here. Halsey was missing one of his task groups, 38.1 under VADM McCain. It had Hornet, Wasp, Hancock, Cowpens and Monterey. Effectively 40 percent of his strength was off refueling. What he had was still a powerful force, be not nearly as much as it could have been.
Ozawa: i expected destruction of my fleet, but if kurita carried out his mission, that was all i wished
Americans: yeah...about that....
Wow! Both sides had brave Destroyers that was willing to fight an entire fleet.
Then Halsey compounded his arrogance by sailing directly into a typhoon which sank at least one destroyer. I guess the Hero of Dolittle's Tokyo raid kept extending his fifteen minutes of fame.
Helldivers be dropping 500 pound bombs in every universe
Salute for hatsuzuki. She knew she was likely doomed but she still fought valiantly
Looking at the waves of planes just keep on coming really put you in place. How do you even win such an opponent? Absolutely mad.
Great presentation: very detailed and thorough!
Aptly named: "Cape Engaño" means Caped Deception.
truly! the incorrect pronunciation & spelling kinda hurts but the quality of the content is superb
"the last naval battle of aircraft carriers is about to begin" love it
Take no prisoners
We had a cool old guy was a ship’s navigator in WW2
WIA Coral Sea USS Lexington
Lost a leg and hand
his war was over
He was a post man after the war for 52 years
Imo the most underrated ww2 naval battle, 5 total carriers sunk is insane
Underrated perhaps, but it was only 1 fleet and 3 light carriers. Midway saw 5 fleet carriers sunk.
@@zacklewis342 true, but it includes the American fleet carrier Princeton
@@gaiusoctavius6107Light carrier, Princeton was an Independence-class.
@@S0RGEx oh yeah I forgot, but still it was barely smaller than the earlier “fleet” carriers like Hiryu and Soryu which fought at midway
Ah yes, that time Halsey got deceived by a decoy force.
Still, worth covering because it finishes off the IJN's vaunted carriers, which would've been a real pain in the ass if they were allowed to hang around for the rest of the war.
He should’ve just pursued them with the carrier fleet and it’s escorts and left task force 34 behind. They had more than enough surface ships to cover the carriers without the need for the fast battleships.
No, they wouldn't have been, because after this engagement Japan was out of fuel and pilots. And even if that were true Halsey could've easily split his force to take both Kurita and Ozawa-while people will point out he didn't want to do this, he wasn't above it as proven by his second blunder of turning south just 15 minutes out of main battery range.
Yes a new one… can’t get enough of these videos, the next logical step is a carrier and battleship collection
finally, some coverage of this battle!
*Battle 360*
What strikes me in this video is how wave after wave of USN planes are launched, find the enemy, attack, return and are recovered, seamlessly. It shows a marked improvement over Midway and the early war by men who had become practiced professionals
All these videos were very fun to watch. I can’t wait to see you cover Operation Ten-go.
24:20 This is Operation Ten Go.. Its wasn't even a battle, it was suicide mission. A fleet without any Air Cover. The Yamato didnt even stood a chance.
A new Operations Room video always makes my day.
Admiral Halsey was nicknamed “Admiral Haul-ass” at the time
Seems fitting.
been waiting intently for this video since the last one you posted
Freaking Taffy 3 went full on last stand to the death and pulled something amazing out of their hats. Tom Hanks and the Tiger at the end of SPR vibes.
The losses panel at @ 22:52 is a bit confusing since the graphic shows silhouettes of both Yamato and Musashi as well as Nagato.
Also shows an Essex class carrier as a loss when it actually was a Independence class carrier USS Princeton
As well as an Essex class carrier on the American side.
I do believe it meant ship losses INCLUDING those too damaged to continue fighting and being sent home for repairs
@@sayhallo3769 I actually missed the Essex! :D But I don't think it includes those damaged, because for the Japanese the three battleships lost were Musashi, Fuso, and Yamashiro. The graphic has (correctly) three battleships in the losses category, they're just not the correct visual model.
@@michaelusswisconsin6002 Knowing less about the US ships here, I completely missed that! Thank you :D
I saw the Essex but thought it was USS Franklin, not remembering when she was hit by bombs or if the severe damage was enough to classify the ship as a loss.
Where is task force 34, the world wonders
Taffy 3: Its aight, we got this!
Rose are red
Violets are blue
I love watching this channel
And so do you
I watched the video a few hours ago when I got home from work and here I am playing a game watching it again on my second monitor. :)
Thanks Oproom.
Bruh Halsey sounds like such an egotistical baby boy.. dude was in command of probably the most powerful naval force on the planet at the time and he gets urgent messages that people he was meant to be protecting were in danger and he tells them "its too late for you" lol and then when his commander unintentionally tells him off he starts crying like a kid while people are dying because of him... i havent finished the vid yet but i really hope there was consequences for his actions
Halsey received no consequences for his double-blundering at Leyte, and incredibly escaped consequences for getting ~700 men killed by blundering into 2 typhoons in early-mid 1945. He was too heavily lauded by the US public for that to be done in a graceful manner.
Unfortunately he didn’t 😒
Never get tired of the background music. Great Content as always ❤
Like Connery said in "The Hunt for Red October", "Halsey was a fool".
I know it's not necessarily humorous in context, but the image in my mind upon hearing of Admiral Halsey throwing his cap and crying made me just bust out laughing