I can't remember exactly from where but I do recall an account of soldiers unable to actually see each other despite being just 40 metres apart. The brightly coloured and distinctive uniforms really make more sense when you consider that was often the norm.
The Spanish troops loyal to King Joseph likely had a variety of motivations for fighting against their fellow countrymen. There was some limited support for the French cause even from the onset of the war, especially in the cities, who embraced the Revolutionary and Napoleonic-era reforms. Joseph actually raised another Spanish regiment, but because of the situation in Spain, they never saw combat in Iberia. Instead they fought in the Russian and German campaigns respectively. The quality of these troops were overall fairly poor, only really good for garrison duties.
Before the age of industrial warfare (when there were no fronts in wars but single armies or corps marching around the country), the main objective of operational warfare was to outflank or threaten the enemy. This was especially true in the "cabinet" wars of the 18th century, when operational manoevering was seen as the superior form of beating an enemy and battles were almost an afterthought (or at least this was the ideal). The goal was to occupy important positions, to disrupt the logistical chain of the enemy and to force him to retreat strategically. You can see this in the Seven Years War. Even in the war of 1870, manoevering was still as important as fighting the actual battles. So I think that "brilliant marching" refers to this. Push your enemy out of advantageous positions by threatening him operationally or strategically instead of just trying to beat him in a tactical battle. Napoleon tried to do the same at Arcole.
Revolutionizing operational warfare was what made Napoleon such a fearsome commander to begin with. The goal of maneuvering, aside from compelling the enemy to give up their campaign, was to also achieve an advantage at the point of contact. Aside from the very common "maneuver to the rear" which was done by many generals in the past to threaten their opponents' line of communications, he also employed the "central position" and "interior lines" instinctively in order to cut enemy corps in twain and prevent his adversaries from properly coordinating and concentrating against him, allowing him to defeat each in detail. In American Civil War circles, you see people go on and on about how Napoleonic tactics led to higher casualties, but the bulk of these people tend to disregard that the best commanders on both sides of the ACW in high command performed as well as they did not because of their battle tactics, but largely because of their abilities to maneuver on the operational level (using maneuvers they studied and learned from Napoleon, written down by Jomini). Lee utilized the maneuver to the rear very often and his boldness often led to many successes from 2nd Manassas to Chancellorsville. Grant utilized defeat in detail and the central position in the Vicksburg Campaign to keep apart Pemberton and Johnston and decisively defeat the former separately. In the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke utilized interior lines and the central position in his operational plans to keep the French Army of the Rhine and Army of Alsace apart, while concentrating numbers to be able to defeat each in detail at any point in time. Even in WWII, you see Napoleon-type operational maneuvers with the breakthrough of the Ardennes and subsequent envelopment of the Allies round Dunkirk, compelling their mass withdrawal and the decisive defeat of France. Hell, even in the current conflict in Ukraine, you can see elements of Napoleonic operational maneuvers, only done on a much larger scale than before.
Hi! If you are interested in more Napoleonic history, I would recommend a video called "Napoleonic Belgium, An Era Of Hope" by a small channel called BelgianHistoryRemembered. Production quality is, of course, nowhere near as good as Epic History TV. But the videos are considerably shorter and he's very good at explaining things.
I can't remember exactly from where but I do recall an account of soldiers unable to actually see each other despite being just 40 metres apart. The brightly coloured and distinctive uniforms really make more sense when you consider that was often the norm.
The Spanish troops loyal to King Joseph likely had a variety of motivations for fighting against their fellow countrymen. There was some limited support for the French cause even from the onset of the war, especially in the cities, who embraced the Revolutionary and Napoleonic-era reforms. Joseph actually raised another Spanish regiment, but because of the situation in Spain, they never saw combat in Iberia. Instead they fought in the Russian and German campaigns respectively. The quality of these troops were overall fairly poor, only really good for garrison duties.
Before the age of industrial warfare (when there were no fronts in wars but single armies or corps marching around the country), the main objective of operational warfare was to outflank or threaten the enemy. This was especially true in the "cabinet" wars of the 18th century, when operational manoevering was seen as the superior form of beating an enemy and battles were almost an afterthought (or at least this was the ideal). The goal was to occupy important positions, to disrupt the logistical chain of the enemy and to force him to retreat strategically. You can see this in the Seven Years War. Even in the war of 1870, manoevering was still as important as fighting the actual battles.
So I think that "brilliant marching" refers to this. Push your enemy out of advantageous positions by threatening him operationally or strategically instead of just trying to beat him in a tactical battle. Napoleon tried to do the same at Arcole.
Revolutionizing operational warfare was what made Napoleon such a fearsome commander to begin with. The goal of maneuvering, aside from compelling the enemy to give up their campaign, was to also achieve an advantage at the point of contact. Aside from the very common "maneuver to the rear" which was done by many generals in the past to threaten their opponents' line of communications, he also employed the "central position" and "interior lines" instinctively in order to cut enemy corps in twain and prevent his adversaries from properly coordinating and concentrating against him, allowing him to defeat each in detail.
In American Civil War circles, you see people go on and on about how Napoleonic tactics led to higher casualties, but the bulk of these people tend to disregard that the best commanders on both sides of the ACW in high command performed as well as they did not because of their battle tactics, but largely because of their abilities to maneuver on the operational level (using maneuvers they studied and learned from Napoleon, written down by Jomini). Lee utilized the maneuver to the rear very often and his boldness often led to many successes from 2nd Manassas to Chancellorsville. Grant utilized defeat in detail and the central position in the Vicksburg Campaign to keep apart Pemberton and Johnston and decisively defeat the former separately.
In the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke utilized interior lines and the central position in his operational plans to keep the French Army of the Rhine and Army of Alsace apart, while concentrating numbers to be able to defeat each in detail at any point in time. Even in WWII, you see Napoleon-type operational maneuvers with the breakthrough of the Ardennes and subsequent envelopment of the Allies round Dunkirk, compelling their mass withdrawal and the decisive defeat of France. Hell, even in the current conflict in Ukraine, you can see elements of Napoleonic operational maneuvers, only done on a much larger scale than before.
Hi! If you are interested in more Napoleonic history, I would recommend a video called "Napoleonic Belgium, An Era Of Hope" by a small channel called BelgianHistoryRemembered. Production quality is, of course, nowhere near as good as Epic History TV. But the videos are considerably shorter and he's very good at explaining things.
It makes you think just how many more soldiers would have died from sickness in the ancient or medieval eras.