Titan II Propellant Transfer Operations (1980)
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- Опубліковано 21 гру 2020
- This 1980 U.S. Air Force film instructs how to transfer propellant into a Titan II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Technicians are seen wearing a Rocket Fuel Handler's Coverall Outfit (RFHCO), also known as a "refco" suit. Air Force Propellant Transfer System technicians wore suits like this in the 1960s-1980s. The vapor-proof rubber suit was fire-resistant and completely enclosed the body when worn with a helmet, gloves, and boots.
Such suits were also known as a Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble, commonly called a SCAPE suit.
The National Museum of the U.S. Air Force web site has more about these rocket fuel handlers' suits at www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Vis....
The film is undated, but a June 1984 DOD audiovisual catalog on page C-163 dates the film as 1980:
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltex...
The Titan II ICBM was in service from 1963 through 1987.
Visit our web site at www.afspacemuseum.org. We're on Twitter at @afspacemuseum.
DVD_0136UMATIC - Наука та технологія
Can't believe I stumbled across this post. I served with 308th and 381st PTS.. I remember several of the guys in the film. Lots of deactivation memories and I'm proud of having been a part of all this.
I am currently working on a kind of simulator for titan 2 missle silo operations.
The last days I am searching for data like correct and incorrect tank pressure in PSI and time to drain and fill for each tank.
Are these informations still classified or just hard to find?
If this data is unclassified, some detailed data would be appreciated.
Thank you in advance :)
What was the purpose of loading and unloading? Does either of the two have a shelf life or something? Thank you for your service and God bless!
Lots of memories here! I was a senior crew deputy at MAFB and LRAFB in the final 3 years of Titan II and PTS was always a difficult experience. One of the toughest operations in the weapon system. Lots of brave maintenance personnel who did a great job, right until we took the last missile off alert.
My Husband was there... almost lost his life deflecting a leak with his glove...punched a hole in his glove... suit filled up with the oxidizer...Fortunately he still lives to tell about it...
@@annmorris3710 Glad to hear he made it.
@@ptonpc thanks...me to... Terrifying Life Experience...No one...and I mean No one could ever begin to understand an experience like his... unless they had been there...Sadly it all happened on his 21 Birthday too...Just makes me sad to think about it...
@Ann Morris. If you are referring to the incident at Rock Kan. , Aug. 21, 1978. I was a SP that was on duty and responded. I would like to speak with your husband. I currently live in Grants Pass Oregon. My phone number is not restricted. William C. Wisener , (381st. SPS. )
@@annmorris3710 His actions saved lives but it's not something anyone should have to go through. Thank you.
I was the 1st Lt., Sector Maintenance Officer (SMO), in this film. Brought back great memories, dedicated, professional team members.
(My last name was Posluszny back then)
I am currently working on a kind of simulator for titan 2 missle silo operations.
The last days I am searching for data like correct and incorrect tank pressure in PSI and time to drain and fill for each tank.
Are these informations still classified or just hard to find?
If this data is unclassified, some detailed data would be appreciated.
Thank you in advance :)
@@ukomoto sounds like a great project, keep us posted!
So that's what a ref-Co looks like, reading Command and Control about the Damascus incident, scary and heartbreaking, brave men indeed
I read Command and Control a couple of years ago - a well-written account of a Titan II propellant (oxidizer) release accident ... this video provides some nice visual context to go along with the book.
Read that book also. It’s a great book.
Great book. if you're in the Tucson area take the Titan 2 Museum tour. Get to sit in control room chair.
You know my husband keeps telling me that there was a movie made about the accident and I have yet to find it... Of course he got no royalties from it...
Not that he would have expected any royalties but was never offered any of course...
@@johncasey281 We did one year... we took the children...
Lesson one: Don't drop the socket
The double checking checking of checklist and still made a mistake the more complex you make things more things and go wrong
So many things went wrong during that incident, doors wedged open, tools not available, training and equipment degraded etc.
@@jasonjamrs7413 this are dependent
Of the ppl you use!! Trained monkeys
Or engineer !!! Difrence is
Engineer s know how TOXIC this is
Monkeys don't!!
I remember watching the movie they made about that incident.
@corey Babcock Disaster at Silo 7
Those are the best-looking ref/co suites I ever saw most of the ones I saw in real life had patches all over them
I remember these PTS operations well. I was on a launch crew and can remember the smell of the fuel during and after the PTS operations. I was on crew at McConnell AFB, 1971-75. These PTS guys were very brave airmen.
This is cool viewing
Spent some time in the Silo at Rock Ks. Project Pacer Down . Silos couldn't be hardened plus that liquid fuel problem among others. Dad worked on the Atlas F . Schilling AFB Salina Ks was home for them.
thank you for keeping us all safe sir and mam from canada here salute
Chewing gum while talking to an officer- only in the Air Force.
My first USAF assignment was in PTS at the 308 MIMS, Little Rock. Great video, but leaving for the missile site from the base during a recycle was well before the sun rose, unlike in this video!
Are you still in the Arkansas area?
I wonder if it really was like this, or if a culture of shortcuts and good-enough, took over after a few years?
Liquid fuel missiles didn't have room for good enough.
The fuel was not only incompatible with human life it also ignited if combined with the oxidizer.
you might not sleep well if you read up about how the US neglected upgrades of the control computers until 2016 approx..
Yes it was really like this...My Husband was there...
@@danielrazulay Dunno, seems like running nuke silos on tapes is preferable to windows 11 honestly.
@@tricitiesair Nitrogen chemistry is complex and unpleasant once oxygen and hydrogen get involved. The oxidizer especially has a constant 3-way chemical equilibrium and this is temperature and pressure dependent. You can see the care required to handle it, the fuel (Aerozine 50) is if anything worse in toxicity although more stable.
When I grow up I wanna be a Titan II Propellant Transfer Technician…
Did anyone else notice the NCOIC chewing the gum like there was no tomorrow? Heck of a time too want a smoke…
Rather see him chewing cud than smoking anywhere near that place anyway right?
@@annmorris3710 not problem
When they ask for volunteers to "gas up some vehicles" don't raise your hand.
2 people had to be present when used or unused code sheets were burned as they required that 2 signatures were signed that the code sheet was destroyed and accounted for.
So all you'd need to do to gain unauthorized access is to ambush the convoy on its way to the site from the base and obtain the code sheet. Now, um, how difficult would that be? The base would be a known location, the launch facility would be a known location and the rout between them would be known.
Am I missing something or is there a vital security step we aren't seeing in this?
@@johnrauner2515 The launch facility wouldn't be a known location necessarily. The route could lead in the direction of several possible sites.
Security forces go along with the convoy and everyone is in radio contact.
I've driven along highways that go along some of the roads that lead to these sites in North Dakota.(in the middle of nowhere.) There's people out there, watching.(in vehicles)
You almost get the feeling that you're trespassing, even though you're not.
You get the feeling that if you were to pull over on the side of the highway some folks would be coming along to assist you pretty quickly.
@@electrolytics Helicopters usually monitoring/guarding as well. Later! OL J R :)
@@johnrauner2515 you do realize if they don’t have contact I think 3 minutes after they enter the gate they aren’t getting in? And they have a team show up after that 3 mins so no not going to happen. Plus there’s 3 different doors before even entering the blast lock? Also all 3 doors have cameras.
@@johnrauner2515 here’s the video of the actual full procedure from the museums UA-cam ua-cam.com/video/GzCXBIXh294/v-deo.html
Air Force Training Film....friend of mine was a S.P. on the Griff they guarded the nukes etc.
Damascus must've scared the AF into reaffirming how to do things.
Delivery anywhere in the world in 20 minutes or your next one is free? 🙄
Crazy to think that they used to use UDMH rather than solid fuel.
Solide tale Up more SPACE
This if you look at IT
Have more power on less
SPACE
And the siloes need to be way
Deeper if solid ..solid became a THING
On the shuttel.. in the 80 this is way Way before
REMEMBER the SPACE program started whit titan 2 as lift body
At the time storable liquid propellants were a HUGE improvement over the first generation liquid oxygen/kerosene propellant missiles like Atlas, Titan 1, and the Soviet R-7 Semyorka (still in use today as the "Soyuz rocket"). Liquid oxygen is negative 291 degrees, so it's a cryogenic liquid that has to be stored at extremely low temperatures and in pressurized systems. Unfortunately due to the low temperatures it constantly boils off in the lines and missile propellant tanks, so those early missiles had to be stored with the propellant tanks DRY and IF the missile needed to be launched, it couldn't be until the propellant was loaded into the missile. In times of crisis, the missiles could only stand "on alert" ready to launch for a finite period of time, basically until the liquid oxygen storage dewars adjacent to the coffin launcher or missile silo ran out of liquid oxygen, since the tanks of the missile required constant "topping up" of liquid oxygen due to boiloff, and venting of the boiled off oxygen vapors from the tank to prevent the tanks from overpressurizing and rupturing. Once the dewars were empty, the boiloff would go unreplenished until the missile no longer had enough oxidizer to perform its mission. It would be "out of commission" until the dewars were refilled so that the missile could go back on alert. Fueling operations for the old liquid oxygen missiles took hours, so yeah lots of operational limitations and disadvantages to the old Atlas/Titan 1's and Soviet R-7.
Engineers figured out pretty quickly that room-temperature storable liquid propellants would be far superior. Since they're room temperature liquids, they don't have to worry about boiloff issues like liquid oxygen, and can be stored in the missile tanks for very long periods of time, so the missile can stand "on alert" for long periods of time fully fueled and ready to launch at the turn of a key, like solid propellant missiles. The downside is, they're VERY toxic (hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer) and require the use of "space suits" and very careful propellant handling to prevent exposure and death. They're also highly corrosive and hypergolic, meaning they ignite on contact with each other... this means leaks are particularly dangerous, from a fire danger as well as toxic vapor danger perspective. This was the reason that the US Navy decided to develop solid propellants for their submarine based Polaris missiles, since the risks of toxic vapors and flammable liquid propellants capable of igniting on contact was deemed too dangerous for a submarine (fire aboard ship is the biggest nightmare for ship or sub personnel). Solid propellants can't leak or ignite on contact or emit toxic vapors, etc. The Soviets didn't have solid propellant technology for large missiles until later, so most of their ICBM's and SLBM's were storable liquid propellant fueled until the 1970's.
Titan II, using storable liquid propellants, was a huge improvement over Atlas/Titan I in this regard, despite the dangers of handling the toxic, corrosive, and hypergolic propellants. Liquid oxygen had it's own dangers in handling, being cryogenic and pure oxygen has the tendency to burst into flame on contact with anything flammable, and to burn extremely vigorously... even the oils in a fingerprint can ignite in contact with liquid oxygen, aluminum will burn like rubber with liquid oxygen, even diamond burns in liquid oxygen. SO they were used to dealing with the hazards of liquid propellant; storable liquid propellants just had some different issues from liquid oxygen.
As development of the solid propellant technology advanced, it was clear that future missiles would be solid propellant. No tanks, no valves, no complex mechanical rocket engines, it's a solid so it cannot leak, no toxic vapors or cryogenic temperatures, etc. The fuel is much denser, so more can be stored in a smaller missile. Speaking scientifically, the most EFFICIENT propellant for missiles is liquid oxygen and kerosene, it has the highest specific impulse or "fuel economy" in layman's terms, (yes liquid hydrogen/oxygen is higher but not used in missiles because liquid hydrogen has a whole 'nother set of complications in its use); storable propellants like hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide have lower ISP (specific impulse) thus it takes more of it to do the same job, which is why Titan II is larger than the LOX/kerosene Titan I (plus greater payload/heavier warhead, which required more fuel to propel it to its target). Solid propellant has the lowest ISP, but it's denser and thus more fuel fits in a smaller missile. Operational concerns outweigh sheer efficiency, IOW, solid propellant is "good enough". The solid propellant Polaris was much smaller than its Soviet storable liquid propellant missile counterparts. It was clear that solid propellants was the "wave of the future" for all future ICBM's. The first Minuteman missiles went on alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minuteman was a much smaller missile than its predecessors, could stand on alert virtually indefinitely with its solid propellant ready to ignite at the turn of a key. The silos could be much smaller and simpler, allowing them to be hardened against nuclear attack much more than the larger, more complex silos required for liquid propellant missiles, which improved survivability of the missiles and lowered costs and made them much easier to build. It also did away with propellant handling in the silo for the missiles, since the missiles had its propellant cast in the rocket motor at the factory and thus none of these complex and dangerous operations, and none of the plumbing and monitoring/support systems required for propellant handling in the silo. The downside is, the missile is EXTREMELY HEAVY because it must be moved, transported, and emplaced in the silo FULLY FUELED, and of course there are procedures required for the safe handling of solid propellant missiles also since the propellant is already mixed together and cast into the motor casing, and any accident which would ignite the propellant would cause it to burn until it was all expended. Being that Minuteman and Polaris were fairly small missiles, these weight and handling issues were easily overcome (unlike the massive shuttle boosters and proposed 21.6-33 foot diameter monolithic solid propellant boosters NASA had been considering and even tested, but never developed further-- their sheer mass and handling difficulties made them infeasible operationally, at least cost-wise). Thus as Minuteman came online, it replaced Atlas and Titan I which were retired, and Titan II remained in service due to its huge warhead designed to destroy deeply hardened targets, at least until the Damascus incident revealed the weaknesses of the system and the costs involved were no longer deemed worth it, and Titan II was retired.
The Soviets too had quickly realized the drawbacks of LOX/kerosene propellants and instituted a crash program to develop storable liquid propellant missiles to replace R-7, like the R-9 and R-11 and subsequent missiles. Their haste and cutting corners on safety directly led to the 1960 "Nedelin disaster" where an R-9 missile on a launch pad for a test flight, fully fueled, developed a problem and rather than canceling the test, standing down, conducting the repairs, and rescheduling the test, the newly appointed head of the new Soviet Rocket Forces, the branch of service created to oversee the Soviet Union's nuclear ICBM force, decided to order the technicians to the pad to work on the fully fueled missile and conduct the repairs and continue the test. To "lead from the front", Marshal Nedelin went out to the pad along with his aides/entourage, while the missile was being worked on. Nobody realized it but a timer on the second stage had been activated and during the course of repairs, the upper stage ignited on the pad and its rocket engine blast soon burned through the top of the first stage's fully filled propellant tanks, rupturing them and collapsing the entire rocket onto the pad. The spilled liquid propellants ignited on contact, and clouds of toxic vapors gassed the survivors, as the entire area turned into a burning hellscape. Hundreds of technicians and rocket experts died, along with Marshal Nedelin and his aides; he was only identified by the partially melted medals he had been wearing (he was a highly decorated Soviet general from WW2). Those that survived were burned beyond recognition and the fire was so hot the tar in the access roads was melting and bubbling, with survivors having to run through it trying to get to safety. It was the greatest disaster in rocket history.
Later! OL J R :)
@@kennethschultz6465 No. Solid propellant is less efficient than liquids, BUT it's MUCH denser, so more fuel fits in a smaller package, which is exactly what you want for a missile. In addition, the solid propellant is mixed and cast as a paste into the motor casing and cured into a solid chunk at the factory, so there's NO propellant handing lines, valves, systems, monitors, vents, etc. required in the silo for solid propellant missiles versus liquid propellant missiles. This means the silo can basically just be a "hole in the ground" made from extremely hardened reinforced concrete, making the missile much harder to destroy than the larger, more complicated silos which cannot be built as hardened as the smaller solid propellant missile silos, making liquid propellant missiles more vulnerable to a nuclear attack. Basically the only thing solid propellant missiles need in the silo is a series of wiring/cable connections to the missile to monitor the sensors aboard the missile, program its guidance unit and provide power to it, and to order the missile to ignite when launched. Solid missiles are also much simpler, as there's no complex liquid rocket engine with propellant pumps and combustion chambers and injectors; solid propellant missiles use solid rocket motors which burn the premixed propellant from the center outwards, and exhaust the hot gases through rocket nozzles which steer the missile in flight under control of its guidance system.
The shuttle solid rockets came about as a cost-saving measure, and to simplify reusability. NASA did not have the money to develop the fully-reusable flyback shuttle booster which the original shuttle had been based upon, and had to team up with the Air Force to get the funding necessary to even finish the shuttle, which changed the shuttle program remarkably and not for the better. Solid propellants had always been deemed "too dangerous" for manned vehicles, precisely because they cannot be shut down once ignited-- they burn until the propellant is all expended. Liquid rocket motors can be commanded to shut down so a crew vehicle can escape if the booster is malfunctioning, solid propellant boosters cannot be shut down. NASA and the Air Force needed a reusable booster, and while experiments on dunking liquid rocket engines into salt water and then refurbishing and reusing them had been done, and various proposals for parachuting delicate liquid rocket boosters into the sea for recovery and reuse had been studied and proposed but never funded or attempted, landing a fragile thin-skinned and very large liquid rocket booster into the sea and recovering it and refurbishing it for reuse and certifying it 100% reliable (or as close as possible for a manned vehicle) was deemed too problematic. Reusable solid rocket boosters would use a very thick (about 2 inches thick) maraging steel (same steel used in submarine hulls, extremely tough material) casings to contain the rocket propellant and form the walls of the solid rocket motor, and thus were MUCH tougher and easier to recover after a parachute landing at sea and towing back to KSC for reuse. Liquid rockets landing in the sea would experience hard to predict landing forces, stressing the vehicle's airframe, possibly bending or stretching or at the very least stressing the metal structures and weakening them, and possibly causing propellant leaks or failure on subsequent flights, which is why solid propellant boosters were chosen for the shuttle. In point of fact, the solid rocket boosters of the shuttle cost SO MUCH to recover, refurbish, inspect, transport by train to Utah for more propellant to be cast inside them, and then transported back to the Cape and stored, and then transported, erected into the boosters, prepared for launch, transported to the pad, launched, and recovered again, that it would have been cheaper to simply make disposable boosters out of spiral-filament wound composite rocket motor casings like those used for missiles which are "single use only" fire and forget type vehicles. The failure of a solid rocket booster caused the death of 7 astronauts in the Challenger disaster.
Solid propellants are REALLY inefficient and heavy and hard to handle, which is why they're a very poor fit in the space program, where weight and ease of handling and the benefits of more efficient liquid propellant is a real bonus... which is WHY solid propellants, particularly LARGE solid propellant boosters like the Titan III/IV had, have been retired. Small monolithic solid propellant boosters like the Delta series rockets and more recently, the Atlas V and Delta IV use, have survived because they're good cheap "extra thrust" at liftoff and not as difficult to handle or expensive to operate as LARGE boosters like the segmented Titan III/IV SRM's or the Shuttle's huge segmented SRB's. Even going forward, NASA's new SLS will reuse old shuttle boosters, but NOT recover the casings, instead allowing them to crash into the ocean and break up and sink, as it's not cost-efficient to recover them. When the Air Force realized that Titan IV cost about the same as a shuttle launch, and opted to develop the EELV boosters to replace them, (Atlas V and Delta IV), only small solids ended up being used. For the "heavy" launch rocket versions, they reverted to a "common core" approach using two additional first stages virtually identical to the core (some minor differences between the two) flanking either side of the core and acting as huge LIQUID rocket boosters!
It's the same reason that Falcon 9 uses a LIQUID recoverable first stage, and land or shipboard landings, to simplify recovery and reuse. The Falcon Heavy uses the common-core concept using a pair of first stages on either side of the core as LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTERS, again returning to a land landing to simplify reuse.
Solid propellant is TERRIFIC for missiles-- no propellant handling and ready to go at a moment's notice for as long as the missile is "operational", but for space launch it's just a poor fit, particularly manned launches.
Later! OL J R :)
At 7:58 there’s a fellow with very long hair. Was that allowed during this or any period?
I think there was one woman in the film..
In the Canadian Armed Forces hair cannot touch the ears and definitely not the collar. Then there's these yahoos that let hair just do whatever. Must not be much for standards in the US military.
That’s a female.
Is it just me or does the guy in the thumbnail look like Herman from The Munsters?
One man in a white shirt. What is his job, and why would he be in a distinctly different uniform?
??
Safety Officer
@@terencefraser3395 If this was an oil facility, everyone would have safety glasses and no one would have their sleeves rolled up.
The white shirt was thermo underwear, It was part of the RFHCO.
the low ranking man on the team usually coded in not a Msgt......
Damn Russians
What do Russians have to do with anything in this video? Incase you have a low IQ this is about the US Air Force maintaining ICBM systems in USA. At that time they had an arms race with USSR, of which the Russian FSR was part of it.
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I was on the Nuclear Weapons Handling Team and part of the PRP aboard the destroyer I was stationed. This sounds basically the same as our checklists that we worked through…hours of tedium and constant alert might be why my adrenals are now completely empty 🫤