Well done! Repeated games are one of the more difficult topics to explain, and this presentation should help many more people understand tit-for-tat and cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
there are quite some channels out there, that seem to be managed by a student. they post videos december/early in the year and around june/july/august. simply the time between semesters at an university. thats why many of these channels cover a specific field in detail, but not much more. i think the person behind "this place" studies biology, exspecially in the field of evolution.
Unconditionally nice guys finish last. No one should be nice to people who are trying to take an advantage of you. Also, most of these "nice guys" are not really being nice, but are (very poorly) trying to manipulate someone. They are just using niceness to get laid, so it is this very artificial kind of niceness, where they say nice things all the time, but never really self-sacrifice, and when they just come across as creepy, they cry how women only date jerks. Then there are the genuinely nice guys, but they don't advertise themselves as "the nice guy", but think that being nice is just part of basic human decency, so they don't make a big deal out of it. I would be extremely wary of people who all the time advertise some quality of theirs. Be it their niceness, intelligence, morality, whatever. It usually means they are trying to take the attention away from some other shady shit they are up to.
Dude, "nice guys finish last" doesn't even refer to romantic/sexual endeavors. Though it can be applied to them, that's not the point of the saying. I wasn't thinking about that at all when I wrote this.
No. It proves that the optimal strategy in a prisoner's dilemma scenario is to retaliate immediately, and always be the second to forgive. That's not what I would call good. It's not necessarily evil either. It's just the best strategy. The prisoner's dilemma has a reward system designed to encourage cooperation anyway. The fact that a "good" strategy beats out an "evil" one is due to the way the reward system is designed; not an inherent law of nature. Not all reward systems work this way, so we can't call this a proof for good vs evil.
@@MrFishtoot It's not a stupid thing to ask, because actually that's a good and important question. His comment saying that "this is not a law of nature" is nonsense and false, because this strategy and rewarding system is exactly how nature by itself works. We can see this proof everywhere we look in the evolution of animals and also in today's economy. We humans managed as species to get this far and developed because we learned how to cooperate and as a result we evolved much better comparing to solitary animals or any uncooperating species. Retaliating when necessary and cooperating when is fair is a very good strategy in life.
I had a contest like this in my computer science class. Each strategy played each other one 200 times. My program started by cooperating, then acted like tit-for-tat unless one of two things was true: either the opponent had defected more often than cooperated or the opponent had defected 5 or more times. I also submitted an alternate program that was the same, except it always defected on the last round.
I'm a golfer and I still hate all the points that I'm left with at the end of a round and I would like them to pack up, leave and take the kids with them.
Right. But it cant be pathologically compassionate, which is why communism always gets the boot. And it cant be pathologically narssistic, which is why cronyism degenerates. But there is still competition...a competition of competing strategies. There isnt a Jesus Christ strategy where one it has been established it always and everywhere shall be flr all time.
roidroid Such impudence! The letter G is not multiplying. It is just the duality of G. One is two, and two are one. It is the same being in two different forms.
What a great video! Most people don't realize it, but game theory is build in to our very genes, and indeed the genes of every living organism. You really illustrate this point in an easy to understand way. I remember reading about these tournaments in The Selfish Gene, a book that quite literally changed my view of what life is in a radical way.
I really like that book. I learned about evolution in high school and university but didn't really get an understanding for it till that book. I can't believe how old it is though. We should have been learning evolution through that lens the whole time.
This Place The gene-centered view of evolution is very useful model for thinking about how life works, but it's also a very challenging and counter-intuitive way of thinking about how life works. We humans love to feel important, and it's hard to feel important if one sees oneself as merely a vehicle constructed by their genes for the "purpose" of gene replication. The more you learn about biology, though, the more this view rings true. Consider the sea squirt, a creature that develops a brain during its larval stage, but as soon as it reaches the next part of its life cycle it finds a nice comfy spot to anchor and live out the rest of its existence without the need to move or react to its environment in any way. Then the first thing it does is digest its own brain and nervous system since they're no longer useful to the genes of that organism. We only have a brain, and by extension a consciousness, because it's useful to our genes for their vehicle to be able to move around and react in real time to happenings in their environment. Then you can start to think about all the many and varied ways that our genes manipulate our consciousness to their own ends, and you start to realize how deep that rabbit hole goes. This is precisely why I think metacognition is one of the most important things we can do, unless we consider our own thoughts and why they occur to us, we're slaves to the unthinking will of our genes; but as soon as we see the chains for what they are, they melt away. And make no mistake, what is best for us is not the same as what is best for our genes. Our genes will tell us that sacrificing ourselves for two siblings or eight first cousins is a roughly even trade. Our genes know nothing of human flourishing, they simply run on the unthinking calculus of how to best replicate; and most of us are running their operating system on the hardware of our minds without even thinking about it, we're walking around on complete auto-pilot. That's why The Selfish Gene is more than just an interesting book, it's an important book; and I'm glad that you're bringing many of the concepts contained therein to a new generation.
It feels like after your comment got This Place's attention you saw it as an opportunity to share thoughts so you immediately tried to say everything you could that was relevant lol
bwoy12345 Sure. I have quite a bit to say about the gene-centered view of evolution and I don't know very many people who understand it well enough to talk about it with.
New strategy : TIT FOR 1 1/2 TATS basically TIT FOR TAT, but it defects every other enemy defection, doesn't matter if they are back-to-back or 100 rounds away. Plus, if the opponent defects at the same time, it becomes TIT FOR TAT as long as the opponent keeps defecting, then when the opponent cooperates again, it switches back to itself, as in defect on the second defection. It may not do as well as regular TIT FOR TAT, but it might just be better than FORGIVING TIT FOR TAT, since it would still retaliate on strategies like TESTER, while still preventing defection echos.
Yeah, I was wondering what a "less forgiving" tit for tat would be like. For instance, it "forgives" the first time, but then if they do it again, the programming swaps to regular tit for tat mode unless they "play fair" for some number of rounds, after which it goes back to being forgiving. You could call "only forgives once" version "fool me once" or something like that. Then you could make several variants that have different requirements for rounds of fair play before switching back to "forgiving" mode, and see which works out the best. You could also try variants like having it so each time they "betray" it sticks to regular tit for tat mode even longer before going back to being forgiving, and/or after a certain number of betrayals it *never* leaves tit for tat mode.
I love how the Prisoner's Dilemma has so many applications to the real world. Evolution, company rivalry, and even how people interact with each other.
The book didn't give much description of it. Harrington isn't the name of the strategy (nor is JOSS), these are the last names of the people who entered them into those tournaments. That may be why you can't find info on them. Most of the strategies in the book were referred to that way. But here is where the passage talking about it. Or if that is a temporary link search for "harrington evolution of cooperation" and it should bring it up. books.google.ca/books?id=GxRo5hZtxkEC&pg=PT33&lpg=PT33&dq=harrington+evolution+of+cooperation&source=bl&ots=j4qSHfDXTE&sig=71hE72G-aiTDFzYqvttJnczbNn8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiu6dnRwN3NAhUj9IMKHa7iDHcQ6AEIIjAA#v=onepage&q=harrington%20evolution%20of%20cooperation&f=false
I have watched 3 to 4 video about Prisoner's Dilemma but this is the first one with such in depth look into the strategies, really liked it. Thanks making this!
I remember hearing of this, in a "Social Darwinism" context. People always asume that the *most complex* one are the best adapted. But this is an actuall test where one of the least complex tactics (just copy the other sides last move) won. It was way less complex then any other strategy entered (except maybe "always play nice") but still won out.
When you consider that life consists of a bunch of squishy computers, it's hard not to appreciate our mental algorithms, which are so complex regarding strategy, that we make and seek out videos such as this.
I love this video so much! I see life as an (endless) iterated prisoner's dilemma, I was just never able to put it in words why I think we are all better off cooperating (with an occasional punishment). Thank you for making this! :)
This is such a well-animated and well-explained video! I wonder if it makes sense to defect on the very last move because you can’t be retaliated against? EDIT oooh I just read the description and I see you discussed it there
The party game Jack Box has a prisoner's dillema like question pop up in one of the minigames. Every year when we play it at the LAN party, the question comes up "take the money, and everyone who didn't loses the game. But if everyone takes the money, everyone loses the game. If no one takes the money, nothing happens" and the answer is to always take the money. As that scenario requires that everyone else in the group also takes the money for you to lose the game.
The fascinating thing about this is that it even explains interspecies cooperation. Kropotkin's Mutual Aid was a hugely popular work when it was first pulished, and I think we've spend much of the last century in denial of the evidence for cooperation, because no one could think of a reason it might exist. Now we know! Thanks!
This is by far my favourite video on youtube right now. actually - aside from music or other amusement related videos i would say it is the most easy to follow and interesting videos ive seen sofar. i really am happy to find this masterpiece
It's supposed to demonstrate why certain strategies (like tit-for-tat) evolve in environments where the reward system is similar to that of the prisoner's dilemma. These sorts of environments are often, though not necessarily always, present in real life scenarios. In that sense, yes; it can be used to demonstrate the benefits of strategic patterns in certain (but not all) real life scenarios. The important factor here is the reward system. As reward rules change, strategies will change to fit them.
ok, this is getting a bit creepy now I randomly decided to try 999 a week ago, around 5-6 years after a friend of mine suggested it. I did google a few things up (ice-9, glycerin, "can I find Snake?") then I find out there's a new game (ZTD) and bump into a 999 live gameplay 00:00 today and I find this comment here. Morphogenetic fields playing tricks on my unconscious
I like how this video kinda explains why many animals have some kind of moral (many experiments have shown that humans aren't the only animals with a sense of morality)
I did a presentation on this in grad school. We held a little iterated prisoners dilemma with starburst candies as the reward :). Then we broke down the math of it a little bit. You explained it very well, and I appreciate your animations. As a funny aside: I met my wife in that class :).
Yeah, but since both defecting is worse for the group, once tit for traitors kill off a portion of the tit for tats, they'll get less than the tit for tats get with each other.
In the 2nd tournament, the host did not disclose how many rounds there would be specifically to avoid this, as it goes against the spirit of the experiment
Only so long as organisms gain benefits based on a system of rules similar to the prisoner's dilemma. Depending on the distribution of rewards, you will see different variations in strategy evolve.
Amazing new video Jesse! Why don't you have a billion subscribers yet?? Can't wait to translate this one and the older prisoners dilemma video alongside the others... once the caption translations are turned on that is.
Wonderful analysis. I highly recommend that everyone actually read Axelrod's book: it's actually incredibly accessible to everyone and it's incredibly informative and thought-provoking.
Actually tit for tat still wouldnt be optimal. The optimal one would be tit for tat where you always pick "defect" on the last round, since that would be the most beneficial move that would have no consequences.
"And they didn't do a set 200 rounds; that way nobody would know when the interaction would end." Pro tip: When the people who clearly know a lot about a topic (like Jesse, or the people running the tournament) tell you something, they're *probably right*, especially when your counter-point feels oh so clever. Before you try correcting them maybe try re-examining the evidence with your Thinking Cap on.
I highly recommend everyone playing "The Evolution of Trust" free online flash game by Nicky Case. It's basically an interactive version of this video that's easier to understand and where you can change some rules to see how it changes which strategies survive.
7:47 that's interesting. It's like the Tit4Tat here is committing a suicide attack, taking out both it's opponent AND ITSELF, for the protection of the rest of the Tit4Tat family.
Only four years late, but here's Harrington described in The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod: "To give an example, the best of the rules which was not nice was submitted by Paul Harrington and ranked eighth. This rule is a variant of TIT FOR TAT which has a check for RANDOM, and a way of getting out of alternating defections (echo effects), and also a method of seeing what it can get away with. It always defects on move 37 and with increasing probability after that unless the other player defects immediately after one of these defections, in which case it no longer defects randomly. It did not do as well as TIT FOR TAT with any of the five representatives, but it 202 Tournament Results suffered most from the second representative. With that entry it got 37.2 points less than TIT FOR TAT did. This second representative is REVISED STATE TRANSITION, modified from the supplementary rule of round one and submitted in round two by Jonathan Pinkley. REVISED STATE TRANSITION models the other player as a one-step Markov process. It makes its own choice so as to maximize its own long-term payoff on the assumption that this model is correct. As Harrington's rule defected more and more, the REVISED STATE TRANSITION rule kept a running estimate of the probability that the other would cooperate after each of the four possible outcomes. Eventually REVISED STATE TRANSITION determined that it did not pay to cooperate after the other exploited it, and soon thereafter it also determined that it did not even pay to cooperate after a mutual cooperation."
It turns out that the strategy that actually scored the best was one that was entered a ton of times and what it did was see if its opponent was also the same thing it was by starting off with a pattern of defect/cooperate, then, if the opponent had the same source code as it did, it shared how many points it had in the tournament total. The place with the lower score would always cooperate and the player with the higher score would always defect. This allowed the program to score even higher because there were many cases where its opponent was actually trying to help it.
Adding my specific datum point. We had a tournament in a Game Theory class I was in where we made our own strategy (I, of course, played always defect for reasons that would require you to have been in the class to understand). Tit for tat actually was defeated by what was in effect "tit for tat, but defect at the end." The last round wasn't known a priori, but one person correctly guessed it to win.
well done, this video summarized todays endless 3h lecture very nicely. Now I got the gist of what my professor wanted and can include the complicated equations he used to describe those models...meh
Great video. For future videos my request is more complicated subjects. All your previous videos explained stuff so well i understood them twice. Why not make it twice as complicated, so I and others only understand it once?
This comes up in Ch.8 of Hurford, James R. (2007) _Origins of Meaning_ as well, in the context of the evolution of language, if people want another reference. (Just one I read in class and enjoyed). Nice presentation.
What about a adaptive strategy that uses the first rounds to identify the other strategy, to then apply the best counter-strategy? One problem i see with adaptive is that it is only effective if there is very many rounds. This strategy also allows of an "anti-strategy"; pretender. The pretender pretends to be a different strategy in the beginning and then changes strategy once the adapter has applied its counter strategy ( pretender knows when adaptive has applied counter-strategy because adaptive will react the same way every round).
What about systems with more than two parties? For example: One where an individual can choose to betray the others for a higher profit, but where too many betraying parties results in a lower score for everyone. I'd like to see more analysis on these types of problems expanded into more dimensions.
I find it interesting that one could change what each aspect of the dilemma symbolizes and force a difference in strategy and thinking. For instance, if each number represented a loss in "points" or anything, different types of strategies would be more relevant and efficient. This flexible idea can start many things, especially stories for like gaming or TV shows and stuff! :O
There are other strategies, which you hadn't mentioned, and since then, players had made their own AIs, like Copykitten, a nicer version of Copycat (another name for Tit for Tat). Copykitten first cooperates twice, then only defects if the opponent defected twice. The idea is, if there's a small miscommunication chance, it would ignore any one-off mistake. But against a meaner 'gene pool', Copytiger is better. It cooperates, then Tit-for-Tats, then only cooperates when the opponent had cooperated twice. A strange effect is that if you have a starting scenario where Player 1 cooperates, while Player 2 defects, then you give them both the same AI, Tit for Tat alternates between defects and cooperations, Copykitten ignores it and immediately starts cooperating, and Copytiger first does a flipped version of the start, then proceeds to always defect. For more cimprehensable information, see ncase.me/trust. Also, Tit for Tat isn't the best strategy, because defecting in the 10th, final round has no consequences. :P
Could someone please discuss the prisoner's dilemma in Virtue's Last Reward? In this game, it's not just an "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma", but it's iterated with RANDOM OPPONENTS in the group! I really wonder what the best strategy is mathematically for that!
Well done! Repeated games are one of the more difficult topics to explain, and this presentation should help many more people understand tit-for-tat and cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Ayy Presh! :D
Heyo
I hate you
Mind your glasses
Prestolwolker
You know that they're not milking the video for revenue when the run time is 9:58
That's exactly what I mean, I wasn't trying to be sarcastic, sorry if it came off that way.
Wish it was 2 seconds longer, these people need money if they wanna survive on this site.
In late July monetization will be at 8 minutes
This didn’t age well
@Matthew_ you can monetize videos that are 8 minutes now
silent for half a year and then you reward us with 2 videos in a month?
This is madness... THIS IS ... This place.
Since it is July right now, I suspect school is the reason.
there are quite some channels out there, that seem to be managed by a student. they post videos december/early in the year and around june/july/august. simply the time between semesters at an university. thats why many of these channels cover a specific field in detail, but not much more.
i think the person behind "this place" studies biology, exspecially in the field of evolution.
I'm debating going with a sparta or Patrick joke..
Whenever anyone says "nice guys finish last", I just refer them to this dilemma.
Unconditionally nice guys finish last. No one should be nice to people who are trying to take an advantage of you. Also, most of these "nice guys" are not really being nice, but are (very poorly) trying to manipulate someone. They are just using niceness to get laid, so it is this very artificial kind of niceness, where they say nice things all the time, but never really self-sacrifice, and when they just come across as creepy, they cry how women only date jerks. Then there are the genuinely nice guys, but they don't advertise themselves as "the nice guy", but think that being nice is just part of basic human decency, so they don't make a big deal out of it. I would be extremely wary of people who all the time advertise some quality of theirs. Be it their niceness, intelligence, morality, whatever. It usually means they are trying to take the attention away from some other shady shit they are up to.
Dude, "nice guys finish last" doesn't even refer to romantic/sexual endeavors. Though it can be applied to them, that's not the point of the saying. I wasn't thinking about that at all when I wrote this.
If you google that phrase, +90% of results will be about romance.
Actually, it's a pretty even split. As far as image results go, it's almost entirely about romance, but otherwise, that's far from accurate.
When people refer to "nice guys" they don't refer to tit for that, they refer for the dude who, in this scenario, NEVER retaliates.
Why good beats evil in the end, proven with math
No. It proves that the optimal strategy in a prisoner's dilemma scenario is to retaliate immediately, and always be the second to forgive.
That's not what I would call good. It's not necessarily evil either. It's just the best strategy.
The prisoner's dilemma has a reward system designed to encourage cooperation anyway. The fact that a "good" strategy beats out an "evil" one is due to the way the reward system is designed; not an inherent law of nature. Not all reward systems work this way, so we can't call this a proof for good vs evil.
Except in the last round
"Evil will always triumph because good is dumb" - Dark Helmet.
This seems like a stupid thing to ask but could you give an example of a real world reward system that does not reward cooperation?
@@MrFishtoot It's not a stupid thing to ask, because actually that's a good and important question. His comment saying that "this is not a law of nature" is nonsense and false, because this strategy and rewarding system is exactly how nature by itself works. We can see this proof everywhere we look in the evolution of animals and also in today's economy. We humans managed as species to get this far and developed because we learned how to cooperate and as a result we evolved much better comparing to solitary animals or any uncooperating species.
Retaliating when necessary and cooperating when is fair is a very good strategy in life.
I had a contest like this in my computer science class. Each strategy played each other one 200 times. My program started by cooperating, then acted like tit-for-tat unless one of two things was true: either the opponent had defected more often than cooperated or the opponent had defected 5 or more times. I also submitted an alternate program that was the same, except it always defected on the last round.
That strategy would be the only viable non-nice strategy
him: everyone likes points
me:wait... golf.
Golf just has antipoints. You lose points when playing.
I'm a golfer and I still hate all the points that I'm left with at the end of a round and I would like them to pack up, leave and take the kids with them.
You know, it's always nice to have your worldview -- that cooperation is better than competition -- validated statistically.
Right. But it cant be pathologically compassionate, which is why communism always gets the boot. And it cant be pathologically narssistic, which is why cronyism degenerates.
But there is still competition...a competition of competing strategies. There isnt a Jesus Christ strategy where one it has been established it always and everywhere shall be flr all time.
I wish everyone had that mentality now a days. Everyone would all be winners no matter what.
You might enjoy reading Mutual Aid: A factor of evolution, by Peter Kropotkin.
@@m.kastro591 if everyone is the winner, then nobody is, because it would be 8 billion-way draw.
@@SN00888 Life isn't a zero sum game, you can gain without forcing someone else to lose.
Where can I get the letter G? There is no link in the discription
Believe, and the letter G will reveal the link to you.
+louisng114 GG
GG?
i wanted G when it was unique and exclusive, but now it looks like it's multiplying, i don't want it anymore.
roidroid Such impudence! The letter G is not multiplying. It is just the duality of G. One is two, and two are one. It is the same being in two different forms.
Silly you. It's like someone who is wearin lasses askin where their lasses are.
What a great video! Most people don't realize it, but game theory is build in to our very genes, and indeed the genes of every living organism. You really illustrate this point in an easy to understand way. I remember reading about these tournaments in The Selfish Gene, a book that quite literally changed my view of what life is in a radical way.
I really like that book. I learned about evolution in high school and university but didn't really get an understanding for it till that book. I can't believe how old it is though. We should have been learning evolution through that lens the whole time.
This Place
The gene-centered view of evolution is very useful model for thinking about how life works, but it's also a very challenging and counter-intuitive way of thinking about how life works. We humans love to feel important, and it's hard to feel important if one sees oneself as merely a vehicle constructed by their genes for the "purpose" of gene replication.
The more you learn about biology, though, the more this view rings true. Consider the sea squirt, a creature that develops a brain during its larval stage, but as soon as it reaches the next part of its life cycle it finds a nice comfy spot to anchor and live out the rest of its existence without the need to move or react to its environment in any way. Then the first thing it does is digest its own brain and nervous system since they're no longer useful to the genes of that organism.
We only have a brain, and by extension a consciousness, because it's useful to our genes for their vehicle to be able to move around and react in real time to happenings in their environment. Then you can start to think about all the many and varied ways that our genes manipulate our consciousness to their own ends, and you start to realize how deep that rabbit hole goes.
This is precisely why I think metacognition is one of the most important things we can do, unless we consider our own thoughts and why they occur to us, we're slaves to the unthinking will of our genes; but as soon as we see the chains for what they are, they melt away. And make no mistake, what is best for us is not the same as what is best for our genes. Our genes will tell us that sacrificing ourselves for two siblings or eight first cousins is a roughly even trade.
Our genes know nothing of human flourishing, they simply run on the unthinking calculus of how to best replicate; and most of us are running their operating system on the hardware of our minds without even thinking about it, we're walking around on complete auto-pilot. That's why The Selfish Gene is more than just an interesting book, it's an important book; and I'm glad that you're bringing many of the concepts contained therein to a new generation.
It feels like after your comment got This Place's attention you saw it as an opportunity to share thoughts so you immediately tried to say everything you could that was relevant lol
bwoy12345
Sure. I have quite a bit to say about the gene-centered view of evolution and I don't know very many people who understand it well enough to talk about it with.
waiting for the day that people discover this channel and it blows up
ill be watching like a proud father
"Video's over now."
Three videos in and I already love you. That was excellent.
New strategy : TIT FOR 1 1/2 TATS basically TIT FOR TAT, but it defects every other enemy defection, doesn't matter if they are back-to-back or 100 rounds away. Plus, if the opponent defects at the same time, it becomes TIT FOR TAT as long as the opponent keeps defecting, then when the opponent cooperates again, it switches back to itself, as in defect on the second defection. It may not do as well as regular TIT FOR TAT, but it might just be better than FORGIVING TIT FOR TAT, since it would still retaliate on strategies like TESTER, while still preventing defection echos.
"Tit For Tat but I'll Remember This."
Yeah, I was wondering what a "less forgiving" tit for tat would be like. For instance, it "forgives" the first time, but then if they do it again, the programming swaps to regular tit for tat mode unless they "play fair" for some number of rounds, after which it goes back to being forgiving.
You could call "only forgives once" version "fool me once" or something like that. Then you could make several variants that have different requirements for rounds of fair play before switching back to "forgiving" mode, and see which works out the best. You could also try variants like having it so each time they "betray" it sticks to regular tit for tat mode even longer before going back to being forgiving, and/or after a certain number of betrayals it *never* leaves tit for tat mode.
Kinda like we forgive, but not forget?
Smart
You are, by far, one of the best channel I know on UA-cam. I'd put You on the same level as Vsauce or Kurzegesagt, if not even higher.
Mix in Kurzegesagt's facts with Vsauce's philosophy. All three of them great channels. Oh and +1 to This Place for the satire at the end ;)
I love how the Prisoner's Dilemma has so many applications to the real world. Evolution, company rivalry, and even how people interact with each other.
Could you explain the HARRINGTON strategy? I couldn't find any articles.
The book didn't give much description of it. Harrington isn't the name of the strategy (nor is JOSS), these are the last names of the people who entered them into those tournaments. That may be why you can't find info on them. Most of the strategies in the book were referred to that way.
But here is where the passage talking about it. Or if that is a temporary link search for "harrington evolution of cooperation" and it should bring it up.
books.google.ca/books?id=GxRo5hZtxkEC&pg=PT33&lpg=PT33&dq=harrington+evolution+of+cooperation&source=bl&ots=j4qSHfDXTE&sig=71hE72G-aiTDFzYqvttJnczbNn8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiu6dnRwN3NAhUj9IMKHa7iDHcQ6AEIIjAA#v=onepage&q=harrington%20evolution%20of%20cooperation&f=false
If you'll forgive me asking, what is "the book"? It sounds interesting.
click "read more", there's a link
I think he provided one, I read about this in the Selfish Gene.
Exploitative strategies don't go extinct in the real world… As they say, "There's a sucker born every minute." An example would be con-men.
Where exactly can I order my G's ? I almost ran out recently and need to stock up a_ain. Damnit, I ran out of them, _reat...
Heres some g's gggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg
gg
Try Avoid7. Don’t use a seventh-symbol.
I have watched 3 to 4 video about Prisoner's Dilemma but this is the first one with such in depth look into the strategies, really liked it. Thanks making this!
I remember hearing of this, in a "Social Darwinism" context. People always asume that the *most complex* one are the best adapted.
But this is an actuall test where one of the least complex tactics (just copy the other sides last move) won. It was way less complex then any other strategy entered (except maybe "always play nice") but still won out.
When you consider that life consists of a bunch of squishy computers, it's hard not to appreciate our mental algorithms, which are so complex regarding strategy, that we make and seek out videos such as this.
I really wasn't expecting such a complete video on this subject
I love this video so much! I see life as an (endless) iterated prisoner's dilemma, I was just never able to put it in words why I think we are all better off cooperating (with an occasional punishment). Thank you for making this! :)
almost 100000 subs ?! this channel grows fast (it is what it deserves for this great quality)
They aren't growing fast enough. They deserve a lot more.
+Aveyago I agree
Read Axelrod's "Evolving New Strategies", watched this, reread Axelrod... much greater clarity now. Great video. Bravo
This is such a well-animated and well-explained video! I wonder if it makes sense to defect on the very last move because you can’t be retaliated against?
EDIT oooh I just read the description and I see you discussed it there
Hey Cary!
Oh so I see you've been planning this for a while... 👀
cool beans
This channel beats almost every other channel I'm subscribed to. The visuals and the small touches are priceless.
This would make an amazing evolution AI
The party game Jack Box has a prisoner's dillema like question pop up in one of the minigames. Every year when we play it at the LAN party, the question comes up "take the money, and everyone who didn't loses the game. But if everyone takes the money, everyone loses the game. If no one takes the money, nothing happens" and the answer is to always take the money. As that scenario requires that everyone else in the group also takes the money for you to lose the game.
"Hi welcome to trivia night!"
What is the Harrington strategy? I tried searching, but I cannot find about it anywhere.
The fascinating thing about this is that it even explains interspecies cooperation. Kropotkin's Mutual Aid was a hugely popular work when it was first pulished, and I think we've spend much of the last century in denial of the evidence for cooperation, because no one could think of a reason it might exist. Now we know! Thanks!
here's an idea, T4T but it always defects on the last turn
This is by far my favourite video on youtube right now. actually - aside from music or other amusement related videos i would say it is the most easy to follow and interesting videos ive seen sofar. i really am happy to find this masterpiece
Giggling like a child because of the plaque that reads T4T
I feel like I can listen to you talk for hours. Great job again. Keep it up!
This dumps a good part of religious and moral philosophy. Thanks for making it as simple as possible but not simpler.
I've rewatched this video about 6 times. I always find myself back to it.
This is supposed to be like life isn't it?
i think so
It's supposed to demonstrate why certain strategies (like tit-for-tat) evolve in environments where the reward system is similar to that of the prisoner's dilemma. These sorts of environments are often, though not necessarily always, present in real life scenarios. In that sense, yes; it can be used to demonstrate the benefits of strategic patterns in certain (but not all) real life scenarios.
The important factor here is the reward system. As reward rules change, strategies will change to fit them.
his avatar is earth and his name is this place. so yes
No.
It demonstrates how morality can arise from natural selection.
Dude my professor showed this too us in class and then i found the rest of your stuff on this channel, def. earned my sub.
Virtues Last Reward anyone?
Awesome game, have you played/ are playing Zero Time Dilemma?
ok, this is getting a bit creepy now
I randomly decided to try 999 a week ago, around 5-6 years after a friend of mine suggested it. I did google a few things up (ice-9, glycerin, "can I find Snake?") then I find out there's a new game (ZTD) and bump into a 999 live gameplay 00:00 today and I find this comment here. Morphogenetic fields playing tricks on my unconscious
I hadn't seen any ZTD or VLR news before playing and finding stuff
I was hoping to find a comment referencing VLR :P
^^
This is literally the most interesting video I've EVER seen, and overall one of the best videos I've seen.
Now I'm just wondering who got a worse score than a random strategy
Kabitu1 maybe an always defector?
Matheus Tran
Nah, HOTZ.
I like how this video kinda explains why many animals have some kind of moral (many experiments have shown that humans aren't the only animals with a sense of morality)
Where can I buy the letter G?
I did a presentation on this in grad school. We held a little iterated prisoners dilemma with starburst candies as the reward :). Then we broke down the math of it a little bit. You explained it very well, and I appreciate your animations. As a funny aside: I met my wife in that class :).
this is that game! The evolution of trust!
There is a very good interactive game called The Evolution of Trust which shows basically all of this stuff but in a game. It's really cool!
I made the portuguese translation :D
Brigaldo
Ty and gj :D
You're back! I'm so happy. Love your art style, explanations, and videos in general. Sharing the crap out of them.
Idea: Tit for traitor:
tit for tat
but it defects last round
so no reaction can be had
Yeah, but since both defecting is worse for the group, once tit for traitors kill off a portion of the tit for tats, they'll get less than the tit for tats get with each other.
In the 2nd tournament, the host did not disclose how many rounds there would be specifically to avoid this, as it goes against the spirit of the experiment
Another idea: reverse tester:
Betrays twice, then cooperate, then acts as tit for tat
You make some of the most informative and insightful videos on youtube
can this can explain why morals are they way they are? (I think so)
Excellent observation!
Also governments.
Yes it is often used in state of nature discussions and explains why the state was established.
Doesn't explain the state in the modern sense if you read anything by Kropotkin.
Only so long as organisms gain benefits based on a system of rules similar to the prisoner's dilemma.
Depending on the distribution of rewards, you will see different variations in strategy evolve.
I like the way you ended the video. "Video's over now." Perfect.
Are you an accordion player?
no but I really like it
Amazing new video Jesse! Why don't you have a billion subscribers yet?? Can't wait to translate this one and the older prisoners dilemma video alongside the others... once the caption translations are turned on that is.
God I love your voice. Have my baby?
i hate his voice ugh
He'll kill it
Intelligent thinking of linking this dilemma to evolution of cooperation. Well done and thank you!
Can't wait to get my letter G in the mail!
Wonderful analysis. I highly recommend that everyone actually read Axelrod's book: it's actually incredibly accessible to everyone and it's incredibly informative and thought-provoking.
What will you be doing for 100k subs?
nothing. but I give you permission to eat a cupcake in my honour.
+This Place , Can I have milk too?
milk is for winners
Milk for all!
My brother recommend this channel I'm so happy he did
Actually tit for tat still wouldnt be optimal. The optimal one would be tit for tat where you always pick "defect" on the last round, since that would be the most beneficial move that would have no consequences.
"And they didn't do a set 200 rounds; that way nobody would know when the interaction would end."
Pro tip: When the people who clearly know a lot about a topic (like Jesse, or the people running the tournament) tell you something, they're *probably right*, especially when your counter-point feels oh so clever. Before you try correcting them maybe try re-examining the evidence with your Thinking Cap on.
He just didn't listen to the whole thing.
Uh, i was obviously talking about the first scenario.
+luboisfat in which case forgiving tit for tat is more optimal, as are many many others methods.
TheAdmiralBacon But it clearly says in the graph that Tit for Tat is the best option.
Title:
Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences
Very well presented and captivating animations.
You can exploit tit-for-tatter by deflecting on the last round if you know what is the last round.
That's the JOSS strategy stated in the video.
+remilia scarlet no, JOSS deflects randomly, nat only on last iteration.
failing@commenting Oh,ok.
That strategy you said could work for the last round of the first one since the first tournament have a fixed 200 rounds.
It wouldn't be as good against itself.
Right like building trust with someone then stabbing them in the back. as you leave.
Waiting for the day people discover this channel and it booms.
You explain this very complicated.
the best person to present ideas : This Place
I highly recommend everyone playing "The Evolution of Trust" free online flash game by Nicky Case. It's basically an interactive version of this video that's easier to understand and where you can change some rules to see how it changes which strategies survive.
Extremely mind blowing and comprehensive video on this topic! Big thanks!!
I really love your videos! from your voice to the visuals and amazing soundtrack!
the evolution of trust feels like a game version of this video.
Huzzah! A fellow person of culture.
Huzzah! A fellow person of culture.
7:47 that's interesting. It's like the Tit4Tat here is committing a suicide attack, taking out both it's opponent AND ITSELF, for the protection of the rest of the Tit4Tat family.
"That's why I'm telling you about it only at the end" 10/10 would watch again
20 minutes of content in 10 minutes of video. great stuff
Your videos are so original and engaging, I'm surprised you're not much, much more poplar!
Only four years late, but here's Harrington described in The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod:
"To give an example, the best of the rules which was not nice was submitted by Paul Harrington and ranked eighth. This rule is a variant of TIT FOR TAT which has a check for RANDOM, and a way of getting out of alternating defections (echo effects), and also a method of seeing what it can get away with. It always defects on move 37 and with increasing probability after that unless the other player defects immediately after one of these defections, in which case it no longer defects randomly. It did not do as well as TIT FOR TAT with any of the five representatives, but it 202 Tournament Results suffered most from the second representative. With that entry it got 37.2 points less than TIT FOR TAT did. This second representative is REVISED STATE TRANSITION, modified from the supplementary rule of round one and submitted in round two by Jonathan Pinkley. REVISED STATE TRANSITION models the other player as a one-step Markov process. It makes its own choice so as to maximize its own long-term payoff on the assumption that this model is correct. As Harrington's rule defected more and more, the REVISED STATE TRANSITION rule kept a running estimate of the probability that the other would cooperate after each of the four possible outcomes. Eventually REVISED STATE TRANSITION determined that it did not pay to cooperate after the other exploited it, and soon thereafter it also determined that it did not even pay to cooperate after a mutual cooperation."
This video actually explained evolution with the help of math. Great job.
I love your videos! The animation and lecture styles used really appeal to me.
What can I do to support this channel?
It turns out that the strategy that actually scored the best was one that was entered a ton of times and what it did was see if its opponent was also the same thing it was by starting off with a pattern of defect/cooperate, then, if the opponent had the same source code as it did, it shared how many points it had in the tournament total. The place with the lower score would always cooperate and the player with the higher score would always defect. This allowed the program to score even higher because there were many cases where its opponent was actually trying to help it.
Excellent video. Summed up and explained the last few chapters in the Selfish Gene really well 👍
Really good way of putting this. Well done
Adding my specific datum point. We had a tournament in a Game Theory class I was in where we made our own strategy (I, of course, played always defect for reasons that would require you to have been in the class to understand). Tit for tat actually was defeated by what was in effect "tit for tat, but defect at the end." The last round wasn't known a priori, but one person correctly guessed it to win.
I like the different viewpoint to this topic, very interesting and informative.
"That's a healthy piece of real estate!" - Everyone's favorite blue midget Homestar, Homsar on the letter G
well done, this video summarized todays endless 3h lecture very nicely. Now I got the gist of what my professor wanted and can include the complicated equations he used to describe those models...meh
Great video. For future videos my request is more complicated subjects. All your previous videos explained stuff so well i understood them twice. Why not make it twice as complicated, so I and others only understand it once?
This comes up in Ch.8 of Hurford, James R. (2007) _Origins of Meaning_ as well, in the context of the evolution of language, if people want another reference. (Just one I read in class and enjoyed). Nice presentation.
Fantastic explanation and I like that you used the tournament results.
What about a adaptive strategy that uses the first rounds to identify the other strategy, to then apply the best counter-strategy?
One problem i see with adaptive is that it is only effective if there is very many rounds.
This strategy also allows of an "anti-strategy"; pretender. The pretender pretends to be a different strategy in the beginning and then changes strategy once the adapter has applied its counter strategy ( pretender knows when adaptive has applied counter-strategy because adaptive will react the same way every round).
Great content as usual! Thank you :) Hope the channel keeps growing.
Just as good if not better than the veritasium version. Fantastic video.
I think you described the unexpected hanging paradox in the description.
What about systems with more than two parties?
For example: One where an individual can choose to betray the others for a higher profit, but where too many betraying parties results in a lower score for everyone.
I'd like to see more analysis on these types of problems expanded into more dimensions.
Pretty interesting! And manages to explain a lot of stat/ideological concepts in a pretty absorbable way! Nice!
Double Grudger: Grudger, but let 1 defect through.
It's taking me a bit to wrap my head around this but it's really cool
I find it interesting that one could change what each aspect of the dilemma symbolizes and force a difference in strategy and thinking. For instance, if each number represented a loss in "points" or anything, different types of strategies would be more relevant and efficient. This flexible idea can start many things, especially stories for like gaming or TV shows and stuff! :O
There are other strategies, which you hadn't mentioned, and since then, players had made their own AIs, like Copykitten, a nicer version of Copycat (another name for Tit for Tat). Copykitten first cooperates twice, then only defects if the opponent defected twice. The idea is, if there's a small miscommunication chance, it would ignore any one-off mistake. But against a meaner 'gene pool', Copytiger is better. It cooperates, then Tit-for-Tats, then only cooperates when the opponent had cooperated twice. A strange effect is that if you have a starting scenario where Player 1 cooperates, while Player 2 defects, then you give them both the same AI, Tit for Tat alternates between defects and cooperations, Copykitten ignores it and immediately starts cooperating, and Copytiger first does a flipped version of the start, then proceeds to always defect. For more cimprehensable information, see ncase.me/trust.
Also, Tit for Tat isn't the best strategy, because defecting in the 10th, final round has no consequences. :P
Wow the videos just keep coming... it's like christmas :D
This made me rethink Game Theory, thanks!
Could someone please discuss the prisoner's dilemma in Virtue's Last Reward? In this game, it's not just an "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma", but it's iterated with RANDOM OPPONENTS in the group! I really wonder what the best strategy is mathematically for that!