Pinned post for Q&A :) EDIT: With regards to the '7 out of 8 battleships' line, I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line, apologies!
Given that the ships used were either their designs or iterations on their designs what was Britain's and France's reactions to the Battle of Tsushima, did it lead to a massive need to redesign their ships and their doctrine given how much damage both the Russians and Japanese ships took in the battle and how most of the features which were meant to be safe failed?
In your "BB clash at Leyte", how many 18inch hits from Yamato do you assumed were necessary to destroy a standard type BB? Also, what damage could their 14inch and 16inch guns have done to Yamato's turrets? What damage can a non-penetrating hit do to equipment and personnel inside?
Lee made the right call. He had little to gain by trying to go toe-to-toe with the Japanese in a night fight, and a lot to lose. At that point in the war, American air power was so dominant that it may well have seemed the Navy wasn't going to take meaningful casualties for the rest of the war, with the exception of the occasional sub attack. Why gamble away a winning advantage by playing into your enemy's few remaining strengths? The only thing that made the IJN relevant again was the kamikaze, and they didn't adopt that until the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
@@jeffm1463 That said, the fleet carriers didn’t really need protection against Japanese surface ships-unlike Taffy 3, the fast carrier taks force could simply outrun Japanese battleships, and the distances involved meant that the odds of the Japanese surface units even coming into contact with the fast carrier task force was remote.
I’m not sure you can say that a “winning advantage” was really on the line….BUT, sailors lives certainly were on the line in that event - and from what I’ve learned of Lee, he fully understood that factor.
@@jimtalbott9535 Very good point. The US was far enough ahead in the war that the total loss of Lee's entire group wouldn't have made a difference to the strategic picture. But it would have made the potential loss of life that much more appalling.
I agree that Lee made the right call but by 1944 the USN had it's own countervailing advantages. Such an engagement would have been in the environment that prewar planners envisioned except it would have been at night. Unlike Guadalcanal radar would have much more effective and would put the US at a tactical advantage allowing them to gain a favorable position before the engagement began. The only significant threat was the Long Lance. A gun duel, particularly with capital units, would have been one sided. The Japanese could not hit what they could not visually see while the USN could. The Japanese battleline was slower so Lee could have dictated the range and stayed out of visual spotting range. Long range at night was 20kyd+, well within effective gunnery range for blindfire capable ships.
To Lee's credit, it was very telling that he didn't take up the engagement. A LOT of commanders would have taken up the challenge for their own self-aggrandizement. He did the right thing.
@@liverofADPIE Lee was faunching at the bit to get back to Leyte, but Halsey kept jerking him around. Halsey should have been cashiered long before he knda-sorta was.
@seventhson27 - hum wonders why Halsey comes to mind? Could it be the battle action at Leyte Gulf comes to mind, this meant that Taffy 3 was to do Halsey job which meant that Taffy 3 defended the carriers left behind. The destroyers like USS Johnson who fought like battleships.
My Grandfather fought and lost his leg during the massive Banzai Charge while operating a M1917 Machine Gun. He was eternally grateful to Admiral Spruance/Lee for protecting their backsides instead of sending the battleships off into an Egotistical machoism contest. It meant the world to the men fighting and dying on the Island that the Fleet didn't leave them.
The battleships and some cruisers would have left, not the entire fleet. Imagine Leyte Gulf, without the Japanese Fleet having a chance to be present since they are on the ocean floor.
Anything could have happened, but even the best case outcome of a crushing US victory seems less good than the historic outcome, so I'd rate Lee's decision pretty highly. Lee seemed to understand the US strengths and felt obliged to play to them even though it meant he'd be playing 2nd fiddle - good man.
Keep in mind there was likely some other things related to Intelligence that may have been going on there. Spruance had just been briefed in on the intelligence coup of getting their hands on Admiral Toga's Z plans. The Japanese Navy's plans for the defense of the Marianas. Right as they were departing for Saipan. Given the extremely classified nature of that intel he was limited in who else could be briefed in. Plus he was limited by who was already at sea. Inducations are Lee likely knew of the documents contents at that point. Mitcher and McCain among others, did not. Anyone who read that document knew the Japanese plan was likely to bait out the American fleet so Japanese surface units could run around the flank and attack the Marine invasion forces. Lee likely did not want to give chase, because the Japanese plan wanted him to give chase. Expected him to do so. And he knew this.
I find it it amusing, I got into these videos (in part) because I need something interesting to listen to during my commutes, and Drach you apparently started the channel because, of all things, an interest in having something interesting to listen to on your commutes! Thanks for another quality video.
Podcasts and "longform" videos like much of Drach's catalogue make the commute to work one of my favorite parts of the day now. And when you don't finish a long video on the morning commute you have something to look forward to at lunch.
@@wallybooger1 The Voyage of the Damned Part 1 & 2! Probably the funniest of all Drach's videos simply because of one vesseI that I probably don't even have to write the name of if you've watched/listened but I'll do it anyway. *Kamchatka!*
You have to respect Lee for declining the engagement. He loved commanding battleships and this was his dream engagement, like the line battles of old. But he gave up the opportunity to protect his men.
Fight to your strengths, not your opponents. If you can take out a Yamato battleship at the cost of 50 aircraft or 1-2 battleships, take the loss in aircraft. As interesting as this engagement would be for us to talk about 80 years later, for the men lost unnecessarily, it would have sucked. The Pacific theater strategy of island hopping was to avoid fighting unnecessary battles, and this surface engagement was an unnecessary battle against ships that would have minimal effect on the war. Outside of Samar, what damage did they cause because they weren't sunk in the Phillipine sea?
Exactly. And the Americans didn't lose 50 planes to take out Yamato. They lost 10 planes to take out Yamato, a cruiser, and 4 destroyers. And they only lost 12 men killed in the process, since they rescued some of the pilots after the fact.
@@Snarkbar : If anything the Yamato and Musashi were simply resource sinks. They drank insane amounts of fuel and wasted the talents and manpower of about 6,000 trained sailors. Given how pitifully little they accomplished during the war and how few men and planes were lost in sinking these floating hotels their existence was a logistical disaster. Sure, they are the biggest, but I never understood the mystique attached to these Golden Turkeys.
@@Bufoferrata The Yamatos were far from unique in being pointless and a waste of resources. This is a WWII-era battleship thing in general. Even vessels that had far more active careers rarely actually did anything other units couldn’t have done more cost-effectivel. The Iowas being a good example: they served as gigantic, expensive CLAAs when a larger number of actual CLAAs would have been far more strategically justifiable, plus shore bombardment roles already covered by Standards and subcapital units. If anything, the Iowas are more overrated (in terms of perceived value) than the Yamatos, since the Yamatos constantly get criticized for being a pointless waste of resources and the Iowas do not despite also being a pointless waste of resources. Though if you really twisted my arm and made me choose which WWII-era battleships were the least sensible, I’d go with the four Kriegsmarine vessels, because on top of the same strategic flaws everyone else’s battleships also had, those four were in a situation where they would be strategic failures EVEN IF battleships as a whole weren’t a net strategic negative by that point (partly because a surface fleet was the last thing Germany needed, and partly because those four were much worse-designed than any other contemporary designs, meaning they were effectively useless for countering enemy capital ships because everyone else had better-designed capital ships). Yes, they did tie down a lot of Allied assets, but that mostly has to do with the Allies vastly overestimating the threat they posed.
@@Bufoferrata They were designed for a war they didn't end up fighting. They would have been great at Jutland, but after Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to the bottom so easily, it was pretty clear that Jutland wasn't going to happen again.
@@Snarkbar You can say this about literally every battleship of the WWII generation. Albeit note that with the sole exception of Germany, WWII-era navies (and not just the Allies) built battleships on the assumption they would be engaging at longer ranges than at Jutland, hence the advent of AoN armour (as it turned out, some of these navies were planning to engage at ranges where even radar fire control wouldn’t be adequate to enable effective gunnery, but AoN was superior even at closer ranges-not that this really proved relevant in a war when battleship construction was no longer strategically justified)
I get the impression that US Naval officers from gunnery up to Nimitz himself still didn't fully understand radar. They seemed to think that radar was the great equalizer to counter Japanese night fighting skill. As seen in the various night battles in the Solomons radar just shows a blip on the screen. It did not show if the blip was a friendly or hostile. US warships with a radar contact still held their fire because they were concerned that the contact may be a friendly. Lee understood that even with radar in a night action would still be chaotic. Ships taking damage and/or sinking would disrupt the formation. Lee's concern about communication breakdowns would cause more chaos. The US Navy's advantage in numbers and quality of ships would have been negated. Lee made the right call.
I believe your assessment is correct. Since you mentioned Nimitz: he did not have a seagoing command throughout the Pacific War. His position kept him mostly in the Pacific Fleet’s HQ at Pearl Harbor. Any operational experience he had with radar was most likely given to him in demonstrations, not from being on a deployed ship and especially not in combat. Though as bright as Nimitz was, he likely knew his shortcomings on tactical details such as that, so likely did defer to the knowledge of officers like Lee who did use radar to take battleships into battle at night. Likewise Nimitz’s understanding of carrier warfare was more limited than that of Spruance, Halsey, Fletcher, and Mitscher. He didn’t have to be the most knowledgeable, he had to be in charge. That’s something that made Nimitz such an excellent admiral: he painted the strategic big picture, and left room for his underlings with experience-based knowledge to make the tactical decisions within that big picture. In stark contrast to the 1944 IJN high command, who stifled their underlings’ knowledge and experience by making every major strategic and tactical decision in Tokyo.
@@Engine33Truck during the battle when Spruance decided to move onto a more advantageous launch position for morning strikes one of the members of his staff urged him to countermand the order Nimitz said I agree with you but doing that is the first step of me running the entire war from pearl
Lee had fresh memories of taking an ad-hoc group into action against a well trained enemy. The Battle of Guadalcanal had also demonstrated the damage he could expect if he got into a night knife fight against the IJN. Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. The there is his primary mission, protect the main striking force of the USN, the carriers. If we assume he has at least taken damage he could be out of position to not be able to carry out his primary mission. It is a conservative decision, weighted to protect the carriers. His potential fleet would not have sailed and trained as a unit.They would have to be extracted from present assignments, Assembled along with their escorts, Again a group that would not have at least exercised together. As for the officer the made the comment that radar controlled gunnery doesn't care if it is night or day, this is true, but it also doesn't care if it is friend or foe.
" Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. " Doctrine for the USN had been for BB shootouts to be made at medium ranges. Well over 10,000 yards. The armor protection reflected this. Less resistance to enemy fire at 5000 yards that at 15,000 yards.
Right, and that was 1 comment from one gunnery officer, speaking for his own perspective, which could've been responsibility for anything from 1 turret to all guns of a specific ship. Lee had a bigger picture to keep in perspective.
@@77thTrombone God bless him for being more interested in his mission than in personal Glory. I really wonder about Arleigh Burke overstepping his authority at Leyte Gulf.
@@77thTrombone I feel that Lee’s comment about communications issues may have been regarding the risk of friendly fire or coordinating the maneuvering of the fleet in the dark, where the risk of ship on ship collisions also becomes a major issue.
Lee did the right thing. Risking his ships in a night engagement just because you wanted a glorious big gun duel would be like foregoing dropping the atomic bombs in favor of proceeding with Operation Olympic just to prove the superiority of American infantry and artillery.
I think Lee knew it was better to let Japanese BBs get attrited by aircraft and submarines rather than slug it out in gun duels - he would not run away if he stumbled into a BB fight but knew there was more to lose than gain in fighting Japanese battleships directly
Yes. A chance for glorious battle, but of no practical value. He'd been in a night action, and didn't want another. And it was obvious that surface ships of any size were practically helpless against an un-contested air strike.
@@bkjeong4302 You are correct, but the advantage may not have been big enough to make a real difference. The IJN routinely trained for night operations and had a good system of fire control and communication. Lee was well aware that the US Navy had not had as much training in those operations and as far as I can tell they were still having comms issues to the point he just didn't feel they had enough of an advantage to risk it. I don't know how aware he was of the IJN's radar capabilities at that point, but as Drach pointed out, they had functional enough systems in this particular group that overall, with the addition of the IJN's huge advantage in torps, it may have actually been pretty even. If there was a US advantage, it certainly wasn't enough to take that risk in Lee's opinion, and I tend to agree with him.
Lee was smart. He did not look at a problem from one angle. He was capable of three dimensional thinking. Anyone who could do calculus in his head was capable of seeing multiple outcomes and see which one was most beneficial!
The Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo was a very, very real threat. Our cruisers did not carry torpedos and night battles are very confusing even in peace time practice. SMC USN. Ret.
Yeah there were only a few US cruisers left with torpedoes at that time of the war. The Japanese torpedoes were extremely destructive, especially to their carrying ships if a shell hits the tubes or near to them.
It's easy to judge decades after the fact, but I also think Lee was right to be cautious. A more aggressive strategy MAY have yielded good results, but there were also ways it could have gone horribly wrong. It's rather like what was said of Jellico at Jutland, that he had the means to lose the war in an afternoon.
You mean say as I sit here on my couch eating popcorn with my dogs, 80 years after the fact and 0 responsibility for anything that I shouldn't slight Lee for his decision??? Gee whiz you're harsh......
In World of Warships some players just want to win harder. When they are winnig they take risks and often jeopardise whole effort, often losing in the end. Mr Lee would not be one of them. He understood that when you are winnig there is no point to take big risks (nightfight is alvays risky). Wise guy.
Aviators and submariners weren't risking large surface assets with thousands of personnel by being overly aggressive especially with a formation who had not operated as a separate unit to practice surface combat.
@@John-ru5ud Agreed....there was less at risk during their operations. Admiral Lee was acutely aware of his ships were a much more significant investment.
At this point in the war, victory seemed certain if no needless risks were taken - like potentially throwing away large amounts of assets. Industry meant that numerical superiority grew by the day. If the Americans did nothing outright stupid - like facing Long Lance torpedoes at night - then it was simple fantasy by Japan and Germany that they could force such a devastating battle that they could even get breathing space. That doesn't even account for the superior training programs of America.
The PRC navy might be planning a similar tactic against US carrier groups. The Chinese have large numbers of shore-based, long range anti-shipping missiles. In a war, they could simply fire enough missiles simultaneously to overwhelm a US force’s point defenses, should it approach the coast of China.
@@gerardlabelle9626 That is the general idea in Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising", where the Soviets launched about a hundred anti-ship missiles. Even though the Americans took out many of the missiles, it only took a couple to do in a capital ship.
You have to be incredibly impressed with the guy. The temptation to fight history's last great battleship battle must have been incredible. But from a strategic point of view there was nothing to gain and a lot to lose. We had complete air superiority by that point, you could practically walk across the Pacific on the decks of Essex class carriers while the Japanese were scraping the bottom of their pilot barrel. We were going to sink the remainder of the Japanese fleet sooner or later, he knew that. The battleships were needed to bombard beaches, that wasn't as glamorous as sinking another battleship but it was much more important for bringing the war to an end. He put the war's needs, and the lives of his men, above his own need for glory.
I guess he forgot the US built the Missouri and Wisconsin. I watched some of his videos, and wonder where he gets his information from. Because he be way off on a lot of things.
Uncle Drach, your explanations that make it plain that battles do not take place in a vacuum add so much to my understanding of naval history. I very much appreciate the way you share your knowledge.
Lee provided his best military advice for winning the war. Not only was he correct (IMO) to decline a night surface action, but he was correct for operational and strategic reasons. By the time of Philippine Sea, the IJN could no longer win the war and that was primarily due to unrestricted submarine warfare on the merchant fleet and constant hammering from aircraft. Why change the calculation by risking assets that take years to build?
While I would have enjoyed reading about a major Battleship to Battleship fight as well as the next guy, Admiral Lee did the right thing! Even in a best case scenario, he was likely to take damage to at least some of his ships, possible severe damage with high casualties. If things didn't go his way, between the torpedoes and the 18 inch guns of the Yamamatos, things could end quite badly, with severe damage, casualties, loss of ships, and potentially even loss of a Battleship or two! The Iowas weren't that heavily protected! It is really easy for aggressive subordinates, such as Burke, or Naval historians to criticize after the fact, because they didn't have to make the decision.
Not only that, he would've been ridiculed for taking risks that weren't necessary and it would've been the end of his command too. Losing an Iowa to the Yamato's was definitely a possibility and (as far as I know) both the Yamato-class battleships and the Type 93 (?) "Long Lance" were still unknown factors to U.S. Intelligence until war's end. So he would've gone into the fight and gotten a much ruder awakening than the Battles of Iron Bottom Sound had been I believe (nevermind his "green" naval crews on board the newer battleships too).
"The Iowas weren't that heavily protected!" I see this claim thrown left and right, despite Iowas sharing a near identical protection profile to the South Dakota class, and absolutely nobody calls the South Dakotas moderately or weakly protected.
@@24YOA All of them were protected against the threats they thought they were going to face, but no one knew of the 18.1" guns of the Yamato class, it was such a guarded secret of the IJN. Don't ask me how they managed to keep it a secret with all of their codes broken, etc., but it was done... 🤷♂️ I'm not taking anything away from U.S.'s 16" guns but the 18's would punch through sooner at longer ranges than they would, so it was probably for the best Lee held what he had (though I'm surprised that Japan had the Kongo class battleships sortying with the Yamatos, the Ise, Hyuga, Nagato, and Mutsu were all better battleships than the Kongo class for such a role). They liked to do stupid stuff, don't understand why... 🙄
@@tyree9055 speed is probably the answer there. This is the surface force meant to guard the carriers and the older IJN battleships just couldn’t keep up.
Think back to the words of Adm Jellico at Jutland, "When you are winning, risk nothing." While Lee's battle line was not winning itself, the overall battlegroup was winning. Why risk surface units in a risky and unnecessary night engagement.
As usual a SUPERB presentation...the use of moving pictures brought the story to life....more of this please...my only regret is that as I am 59 (in Aptil) that I will probably never see a large portion of your future content especially after the various declassifications occur. My deep respect and appreciation as always.
For the first 22 minutes of the video, I was trying to figure out why the Americans would be hesitant to engage the Japanese in a surface engagement, being as Lee had 7 modern battleship, 2 of which were Iowa class ships. (I had no idea what the van force consisted of) Then the Van Force was shown and my first though was, and I quote "Oh shit".
I believe that Lee was 100% correct in his decision making. There was nothing to gain. A single 18" shell hitting ANY ship could well kill a hundred or more men. It is easy to imagine a thousand or more dead. Air power can do the same job, with far fewer dead.
My interest in military history is all over the board. Specifically WW2 in general. Finding your channel is a godsend. I’ve learned so much more than I did in school. My grandfather served on LST 1014. He told me a few stories about beach landings. His duties included ships cool and gun captain on a 40mm boaforce .
7:22 Admiral Lee? Cold feet? Sounds like classic Monday morning quarterbacking, Professor Millett. Lee took a logical and dispassionate assessment of the situation.
Those old battle wagons were really fearsome weapons. Many are currently museums. They even let you sleep on them overnight. I’ve stayed on the Massachusetts and New Jersey with my sons when they were in the Scouts and toured the Wisconsin while visiting my son who is stationed in Norfolk, VA. These things are massive. You could spend days and not see them in their entirety. When we were touring the “Big Wisky” (USS Wisconsin) in Norfolk, my son commented that, in comparison, his ship (itself nearly 700 ft and 9500 tons) “feels like a tuna can.” 🤣 If you ever get a chance to visit one of these “bad boys,” give it a full day. You won’t be disappointed!
The Japanese were adept at night action, and the US had major aviation advantage during the day. Lee's decision seemed prudent and moreover he probably saved many US lives. It wouldn't make headlines or sensational history, but Lee was not a grand stander. Bully for him.
Good afternoon Drach. I love your analysis of this situation. Admiral Lee was a highly competent officer, aggressive when he needed to be but NOT a "Halsey" type of "ATTACK, repeat ATTACK" aggressive. He appears to me to have been a more thoughtful officer, perhaps even more so than Admiral Spruance (who was known to go haring off with USS Iowa, looking for a fight on at least one occasion.) I think Sun Tsu would have approved of the man. Lee knew both the strengths and weaknesses of his force and had a very good idea of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents. Hindsight being 20/20, I think he reached the correct decision.
15:24 Don't you mean Adm Lee 7 of 10 fast battleships the US built? 2 North Carolinas, 4 South Dakotas and 4 Iowas. He was missing 1 South Dakota and 2 of the Iowas.
@@Drachinifel This channel is impossible ! Too many experts ^^ Drach next time, just say it was a check to see if people were really listening to you :) Thanks for the amazing work !
@@Drachinifel Ah i see. Thanks for the reply. That just makes Adm Lee seem that much more impressive. Almost Every new battleship the US build they gave to Lee. haha.
I think VADM Lee once again demonstrated his superior judgement and decision-making, which furthermore didn't require him to use his equally superior tactical skill in battle..."Just because you can, doesn't mean you should." I think that the superior radar, especially radar-controlled gunnery makes a night engagement favorable to the US Navy. However, Lee rightly understood the absolute requirement for effective C3 ( Command, Communication and Control ) coupled with adequate training and experienced crews in night tactics. Doctrine is one thing, but execution of doctrine requires training, exercising these skill sets and experience. I'll echo what ADM Ozawa said, "Your electronics were superior"...The electronic war was decisive in WW2, and especially in the Pacific, however, ADM Lee understood what his overall strategic role was within the battle fleet, and pursuing a fleet action in the Philippine Sea just didn't add up to a wise decision...ADM Lee was an amazing man, brilliant, studied and considerate of his men...He made the right decision(s) throughout the war, and more importantly...LEARNED from his experience...
What Lee feared and indeed had experienced was the roll of luck that ruled these night engagements. I think he was right not to risk so much when AirPower already held a strong advantage.
I play your new stuff while I'm working, and then replay it two or three times so it all gets into my brain. I hope you get credit for all that watch time.
I have often wondered about Lee taking on Japanese Van force at Battle of the Phillipine Sea. I really enjoyed this video. If Lee did not feel that his force was prepared to take on the Japanese at night then I feel it was for the best. I really enjoy your alternative history videos. Thank you.
Had the pleasure of being enrolled in a class on Naval History by Clark Reynolds. Best and most interesting teacher I ever had. A class that you actually looked forward to attending. Also, having used radar my entire career, I do not remember any difference between night and day. I suppose it depends on the frequency and I have no idea of the frequencies used in 1944 as surface search and fire control were likely different.
Lee made the correct call, a night action would have gained little if anything and risked heavy damage and casualties to his own force when American air power was already heavily dominant. This would have been as Jingles likes to call it a case of trying to win harder.
VERY interesting. The battles for the Marianas and the Philippines certainly offer a huge range of "what ifs".. I think Spruance is often criticized for his caution in not leaving the invasion force under-protected. Watching our videos and playing our wargames we often forget that the commanders lacked the "God's eye view" that we enjoy.. Spruance had to stay close to the invasion site to accomplish the greater mission. As you stated, Lee also had the combat experience to not want to ply to known Japanese strengths. By that point in the war, the USN had finally accepted that the Japanese had an excellent torpedo and were quite good at using them. Who really wants to get into a barroom fight where both parties have very big clubs and could hurt each other badly. Admittedly the cold logic says that the USN could trade battleship losses with Japan and still come out the winner, but as you have shown there are factors that could shift the advantage to either side. Another less tangible factor for Lee; he knew each one of his battleship captains and he had reports on the effectiveness of each ship. Who knows, perhaps any combat losses would have caused the Kentucky and the Illinois to be finished (I think Montana was already canceled by then).
Lee was experienced with night actions against the Japanese and well knew the potential effects of a long lance torpedo barrage. During his night action at Savo Island off Guadalcanal, he watched half of his destroyers severely damaged or sunk by long lances. His flagship USS Washington barely escaped such a barrage after destroying the battleship Kirishima..
In war you really need to anticipate the Worst Case scenario as being the likely one. Whether it was actually likely or not. As many others in the comments have stated, Lee made the right decision; by now it was clear to everyone that air power was what was going to win the war, and our carriers were definitely shifting things in our favor. Better to play it safe and let the aircraft pummel the enemy into submission rather than risk losing years of construction and investment for vainglory.
You cover many more what-ifs than I could ever envisage. Two thoughts: Primarily, this battle takes place in 1944, not 1942. The Navy is winning the war at this point, it does not have to take the same risks that it had to at Midway, or Guadalcanal. So, Lee does not really have to engage the Japanese unless he really believes that he has the advantage. Having already experienced what they could do at night, he would have been prudent to wait for the kind of advantage that Jessie Oldendorf had at the Surigao Straight. (Burke had indeed had success against Japanese naval forces at night, but he had also had the time to work out his tactics and train his officers and crews before attempting to do so.) Second, Lee was also tasked with protecting the carrier force, in concert with a landing on a strategically important set of Japanese islands, and he took this responsibility seriously. Would that Admiral Halsey had maintained a similar sense of responsibility off Samar. It is always easy to second-guess a decision with hindsight; it is helpful to consider at what point in the war a commander is having to make the decision.
@@ramal5708 Halsey was the right Admiral for 1942, when we needed someone who would take risks and fight aggressively. He was still the right Admiral in 1943, when he risked what few carriers we had to attack the gathering Japanese cruiser force at Rabaul that was threatening our landing zone at Bougainville. By 1944, we needed someone who could see the bigger picture and make certain that he did not lose sight of his most important job, and maybe Halsey was not that man.
@@ph89787 Halsey was senior to Spruance so never would of worked. Would of also been a slap in the face to Mark Mitscher who turned Taskforce 38/58 from a concept into a well oiled machine. And it has been well documented that Halsey did more harm than good when he tried to micromanage Mitscher and have a hands on approach in regards to Carrier Operations. Simply put, Carrier tactics had changed since 1942, Halsey was using the old book and overriding Mitscher who wrote the new book.
@@thomasknobbe4472 Halsey was also most definitely being effected by the stress of of the early wars years and probably should have been rotated out before that point for health reasons. Not to take anything away from his service, but he was still only human and by all accounts he had not been at the top of his game for some time before that
@@petriew2018 this is a very good point. We tend to think of people as static personalities, as always behaving the same way over places and time. It is quite possible that by 1944 the stress of ongoing command had worn Admiral Halsey down, and he was not able to consider all the options, and all the possibilities, as he could two years previously. I have not studied the typhoons that struck his fleet on, what, two occasions? Might the chronic stress of constant command have had something to do with the evident mistakes he was making at this point?
10% what if scenario and 90% of deep expertise on your part...while i long for the 10% alternate scenario, all the building stands up thanks to the remaining 90% of knowledge. Very, very fascinating vid Drach, thank you so much!❤
I think Sun Tzu would be proud of Admiral Lee's analysis on why he should not sail west to engage the IJN in a night surface action. He had a healthy respect of his command's capabilities and the enemy's. This is one of those alternate scenarios that might have ended up worse than the outcome of OTL. The other one would be the Battle off Samar.
Kantai Kessen (Japanese Decisive Battle Doctrine), which the Japanese had been itching for since the beginning of the war, called for a cloud of Long Lance torpedoes to be unleashed first thing in the battle. The Japanese had a LOT of Long Lance torpedoes. The Japanese got their Kantai Kessen, but it didn't go quite the way they'd planned.
Lee made the right call, his experience in night fighting showed that the U.S Radar wasn't the golden gift everyone thought it was, Note that SoDaK had it's radar and much of it's electrical knocked out, and Washington had some pretty big Black Holes in her coverage, something Lee knew all too well, then there was the whole thing about shootin and scootin at night, and relying entirely on radar to score was very risky at a time when that wasn't really needed! Finally, Lee understood the importance in covering the men ashore, and not needlessly risking serious american capital against an ever fading IJN force! Second Guessing Lee here is a big tell on everyone else who questioned his choice!
I suspect the skill of the various ships CIC staff is what Lee was worried about. And it doesn't take a lot of moving elements for a CIC to get overwhelmed as happened when kamikaze tactics became commonplace. At a cursory glance, the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay does appear show that even with CIC and radar(as its late '43), nightfighting can still get really confusing even for the IJN.
The general understanding of the time is that battle line strength is based on the square of the number of (competitive) battleships. Pre-war, 15 battleships vs 10 would have seen a relative strength over 2 to 1 (225 to 100), for a clear US advantage. This scenario is 7 to 5, for a ratio of 49 to 25, almost 2 to 1. However, the fact that one battle line is twice as strong as, and should easily defeat, the other does not mean the victorious battle line will not take damage and/or losses. Why volunteer to take damage to expensive battleships that will take months to repair (if not sunk) when you can use air power with cheap attrition units that will be replaced by the next few day's production?
I'm not sure whether the US had reached the "push the planes with the most flight hours over the side of the carrier to make room for the next batch of factory-new replacements" stage of the war yet, but they were getting close.
@@Snarkbar I'm also remembering the other decisive win the US scored off Guadalcanal, October's Cape Esperance. Despite achieving almost complete surprise with the gun line and shooting up Aoba, Furutaka, and the lead destroyer, USS Boise still took a shell hit that burned out much of the fore part of the ship and killed over a hundred men.
That squaring 'trick' is neat! :) I just want to point out that, if you're doing 7v5, one lucky hit to a radar antenna can effectively reduce that to 6v5, which sucks. In a 15v10, whose force ratio isn't THAT much higher, one (un)lucky hit brings you to 14v10, which is obviously a much less significant drop in ratio! So being "twice as strong" STILL skews in favor of having more engaging ships, because your Hood/Scharnhorst/Norfolk changes decrease :)
Lee won his battle off Savo Island at night. At that time, Admiral Lee was the world's leading expert and the only living person with experience on night engagements with battleships. His rationale for avoiding a night engagement eludes me. Admiral Oldendorf had no trouble employing his battleships at night.
7:21 I could understand other (more eager) officers at the time of the battle having this view of Lee, but I'm quite astonished to hear a historian well after the fact effectively accusing Lee of cowardice. I think Lee's record clearly shows that he was perfectly willing to take on the risks of major combat, but he also understood how high the risks of a night surface battle could be and when it was justified to take those risks. In 1942 off Guadalcanal, Henderson Field was a vital strategic objective to keep in operation, the IJN was coming back to bombard it, and the only way to stop them was for Lee to put his ships in their way. So in that case, the risks of a night action were justified, and we know what happened there. In 1944 off the Marianas, however, it was a very different story. There, Lee knew that the US fleet had another option for attacking the Japanese (carrier airstrikes) which would provide them with far greater advantages, and were likely to inflict at least as much damage as his battleships could without nearly the same risk. So when Lee recommended against a night surface action, he was effectively urging Mitscher and Spruance to fight that more advantageous air battle instead. I feel that Lee's assessment of risk versus reward was accurate, and was also in keeping with Spruance's overall approach the campaign. Keep in mind that even a single Long Lance hit on one of Lee's ships would likely have cost more lives than the USN lost in the entire historical battle. And if two or three of Lee's heavy ships had actually been sunk, at night in the middle of the open ocean, the casualties might easily have been 10 times what the USN historically suffered.
@@rembrandt972ify Ya, that's what I was saying. I could understand someone like that gunnery officer on the Iowa (who seemed very eager to fight the night battle) having a negative view of Lee's recommendation, though I'd still disagree with them. I just cannot comprehend how a historian looking from decades later with access to all of the information could possibly think that Lee recommended against a night battle because he "wasn't willing to take the same risks that the aviators and the submariners were taking every day".
13:02. Correct me if I’m wrong Drach. But isn’t Air Group 10 aboard USS Enterprise trained for night operations? So even in a night engagement, Lee would still have had air support. The only issue would be that they’ve only conducted a night attack on land and stationary ship targets. During Operation Hailstone.
Theoretically, but I don't think anyone would want to risk trying a relatively new tactic for the USN (night strikes on moving targets) whilst their own ships were in close proximity. The chances of either getting it wrong and attacking their own ships, or their own ships being a bit too quick on the trigger, would be too great.
Superbly well done Drach! I generally eschew floating or commenting on "what ifs"; they are notoriously fraught with complications, which require multiple assumptions, any one of which can undermine one's conclusions. However, I can say with certainty that Lee's decision was NOT based on anything remotely like a lack of courage. That simply was not in his character, as I understand it. And his instincts - based on battle-tested experience - had a track record of success that only a fool would second-guess.
30:58 video like that always amazes me to see how fast one of these giant battleships actually can move. The fact that the Iowa class is able to keep up with modern nuclear carriers is telling; the term "fast battleship" is well deserved.
It sounds like Lee understood modern carrier tactics much earlier and better than many of his contemporaries. The surface fleets primary reason for existence is to defend the carriers.
Good stuff, Drach. It's always interesting to speculate on such things, isn't it. I don't see how it would have made ANY sense for Lee to have acted other than he did. Remember, too, there's Spruance to consider. Despite the criticisms over Spruance not being aggressive about pursuing the IJN forces after the smashing victory at Midway with sinking the IJN's carriers, I think he was absolutely correct in his choice. I think BOTH of them were of the "remember your mission, STICK TO THAT, and ALWAYS assess possible opportunities that arise in light of YOUR PRIMARY MISSION" school of thought. As an aside, I consider them both superior thinkers to Halsey, whose primary strength as I see it really was in motivating and lifting the morale of the USN Pacific forces in the very difficult early period of the Pacific war. My thoughts might be regarded as heretical, LOL, but they are what they are. It is, however, even for experienced historians, to keep the problem of "knowing what happened after...." from affecting these discussions without those involved realising it. One VERY important and particular aspect of that is the difficulty of restricting any discussion/analysis to what the relevant commanders knew/suspected AT THE TIME, plus their particular doctrines to which they and their navies subscribed. I'm not mentioning this to suggest your video has a problem due to those sorts of issues, not at all. I thought I'd mention them as they're REALLY important and difficult to avoid entirely, usually requiring quite some effort of research and then self-critiquing; ideally of course you get someone else with relevant knowledge and skills to do so, which of course is a very grossly simplified statement of the 'peer review' concept. An example of the sort of question that might come from the above would be to ask a question about the behaviour of the Japanese forces in the 'worst case' for Lee. Q: do you think, given the IJN obsession over the decisive battle concept (I've forgotten what they called it, sorry), that it's more likely they'd have gone "all in" with EVERYTHING they had, choosing to break away ONLY if and when it became evident they were being destroyed too rapidly WITHOUT destroying their enemy at a greater rate? I thought that particular element of your excellent 'worst case' was an interesting one, and would love to know how you arrived at it. Of course there are countless technical and other matters to consider, and such a topic could soon result in hours of videos let alone books, LOL, so I'm not for one second suggesting you "ought" to have addressed more of them. I think you've done a great job of explaining the circumstances and presenting two 'extremes' of the ranges of possibilities in a way that covers enough without going overboard (couldn't resist, LOL). Cheers
The Americans were afraid of going into ‘battleship battle’ with the Japanese after Guadalcanal because they deemed, Japanese gunnery and ‘long lance torpedo’ to be superior. However Americans put faith in their aviators and submarines, combining with their code breaking. The Americans had their advantage in that.
@@ramal5708 Launching air and surface attacks at the same time is impractical due to range differences; carriers far outrange battleships and rely on maintaining that range as a defence against enemy surface ships, meaning that the carriers have to be a few hundred miles away from the enemy during the engagement. If the battleships are attached to the carriers they're too far away to actually fire at enemy vessels, and if they’re not attached to the carriers you’d still need absolute perfect positioning plus a ridiculous amount of luck to actually have them be able to attack at the same time as the carrier aircraft.
@@ramal5708 At Cape Engano the Americans DIDN’T use the surface units and carriers at the same time. They used the carriers first, then had to wait for the surface ships to get within range. Furthermore, Cape Engano really does not work as a good case study, because the Japanese were not trying to evade the American surface ships (because they were a decoy force without actual combat capability). And even then, it would have been much more efficient for the Americans to not even bother using the surface ships, and just send in even more air attacks.
@@ramal5708 Okay, so you’re going to hit them with aircraft and then with surface ships. But the question is: WHY? This is straight out of pre-WWII doctrines that wrongly assumed carriers couldn’t sink enemy surface ships, but only damage them, leading to cases where carriers were prevented from sinking targets they could have sunk. If you already know you can sink the enemy ships with air attacks, why not just keep doing that? Why bother trying to close with your own surface units and putting more of your sailors and ships at risk?
@@ramal5708 Congratulations, you said just what I was trying to say all along: THERE IS NO POINT IN BRINGING SURFACE SHIPS TO ENGAGE ENEMY VESSELS with IF YOU CAN JUST USE FLEET CARRIERS TO ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE ENEMY WITHOUT FEAR OF COUNTERATTACK.
America won the only true BB vs. BB battle in the war. At night. With radar. Against a superior fleet. Japanese BB's were better at bombing beachheads than they were fighting surface actions.
I have to agree with estimates. I am quite sure Admiral Lee (in addition to any other flag officer) would have studied the battle of Jutland, and understand that having superior numbers does not guarantee victory… and also Lee’s previous experience at Guadalcanal, would have to had a great influence on what he did. What did happen was that the invasion of the Marianas went off unhindered by the Japanese Navy, and his ships remained intact and capable of further offensive action. Yes, letting the Japanese get away allowed them to initiate the Battle of Leyte Gulf. But that wasn’t Ching Lee’s fault. In a perfect world, Spruance would’ve listened to Mitscher and attacked earlier upon his submarines sightings. As it is, the subs got Taiho and Shokaku; however, with multiple attacks from any or all four of the task groups, a lot more ships than a light carrier may have gone down. Add to this, a few hits on Yamato and Musashi (because as history shows it takes A LOT to sink them), maybe these ships aren’t included in the Center Force later. I tend to agree with you that the potential surface fleet action was a gilded invitation to the US ships eating a whole lot of long lances, whether they had the tactical advantage or not. Same thing Jellicoe considered at Jutland, right? As Professor Lambert put it, ‘yes the Germans may have won a tactical victory, but their fleet never sallied out again. They knew they would be destroyed.’ The IJN lost nearly its entire air group and three carriers, and provided absolutely no help to its garrison on Saipan.
I think Lee was a realist. While aggressive subordinates wanted to charge straight at the Japanese battle line, dreaming of a second Jutland and lots of glory for themselves, Lee saw the big picture. He knew that the carriers were the queens of the fleet and that the fast battleships existed for one reason only - to protect and serve the carriers. The old battleships were the only ones that had a chance of engaging in a surface action, as happened at Surigao Strait, and that was because they were basically expendable. Engaging the Japanese battleships would cause far more damage to the Americans that to the Japanese. Even if all the Japanese ships were eventually sunk, the Americans would be at best heavily damaged, and maybe even some of the battleships would be sunk, which would hamper carrier operations for many months in the future. The video points out the problems 1) the action would be fought at night, and Lee had already learned the hard way how good the Japanese were at night fighting 2) Lee's forces were untrained in surface engagements 3) the Japanese had a deadly weapon - the Long Lance torpedo - which the Americans had no answer for (American torpedoes in WW2 were crap, due to prewar underfunding in torpedo development). In a night action with salvoes of Long Lances being launched, the battle line could well have been devastated, with no effective way to fight back. It has to be borne in mind that modern battleships like the Yamato and Musashi could not be sunk by gunfire alone. (In fact both of them were eventually sunk by mass torpedo bomber attack). Even if carrier air could have sunk them next day, it would still be a pyrrhic victory. Lee made the right call.
late comment but maybe a valid one, and no i did not read the other 780 comments 😛. what if Lee or Ukagi or Ozawa had been killed/badly wounded in the first few salvo's and could no longer give the orders, who would take over command of the battle-fleet, would that person be as capable as their boss/superior, what if that commander was a carrier-admiral and not a battleship-admiral ?, the scenario while being absolutely marvelous leaves a few questions open. Again very good work on this Drach, i enjoy battle reports I'm just annoyed we dutch do not get mentioned a lot, after all we invented GTW (Grand Theft Warship) many, many, many years before they invented GTA 😛.
Looking back at the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, where US and IJN cruisers and destroyers tangled with each other at night, probably factored in Burke's opinion, as he was in command of DesDiv 45 & 46. The battle had showed how the USN had made some significant improvements to how they fought at night, but there still was a lot of confusion and mistakes made, even with IFF systems and better radar. It didn't end up badly for the US at all and proved, finally that the USN was capable of not only fighting night engagements, but winning them. It also showed that battles fought at night were not without complications and with a bigger force, those complications can stack up fast. All told, it was probably the best decision for Lee to make considering the circumstances. A night battle would have seen both sides inflicting damage on one another with little to show for it, other than dead sailors and ships in the repair yard while not achieving a decisive outcome.
Superb video. I agree with Lee's caution, particularly given the context of the known consequences of Halsey's foolish aggressiveness at Leyte Gulf. One thing I would have highlighted more is how even if the fast battleships all survived taking a few Long Lance and 18" hits, it would knock them out of action for quite some time for repairs, during which time the carriers wouldn't have their strongest anti-air gun platforms to defend them from kamikazes. Better to prioritize using his ships to shield the carriers from the worst of the Japanese air attacks.
I wonder what the fuel state was for the various formations? The Japanese had been depending on increasing the range of their strike aircraft by shuttle bombing using the airfields on Guam.
Lee took the information that he had, plus the known capabilities of his ships and their crews, considered his primary mission objectives, and made the best decision. Simple as that.
Very good presentation. I personally prefer the US wins big. A bit of trivia regarding your lead photo of Missouri firing it's turret two. The photo was part of a Missouri Comes of Age article in a 1944 National Geographic and was firing in the Caribbean Sea during work ups. The 4x5 color negative was almost destroyed in a flooding accident at the Naval Photo Archives in Washington DC when a water pipe burst in the late 80s. A shipmate of mine was stationed there and rescued it and many others. I also and a black light poster of that shot for many years. I wish that I still had it.
The gunnery officer's comment about their departments not seeing a difference between day and night work doesn't take into account the rest of the ship that has to work in the dark and not sail into the other ships in the same position.
While avoiding torpedoes, yes. Exactly. It was just that kind of focus on individual ship gunnery almost to the exclusion of all other considerations that had led to so many disasters in the Solomons.
The IJN consistently sought to spring a trap on the USN where they could effect maximum damage with minimum loses. It was the legacy of their defeat of the Russians in one overwhelming victory that would break the enemy’s will to continue the war. That was never going to happen with the US, and the Japanese could not afford to lose their ships, so they always backed off rather than pursuing their strategic goals. The Germans kept thinking they could do the same thing with the Soviets. The Italians figured out the situation early and made the best of a bad bet.
One thing that would have lessened the Japanese chances, even in the worst case, was they had even less opportunity to train than Lee's forces due to fuel issues. I can't remember how long it'd been since Yamato / Musashi had even fired the main guns, but it was something horrific.
@drachinfel, @ 2:11 you mention that old battleships weren't due to arrive until the next day, so Vice Admiral Lee got first crack with his fast battleships. I'm new to this, but I take old battleships as being those of Naval Treaty and earlier? If so, the only old battleships I see in the order of battle anywhere is for the IJN. Have I misinterpreted this section?
I think I understand now. The old battleships only participated in the Battle of Saipan, being separate from the naval Battle of the Philippines Sea. Apologies, this is all new to me, but thoroughly fascinating
Love the clip of the 40’s US Navy Bro’s leanin back and chillen on the deck with 16 inch guns going off directly next to them. Can’t imagine I’d necessarily want to switch places at that moment but I still love it.
If you were in command of a fleet, and there was a similar choice to make, possible a hundred or so casualties of your aviators verses 2,000 or more sailors dead in your capital ships (possibly more, there is always the "Hood" possibility even in a clear victory)... it should be an easy one to make. The correct choice was made: Armchair battleship lovers may not like it, but they were not in charge of the lives of men nor in the firing line actually risking their life. The amount of air power at the US Navy's command made it pretty obvious what would be the likely result going with the air option. As it turned out, they did not get a chance to destroy the enemy surface fleet but they didn't know that at the time of the decision. Later events proved the basic concept correct; both Yamato's being sunk with fairly low casualties in air crews.
I agree, Lee appreciated the risk and the difficulty of controlling the time of the engagement. The young gunnery officers were embracing the new technology, but they were not the ones making decisions in battle.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
EDIT: With regards to the '7 out of 8 battleships' line, I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line, apologies!
Given that the ships used were either their designs or iterations on their designs what was Britain's and France's reactions to the Battle of Tsushima, did it lead to a massive need to redesign their ships and their doctrine given how much damage both the Russians and Japanese ships took in the battle and how most of the features which were meant to be safe failed?
All WW2 navies at their peak Vs 1945 US Navy
Was there a way for Japan to win against the US navy? And if yes where was the most likely area where they could achieve that victory?
Im looking for a book on british maritime lore and traditions, any recommendations?
In your "BB clash at Leyte", how many 18inch hits from Yamato do you assumed were necessary to destroy a standard type BB? Also, what damage could their 14inch and 16inch guns have done to Yamato's turrets? What damage can a non-penetrating hit do to equipment and personnel inside?
Lee made the right call. He had little to gain by trying to go toe-to-toe with the Japanese in a night fight, and a lot to lose. At that point in the war, American air power was so dominant that it may well have seemed the Navy wasn't going to take meaningful casualties for the rest of the war, with the exception of the occasional sub attack. Why gamble away a winning advantage by playing into your enemy's few remaining strengths? The only thing that made the IJN relevant again was the kamikaze, and they didn't adopt that until the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Exactly!! Protecting the CVs was ADM Lee's #1 priority not fighting IJN BBs
@@jeffm1463 That said, the fleet carriers didn’t really need protection against Japanese surface ships-unlike Taffy 3, the fast carrier taks force could simply outrun Japanese battleships, and the distances involved meant that the odds of the Japanese surface units even coming into contact with the fast carrier task force was remote.
I’m not sure you can say that a “winning advantage” was really on the line….BUT, sailors lives certainly were on the line in that event - and from what I’ve learned of Lee, he fully understood that factor.
@@jimtalbott9535 Very good point. The US was far enough ahead in the war that the total loss of Lee's entire group wouldn't have made a difference to the strategic picture. But it would have made the potential loss of life that much more appalling.
I agree that Lee made the right call but by 1944 the USN had it's own countervailing advantages. Such an engagement would have been in the environment that prewar planners envisioned except it would have been at night. Unlike Guadalcanal radar would have much more effective and would put the US at a tactical advantage allowing them to gain a favorable position before the engagement began. The only significant threat was the Long Lance. A gun duel, particularly with capital units, would have been one sided. The Japanese could not hit what they could not visually see while the USN could. The Japanese battleline was slower so Lee could have dictated the range and stayed out of visual spotting range. Long range at night was 20kyd+, well within effective gunnery range for blindfire capable ships.
To Lee's credit, it was very telling that he didn't take up the engagement. A LOT of commanders would have taken up the challenge for their own self-aggrandizement. He did the right thing.
Aye! Like Halsey at Leyte, who , Who went off chasing windmills instead of protecting the landing forces
Going up against two Yamato class BB willingly doing without air superiority that the US had would be insanity.
@@liverofADPIE Lee was faunching at the bit to get back to Leyte, but Halsey kept jerking him around. Halsey should have been cashiered long before he knda-sorta was.
@seventhson27 - hum wonders why Halsey comes to mind?
Could it be the battle action at Leyte Gulf comes to mind, this meant that Taffy 3 was to do Halsey job which meant that Taffy 3 defended the carriers left behind. The destroyers like USS Johnson who fought like battleships.
My Grandfather fought and lost his leg during the massive Banzai Charge while operating a M1917 Machine Gun. He was eternally grateful to Admiral Spruance/Lee for protecting their backsides instead of sending the battleships off into an Egotistical machoism contest. It meant the world to the men fighting and dying on the Island that the Fleet didn't leave them.
The battleships and some cruisers would have left, not the entire fleet. Imagine Leyte Gulf, without the Japanese Fleet having a chance to be present since they are on the ocean floor.
Thank you for sharing, great perspective,
Anything could have happened, but even the best case outcome of a crushing US victory seems less good than the historic outcome, so I'd rate Lee's decision pretty highly. Lee seemed to understand the US strengths and felt obliged to play to them even though it meant he'd be playing 2nd fiddle - good man.
Putting your duty ahead of your ego, what a foreign concept these days.
Keep in mind there was likely some other things related to Intelligence that may have been going on there. Spruance had just been briefed in on the intelligence coup of getting their hands on Admiral Toga's Z plans. The Japanese Navy's plans for the defense of the Marianas. Right as they were departing for Saipan. Given the extremely classified nature of that intel he was limited in who else could be briefed in. Plus he was limited by who was already at sea. Inducations are Lee likely knew of the documents contents at that point. Mitcher and McCain among others, did not. Anyone who read that document knew the Japanese plan was likely to bait out the American fleet so Japanese surface units could run around the flank and attack the Marine invasion forces. Lee likely did not want to give chase, because the Japanese plan wanted him to give chase. Expected him to do so. And he knew this.
I find it it amusing, I got into these videos (in part) because I need something interesting to listen to during my commutes, and Drach you apparently started the channel because, of all things, an interest in having something interesting to listen to on your commutes! Thanks for another quality video.
I watch these while pushing carts for work.
Podcasts and "longform" videos like much of Drach's catalogue make the commute to work one of my favorite parts of the day now. And when you don't finish a long video on the morning commute you have something to look forward to at lunch.
I know that I'm hooked, too.
Look up voyage of the damned,the Russian second pacific squadron. Part one and two
@@wallybooger1 The Voyage of the Damned Part 1 & 2! Probably the funniest of all Drach's videos simply because of one vesseI that I probably don't even have to write the name of if you've watched/listened but I'll do it anyway. *Kamchatka!*
You have to respect Lee for declining the engagement. He loved commanding battleships and this was his dream engagement, like the line battles of old. But he gave up the opportunity to protect his men.
But later on he was rewarded for his putting his men before his ego at Leyte Gulf
Bismarck vs Hood…3 survivors. Lee was a real man; nothing to prove to anybody.
Fight to your strengths, not your opponents. If you can take out a Yamato battleship at the cost of 50 aircraft or 1-2 battleships, take the loss in aircraft. As interesting as this engagement would be for us to talk about 80 years later, for the men lost unnecessarily, it would have sucked.
The Pacific theater strategy of island hopping was to avoid fighting unnecessary battles, and this surface engagement was an unnecessary battle against ships that would have minimal effect on the war. Outside of Samar, what damage did they cause because they weren't sunk in the Phillipine sea?
Exactly. And the Americans didn't lose 50 planes to take out Yamato. They lost 10 planes to take out Yamato, a cruiser, and 4 destroyers. And they only lost 12 men killed in the process, since they rescued some of the pilots after the fact.
@@Snarkbar : If anything the Yamato and Musashi were simply resource sinks. They drank insane amounts of fuel and wasted the talents and manpower of about 6,000 trained sailors. Given how pitifully little they accomplished during the war and how few men and planes were lost in sinking these floating hotels their existence was a logistical disaster. Sure, they are the biggest, but I never understood the mystique attached to these Golden Turkeys.
@@Bufoferrata The Yamatos were far from unique in being pointless and a waste of resources. This is a WWII-era battleship thing in general. Even vessels that had far more active careers rarely actually did anything other units couldn’t have done more cost-effectivel. The Iowas being a good example: they served as gigantic, expensive CLAAs when a larger number of actual CLAAs would have been far more strategically justifiable, plus shore bombardment roles already covered by Standards and subcapital units. If anything, the Iowas are more overrated (in terms of perceived value) than the Yamatos, since the Yamatos constantly get criticized for being a pointless waste of resources and the Iowas do not despite also being a pointless waste of resources.
Though if you really twisted my arm and made me choose which WWII-era battleships were the least sensible, I’d go with the four Kriegsmarine vessels, because on top of the same strategic flaws everyone else’s battleships also had, those four were in a situation where they would be strategic failures EVEN IF battleships as a whole weren’t a net strategic negative by that point (partly because a surface fleet was the last thing Germany needed, and partly because those four were much worse-designed than any other contemporary designs, meaning they were effectively useless for countering enemy capital ships because everyone else had better-designed capital ships). Yes, they did tie down a lot of Allied assets, but that mostly has to do with the Allies vastly overestimating the threat they posed.
@@Bufoferrata They were designed for a war they didn't end up fighting. They would have been great at Jutland, but after Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to the bottom so easily, it was pretty clear that Jutland wasn't going to happen again.
@@Snarkbar
You can say this about literally every battleship of the WWII generation.
Albeit note that with the sole exception of Germany, WWII-era navies (and not just the Allies) built battleships on the assumption they would be engaging at longer ranges than at Jutland, hence the advent of AoN armour (as it turned out, some of these navies were planning to engage at ranges where even radar fire control wouldn’t be adequate to enable effective gunnery, but AoN was superior even at closer ranges-not that this really proved relevant in a war when battleship construction was no longer strategically justified)
I get the impression that US Naval officers from gunnery up to Nimitz himself still didn't fully understand radar. They seemed to think that radar was the great equalizer to counter Japanese night fighting skill. As seen in the various night battles in the Solomons radar just shows a blip on the screen. It did not show if the blip was a friendly or hostile. US warships with a radar contact still held their fire because they were concerned that the contact may be a friendly. Lee understood that even with radar in a night action would still be chaotic. Ships taking damage and/or sinking would disrupt the formation. Lee's concern about communication breakdowns would cause more chaos. The US Navy's advantage in numbers and quality of ships would have been negated. Lee made the right call.
Technology tends to run ahead of tactics.
I believe your assessment is correct. Since you mentioned Nimitz: he did not have a seagoing command throughout the Pacific War. His position kept him mostly in the Pacific Fleet’s HQ at Pearl Harbor. Any operational experience he had with radar was most likely given to him in demonstrations, not from being on a deployed ship and especially not in combat. Though as bright as Nimitz was, he likely knew his shortcomings on tactical details such as that, so likely did defer to the knowledge of officers like Lee who did use radar to take battleships into battle at night. Likewise Nimitz’s understanding of carrier warfare was more limited than that of Spruance, Halsey, Fletcher, and Mitscher. He didn’t have to be the most knowledgeable, he had to be in charge. That’s something that made Nimitz such an excellent admiral: he painted the strategic big picture, and left room for his underlings with experience-based knowledge to make the tactical decisions within that big picture. In stark contrast to the 1944 IJN high command, who stifled their underlings’ knowledge and experience by making every major strategic and tactical decision in Tokyo.
@@Engine33Truck during the battle when Spruance decided to move onto a more advantageous launch position for morning strikes one of the members of his staff urged him to countermand the order Nimitz said I agree with you but doing that is the first step of me running the entire war from pearl
@@seanmac1793 …. I find it difficult to criticize how Nimitz ran the Pacific war decades after he did it so well
@@Idahoguy10157 i am not criticizing him
Lee had fresh memories of taking an ad-hoc group into action against a well trained enemy. The Battle of Guadalcanal had also demonstrated the damage he could expect if he got into a night knife fight against the IJN. Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. The there is his primary mission, protect the main striking force of the USN, the carriers. If we assume he has at least taken damage he could be out of position to not be able to carry out his primary mission. It is a conservative decision, weighted to protect the carriers. His potential fleet would not have sailed and trained as a unit.They would have to be extracted from present assignments, Assembled along with their escorts, Again a group that would not have at least exercised together. As for the officer the made the comment that radar controlled gunnery doesn't care if it is night or day, this is true, but it also doesn't care if it is friend or foe.
" Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. "
Doctrine for the USN had been for BB shootouts to be made at medium ranges. Well over 10,000 yards. The armor protection reflected this. Less resistance to enemy fire at 5000 yards that at 15,000 yards.
@@Carlschwamberger1 I think it was a difficult choice, but the right one.
Right, and that was 1 comment from one gunnery officer, speaking for his own perspective, which could've been responsibility for anything from 1 turret to all guns of a specific ship. Lee had a bigger picture to keep in perspective.
@@77thTrombone God bless him for being more interested in his mission than in personal Glory. I really wonder about Arleigh Burke overstepping his authority at Leyte Gulf.
@@77thTrombone I feel that Lee’s comment about communications issues may have been regarding the risk of friendly fire or coordinating the maneuvering of the fleet in the dark, where the risk of ship on ship collisions also becomes a major issue.
Lee did the right thing. Risking his ships in a night engagement just because you wanted a glorious big gun duel would be like foregoing dropping the atomic bombs in favor of proceeding with Operation Olympic just to prove the superiority of American infantry and artillery.
I think Lee knew it was better to let Japanese BBs get attrited by aircraft and submarines rather than slug it out in gun duels - he would not run away if he stumbled into a BB fight but knew there was more to lose than gain in fighting Japanese battleships directly
Exactly, the battle line is a fist while naval aviation is a spear. Why get into a fist fight when you can spear your enemy first.
Yes. A chance for glorious battle, but of no practical value. He'd been in a night action, and didn't want another. And it was obvious that surface ships of any size were practically helpless against an un-contested air strike.
@@ramal5708 Actually, given radar night engagements would favour Lee more.
@@bkjeong4302 sure, but thats only one aspect
@@bkjeong4302 You are correct, but the advantage may not have been big enough to make a real difference. The IJN routinely trained for night operations and had a good system of fire control and communication. Lee was well aware that the US Navy had not had as much training in those operations and as far as I can tell they were still having comms issues to the point he just didn't feel they had enough of an advantage to risk it. I don't know how aware he was of the IJN's radar capabilities at that point, but as Drach pointed out, they had functional enough systems in this particular group that overall, with the addition of the IJN's huge advantage in torps, it may have actually been pretty even. If there was a US advantage, it certainly wasn't enough to take that risk in Lee's opinion, and I tend to agree with him.
Lee was smart. He did not look at a problem from one angle. He was capable of three dimensional thinking. Anyone who could do calculus in his head was capable of seeing multiple outcomes and see which one was most beneficial!
Its called smarter, NOT harder
The Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo was a very, very real threat. Our cruisers did not carry torpedos and night battles are very confusing even in peace time practice. SMC USN. Ret.
Esp having over 100, in the water, at night.
Yeah there were only a few US cruisers left with torpedoes at that time of the war. The Japanese torpedoes were extremely destructive, especially to their carrying ships if a shell hits the tubes or near to them.
1,080 lb of TNT hitting you in the teeth you'll will know it Look at what had happen to the H.N.L.M.Ss Java and De-Ruyter the H.N.L.M.S Kortenaer
3:05 "Did you correct for the relative speed of the island?"
"What's the relative speed of the island?"
"Nothing, its an island"
It's easy to judge decades after the fact, but I also think Lee was right to be cautious. A more aggressive strategy MAY have yielded good results, but there were also ways it could have gone horribly wrong.
It's rather like what was said of Jellico at Jutland, that he had the means to lose the war in an afternoon.
You mean say as I sit here on my couch eating popcorn with my dogs, 80 years after the fact and 0 responsibility for anything that I shouldn't slight Lee for his decision??? Gee whiz you're harsh......
In World of Warships some players just want to win harder. When they are winnig they take risks and often jeopardise whole effort, often losing in the end. Mr Lee would not be one of them. He understood that when you are winnig there is no point to take big risks (nightfight is alvays risky). Wise guy.
Should have made him an Admiral or something...
Aviators and submariners weren't risking large surface assets with thousands of personnel by being overly aggressive especially with a formation who had not operated as a separate unit to practice surface combat.
They were expendable.
@@John-ru5ud Agreed....there was less at risk during their operations. Admiral Lee was acutely aware of his ships were a much more significant investment.
At this point in the war, victory seemed certain if no needless risks were taken - like potentially throwing away large amounts of assets.
Industry meant that numerical superiority grew by the day. If the Americans did nothing outright stupid - like facing Long Lance torpedoes at night - then it was simple fantasy by Japan and Germany that they could force such a devastating battle that they could even get breathing space.
That doesn't even account for the superior training programs of America.
I just heard “100 long lances” being in the water and I shuddered. That is a frightening amount of roulette death headed your way.
The PRC navy might be planning a similar tactic against US carrier groups. The Chinese have large numbers of shore-based, long range anti-shipping missiles. In a war, they could simply fire enough missiles simultaneously to overwhelm a US force’s point defenses, should it approach the coast of China.
@@gerardlabelle9626 That is the general idea in Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising", where the Soviets launched about a hundred anti-ship missiles. Even though the Americans took out many of the missiles, it only took a couple to do in a capital ship.
the classic wall of skill
A covey what a typically quaint English phrase, keep up the good work drac
You have to be incredibly impressed with the guy. The temptation to fight history's last great battleship battle must have been incredible. But from a strategic point of view there was nothing to gain and a lot to lose. We had complete air superiority by that point, you could practically walk across the Pacific on the decks of Essex class carriers while the Japanese were scraping the bottom of their pilot barrel. We were going to sink the remainder of the Japanese fleet sooner or later, he knew that. The battleships were needed to bombard beaches, that wasn't as glamorous as sinking another battleship but it was much more important for bringing the war to an end. He put the war's needs, and the lives of his men, above his own need for glory.
I bought "Battleship Commander" after hearing your earlier video on Lee. It's a great book. I'm glad you bring naval history to others.
Same here - I bought it on Drach's recommendation. Excellent book!
@@tfbond8687 I asked for it as a Christmas present, great book.
Bought, will start reading as soon as I finish watching this 😁
Wear the "Don't you mean 7 of 10" comments as a badge of honor Drach. It is because of you and your videos that so many know that.
I guess he forgot the US built the Missouri and Wisconsin. I watched some of his videos, and wonder where he gets his information from. Because he be way off on a lot of things.
Uncle Drach, your explanations that make it plain that battles do not take place in a vacuum add so much to my understanding of naval history. I very much appreciate the way you share your knowledge.
Lee provided his best military advice for winning the war. Not only was he correct (IMO) to decline a night surface action, but he was correct for operational and strategic reasons. By the time of Philippine Sea, the IJN could no longer win the war and that was primarily due to unrestricted submarine warfare on the merchant fleet and constant hammering from aircraft. Why change the calculation by risking assets that take years to build?
While I would have enjoyed reading about a major Battleship to Battleship fight as well as the next guy, Admiral Lee did the right thing!
Even in a best case scenario, he was likely to take damage to at least some of his ships, possible severe damage with high casualties.
If things didn't go his way, between the torpedoes and the 18 inch guns of the Yamamatos, things could end quite badly, with severe damage, casualties, loss of ships, and potentially even loss of a Battleship or two! The Iowas weren't that heavily protected!
It is really easy for aggressive subordinates, such as Burke, or Naval historians to criticize after the fact, because they didn't have to make the decision.
Not only that, he would've been ridiculed for taking risks that weren't necessary and it would've been the end of his command too. Losing an Iowa to the Yamato's was definitely a possibility and (as far as I know) both the Yamato-class battleships and the Type 93 (?) "Long Lance" were still unknown factors to U.S. Intelligence until war's end. So he would've gone into the fight and gotten a much ruder awakening than the Battles of Iron Bottom Sound had been I believe (nevermind his "green" naval crews on board the newer battleships too).
"The Iowas weren't that heavily protected!" I see this claim thrown left and right, despite Iowas sharing a near identical protection profile to the South Dakota class, and absolutely nobody calls the South Dakotas moderately or weakly protected.
@@24YOA All of them were protected against the threats they thought they were going to face, but no one knew of the 18.1" guns of the Yamato class, it was such a guarded secret of the IJN. Don't ask me how they managed to keep it a secret with all of their codes broken, etc., but it was done...
🤷♂️
I'm not taking anything away from U.S.'s 16" guns but the 18's would punch through sooner at longer ranges than they would, so it was probably for the best Lee held what he had (though I'm surprised that Japan had the Kongo class battleships sortying with the Yamatos, the Ise, Hyuga, Nagato, and Mutsu were all better battleships than the Kongo class for such a role). They liked to do stupid stuff, don't understand why...
🙄
@@tyree9055 speed is probably the answer there. This is the surface force meant to guard the carriers and the older IJN battleships just couldn’t keep up.
Admiral Yamamoto was dead by this point, they wouldn't have to worry about him.
A what if scenario where Admiral Lee had a Battleship fight? _This is where the fun begins_ (But not fun for the IJN)
You mean we will have a new long poking device episode (flying ones for a change ^^) :)
Think back to the words of Adm Jellico at Jutland, "When you are winning, risk nothing." While Lee's battle line was not winning itself, the overall battlegroup was winning. Why risk surface units in a risky and unnecessary night engagement.
The same thing happened at Okinawa. The battleships were offered a surface engagement against Yamato and elected to let the planes do it instead.
As usual a SUPERB presentation...the use of moving pictures brought the story to life....more of this please...my only regret is that as I am 59 (in Aptil) that I will probably never see a large portion of your future content especially after the various declassifications occur. My deep respect and appreciation as always.
For the first 22 minutes of the video, I was trying to figure out why the Americans would be hesitant to engage the Japanese in a surface engagement, being as Lee had 7 modern battleship, 2 of which were Iowa class ships. (I had no idea what the van force consisted of)
Then the Van Force was shown and my first though was, and I quote "Oh shit".
Yeah. Nobody sane takes on that force unless absolutely necessary, no matter the odds. Casualties in such a battle would be horrific.
I believe that Lee was 100% correct in his decision making. There was nothing to gain.
A single 18" shell hitting ANY ship could well kill a hundred or more men. It is easy to imagine a thousand or more dead. Air power can do the same job, with far fewer dead.
The thing is battleship guns don't often hit their targets.
@@vinnyganzano1930 Unless your name is Willis Augustus Lee, Jr. ;)
My interest in military history is all over the board. Specifically WW2 in general. Finding your channel is a godsend. I’ve learned so much more than I did in school. My grandfather served on LST 1014. He told me a few stories about beach landings. His duties included ships cool and gun captain on a 40mm boaforce .
*bofors (swedish company)
7:22 Admiral Lee? Cold feet? Sounds like classic Monday morning quarterbacking, Professor Millett. Lee took a logical and dispassionate assessment of the situation.
Those old battle wagons were really fearsome weapons. Many are currently museums. They even let you sleep on them overnight. I’ve stayed on the Massachusetts and New Jersey with my sons when they were in the Scouts and toured the Wisconsin while visiting my son who is stationed in Norfolk, VA. These things are massive. You could spend days and not see them in their entirety. When we were touring the “Big Wisky” (USS Wisconsin) in Norfolk, my son commented that, in comparison, his ship (itself nearly 700 ft and 9500 tons) “feels like a tuna can.” 🤣 If you ever get a chance to visit one of these “bad boys,” give it a full day. You won’t be disappointed!
A couple of years ago i went on board Big Wisky in Norfolk Along-with the Big-J at times
Just finished reading that very section of Battleship Commander! Very thoughtful of you Dach, to provide an immediate verbal appendix to chapter 12😀
Drach this was a very well put together piece of reasoning and thought out very well. My hat is off to you good sir.
The Japanese were adept at night action, and the US had major aviation advantage during the day. Lee's decision seemed prudent and moreover he probably saved many US lives. It wouldn't make headlines or sensational history, but Lee was not a grand stander. Bully for him.
Good afternoon Drach. I love your analysis of this situation.
Admiral Lee was a highly competent officer, aggressive when he needed to be but NOT a "Halsey" type of "ATTACK, repeat ATTACK" aggressive. He appears to me to have been a more thoughtful officer, perhaps even more so than Admiral Spruance (who was known to go haring off with USS Iowa, looking for a fight on at least one occasion.)
I think Sun Tsu would have approved of the man. Lee knew both the strengths and weaknesses of his force and had a very good idea of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents.
Hindsight being 20/20, I think he reached the correct decision.
15:24 Don't you mean Adm Lee 7 of 10 fast battleships the US built? 2 North Carolinas, 4 South Dakotas and 4 Iowas. He was missing 1 South Dakota and 2 of the Iowas.
I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line :)
@@Drachinifel This channel is impossible ! Too many experts ^^ Drach next time, just say it was a check to see if people were really listening to you :) Thanks for the amazing work !
@@Drachinifel Ah i see. Thanks for the reply. That just makes Adm Lee seem that much more impressive. Almost Every new battleship the US build they gave to Lee. haha.
I think VADM Lee once again demonstrated his superior judgement and decision-making, which furthermore didn't require him to use his equally superior tactical skill in battle..."Just because you can, doesn't mean you should." I think that the superior radar, especially radar-controlled gunnery makes a night engagement favorable to the US Navy. However, Lee rightly understood the absolute requirement for effective C3 ( Command, Communication and Control ) coupled with adequate training and experienced crews in night tactics. Doctrine is one thing, but execution of doctrine requires training, exercising these skill sets and experience. I'll echo what ADM Ozawa said, "Your electronics were superior"...The electronic war was decisive in WW2, and especially in the Pacific, however, ADM Lee understood what his overall strategic role was within the battle fleet, and pursuing a fleet action in the Philippine Sea just didn't add up to a wise decision...ADM Lee was an amazing man, brilliant, studied and considerate of his men...He made the right decision(s) throughout the war, and more importantly...LEARNED from his experience...
Yeah good thinking on his part and as a naval-officer had said If you're not lucky we can't use you
Thank you for these great quality, interesting videos.
What Lee feared and indeed had experienced was the roll of luck that ruled these night engagements. I think he was right not to risk so much when AirPower already held a strong advantage.
I play your new stuff while I'm working, and then replay it two or three times so it all gets into my brain. I hope you get credit for all that watch time.
I have often wondered about Lee taking on Japanese Van force at Battle of the Phillipine Sea. I really enjoyed this video. If Lee did not feel that his force was prepared to take on the Japanese at night then I feel it was for the best. I really enjoy your alternative history videos. Thank you.
Had the pleasure of being enrolled in a class on Naval History by Clark Reynolds. Best and most interesting teacher I ever had. A class that you actually looked forward to attending.
Also, having used radar my entire career, I do not remember any difference between night and day. I suppose it depends on the frequency and I have no idea of the frequencies used in 1944 as surface search and fire control were likely different.
The idea of a ship I'm on being hit by a close range 18" shell from a Yamato class is the stuff of nightmares.
Agreed, Iowas were probably the "best" battleship but if ANYTHING on the water caught a Yamato shell, let alone a full salvo...
A-YIKES I SAY!
Matched against a Yamato, an Iowa was a Battle Cruiser. It was faster, less heavily armored with smaller guns.
Lee made the correct call, a night action would have gained little if anything and risked heavy damage and casualties to his own force when American air power was already heavily dominant.
This would have been as Jingles likes to call it a case of trying to win harder.
and or a sudden rush of shit to the brain :D
VERY interesting. The battles for the Marianas and the Philippines certainly offer a huge range of "what ifs".. I think Spruance is often criticized for his caution in not leaving the invasion force under-protected. Watching our videos and playing our wargames we often forget that the commanders lacked the "God's eye view" that we enjoy.. Spruance had to stay close to the invasion site to accomplish the greater mission. As you stated, Lee also had the combat experience to not want to ply to known Japanese strengths. By that point in the war, the USN had finally accepted that the Japanese had an excellent torpedo and were quite good at using them. Who really wants to get into a barroom fight where both parties have very big clubs and could hurt each other badly. Admittedly the cold logic says that the USN could trade battleship losses with Japan and still come out the winner, but as you have shown there are factors that could shift the advantage to either side. Another less tangible factor for Lee; he knew each one of his battleship captains and he had reports on the effectiveness of each ship. Who knows, perhaps any combat losses would have caused the Kentucky and the Illinois to be finished (I think Montana was already canceled by then).
Lee was experienced with night actions against the Japanese and well knew the potential effects of a long lance torpedo barrage. During his night action at Savo Island off Guadalcanal, he watched half of his destroyers severely damaged or sunk by long lances. His flagship USS Washington barely escaped such a barrage after destroying the battleship Kirishima..
Absolutely fantastic video! I thoroughly enjoy this type of content.
In war you really need to anticipate the Worst Case scenario as being the likely one. Whether it was actually likely or not. As many others in the comments have stated, Lee made the right decision; by now it was clear to everyone that air power was what was going to win the war, and our carriers were definitely shifting things in our favor. Better to play it safe and let the aircraft pummel the enemy into submission rather than risk losing years of construction and investment for vainglory.
You cover many more what-ifs than I could ever envisage. Two thoughts: Primarily, this battle takes place in 1944, not 1942. The Navy is winning the war at this point, it does not have to take the same risks that it had to at Midway, or Guadalcanal. So, Lee does not really have to engage the Japanese unless he really believes that he has the advantage. Having already experienced what they could do at night, he would have been prudent to wait for the kind of advantage that Jessie Oldendorf had at the Surigao Straight. (Burke had indeed had success against Japanese naval forces at night, but he had also had the time to work out his tactics and train his officers and crews before attempting to do so.) Second, Lee was also tasked with protecting the carrier force, in concert with a landing on a strategically important set of Japanese islands, and he took this responsibility seriously. Would that Admiral Halsey had maintained a similar sense of responsibility off Samar. It is always easy to second-guess a decision with hindsight; it is helpful to consider at what point in the war a commander is having to make the decision.
@@ramal5708 Halsey was the right Admiral for 1942, when we needed someone who would take risks and fight aggressively. He was still the right Admiral in 1943, when he risked what few carriers we had to attack the gathering Japanese cruiser force at Rabaul that was threatening our landing zone at Bougainville. By 1944, we needed someone who could see the bigger picture and make certain that he did not lose sight of his most important job, and maybe Halsey was not that man.
@@thomasknobbe4472 best combination would have been Spruance as the overall fleet commander and Halsey in charge of the Carriers.
@@ph89787 Halsey was senior to Spruance so never would of worked. Would of also been a slap in the face to Mark Mitscher who turned Taskforce 38/58 from a concept into a well oiled machine. And it has been well documented that Halsey did more harm than good when he tried to micromanage Mitscher and have a hands on approach in regards to Carrier Operations. Simply put, Carrier tactics had changed since 1942, Halsey was using the old book and overriding Mitscher who wrote the new book.
@@thomasknobbe4472 Halsey was also most definitely being effected by the stress of of the early wars years and probably should have been rotated out before that point for health reasons. Not to take anything away from his service, but he was still only human and by all accounts he had not been at the top of his game for some time before that
@@petriew2018 this is a very good point. We tend to think of people as static personalities, as always behaving the same way over places and time. It is quite possible that by 1944 the stress of ongoing command had worn Admiral Halsey down, and he was not able to consider all the options, and all the possibilities, as he could two years previously. I have not studied the typhoons that struck his fleet on, what, two occasions? Might the chronic stress of constant command have had something to do with the evident mistakes he was making at this point?
10% what if scenario and 90% of deep expertise on your part...while i long for the 10% alternate scenario, all the building stands up thanks to the remaining 90% of knowledge. Very, very fascinating vid Drach, thank you so much!❤
I think Sun Tzu would be proud of Admiral Lee's analysis on why he should not sail west to engage the IJN in a night surface action. He had a healthy respect of his command's capabilities and the enemy's.
This is one of those alternate scenarios that might have ended up worse than the outcome of OTL. The other one would be the Battle off Samar.
Kantai Kessen (Japanese Decisive Battle Doctrine), which the Japanese had been itching for since the beginning of the war, called for a cloud of Long Lance torpedoes to be unleashed first thing in the battle. The Japanese had a LOT of Long Lance torpedoes.
The Japanese got their Kantai Kessen, but it didn't go quite the way they'd planned.
Lee made the right call, his experience in night fighting showed that the U.S Radar wasn't the golden gift everyone thought it was, Note that SoDaK had it's radar and much of it's electrical knocked out, and Washington had some pretty big Black Holes in her coverage, something Lee knew all too well, then there was the whole thing about shootin and scootin at night, and relying entirely on radar to score was very risky at a time when that wasn't really needed! Finally, Lee understood the importance in covering the men ashore, and not needlessly risking serious american capital against an ever fading IJN force! Second Guessing Lee here is a big tell on everyone else who questioned his choice!
Oh Hell Yes!!!!!!! So happy to have this now! Literally just finished watching the video on Lee a few hours ago for the third time
I suspect the skill of the various ships CIC staff is what Lee was worried about. And it doesn't take a lot of moving elements for a CIC to get overwhelmed as happened when kamikaze tactics became commonplace. At a cursory glance, the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay does appear show that even with CIC and radar(as its late '43), nightfighting can still get really confusing even for the IJN.
The general understanding of the time is that battle line strength is based on the square of the number of (competitive) battleships. Pre-war, 15 battleships vs 10 would have seen a relative strength over 2 to 1 (225 to 100), for a clear US advantage. This scenario is 7 to 5, for a ratio of 49 to 25, almost 2 to 1. However, the fact that one battle line is twice as strong as, and should easily defeat, the other does not mean the victorious battle line will not take damage and/or losses. Why volunteer to take damage to expensive battleships that will take months to repair (if not sunk) when you can use air power with cheap attrition units that will be replaced by the next few day's production?
I'm not sure whether the US had reached the "push the planes with the most flight hours over the side of the carrier to make room for the next batch of factory-new replacements" stage of the war yet, but they were getting close.
@@Snarkbar I'm also remembering the other decisive win the US scored off Guadalcanal, October's Cape Esperance. Despite achieving almost complete surprise with the gun line and shooting up Aoba, Furutaka, and the lead destroyer, USS Boise still took a shell hit that burned out much of the fore part of the ship and killed over a hundred men.
That squaring 'trick' is neat! :)
I just want to point out that, if you're doing 7v5, one lucky hit to a radar antenna can effectively reduce that to 6v5, which sucks.
In a 15v10, whose force ratio isn't THAT much higher, one (un)lucky hit brings you to 14v10, which is obviously a much less significant drop in ratio!
So being "twice as strong" STILL skews in favor of having more engaging ships, because your Hood/Scharnhorst/Norfolk changes decrease :)
Does this have a fancy name, like the Pythagorean Battleship Theorem or something lol?
@@RCAvhstape not that I know of. I ran across it in Nofi and Dunnigan's Dirty Little Secrets of World War 2.
Lee won his battle off Savo Island at night. At that time, Admiral Lee was the world's leading expert and the only living person with experience on night engagements with battleships. His rationale for avoiding a night engagement eludes me. Admiral Oldendorf had no trouble employing his battleships at night.
The japs were considered "masters of the night" for some reason 🤷
7:21 I could understand other (more eager) officers at the time of the battle having this view of Lee, but I'm quite astonished to hear a historian well after the fact effectively accusing Lee of cowardice. I think Lee's record clearly shows that he was perfectly willing to take on the risks of major combat, but he also understood how high the risks of a night surface battle could be and when it was justified to take those risks.
In 1942 off Guadalcanal, Henderson Field was a vital strategic objective to keep in operation, the IJN was coming back to bombard it, and the only way to stop them was for Lee to put his ships in their way. So in that case, the risks of a night action were justified, and we know what happened there. In 1944 off the Marianas, however, it was a very different story. There, Lee knew that the US fleet had another option for attacking the Japanese (carrier airstrikes) which would provide them with far greater advantages, and were likely to inflict at least as much damage as his battleships could without nearly the same risk. So when Lee recommended against a night surface action, he was effectively urging Mitscher and Spruance to fight that more advantageous air battle instead.
I feel that Lee's assessment of risk versus reward was accurate, and was also in keeping with Spruance's overall approach the campaign. Keep in mind that even a single Long Lance hit on one of Lee's ships would likely have cost more lives than the USN lost in the entire historical battle. And if two or three of Lee's heavy ships had actually been sunk, at night in the middle of the open ocean, the casualties might easily have been 10 times what the USN historically suffered.
I dunno, there are a lot of words you could use to describe the great Ching, I wouldn't use coward as one.
@@rembrandt972ify Ya, that's what I was saying. I could understand someone like that gunnery officer on the Iowa (who seemed very eager to fight the night battle) having a negative view of Lee's recommendation, though I'd still disagree with them. I just cannot comprehend how a historian looking from decades later with access to all of the information could possibly think that Lee recommended against a night battle because he "wasn't willing to take the same risks that the aviators and the submariners were taking every day".
Night surface battles were the IJN's game. Lee made the right call in not engaging them.
13:02. Correct me if I’m wrong Drach. But isn’t Air Group 10 aboard USS Enterprise trained for night operations? So even in a night engagement, Lee would still have had air support. The only issue would be that they’ve only conducted a night attack on land and stationary ship targets. During Operation Hailstone.
Theoretically, but I don't think anyone would want to risk trying a relatively new tactic for the USN (night strikes on moving targets) whilst their own ships were in close proximity. The chances of either getting it wrong and attacking their own ships, or their own ships being a bit too quick on the trigger, would be too great.
@@Drachinifel thanks Drach.
Well presented. Lee made the right choice.
Superbly well done Drach! I generally eschew floating or commenting on "what ifs"; they are notoriously fraught with complications, which require multiple assumptions, any one of which can undermine one's conclusions. However, I can say with certainty that Lee's decision was NOT based on anything remotely like a lack of courage. That simply was not in his character, as I understand it. And his instincts - based on battle-tested experience - had a track record of success that only a fool would second-guess.
Welp. After returning home from sea back in late Oct after 6 months I have FINALLY Caught up with your videos Drach. Thanks for all the great content.
30:58 video like that always amazes me to see how fast one of these giant battleships actually can move. The fact that the Iowa class is able to keep up with modern nuclear carriers is telling; the term "fast battleship" is well deserved.
I admire your efforts to get battleships into a fight against each other.
It sounds like Lee understood modern carrier tactics much earlier and better than many of his contemporaries. The surface fleets primary reason for existence is to defend the carriers.
The same man who advocated to reducing the order for Alaska-Class Super Saiyan Cruisers for more carriers.
Outstanding as usual sir. Protecting the invasion force and it's shipping was the primary responsibility of the navy. That's exactly what they did.
Good stuff, Drach. It's always interesting to speculate on such things, isn't it.
I don't see how it would have made ANY sense for Lee to have acted other than he did. Remember, too, there's Spruance to consider. Despite the criticisms over Spruance not being aggressive about pursuing the IJN forces after the smashing victory at Midway with sinking the IJN's carriers, I think he was absolutely correct in his choice.
I think BOTH of them were of the "remember your mission, STICK TO THAT, and ALWAYS assess possible opportunities that arise in light of YOUR PRIMARY MISSION" school of thought.
As an aside, I consider them both superior thinkers to Halsey, whose primary strength as I see it really was in motivating and lifting the morale of the USN Pacific forces in the very difficult early period of the Pacific war. My thoughts might be regarded as heretical, LOL, but they are what they are.
It is, however, even for experienced historians, to keep the problem of "knowing what happened after...." from affecting these discussions without those involved realising it.
One VERY important and particular aspect of that is the difficulty of restricting any discussion/analysis to what the relevant commanders knew/suspected AT THE TIME, plus their particular doctrines to which they and their navies subscribed.
I'm not mentioning this to suggest your video has a problem due to those sorts of issues, not at all.
I thought I'd mention them as they're REALLY important and difficult to avoid entirely, usually requiring quite some effort of research and then self-critiquing; ideally of course you get someone else with relevant knowledge and skills to do so, which of course is a very grossly simplified statement of the 'peer review' concept.
An example of the sort of question that might come from the above would be to ask a question about the behaviour of the Japanese forces in the 'worst case' for Lee.
Q: do you think, given the IJN obsession over the decisive battle concept (I've forgotten what they called it, sorry), that it's more likely they'd have gone "all in" with EVERYTHING they had, choosing to break away ONLY if and when it became evident they were being destroyed too rapidly WITHOUT destroying their enemy at a greater rate?
I thought that particular element of your excellent 'worst case' was an interesting one, and would love to know how you arrived at it.
Of course there are countless technical and other matters to consider, and such a topic could soon result in hours of videos let alone books, LOL, so I'm not for one second suggesting you "ought" to have addressed more of them. I think you've done a great job of explaining the circumstances and presenting two 'extremes' of the ranges of possibilities in a way that covers enough without going overboard (couldn't resist, LOL).
Cheers
Hokey Smokes, Bullwinkle! That was some great narrative joined to a visual Delight! Cheers and Happy New Year!
Love,
David
The Americans were afraid of going into ‘battleship battle’ with the Japanese after Guadalcanal because they deemed, Japanese gunnery and ‘long lance torpedo’ to be superior.
However Americans put faith in their aviators and submarines, combining with their code breaking. The Americans had their advantage in that.
@@ramal5708 Launching air and surface attacks at the same time is impractical due to range differences; carriers far outrange battleships and rely on maintaining that range as a defence against enemy surface ships, meaning that the carriers have to be a few hundred miles away from the enemy during the engagement. If the battleships are attached to the carriers they're too far away to actually fire at enemy vessels, and if they’re not attached to the carriers you’d still need absolute perfect positioning plus a ridiculous amount of luck to actually have them be able to attack at the same time as the carrier aircraft.
@@ramal5708 At Cape Engano the Americans DIDN’T use the surface units and carriers at the same time. They used the carriers first, then had to wait for the surface ships to get within range.
Furthermore, Cape Engano really does not work as a good case study, because the Japanese were not trying to evade the American surface ships (because they were a decoy force without actual combat capability). And even then, it would have been much more efficient for the Americans to not even bother using the surface ships, and just send in even more air attacks.
@@ramal5708
Okay, so you’re going to hit them with aircraft and then with surface ships.
But the question is: WHY? This is straight out of pre-WWII doctrines that wrongly assumed carriers couldn’t sink enemy surface ships, but only damage them, leading to cases where carriers were prevented from sinking targets they could have sunk. If you already know you can sink the enemy ships with air attacks, why not just keep doing that? Why bother trying to close with your own surface units and putting more of your sailors and ships at risk?
@@ramal5708 Congratulations, you said just what I was trying to say all along: THERE IS NO POINT IN BRINGING SURFACE SHIPS TO ENGAGE ENEMY VESSELS with IF YOU CAN JUST USE FLEET CARRIERS TO ATTACK AND DEFEAT THE ENEMY WITHOUT FEAR OF COUNTERATTACK.
America won the only true BB vs. BB battle in the war. At night. With radar. Against a superior fleet. Japanese BB's were better at bombing beachheads than they were fighting surface actions.
I have to agree with estimates. I am quite sure Admiral Lee (in addition to any other flag officer) would have studied the battle of Jutland, and understand that having superior numbers does not guarantee victory… and also Lee’s previous experience at Guadalcanal, would have to had a great influence on what he did. What did happen was that the invasion of the Marianas went off unhindered by the Japanese Navy, and his ships remained intact and capable of further offensive action. Yes, letting the Japanese get away allowed them to initiate the Battle of Leyte Gulf. But that wasn’t Ching Lee’s fault. In a perfect world, Spruance would’ve listened to Mitscher and attacked earlier upon his submarines sightings. As it is, the subs got Taiho and Shokaku; however, with multiple attacks from any or all four of the task groups, a lot more ships than a light carrier may have gone down. Add to this, a few hits on Yamato and Musashi (because as history shows it takes A LOT to sink them), maybe these ships aren’t included in the Center Force later.
I tend to agree with you that the potential surface fleet action was a gilded invitation to the US ships eating a whole lot of long lances, whether they had the tactical advantage or not.
Same thing Jellicoe considered at Jutland, right? As Professor Lambert put it, ‘yes the Germans may have won a tactical victory, but their fleet never sallied out again. They knew they would be destroyed.’ The IJN lost nearly its entire air group and three carriers, and provided absolutely no help to its garrison on Saipan.
Definitely would be fun to try and play out the second scenario in a game!
I think Lee was a realist. While aggressive subordinates wanted to charge straight at the Japanese battle line, dreaming of a second Jutland and lots of glory for themselves, Lee saw the big picture. He knew that the carriers were the queens of the fleet and that the fast battleships existed for one reason only - to protect and serve the carriers. The old battleships were the only ones that had a chance of engaging in a surface action, as happened at Surigao Strait, and that was because they were basically expendable. Engaging the Japanese battleships would cause far more damage to the Americans that to the Japanese. Even if all the Japanese ships were eventually sunk, the Americans would be at best heavily damaged, and maybe even some of the battleships would be sunk, which would hamper carrier operations for many months in the future. The video points out the problems 1) the action would be fought at night, and Lee had already learned the hard way how good the Japanese were at night fighting 2) Lee's forces were untrained in surface engagements 3) the Japanese had a deadly weapon - the Long Lance torpedo - which the Americans had no answer for (American torpedoes in WW2 were crap, due to prewar underfunding in torpedo development). In a night action with salvoes of Long Lances being launched, the battle line could well have been devastated, with no effective way to fight back. It has to be borne in mind that modern battleships like the Yamato and Musashi could not be sunk by gunfire alone. (In fact both of them were eventually sunk by mass torpedo bomber attack). Even if carrier air could have sunk them next day, it would still be a pyrrhic victory. Lee made the right call.
late comment but maybe a valid one, and no i did not read the other 780 comments 😛.
what if Lee or Ukagi or Ozawa had been killed/badly wounded in the first few salvo's and could no longer give the orders, who would take over command of the battle-fleet, would that person be as capable as their boss/superior, what if that commander was a carrier-admiral and not a battleship-admiral ?, the scenario while being absolutely marvelous leaves a few questions open.
Again very good work on this Drach, i enjoy battle reports I'm just annoyed we dutch do not get mentioned a lot, after all we invented GTW (Grand Theft Warship) many, many, many years before they invented GTA 😛.
Another brilliant video as always!
Looking back at the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, where US and IJN cruisers and destroyers tangled with each other at night, probably factored in Burke's opinion, as he was in command of DesDiv 45 & 46. The battle had showed how the USN had made some significant improvements to how they fought at night, but there still was a lot of confusion and mistakes made, even with IFF systems and better radar. It didn't end up badly for the US at all and proved, finally that the USN was capable of not only fighting night engagements, but winning them. It also showed that battles fought at night were not without complications and with a bigger force, those complications can stack up fast.
All told, it was probably the best decision for Lee to make considering the circumstances. A night battle would have seen both sides inflicting damage on one another with little to show for it, other than dead sailors and ships in the repair yard while not achieving a decisive outcome.
Superb video. I agree with Lee's caution, particularly given the context of the known consequences of Halsey's foolish aggressiveness at Leyte Gulf. One thing I would have highlighted more is how even if the fast battleships all survived taking a few Long Lance and 18" hits, it would knock them out of action for quite some time for repairs, during which time the carriers wouldn't have their strongest anti-air gun platforms to defend them from kamikazes. Better to prioritize using his ships to shield the carriers from the worst of the Japanese air attacks.
Love your clips - and the humour !
I wonder what the fuel state was for the various formations? The Japanese had been depending on increasing the range of their strike aircraft by shuttle bombing using the airfields on Guam.
thank you, just proves that training is very good, having better comm. is important but knowing how to use the com. much better
Lee took the information that he had, plus the known capabilities of his ships and their crews, considered his primary mission objectives, and made the best decision. Simple as that.
Omg Admiral Lee my beloved :D
I got that book you recommended on him, brilliant stuff!
Thank you, Drachinifel.
Very good presentation. I personally prefer the US wins big. A bit of trivia regarding your lead photo of Missouri firing it's turret two. The photo was part of a Missouri Comes of Age article in a 1944 National Geographic and was firing in the Caribbean Sea during work ups. The 4x5 color negative was almost destroyed in a flooding accident at the Naval Photo Archives in Washington DC when a water pipe burst in the late 80s. A shipmate of mine was stationed there and rescued it and many others. I also and a black light poster of that shot for many years. I wish that I still had it.
The gunnery officer's comment about their departments not seeing a difference between day and night work doesn't take into account the rest of the ship that has to work in the dark and not sail into the other ships in the same position.
While avoiding torpedoes, yes. Exactly.
It was just that kind of focus on individual ship gunnery almost to the exclusion of all other considerations that had led to so many disasters in the Solomons.
Most of the ship is at Battle Stations inside the ship. really doesn't matter what time it is.
So just like in your Task Force 34 video. Lee would have been responsible for the near single handed extinction of the Kongo-Class.
No "Kongo Line" jokes yet? Lot here might not be what they use to.
One doesn't question Admiral Lee lightly.
The IJN consistently sought to spring a trap on the USN where they could effect maximum damage with minimum loses. It was the legacy of their defeat of the Russians in one overwhelming victory that would break the enemy’s will to continue the war. That was never going to happen with the US, and the Japanese could not afford to lose their ships, so they always backed off rather than pursuing their strategic goals. The Germans kept thinking they could do the same thing with the Soviets. The Italians figured out the situation early and made the best of a bad bet.
One thing that would have lessened the Japanese chances, even in the worst case, was they had even less opportunity to train than Lee's forces due to fuel issues. I can't remember how long it'd been since Yamato / Musashi had even fired the main guns, but it was something horrific.
Loving the archive footage.
As always, amazing work!
@drachinfel, @ 2:11 you mention that old battleships weren't due to arrive until the next day, so Vice Admiral Lee got first crack with his fast battleships. I'm new to this, but I take old battleships as being those of Naval Treaty and earlier? If so, the only old battleships I see in the order of battle anywhere is for the IJN. Have I misinterpreted this section?
I think I understand now. The old battleships only participated in the Battle of Saipan, being separate from the naval Battle of the Philippines Sea. Apologies, this is all new to me, but thoroughly fascinating
Love the clip of the 40’s US Navy Bro’s leanin back and chillen on the deck with 16 inch guns going off directly next to them. Can’t imagine I’d necessarily want to switch places at that moment but I still love it.
If you were in command of a fleet, and there was a similar choice to make, possible a hundred or so casualties of your aviators verses 2,000 or more sailors dead in your capital ships (possibly more, there is always the "Hood" possibility even in a clear victory)... it should be an easy one to make. The correct choice was made: Armchair battleship lovers may not like it, but they were not in charge of the lives of men nor in the firing line actually risking their life. The amount of air power at the US Navy's command made it pretty obvious what would be the likely result going with the air option. As it turned out, they did not get a chance to destroy the enemy surface fleet but they didn't know that at the time of the decision. Later events proved the basic concept correct; both Yamato's being sunk with fairly low casualties in air crews.
I agree, Lee appreciated the risk and the difficulty of controlling the time of the engagement. The young gunnery officers were embracing the new technology, but they were not the ones making decisions in battle.
@@iamironkanute8750 They took up their new posts, fired at the enemy shores, but the targets didn't go 'Ching'.
Good video, Drach.
There is a lot of B&W footage of Iowa that I have never seen before. Where did you find these films? I love it.