The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes
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- Опубліковано 28 сер 2024
- Looking for the most in-depth look at Operation Market Garden? Using animations and detailed maps, let's find out what happened and who was to blame for the failure at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven. Was the plan really doomed to fail from the start? Was it really "A Bridge Too Far"? Let's find out.
I originally created this series as 8 separate videos. This video is all episodes of my series in one video for your viewing pleasure.
Check out my other Battlestorm Videos!
• BATTLESTORM WW2 Docume...
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Sources:
John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009.
Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004.
Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007.
Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009.
Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014.
Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011.
Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974
Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958.
Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.
Music used:
Battle of Kings by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Cloister of Redemption by Jens Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Damnation by Jens Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Escape from the Temple by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Incursion by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Rallying the Defense by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound...
Seeking Loot by Aaron Spencer machinimasound...
Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (creativecommons...)
I’m a retired US Army infantry officer. I have driven and walked this historic ground. This battle analysis and presentation was exceptionally well done! Thank you!!!
I've done the same and you're right (USAF here)
I have done the same, and the Flanders ww1 tour also. very sad days I will never forget.
I actually got to parachute into Son, DZ for the 75th Anniversary. What an amazing jump it was! AATW! 82nd here.
What more could one ask than to be jumping into Arnhem on that day? It wasn't ''fun'' by any stretch of the imagination but that was a ''glory'' moment if there was one.
Ex British Army and walked from Nijmegen bridge up that road several times. Hard to imagine the drama of those fateful few days for the British and Polish troops in the Cauldron. It could have all been so different.
I was working with an Arnhem veteran as an electrician in 1972. We were working on a roof when he called me over to him. I found him standing on a parapet shaking like a leaf. He begged me to grab him and pull back from the edge because he was going to jump. He had parachuted into Arnhem, seen nearly all his mates killed or badly wounded but he managed to swim across the river and survived the battle without a scratch. I think he had survivor guilt.
Thank you very much for sharing
Sounds like a severe case of PTSD... My father had similar attacks, the horrors experienced by these men are just too great to describe. I had hoped that we'd gotten passed war in Europe, but apparently I was wrong...
nice story , a made up story but nice.
Sadly after the war no help for soldiers like there is today. My dad had nightmares over Arnhem till the day he died. There is a lot of things these men have seen that to be honest, I’ve heard and believe me you wouldn’t want to experience what they did.
@@gilltagg3352 but ppl constantly thank them for their service. what more can you want
I'm from Poland and I bought a house here in Driel where my brothers from Poland landed, I always go to the Polish monument on Sundays which is in the center of Driel in the Polish square, be brave, my hero, be brave, for our freedom and yours
Poland is one of the only nations standing up to the insanity of the globalist Marxist
That's pretty cool, friend. Thank you for honoring those who fought.
@@johnbrady7431Zaazfassgx ⁰⁰
Welcome my friend and thank you for your service. Kind regards from Arnhem
It reminds me of the spartan grave marker, go ye travelers, and tell Sparta that here we lie, according to our oath. I have a hefty genetic polish inheritance, and the more I learn about how much they suffered, to be able to wear their woes then, and reach out to their Ukrainian cousins in their struggle, I'm filled with respect and wonder. God bless, from Prince George County Virginia, 🙏 ❤️
I’m 68 years old and my dad was a paratrooper with the 101st / 502 in ww2. He earned two bronze stars and two Purple Hearts among a host of other medals throughout the war.
As for operation Market/Garden he described it as being “sent to hell” before it was over. He said the plan from the beginning was “a goddamn disaster” in his opinion.
He later served 4 tours in Vietnam and somehow survived that mess as well. He retired as a Master Sergeant in 1974.
So, where was your dad during MARKET GARDEN?
All his nine lives were used plus a few more, to survive all that.
Was your grandpa basil plumley?
Little villa his dad obviously wasn't hanging around MONTY or your dad who wasn't there
Salute!
I am tired of simple short-sighted documents of big companies that treat people like fools.
You do such a good job ... One of the best documents on the yt
Me too. Glad you enjoyed this! Don't forget to check out my other Battlestorm documentaries.
@@TheImperatorKnight Superbly entertaining and well-researched TIK , each one has been a tour de force. Also impressed at your courage inviting internet flak by fearlessly stating unpopular truths.
'Crusader' was a clumsy and confused mess - I grew up watching films that praised Market Garden as a magnificent heroic failure. It's only now that bold historiographers (and a vocal number of the sadly dwindling survivors willing to speak publicly) who point out some of the serious and flawed Allied mistakes.
Of course nobody is detracting from how well our people fought, confounding German expectations. However the German side improvised magnificently and reacted fiercely, and the whole plan seemed to be off the rails within hours.
Looking forward to the next Stalingrad episode!!!
@@TheImperatorKnight this was the first one of your documentaries i've had a chance to to watch and i really have to tip my hat to you. really a top notch job. i appreciate the detail you go into. really learned alot.. thanks
@@nspr9721 German improvisation in the last year of the war has been overlooked as a major element. The ugly truth may be the were close to winning the war...
@@geitenkampsejos Maybe not close to winning the war Geiten - and we gave them a sharp run for their money - but qualitatively superior to the Allies, with better tactical reflexes and ability to improvise despite all our many advantages, despite all their many disadvantages - and ruthlessly able to punish our clumsy mistakes. Arnhem veterans would tell me as a child in the 80s how good the Germans were, and that their 'A-minus' people at Arnhem beat all our 'A-plus' people. One very fine old warrior said to me 'thank God is wasn't SS Totenkopf, Reich or Wiking we were fighting against!'
Your presentation is the first that actually recaps the mistakes made and accurately depicts why it went so badly. I have never seen anything like this before in a documentary so boldly and brilliantly stated! Thank you!
Not one mistake but a series of mistakes were made
Just wanted to say, at the very least, that I am very impressed by your presentation. I am fairly knowledgeable about Market Garden and it's clear that you are too. Your graphics do a great job at showing the progress of the engagement without relying on worn-out footage. I just wish our History Channel would produce documentaries half this good. I salute you sir - keep up the good work!
Thank you for your awesome comment, it's put a smile on my face :)
I'm not sure what happened to the History Channel, but I think they need to rename it at the very least. I got sick of seeing tv documentaries about Arnhem that didn't go into any detail at all about what actually happened, which was why I wanted to make this. The units and events are as accurate as I could make it given the sources. The conclusion is debatable, but the rest is right at least.
And I'm still working on more docs like this. Have you seen my Operation Compass video and my more recent (and 3D) Desert Fox 1941 video? Here's a link to the playlist ua-cam.com/play/PLNSNgGzaledgHIszXQVDreX-ZC1Xejf9Y.html :)
I'll second that! A very well thought out presentation.
ill give that a third, its best documentary ive scene on operation market garden
DL Wood Amen. Fourth. Great presentation. Keep up the great work.
DL Wood i
My Uncle Ray was was there in the main battle of Market Garden, he was with the 82 Airborne 505th Company C, commanded by General Gavin. He fought in the store fronts in Market Garden, he was falling back when a mortally wounded Soldier called out for help. When my Uncle Ray went to help him he knew there was nothing he could do because the Soldier was so badly wounded, the Soldier asked my Uncle Ray not to leave him. This wasn't the first time my Uncle Ray had disobeyed orders when told to fall back, they were told to leave the wounded for the Medics. In Holland he was told that a good friend had been hit, he was told to fall back, instead, he threw his knapsack down and under heavy machine gun and sniper fire went to find his friend, after he found his buddy he flagged a Jeep down, put his buddy on the Jeep and was heading back, on his way back he came across another buddy. Uncle Ray put him over his shoulder and was carrying him back when he came across another wounded Soldier, he picked him up also and went aways until he fell down and couldn't go any farther. Uncle Ray went back and got help for the two Soldiers. Uncle Ray stayed with the wounded Soldier all night in the store front in Market Garden, helping the Soldier to undress and then helping him to dress again after using the toilet, he stayed with the Soldier until he passed, then made his way back to his company.
Wow, what a brave man, thank you uncle Ray.
Thank you Uncle Ray
Brave man...
AATW!
Thanks Uncle Ray
Thanks for your documentary. My father William Sydney Doughty was in 30th Corps. He survived war and wasn't demobbed from Germany until 1946. He felt a terrible guilt and shame over Market Garden and eventually suffered mental breakdown, destroying his medals and uniform on a bonfire in the back garden He died aged 55 after insulin shock therapy at the Kingsmill Hospital, Mansfield in an endeavour to wipe out his wartime memories. He would now be 107 if still alive, but I guess he would be relieved to know, that it was Gavin 's 82nd fault and not 30 Corps that Operation Market Garden failed. It a pity that your documentary arrived to late to save him from the NHS psychiatrists. Thank you restoring the honour of 30 Corp with the truth. I am sure he did his best to get to the bridge too far.
Do you know what your father did?
Two of my uncles were with the paras on this operation, they both survived the war & for what it's worth neither of them blamed 30 corps or the poles! they blamed the RAF for delaying the drops & the idiots who would send men into battle with ineffective communications equipment!
Gavin should secure the Niminijen bridge ASAP.
I’m sorry for your loss but this is revisionism. The amount of facts left out are too many to list but it comes down 30 Corp not being their on the first day with little or no opposition . Sorry he also mislead on the amount of air support that was given to 30 Corp that received all the ground support aircraft. The RAF said that it would be to hard to help the airborne fighting so close to the Germany’s. The tanks didn’t have that problem so they got the air support. The Brits were In charge of the entire operation and failed to complete it as planned. Sorry again for your loss but this video was just a way of changing history.
@@bigstyx That really follows the popular but incorrect version "created' during and after the plans failure. It was insane to not take Nijmegen -how could the plan possibly be achieved without it? Gavin literally doomed the mission by removing a key part of the corridor - the prime goal of his presence - and Browning royally messed up by allowing this to happen.
The planning mistakes of the British were responsible for so many losses too - inexcusable. But Gavin - virtually criminal.
The weather was awful. Strong winds blowing the gliders off course. My father survived which is why I am here.
I was born 8/8/45.
May his memory live forever more
I lost a relative there, he was a radio operator
God rest their brave souls, we have so much to thank them for.
My late father died aged 101 last year. He was a glider pilot in this operation under Sergeant Les Howard. They crash landed....got their men in.... not so many returned it ...how many men lives will continue to be lost fighting corrupt men games. Are you certain Germany lost the war? The U boats attacks left us in pretty bad shape. Do you have any footage of Germany in the war at all? What about the BAlfour declaration
My Grandfather died in the battle he was a lieutenant in the xxx tank corp.
To think all these years I've been blaming Sean Connery!
Seriously great insight into the battle. I've not seen anything quite so well put together as this. Good job.
I laughed! :) if you enjoyed this, I have some more Battlestorm documentaries out there. In fact, you might enjoy the Bruneval Raid, which was also 1st Airborne Division's first mission, and the first mission Frost was in. Plus it may actually be one of the turning points of the war (no joke) ua-cam.com/video/6EiOG_yvT04/v-deo.html
Great I'll check it out.
Thanks I just watched the Bruneval raid vid and I must say another excellent job. These are great and I will be working my way through more.
I was wondering if you were a strategy gamer and after seeing some of your older Close Combat vids I see that you are or at least were. I am a Combat Mission nut and was wondering if you have ever played it?
It wasnt Connerys fault, it was Roger Moore.
Sean was stuck in that stupid house, surrounded by bad guys.
I live in Arnhem, I visited the airborne museum countless of times, I visit the dropping each year and I walk the 'Airborne Wandeltocht' each year. But still I learned stuff from this video!
You are lucky to live in a city with so much history!
@@soldierorsomething not sure you can call what happened in arnhem luck. It used to be a beautiful historic market town
@@soldierorsomething We did not get destroyed on november 30 1813 when German and Russian troops did beat the French Army at the "storming of the Rhine-gate" with the French forces pulling south over the boat bridge-a few thousend people died...But Arnhem was almost destroyed between september 1944-april 1945...
In German propaganda "Arnhem was the Stalingrad of the West", all the citizens either evacuated or died...In april 45 the Canadians liberated an empty city almost destroyed...
@@soldierorsomething
Practically everybody in Europe lives in a city or town - even a village - with as much history, and more, but your sentiment was well made. Arnhem and it's population suffered terribly during this operation and during the German backlash in the aftermath.
It sucks that your country practically doesn't let anyone own a gun yet when you were under occupation, they wanted the people armed to fight the occupation
My grandfather was part of the 2nd Battalion at Arnhem Bridge and I'm currently researching his military career. What he went through at Arnhem altered his entire life. Thank you so much for making and sharing this video - very useful information and very well explained.
My Granddad was also 2nd Para and at Arnham (Italy and North Africa before that), making it to the bridge with John Frost. He was thrown off the bridge by a blast wave in the first assault on the bridge. His radio saved his life getting trapped in between two steal beams, and he was hanging there for a few days until the Germans got to him..
Interesting. The first British assault?
Annerley73 hmm ok 1st British assault I shall ask my teacher who was a veteran if there was a regiment called that
Respect to your grandfather.
Yea Lewis, this documentary, I dare not call it just a "video", is definitely one of masterpieces of educational youtube.
Wow, thank you! That's kind of you to say that, and is fantastic considering this was my first history video too
If only all documentaries had this level of detail and care put into them
MrToymaster1 yes. Lewis deserves some kind of offer from tv producers as a commentator or something
Wow. There is SOOOOOO much detail into this it gives you a very good run down of how complicated operations planning is, unknown factors, personal agendas, missed opportunities, etc. There is so much that goes into a battle plan going right or wrong. In the words of Patton "In war, everything goes according to plan until the first shot if fired." I sure hope to see A LOT more videos from you. Subscribed!
I feel like it is a very good discussion of the fighting at Arnhem, on both sides. But I feel it is not a very deep analysis of the other sectors and the early phases XXX Corps’ march. He doesn’t even mention the SIX other bridges the 82nd were supposed to seize in their attack, or the bloody fighting over them. If you look on a map, there is an entire waterway between Grave and Nijmegen, and attentive Germans blew up several of these. It was actually fairly near run. This is one of several important features that are elided over as they don’t contribute to the central thesis.
Best overall presentation I've found so far. Excellent stuff. My uncle Hugh seems to have been part of the 45-man unit of the 3rd BN. A radio operator, Private by choice because he wanted to do that job and not command others, he was shot in the foot while out and about trying to get fellow soldiers to safety. He was taken prisoner, ending up at Stalag IV D. He died in hospital at Wittenberg on Jan 21 '45 with gangrene, aged 22. The honour, in my humble opinion, goes to men like him of all nationalities.
God bless him, may he RIP
xx
@@maryfinnfan4140 Thank-you Mary!
My Dad was a sergeant in charge of his platoon of 11 guys, 2x Universal Carriers and 2x 3 inch Mortars during the D-Day landings on Juno Beach (Nan White). He fought all through Europe into Berlin including on the ill-fated Operation Market Garden. How very true was Helmuth von Moltke's quote; "No battleplan survives first contact with the enemy". Dad eventually discharged from the army in the 1950s at the rank of Company Quarter Master Sergeant (CQMS). Rest in peace Dad.
While in the Netherlands I had the pleasure of going to a museum dedicated to M-G. Being a long-term reader of military history, it was fantastic (if of course terribly sad). The main curator was so surprised to run into an Australian visiting the Netherlands who knew a lot about the history he gave me and my brother's family (they live there, I was visiting) a personal tour, which was a terrific experience.
You've done a wonderful job with this combined presentation. Probably the best I've seen on M-G. I'll forward it to my friends who are similarly into military history and will no doubt love it as well.
Cheers
Was the museum the Hartenstein hotel? I heard they turned the former HQ into a Market Garden museum.
Thank you for sharing, I'm glad to hear you enjoyed the video. Be sure to check out the Bruneval Raid Battlestorm video, which was John Frost's first mission. Plus I have a video on General Browning too you might like. I'll give you the links
Bruneval ua-cam.com/video/6EiOG_yvT04/v-deo.html
Browning ua-cam.com/video/Dvv8GQIRYVU/v-deo.html
Hi again. Thanks for the reply.
Here's the Airborne museum you're mentioning: www.airbornemuseum.nl/en/villa-hartenstein which is of course on the western edge of Oosterbeek.
The one we went to was the Arnhem War Museum: www.arnhemsoorlogsmuseum.com/ which is to the northeast of Oosterbeek and northwest of Arnhem itself.
I showed this video to a friend who's always been particularly interested in Market Garden (we even played a wargame on it on an early Apple computer in the late 80s, and he has Cornelius Ryan's book as well as others) and it turned out he'd found and watched it a few weeks ago. He did say he was very impressed with it, too.
Cheers
The Maps kept my attention throughout the whole 1,5 hours! Masterpiece!
Good to hear! Coincidentally, I've just released a new video on this subject - a review of Beevor's new "Arnhem" book. I talk about the Nijmegen situation in a lot more detail than I do here. You may be interested, so here's the link ua-cam.com/video/fr92BwihIoU/v-deo.html
Thank you for such a detailed but clear narrative, much aided by the maps.
My father was with 4 Para at Arnhem and was captured on 24th September. He never spoke much about his experiences after the war but for the first time I have been able to understand what he must have gone through.
Respect to your father.
Another scandal about this operation is that the Dutch military-in-exile in London were not consulted during the planning - they had already done studies on operations in the Nijmegen area and were furious that they had been left out
Local knowlage??????
Awww diddums. Maybe the British should have the Dutch Army liberate the Netherlands too? Oh wait.......
@@lyndoncmp5751 Do you not think that such intelligence from the Dutch government would have been useful?
They negotiated Munich to give Germany Sudetenland without inviting the Czechoslovaks. It’s a tradition, really.
They had been left out because of the "England Spiel" or England Game. The German Abwehr had completely penetrated the Dutch resistance and fed the clueless Birts a steady stream of phony information which might have even affected the outcome of Market Garden. A lot of supplies did end up in German hands. The Germans also tricked the British into sending in over new 50 agents. To a man they were all caught and promptly executed by the Germans. It was only after this massive loss of life that the British finally figured out what was going on. So much for British "intelligence."
Having read the odd book and seen a few documentaries, this exposition of the operation is a very good production. With just graphics and photographs we are not sidetracked by footage from all manner of WW2 battles- so, no distractions.A very good overview that takes you directly into what Market Garden was all about. Well done.
Good plan: each suboperation is backed up by at least one alternative variant in case of partial failure.
Bad plan: each suboperation must succeed as originally planned in order for the overall plan to succeed.
Must have been another bathroom plan thought up by Monty.
Wholeheartedly agree with this comment
Wow, I wonder how nobody thought about having a backup plan! Thank you for coming up with this original idea!
I don't agree; you can over-plan and try to cover your arse against all eventualities, but once the battle starts, all your plans turn to shit! To my mind, Market Garden, audacious as it was, should have worked and only didn't BECAUSE Gavin didn't stick to the plan, and for what reason? Phantom panzers that only he knew about that it turned out didn't exist, except I his fevered imagination! this wasn't the only example of over-cautious American Commanders, at Anzio General Lucas dug in instead of pushing toward Rome; If most US Generals were like Patton.......he would have raced to the bridge and secured it!
Many of the sub operations succeeded but some didn't, the taking of the Son bridge for example, but a commander sitting on his thumbs? Gavin should have been ashamed at that, and it adds insult to injury Robert Redford berating 30 Corps for 'drinking tea" in the movie....always struck me as a bit, or a lot, odd that.
GloryCarrier22 I kind of agree. After all, battles or wars are not won or lost because one of the two sides failed to come up with a backup plan. Literally everyone has “backup plans”. But if simply having a backup plan could solve problems then everyone would always be winning and there basically would be no war.
The real most valuable ability is to be able to improvise and to create a plan at a point in battle when something unexpected is happening. To basically get the most favorable outcome to you possible given the options.
I went for a drive through the Groesbeek heights last week. It’s an amazingly beautiful part of Holland. From the centre of Nijmegen it’s a sudden steep climb for Dutch standards anyway. Then up there it’s sloping fields all the way over to where the landingzones were.
I came across an excellent museum, het Vrijheidsmuseum (Feedom Museum) which has a wonderful exhibition of how freedom was lost, won and is being preserved. Of course it is mostly about Market Garden and the battle over Nijmegen and the Groesbeek heights, Hell’s Highway and the later push into the Rhineland from there.
Still…….I can’t help seeing those hills overlooking Nijmegen as a very important strategic point which was of critical interest to both the Allies and the Germans.
Not knowing if there will be a German counter offensive out of the Reichswald forest, I can imagine taking and securing the heights would have been vital.
Bay of Pigs (1962), Entibe (1976) or Desert One (1980) "Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan."
“Sucess has many fathers, but defeat is an orphan. JFK”
@@davidpallin772 If you correct someone else do it accurately:
"Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan."
If you are referring to the Entebbe raid by the Israelis to free their hostages, then, that should be counted as a win. The casualties among the rescue teams were low, and only about 3 to 4 hostages were killed. Yonatan Netanyahu, the Israeli commander, was killed.
@@ronschramm9163 Yes I thought that too.
@@KugleeKuglee "La victoria trova cento padri, e nessuno vuole riconoscere l'insuccesso.” Count Caleazzo Ciano. He was Son-in-Law of Mussolini, I believe this translates to something like: Victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan.
While serving my first tour in Germany (74-77) we had a lot of opportunity to discuss this, as the book was out and the movie was being made. It was the opinion of one of the best officers I have ever met, Maj. Donovan, that the failure to take the bridge at Nijmegen that caused the whole plan to fall apart....
@John Cornell Yes, they did fail to capture their bridge. But, had 30 Corps been able to advance on schedule, Frost's men would have still been in possession of the north side of the bridge.
XXX Corps WERE on schedule, they arrived at Nijmegen ON TIME, but were delayed because the 82nd had failed to a take the bridge as ordered immediately on landing, this is the Great Unsaid, the point that Cornelius Ryan somehow failed to mention in ABTF and Attenborough in his Made-for-the-Mid-West epic of the same name. If the Nijmegen bridge had been taken on time as ordered, the whole operation would have been successful. The reason XXX Corps were unable to "advance on schedule" is because the bridge had not been taken, Gavin's fault entirely. @@RossOneEyed
Gene Hackman's Polish accent from this movie was a war crime. In my nightmares I hear him yelling something like shnur, shnur.... I wake up covered in sweat. Horrible.
LMAO ... yes, his accent is really bad indeed.
hahah same here :D
True, but I liked the character he created, it was very believeable
I agree with Jerzy Feliks - awful accent, but he captured the essence and mannerisms of the man well. I cannot believe that British junior officers would snigger and laugh like ignorant schoolboys when he got up to make perfectly sensible and cogent arguments, all of them proved right in time. A pity Sosabowski fell on the wrong side of slimy Browning having refused to go along with his empire-building.
im polish and i always say: siure siure or shure it is normal.
Best Arnhem documentary I've ever seen. Period. I've seen a lot of them and this guy embarrasses most so called professional programmes...
Please note that the map around minute 4 is completely wrong. The zuiderzee did not exist and the wadden islands were not linked. Rubbish.
Time and again I have discovered these homegrown documentaries produced by someone who is compelled to overdo it and explain everything and I love them! ❤ The motivating interest comes from those geeks among Us who actually want to understand what really happened 🤔👍
@@jandenijmegen5842I'm going to research this I would be surprised if they are that far off.
@@jandenijmegen5842I'm going to research this I would be surprised if they are that far off.
Here around Arnhem the heroes of 17-26 september 1944, British, American and Polish alike, are honoured till this day. The battle was lost but the hearts and the minds were won. And the war was won. Remember, remember that day in september.
Sadly i don't believe poles are honoured equally. Im Polish and the way we got treated during the war and now are honoured is really unfair
But i still Honour every country in the allies. I believe we all did somthing good
@@A.r.i.b.i the poles got handed a shitty stick tbf, you got divided up by the Germans and Russians then just got taken by the Russians. And then at the end you wasn't even allowed in the victory parade because the allies didn't want to upset the Russians. You guys fought like lions in the RAF and where ever you guys set foot afterwards be it in Africa or Italy. Your countries service isn't lost to this brit!!
@@AndRew-vo9bz ❤️ You are a very Nice man
@@A.r.i.b.i Any Brit knows that the Poles were magnificent in WW2. That is what is important.
@@OldWolflad Yes ❤️
I had a pal and a work colleague who was a paratrooper at Arnhem. The battle plan might have been a mistake but Les told me that the morale of British airborne was beginning to suffer because all they did was train, train and train again. The war might be over before they, "had a chance to have a crack at the Jerries". He reckoned that this the main reason why General Browning pushed SHAEF to approve of Operation Market Garden and why Montgomery was so lukewarm about it. Les passed away in 1997.
That's normal given the culture of that era..But Imagine Lauri Törni fought in 1939-44 and then joined the Nazis in January 1945. He surrendered while wearing an SS uniform and asked permission to join the US Army, which of course was not granted until many years later.
@@jussim.konttinen4981 Relevance?
@@stephen1137 He only practiced in October-December 1944, so his morale began to suffer.
General Gale (Cmdr of 6th Airborne that dropped at Normandy) was quoted as saying that he would have insisted that the Para Rgt (all 3 Btns) should be dropped just south of the Arnhem Rd bridge, to the point that he would have resigned his command if he did not get his way. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Para (with supporting engineers) would have seized the bridge at both ends and I think would have held it for considerably longer.
@jackal72
That point is debatable. Whilst it was suitable for the para-element of the 1st Parachute Brigade (as it was the planned DZ for the Poles on Day 3), the Brigade relied on over 70 gliders for its own troops plus other gliders carrying supporting Divisional troops. They would still need to be landed at the Landing Zones to the west of Arnhem thus splitting the Division and denying Brigadier Lathbury of a significant proportion of his Brigade’s combat power. It’s difficult to judge wether an increased number of lightly armed paratroopers from a landing (those that would have survived the 6 light and 6 heavy anti-aircraft guns reported to be on the high dyke around the DZ) would have outweighed the effect of the five 6-pounders guns that made there way to the northern edge of the bridge with Brigade Headquarters and 2 Parachute Battalion. Especially, given that those 6-pounders effectively destroyed the attack over the bridge by the 9th SS Panzer Division’s Reconnaissance Battalion.
That said, that option was available to Urquhart. The lead planner for MARKET in 38 Group, Squadron Leader Lawrence Wright, reports in his book (The Wooden Sword) he briefed Urquhart at Moor Park on the pros and cons of each of the three identified areas for DZs and LZs before the decision was made. He recalls:
‘Command of 1st Airborne had been taken over by Major General R.E. Urquhart, D.S.O.; this was his first experience in Airborne. We had thoroughly thrashed out the landing zone problem with his Intelligence officers for about a fortnight, when I went to Moor Park for a final agreement with them. My arrival threatened to spoil their plan to take an hour off for a well-earned swim, but the General hearing of this, sent them off and summoned me; thus I was honoured with a first-hand exposition of his thoughts about Arnhem. I found him alone in the garden, seemingly painting a landscape, but his easel held the battle picture. He was of course fully aware of the basic dilemma. Although his initial force, with the advantage of surprise, might assemble successfully at an objective so distant, the protection of the zones for the next day's landings would require all the gliderborne troops from the first lift, leaving only the lightly- armed Reconnaissance Squadron and 1st Parachute Brigade to hold the bridge for 24 hours. We shall be too thin on the ground, he predicted, and he reopened the question of landing gliders on the polder, making me restate the pros and cons of the terrain. It was not for the Air side, not even for Holly or for Leigh-Mallory, to say whether greater losses would be suffered in landing on bad ground near the objective, in a flak area, than in fighting several miles towards it with a force initially intact. That was for Urquhart to judge, and he chose the latter. We were soon writing our orders accordingly.’ (Pages 226-7)
16:40 Considering the fact that the element of surprise worked in the allies favour and most objectives were achieved within the first few hours confirms that it was a sound enough plan from the get-go. It was just the intel and follow-up that fell short. In addition to this landing the British 1st Airborne west of Arnhem in the clearings at Wolfheze was a stroke of genius in itself and by using the woods as visual cover from the city the results paid off early with the Arnhem city commandant ambushed and killed (General Freidrich Kussin). Keeping Browning's 376th HQ element of British 1st Airborne back at Nijmegen proved to be a sensible move. Arnhem is too big a city to land directly in front of regardless of the flat terrain but landing the Polish First Independent Airborne Brigade far further south at Elst or just south of it between Valburg and Bemmel might have paid dividends early in the battle before SS Captain Viktor Graebner's Recce battalion sped south. As it is the body of land between the Nedderijn and the Waal that is of prime importance because the Pennerden Canal (Nedderijn) can be bridged with Bailey Bridges in multiple places as is stated as possible later in the video. Given this fact, the real concern is the proximity of the German border which isn't shown here and in reality just how marshy this land truly is once one gets offroad. The German elements in this region are nevertheless surprisingly small considering the size of the force that became trapped in Courland after the first week of October 1944 where there were five Panzer Divisions plus much more in the form of security detachments. 24th Panzer Division "The Leaping Horsemen" in Stalingrad got worn down to around 839 men with 25 tanks around the start of October 1942 so if you stumbled on a Panzer Division this size during 'rest and refit' in this area and you had PIATs anti-tank guns at your disposal you wouldn't look as panicked as Sean Connery did when he learned of the size of the forces surrounding him (Frost) in the movie, A Bridge Too Far.
Well! I must say that I have read a lot about Market-Garden, followed not-so-friendly online 'debates' between Brits & Americans that were almost as ferocious as the battle itself, watched several documentaries, and enjoyed watching Shssssseeean Connery sssshlurrrr his way to the bitter end in the movie....BUT, after watching this, I can say with all confidence that only now do I have a proper understanding of what occurred during those nine crazy days! Bravo! Superb work with just the right pacing, the perfect amount of detail, & well-designed helpful graphics!
As far as my feedback re: the outcome of the battle...
1. I found the sacking of the Polish commander especially shameful, because, as a Canadian, I am quite familiar with how brave, loyal, and professional the Polish soldiers were from D-day to V.E. Day. For example, the Poles' 1st Armoured Division fought heroically against desperate, fanatical, and well-trained German troops & armour to hold a key hill overlooking the only road & bridge the trapped German forces could use to escape the Falaise pocket. The excellent quality of the Polish tankers & infantry enabled them to plug the Falaise Gap until Canadian forces could arrive. The Poles endured viscious attacks from German forces in the pocket trying to escape, AND from German forces that escaped the pocket earlier then turned around and tried to unplug the gap from outside the pocket . (if ever there was a war movie that should have been made...)
The Poles distinguished themselves many other times during 1944/45, so I have no doubt that the Polish commander & his men performed well during Market-Garden.
Anyway, given that racial & cultural intolerance was not restricted to the Nazis, but was common in the Allied nations too, I guess I shouldn't be surprised that the Polish commander was made the scapegoat. Given Churchill's hesitation to help Poland when the Germans attacked in September, 1939, perhaps Churchill was behind the scapegoating of the Polish commander in Market-Garden?
Finally, knowing just how much personal & national pride, personality clashes, differences in terms of leadership style & tactical preferences, and politics negatively impacted the ability of the Allied generals & officers to work as a cohesive team, I guess the politically motivated sacking of the Polish commander could also be seen as an attempt for the Brits & Americans to save face. Pathetic, but true?
2. While Gavin & Browning appear to be the ones who should bear the brunt of blame for the failure of Market-Garden, I honestly believe that Gavin's decision to prioritize protecting the hill over taking the bridge really needs to be given a much closer look. Was Gavin convinced that allowing the Germans possible access to the high ground would allow them to see approaching 30 Corps & the 82nd Airborne's defences at the bridge, thereby enabling the Germans to direct more effective counter-attacks from there? Was Gavin concerned that if the Germans held the hill and placed antitank guns & artillery there, that they'd be able to block 30 Corps & shell 82nd Airborne at the bridge during any counterattack on the bridge by German forces?
I wish that more information was available re: Gavin's logic (if there was any logic). Additionally, seeing a topographical map or 3-D rendering of the terrain around the bridge would be helpful, as I have no idea how high the hill was, how easy it would have been for the Germans to assault the hill from various directions, and whether or not the hill provided a commanding view of the area.
Also, it may not hurt to know a bit about Gavin's prior experiences & how he performed. Perhaps, in the past, he had made a tactical error that resulted in his troops being ambushed, or he unwittingl led his men into a trap, so he was gun-shy or worried being demoted because of previous errors? Usually there are reasons when people make surprising or perplexing decisions, so I can't help but wonder.. .
3. Furthermore, it is pretty clear that a battle with such great strategic potential did not receive an amount of resources or a level of support from the airforce befitting of the potential payoff from a successful operation. It makes me wonder if the plan never had the full confidence & commitment from all participants in the plan. I also believe that the plan needed more wiggle room built into it, so that the entire operation would not be crippled by intangibles or the unexpected, e.g. bad weather in England & stronger resistance from the Germans than anticipated.
4 . Last, but not least, given how politics had already had an impact on Allied operations in Sicily, Italy, and Normandy, I can't help but wonder if there were much greater forces at play behind the scenes that could have influenced the modification of the original plans, the allocation of assets before/during Market-Garden, the availability of reinforcements, , expectations placed on commanders, etc., etc. Was the battle doomed from the start because of politics?
Certainly, by this point in WWII, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had already met at least once to discuss the final phases of the war in Europe, the potential joint occupation of Germany, reassigning of borders, limits on advancing troops, and so on. Is there any indication that a successful Market-Garden could have thrown a wrench into what Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had discussed?
ok...that's more than enough verbage from me! lol
@John Cornell So you are saying it was Sosabowski fault that the whole operation failed? Okay sir, thanks for sharing.
I was 11 years old and living in Arnhem along the railroad tracks full of broken down steam locomotives. My father expressed his opinion about the Paras landing so far away from the bridge, Oosterbeek and points west were just too far, it was along walk and of about 10,000 men only about 1000 got to the North side of the bridge pulling trolleys with ammo and food. We saw them walk by full of confidence, past our house, further south past the hospital and along the railroad tracks. It took the Germans a long time to start shooting down onto the Paras from our area that was higher ground. We lived on the Noordelijke Parallel weg across from the Elizabeth Hospital. Tanks in front of our house started shooting and blew our windows out, the Germans demanded food from us and my mom's supply of homemade applesauce and blueberries was taken. I found out later that the troops dressed in black were the feared SS. They were remnants of the SS that was badly mauled in Normandy but still potent enough to handle the British Paras. Arnhem is surrounded by woods and great hiding places for an Army. We spent some days in the cellar and were later forced out of hour house and we became refugees. Taken in by farmers as were other refugees, we ate well. All people were forced out of Arnhem and forced to walk North. I am not sure but I believe there were about 50,000 residents at the time. My parents problem was what to take since we only had 2 bikes for 4 people my Dad, Mom, Sister and me. We came back in May 1945 and found the house trashed, all window glass was gone and we never lived there again. There was a lot of looting and anything of value was stolen. My school too was taken over by the Nazi's and later a second school, going to school became a problem even though the administrators tried. One of my schoolmates was Audrey Hepburn, she was in 4th or 5th grade and I was in second. She was an unknown at age 11 and learned her Dutch pretty well.
You have " very meaningful and historic" experience with addition to an astonishing AUDREY .
Thank you for relating this human story.
Fascinating sidelight, thank you!
Monty: You have failed me for the last time
Sosabowski: Hold on, this whole operation was your idea!
@John Cornell how he was delayed till the 3rd day by then things had gone out of our favour the polish had to land into the situation that was playing out they fought hard to maintain driel and the ferrylift to get British troops out explain to.me again how the poles were irrelevant ya dick
@John Cornell don‘t destroy my meme dammit 😂
@@tonypape7189 grow up. We dont need a demonstration of your ignorance, im sure all your acquaintances are quite aware of that fact.
@John Cornell Nobody else made such a big mistake (wanting a battle to propel yourself into the spotlight instead of winning the war).
@John Cornell ok, whats your point? LOL. You are good at stating your opinion. But you failed on saying what it has to do with this video, you failed to say what it has to do with my comment. Unless you are just trolling.
I have worked as an art director and production designer on several military documentaries, mainly WW1. I succeeded as I considered it a privilege to get as near to the truth as we could and an honour to meet veterans. I join others in complimenting your research and analysis.
My mother is an Urquhart. At her father’s insistence I have it as my middle name. It’s a tiny clan so “The general” must be a distant cousin. I grew up hearing he held responsibility for the losses and diminished the family name. I always felt this unfair as my research has shown war is not that simple.” For the want of a nail” as they say.
There's a YT video featuring a 1970s British TV show interview with Urquhart and some of his family.
Anyone else here, albeit by a circuitous route, because of Close Combat: Operation Market-Garden? When I was a kid, that game enthralled me with the complexity and desperation on both sides of the fight. A few weeks after discovering that, I found time-life books entire ww2 series of pictorial books on the 2nd world War while at a flea market with my parents, and now here I am. 25 years later. Watching another video about this operation.
Great videos, TIK. I recently discovered this channel and it has reignited my passion for this material.
I actually started this channel started with Close Combat A Bridge Too Far videos. Did two complete Let's Play's of it, and numerous other videos, including the first multiplayer video of that game on UA-cam. Sadly, because of COPPA, I decided to hide them, so you can no longer view them. But that was the reason I chose Market Garden as my first documentary, because that game was so good that I read about the topic. Cheers!
Grown up in Arnhem, every year I walk the Nijmegen 4 day marches. The area around the Nijmegen bridge was already fortified by the Romans about 67 Y BC. They saw the defensive potential of this spot.. I marched (bridge too far 1976) as a german infantry-man over Nijmegen brigde to defend the northern site. Gavin did what the British did around Wolfheze. Land and dig in and send your spare troops to attack Nijmegen bridge. As a participant of the Nijmegen 4day marches I have walked 17 times from Groesbeek heights to Nijmegen so I know the surroundings pretty well. Excellent for agressive defence by aggressive paratroopers against waves of second-rated german infantry. Gavin made two mistakes. First not landing by assault gliders and seaplanes close to the bridges. (like he did at Grave bridge). Second going for the defence of Groesbeek -heights with his main force instead of attacking Nijmegen Bridge with his main force.
Seaplanes? Catalinas were not big enough, or plentiful enough, to be used in such an operation. Also they would be highly vulnerable to ground fire. Not a good idea in Market Garden.
The Germans used 12 Heinkel He-59 seaplanes that landed at the Maas at Rotterdam very close to the bridges. Only 80 to 90 men were flown in this way but they succeeded in taking both the north and the south site of the Rotterdam bridges. So essentially it was a big success. There are other planes than catalinas and you can have a squadron of typhoons in the air to attract and suppress ground fire.
Seaplanes were not necessary in Market Garden. The 101st and 82nd were unmolested. 1st British got to the bridge. A landing on the island would have been helpful.
if this would have been true then Gavin must have thought that he had done his job and probably relayed this story to everyone that wanted to hear it telling everybody that he had indeed ordered to take the bridge right after landing. unfortunately he did not tell this story but told another story that he had to defend the groesbeeksheights because there were 1000 tanks there(total nonsense) + after the battle lobbying for 2nd chances for general officers who made mistakes lets me to conclude the Gavin himself probably thought and knew that is actions(or inactions) made market garden fail and thus I think its his fault that market garden failed.
shame on Gavin for keeping his mouth shut while the polish where blamed for the failure.
And if even a couple dozen tanks attacked from the forest, like the allies believed would, what good is a rifle company or two going to do? You're using hindsight and the benefit of knowing which intel was correct or not. Hardly valuable to anyone now...
This is a very fine presentation. Rarely have I seen a complex battle explained so clearly and informatively. I would like to see this be a model for other presenters on military history. Very well done and thank you for making it available to us.
No worries, I'm glad you liked it! Make sure you check out my other "Battlestorm" videos because I've done a few now, and I'm working on more, including Operation Crusader, and Stalingrad (which will be a bit longer than this lol)
My Great-grandfather was 82nd airborne and participated in market garden. Very interesting to learn more about it. He was pen-pals with a dutch family that aided them for years, but we lost those letters in a house fire.
It's messed up that Churchill threw the Polish unit under the bus and blamed them for the failure when Sosabowski tried to be the voice of reason in the first place. It's hard to resist the thought that the Polish paratroopers were kept around to be cannon fodder and scapegoats.
Tbh, it's an amalgam of all these miss steps before and during the operation, both British and American. It should have never occurred without proper intel and air superiority. The 82nd Airborne would not have re-prioritized away from the bridge had they known the reality of the situation on the ground, while air superiority (as well as the needed number of transports) would have assured that the needed number of men was where they needed to be. It was not an operational failure, though there were many operational missteps, those were precipitated by the logistical failure before day one of the operation even began. Meanwhile, it only took a few days for the Germans to figure out what they needed to do, and their operational goal was simple enough for them to do it.
It's interesting that so many of these 'theories' are more representative of the times in which they're formulated rather than the realities on the ground suddenly being 'discovered'. A thousand theories could be crafted, and only the ones advantageous at that moment are popularized. What's that old quote? "Bright men study tactics, geniuses study logistics."
1:50:50 - But where was the oversight from his superior? There was none, so why do you throw all of it on Gavin when it equally belongs to Brown? They should have gone down together, Brown only blamed Sosabowski in order to divert blame he rightly deserves for not objecting to Gavin's decision, among his many other missteps, and like I said, logistically the Operation took too many gambles to realistically win enough of them to succeed.
Gavin doesn't make clear which superior confirmed his decision. Technically he has two corps commanders - Browning AND Brereton.
Browning, Montgomery and Brereton, as well as Urquhart and several commanders of 1st Airborne Division, and the RAF, all deserve a portion of the blame for their failure in this operation. However, if we have to choose just ONE person as the person who made the biggest mistake that without doubt caused the whole plan to fail (and without this mistake, the plan could and probably would have succeeded) then, for all the reasons stated, that person is Gavin. Nijmegen bridge shouldn't have been de-prioritized. Taking that bridge, even with all the other mistakes, probably would have lead to an Allied victory at Market Garden.
Okay, I think I understand a bit better your mindset in the last portion of the video - more a retrospective deliberation of the events than the accusatory tone I perceived from my first viewing.
It seemed to me that you were attempting to 'heap the blame' on one man, which set me for a loop considering the previous hour and a half of shared blame and collective misstep you'd walked the viewing audience through, it seemed some dissonance in that respect but I see now from your clarification what you were trying to accomplish. At least, I think I do.
I suppose I have trouble pinning Gavin for the 'fall guy', but not for utterly defensive reasons. Gavin messed up, and in horribly selfish form attempted to cower and cover his tracks. To me, he seems typical of the problems the US forces had with their commanders during that time period, the same type of blundering that would lead to disasters like Kasserine Pass and Rapido - vanity mostly, and Gavin should have taken the fall.
However, (and forgive the anachronistic analogy), it strikes me the same way as it does somebody saying the American Civil War was fought over slavery. While that's absolutely correct and can not be seriously disputed, it doesn't really encapsulate the entirety of the event. It's essentially correct but in its simplicity lay negative space that can open itself up to incorrect assumption. I am innately hesitant of any analysis of historical events that seem to want to 'put a bow' on the event, to definitively analyze it lest it stymie future analysis (my belief is that the study of history should be forever on-going, that only through analysis by diverse researchers from diverse time-periods can a continual understanding of an event be formulated, and re-formulated, the old understandings themselves become part of the history.)
The end of your video typifies this wonderfully, but by taking a stance at the very end, to insinuate the rest hold no merit while yours is the definitive explanation (instead of a hodge-podge of all the theories coming into play in some way), it just left a bad taste in my mouth. Surely you must understand that even your explanation is part of the respective time-capsules of understanding in which the other theories were crafted. It just seems over-simplistic to me - for example, WHY did Gavin believe there to be "1,000 Panzers" in the Reichwald in the first place? Couldn't the troops in Arnhem have held out if they had the transports necessary to land the troops they needed on Day 1 - or even if the misfortune that plagued the Polish drops didn't occur?
This begs the question, "How much of a difference would air superiority and better reconnaissance/Logistics have played in the operation?" I agree that Gavin lit the match, but who stacked the powder - and how? If the entire operation could be derailed by one delay from Gavin how sound of a plan was it, really? I don't say this to lay blame, rather, I'm advocating for collective understanding. If the entire plan was a series of gambles - then eventually one would be lost. Why rush to finish the war 'by Christmas', why put yourselves in a position where you're racing against the clock and disadvantaged from the onset, why go into a battle without knowing for certain the disposition of the enemy? It reads like a list that makes up the complete antithesis to everything mentioned in Sun Tsu's 'Art of War', and for the Germans, all they had to do was hold on and adhere to another of Sun Tsu's principles - get the enemy to defeat itself.
You do an amazing job of presenting the bigger picture, as well as the minute details and it imparts a greater understanding of the events in question, one where those viewing - even those previously uninformed of the event - can assemble an over-view. You thoroughly listed the reasons for the failure throughout this video, but then it seems like at the very end you settle on just one of these reasons, one bent one in the entire house of cards. You spend the video imparting an amazing understanding of the events but then you attempt to explain and though I'm sure it seems like splitting hairs, it's not a historian's job to explain. I am of the very strong opinion (as I'm sure you can no-doubt tell if you've actually managed to read this diatribe) that History should not be 'explained', rather it should be understood, and that an attempt to explain does a disservice to a Historian's hard work and dedication by coloring it with the brackish water of opinion and simplicity. Nothing bathed in reality is ever simple enough to boil down to its base elements without losing a good bit of this understanding.
Despite everything said above, I very much enjoyed the video. You've a knack for this sort of thing and I appreciate that you took the time to respond to my original comment. In addition, if you actually read the arduous piece of text above then you also have the patience of a fucking saint, and so I commend you for that, too!
"Polish paratroopers have played a much bigger role in the Netherlands than predicted by the plan, and more than the number of them. They acted surprisingly well, effectively supporting the bleeding British and saving their remnants from destruction. The landing of 1 Independent Parachute Brigade undoubtedly saved the 1st Air Division from complete destruction, reducing the size of the "
The only reason the Poles were thrown under the bus was because the UK didn't want to anger the USA for their mistakes in Market Garden
Well done. My favorite book on Market Garden is It Never Snows In September. The information and perspective you provide is above and beyond. Brilliant.
Too bad TIK tries to bend the facts because he tries blaming everyone but Monty's plan and of course the Tankers arriving late - none of which the Germans state
Howdy TIK! I'm rewatching this about a year after my first run-through. As before, thank you for your tireless work on this fantastic series!
I have been able to get my hands on a few books and would like to contribute a bit to the info on the Tiger tanks present in the battle. In the episode covering 19 September, you mention two Tiger tanks crossing the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. Here's some more info for that unit and its participation throughout September:
The unit in question is an army unit, s.Pz.Kp "Hummel." It began entrainment to Arnhem on 18 September, but had to dismount at the rail station of Bocholt (some 80km from Arnhem) because the rail line was blocked. Of the 14 tigers in the company, all but two (commanded by Leutnant Knaack and Feldwebel Barneki) had mechanical issues during the road march.
Knaack and Barneki arrived in the evening of 19 September and were immediately assigned to Kampfgruppe Brinkmann; they were deployed later in the night at 20:00 which is the action at the Rhine bridge that you mentioned. The turret and gun barrel of Knaack's Tiger were hit by Frost's paratroopers, wounding two crewmen. The tank was withdrawn to Doetinchem for repairs. Barneki's tank was also immobilized, but was recovered and joined by the other Tigers of the unit the next morning.
S.Pz.Kp Hummel was assigned on the 20th to Kampfgruppe Knaust and fought against Frost's paratroopers until the pocket was dissolved on the 21st. Following this, the unit was deployed in actions around Elst over the next several days. They lost 5 Tigers to British fire west of Elst on 22 September and several other vehicles bogged down. I'm not sure how many of the 14 vehicles were total write-offs during this period. Hummel was later incorporated as a 4th company for the other Tiger unit present in the Arnhem sector, s.Pz.Abt.506.
In the episode on 20 September, you mention 9.SS.Pz.Div having Tiger II tanks at its disposal, however h.s.Pz.Abt.506 (the only unit in the area with Tiger IIs) didn't arrive until the night of 23/24 September. It was attached to 1.Fallschirm-Panzer Armee and its three companies were split from there. The headquarters section and 1./s.Pz.Abt.506 were sent to Aachen while the King Tigers of the 2nd company (under Hauptmann Wacker) and 3rd company (under Hauptmann Otto) were assigned to 10.SS.Pz.Div and 9.SS.Pz.Div, respectively.
2./s.Pz.Abt.506 fought with 10.SS.Pz.Div south of the Rhine. It didn't see significant action until 1 October (which is, admittedly, outside the scope of this Battlestorm documentary series). Eight tigers were lost during counterattacks (mostly due to road conditions and slipping off of dikes, but at least one tiger was disabled by PIAT fire). Half were recovered, but German records indicate 4 total write-offs of "Tigers." It is possible (and is supported by records on both sides) that two of these four "Tigers" were, in fact, a pair of Jagdtiger tank destroyers deployed in early combat trials with the 506th. These were knocked out by Allied air attacks.
3./s.Pz.Abt.506 was deployed with Kampfgruppen Spindler and Allwoerden in the southeastern sector of Oosterbeek. They indeed struggled, as you mentioned, with the close-quarters nature of the fighting; while the 506th was a veteran unit, some of the replacements it had received during its refit in August through early September were lacking in training. As such, the unit did lose a single Tiger to PIAT and 6-pounder anti-tank gun fire from the paratroopers on 25 September. This was the only total write-off suffered by the 3rd company in Oosterbeek.
Hope you found this interesting; thank you for all you do!
The Tigers only crossed the Arnhem bridge after the British paras capitulated, which was at the same time the British tanks were crossing the Nijmegen bridge.
Excellent research V,
Possible to drop those book links for your finds?
vear sa venlig...Tak og tak,
Hej🍻
R PM
Tigers In Combat Volume 2 by Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger I in the West by Jean Restayn, Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margry.
Vioarr,
Kompanie Hummel lost a total of 5 of its 14 Tiger Is during the fighting in the Netherlands.
It had 9 Tigers left when it became temporarily attached to Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 as its 4th company for the Aachen fighting in November.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I wasn't able to find info on whether any of the five tigers knocked out were recovered. Would you mind please dropping the source for this?
One minor nitpick though in that Hummel wasn't officially integrated into the 506th until 18 December, though both units did fight near Aachen.
Recently saw (again) "A Bridge too Far" on YT. A pretty faithful theatrical rendition of the book by Cornelius Ryan. Watching your documentary to fill in the gaps. Once again, you're doing great work.
Ryans's book is full of fiction. The film shows the 82nd taking one end of the bridge. No US solder stood on the bridge. The Irish Guards took it for them.
It can be faithfully reported as a pretty faithful theatrical renditon of the garbage put forward by Ryan. Perhaps they should have researched Ryan's rendition of the facts a little more closely.
Bullcrap Burns I already posted the Guards admitted the tanks sat. Like you in front of the monitor
This is so well made its almost hard to watch. Feel awful for Frost's men, so desperately encircled waiting for renforcements
It seems like they were used as pawns, then thrown away. Terrible.
Blame Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst and even Urquhart for that.
I think it may not have been a matter of a bridge too far, but of the British drop zone being too far. Dropping airborne troops eight to thirteen miles from their objective negated any element of surprise the British had. Why paratroops were not dropped south of the bridge - where later the Polish brigade was to land - had always baffled me. Just one batallion dropped there on the first day would have secured all the crossing points on the river and the main bridge from both sides. Why that ground was considered too marshy for British paratroops, yet was obviously adequate enough for Polish airborne troops to land on, will never get into my head.
@@SNP-1999 since I watched the film as a kid in the eighties I've always thought the same. It may of been the gliders, but as you say drop enough by parachute in close to take the bridge...
@@rob5944
Yes, you are right where gliders were concerned, but paratroops definitely could have landed there on day one - as was later proven by the Polish drop. I realise that maps can be deceptive, not always showing the ground substance, but directly to the east of Arnhem bridge, between the outskirts of the city and the river, there was also a large patch of open ground upon which a second large group of paratroops may have landed, to take the town and main bridge from the flank ( but may have thought to have been too dangerous due to the vicinity of the river, causing deaths by drowning. But there again, the Poles landed directly next to the river, so....?). It somehow doesn't make sense, does it ?
You've done a really nice job with this. Where there are multiple interpretations you give a nice middle and references.
One of the best studies of this operation ever made. Thank you TIK.
This is a fascinating documentary. There were plenty of heroes on both sides. I agree with the conclusion concerning Njimegen bridge. However the whole issue around resupply by the air force and lack of air support need further investigation.
I have just watched one of the best documentary on a battle plan, well done.
ya if you like fiction and are a fraudulent fauntleroys
Excellent work, Thank you! As a German, I believe Monty’s plan was basically both bold and courageous, and could have succeeded if 1st Airborne had been dropped close to the bridge at Arnhem. Remember, Horrock’s XXX.Corps needed a bridgehead, not just a bridge. Otherwise, even if the Irish Guards had arrived in time, they would have got stuck on the bridge and behind, on an elevated narrow highway, in totally open terrain south of Arnhem and the river, cannon fodder for the German AA guns. If such a landing had been possible and had been done, Gavin’s mistake at Nijmegen wouldn’t have been felt at all, since the Germans could not have reinforced their small bridge guard there in time. And with the landings taken place where they actually did, even with the Waal bridge taken earlier, Harrock’s tanks still would have been stopped and slaughtered on the highway between Elst and Arnhem.
So IMHO everything depended on the (enforced) wrong choice of landing zones for 1st Airborne. If it wasn’t possible for them to jump / land close to the bridge, the operation was doomed from the start.
Absolute.
The big ''IFza''
The whole operation was a brilliant concept, conjured up, brainstormed, and then implemented in just a couple weeks, and then it all turned into a wet ball of stinking wool covered in sheep dip because of the complete failure of a few placed in Command, resting mainly at First Airbourne Corps, and RAF staff levels..and then ultimately by the total lack of any sort of aggressive tactical initiative by key veteran commanders there.. in place, on the ground, who just ended up, looking at a map for four days... scratching their nuts.
Even with the critical failures at the Nijmegen...
The whole operation, as you well point out, could have still come off.
''If'' everyone had just taken a mad minute...and piggy-backed the outstanding success of Ops 'Tonga and Dead Stick', the 6th Paras' Pegasus/Horsa bridges glider-bourne coup-de-main captures of the Orne River/Canal crossings, then, as you well exclaimed, after securing the Arnhem ''crossings'' just drop the whole of the following 1st's Para Bdes South, in the wetlands, which were far less daunting than any of the LZs experienced in Normandy....even stretching down the N 325 to Nijmegen to link with the Americans..(why didn't the 82nd drop a Regt North of the bridge?...and as far as I know they never used their Waco gliders in coup-de-main assaults in NW Europe.
That Arnhem Horsa glider op that never happened?... We called it ''Operation Bellerophon''.
The main questions remaining for many are:
1/What was with the RAF's mind-boggling, continual refusals to go all out at this more than critical time in the whole campaign?...
No TAC Air Support!
The 2nd Tactical Airforces' RAF/RCAF Gp commands, which were on the continent en masse...alone, could have interdicted the great, GFM Models' whole deck.
2/Was 6th Airbourne Commander Gale and his staff ever even consulted?
Conclusion: If they had just brought in Gale to command, he would have had held precedence, and insisted upon the proper strategies and the air support necessary to be implemented to assure victory.
Prost, Slain te', Cheers🍻
@@rpm1796
The 1st Airborne took one end of their bridge, denying its use to the Germans. Two US para units the 82nd and the 101st *failed* to seize their bridges. These two failures *delayed* XXX Corps putting the operation back *42 hours.* This time window was more than enough for the Germans to run tanks in from Germany into Arnhem, precluding a bridgehead over the Rhine. The First Airborne at Arnhem never delayed XXX Corps.
*1)* The 82nd took over *nine hours* to launch an attack on the Nijmegen bridge.
*2)* It took the 101st *four hours* to launch an attack on the Zon bridge - moving only 3 km to the bridge from the drop zone.
Indeed.
Due to the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst British 1st Airborne failed to get to Arnhem in enough strength to make a difference there.
XXX Corps couldn't even have crossed the bridge had they got there. The wreckage of Grabners SS column was strewn all over it, creating a road block. Also the Germans always controlled the long exit ramp off the bridge and had excellent fields of fire against anything on the bridge.
The plan for Market Garden involved a major section of Arnhem to be captured right up to the northern suburbs, so XXX Corps could cross and fan out. That never happened. The bridge was never captured and only a few houses on the north side were. It was never enough, regardless if XXX Corps reached the bridge or not.
@@lyndoncmp5751
If the 82nd and the 101st had never failed to seize their bridges, XXX Corps would have been at Arnhem bridge on late evening d-day plus 2. And on the southern bank. That evening saw the first few German tanks arrive at Arnhem, which were knocked out by the paras.
Once identified the German guns on the north bank would have been knocked out by XXX Corps guns. XXX Corp would have given support to the paras on the north bank who largely were not facing armour at that time. The Polish units had not been dropped by then. They could have dropped to support the British. In short the paras on the outers of Arnhem would have closed in having support of tanks and artillery on the southern banks, and fresh Polish troops joining them. The radios were working by then.
BTW, a bulldozer was taken along that would have cleared the wreckage on the Arnhem bridge.
This one's barking,Had Monty showed up and Carrington had the balls to keep going - it still would have failed as Model(a real Field Marshal) could have dropped the bridge. *MONTY GARDEN* They were bigger laggards than you and your boy toy Lyndon
Very well done! I was born 400 yards from DLZ at Groesbeek Heights where Gavin landed
Market Garden was an ambitious and clever initiative involving significant risks but promising great rewards if successful. Before anyone starts assigning blame, let's not forget there is no such thing as a foolproof plan when the undertaking is on this scale. You will have a number of variables, like the weather, which need to align favourably for the operation to complete successfully. Commonly this is known as luck. In the end Market Garden did not have the luck on its side.
It's new to me that the Poles were at some point blamed for the unsuccessful outcome. There might have been a view in circulation, had the Poles arrived at Arnhem a little sooner the situation might have been salvaged. But nobody would have blamed the Poles for the delays caused by the weather conditions.
@John Cornell Well, partially true. Both Monty and Browning should have blamed themselves and Ridgeway should have commanded the Airborne contingent. A fool's errand that ended poorly. Cite your source where Monty took any blame, I'll save you time, he didn't.
@John Cornell actually that might have helped "Uncle Bill" Slim quite a bit. Airlift logistics were like gold dust to 14th Army, which is why Slim was so keen to get on with "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. Indeed it was Stilwell's Dakotas that arguably sealed the victory at Imphal with troops airlifted into place in a nick of time.
It was no less important for the year that followed. Browning would be useful for the job, even if it wasn't glamorous.
@@akgeronimo501 is it the same Ridgeway that later commanded UN forces in Korea? Between MacArthur and Clark? Or am I getting mixed up with Nam?
@@mikereger1186 He did a fine job in Korea. Had they let MacAthur actually fight we may not have the China problem today.
@John Cornell The Commanding officer cannot "partially" blame himself. He is responsible for everything that happens and fails to happen. The SS Panzer Corps in Arnhem was in reality around a regiment. Half of it was sent south. The more I read the more I think Urquhart was a terrible choice. He was Monty's guy. LOL
The Air planners? LOL They can't invent assets that were not available. The British didn't even have the assets to drop one division alone. What a joke.
I’m not lying awake looking for someone to blame for events from before I was born, especially since armies and societies are organisms unto themselves, and everything happens at a systemic level. Love the info though, and thank you for the time you spend on these. Your efforts are very appreciated.
Great presentation!
Market-Garden was a flawed plan as it assumed the Wehrmacht was defeated enemy. They were still capable of putting up determined resistance. In hindsight for logistical sense for the entire allied offensive cause, the clearing of the Scheldt estuary and capture of the vital port facilities at Antwerp needed to be given priority. Once they decided to go with operation it was a combination of factors that led to its ultimate failure.
1 XXX Corp only having one road to use...a logistical nightmare. Very easy for the Germans to delay and harass.
2 1st Airborne being dropped miles away from the Arnhem bridge! For D Day we had dropped a detachment of 6th Airborne in gliders right next to Pegasus bridge! The RAF were too risk adverse about losses. You have to break a few eggs to make an omelette!
3 Browning for his ego. He was the Airborne Corps commander. His job was to command. A job he could have done from behind his desk in England. Saved the transports for 1st Airborne to use.
4 Browning and Gavin for not giving top priority to capture Nijmegen bridge on D Day
5 Not having 2 Airborne drops on D Day. 1st Airborne were fighting at half strength at best and it is remarkable that Frost actually made it to Arnhem bridge in first place and hold heroically for such a long time.
Anyway a few suggestions for possible presentations
1 Monte Casino
2 Clearing the Scheldt Estuary and Walcheren Island
3 Hurtgen Forest
Many thanks for a wonderful channel TIK
Hi Claire, I agree with your five factors (and there's probably more). The point of the video was to narrow it down further and make a decision as to which was the most crucial factor out of them all. If you had to choose one of your five factors as being the most crucial, which would you choose?
And they're good suggestions. I'm planning to get through the North African Campaign first before moving on to the Italian Campaign, so Monte Casino may have to wait a while. Clearing the Scheldt, Walcheren Island, and Hurtgen are good suggestions, so I'll add them to my list. Just so you know, I'm currently working on a Battle of Stalingrad Battlestorm documentary (yep).
I've been working on it since April 2017, and current research is over 367,000 words. It's going to be epic when it's done! So, if you're wondering why it takes a while for me to post content, this is why :)
@Claire deMorgan
Market Garden was a success:
♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Essential Antwerp was the only port taken intact.
♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen and Arnhem, which happened.
♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London.
♦ It isolate a German army in Holland.
♦ XXX Corps never lost any territory taken.
All this while Patton was stalled in Lorraine moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army.
Claire deMorgan
Browning being in England or Holland was neither here nor there. The blame points to Gavin not Browning. Browning was not even in Holland on the vital 1st para drop when Gavin for 3 hours never communicated with the 82nd paras who were supposed to seize the bridge.
XII Corps and VIII Corps flanked XXX Corps up to Eindoven. The road never stopped XXX Corps getting to Nijmegen just ahead of schedule. The Germans stopped traffic on the road occasionally by shelling, but never seized sections of the road. XXX Corps reached the Arnhem bridge but two days too late. Supplies were still going up the road and stopping for the odd few hours due to shelling - but still going through.
If XXX Corps had rolled over the Nijmegen bridge instead of stopping and taking the bridge and town, they would have reached Arnhem and joined with the 1st Airborne.
Too much emphasis has been put on the road. Not enough on the weather on the treetops preventing fighter bombers from operating.
Claire deMorgan yeah,the old saw; 2nd rate troops, old men and boys. 1: 2nd rate troops and their C.O.s have something to prove. 2: old men are smart, and boys are mean.
Absolutely first rate presentation. Anyone with a love of history will be as absorbed as I was, I'm sure. Subbed.
I'd like to second the suggestion (by Claire deMorgan) of Monte Casino as a subject for a future presentation. Casino has so much to offer in the way of varied content and drama. The number of different nationalities involved, the many and varied tactical and logistical problems faced by the attackers and the kind of command personalities that were part of that battle all make for a fascinating topic for a project like this.
There were artillery battles, crazy, almost WW1 style charges across open ground, amphibious operations, heavy duty engineering tasks carried out under murderous fire, tank engagements, an assault on a medieval castle at the foot of the mountain, sniper problems, house to house fighting every bit as vicious as that at Stalingrad, death defying mountaineering escapades, hired North African rapists running amok, Spike Milligan being mortared and going "bomb happy", the list of interesting and remarkable incidents is practically endless.
There were many now legendary examples of unimpeachable soldiering from both sides of no man's land (the German Fallschirmjager, for example, earned the admiration of everyone that took part) and many instances of individual actions having battlefield-wide implications amongst the great, set piece engagements.
You've done such a good job with Market Garden here that seeing you give Monte Casino the same treatment would be excellent.
"Out of ammunition, God save the King" (
Major Digby Tatham-Warter DSO)
Apparently the full message was thus: "Position over-run, CO captured, all officers killed or captured, ammunition gone.
Will continue with bayonet --God save the King."
No words....
@@donathandorko
They were giants in those days - now there are only dwarves with long shadows.
@@SNP-1999 True although in recent years we have had some pretty awesome guys such as the Vc winner Joshua Leakey
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Of course, I agree. In every generation there are outstanding individuals, and Joshua is one of them in his.
Top notch video!!! You got my sub for this one. I've been avoiding your videos for a while now, for no particular reason, very glad this was the first one I watched. I'll definitely be checking out the rest. Cheers from Canada!
I feel that your explanation, of a very complex engagement, is, as always, sharp, accurate and to the point. Thank you.
A great, unbiased video with "German" instead of "Nazi this, Nazi that". Refreshing.
@Vinnie P.
Was there a difference between Soviet soldiers and communist soldiers?
How about
If some American soldier was registered as a Democrat? That would make him a Democrat soldier and not an American soldier.
@Vinnie P.
I'm talking about consistency of classification.
What makes you think that it's correct to replace some soldiers nationality with political party allegiance, but not for others?
@Vinnie P.
You didn't answer the question.
@Vinnie P.
I will repeat the question then.
'What makes you think that it's correct to replace some soldiers' nationality with political party allegiance, but not the others?'
@@Esterhazy1973
Read a little bit of a comment thread before you reply.
Really comprehensive and entertaining coverage of the battle. Puts names and faces on an event rhat should be properly remembered for all time. Bravo!
Thank you sir! I've done more videos since this so be sure to check them out :) I'm particularly proud of my recent Battlestorm Battleaxe, and Bruneval videos
Excellent video and thoughtful analysis. I have no military experience and can't judge men who even in their mistakes stand so tall. It seems everything had to go just right for the battle to succeed. Of the three reasons given for failure, any one of them, had they succeeded, might have turned the battle for the Allies. For example, had the British landed closer and taken the Arnhem bridge in strength, the delay at Nijmegen might have been overcome. Had Nijmegen bridge been taken in strength, XXX Corps might have made it to Arnhem in time to relieve Frost or retake the bridge. Had the Germans not fought so hard or had Panzer battalions resting in the area, perhaps both errors might have been overcome. Huge respect for all involved. Incidentally, one of the reasons the 1977 film is one of my favorites is that it rejected the cynicism of its era (post-Vietnam, post-Watergate) and highlighted the heroism of the soldiers (faithful to Ryan's book), even if it used a softer brush on those who made the mistakes. And much respect to Kershaw whose book rounds out the perspective.
Thanks for all your great comments! Lots of good points being made. I've made more BattleStorm videos since this - check out my BATTLESTORM playlist using this link ua-cam.com/play/PLNSNgGzaledgHIszXQVDreX-ZC1Xejf9Y.html
I'm also working on more BATTLESTORM videos so be sure to Subscribe :)
no But the video is pretty good and historically accurate
handsome boss all day no to subscribing? Or no to the good points being made? Or no to the checking out other videos? Which!?
Thanks though :)
+TIK The no meant Really nothing i dunno why i wrote it. good job ! i know te hard work it takes for this kind of videos to be done. in making videos about the spanish empire and... it takes lots of effort
handsome boss all day are you really? Are they on youtube? Link?? If not, put them on it
It does take a lot of effort. The script for this was over 21,000 words. I'm working on a "behind the scenes"/"how I make my battlestorm videos" video at the minute so I hope that helps you when it comes out... unless you're better than me, in which case, give me all your secrets!
Im working on them, they arent on youtube yet, tough. When i do, ill let u know, its something i love, and british historiography has hidden most of the glorious chapters in our history. Thats why i want to make this kind of videos.
Very scholarly and lucid lecture. I appreciate the pace. The graphics help too. Nice job!
Thank you! Glad you liked it!
Irish Guards Commanding Officer of XXX Corps:
“They arrived at Valkenswaard that night to find the town in flames. Sometime later, Brig. Norman Gwatkin, BGS of the division, came forward to see Vandeleur. "We had a glass of champagne together and he told me to take my time getting to Eindhoven, because the Son Bridge had been blown and we would have to wait for the bridging. I think his exact words were: 'Well, push on to Eindhoven tomorrow, old boy, but take your time. We've lost a bridge .' "
Sept.18: The Irish moved out at a leisurely pace between 8 and 9 a.m. About noon, Vandeleur brought the column to a halt. He and Giles entered a villa, found a swimming pool there, proceeded to take a bath. He seems to recall that while they were swimming, a female British war correspondent came into the villa and asked how things were going.
"Not bad," he replied. They had a glass of champagne together”
After Vandeleur and his brother stopped for a dip,then he entertained some tart by a fireside with some wine.Seems Joey was spinning a yarn after his faffing was broughtto light
I have had the opportunity to speak to veterans of the 82nd, 101st, 9th and 10th SS. These men had all seen heavy combat in Sicily, Normandy, The Ardennes, and the Eastern Front. Every single one of them stated unequivocally the hardest battle they fought in WW2 was Market Garden. That says a lot about the ferocity of the fighting faced by these brave young men grappling in Holland. Indeed the campaign was carved from an overly ambitious, hastily planned assault, but when it comes down to it, I feel the Germans brought their A game to these battles. It wasn’t just the SS, FJ, and Heer panzer units brought into the defense, but also naval troops, NCO schools, and RAD forces turned infantry that played a role in countering the best the Western allies had to offer. It’s like response George Pickett gave when asked why the rebels lost the Civil War; “I think the Yankees had something to do with it.”.
Polish people always get no respect from the Western countries , Polish soldiers are some of the best warriors in history . From Medieval period to the 16th and 17th centuries to the 1920 war .And the war in 1939 the battle of Mokra , Battle of the Bzura , Battle of Westerplatte.
Us Aussies will never forget our Polish comrades. ✌️
@snowy the snowman Any good commanding officer would blame himself for failures but praise his men for achievements.
Not to forget Mont Cassino in Italy. It was the Poles who broke that stalemate. They were attached to a Canadian Army Group.
POLAND POLSKA HEROOO
Britain WENT TO WAR for Poland. Seems to be forgotten or ignored by Poles.
My vote is Browning. He agreed with Gavin on Nijmegen. He ignored the intelligence reports. Presumably he agreed with landing zones miles away from Arnhem bridge and slow delivery of paratroopers over days - he (and Montgomery) should have fought the RAF more on that. He seems to be the most common factor when bad decisions are made.
You're right that Browning does factor in most of the bad decisions. His blaming of the Poles is definitely unforgivable. Personally, I think blaming Browning instead of Gavin is a valid argument :)
I agree about Browning, but a bugger problem than any one individual was the plan itself. Too many things had to go right for it to succeed, where there were too many chances for them to go wrong. XXX Corps needed to keep to a tight schedule up a single road in otherwise difficult terrain. The weather had to co-operate. The British airborne had to take the bridge despite being landed so far away and still keep hold of the landing zones. The US airborne divisions had to secure and hold multiple bridges in a short time and fend off German counterattacks threatening to cut the road. All of these things had to happen for the plan to succeed.
In the world of project management, there is a thing called "tolerance". Tolerance is the capacity of the project plan to absorb problems and things going wrong and still succeed. A project plan with no tolerance built into it is considered a bat plan. Market Garden didn't have enough tolerance built in, if indeed it could be said to have had any.
Kudos to this video for mentioning that which is often forgotten about this story: what was meant to happen after Arnhem Bridge was secured. This was the point of the plan. The objective wasn't the bridges; they were just the means to get to the objective. The objective was getting across the Rhine, and bearing this in mind shows the nonsensical nature of Monty's claim of being 90% successful, just because they took all bar one of the bridges. The one they missed was the one that really mattered.
True. If a plan is 90% successful and you still lose the battle ... It was probably a bad plan
thedudepdx
The USAAF decided on the landing zones and no fighter-bombers used.
There was no armour in the Arnhem area on the 17th (jump day) and in the weeks before.
TIK
I think they were wanting an excuse to get rid of Sosabowski for a time and this was an ideal opportunity. He was a very difficult man.
The losses of the Allies during Operation "Market-Garden" were extremely high, higher than those they suffered during D-Day. More than 14 thousand. Soldiers were killed, injured or captured. The losses of the Polish 1 SBS amounted to 418 soldiers, or 23 per cent. state.
After the battle at Arnhem, Marshal Montgomery threw a shameful accusation that the Poles were fighting badly, so he did not want to have them under his command. General Browning has blamed Sosabowski for his reluctance to cooperate in the fighting and to make excessive demands.
The British were not so much about dropping on the Polish general at least part of the fault for failure of the operation, but to get rid of the commander who had his opinion. This is not a feature normally seen with subordinates in the military. Sosabowski refused to send his brigade in July 1944 because it was not yet sufficiently trained. He pointed to errors in the planning of the "Comet" operation, and in commanding the "Market-Garden" operation, he expressed astonishment at the lack of crossing measures. All these things the Brits could not stand.
Under their insistence at the beginning of December 1944, General Stanislaw Sosabowski was deprived of a brigade command, whose combat was one of the brightest moments in Operation Market-Garden.
THANKS TO MONTY!
*Sosabowski refused to take his men in.* _That_ was what got him fired.
D-Day was one day. Market Garden was spread over 11 days in all. Looking at the US losses of 34,000 at the Hurtgen Forest defeat Market Garden was light. One of the aims, of Market Garden was penetrated 60 miles inside enemy lines forming a buffer for Antwerp against German counter-attack. Which it was when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes offensive.
Heyda Marvin
*Sosabowski refused to take his men in.* _That_ was what got him fired.
No one blamed him for not taking the Nijmegen bridge, as he was in England when it should have been taken.
Heyda Marvin
In England Sosabowski _refused_ to take his men in. He eventually did. The failure point in Market Garden was the US 82nd not seizing the bridge immediately. Sosabowski was not blamed for the failure point.
To be honest it didn't matter how Polish were fighting. They were already sold by UK and US to most murderous dictator of these war (Ok, OK Mao killed more people than Stalin but still). What is more not long after the war US and UK were planning to nuck the shit out of Poland in case of war with Soviet Union. So called Allies simply backstabbed Poles . And no I do not think Poland should have support natzis they also were dicks. In my opinion failure on polish part was complying with traitorous allies orders and supporting them for no benefit of their own. But it was simply incomprehensible to them that allies can be as shity as US and UK.
My great uncle was killed at Arnhem during Market Garden; I've been fascinated by it from an early age and have studied it extensively for many years. I reached the conclusion some time ago that the its failure was due to a number of things, but overwhelmingly the responsibility must be laid at the door of Gavin and Browning and mostly I blame Browning for his weakness both before the operation commenced and for not overruling Gavins reluctance to attack and take the Nijmegen bridge.
As for your documentary, Lewis - fantastic. Well researched and equally well presented - thank you.
The First Airborne seized one end of the Arnhem bridge denying its use to the Germans. The 9th SS and its vehicles were shot up on the Arnhem bridge. If XXX Corps had arrived, not being delayed by two US para units, the whole bridge would have been in British hands.
The 82nd never seized the Nijmegen bridge. Three 82nd scouts took prisoner seven of the 18 bridge guards prisoners on the south end of Nijmegen bridge, together with their 20mm cannon, but had to let them go after an hour as no one turned up.
The 9th SS came south to reinforce the bridge about 6 hours after the 82nd landed. The 82nd had 6 hours to move and occupy the bridge but hung around in DePloeg.
Browning was not there to hold Gavin's hand. Browning had full faith in Gavin as up until then he had an excellent record. Browning was in the air when the 82nd 508 should have been moving to the bridge. He was two hours after the first jump. Then Browning had to set up his CP when on the ground.
The 82nd around midnight made their fist attack on the bridge, staying all night around the southern approaches. Browning was informed they had not seized the bridge in the morning of D-Day plus 1. He ordered Gavin to take the bridge ASAP. Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town and the bridge approaches. Gavin said to Browning that XXX Corp can take the bridge when they arrive. They did. The resulting two day delay due to the 101st and 82nd failing to seize their bridges precluded a bridgehead over the Rhine.
Great vid!
Nijmegen is the key to the failure.
Many people make the point that everything had to go right for it to work, but it didn't. The plan wasn't fool proof, but it was far from foolish and did have some flex.
Lack of air transport to drop all troops when needed, Bridges blown up, and Bailey bridges thrown up, 1st Parachute brigade landing way to far from the bridge being split up and only 2 Para getting through and grabbing the Arnhem Bridge from the north, faulty intel, SS Panzer units and Model in Arnhem, sterling performance of the German forces that opposed the British and American forces.
And yet, in the end the only thing that mattered was XXX Corps being unable to debouche to the Island on day 3 due to needing to spend time clearing Nijmegen of a determined and forceful opponent because the 82nd didn't complete its day one objective. They weren't the first unit in WWII with a commander who fell prey to dealing with secondary objectives, Caen, Anzio, etc. etc, and no doubt won't be the last in history either.
As many have argued Gavin holds a good degree of responsibility for this, but Browning also holds a lot, seemingly being rather too concerned with setting up his HQ overlooking the area where intelligence reports that he and Gavin were supposedly privvy to apparently had hundreds of German vehicles hiding.
Whilst the pair of them were fucking about Frost and the lads were were bleeding to keep their end of Arnhem bridge bottled up, and they cost the lives of many a man of the 82nd to finally right that wrong.
If they'd have prioritised getting across the river and preventing the German relief forces coming into Nijmegen and fortifying it, then Day 3 (or 4 if XXX Corp needs to fight to the south of Arnhem bridge) sees the battered II Para relieved and XXX Corp over the Rhine. All the whining about Antwerp is then consigned to the history books, as it no longer matters, the Germans defence from then on fails to solidify, many trapped in the Netherlands with no hope of relief or resupply and the war ends in 1944.
That was the gamble, and given the potential rewards it was worth the try, it failed on a knife's edge despite so much going wrong, in fact a lot had to go wrong to give the Germans a fighting chance, but a bad decision, shared between Gavin and Browning was the only thing that truly sank the endeavour.
I think Browning and Gavin both need to be given more credit for the Nijmegen highway bridge being a primary objective and too much emphasis has been given to Browning's warning to Gavin that the Groesbeek heights also needed to be secured. Because the bridge was not seized on the first day, I think people assume this was intended by the bridge not being given high enough priority. There is an argment that the bridge should have been given more consideration with a coup de main operation, but it was not de-prioritised in favour of the high ground until after the first failed attempt to seize the bridge. The fact is that the officer charged with the capture of the bridge failed to carry out Gavin's instruction, and there's plenty of evidence in the literature, some of it going back to the officer's previous performance in Normandy, to support it.
First, Gavin wrote in his report to US Army Historical Officer, Captain Westover, on 17 July 1945:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city."
In his interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far, Ryan notes [with my square brackets]:
Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats [polder or farm land] to the east.
We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.
(James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University - Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967)
The British request to drop a battalion north of the bridge for a coup de main was a legacy of Browning's original operation COMET plan to use dawn glider coup de main assaults on all three main bridges - Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave - to repeat the success of operation DEADSTICK on the Orne canal and river bridges in Normandy. These elements had been removed by Brereton for the planning of operation MARKET, because he thought it too risky for a daylight assault, having already deleted COMET's double airlift for D-Day. Despite Browning having advised Dempsey (British 2nd Army) that COMET should not go ahead without the glider coup de main assaults, he could not protest their removal by Brereton for MARKET, because he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's LINNET II plan (Liege and Maastricht bridges), scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps. LINNET II was thankfully cancelled and the two men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning was now aware Brereton had intended to accept his resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. Browning was now politically neutralised and it seems his only influence on the planning for MARKET was to bring forward the delivery of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek on the first lift, where he could at least influence events after the troops had landed, but at the expense of some anti-tank guns going to Urquhart's 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.
(The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in northwest Europe, 1944 - Roger Cirillo PhD Thesis, 2001 Cranfield University)
So everything now rested on Gavin's instruction to Colonel Lindquist and the battalion assigned to secure the Nijmegen bridge, but Lindquist failed to appreciate the urgency and importance of the primary objective and sent only a pre-planned recon patrol to the bridge. By the time Gavin found out and ordered Lindquist to get the 1st Battalion moving, it was too late, and the 10.SS-Panzer-Division had won the race to reinforce the city and its bridges. Cornelius Ryan did not explore this aspect of the operation and most historians have also followed Ryan's established narrative. Only more recent books have explored what Gavin had already indicated in 1945 letter and 1967 interview, and if you want to read in detail the drama that followed and is completely absent in A Bridge Too Far, you would have to consult some books written about 12 years ago, although I have posted extracts from these books elsewhere in the comments:
September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012).
Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012).
The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge.
I was going to come and delete my comment from the other day, though I'm now glad I didn't much appreciated extra info there Dave, thanks.
I'd had a couple of beers and was feeling properly patriotic and a bit more optimistic about what MG could have achieved (I suspect without Antwerp even a maximally successful Market Garden could not have been properly exploited) and was probably a bit too harsh on Gavin in particular, though I still think he needed to have given a lot more focus on making that bridge the overriding priority. Browning I still see as being very culpable for quite how big a debacle occurred. I was aware of his previous threat to resign leaving him feeling unable to rock the boat because he would have found himself out on his ear, I don't think that a good enough reason for him not to have spoken out, and I am still somewhat mystified by his deciding to divert so much transport to bring his HQ in the first drop, at the expense of 1st Airborne, though maybe it made sense to him at the time given his ambitious nature, his presence on the field did not seem to add anything useful that I can see and only served as a distraction.
I am going to check out those books you suggest, as for no good reason I've developed an interest in Market Garden. Likely due to being given an old Fox Paragon Umbrella that had gone to war and seeing one in the film many years ago, anyway, I went for a visit to Arnhem last year and walked over the bridge and had a good look at the surrounding countryside and the river and it drove my interest further, I've about 4 more books on my list I'm going through right now, and will add your suggestions to the list and hopefully come away with a more nuanced point of view.
@@davemac1197
@@valiskuk - I'm glad you didn't delete the comment, I think you're on the right track - and too few people are because the conventional narrative has become so widely accepted for so long.
Antwerp is a common diversion - a lot of people think it should have been the priority over a Rhine crossing, but mostly they're the people who think Patton should have crossed the Rhine first. The logic was that a Rhine crossing at Arnhem would be easier sooner rather than later, before the Germans had reinforced their river and canal defence lines. Eisenhower saw that logic and that's why he endorsed the operation. Montgomery was already going to Arnhem with COMET, he only needed Eisenhower's endorsement to expand the operation into MARKET to include the American divisions. Antwerp was needed for Eisenhower's broad front advances into Germany, not for getting to the Rhine, so the argument that Antwerp should have come first is completely beside the point. Opening Antwerp doesn't cut the V-2 supply lines, it doesn't even trap the 15.Armee at Antwerp (only one of Montgomery's wider encirclements could do that after a smaller one fails), and it certainly wouldn't make a later Rhine crossing any easier. So Antwerp is a diversion from the real debate.
The thing about Browning is that his judgement seems to have been spot on. He was right about holding the Arnhem bridge for four days (and perhaps it being "a bridge too far"). He was right to dismiss the aerial photo of German tanks in the Arnhem area - now that the photo has been found it does indeed show obsolete vehicles and not a 1944 panzer division. And he took his Corps HQ to Groesbeek on the first lift at the expense of not more infantry as I had first assumed (38 glider tugs could have taken the second half of the South Staffords battalion) but actually disrupted the original anti-tank gun delivery schedule. I've recently finished reading a new series of books on the Anti-Tank Batteries at Arnhem by Nigel Simpson et al (2019-2023). It's clear from them that heavy armoured counter-attacks were expected and briefed to the AT units, but the fact the German armoured response took several days to build up is a question of judgement, so the guns were not all needed on the first lift, and indeed some that were delivered on the 1st lift barely fired any rounds throughout the whole battle, such was German wariness of British AT guns. His attitude towards the Americans has one of being totally supportive - he won't hear a word against them. I think he took the view of "by their deeds shall they be known" (which is a biblical expression and I've probably butchered it). Maybe he didn't anticipate Cornelius Ryan and Hollywood, I don't know.
I think Gavin does bear a great deal of responsibility for the failure of the operation, but not because he didn't try to get the Nijmegen bridge. Clearly he did, but he was let down by a subordinate and when he found out it was a scene that would have been truly worthy of Ryan O'Neal's soap opera scenery chewing acting, but of course America would never accept the true circumstances being filmed. The internal politics within 82nd Airborne were hinted at by Gavin in his interview with Cornelius Ryan, but how much he appreciated the problems at the time is an open question. In 1967 he told Ryan that Ridgway didn't trust Lindquist and wouldn't promote him. In fact, Ridgway had a problem in that he couldn't promote another colonel from the division over him because Lindquist had seniority. Gavin may have had the same problem because he didn't replace himself as Assistant Division Commander when he inherited the division from Ridgway, so throughout MARKET GARDEN's planning and execution Gavin was running himself ragged doing both jobs (and carrying a jump injury sustained on 17 September).
Best book on the overall operation is Swedish historian Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020). They use unpublished documents and interviews in the Cornelius Ryan Collection and specifically debunk the myths in the Hollywood film version of A Bridge Too Far.
Dutch researcher RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011) and his factbook on the whole operation, Little Sense Of Urgency (2014), are also recommended.
A free download on the aerial photo story is an interesting read and can be found on the RAF's MoD site, called 'Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story', Air Historical Branch (Royal Air Force 2016, 2nd Ed 2019), it's written by Sebastian Ritchie, whose book Arnhem: Myth And Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden (2011, revised 2019) is a study of the air planning aspects if you want to go further into that side of it.
Best wishes and happy reading.
@@davemac1197 wrote:
_"but it was not de-prioritised in favour of the high ground until after the first failed attempt to seize the bridge. "_
Correct! The bridge *was* top priority on d-day for sure.
@@valiskuk
In Eisenhower's own words in early September Antwerp was *not* the priority and that forces could advance on the Ruhr. Although he did prioritise Antwerp weeks later. Not one leading allied commander argued in the first half of September that the British Second Army should halt its pursuit of the Germans after it had just moved 400km in a week, and then stop to open Antwerp and clear the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt would have taken at least a month.
In early September, SHAEF thought the Germans were nearly finished. No leader at the time said there should be a halt when it appeared a bridgehead over the Rhine could have been achieved and a buffer created to protect Antwerp when the port is online. The idea was to get across the Rhine, break through the Westwall and then halt to open up Antwerp, building up supplies for the next stage, the advance through Germany.
Antwerp was never needed for the westwall battles. Supplies were coming via LeHavre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. The allies were not moving anywhere fast so there was no need to get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance quickly - because there was *no* advance.
All the US operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied. They did not fail because Antwerp was not opened. They failed because of poor US strategy and tactical decisions. An example, was in the Lorraine, with Patton too cautious and hesitant failing to correctly concentrate his forces suffering 55,000 casualties.
Antwerp was fully operational in December. It never put the Germans off in scything through US lines in the Bulge attack.
Antwerp was no panacea.
this non-profit amateur video is 100 times better than those "proffesioanlly" made documentaries by old white haired veterans.
Edit: after 6 years, i want to clarify my lack of english skills. No disrespect to military veterans, but documentaries involving them about this battle just absolutely suck in comparison.
Thank you for your awesome comment :) also, you ain't seen nothing yet. Wait until I finish my Stalingrad documentary...
while i agree with the comment on the quality of the video, is there any justification for sounding derogatory about veterans?
emosh73 haha. First, context matters and this discussion didn't warrant a deragatory comment. Second. Your reply is incoherent (been drinking?). Third, you are an angry cowardly troll for anonomously calling names. (Probably wear a mask at antifa counter protests)
TIK Has it been finished yet? I found this video to be extremely good mate. I knew the 'stock' version of the operation but this was superbly detailed. Have no problems reccomending this. Brilliant and keep it up, you've earned another subscriber 👍
Paul Sacco
He's an American *and* a Trumpanzee.
Do not expect coherence.
Excellent documentary, thanks for making and uploading! How have I missed this one for 5 years?
Coming back to this 8 yrs later and it's still my favorite battle of WW2. Such a great documentary TIK!
if this guy was my history teacher.. i would have definitely got all A's.. love the way he speaks..
Just in case you haven't heard, I'm working on the next ww2 documentary... You can get quotes and more updates if you follow me on Instagram instagram.com/tikhistory/
Let me know what battles you want me to cover in the future
+TIK first of all good to see it all gathered in one video.
secondly i would be cool with a battle that we dont hear alot about but have some surprisingly important meaning; i think alot of subs here on the channel already to watch alot of stuff from the discovery channel/ the history channel etc - alot of battles in india, Thailand, Burma is often refered to as the "forgotten war" while the pacific and western and eastern got a lot of the hardware, the supplies and attention.
+Rex1987 Well I now have a few books on the war in Ethiopia during ww2, since most of the books covering the Western Desert Campaign also cover that one too. So that's certainly one I could do in the future. It's not a huge conflict too (like the Eastern Front) so it would be possible :)
+InDisguise let's put it this way, I've been looking into ways to at least cover the cost of having to buy the books to do the research from, but so far I haven't figured that out :/
+TIK Cover the Normandy campaign!!!!!11!!!!!1
Devon Ziegler nah, it's boring, nothing happened :D
But I will do eventually. Part of the benefit of researching the Western Desert Campaign is getting to grips with Monty and later Eisenhower, Patton etc when they arrive on the scene at Tunis/Sicily/Italy. Then it'll make it easier for me to critique Monty's performance at Normandy in context of the performance of all the Allied generals in previous battles... so there's method in my madness ;)
A great video to come back to every now and then. It's 2 self-contained hours of interesting content.
Perhaps the best series on any WW2 battle I ever watched, no excuses, no bias, just plain facts.
Great presentation. I learned a few things more on this battle I did not know. I especially love these big battle vids on battles throughout history because I get to read the funny attempts at pointing fingers of blame by everyone all over the place. It's like that EVERY military battle video. I'm still laughing at the re-fighting of the battle below. You commentors crack me up. Once again, great vid.
My father Fred Pearce was a Sergeant in the Ox & Bucks défense platoon surrounding the 1st Airborne HQ
He was shot in the leg and taken POW for nine months until the end of the war
He was lucky to survive
He never spoke ever about Arnhem
In retirement another ex Arnhem vet was living close to him in the same village, but they talked to one another
I learned more about Market Garden after his death in 1990 and cycled around Holland visiting all the bridges & I am very proud of him & all the brave young men involved
@nigep that’s amazing. I have recently become involved in a local project to recreate some cycling routes around the 1st Airborne Division’s base locations in Lincolnshire before and after Arnhem. I was delighted to discover the Ox & Bucks involvement as the regiment was one of the antecedent regiments of my own. The Divisional HQ location isn’t that far from my home between Lincoln and d Grantham, so if you are ever in the area and would like to go for a cycle to see where Serjeant Pearce was based, it would be a pleasure to join you.
@@mikeainsworth4504 that’s wonderful & I will look forward to it
Thank you Mike
I’m English but live in Orkney but come to England to visit my sons once or twice a year
Take Care
Market Garden has always been my favorite battle of World War II. I have studied it extensively. I've read all the books you cite, as well as a number of others, including Frost's and Urquhart's memoirs. You've done a good job with regard to the battle. Your maps are first rate. I can't agree with your overall conclusion, however. I knew quite early on your were angling toward the conclusion that it was all Gavin's fault, as detailed by Lloyd Clark in Crossing the Rhine. I found his conclusion hard to swallow when I first read it. My thought is best described by the phrase, "Success has many fathers. Failure but one." Why try to find a single factor (or scapegoat) for the battle? There is plenty of blame to go around, starting with Eisenhower. The operation never should have been approved to start with. The important thing was to clear the Scheldt and open Antwerp. Market Garden took away from that objective, which was then dumped on the poor Canadians who were already stretched thin with orders to clear the other channel ports. Eisenhower even remarked just after approving the pan that he didn't think it would succeed. But politics demanded he back Montgomery. The resources for MG should have been used to clear the Scheldt but everyone was too blinded by the idea of finishing the war by Christmas, so Antwerp wouldn't be necessary. So it's an intelligence failure as well for failing to appreciate the fight left in the German army. The same intelligence wizards who said before the Bulge that Germany was through and couldn't mount offensive operations. Monty and Ike still thought they were pursuing a defeated foe back to Germany. But the German forces has already stiffened as a result of the time granted by Allied logistical problems, which would have been solved by the opening of Antwerp. Monty pushed an operation which was ill conceived more out of a desire to one up Bradley and Patton and get the lion's share of supplies then out of a real strategic gain. It is interesting this plan is totally out of character for Monty. El Alamein, Caen, D-Day, Varsity - his other operations are carefully and meticulously planned for overkill. But not Market Garden. He has to move quickly or lose primacy of logical support. The air plan was ridiculous. Ike or Monty should have overruled the USAAC and RAF and insisted on two drops the first day. Of course, then we might have been arguing about the failure of Market Garden thanks to the tremendous loss of transport aircraft in the second wave. Look at the losses incurred during Varsity. But in the end, if you have to blame one man, it has to be Browning. He was so worried he was going to miss out on the fighting, as he had done so far, that nothing was going to prevent this operation from going forward and him from commanding it. There is evidence he ordered Gavin to concentrate on the Groesbeek Heights as more important than going for the bridge. And he took 36 transports away from the 1st Airborne to bring his worthless Corps headquarters. There was no need for him to bring a headquarters when the various airborne units would come under effective XXX Corp control during the battle. He should have stayed in England but his ego wouldn't let him miss his last chance at glory. Bremerton should have ordered him to stay behind, but Bremerton simply checked out with regard to this battle. Even if the 82nd had taken the bridge, it is not assured that XXX Corps reaches Arnhem in time. And even if they do, we are back to the real problem. German 15th Army in the Scheldt sliding over (as they did) to throttle the breakthrough. Everyone ignores the fact that it wasn't just XXX Corp that attached. They were to be supported by attacks on either flank, but those stalled almost immediately. The plan was abortive from the start and had almost no chance of success, even if everything went right. Look at the outcome - a salient in the German lines that is stagnant almost until the end of the war, and a war of attrition on The Island. A simple bridgehead over the Rhine is not enough. First Army proved that at Remagen. The whole plan was predicated on Germany being beaten already and a simple push knocking down the whole rotten house. Now where have I heard that before? So, yes, Gavin should have moved more quickly to secure the Bridge at Nijmegan. But to blame the failure of the whole operation on him is scapegoating. Their Dutch advisors tried to tell the Allies that the plan was daft, based on the terrain, but no one listened.
You're right that there were many reasons for the failure of this Operation, and it would take too long to list them all here. However, if you were to choose the major/one/critical reason for the failure, which would you chose? For me, it's the failure to take Nijmegen Bridge. That doesn't excuse the poor planning, the British at Arnhem (who really dropped the ball) or that XXX Corps might have been able to race off to Arnhem after Nijmegen Bridge was finally taken. But, for me, it was the biggest factor in the collapse. The 36 hour delay at Nijmegen is inexcusable.
"The resources for MG should have been used to clear the Scheldt but everyone was too blinded by the idea of finishing the war by Christmas, so Antwerp wouldn't be necessary."
This operation was probably not aimed at riding off to Berlin, and probably was in fact about clearing the Scheldt ua-cam.com/video/f79KgQVL3MM/v-deo.html
"Ike or Monty should have overruled the USAAC and RAF and insisted on two drops the first day."
Brereton made that decision.
"Bremerton should have ordered him to stay behind, but Bremerton simply checked out with regard to this battle."
No, Brereton had an active part in the planning of the operation. He just didn't follow the troops into battle like Browning.
"But in the end, if you have to blame one man, it has to be Browning. He was so worried he was going to miss out on the fighting, as he had done so far, that nothing was going to prevent this operation from going forward and him from commanding it. There is evidence he ordered Gavin to concentrate on the Groesbeek Heights as more important than going for the bridge."
That's fine if you want to blame Browning as he made a lot of mistakes, and perhaps made the decision not to take the Nijmegen Bridge on day 1. Blaming the Poles is certainly inexcusable.
"Even if the 82nd had taken the bridge, it is not assured that XXX Corps reaches Arnhem in time."
Possibly. However I do think it would have been easier to fight 10th SS Panzer Division north of Nijmegen than inside a city they'd had two days to fortify.
"They were to be supported by attacks on either flank, but those stalled almost immediately."
This is Montgomery's fault. O'Connor didn't know about the operation until the last minute, which explains why his 8th Corps couldn't keep up. And it's not like O'Connor wasn't a good general. His performance during Operation Compass in 1940-41 was brilliant ua-cam.com/video/b71kdhj27rk/v-deo.html
"The plan was abortive from the start and had almost no chance of success, even if everything went right."
I don't see it like that. At the end of day 1, every bridge except Nijmegen Bridge was taken (Son was blown but the area was taken). Even after a 14 hour delay at Son Bridge, XXX Corps was at Nijmegen on time with a full day to go the last 8 miles to Arnhem to reach it on time. It was then delayed by a critical 36 hours due to the Germans having possession of Nijmegen, which they really shouldn't have had. If the 82nd had gone for the bridge (which they did, but only after delaying for several crucial hours on day 1) they would have taken it before 10th SS Panzer Division even arrived on the scene. Therefore, the plan was only abortive because Gavin and/or Browning messed up at Nijmegen. It had a good chance of success, until the decision was made not to go for Nijmegen bridge.
"So, yes, Gavin should have moved more quickly to secure the Bridge at Nijmegan. But to blame the failure of the whole operation on him is scapegoating."
XXX Corps was blocked at Nijmegen. That's not scapegoating. That's just a fact. Ignoring this critical error and then blaming Montgomery for everything, isn't fair either. Montgomery should bear responsibility for the operation's success or failure, since he was ultimately in charge and that's how "responsibility" works. However, the operation itself failed at the tactical level thanks to the decision not to go for the Nijmegen Bridge on day 1. If you want to blame Gavin, fine. If you want to blame Browning, fine. If you want to blame both, fine. But Montgomery isn't to blame for the tactical failure to take Nijmegen Bridge.
And, just to be clear, I'm not a Montgomery fanboy. I can't wait to dive into his other battles so I can get to grips with the failures he made elsewhere. However, I'm not convinced he was to blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden. Maybe the plan could have been different. Maybe it would have been better if the plan wasn't attempted at all. But even as it was, Market Garden could have worked... had Nijmegen Bridge been taken on day 1. And there's no valid excuse as to why it shouldn't have been.
If Gavin had taken Nijmegen bridge would the operation objectives have been acheived? How long would the allies have been able to hold that ground?
Thanks for that clear, cogent, and (to me) excellent and correct commentary for me to consider after an extrordinary and most detailed (yet wonderfully absorbing and lucid) presentation of this remarkable mistake made by the Allies during WW2. I grew up in the 60's; never knew jack about WW2 really until "World at War", and have been Anglophile since where war docus are concerned. TIK is the fucking bomb (the best docu's on The Tube for real waraphiles), but Damn, excellent commentary is an added treat here... tanx again man, keep bothering if you please Mr. WCox!
TIK
_"That's fine if you want to blame Browning as he made a lot of mistakes, and perhaps made the decision not to take the Nijmegen Bridge on day 1."_
Browning made no such decision. That was Gavin. Browning was in the air when the 82nd men should have been moving towards the bridge. They were not. *General* Gavin was in charge on the 82nd, not Browning. Browning was in charge of *all* paras on the next level up in command, having to deal with three generals. Browning would not be dealing with the 82nd's colonels, Gavin would be.
TIK
_"I can't wait to dive into his other battles so I can get to grips with the failures he made elsewhere."_
You will be looking for a long time. Monty had setbacks but no failures. His record is absolutely brilliant. He _never_ suffered a reverse from mid 1942 onwards, through 9 countries.
This is the best documentary on Market Garden i have ever seen
you haven't looked hard or are a monty fanboi
@@bigwoody4704 I think TIKhistory is quite good, but a little bit biased (pro-british, anti-american). I have read about 10-15 books about Market Garden plus other relevant books (2*Guderian, Beevour? about Crete, some books about Overlord and El Alamein).
From the beginning: Market Garden was a very bad plan. The single road (with some parts with partial parallell roads like Best /Son was a very bad idea. Read Guderians two books if you don't capture that).
The use of day-light was very bad. The surprise attack should have started at dawn, not after lunch. Especially since XXX corps and 3rd battalion (under leadership of Fitch, Lathbury and Urquhart himself didn't like working in darkness).
The section of LZ was very bad. In Comet, the recce squadron (Gough) was assumed to land at Elst and proceed northwards towards Arnhem and attack the bridge from the south. In MarketGarden he landed NW of Arnhem and started very very late. His jeeps landed with the gliders, but his troops landed much as paratroopers (they didn't like gliders). About 60 minutes was lost, which enabled Krafft to create a blocking line.
Personal diaries from soldiers at Arnhem shows that they were not preparred for opposition. I will not dive into details now, Gough's way of commanding his squadron could be discussed.
Another topic is Urquhart's activities. In his book, he makes fun of the german's use of messengers on bicycles. With his break down of radio communications, a better use if messengers may have been a very very good idea.
not a little bit - at least on his Monty Garden boards.He listed books he read on the subject an most don't come to his conclusions because I had used quotes from the books to shoot down his robust theories getting monty off the hook. TIK slowly bends the narrative to appear legitimate He's actually a gamer and that were he gets all his maps and such. The 82nd airborne or any one else were not responsible for that debacle except monty for pushing for it and IKE for letting him off his leash. Many brought this up also,sadly many of those posts mysteriously went missing.
TIK covers for the fact the Crown needed and received our help, they couldn’t forgive us for the humiliation of becoming a junior partner to a country they couldn't colonize - twice. A little too much for someone who thinks Englishmen are "LORDS" He quoted two guys(Nielands & Poulussen) that were neither peer reviewed or accredited Historians that access proper historical resource. For instance WIKI that you our I can edit all day long and many do and I actually went in to correct one of these revisioinst slappies.
Read
*It Never Snows in September* by the Germans
Sabastian Ritchie,Arnhem Myth and Reality
ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr
Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" by R.W. Thompson
A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett
Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 by Antony Beevor - all British Historians both Monty and TIK get jiggy with the facts
Monty with all of the backbone of a gummy bear didn't show up - Monty Garden
as a dutch person i must say your pronounciation of the cities is pretty good, nowhere near how dutch people would say it but legible enough to not be a complete laughing stock to dutchies, well done.
You have brought something new to something i have studied for years, tremendous work
Deep thanks
Glad you liked it :)
Great series Tik - loved your Stalingrad as well. Would love one on the Ardennes offensive which i believe you are yet to cover. I realise it takes a considerable amount of time to research the various sources and bring together your version. Keep up the good work.
Here is an accounting of my Uncle Ray during Operation Market Garden. This was written by Dutch Schultz.
"Anyway, my buddy Ray Gonzalez’s platoon went to take this high ground up the street protecting our area into town. In the process of doing it, one of the guys, one of the newcomers had gotten into a fire fight. One of the soldiers, a guy by the name of Creswick was shot in the stomach and the platoon did not have a medic with them at that time. Of course, when a guy had an open stomach wound, it was just a question of time before they would die. Rather than leaving Creswick laying in the dirt and mud to die, they put him in a vacant store in town just down a bit from the high ground while the rest of the platoon went up the hill to repulse the German counterattack. Ray had the lowest point on the hill to defend and watch. So he was closest to The Nijmegen Bridge over the Waal River in 1944
Creswick’s location. During the night, he went in to check on Creswick and he did it three times. The second time he went down to check on him, Creswick told him he had to go to the bathroom to have a bowel movement. Ray took off his combat gear set it down, carried Creswick over to a toilet, undressed him, and put him on the toilet so he could have his bowel movement and then he cleaned him all up too. My thought watching this was, “The guy is dying, why bother even making sure that he has a BM? You know it doesn’t matter when you are dying.” Ray was accommodating him all the way. That was love. Pure love. I cry thinking about it. Combat is so damn emotionally confusing. You will never understand it. I hope you will never understand it.
Ray picked Creswick up off the toilet, redressed him, and put him back softly on his bedding and went back to his position. He took some risk in doing this because this shop was located was along this highway. It was an exposed position. Funny I remember that the shop we were in had a huge plate-glass window that was not broken. When the sun hit it, it was like a mirror. I was given a direct order to break the window and do it quietly. Any German patrol could have come up and taken out Ray and all of us. The third time he came down the hill, Creswick was dead. You know, I thought it was quite marvelous that he would take the time to show this guy some tenderness. That’s Christian mercy in action. Normally you don’t expect this kind of thing in a combat situation. Ray’s platoon was relieved days later. They came under heavy machine gun fire and small arms fire. Ray got out of their forward position along with some others in his company. Some were killed and some were wounded coming off that hill. When Ray found out the Creswick’s body was still back there in that storefront, he took off all his equipment, except for his rifle, and went back into this area where Creswick was lying and he carried him out. In the process of carrying Creswick’s body out of the storer, there was also a Mexican kid, from New Mexico according to Ray who knew Ray, and he had been hit in the leg and knee in there. He said to Ray, “please come after me, please come back and get me, please come back and get me, don’t leave me here.” Ray said, “I’ll be back.” He set Creswick’s body down and he picked this kid up and he must have carried this him at least a half of mile when this medical jeep came up. He got this guy in the back of the jeep for first aid. Eventually he got Creswick out too. Ray got the Silver Star for this.
There's no unit identifications or locations in this, so there's no context. Nearest guys to the Nijmegen bridge were the three scouts from the 1/508th S-2 Section that got to the south end of the highway bridge, captured 6 or 7 Germans and a "small artillery weapon", and then waited for reinforcements that never came. After an hour at dusk they heard "heavy equipment" (9.SS-Panzer recon battalion) arriving at the north end of the bridge, so they released their prisoners and withdrew.
Sources:
- Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, by Phil Nordyke, 2012
- The 508th Connection, by Zig Boroughs, 2013
Wow, I am actually amazed at how much of a mess this all was.
Was it worth it then? I saw your comment on the other video :)
Very much. Especially doing the entire thing with the map. To explain what's really going on at an opperational level, this is really very valuable.
@@Yora21 Go watch TIK's documentary of operation Crusader. NOW that's a Clusterfuck of confusion
@@TheImperatorKnight That's a really good question, we must remember that the west front was by then halting due to the fact that the allies were too successful and were altogether too far from the initial supply points.
Market Garden (mostly 30th Corps I guess) took all the fuel that could be spared while other sections of the front, namely Patton's 3rd army was left out to dry.
Was it a correct decision to go for Market Garden instead of something else? I guess we'll never know, but I guess there were better options then a risky operation like MG.
@@redspark2009
Total rubbish. Patton's advance resumed even before Market Garden began. The supplies given to the operation over and above what 21st Army Group was already getting was 500 tons per day (Enough for one division) for a limited period before and during Market Garden.
Great research and interesting narrative. This was a great explanation of Market Garden and I will now seek out more gems from you TIK.
I've read that at lest one German General level officer described Market Garden a great tactical victory but strategic defeat in WWII, for the Germans. The point was that the Germans fought very well and prevented Market Garden from succeeding completely. However, by stopping it, it slowed or halted the Allied advance in the West. This meant that the war in the East would continue and that the Russians would end up taking more of Germany that otherwise might have happened.
Now I know there were treaties on the division of Germany, but had Market Garden been a success and an Western offensive could have either continued along that route or been renewed more quickly, then they Western Allies might have been able to take more of Germany.
Zones of occupation were already decided at Jalta. Soviets take everything at the east of Elbe. For Germans it would be more practical to surrender to Americans than Russians.
Montgomery and british wanted a take of berlin Eisenhower and marshall not so much . They preferred a more direct thrust at munich Salzburg and austria in an apple falls from the tree theory . But yes the british didnt exactly meet their berlin objectives for its partition . It was the russians who cracked that nut. Capture the flag isnt all what its cracked up to be . Denial of resources is but severing command from control communications is close.
@@terencewinters2154 - I remember some comment that Eisenhower held back from pushing against Berlin so as to save his troops & allow the Russians to take more losses?
There was a pretty common illusion among the German Generals that they could somehow reach a deal with the Allies and join forces to continue the war against the USSR together.
However, while this idea probably had some support especially among the British Officer Corps, in practice it was out of the question for two reasons, both related to public opinion: one was the well-earned reputation of Nazi Germany, the other the fact that a hot war against the USSR with all that entailed would be supremely unpopular and lead to mass mutinies and a political crisis in a matter of time, especially given how badly people had already sacrificed for the war.
Europe itself was already a cauldron of revolutionary sentiments at this time, and allying with Hitler‘s generals would have led to total chaos. I
Achieving Germany‘s total capitulation was also great for American businesses.
But the Prussian officers had to tell themselves something to keep this all going, and ironically, they did get to ally with the USA against Russia after the war. Just in an extremely junior position. But there was no way to avoid a German capitulation once Hitler threw away the last chances of a cease-fire in the east (the last such offer from Stalin even happened after Stalingrad, I think.)
Market Garden & the word "success" should be considered mutually exclusive - even if everything miraculously works and you advance past Arnhem, you then have to get over the Issel river on the way towards Germany and the Ruhr objective. This whole time you are supposedly continuing the advance supplied via the single road, in a situation where supply is very stretched & tentative due to the approaches to Antwerp not having been cleared. Meanwhile the Germans would plaster the road with artillery, V-2's and any bombers they could dig up. It would become the highest priority for the Germans, who would probably organize a proper panzer-led counter offensive to cut it. You simply cannot ignore logistics! How stupid would Monty look if a good chunk of Brit. 2nd Army were cut-off in Germany & N. Holland due to supply? (Hitler might have been persuaded to release the build up of units meant for the Bulge, early, for just such a perfect opportunity.)
A Bridge too Far was one of my most favorite war movies, in which the protagonist or so called heroes lost in the end
I agree that it was Generals Gavin and Browning not taking Nijmegen bridge that sunk Market-Garden, but the German inventiveness in coming up with scads of ad-hoc "Kampfgruppen" and other smaller "odds and sods" fighting groups helped to drive the nails into the coffin.
I actually disagree. Something which is ignored here is that had the 82nd landed a battalion north of Nijmegen bridge, it would have faced an SS panzer division almost right away, and there is a good chance the airborne troops would have been mauled, if not annihilated. Even if they had held on, odds are the Germans would have shelled the bridge and destroyed it. The only way to have prevented this would have been for the British paratroopers to have landed south of Arnhem bridge. That way they could have taken the bridge (hopefully), secured resupply drop zones and prevented any advance on Nijmegen bridge. However, as Roger Whittaker says, "I don't believe in IF anymore".
What puzzles me is that Gavin got away with a plan that didn't go for the bridge immediately. Hook up of XXX corps with 82nd at Grave was in the morning of 19th sept and the Guards could have reached 2nd Para if the Waal bridge was in possession. All bridges where troops landed near were taken.
Student held the island of IJsselmonde in 1940 with few troops. A landing on the Island between Rhine and Waal may have been a good option.
The plan was to get the Guards to Arnhem fast and without a fight. Perhaps that was why they didn't worry about the depleted German Panzerdivisions.
I have to agree, and attempts to have a coup de main assault on the Nijmegen highway bridge were cancelled or dismissed. In the first instance, Browning had planned dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, for Operation COMET using D Companies of the three battalions of 1st Airlanding Brigade. The lead Glider Pilot for the Nijmegen mission was to be the same man who led Operation DEADSTICK in Normandy on D-Day to secure the Orne canal 'Pegasus Bridge', Sergeant Jim Wallwork. This operation was planned for 8 September, delayed by weather until 10 September, when it was cancelled by Montgomery as troops were boarding the aircraft after he had received intelligence on the II.SS-Panzerkorps moving into the Arnhem area.
Montgomery proposed instead an upgraded operation (provisionally called SIXTEEN, then later MARKET GARDEN) involving three divisions instead of just British 1st Airborne and the attached Polish Brigade by adding the two US Airborne Divisions to hold the corridor between Eindhoven and Nijmegen. This would enable the British and Poles to concentrate at Arnhem with their superior anti-tank gun assets, 83 guns in total. This necessitated turning over the planning to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army, and he removed some of the key features of Browning's COMET plan. This was thought necessary because the US air assets had reduced capabilities - fewer trained night navigators that forced a single daylight lift instead of double lifts on the first day, and US glider pilots were not combat trained for direct assaults like their British counterparts.
The glider assaults on the bridges were also deemed to be too risky for broad daylight, but Browning had warned during the COMET planning that the operation should not go ahead without the planned dawn raids. He was unable to protest Brereton's changes because he had already been politically neuralised over the Operation LINNET II affair, in which he threatened to resign because Brereton had planned the operation with too little notice to print and distribute maps for the troops. Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation. Fortunately, the operation was cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning could hardly threaten resignation again, knowning what would happen if he did. It may have been this episode that persuaded Browning that if he could not influence the planning then he would try to influence events on the ground by taking his Corps HQ to Groesbeek on the first lift - it is known that this decision was a last minute change to the MARKET glider lift schedules.
For MARKET the 82nd Airborne were assigned to the Nijmegen and Grave sector and they were briefed by 1st Airborne Division planners who had already spent a week studying the same area for COMET. According to Cornelius Ryan's 1967 interview with General James Gavin for his book, A Bridge Too Far (1974), "the British" requested that a battalion be dropped north of the Nijmegen highway bridge to secure it by coup de main, and after toying with the idea, Gavin eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily. There, the USAAF were panicked by Flak and dropped his 505th Regiment over a huge area, so Gavin landed with just four or five men to command. He said the whole division was disorganised for days. He decided instead to land his troops concentrated on three main drop zones as a power centre and then fan outwards to secure the objectives. At Grave, 504th PIR CO Colonel Reuben Tucker - a veteran of Sicily and Anzio - insisted on a special drop zone south of the Grave bridge for one company and he got it, but there were no other coup de main provisions made by the US Airborne for MARKET.
Gavin therefore instructed the 508th PIR to secure the vital Groesbeek heights as their initial objective to protect the landing zones from a counter-attack from Nijmegen, and only if this went well to send the 1st Battalion on to the highway bridgeas soon as possible. Unfortunately, the 508th CO was a poor field commander and did not understand the importance of securing the bridge quickly and delayed sending the battalion, only sending a small pre-planned recon patrol instead. This was in spite of being met at De Ploeg (1st Battalion objective on the Groesbeek ridge) by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees, who told him the Germans had evacuated the city and left only an NCO and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge. It was for this reason the 508th lost the race to secure the bridge to elements of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division, compromising the entire operation and sealing the fate of 1st Airborne at Arnhem.
@@davemac1197Thanks you helped solve the puzzle; you said “Montgomery instead proposed an upgraded operation (called Operation SIXTEEN)”. Checking the original Op SIXTEEN mission for the Nijmegen - Grave which was originally for the 101st; it said quote “Will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave with the same objective in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosebeek is imperative in order to accomplish the Division’s task”. This is exactly the same wording for Browning’s Operational Instruction No.1.
Thus Montgomery originally considered the high ground “imperative to accomplish the division’s task”. What does imperative mean?
@@jbjones1957 - the Oxford dictionary definition of "imperative" is "of vital importance; crucial."
I still think this all came out of Browning's planning for COMET and not Montgomery. Montgomery did often involve himself in Dempsey's 2nd Army operations planning, but down to divisional level I don't think he was involved at all. My understanding of military command structures - and I'm fully prepared to be corrected by serving or veteran officers - is that commanders concerned themselves no more than two levels below their own command, so for Montgomery as an Army Group commander he would be working with Dempsey's 2nd Army staff to plan the Corps operations of XXX, VIII and XII Corps, and for the I Airborne Corps component he had meetings directly with Browning.
There's plenty of documented evidence Browning had the view the Groesbeek heights were critical but not a word from Montgomery on this. I wouldn't expect there to be, but it doesn't really make much difference because Browning and Gavin seem to have been in agreement and there was no apparent discord on this point. The heights were an operational concern for 82nd Airborne (and previously 1st Airborne Division for COMET).
With regard to what went wrong at Nijmegen, the issues are the planning compromises - the removal of COMET's dawn glider coup de main assault, the British request (Cornelius Ryan's interview notes with Gavin does not state who specifically) to drop a parachute battalion north of the bridge as an alternative, and the assignment of the 508th PIR to the Nijmegen mission instead of the more experienced and aggressive 505th. The issue on the ground was then the command failure at the top of the 508th in not following Gavin's pre-flight instruction, the instruction is again well-documented, and more recently backed by witnesses to the briefing published in books by John McManus and Phil Nordyke. The bridge was not de-prioritised until after the first belated attempt to secure the bridge in the evening of D-Day, 17 September, had already failed. Browning then overruled Gavin on trying again until the tanks of XXX Corps arrived.
@@davemac1197 I may have been harsh by saying directly it was Montgomery but he was there with Dempsey and Browning, and as senior commander he signed off and acknowledged that plan at his headquarters. It is interesting that Montgomery (so far that I’ve read) didn’t observe that the heights were a mistake or that the conduct of operations were a negative.
I view that the senior Allied commanders were in agreement over the heights. The use of gliders for coup de main, was not a capability for American Airborne forces and it was employed as a transport asset rather than a assault asset.
Gavin certainly has major failings and he played his cards very safe as a new divisional commander. Dropping north of the Waal has high risk rewards with potential high casualties or failure; I can see pros and cons. [edit: since reading that interview with Ryan and the parachute coup de main suggested by the British (likely Browning) then Gavin should have attempted that coup de main] It’s similar to the scenario if 1st Parachute Brigade dropped on DZ K south of Arnhem Bridge. The Lindquist affair, I agree with. Since, I’ve read more about Browning, I don’t see him as a villain and can observe the military logic in his thinking. So Browning is probably correct to conserve forces, dig in and wait for 30 Corps, given the situation Browning had knowledge on at the time. We have hindsight, Browning didn’t.
@@jbjones1957 - a lot of interesting points, I'll try to take in turn.
I think the priorities of the bridge versus ridge at Nijmegen is not really an issue as I think everyone down to Gavin inclusive was (or probably would be if you include Montgomery) in agreement. By far the best historical analysis I've read on this issue is by American historian John McManus in September Hope (2012), and I have posted the full page of that analysis before in other threads, but I haven't done so here. Hopefully you've seen it in one of the other threads. If not, I can easily post it again.
What went wrong was a command failure below Gavin, in the 508th PIR, and Phil Nordyke's combat history of the regiment gives very interesting background in his chapters on formation of the regiment and first combat operation in Normandy. Interesting that Nordyke is not a full-time historian, he's actually a computer consultant like myself and just seems to have a particular interest in the 82nd Airborne, writing many books on it, and three regimental histories. I believe he's the 'official historian' of the 505th. His style seems to be to give the facts and first hand accounts, even if they seem conflicting, and let the reader make their own judgement.
Browning is an interesting one. Having grown up with the conventional narrative that Montgomery and Browning were the villains of this drama (I first read Cornelius Ryan at age 15, borrowed from a school friend), it has been interesting how my opinion has changed over the years from further reading. The most remarkable thing I find about him is that his judgement seems to have been borne out time and again. He was absolutely dead-on when he first (allegedly) said to Montgomery "we can hold it [the Arnhem bridge] for four [days], but sir, I think we may be going a bridge too far." The second part may be a reference to the fact his own preference was for Wesel as the target instead of Arnhem, and this would have meant one less major river to cross.
Browning is often criticised for not having led airborne troops in combat before, but this is disingenuous. He was decorated as a junior officer in WW1, receiving a DSO (Distinguished Service Order) for taking command of three companies that had lost their officers while still only a Lieutenent himself. According to his Wiki page - 'the order was generally given to officers in command, above the rank of captain. When a junior officer like Browning, who was still only a lieutenant, was awarded the DSO, this was often regarded as an acknowledgement that the officer had only just missed out on being awarded the Victoria Cross.' In 1940, he was a Brigadier in command of 128 Brigade of 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, which was a territorial (reserve) unit being mobilised to join the BEF, but the move was cancelled when the French collapsed. He then led the formation of the British Airborne and could draw on the experience of all of its commanders who had been in action before MARKET GARDEN.
Browning was criticised for dismissing the only aerial photo image of German armour in the Arnhem area, a key scene in the film version of A Bridge Too Far, but I think his judgement was again spot on after the missing photo recently emerged from a Dutch government archive and analysed. The photo does indeed appear to show obsolete tanks, and we now know they did not belong to II.SS-Panzerkorps and the unit is now identified as a training unit that were camped opposite the 506th PIR's drop zone at Wolfswinkel, north of Son in the 101st Airborne sector. The tanks attempted to interfere with the 506th's landing but were shot up by escorting USAAF fighter aircraft. Cornelius Ryan's telling of this episode rested entirely on interviewing Corps Intelligence officer Major Brian Urquhart (Browning had already passed away). Major is a GSO 2 staff position - the Corps didn't appear to have a GSO 1 (Lieutenent Colonel) for Intelligence, so newspaperman Ryan appears not to appreciate the young Major was probably out of his depth at this level and Browning was a cooler head showing some judgement rather than gung ho for the operation as the film seems to suggest. Browning's widow is well known to have been deeply upset by the film's protrayal, and although Dirk Bogarde also knew Browning personally (he was on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff ironically selecting bombing targets from RAF aerial photos) he appears to have opted to mitigate the script by playing the character as conflicted instead of turning down the role to have another actor take the part.
Browning's third major criticism was the decision (presumably his own) to take his Airborne Corps HQ to Groesbeek on the first lift, which required taking 38 glider tugs from other possible glider loads. First speculation that they were taken from the second half of the 2nd (Airlanding) Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, but this appears to be incorrect. The changes actually affected some of the anti-tank units going to Arnhem instead. Either way, a study of the anti-tank resources in action at Arnhem and the South Staffords' role can both demonstrate that the outcome at Arnhem would not have been changed if the glider schedule had not been changed. The most interesting thing about this is the fact the changes were made at a late stage, so Browning had not planned to go to Groesbeek on the first lift right from the start, it was a late change. It was so late in fact that some of my books have incorrect glider data, because the books were based on the planned allocation of Chalk Numbers and not actual, and the official records were not updated with the changes. This is specifically described in the recent volumes on 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery: A-Z Troop volumes, by Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, and Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022). Some of their data is speculative because it has been reconstructed to take account of the late changes. The problem here is that we don't really know the reason for the late change (unless it's in a book I haven't read, like Mead's biography of Browning). It seems likely to me that it was in his judgement the best way he could influcence events, after he had been politically neutralised by Brereton in objecting to planning aspects in the LINNET II affair. Even Gavin was frustrated by 1st AAA's unwillingness to adjust the air plan devised for LINNET/LINNET II in order to adapt it for MARKET's requirements on the ground, and that also seems to be the main reason some of COMET's key features were removed.
Was Market Garden a mistake? Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
f schiller it was a small risk with a potentially high reward.
A plan that probably would have worked, would it have been the other way around.
Marry Christmas the surprise factor, which is what you are referring to, is almost always succesfull.
Attack is easier than defense.
If you can attack, in an unexpected manner, and strike your enemy unprepared you can easily beat larger forces with very small units.
Its common sense.
The german military won the war against france bcs they attacked differently than was expected.
You can see the quality in an army from top to bottom when it comes to operations such like this.
How well planned?
How well improvised in action?
Or in the reaction.
What did the opponents do after the surprise?
How quickly could they organize themselves and start a counter offensive or set up defenses?
The problem was Gavin did go for the hills and forgot the dam bridge. Its the Bridges stupid.
@@Mulberry2000 "Alright, guys, we've almost secured our LZ and we're about ready to move on the br-OHMYGOD SOMETHING JUST MOVED IN THE TREES KILL IT KILL IT"
-Gavin, as his men dump thousands of rounds into half a dozen Germans in wheelchairs, only one of which has a gun
This "plan" is the reason I find Montgomerry a war criminal - in Russia, after such "excellent" plans and a battle, he would be simply shot at dawn as a traitor and German spy. Neverthless - he manage to waist so much Allied war effort... so many lives - achieving NULL
Wow, this is so amazing! I appreciate your work so much! You are one of the best online historians I know! :D
I blame Gavin. I was an 82nd trooper and graduate of combined arms and services course. Mission secure the bridge in order to allow thirty corps to get across the Rhine. My hero became a turd
When the British paratroopers at the Arnhem bridge gave up, the Germans immediately started to move troops from Arnhem towards Elst to strengthen a blocking line between Arnhem and Nijmegen.
When the 82 took the Nijmegen bridges, the XXX corps didn't move northwards. Why were they not ready for that? Especially since the 82nd were late to take the bridges? XXX corps had had plenty of time to prepare a task force to move northwards.
To blame only Gavin for the failure av Market Garden is not fair.
@@ErikExeu I don't blame him for everything. But as a field grade officer I find him grossly negligent for not going for the bridge the first day first thing. Task take the bridge in order to allow 30 corp to move to Arnhem. He failed to focus on his primary task. Look at the time line if they didn't have to fight for that bridge It changes things
@@stewartorr1939 Correct, you didn't, but this youturbe clipp does (it is the conclusion in the last 10 minutes). I agree Gavin should have prioritised the bridges over Wahl, and he didn't. Then acting corps commander Browning should have interfered, and he didn't. So the bridges were taken late, but XXX corps were still not ready to proceed northwards. XXX corps didn't follow Monty's plan and delayed the offensive even more by staying another night in Nijmegen. And as I wrote earlier, Monty's plan to let a corps attack along one single road, with the three divisions located after each other (and with no flank protection , was not a good plan.
Hence, I do not agree with "TIKhistory" that Gavin is "the one" to blame.
Of course you do you are and inbred british subject.Why was churchill under FDRs desk at the Whitehouse instead of Whitehall
@@stewartorr1939 - Brereton and Williams are responsible for deleting the double D-Day airlift and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges from Browning's COMET plan for MARKET, and Browning was unable to protest because he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's LINNET II operation scheduled at too short notice. LINNET II was fortunately cancelled, but Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps.
Sources:
The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in northwest Europe, 1944 (Roger Cirillo PhD Thesis, 2001 Cranfield University, College of Defence Technology, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis)
Little Sense Of Urgency - an operation Market Garden fact book, RG Poulussen (2014)
Gavin was also responsible for his own divisional plan, including toying with and eventually dismissing a British request (presumably Browning's) to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge to take it by coup de main, because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop. He then assigned his weakest regimental commander, Colonel Lindquist of the 508th PIR - who had not performed well in Normandy, to the critical Nijmegen mission instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th. Gavin obviously thought it sufficient to instruct Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the Nijmegen highway bridge immediately after landing, so Gavin and Browning did prioritise the bridge and see McManus for the best analysis on the whole bridge versus ridge debate.
Sources:
Letter General Gavin to Historical Officer Captain Westover, 17 July 1945 (Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen 2011)
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012)
Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)
The fact is Lindquist failed to carry out this instruction, despite receiving a personal report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at the initial objective on the Groesbeek ridge, that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left the highway bridge guarded by a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men. He instead continued with his own plan to send a recon patrol based on a rifle platoon and the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section. He reported back to Gavin that he was not sending the battalion until the DZ was cleared. On hearing this, Gavin drove to the 508th CP, telling Lindquist "I told you to move with speed", at about the same the SS were arriving in Nijmegen. It then took another two hours to get A and B Companies out of their extended defensive positions along the Groesbeek ridge and moving into the city.
Source:
Nordyke (op cit, 2012)
The patrol got split up in the crowds of Dutch civilians and only the three-man point team from S-2 reached the bridge, took seven surprised prisoners at the south end without firing a shot, and waited an hour until dark for reinforcements that never arrived. They decided to withdraw and as they were leaving heard "heavy equipment" (SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 with about 30 armoured vehicles) arriving at the other end.
Source:
The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), Chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge
Essential background on Lindquist's poor performance in Normandy:
Nordyke (op cit, 2012), Chapters 3 and 8.
Gavin also talked about his and Matthew Ridgway's views on Lindquist in his interview with Cornelius Ryan (op cit, Cornelius Ryan Collection)
The German side of the Nijmegen bridge story, both reinforcement and attempted demolition, based on the diary of SS-Untersturmführer Gernot Traupel, who was acting adjutant to Kampfgruppe Reinhold (II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) is in Chapter 4 of Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of the Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2014).
The only reason TIK didn't mention these other aspects, I'm sure, is because he hasn't drilled down to Nordyke's regimental histories or read Cirillo's thesis on command aspects or it seems, Cornelius Ryan's notes on Gavin's interview. The Gerritsen and Revell book is a specialist publication I doubt many people have read. I think TIK is on the right track as far as he's gone, but you can go a lot deeper with more references and it only reinforces his video.
Rewatched this again, and from this, I have some conclusions:
1. The plan was ambitious but not impossible.
2. The RAF Sabotaged the plan by not doing two flights of troops in one day, the delays later should have been assumed ( with British weather), and crews should of been in place to take over the next wave.
3. For some reason, in an operation that could only work by keeping the bridges intact, the Nijmegen bridge wasn't taken, which is a baffling decision. It was only by luck, that the explosives didn't go off, and make this whole thing not just a loss, but a disaster. First airborne and the poles would all have been lost!
4. The drop zones, around Arnhem, were bizarre (again RAF saying they couldn't drop 1st where the poles were meant 2 drops), if they had been dropped on the south bank. They would have controlled the bridge which would have definitely worried the Germans more. Even with the tanks coming in later on, they still had a better chance all being together in Arnhem, in street-to-street fighting, where the tanks would have struggled more.
5. Any anti-tank equipment possible, should have been taken with the 1st, it seems like everyone who knew about the tanks wanted to just ignore the facts. With the rush to get everything going so quickly, barely anyone wanted to rock the boat.
6. The equipment not being tested beforehand, with the radios not working, resulted in zero communication and as a result, zero cooperation. With the radios working the supplies coming in could be redirected, and again, giving the 1st a fighting chance.
I know this is long but, in final conclusion, I believe the plan would have worked with better preplanning, with the officer's personal grudges and issues causing most of these problems. As a result, some of the best troops of the Allies were lost in amazingly brave, but sadly futile fighting. I believe the plan may have not been approved without Arnhem Bridge being included, this is because it allowed the rest of the plan, intending to shorten the war. (Apologies, if I made any mistakes, wrote this up in one go with my raw thoughts)
I can help out with some of your questions.
1. I wholeheartedly agree with you, and that's why it was attempted and not cancelled like all the post-war armchair tacticians suggest.
2. The RAF were happy with the original Operation Comet plan to conduct two airlifts on the first day - one at dawn and the second in the afternoon. They were also happy with the proposed glider coup de main attacks on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave highway bridges, with 6 gliders each, carrying one company from each of the three Airlanding battalions in 1st Airlanding Brigade. These were modelled on the highly successful Pegasus Bridge coup de main in Normandy on D-Day and Staff Sergeant Jm Wallwork, who flew the lead glider on that mission, was due to lead the Nijmegen bridge attack.
After weather delayed Comet from 8 to 10 September, Montgomery cancelled Comet on the morning of 10 September, because of the worsening intelligence picture, and met with Eisenhower later that afternoon to propose an upgrade called Market Garden with the two American Airborne divisions added, so 1st Airborne could concentrate at Arnhem. The detailed planning, which basically combined the ground plan for Comet with the three-division air plan from the cancelled Linnet II operation, would have to be undertaken by 1st Allied Airborne Army instead of being an all-British Airborne Corps affair. Because the larger air plan depended on every aircraft being available and losses kept to an absolute minimum, General Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command objected to the double airlift and also the glider coup de main attacks for fear of losses due to Flak. General Lewis Brereton of 1st AAA backed him up and so the RAF's approval of the Comet plan was moot, despite it being their aircrews that towed the gliders and the release points were on the ground tracks for the main drop zones and 6 Km from the bridges.
The weather requirement was for two days of clear weather, which was enough to get three airlifts in on the Comet plan. When Market was scheduled for 17 September, they had two days forecast as clear and then unpredictable (mixed) thereafter.
3. This is where the conventional narrative on Market Garden has been wrong for decades. Since Cornelius Ryan published A Bridge Too Far, it has been believed the Groesbeek heights were prioritised before the Nijmegen highway bridge, or given equal priority and there was a communications breakdown within the 82nd Airborne. Recent research has brought to light that Gavin actually instructed the commander of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to send one battalion straight to the bridge as soon as practical after landing, and if there was little or no resistance on his initial Groesbeek ridge objectives. This he failed to do, believing he had to wait for a divisional order to move on the bridge, and by the time Gavin found out and go him moving, it was too late and they lost the race to elements of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division coming down from Arnhem on the first evening. The regiment had similar command problems in Normandy and I recommend 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) - for both the Normandy and Nijmegen stories.
After the war, it seems that Gavin was reluctant to throw a subordinate officer under the bus and took much of the responsibility on his own shoulders, even co-opting the help of Browning in correspondence to muddy the waters with regards to the bridge vs high ground priorities.
The Nijmegen highway bridge was not prepared for demolition on the first day, although the explosive charges were stored in rooms inside the bridge piers and a local 'Schutzgruppe' of ethnic German NSDAP militia were drilled every month to wire up the bridge charges under the supervision of an engineer officer from von Tettau's Pionier staff at the WBN (occupation forces Netherlands). On 17 September, the NSDAP Shutzgruppe failed to show up and the officer could do nothing alone until 1./SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 10 arrived the next day as part of Kampfgruppe Reinhold and started immediately to work. The charges probably failed to go off on 20 September due to artillery fire cutting the lines, but it's not known for certain. The Dutch believe a local resistance hero cut the wires, and this seems quite possible, but engineers usually test firing circuits at regular intervals and any breaks repaired.
4. The original Polish Drop Zone 'K' near the Arnhem highway bridge was not suitable for the first day because it was flanked by two of the four heavy batteries of gemischte Flak-Abteilung 591 that surrounded Arnhem on four sides. The zone was also crossed by high tension lines (!) from the Arnhem power station just southeast of the bridge. It was assumed in the planning that 1st Parachute Brigade would control the area by D+2 when the Poles were due, and so the Flak would be neutralised and the HT lines cut. The power station was also the RV for all four squadrons and companies of the Royal Engineers after their initial tasks were completed, and they would be in control of the power station. The intended role of the Polish Brigade was to pass over the bridge and take up their allotted eastern sector of the planned divisional perimeter around Arnhem.
5. There are no anti-tank guns seen at Arnhem in the Hollywood film, perhaps because they were not available for filming, but more likely because they wouldn't help Richard Attenborough's deliberate intention to portray the 1st Airborne Division as ill-equipped and the planners incompetent in his "anti-war film". Neither was actually true. The Division took 52 x 6-pounder and 16 x 17-pounder anti-tank guns to Arnhem. The Polish Brigade also had their own Anti-Tank Squadron with 4 Troops of 4 x 6-pounder guns, but they elected to reorganise them as 3 Troops of 5 guns taken by air, and the spare gun was probably in the Brigade 'sea tail' arriving by road (9 men are documented on the Squadron sea tail roster). That gives you a total of 83 anti-tank guns taken by air, or 84 if you count the Polish spare gun. By a stunning coincidence, Generalfeldmarshal Model had exactly 84 operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B front in September, facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 tanks in Belgium and Hodges' US 1st Army with I don't know how many tanks at Aachen. The Allies' optimism going in to Market Garden was well founded.
6. There are myths associated with the radios as well. The 'wrong cystals' only affected two VHF radio sets sent to Arnhem and they belonged to the two teams from the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron for contacting aircraft. All the British sets were working properly, but at much reduced ranges, and this was not understood at the time. The reason was the high iron content in the glacial moraine of the Veluwe high ground, and I believe this still affects police radios and TV/radio reception today. The worst affected were the battalion communications net as the distances involved were marginal for even the normal working ranges, but although the more powerful Royal Artillery sets were also affected they were still working over the ranges required to contact the gun batteries, so the pack howitzer batteries in Oosterbeek were able to support the 1st Parachute Brigade at the bridge - something also not shown in the film, of course. Both the British and US Airborne forces used the American made hand-held SCR-536 (actually called the "handie-talkie") in platoon communications and found it to be virtually useless unless you were almost in line of sight and were not popular. One of the reasons why Frost used a hunting horn!
Probably the best recent work that debunks the many myths in the film is Swedish historian Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020), using unpublished documents and interviews in the Cornelius Ryan Collection held at Ohio State university.
Hope this has been helpful.
@@davemac1197 Ye thanks, but wasn’t really questions, was conclusions based off this information in the market garden series.
@@jacobgorman3145 - I wanted to offer corrections on the role of the RAF, but on all of the points you raised the information's out there and the Market Garden research rabbit hole runs very deep. I've been reading on this for 46 years (since reading Cornelius Ryan before the film was released) and I think the first rule of research is not to stop digging when you think you have found the answer - and that's a criticism directed not so much at people reading the comments on UA-cam videos, but to historians and professional authors.
TIK has done a terrific job in challenging the conventional narrative and he is right to be focussing in his later videos on Gavin and the 82nd Airborne. He hasn't drilled down to regimental level on the blunder at Nijmegen, which is why I would recommend anyone interested in this to read 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's regimental combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), because most books on Market Garden as a whole don't even reference it - they are so wedded to the conventional narrative.
@@davemac1197 so you disagree with the series?
@@jacobgorman3145 - actually no, but TIK hasn't gone as deep to drill down to the problems within the 508th PIR. They actually go back to Normandy and the formation of the regiment.
TIK obviously reads a collossal number of books, on Stalingrad, Hitler and National Socialism etc., as many books perhaps as I have on Market Garden alone, as I don't have more than a passing interest in some of his other topics.
He's correctly identified Nijmegen as the key to understanding what went wrong with Market Garden, but Gavin being responsible is as far as he's got with the books he has used. One of his recommended books is Lost At Nijmegen by Dutch researcher RG Poulussen, which was probably the first to break into this area, and the post war documentaion of corresponsdence between Gavin and Browning, which is inconclusive and obviously written after the fact, is as far as he went.
Nordyke's book on the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) and also John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012) were both published in the same year and do not reference each other, but they independently interviewed witnesses to Gavin's divisional briefing and testified to the clear instructions he gave to the 508th's CO to send a battalion directly to the bridge. Nordyke's witness is Captain Chet Graham, the 508th HQ Company CO and liaison to Division HQ, and McManus has an account from Division G-3 (Operations Officer) Jack Norton, who both sat in on the briefing.
The weird thing about McManus is that he appears to be an excellent historian, unearthing the true story and presenting a detailed narrative of events on what went wrong, but where he differs from Nordyke is that he then offers a personal opinion that it was still Montgomery's fault for coming up with the idea in the first place, which is a common American complaint I call the 'too difficult' excuse.
In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan, Gavin did touch on the internal politics within the 82nd Airborne, but did not expand on it and the story did not make it into Ryan's book. The whole Nijmegen story on the first day is inconspicuous by its absence from the book and more publicly in the film, where the implication is that the bridge at Nijmegen was strongly held by the Germans from the get go, but this is not true. In fact the film does show Bittrich (Maximillian Schell) giving Ludwig (Hardy Krüger) orders to get to Nijmegen, which is correct - the SS panzer troops were not already there, but they did win the race against the too slow 508th to reinforce the bridges and the city.
Excellent presentation. I am pleased you have exploded some of the myths. Unfortunately most people see the movie and assume that that was how it happened.
I love your videos Lewis. I binge watch your videos constantly. The Marget Garden series is my favorite. I share these vids with all my friends
Gavin had one job...
..and he could not do that right. He could have wanked on the bridge whistling Dixie.
Market Garden suffered from the same problem the Japanese had throughout ww2, in that plans that were too elegant with too many moving pieces depending on unalterable timetables.
WW2 seemed mountains of technological evolution from WW1, but the truth is that for most combatants, there was still a need for horse drawn supplies, and battalion (and below) runners to keep communications going.
From the start, I believe 1 BR AIRBORNE had no usable/workable radios. Something about crystals and the low altitude of Dutch landscape if I remember it right. So, there's your farthest force, isolated, dropped 10+ miles from its objective, onto 2 (depleted) German SS armor formations, facing Model and Student, with no air cover, and some rather bullshit reactions from the air people about pilot exhaustion and inability to ground support, with no communications from Day 1.
It's a miracle it didn't end worse than it did, honestly. Likely the Dutch resistance might have helped out. But the US and Britain basically are mailing it in by this point, hoping the minor allies are the units to be bloodlet. So Poles get massacred and the Canucks gotta walk thru the Scheldt Estuary.
We could not 'tire' the pilots to support any more than they did. Might lose some, and that's unthinkable.
This was a way-too-compllicated plan, with way too many parts, poor intel and absolutely a bungle of support. Seems almost like the Allies didn't think it would work anyway, and gave it half-assed support from the start.
Rob Nelson everybody has a plan. then they get hit in the face. Mike Tyson.
Market Garden failed by a whisker. The unforgivable failure point was Gavin of the US 82nd at Nijmegen.
@Gazzara5 Read The Villa Aston's John Cornell's and my post on this vid. Also look at TIKs full Market Garden vid, Gavin and the US 82nd *failed* to seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately on landing, allowing the Germans to seize the bridge and pour men into Nijmegen. They were hanging around not moving towards the bridge.
XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen just ahead of schedule expecting to roll over the bridge to Arnhem, instead they saw the bridge still in German hands with fighting in Nijmegen town. They then had to take the bridge themselves and clear out Nijmegen town using the 82nd men as support. Once XXX Corps entered a para zone they went under XXX Corps control.
XXX Corps took the bridge meeting the US 82nd men 1 km north in Lent. *Do not go by Hollywood history and poor History Channel documentaries.*
@@johnburns4017 Gavin was hurt (I know) in his spine, but his lack of leadership and insight cost the allies the operation.
In addition to a very complex plan with numerous critical paths, the failure of any one could have been disaster for the plan. Where were the failures (Not in order of worst, I think that is #4, air support)? 1. Failure to immediately take the Nijmegen - Gavin, and Browning for not stopping the decision (note, if they had taken it, could they have held it against 10th SS Panzer and others?). 2. Not understanding the intelligence on the strong German presence (compared to the defeated foe portrayed) so Browning. 3. Arnhem landing areas remote from target, so Brit 1st Airborne command for not fighting it 'till they were fired & Browning. 3. Reducing transports to Arnhem, so Browning. 4. US Air Corps for abandoning a critical battle with barely armed troops desperately in need of air support.
Operation Market Garden is a bit like a Japanese navy plan in being more complicated than is likely to be able to be executed as necessary.
Good comparison.
Agreed. It was far to complex to take on with as little time they had to plan and prepare.
I wouldn't even say it was complex, just really failure prone.
The plan was basically: create an armored spearhead and push it across Rhine by the means of these exact brodges our paratroopers woupd take beforehand.
I'm sure the exact road was carefully choosen, but it seems like noone ever asked "what if it won't go exactly as planned" and I don't mean "let's create an ungodly amount of just-in-case plans", but "just assume that plan worked in 80% and just one of the bridges went boom, can the plan be in any way succesful then, even by some absurd means?". The answer was clear no, some bridges had alternatives or could be rebuild quick enough, but Nijmegen had to be taken or whole plan was useless. They had no alternative route around it, no ideas how to deal with, for example, desperate artillery destroying it as the last attempt at destroying the spearhead, nothing. They just assumed that they would take the bridge and fortify it enough to ensure it's survival. At the same time thinking there's shittone of tanks just next to it. Like, c'mon, it didn't occur to anyone that either they need way larger force to secure it immediatly while fighting the supposed tanks or have a solid alternative plan for the operation to hold any water? Even Anhem forces after it became clear they won't take any of the bridges came up with an alternative plan with the oppurtinities they came across during their tries. Gavin just sat at his ass and shelled empty forest.
The plan was commited to failure it seems, the fact that Nijmegen bridge didn't blow up was just a roll of a dice. If Germans would succeed at that then the whole operation would be halted and commanders would be just sitting there watching men at Anhem be killed like "Wait, the Germans can blow up a bridge?".
They clearly didn't believe they could drop more men at the most crucial bridge, so they should clearly made that bridge way less crucial for the whole operation. At worst build a metal portable bridge l in pieces that can be dropped few miles of that bridge so that your paratroopers won't have to make a marine attack on German positions.
The whole operation hinged upon the idea that no Plan B will not be needed, they didn't even came up with one, they just assumed that their current plan is perfect and nothing can go wrong. Then nearly everything gone wrong, the only place were it wasn't a shitfest was Som and surroundings and it was just cause they had at least a simple plan B with building replecemnt bridges in quick manner with time that Anhem troops couldn't afford even if all else went according to plan.
I don't Market Garden is all that complicated from a strategic point of view, it is just impossible from a logistical point of view, unless you believe the other side won't fight.
As a historian I appreciate the veracity of the argumentation and the balance in the way was presented. Very well documentated documentary, show not a heroes tale, but the wrong minded decisions military leaders did -and frecuentely did- over the battle field. Arrogance and fear to object chiefs dobtful comands and hide inteligence mistakes, cost many, many lives, including Sosabowski polish comand. Great work as a path to analice not only the war actions, but its human component.
I'll have to agree that the failure to prioritize the capture of Nijmagen bridge was the principle reason that the op failed. That should have been the very first act of the very first paratroops boot that hit the ground. The orders should have been "When you land head for the bridge. Everyone's rally point is ON that bridge. We'll work out the details later." That being said, this is monday morning quarterbacking and none of us were there. Gavin made the decisions he made based on the situation and intelligence he had at the time.
The plan was too ambitious. By dropping all the paratroopers on the same day they telegraphed the entire plan condemning it to failure, and costing unnecessary casualties.
The initial assault by XXX corp suffered 9 tanks destroyed in the first 2 hours, and only resulted in 7 miles of progress on day one.
Day one the only para drop should have been the 101 at Eindhoven. The german reaction would have revealed their strength and drawn more of them from Nijmegen, and possibly Arnhem.
The narrow road would have worked for the allies then, and air/ground attack aircraft could have reduced the german movement.
On Day two the 82nd should have been dropped depending on the german reaction to day one. Why send them on Day 1 and expect them to hold the bridges a day longer suffering casualties the whole time.
Same with Arnhem. Why drop them on Day one? It made no sense.
They should have LEAP frogged XXX corps progress in multiple hops spread out over 3 or 4 days..That would have eliminated the transport and communication problems, and each drop would have acted as 3 separate diversions to expose the german forces, while confusing them. (Patton style.)
The plan was the cause of the failure, and that fault lies on one person. Montgomery!
To try blaming this on Gavin is rediculous.
@@unitedwestand5100 Rubbish your making excuses for the American general - he bottled it. It is not ridiculous. What was his job a Nijmegen, What was his job at Nijmegen, What was his job at Nijmegen? The damn bridge, the damn bridge, the damn bridge. Get it!. Gavin failed and caused the delay, the brits had to help the Americans clear out the town for god's sake.
@@Mulberry2000 Yup! Gavin's job was to grab the bridge, so that an airborne carpet could be laid right up to Arnhem. The Yanks were able to secure Eindhoven bridges. The Brits got and held Arnhem bridge with a fraction of their Division and held on to it for several days. Gavin failed to grab his bridge until after the main advance were long into Nijmegen. Gavin screwed up Market Garden by taking his eye off the most important objective, possibly with Browning's approval. Gavin and Browning might have well played for the German side. They screwed up. Pure and simple.
@@Liendoelcm Browning is irrelevant here because he may have agreed later on when he saw that Gavin has screwed up. The point is, Gavin was given the mission, get the bridge, get the bridge. He landed and for many hours did not bother to get it. By the time Browning arrived complete surprise had been lost and the chance of getting the Bridge. The whole operation depended on the first drop of American paratroopers and its surprise. In fact, Nijmegen was the most important bridge of Market Garden, not Arnhem.
The Americans screwed up, and for 75 years, the US government and lazy historians blamed the Brits for the failure of MG. Did you see the scene in the movie a Bridge too Far, where an American was lecturing a brit tank commander1 The American was livid that the brits would not move on, and was having a cup of tea. The Tank commander said he cannot move due his troops were still fighting in Nijmegen. That part of the movie held the key to why the whole operation failed. No British soldiers should have been fighting in the city, it should have been captured by the Americans before XXX corp had arrived. So the American was full of crap.
The Brits and Browning thought there were no tanks around and there were partly correct - they were at Arnhem. Gavin thought a thousand tanks were in the woods nearby his landing zone without any evidence whatsoever. A thousand tanks make a lot of noise and need a lot of support plus troops. Also, they cause massive disruption to the woods and the countryside. Yet Gavin still believed in the phantom tanks.
Gavin bottled it.
@@Mulberry2000 Ok..I agree it came down to Gavin to grab the bridge asap, and that he failed to do, but still think Browning should have been stomping all over him for not doing so at the outset!. Next thing is A Bridge Too Far should be redone telling the truth of the matter! An excellent explanation of Market Garden BTW.