This was thought provoking. Considering that a lot of skeptics come at the PoE from a utilitarian view, as you’ve also said, this theodicy works against the very “presupposition”. Great job A2!
I'm a utilitarian and I think this was a misrepresentation of utilitarianism. No utilitarian believes that torturing 9 people is ok as long as you also help 10 people out. Utilitarianism is about the minimization of suffering and the maximization of pleasure, not about the maximization of utility (at least not about the maximization of utility you talk about in the vid). Most utilitarians would reject that the maximizing utility is what should be done. Utilitarian ethics are almost always described as consisting in the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of suffering. Minimizing suffering would consist of reducing suffering to 0 and maximizing pleasure would consist of causing as much pleasure as possible. Therefore, a utilitarian God would reduce suffering to 0 and increase pleasure to infinity. He clearly didn't do this so He's therefore not a utilitarian God. This is the most intuitive form of utilitarianism and probably the one most utilitarians hold. I don't know of any utilitarians who accept this type of morally counter-intuitive utilitarianism. This means utilitarians can still use the problem of evil, as most utilitarians who use it probably don't subscribe to this weird new type of normative utilitarian ethics. Even if we grant this flawed definition of utilitarianism, I still have some objections to the real world being equal to pleasure world. Even if for every moment of the afterlife, souls in Hell experienced more suffering than the pleasure experienced in Heaven, given that it's experienced for an infinite amount of time, it's still infinite suffering. Any number times infinity equals infinity. This means there isn't more pleasure than suffering and the real world is therefore worse than pleasure world. A way to get around this would be to say that the infinite amount of pleasure experienced in Heaven is a bigger infinite than the infinite suffering spent in Hell, if we accept that for every spent moment in Hell, less suffering is experienced than pleasure experienced in Heaven. Therefore, the suffering of Hell is a smaller infinite than the pleasure of Heaven, and there's still more pleasure than suffering, making the utility of the real world good. However, this would mean there's a difference between infinities of different sizes when considering utility. However, if the differences between different infinities are relevant when considering an action's utility, then God should've created pleasure world instead of the real world, because the infinity of pleasure in pleasure world is a bigger infinity than the one in the real world. Therefore, if infinities of different sizes aren't relevant differences when calculating utility then the suffering experienced in Hell is equivalent to the pleasure experienced in Heaven, making the utility of the real world 0, infinitely worse than pleasure world. This would mean God would have created pleasure world. If infinities of different sizes are relevant differences when calculating utility, then God woul've created pleasure world, as the infinite pleasure of pleasure world is a bigger infinity than the one in the real world. This means that the real world can't have the same utility as pleasure world. Universalism and annahilitionism (I don't know how to spell it) would be good ways around this. Another thing to consider about Hell and Heaven. To calculate the utility of the real world, we should substract the infinite amount of suffering experienced in Hell to the infinite amount of pleasure experienced in Heaven. Infinity-infinity is impossible, so it's impossible to calculate the utility of the real world, wich means that God couldn't have calculated the utility of the real world before creating it. But, if He didn't calculate the utility of the real world, then creating it was an inmoral act, as calculating the utility of an action is how one determines whether an action is moral or not. This means that God, an infinitely inteligent and omnibenevolent rational being, didn't determine whether or not the action He was about to make was moral or not. That would be morally irresponsable. I'm not so sure about this last bit, but what do you think? Universalism and annahilitionism would again be good ways to around this. I still think this channel is amazing btw. Never stop making vids.
The only coherent way I'm aware to talk about bigger infinites is multiplying infinity to infinity. It's based on a concept of 1-to-1, the easiest example to look up is why all integers is a smaller infinity than all reals. Essentially, there are inf_0 (it's actually called Aleph null, the first transcardinal infinity) integers, and there are also inf_0 reals between 0 and 1, but the reals also continue to extend to 2, 3, 4... This means the reals are a larger infinity, in a significant way. So the only way it seems coherent to say pleasure in heaven outweighs suffering in hell is if heaven has infinite occupants to hells finite occupants. Assuming we ignore everything you said about more refined utilitarianism.
my theodicy is relational. Here expressed as a poem: ORTHOTOPIA In Utopia, the prophet came to warn of hell and wrath; to tell the blest ones, in their joy, they walked a curséd path. ‘You speak of ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’’, the paradise people said. ‘We do not know your words. What is ‘dark’, ‘burned’ and ‘dead’? We cannot believe in your angry god - his judgement and his iron rod.’ In Dystopia, the prophet came to promise eternal peace; to tell the curséd ones in pain of the coming of blest release. ‘You speak to us of ‘joy’ and ‘love’’, perdition’s people said. ‘We do not know your words. What is ‘light’, ‘feast’ and ‘fed’? We cannot believe in your loving god for all we know is an iron rod.’ In Orthotopia, the prophets came to warn and give good news; to tell of curse and blessing. Let them with ears now choose. ‘You speak to us of Heaven and hell,’ said the people who share your fate. ‘We know of pain and pleasure and so we now in truth relate to the words of life and death. Tell us of the One from Nazareth.’
You were using a very raw kind of utilitarianism: hedonistic calculus, the pain and pleasure were totally simetric, the mere addition paradox, you used infinities as a number, etc. Nowadays utilitarianism has an answer for all the problems you raised. Solution within a utilitarian framework: rejecting using hedonistic calculus with infinities (read some current utilitarians, they don't use that, even less with infinity because it leads to paradoxes as you showed), then rely on a asymetry between pain a pleasure. The best possible world within an (real, current and actually held) utilitarian framework would have no pain at all. It was a really fun and challenging video hahaha
I think this argument can handle an asymmetry between pain and pleasure, as ling as our sole obligation is to maximize utility, because the infinity pleasure will always absorb the finite suffering. Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared 1) Using infinities in a hedonistic calculus is really problematic at you can argue that you can do it 2) With some kind of asymetries (like Benatar's), no amount of pleasure can absorb an amount of pain in the case of a life that hasn't started yet. Have a nice day you too :)
I know that this is somewhat of an internal critique, but I think there is a lot of baggage associated with this. It seems that at the cost of defeating the problem of evil, you introduce the idea that whatever universe God creates is just as arbitrary. This seems to eliminate the idea of meaning and purpose in the universe. Just a thought I had after initially watching the video. EDIT: I also think a utilitarian would just reject the idea that you can just add pleasure to pain to get a value to compare possible worlds together. They would probably say that you can split the pleasure and pain metrics. For example, they might say that there are two loosely connected goals of minimizing pain to the greatest extent possible and maximizing pleasure to the greatest extent possible. Looking up the definition of utilitarianism, it would seem that increasing the amount of pain above 0 would only be justified if it increases the maximum amount of pleasure giving a greater outcome overall. However, given the premise you laid out in the video that "there isn't a maximum amount of pleasure", it would seem that there still isn't a good reason to increase the amount of pain from 0. EDIT 2: In other words at 8:50, there would have to be a connection between the two events in order for the ouchie to be justified Utilitarianism is the doctrine that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority. In our case, a possible world with the existence of evil would only be justified if the evil directly increases maximum utility otherwise we are at the same spot as before, still looking for justification for the existence of evil. And once again, with the premise you gave, that there isn't this maximum utility, there is never a justification for evil. Since it is possible to minimize evil, the arbitrariness problem would only fall on maximizing the good of the universe. Hopefully that made sense
// I know that this is somewhat of an internal critique, but I think there is a lot of baggage associated with this. It seems that at the cost of defeating the problem of evil, you introduce the idea that whatever universe God creates is just as arbitrary. // True, but that doesn't make it less true. Just... well, annoying! For your other points, I am a little fuzzy on what you're saying, but here's the best responses I can give based on my understanding. // I also think a utilitarian would just reject the idea that you can just add pleasure to pain to get a value to compare possible worlds together. // Remember, we are looking at which _actions_ maximize utility. When viewing actions, it seems adding up the pleasure and subtracting the pain is exactly what we're supposed to do. It just so happens that in God's case, the actions available to Him *are* the actualization of possible worlds. // Utilitarianism is the doctrine that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority. In our case, a possible world with the existence of evil would only just justified if the evil directly increases maximum utility otherwise we are at the same spot as before, still looking for justification for the existence of evil. // Again, the kind of "action" we are considering is of the form "God actualizes world w." This action cannot occur without ensuring the evils that are in w, but if it is undertaken, then it promotes all the pleasure in world w. // Since it is possible to minimize evil, the arbitrariness problem would only fall on maximizing the good of the universe. // There aren't two kinds of obligations -- minimize pain and maximize pleasure -- but one kind of obligation: maximize utility. This is equally fulfilled by creating one unit of pleasure, or by creating both a unit of pain and two units of pleasure. Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared Thanks for taking time to response to my comment. You seemed to have got the gist of my comment. I guess the problem here is that I am viewing each aspect of our universe as a separate action, each individual component of our universe would also need to maximize utility. In the example you gave, with the ice cream and the stubbed toe, the ice cream increases utility but the stubbed toe doesn't. A utilitarian wouldn't say that torturing someone is fine as long as you create a spa at the same time. The events MUST be connected in order for the torture to be justified. Maybe this is just my misunderstanding of the the doctrine, idk.
@@BrainStormTnT you're correct. Utilitarian would say torture of one is justified if you save a million lives somehow. It's directly linked events and if you would to somehow argue indirect events (like AS has) it wouldn't even make sense from a normal causal standpoint view of ethics/morality.
This is basically the main reason philosophers hate using infinity for good and bad with Util. There’s actually a really big literature talking about infinite bad in regards to existential threats, since they make other factors become trivial. Still funny video
Some versions of utilitarianism hold to an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. For example, David Benatar holds to the view that any amount of pain and suffering, no matter how small, outweighs any pleasure we might experience. This leads him to the conclusion that non existence is better than a life filled with lots of pleasure and a small amount of pain and suffering. His reasoning is basically, we don't feel a negative reaction about all the pleasure being missed out on an uninhabited planet because no one there is experiencing any pleasure, because no one existed in the first place to miss out on anything. Yet we do have a negative reaction to even small amounts of pain and pleasure. Therefore there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain.
Excellent demonstration of the problem of multiobjective optimization. You have two objectives: 1) Minimize suffering, 2) Maximize well-being. How much is it worth to increase suffering for an improved well-being? But i disagree with you that the worlds are equivivalent. Even with your accessment of a 1:1 comparison, a world identical to ours without hell would be a clear improvement since you would cut out infinte and importantly needless suffering. Especially once you consider Luke 13:24, the proportions of people in heaven and hell might be a bit lopsided in the wrong direction for your argument. But yes for any theistic worldview without a concept of infinite suffering in hell, but with heaven, this argument holds true, at least it can not be instantly refuted.
Well, for the first case you consider, there seems to be something intuitively wrong about it. Clearly, if this world was nothing but suffering and torture for a million years, followed by infinite pleasure in heaven, that would be worse than a world where there is just the infinite pleasure in heaven. Maybe the problem is that utilitarianism was never meant to consider infinite utilities, and it needs to be adjusted for them. For your second case, I think what it shows is that it's logically contradictory to have a being that at the same time: - is morally perfect (so it cannot chose a course of action if there's a better course of action available to it) - has the power to create arbitrarily good worlds
I don’t think moral perfection entails that one cannot choose an action if there is a better one. It seems that it only entails that one would never pass up a best course of action. Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared Hmm. That seems very odd. Any reason I can think of for why a morally perfect being wouldn't pass up a best course of action, is also a reason why said being wouldn't choose an action while knowing that there is a better one and having the power to choose the better one. How do you reconcile that?
@@Nickesponja I guess what I have in mind is that a morally perfect being will maximize goodness whenever possible. But in the case of God and xyz other commitments, then maximizing goodness is not possible, so that factor doesn’t come into consideration.
If you use the surreal numbers there actually is a largest number. It's called ON and it's defined as the successor of ON. ON is so big, that adding it to it's negative, OFF, doesn't cancel them out. It shows up in a practical sense in a game where player 1 has infinite moves that don't end the game.
Great video Apologetics , What Do You Think about The modern Quantum Physics and the concept "Ex Nihilo " ( Anything came From Nothing ) and his relation with The existance Of God ?? I'm Sorry for my English , isn't my first language
@mineben256 Right. I'm pointing out that this is a nonsensical comment. QFT doesn't apply to questions of nothing because there is no such thing as nothing in QFT. QFT obviously presupposes it's own existence. Of course God presupposes it's own existence and at that point the question of what constitutes the necessary bedrock of reality is free to open response. I wasn't really commenting on that though.
Ironically I find it most annoying that the theodicy supposes utilitarianism 😅 I just don't see Christian ethics that way. A life lived with heavy suffering but still lived in love and sacrifice, is a better life than one lived in egoism and pleasure. So suffering, at least to some extent, might be a blessing even, in that it is a call for us to live less for ourselves and more in humbleness.
Depends on how you define “arbitrary.” If it means “for no reason,” then that’s false: the reason that motivates God to actualize a world w is the net positive utility in world w. Have a nice day! :)
Few issues. Firstly, the Problem of Evil doesn't necessarily rely upon utilitarianism. It relies on a proposed contradiction with the omnis of a god with the existence of something that can be called "evil" accurately. It works equally well if we consider divine command theory. The problem of suffering, which I'll admit, is tied very strongly to the problem of evil does rest a bit on utilitarianism. But we can table this note for now. Now, I find it a bit interesting that you propose that the god can only choose which worlds to actualize and you don't consider any actions in the conventional sense. It would seem that it can do both and depending on how you consider this god entering into the world. Like the god could make the world as it is now except it constantly acts like a superman in that world. You can say this is the actualization of a different world but it is also the more typical conception of performing an actions. Now. When you try to make the two worlds equal you run into a few issues. First infinity minus a finite amount is a smaller infinity. Or at least under some conceptions if infinity that would be true. On the other hand you didn't actually talk about how the negative infinity of hell factors in. And an issue does crop up when you consider that more are supposed to end up in hell rather than in heaven. So it seems like the hell infinity will be larger than the heaven one. As for best world considerations. If we can consider the reality of infinity then it seems the god could make a best world. One with an infinite number of people receiving infinite pleasure and no pain. Even if you would like to say that there is no best world, your response with arbitrary choices between any is completely incorrect. It would simply be logically impossible to create any world since it is impossible to make a world without a better world. If you ask the god to square a circle it wouldn’t just make any shape because it couldn't do the original task. If we accepted your proposition about arbitraryness as correct then it can make only a "hell" and still be considered "good". Anyway, I know this is old and you're thoughts may have changed. But it really doesn't do what you want it to do.
There is no objective measurement right now. So as I see, the way it works is that people should agree what outcomes correspond to what numbers. Which is super imprecise
Thanks for the video. I've learned about this idea from your other comments and good to see it expanded upon in the video! I have 2 thoughts: 1) Didn't understand how jump (10:02) was made from non-utilitarianism to MUST open the door to some form of Christian values. 2) I think that some arguments and the conclusion (9:40) in particular don't work with Negative utilitarianism 1) Isn't that the black and white fallacy? There might be non-utilitarianism theories not opening the door to some form of Christian values, right? 2) Agree that any amount of pleasure is justified because there can always be more pleasure. But there can't be less than 0 suffering. So it seems to me that "no suffering" is a reasonable condition when choosing a world under Negative utilitarianism framework
Regarding (1): I wasn’t saying that one must go from Utilitarianism to Christian values. However, one must go from Utilitarianism to something else, and Christian values are a candidate: Regarding (2): I assumed for this video that Utilitarianism gives us one obligation: to maximize utility. However, one could argue that, alternatively, we have two obligations. One is to maximize pleasure and one is to minimize suffering, and when in conflict we go with the stronger obligation. This theodicy does seem incompatible with the second form of Utilitarianism (as far as I can tell). However, in the dialectic, I am simply trying to evade the Problem of Evil, so I can use this theodicy as an undercutting defeater of the PoE until an argument for the latter form of Utilitarianism is offered. Have a nice day! :)
Well with annihilationism it wouldn't work because then you would have Pain + annihilation vs. pleasure + annihilation. From a strictly math standpoint it would be -1+0 vs. 1+0.
@@ShouVertica I said that cause I was at the point in the video where he was talking about hell,with annihilationism the pain isnt eternal at all,in fact you dont even require there to be pain at all in annihilationism.while still having the pleasure of eternal heaven
@@tbcop9898 Right but if you are using heaven/hell then both worlds have the same heaven/hell. Otherwise you could just say "heaven vs. world +heaven" and the answer is clear that just heaven would be better.
@@ShouVertica right.and heaven+world vs heaven+hell+world.heaven+hell is better.this also calls into question our assumptions about omnipotence.which is at the heart of the POE.
But how could you say that that Pleasure > Pain in this world? Pain is so much inherent in our world that we barely notice it. For example : We eat to avoid the suffering of hunger , We cloth to avoid the suffering of humiliation , etc. 🤔
If there is no best possible world, then there is a problem with God's omnibenevolence. The most straightforward definition of an omnibenevolent being is one that always does the best possible action in every situation. But, if there is no best possible world, then there is no best possible action when God decides which world to create. Hence, he cannot be omnibenevolent. How would you define omnibenevolence to get around this objection? You could try with a satisficing definition (In the absence of a best possible action, an omnibenevolent being will perform one that is good enough), but then we could get an even more benevolent being by just increasing the arbitrary threshold for what counts as good enough. This is a problem if God is meant to be the greatest possible being, since we could always come up with a possible being that is even greater than God.
"When a person can't find a deep sense of meaning, they distract themselves with pleasure." -Viktor E. Frankl God's focus of the world is meaning, not pleasure. The focus of a writer is a good story, not world void of conflict. In fact, a world void of conflict would be completely lacking in morality, inspiration, and purpose. Atheists have conflated meaning to pleasure because they lack any true sense of meaning. When we die, we cease to be, and even those whom we pour into in our life will die and likewise cease to be. There is no meaning to life at all. So fill it with pleasure, and ridicule a God you disbelieve for not giving you more pleasure. The whole notion of the Problem of Evil is mistaking pleasure as the purpose of life.
Just thinking of counterpoints as I watch the video: 1. According to most Christian stances, the amount of people in Heaven will probably be lower than the amount of people who go to Hell. If only Christians go to Heaven then the amount of people who have ever lived (about 107 billion according to WolframAlpha) is most likely much greater than that population. If we add in the people who lived before Christ (about 46.5 billion I believe) you may get a proportion of a little more than half of the population that has ever lived. However, this would be a liberal stance, because according to the Bible Jesus came only to the people that lived in Noah's time and before to give them the choice of accepting him, and even then some apparently rejected (this is in one of the letters of Peter). So this doesn't include those living after Noah and before Christ. And this says nothing about more conservative stances and the amount of nominal Christians who didn't/don't really believe. 2. You're right that utilitarianism is not the best framework. What ultimately turns me off from Christianity is the idea that billions of good people (and less bad people) will suffer torment for eternity because they didn't believe in God based on little evidence. This includes friends, family, coworkers. It peppers interactions with others, and fuels division and us/them thinking. It's the exact opposite of any idea of justice.
I have never believed that this is the best of all possible worlds. Rather, I have always believed that this is the best way to achieve the best of all possible worlds. What the Bible calls the new Heaven and the new Earth (Rev.21:1). A new creation that has never known sin, and never will.
Utilitarianism is not a theory. It is a definition of a moral value system. It can't be a theory because there is nothing that can be proved or disproved.
Another reason to not accept infinities naively into utilitarian calculus. (Or reject utilitarianism entirely) Also, the sets {1,2,3...} and {10, 20, 30...} aren't identical, they just have the same cardinality. I also don't buy the "God would be justified in picking any holocaust world just because there isn't a best world", that's a bit too stupid. God is morally perfect, not just morally adequate.
He can’t pick a world with on average negative utility, if that’s what you mean by a holocaust world. But, if Utilitarianism is true, there is no principled way to pick *which* world with a net positive utility. Have a nice day! :)
In that case, I don’t understand your argument. I reasoned in the video that a morally perfect Being is nonetheless forced to create a world with an arbitrary and possibly mediocre level of utility.
@@ApologeticsSquared I don't buy that premise. (Might be because I don't buy many of these assumptions) Utilitarianism (I know, that was your point) Positive form of utilitarianism, rather than negative or mixed where suffering counts as well Non-bounded utility Absorption effect of infinites in the utility calculus Any arbitrary choice being as good as any others when you cannot pick a best But sure, if all those
Hey I'm two years late. I find utilitarianism plausible so much as to me it describes that moral statements are about harm. Your theodicy seems to be about compensation in heaven. I agree that for two individuals who lived infinite lives no matter what, both of their utilities will be infinite. That said, their two subjective experience of their utilities can be drastically different. Consider a scenario with runners Mike and Nathan. Both run for an infinite distance and at the same speed, but Mike gets a 500 meter head-start. Even thought they both cover the same amount of total distance, Mike will always be further ahead from Nathan's perspective. Consider a similar scenario for suffering.Two individuals could be compensated infinitely for suffering, but one the one who suffered the least will always be in a better position from the other's perspective. I wouldn't say this is a undercutting defeater, as if I know it would be in principle possible for two individuals to have the same amount of utility from each other's perspective. But I am still skeptical that any possible worlds are on the table as long as they include compensation in the afterlife.
If you are tasked to choose the largest integer, you shouldn’t do anything. Because every answer would be wrong. When deciding to create the best world, God shouldn’t do anything, because every answer would be wrong. If there is no answer, all answer are wrong. So God should’ve never done anything, because all he would have done would’ve been wrong.
The thing is, God doing nothing is still a possible world. So, even then, God is actualizing a possible world! He’s locked into picking *some* possible world, so He might as well choose one with a net positive utility. Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared From a neutral perspective : What about the possible world where God keeps on thinking about the greatest possible world? Surely that would be the moral solution. Not giving up on trying to create a net positive, and not giving up on trying to find the best world possible. From a more personal perspective : a world with a net positive of +3 but with 5 pain and 8 pleasure would be worse than a world with 3 pleasure and no pain. With this perspective, even if God chose a googleplex and not a googleplex +1 net positive, he couldn’t be held accountable for the evil in the world, which would at minimum destroy any argument against god of that kind and we would have no need for any theodicies. « Primum non nocere » - "First of all, do not harm". That’s what doctors all around the world are taught, and for good reasons. So why can’t god do the same?
You spent more than ten minutes trying to argue for God's existence using Mathematics concepts. The problem is that the latter are "universal"(zero, infinity,...), the former( Yhwy, Jesus,Allah,Kim Jong-Un,....) is "culture specific"! You seem to be going in circles, n'est ce pas!?
This was thought provoking. Considering that a lot of skeptics come at the PoE from a utilitarian view, as you’ve also said, this theodicy works against the very “presupposition”. Great job A2!
That is Really Annoying.
Spent the whole video wondering where you were going with all this just to have my mind blown. Awesome job!
Nice! As a skeptic, I love seeing an apologist challenge issued by working internally to another worldview. Subbed!
3 is actually the perfect answer since it's not the smallest positive number (1) but it emphasizes the fact that there is no answer amazingly.
I'm a utilitarian and I think this was a misrepresentation of utilitarianism. No utilitarian believes that torturing 9 people is ok as long as you also help 10 people out. Utilitarianism is about the minimization of suffering and the maximization of pleasure, not about the maximization of utility (at least not about the maximization of utility you talk about in the vid).
Most utilitarians would reject that the maximizing utility is what should be done. Utilitarian ethics are almost always described as consisting in the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of suffering. Minimizing suffering would consist of reducing suffering to 0 and maximizing pleasure would consist of causing as much pleasure as possible. Therefore, a utilitarian God would reduce suffering to 0 and increase pleasure to infinity. He clearly didn't do this so He's therefore not a utilitarian God. This is the most intuitive form of utilitarianism and probably the one most utilitarians hold. I don't know of any utilitarians who accept this type of morally counter-intuitive utilitarianism. This means utilitarians can still use the problem of evil, as most utilitarians who use it probably don't subscribe to this weird new type of normative utilitarian ethics.
Even if we grant this flawed definition of utilitarianism, I still have some objections to the real world being equal to pleasure world.
Even if for every moment of the afterlife, souls in Hell experienced more suffering than the pleasure experienced in Heaven, given that it's experienced for an infinite amount of time, it's still infinite suffering. Any number times infinity equals infinity. This means there isn't more pleasure than suffering and the real world is therefore worse than pleasure world. A way to get around this would be to say that the infinite amount of pleasure experienced in Heaven is a bigger infinite than the infinite suffering spent in Hell, if we accept that for every spent moment in Hell, less suffering is experienced than pleasure experienced in Heaven. Therefore, the suffering of Hell is a smaller infinite than the pleasure of Heaven, and there's still more pleasure than suffering, making the utility of the real world good. However, this would mean there's a difference between infinities of different sizes when considering utility. However, if the differences between different infinities are relevant when considering an action's utility, then God should've created pleasure world instead of the real world, because the infinity of pleasure in pleasure world is a bigger infinity than the one in the real world. Therefore, if infinities of different sizes aren't relevant differences when calculating utility then the suffering experienced in Hell is equivalent to the pleasure experienced in Heaven, making the utility of the real world 0, infinitely worse than pleasure world. This would mean God would have created pleasure world. If infinities of different sizes are relevant differences when calculating utility, then God woul've created pleasure world, as the infinite pleasure of pleasure world is a bigger infinity than the one in the real world. This means that the real world can't have the same utility as pleasure world. Universalism and annahilitionism (I don't know how to spell it) would be good ways around this.
Another thing to consider about Hell and Heaven. To calculate the utility of the real world, we should substract the infinite amount of suffering experienced in Hell to the infinite amount of pleasure experienced in Heaven. Infinity-infinity is impossible, so it's impossible to calculate the utility of the real world, wich means that God couldn't have calculated the utility of the real world before creating it. But, if He didn't calculate the utility of the real world, then creating it was an inmoral act, as calculating the utility of an action is how one determines whether an action is moral or not. This means that God, an infinitely inteligent and omnibenevolent rational being, didn't determine whether or not the action He was about to make was moral or not. That would be morally irresponsable. I'm not so sure about this last bit, but what do you think? Universalism and annahilitionism would again be good ways to around this.
I still think this channel is amazing btw. Never stop making vids.
the vids are really average.
The only coherent way I'm aware to talk about bigger infinites is multiplying infinity to infinity. It's based on a concept of 1-to-1, the easiest example to look up is why all integers is a smaller infinity than all reals. Essentially, there are inf_0 (it's actually called Aleph null, the first transcardinal infinity) integers, and there are also inf_0 reals between 0 and 1, but the reals also continue to extend to 2, 3, 4... This means the reals are a larger infinity, in a significant way.
So the only way it seems coherent to say pleasure in heaven outweighs suffering in hell is if heaven has infinite occupants to hells finite occupants. Assuming we ignore everything you said about more refined utilitarianism.
I really enjoy learning from your channel because I find it hard to understand when there are no visual presentations and just mere discussions.
my theodicy is relational. Here expressed as a poem:
ORTHOTOPIA
In Utopia, the prophet came
to warn of hell and wrath;
to tell the blest ones, in their joy,
they walked a curséd path.
‘You speak of ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’’,
the paradise people said.
‘We do not know your words.
What is ‘dark’, ‘burned’ and ‘dead’?
We cannot believe in your angry god -
his judgement and his iron rod.’
In Dystopia, the prophet came
to promise eternal peace;
to tell the curséd ones in pain
of the coming of blest release.
‘You speak to us of ‘joy’ and ‘love’’,
perdition’s people said.
‘We do not know your words.
What is ‘light’, ‘feast’ and ‘fed’?
We cannot believe in your loving god
for all we know is an iron rod.’
In Orthotopia, the prophets came
to warn and give good news;
to tell of curse and blessing.
Let them with ears now choose.
‘You speak to us of Heaven and hell,’
said the people who share your fate.
‘We know of pain and pleasure
and so we now in truth relate
to the words of life and death.
Tell us of the One from Nazareth.’
You were using a very raw kind of utilitarianism: hedonistic calculus, the pain and pleasure were totally simetric, the mere addition paradox, you used infinities as a number, etc. Nowadays utilitarianism has an answer for all the problems you raised.
Solution within a utilitarian framework: rejecting using hedonistic calculus with infinities (read some current utilitarians, they don't use that, even less with infinity because it leads to paradoxes as you showed), then rely on a asymetry between pain a pleasure. The best possible world within an (real, current and actually held) utilitarian framework would have no pain at all.
It was a really fun and challenging video hahaha
I think this argument can handle an asymmetry between pain and pleasure, as ling as our sole obligation is to maximize utility, because the infinity pleasure will always absorb the finite suffering.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared 1) Using infinities in a hedonistic calculus is really problematic at you can argue that you can do it
2) With some kind of asymetries (like Benatar's), no amount of pleasure can absorb an amount of pain in the case of a life that hasn't started yet.
Have a nice day you too :)
I know that this is somewhat of an internal critique, but I think there is a lot of baggage associated with this. It seems that at the cost of defeating the problem of evil, you introduce the idea that whatever universe God creates is just as arbitrary. This seems to eliminate the idea of meaning and purpose in the universe. Just a thought I had after initially watching the video.
EDIT: I also think a utilitarian would just reject the idea that you can just add pleasure to pain to get a value to compare possible worlds together. They would probably say that you can split the pleasure and pain metrics. For example, they might say that there are two loosely connected goals of minimizing pain to the greatest extent possible and maximizing pleasure to the greatest extent possible.
Looking up the definition of utilitarianism, it would seem that increasing the amount of pain above 0 would only be justified if it increases the maximum amount of pleasure giving a greater outcome overall. However, given the premise you laid out in the video that "there isn't a maximum amount of pleasure", it would seem that there still isn't a good reason to increase the amount of pain from 0.
EDIT 2: In other words at 8:50, there would have to be a connection between the two events in order for the ouchie to be justified
Utilitarianism is the doctrine that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority. In our case, a possible world with the existence of evil would only be justified if the evil directly increases maximum utility otherwise we are at the same spot as before, still looking for justification for the existence of evil. And once again, with the premise you gave, that there isn't this maximum utility, there is never a justification for evil. Since it is possible to minimize evil, the arbitrariness problem would only fall on maximizing the good of the universe.
Hopefully that made sense
// I know that this is somewhat of an internal critique, but I think there is a lot of baggage associated with this. It seems that at the cost of defeating the problem of evil, you introduce the idea that whatever universe God creates is just as arbitrary. //
True, but that doesn't make it less true. Just... well, annoying!
For your other points, I am a little fuzzy on what you're saying, but here's the best responses I can give based on my understanding.
// I also think a utilitarian would just reject the idea that you can just add pleasure to pain to get a value to compare possible worlds together. //
Remember, we are looking at which _actions_ maximize utility. When viewing actions, it seems adding up the pleasure and subtracting the pain is exactly what we're supposed to do. It just so happens that in God's case, the actions available to Him *are* the actualization of possible worlds.
// Utilitarianism is the doctrine that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority. In our case, a possible world with the existence of evil would only just justified if the evil directly increases maximum utility otherwise we are at the same spot as before, still looking for justification for the existence of evil. //
Again, the kind of "action" we are considering is of the form "God actualizes world w." This action cannot occur without ensuring the evils that are in w, but if it is undertaken, then it promotes all the pleasure in world w.
// Since it is possible to minimize evil, the arbitrariness problem would only fall on maximizing the good of the universe. //
There aren't two kinds of obligations -- minimize pain and maximize pleasure -- but one kind of obligation: maximize utility. This is equally fulfilled by creating one unit of pleasure, or by creating both a unit of pain and two units of pleasure.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared Thanks for taking time to response to my comment. You seemed to have got the gist of my comment.
I guess the problem here is that I am viewing each aspect of our universe as a separate action, each individual component of our universe would also need to maximize utility. In the example you gave, with the ice cream and the stubbed toe, the ice cream increases utility but the stubbed toe doesn't.
A utilitarian wouldn't say that torturing someone is fine as long as you create a spa at the same time. The events MUST be connected in order for the torture to be justified. Maybe this is just my misunderstanding of the the doctrine, idk.
@@BrainStormTnT you're correct. Utilitarian would say torture of one is justified if you save a million lives somehow. It's directly linked events and if you would to somehow argue indirect events (like AS has) it wouldn't even make sense from a normal causal standpoint view of ethics/morality.
This was so good!
This is basically the main reason philosophers hate using infinity for good and bad with Util. There’s actually a really big literature talking about infinite bad in regards to existential threats, since they make other factors become trivial.
Still funny video
Some versions of utilitarianism hold to an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. For example, David Benatar holds to the view that any amount of pain and suffering, no matter how small, outweighs any pleasure we might experience. This leads him to the conclusion that non existence is better than a life filled with lots of pleasure and a small amount of pain and suffering. His reasoning is basically, we don't feel a negative reaction about all the pleasure being missed out on an uninhabited planet because no one there is experiencing any pleasure, because no one existed in the first place to miss out on anything. Yet we do have a negative reaction to even small amounts of pain and pleasure. Therefore there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain.
Excellent demonstration of the problem of multiobjective optimization. You have two objectives: 1) Minimize suffering, 2) Maximize well-being. How much is it worth to increase suffering for an improved well-being? But i disagree with you that the worlds are equivivalent. Even with your accessment of a 1:1 comparison, a world identical to ours without hell would be a clear improvement since you would cut out infinte and importantly needless suffering. Especially once you consider Luke 13:24, the proportions of people in heaven and hell might be a bit lopsided in the wrong direction for your argument. But yes for any theistic worldview without a concept of infinite suffering in hell, but with heaven, this argument holds true, at least it can not be instantly refuted.
Well, for the first case you consider, there seems to be something intuitively wrong about it. Clearly, if this world was nothing but suffering and torture for a million years, followed by infinite pleasure in heaven, that would be worse than a world where there is just the infinite pleasure in heaven. Maybe the problem is that utilitarianism was never meant to consider infinite utilities, and it needs to be adjusted for them.
For your second case, I think what it shows is that it's logically contradictory to have a being that at the same time:
- is morally perfect (so it cannot chose a course of action if there's a better course of action available to it)
- has the power to create arbitrarily good worlds
I don’t think moral perfection entails that one cannot choose an action if there is a better one. It seems that it only entails that one would never pass up a best course of action.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared Hmm. That seems very odd. Any reason I can think of for why a morally perfect being wouldn't pass up a best course of action, is also a reason why said being wouldn't choose an action while knowing that there is a better one and having the power to choose the better one. How do you reconcile that?
@@Nickesponja I guess what I have in mind is that a morally perfect being will maximize goodness whenever possible. But in the case of God and xyz other commitments, then maximizing goodness is not possible, so that factor doesn’t come into consideration.
Is this argument in the academic literature in various forms or is it completely new?
I know that at the very least Vince Vitale has some articles on it.
If you use the surreal numbers there actually is a largest number. It's called ON and it's defined as the successor of ON. ON is so big, that adding it to it's negative, OFF, doesn't cancel them out. It shows up in a practical sense in a game where player 1 has infinite moves that don't end the game.
Great video Apologetics , What Do You Think about The modern Quantum Physics and the concept "Ex Nihilo " ( Anything came From Nothing ) and his relation with The existance Of God ??
I'm Sorry for my English , isn't my first language
There is no such thing as nothing in QFT. Every location in space has some non-zero energy.
@mineben256 Right. I'm pointing out that this is a nonsensical comment. QFT doesn't apply to questions of nothing because there is no such thing as nothing in QFT. QFT obviously presupposes it's own existence.
Of course God presupposes it's own existence and at that point the question of what constitutes the necessary bedrock of reality is free to open response. I wasn't really commenting on that though.
Ironically I find it most annoying that the theodicy supposes utilitarianism 😅 I just don't see Christian ethics that way. A life lived with heavy suffering but still lived in love and sacrifice, is a better life than one lived in egoism and pleasure. So suffering, at least to some extent, might be a blessing even, in that it is a call for us to live less for ourselves and more in humbleness.
Considering that a “best possible world” is impossible, wouldn’t God’s decision to create this world be arbitrary?
Depends on how you define “arbitrary.” If it means “for no reason,” then that’s false: the reason that motivates God to actualize a world w is the net positive utility in world w.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared would the decision to make this world specifically be arbitrary under ethical theories other than utilitarianism?
I think not.
@@ApologeticsSquared " the reason that motivates God to actualize a world w" and he told you that?
Few issues.
Firstly, the Problem of Evil doesn't necessarily rely upon utilitarianism. It relies on a proposed contradiction with the omnis of a god with the existence of something that can be called "evil" accurately. It works equally well if we consider divine command theory.
The problem of suffering, which I'll admit, is tied very strongly to the problem of evil does rest a bit on utilitarianism. But we can table this note for now.
Now, I find it a bit interesting that you propose that the god can only choose which worlds to actualize and you don't consider any actions in the conventional sense. It would seem that it can do both and depending on how you consider this god entering into the world.
Like the god could make the world as it is now except it constantly acts like a superman in that world. You can say this is the actualization of a different world but it is also the more typical conception of performing an actions.
Now. When you try to make the two worlds equal you run into a few issues. First infinity minus a finite amount is a smaller infinity. Or at least under some conceptions if infinity that would be true. On the other hand you didn't actually talk about how the negative infinity of hell factors in. And an issue does crop up when you consider that more are supposed to end up in hell rather than in heaven. So it seems like the hell infinity will be larger than the heaven one.
As for best world considerations. If we can consider the reality of infinity then it seems the god could make a best world. One with an infinite number of people receiving infinite pleasure and no pain. Even if you would like to say that there is no best world, your response with arbitrary choices between any is completely incorrect. It would simply be logically impossible to create any world since it is impossible to make a world without a better world. If you ask the god to square a circle it wouldn’t just make any shape because it couldn't do the original task.
If we accepted your proposition about arbitraryness as correct then it can make only a "hell" and still be considered "good".
Anyway, I know this is old and you're thoughts may have changed. But it really doesn't do what you want it to do.
Wait how exactly can you subtract pain from happiness. There isn't a clear unit for it
There is no objective measurement right now. So as I see, the way it works is that people should agree what outcomes correspond to what numbers.
Which is super imprecise
Thanks for the video. I've learned about this idea from your other comments and good to see it expanded upon in the video!
I have 2 thoughts: 1) Didn't understand how jump (10:02) was made from non-utilitarianism to MUST open the door to some form of Christian values. 2) I think that some arguments and the conclusion (9:40) in particular don't work with Negative utilitarianism
1) Isn't that the black and white fallacy? There might be non-utilitarianism theories not opening the door to some form of Christian values, right?
2) Agree that any amount of pleasure is justified because there can always be more pleasure. But there can't be less than 0 suffering. So it seems to me that "no suffering" is a reasonable condition when choosing a world under Negative utilitarianism framework
Regarding (1): I wasn’t saying that one must go from Utilitarianism to Christian values. However, one must go from Utilitarianism to something else, and Christian values are a candidate:
Regarding (2): I assumed for this video that Utilitarianism gives us one obligation: to maximize utility. However, one could argue that, alternatively, we have two obligations. One is to maximize pleasure and one is to minimize suffering, and when in conflict we go with the stronger obligation. This theodicy does seem incompatible with the second form of Utilitarianism (as far as I can tell). However, in the dialectic, I am simply trying to evade the Problem of Evil, so I can use this theodicy as an undercutting defeater of the PoE until an argument for the latter form of Utilitarianism is offered.
Have a nice day! :)
Is it just me or does this require us to accept a skeptical thesis?
This seems like it can work with annihilationism.......but that would make it even more annoying,lol.good work.
Well with annihilationism it wouldn't work because then you would have Pain + annihilation vs. pleasure + annihilation.
From a strictly math standpoint it would be -1+0 vs. 1+0.
@@ShouVertica I said that cause I was at the point in the video where he was talking about hell,with annihilationism the pain isnt eternal at all,in fact you dont even require there to be pain at all in annihilationism.while still having the pleasure of eternal heaven
@@tbcop9898 Right but if you are using heaven/hell then both worlds have the same heaven/hell. Otherwise you could just say "heaven vs. world +heaven" and the answer is clear that just heaven would be better.
@@ShouVertica right.and heaven+world vs heaven+hell+world.heaven+hell is better.this also calls into question our assumptions about omnipotence.which is at the heart of the POE.
But how could you say that that Pleasure > Pain in this world? Pain is so much inherent in our world that we barely notice it. For example : We eat to avoid the suffering of hunger , We cloth to avoid the suffering of humiliation , etc. 🤔
If there is no best possible world, then there is a problem with God's omnibenevolence. The most straightforward definition of an omnibenevolent being is one that always does the best possible action in every situation. But, if there is no best possible world, then there is no best possible action when God decides which world to create. Hence, he cannot be omnibenevolent. How would you define omnibenevolence to get around this objection? You could try with a satisficing definition (In the absence of a best possible action, an omnibenevolent being will perform one that is good enough), but then we could get an even more benevolent being by just increasing the arbitrary threshold for what counts as good enough. This is a problem if God is meant to be the greatest possible being, since we could always come up with a possible being that is even greater than God.
"When a person can't find a deep sense of meaning, they distract themselves with pleasure." -Viktor E. Frankl
God's focus of the world is meaning, not pleasure. The focus of a writer is a good story, not world void of conflict. In fact, a world void of conflict would be completely lacking in morality, inspiration, and purpose. Atheists have conflated meaning to pleasure because they lack any true sense of meaning. When we die, we cease to be, and even those whom we pour into in our life will die and likewise cease to be. There is no meaning to life at all. So fill it with pleasure, and ridicule a God you disbelieve for not giving you more pleasure. The whole notion of the Problem of Evil is mistaking pleasure as the purpose of life.
Just thinking of counterpoints as I watch the video:
1. According to most Christian stances, the amount of people in Heaven will probably be lower than the amount of people who go to Hell. If only Christians go to Heaven then the amount of people who have ever lived (about 107 billion according to WolframAlpha) is most likely much greater than that population. If we add in the people who lived before Christ (about 46.5 billion I believe) you may get a proportion of a little more than half of the population that has ever lived. However, this would be a liberal stance, because according to the Bible Jesus came only to the people that lived in Noah's time and before to give them the choice of accepting him, and even then some apparently rejected (this is in one of the letters of Peter). So this doesn't include those living after Noah and before Christ. And this says nothing about more conservative stances and the amount of nominal Christians who didn't/don't really believe.
2. You're right that utilitarianism is not the best framework. What ultimately turns me off from Christianity is the idea that billions of good people (and less bad people) will suffer torment for eternity because they didn't believe in God based on little evidence. This includes friends, family, coworkers. It peppers interactions with others, and fuels division and us/them thinking. It's the exact opposite of any idea of justice.
I had an idea at 3:30 💡
1. there’s more good out weighing bad.
2. God creates every such world where (1) is true.
C. MuLtIvErSe ThEoDiCy.
I actually have problems with the Multiverse Theodicy. Maybe I’ll make a video on it.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared thanks, and you.
I have never believed that this is the best of all possible worlds.
Rather, I have always believed that this is the best way to achieve the best of all possible worlds.
What the Bible calls the new Heaven and the new Earth (Rev.21:1).
A new creation that has never known sin, and never will.
Utilitarianism is not a theory. It is a definition of a moral value system. It can't be a theory because there is nothing that can be proved or disproved.
Another reason to not accept infinities naively into utilitarian calculus. (Or reject utilitarianism entirely)
Also, the sets {1,2,3...} and {10, 20, 30...} aren't identical, they just have the same cardinality.
I also don't buy the "God would be justified in picking any holocaust world just because there isn't a best world", that's a bit too stupid. God is morally perfect, not just morally adequate.
He can’t pick a world with on average negative utility, if that’s what you mean by a holocaust world. But, if Utilitarianism is true, there is no principled way to pick *which* world with a net positive utility.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared Our world is the holocaust world. As in, it's a world that had a holocaust in it.
In that case, I don’t understand your argument. I reasoned in the video that a morally perfect Being is nonetheless forced to create a world with an arbitrary and possibly mediocre level of utility.
@@ApologeticsSquared I don't buy that premise. (Might be because I don't buy many of these assumptions)
Utilitarianism (I know, that was your point)
Positive form of utilitarianism, rather than negative or mixed where suffering counts as well
Non-bounded utility
Absorption effect of infinites in the utility calculus
Any arbitrary choice being as good as any others when you cannot pick a best
But sure, if all those
Quick note: the argument explicitly assumes a mixed utilitarianism. It doesn’t work with positive or negative utilitarianism.
Hey I'm two years late. I find utilitarianism plausible so much as to me it describes that moral statements are about harm. Your theodicy seems to be about compensation in heaven. I agree that for two individuals who lived infinite lives no matter what, both of their utilities will be infinite. That said, their two subjective experience of their utilities can be drastically different. Consider a scenario with runners Mike and Nathan. Both run for an infinite distance and at the same speed, but Mike gets a 500 meter head-start. Even thought they both cover the same amount of total distance, Mike will always be further ahead from Nathan's perspective.
Consider a similar scenario for suffering.Two individuals could be compensated infinitely for suffering, but one the one who suffered the least will always be in a better position from the other's perspective. I wouldn't say this is a undercutting defeater, as if I know it would be in principle possible for two individuals to have the same amount of utility from each other's perspective. But I am still skeptical that any possible worlds are on the table as long as they include compensation in the afterlife.
God straight up chooses all the worlds and actualizes them through time 😅😅😅😅
If you are tasked to choose the largest integer, you shouldn’t do anything. Because every answer would be wrong.
When deciding to create the best world, God shouldn’t do anything, because every answer would be wrong.
If there is no answer, all answer are wrong.
So God should’ve never done anything, because all he would have done would’ve been wrong.
The thing is, God doing nothing is still a possible world. So, even then, God is actualizing a possible world!
He’s locked into picking *some* possible world, so He might as well choose one with a net positive utility.
Have a nice day! :)
@@ApologeticsSquared From a neutral perspective : What about the possible world where God keeps on thinking about the greatest possible world? Surely that would be the moral solution. Not giving up on trying to create a net positive, and not giving up on trying to find the best world possible.
From a more personal perspective : a world with a net positive of +3 but with 5 pain and 8 pleasure would be worse than a world with 3 pleasure and no pain. With this perspective, even if God chose a googleplex and not a googleplex +1 net positive, he couldn’t be held accountable for the evil in the world, which would at minimum destroy any argument against god of that kind and we would have no need for any theodicies.
« Primum non nocere » - "First of all, do not harm". That’s what doctors all around the world are taught, and for good reasons. So why can’t god do the same?
It’s pronounced “Bona Feeday”
You spent more than ten minutes trying to argue for God's existence using Mathematics concepts. The problem is that the latter are "universal"(zero, infinity,...), the former( Yhwy, Jesus,Allah,Kim Jong-Un,....) is "culture specific"! You seem to be going in circles, n'est ce pas!?
God is not A being.