Pax Americana Ep. 3: Introduction to Naval Strategy and why it's more Interesting than you think
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- Опубліковано 15 вер 2024
- I share some of my insights from my study of naval strategy. I discusses Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julien Corbett, and Raoul Castex.
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If you want to read the naval strategists mentioned, see:
Mahan:
amzn.to/3UFfUmo
Corbett:
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Castex:
amzn.to/3UHqDwP
I also talk a lot about Foch:
amzn.to/4bSENkX
Michael can you address the advent of sea borne drones in the Russo-Ukraine war. Do they mark a new and lasting asymmetrical advantage vs traditional naval vessels. The Ukraine armed forces have essentially delivered the functional defeat of the Russian Black Sea fleet entirely without a conventional naval fleet of their own. Is the massive vulnerability of Russian ships vs missiles and surface drones due to this technology being game changers, that Western navies should be aware of, or is it due to the ineptness of the Russian navy only?
That's a great topic. I intend to address it. I'm sure Castex would have been excited by the development.
USVs are terribly important and just one more reason a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail catastrophically.
I wonder, what would have happened, War of 1812-wise, if Robert and Mahan had written their books c. 1800; surely Thomas Jefferson would have read them, and the structure of the USN would have been veery different.
How so?
MY thinking is, as the last man to "know everything," he would have read and understood their theories (Which I am well aware were formed about a century later), and would have, as POTUS< BUILT ships, not gunboats. MADISOn in turn would have inherited a Navy, not a navy that was more of a coast guard. @@michaelshurkin613
USN in fact had a better navy man-for-man and ship-for-ship than Britain at this point in history, though was still very badly outnumbered. Not much would have been different had Mahan's writing been available. In other words, much of what Mahan wrote was "simply" a distillation of already existing ideas and principles in US naval strategy. He did however integrate all these ideas and reject other ideas, refinging US naval strategy into something even more powerful. This however is about the atlantic fleet more than the great lakes / champlain fleets, which were built rapidly as the locals had no desire to have war with the British. 1812 is interesting as a strategic choice problem, the lessons from the great lakes fleet are more about maritime procurement than about correct naval strategy.The boats in theory were good in practice built of green wood that would not last, but such are the exigencies of war.
It's a sense of professional obligation that forces me to stare in horror at your admitted ignorance. The USN has had several naval engagements since 1945, the most recent and one of the larger ones was in the persian gulf against Iran and, no surprise here the USN sank lots of Iranian boats and took no losses, though the USN did take a heavy hit with the Cole and of course the USS Liberty is another naval battle, albeit very one sided. About october 1973, I guess someone in Tel Aviv wished they had better SIGINT on that day. But I digress: Inchon landing is an actual invasion, all those CBG air strikes then too FONOPs and anti-piracy missions as well as humanitarian relief/humanitarian rescue missions.
If you don't actually know what you are talking about why even open your mouth?
Here is the transcript: I deleted all the um and uh and it's rather like running shit through a seive hoping to find kernels of undigested corn.
Introduction to Naval Strategy
Naval strategy and the question of sea power: what is it, and what's it for? This may seem like an obvious topic, but it isn't, particularly in this day and age. Why do we need navies? We, the United States, haven't fought a naval battle since World War II. THIS IS WRONG BUT WHAT DO I KNOW What are navies even for? What is sea power, and what's it good for?
There's another interesting issue related to the impact of technology on strategy. The argument is often made that because technology is advancing so quickly, ancient wisdom like Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" (which dates to before the common era) can't possibly be relevant today. With the pace of technological change increasing, it begs the question: are historical lessons about warfare still applicable?
Third, there's a debate among naval strategists about what to do with an actual navy. If you have a navy and you're going to fight another country with a navy, what should your objectives be? Generally, the argument is that you should use your navy to fight other navies, which means you need a navy capable of doing so. But some argue against this approach, leading to an interesting historical and philosophical debate.
Finally, we need to consider what all this means for us today. How do these ideas about naval strategy apply to our current geopolitical situation with Taiwan, China, the Red Sea, and the Straits of Taiwan? How should we allocate our defense budgets?
The Concept of Sea Power
The modern concept of sea power largely goes back to Alfred Thayer Mahan, the grandfather of naval strategy. Writing in the late 19th century, Mahan set the standard for naval strategic thinking. His work was essentially a giant op-ed in favor of the United States becoming a great power. Mahan argued that to become a great power, the U.S. needed sea power, which required a navy capable of delivering that sea power.
Mahan used historical cases to argue that empires rose and fell largely because of sea power. Even empires not typically associated with naval power, like the Roman Empire, were, according to Mahan, sea powers. He believed sea power was the prerequisite for global power, and therefore, the United States needed a navy to deliver that sea power.
Technology and Naval Strategy
The rapid advancement of technology raises questions about the relevance of historical naval strategies. Naval warfare has evolved dramatically over the centuries, from galleys and sailing ships to ironclads, dreadnoughts, aircraft carriers, and modern warships packed with electronics and sensors.
This technological progression leads to two schools of thought: the historical school and the material school. The historical school, represented by Mahan, Corbett, and Castex, believes that despite technological changes, there are eternal truths about warfare that can be deduced from studying military history. They argue that while tactics and techniques may change, fundamental principles remain the same.
The material school, on the other hand, argues that technological changes have made historical lessons largely irrelevant. They believe we must continually rethink our approach to naval warfare as technology evolves.
THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A FALSE DICHOTOMY BUT AGAIN WHAT DO I KNOW
Modern Naval Warfare and Strategy
Today's naval conflicts would likely involve ships that never see each other, relying instead on satellites, sensors, and information networks to detect and engage enemies at great distances. This complexity raises questions about the applicability of traditional naval strategy. NOT THE CASE IN THE NAVAL BATTLES IN THE PERSIAN GULF THEY ACTUALLY HAD LOS CONTACT
However, the historical school's arguments still hold weight. While the means of warfare have changed dramatically, the fundamental principles of naval strategy - such as the importance of sea control and the need to protect lines of communication - remain relevant.
Lessons for Today
1. Sea power remains essential as a prerequisite for being a global power.
2. The U.S. has taken its naval dominance for granted since World War II, but emerging challenges from China and even non-state actors like the Houthis are forcing a reevaluation of naval strategy.
3. There's a need to balance funding between different military branches, with a strong argument for maintaining a powerful navy capable of fighting other navies.
4. While new technologies like drones are changing warfare, the fundamental principles of war may still apply. The challenge is figuring out how to apply these principles in the context of new technologies.
In conclusion, while the methods and technologies of naval warfare have changed dramatically, the core principles of naval strategy remain relevant. The key is to adapt these principles to modern contexts and emerging threats.
Be glad i am not pointing out your channel to others more expert in naval warfare.