The competency of Italian troops can be easily accounted for by seeing how they fought in Italy after the Italian surrender against the Germans under Allied command. They performed admirably with American equipment and with American logistics supporting them.
So happy to have John Parshal and his legendary wallpaper. His veiws and understanding of 1942 and IJN operations is outstanding. Thanks Woody, this podcast is top notch.
The "1942" book is an excellent treatise on how SOME allied leaders and commanders directed the catch-up war. Nimitz/King, Charles Lockwood, Alexander Vandegrift, Wm Halsey all accomplished more with less, and put the Japanese on their back foot the rest of the Pacific. The best commanders survived errors and put together the structure by the end of 1943, which would go on to crush the Empire of Japan. The character of the Pacific War of keeping pressure on the Japanese started with Admiral Ernest King, some still argue "before we were ready", but also before we had earned Japanese respect and even notice, which caused them to make critical errors very early which cost them the opportunity to evict the Marines from Guadalcanal, which as it happened,was the blow from which there would be no recovery. Those years when there were plenty of bleak hours let the light shine from where it could, and kept the fires lit while the boilers were firing up. It's a fascinating, drama that continues to educate those who will listen and learn, and shows the roads to perdition for those who will not. Still.
Back when the History Channel did Battle 360 Enterprise. They kept going to this guy named Parshall for background (black beard in 05). I thought what's the deal with this guy. Then I read Shattered Sword that was all I needed to know!
Thanks so much for having Jon guest on your channel. He always brings a smile and some true insight to the discussion... and it will probably bring WW2TV more subscribers!
Actually, the Sherman was a quite decent tank. It was easy to operate and repair. In 1942 it was reasonably armed with a medium velocity 75mm gun that fired both high explosive and armoured piercing shells. It was also very reliable and fast. But most importantly, the Sherman was easy to produce in quantity.
Add in the capacity of the shipboard cranes setting a limit on just how heavy a tank could be fielded. Could the Sherman have been improved? Sure. As witnessed by the fact that late war Sherman's had very little in common with the early models. The biggest improvenent that could have been fone 3arly on in my opinion. A different engine for one (1). The aircooled radial had certain advantages. The pack of a cooling system for one. But it had bad points too. One of which was to increase the overall height. One possible source of engines if (2) the tooling (3) still existed would have been the Wright Conqueror or D-12 V-12 aero engines. 1) Produced with a variety of powerplants. The Wright radial, the twin GMC diesel two stroke inline sixes, the Chrysler Multibank, the Gubersten radial diesel and the Ford GA V-8. 2) If, biggest and slipperiest word in the English language. Right ahead of "is". 3) The patterns, forge dies, specialized cutting tools, fixtures etc.
Also if it recall correctly the first M4s to arrive in Egypt were actually shipped on an early roll on/roll off type ship that was built originally as a rail car transporter.
Yes it was a good tank and better than the Brit tanks However it tracks were soft and on the chase of Rommel west The Valentine and Armoured Cars took up the chase The Shermans had to be entrained .
@nigellawson8610 And too often ignored, the Sherman was capable of being transported from Detroit by rail and the European/North African battlefields by sea. America could have shifted earlier to a heavier tank but would have had trouble getting sizeable numbers to the battlefield WHEN they were needed.
@@mpetersen6 Good comment. The cranes were important, but just part of the transport problem. The rail lines from Detroit would have had trouble with a heavier tank. These were problems that could be solved, but that would take time. And the need was to put large numbers of tanks in the hands of Allied fighting forces as rapidly as possible.
Woody another absolutely brilliant session! Two of the very finest WW2 historians having a great meeting of minds on a key battle but in brilliant context to how Alameine strategy, force doctrine development, battle outcomes, key leadership & personalities all fit into the wider implications of 1942. For mine the way this executed more as an informed discussion and meeting of minds rather than a more pre-set presentation, really works in this case. A genuine and heartfelt Bravo Zule! and an apology for missing this brilliant session last year until today.
Fascinating discussion about El Alamein and touched on so many facets that the 1 3/4 hr programme just flew by!! Jon Parshall is always worth listening to, so thank you Paul for getting him on again. Great point about the conflict being between two power blocks and a single battle was never going to be "the turning point" or decide the outcome of the war.
I’m an American, and have studied WW2 for like 50 of my 56 years, and have nothing but the highest admiration of the British and Commonwealth soldiers that fought there. And despite the “Patton” image of Montgomery, I have nothing but admiration for him as a commander. And in the course of British history, El Alamein has to be one of the greatest battles. It is a victory as great as Waterloo or Trafalgar.
@@niesenjohn spot on. Montgomery was a rude cunt but an excellent general. Hence why history has not favoured him very well. He offended most of the people that wrote it.
The reason I rate Wavell higher than Monty is that Geographically, Wavell's domain was Huge included Iran Iraq. Monty was the Head of the 8th Army with just one job to destroy DAK
The British general who doesn't get the credit that was due to him was Claude Auchinleck. It was he who made the decision to prepare the El Alamein line as a fallback position. Because of his foresight he was able to stop Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. Auchinleck also receied tremendous from Conningham's Desert Airforce. Without the help of the RAF the 8th Army might have been routed after their defeat at the battle of Gazala.
No Auchinleck could not geton with his C/wealth Commanders and kept them in the dark Whereas Montgomery made it his business to speak to all his men. He did NOT wear the Aussie slouch hat because he liked it. His best fighting force identified with him
Mr. Parshall has become my favorite author based on the books I read on WWII in my youth...now I feel older and wiser. Thanks to WWII TV, I get to hear him say "shot to pieces". I concur on the 25lber, and the Assuies. Their stance at New Guinea from Miline Bay, Way, Buna and Gona.
The 25 pounder credit Accession Number: 024513 Gunners of 2/8th Australian Field Regiment firing a 25-pounder during the July battle. Artillery was used at El Alamein on a massive scale, supporting the infantry when they went forward, and protecting them when they were counterattacked.
To be fair, the US army couldn't do proper combined arms until Normandy. That's when General Quesada put UHF radios in the P-47's and also with front line ground spotters.
I remember a scene from the movie Patton between Rommel and a German officer, the officer says "British commanders and American soldiers, the worst of everything" Rommel then replies "I remind you that Montgomery is a British commander, and he has driven us half way across Africa."
The 9th division was formed in 1939/40 and fought in Borneo until 2 months after the Japanese surrender so fought longer than most other armies. Remember when the Americans landed in North Africa they didn’t know how to fight and the British held the line against the Germans until the Americans reorganised and learnt how to use their tanks. They needed the experience in Nth Africa before they could enter Europe
I served in the 12th SF with a former Luftwaffe Fallschirmjaeger who said his battalion went in to El Alamein supported by 2 tanks, 1 had a gun that would fire but turret wouldn't turn and the other had a turret that would turn but gun wouldn't fire, he also said they were getting only 1/3rd of the supplies they needed and were short of water. They walked into a mine field under heavy artillery fire which destroyed both tanks. They were cut off and surrounded by 2 full strength Canadian battalions and taking heavy casualties. The Canadians ordered them to surrender and not seeing any alternative other than to get wiped out, they accepted "the offer". He said the Canadians had lot of respect for the Fallschirmjaeger and treated them pretty them well. He said the Germans were in really bad shape going into El Alamein, short on supplies and parts and down on strength with no replacements.
German counterattacks were easy to predict: there was a reason that the British troops came up with the saying 'there are three things certain in life: death, taxes, and German counterattacks'
57:20 of course Australians are the best infantry and yes the aggressive patrolling is definitely part of that , we learnt its importance in ww1 and its never let us down
@@OldWolflad The British only had one infantry division in the region until mid 1942 in the form of the 7th division which was renamed twice as first the 6th division in 1940 and then 70th division before the relief of Tobruk in 1941. Montgomery selected Morshead and the 9th division to lead the attack and absorb Rommel's inevitable counterattack (it was German doctrine in two world wars) because they had done it before at Tobruk in 1941. The 9th division was also supremely confident that it could do it again. The Australian's suffered 20% of the casualties at el Alamein despite numbering only 10% of the men. Montgomery himself said that he could not have won without the Australians.
I thoroughly enjoyed the conversation between guest and host, as well as the many astute points made in the sidebar. What I took away from the episode was that for the first time, a General came along who was able to shape the 8th Army into an effective team. Regardless of what one thinks of Montgomery personally, one cannot deny that he accomplished what no other British commander had done in the desert campaign up the that point. My view is that El Alamein was a First World War set piece battle perfected by the new technologies not available then. Look at the artillery operations as is mentioned by John as an example. This was a superb show that provided great food for thought.
In viewing many WW2 videos, Montogery was famous for holding his forces back, when he was to go ahead, causing major problems for the others involved. I believe he did this during Market Garden, not real sure.
@@sandranatali1260 Thank you for responding Sandra. I think your statement about the many films and videos is apt. The views put forth in many of the videos are biased against Monty being decisive. Many of the film makers tend to only use references that they find to support this view, but fail to present opposing viewpoints. It's kind of what we see in the news media today. The truth takes much more work to discover.
I've read the opinion of Montgomery (sadly, I can't remember who said it) that he would have been "a great First World War general." I think this is pretty accurate. EDIT: I found part of what I was looking for. Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker said of Montgomery, in a letter to historian Ronald Lewin, "Monty was a 1918 general."
Absolutely top-notch show...the discussion both on screen and in the sidebar was first class. Only about 3 slides but sometimes not needed as today, with discussion and debate of this calibre.....well done to both of you.
Very interesting discussion. My biggest takeaway was the stellar performance of British artillery in supporting both the infantries initial defensive operations and subsequent counterattacks. I thought the tensions around Montgomery between guest and host+audience could have been explored but maybe that’s too overdone. Any time Jonathan Parshall is talking the conversation is worth listening to.
British field artillery was generally superb. Montgomery's insistence on fighting divisions intact, instead of scattering them in brigades fighting on their own. added to that effectiveness because it took better advantage of the centralize fire control and communications tools available.
I can kind of understand the British attitude towards tanks providing infantry support to a degree. I think the main culprit is the 2pdr gun of early war British tanks and it's mediocre HE round that was so ineffective it wasn't even issued in North Africa. With a proper gun like the British started receiving with the US Lend Lease Grant and Sherman tanks earlier in the war the British world likely have seen the utility of tanks in infantry support as obviously as everyone else. For some reason every other major tank power thought of this in some way pre-war and you see tanks armed with 75mm low to medium velocity guns in service with the Germans, French, and American forces as soon as they can get them.
Midway was a Turning Point in that it negated the Japanese dominance in Carriers and reduced it to more or less parity. This freed even a careful command to consider going on the offensive operationally if not yet strategically.
Thanks for the nice comment Mark, and if you haven't already, please make sure you subscribe to WW2TV and perhaps consider becoming a member? ua-cam.com/channels/UC1nmJGHmiKtlkpA6SJMeA.htmljoin
More of a general comment about the morale victory that 2nd El Alemaine privided, but i think one of the things the Montgomery does not get enough credit for was being the first British general who didnt give into the pressure Churchill was placing on various field commanders to attack prematurely. For that alone he deserves praise and his following success speaks for itself.
Sure Monty had the numbers advantage but he still had to overcome extremely formidable defences, 600,000 mines and a whole line of anti tank guns. Defending is much easier than attacking.
The inability to use Combined Arms on part of the British is quite staggering really, by 1939 British battalions and divisions were equipped with those weapons they needed, whilst supporting weapons such as tanks and artillery were provided at Corps level by ancillary units. It looked good theoretically, but it left British commanders dangerously reliant on fire support weapons that they did not directly control. In reality, British commanders had to go through the time-consuming business of requesting back-up, so could not react quickly or spontaneously. So, these coordination problems seriously hampered the mobility of the British. The Germans on the other hand had the structure to generate superior fire-power by coordinating the assets of several layers of command. The New Zealand 2nd Division were indeed probably the best offensive or mobile division on the Allied side, well Rommel thought so, followed by the Aussies. Agree underrated 4th Indian and South African 1st Division need much more praise. British hindered somewhat by static battle philosophy, but whilst some British divisions were poorly trained and unreliable (notably conscript), don't forget British 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Divisions who were excellent. Rommel also specifically acknowledged toughness of 7th Division whom he described as "the mainstay of the 8th Army", and British Guards Brigade, stating: - "The Guards Brigade was almost the living embodiment of the virtues and faults of the British soldier - tremendous courage and tenacity combined with a rigid lack of mobility. At one battle this division had mauled our German units". Whilst the Anzacs were probably the most adept and most mobile in the heat of the desert, Rommel's Commander-in-Chief Siegfried Westphal thought the British Divisions were the toughest opposition, stating: - “The hardest, toughest in attack, and most persistent in defence were the British divisions, and of these the 7th Armoured Division was undoubtedly the best. The uniformity of the British personnel was most striking. One saw not so much extraordinary audacity but the absence of failures. The 2nd New Zealand division was also outstanding in its fighting ability.” Also don't forget the British 70th Infantry Division (really the 6th) who had earlier broken out of Tobruk under Auchinleck to end the siege, losing half as many men in 19 days of savage fighting against Rommel's forces that the heroic Aussies lost on six months at Tobruk, and also Operation Torch involved the elite British 78th 'Battleaxe' Division, formed from various veteran units. But yes it was largely a multi-national Commonwealth force, involving Greeks and Free-French too.
46:44 artillery for the win , again a Vietnam reference at the battle of Long Tan Aussie and New Zealand artillery was firing 6 rounds a minute per barrel then multiply that by a regiment . We learnt this at Alamain
@@TheDavidlloydjones North Vietnamese had some serious artillery. In most of the South the NVA & Viet Cong used mortars and rockets but in the north the NVA had Soviet 152 & 130mm tubes stationed just north of the DMZ and in Laos. Their guns were often well dug in or in caves. They could outrange US 105 & 155mm artillery. The US troops in I Corps at Con Thien, Gio Linh, & Khe Sanh etc were recipients of heavy artillery bombardments. When US 175mm guns were established at Camp Caroll and the Rock Pile we could utilize counter battery fire. This is a stretch cause I was infantry. “That’s all I’ve got to say about that.”
General Jake Devers of US Armored Forces and my great grandfather, General Ted Brooks, flew around Africa in December 1942 into January 1943 debriefing British leadership regarding Armored combat tactics and strategy that had turned the tide against Rommel. Their analysis guided much of US doctrine and training going forward.
@@michaelsurace1028 I have all the material but probably won’t get the time to do it until my retirement. Planning to be a guest here in December, though! 😊
Hope you get a round to it some day . Very few bios of Corps or Division commanders out there. Even Jacob Devers only recently had bios written about him.
Mostly in a negative sense though. US armored divisions were reorganized so as to imitate German practice, and they mostly succeeded in 1943-45 in operating as flexible combined-arms formations. The British persisted right to the end of the war with the obsolete armored division organization of a tank brigade and an infantry brigade. There were few SP artillery systems in British armored divisions, very little mechanized infantry, poor organization and poor leadership in most of the armored divisions (Roberts being by far the best of their armored division commanders). US armor absolutely did NOT follow British practices.
Folgore fought with great distinction at Alamein and, as I recall, were allowed to surrender bearing arms by the British as they marched into captivity. This honor was not given to any other Axis unit in WWII. (If memory serves)
The current Folgore Parachute Brigade are very proud of their El Alamein battle honour today. Their last sole veteran of that battle Santino Pellichi was given pride and place in all anniversary commomerations till his death 2 years ago. If you're interested about the WW2 Folgore, check out Neil Lawrence's show on WW2TV a year ago.
I have the Time Life picture book on WW2 from the 60s. Read it all as a kid. It covered the North African theatre fairly well. Gruesome picture of British officer sitting on the sand with his side caŕved out by an 88 round that hit him.
Need to remember that Montgomery and other senior British officers experienced the trench warfare of WW1 which informed their opinion that for victory to be certain you needed overwhelming superiority , especially in artillery which was responsible for the vast majority of casualties . That superiority took time to build . People may say “ ah what about blitzkrieg ? “ . Blitzkrieg was a tactical rather than strategic theory and the German generals knew that in France in 1940 they were very lucky and got away with it . Joined up allied thinking , as in the Ardennes offensive , would have seen it off .
It is stunning to learn that the British Armor and Infantry were at Normandy and STILL couldn't fight beside each other. It makes it very difficult to maintain a coalition. The more I listen to historians like the ones running this program (and their zssociates), the more I understand how close run the war was at its onset. Thanks to our historian/hosts. Well done. Thank you. You turned some lights on for me. This is the THIRD time I've watched this program. I could (and probably will)watch it again.
@@terrysmith9362 This is not the only account of difficulties with fighting along side the Brits. In listening and reading other accounts about the problems they had, I'm still amazed that after all of that fighting ... supposedly side by side ... they still didn't seem to be very concerned about the inability of artillery and infantry or infantry and armor to solve the problem. During 1942 in particular, there was a tremendous amount of parochial infighting between the Army and the Navy, the Army Air Corp and the Infantry and other branches on both sides. It seemed to be a bigger problem between the Americans and the Brits. While I did expect some of it early on, I figured that after about 3 years of fighting and suffering heavy casualties, the problem would not still be so serious that it would catch the attention of historians 60+ years later. They were still arguing about whether to standardize between metric and the American system of measurement !!! What did I expect? I expected BOTH sides to quit bitching, to work it out and reduce the number of casualties. I think that is a realistic expectation. I suppose that I gave both sides more credit that it seems they deserved.
The British army in WW2 had many strengths but combined arms ops were never one of them. Robert Forczyk has a good diagnosis of this problem in his new book on the desert campaign. They had no unified doctrine and thus no training or organization to support combined arms operations. And you are absolutely right that these weaknesses show up in 1944-45. The 11th Armoured Division was nearly alone in seeing the problem and seriously trying to deal with it.
Brilliant discussion. We need more of the same with Jon. Wish I could have asked what either of think of how we might have survived 1942 if we'd had today's social media
When John Parshall mentions Corelli Barnett, that sealed the deal for me! Parshall shows he is a brilliant student of war and clearly had read Barnett's great book, The Audit of War.
A discussion that was enjoyable to listen to.. Nice perspectives put out on Monty from you two and the side bar talks. Still amazed at the the fortitude shown by the Desert Rats on overcoming those minefields over multiple days and nights of fighting. Amazing job the 'Sappers' had to do under fire. Quite a victory for the Commonwealth Forces.
Enjoyed this now that I finally listened to the end. After the first 15 minutes I thought it was going to descend into the usual American bashing of Montgomery, but it actually didn't, so that was a relief. What wasn't addressed is that Montgomery very cleverly predicted the battle would last circa 12-14 days and he was spot on. The anticipated casualties were also predicted by him reasonably accurately. Lastly, I feel Montgomery is overly criticised (not here in this discussion, thankfully) for letting Rommel escape after El Alamein but few realise that the 8th Army still did an amazing 1,300km in 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942. And that was immediately after fighting a near two week gruelling battle and getting through half a million mines. It wasn't Montgomerys fault that the retreating Axis force, much lighter and less encumbered and with a head start, managed to keep that bit ahead of him. If anyone knows of a longer and faster advance by any other army in WW2, particularly immediately after fighting a major battle, well Id like to hear about it.
I very much hope so Paul. I enjoyed you pointing out that those under his command seemed to think highly of him, as opposed to those on his level and over. Here is the text of a letter Matt Ridgway wrote to Montgomery after The Bulge: ""It has been an honor and a privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal"
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yes and whatever forces slipped away were minimal anyway, Historian Matthew Cooper said that were less than 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, and 12 field howitzers left. The Afrika Corps out of 116,000 soldiers lost 111,000 men.
Bullet-Tooth Tony, Indeed. I don't see why even historians seem to think the 8th Army should have caught up with Rommel, who had a head start. Rommel didn't exactly have many tanks and heavy weapons to drag along. He had a lighter skeleton force that could keep ahead of the more heavily weighed down 8th Army. There were also some very major rains on I think it was the 7th or 8th November that hampered movements. Its true to say Rommel was affected by the rains too, but he didn't have to haul the vehicles that Montgomery did. Also, Montgomery did not want to overstretch his forward echelons and risk a back hander from Rommel. The 8th Army did well to move that far and that fast immediately after El Alamein.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Not to mention the amount of prisoners of war captured slowing the Eighth army down over 49,000 men. Rommel described the Eighth armies advance to his wife in a letter as "vulture like"
A lot of people cite El Alamein as a turning point in the struggle against Rommel’s forces - but we have to remember this was all about the fight for the Allies to hold onto the Egyptian oil fields. The Germans were desperate for oil. One event, well before El Alamein, that prevented Rommel Rommel from pushing through to Egypt was the Australians and the British Artillery holding onto Tobruk. Churchill wanted them to stand firm against Rommel for 2 -3 weeks. The Aussies ( named the rats of Tobruk by Rommel ) gel on for six months! ( until relieved by South Africans - which eventually surrendered) Those six months were crucial in the Allies being able to build up their forces for counter attack
British artillery was superb in WW2. On the 25 Pounder though, yes, it had a high rate of fire but it NEEDED a high rate of fire to do the job because of the small shell it fired. The US and German 105s could do the same job with far less ammo expediture. An overlooked good feature of the 25 pounder is its better range than the US or German 105. However,Parshall is right to stress the responsiveness of British artillery. That's what it's about. That's how they greatly exceeded German capability.
I really feel like people underestimate suppression & disrupting fire, a bullet whizzing past your ear means that the other guy can see you & potentially hit you. The same works for artillery, the first shell doesn't get you, but now you have to get to ground & hope the next one doesn't, if the guns can fire 3-6rpm then you've got 10 seconds between impacts to recover, check your guts ar3 still in place & find a hole in the ground/get back into your tank & button up
@@NM-wd7kx Quite right. Almost all fire is suppressive fire. But the rate of fire of individual guns isn't especially relevant here. A battery doesn't fire all guns at once. It staggers them so the enemy cannot tell how many weapons are firing and to keep up that suppressive effect as continuously as possible. Add in multiple batteries and the ROF of any single piece becomes irrelevant.
Frank Chadwick talks about the lack of combined arms in the British Army in his brilliant work entitled "The Honor of the Regiment." Regimental traditions of many years had an impact on the reluctance to embrace any universal tactical doctrine.
Quite right. It was like a bunch of separate clubs with little doctrinal sharing between them. Also contributed to a really serious lack of professionalism. Montgomery was a superb professional and this is what pissed off a lot of his colleagues.
A very interesting presentation by Jon with yet another perspective on the battles in N Africa. Woody, its a high standard you have to keep up for the next 2 weeks of this El Alamein series to match the last 2 shows, but I'm sure WW2TV won't let us down.
@@jacktattis no he failed to get to the HQs behind the pass as he was stopped by heavy artillery and close air support. Within days he withdrew from the passes and they were reoccurred and Patton started an offensive.
@@rinkevichjm He had to withdraw It was not the US that made him cautious it was Montgomery and the 8th Army that gave him worries. At that time of the war the USArmy did not phase the Germans
In my humble opinion, “Patton” as a movie is a terrible depiction of history at many levels. Yes, brilliant performance by George C. Scott, tremendous musical,score….. but…… Just a side note, the US Army worked very hard with the limited resources at its disposal in the 1930’s to develop the doctrine of what became known as “concentrated fires from distributed positions,” to achieve rapid concentration of time on target fires from dispersed firing units. The development of The distributed fire control center (our fire direction center) was based on the revolutionary concept (at the time) of tailoring the build of a specific radio technology on the requirements of the Fire Direction Center. That radio technology was the military and civilian FM radio, and the US Army held all 14 patents for FM radio technology until their expiration. Perhaps the two single greatest applications for FM radio in my life was its role in my Army career and driving across my native Texas with AC/DC’s “Thunderstruck” with the volume set to “11”. Loved this segment, as it demonstrates the brilliance and professionalism of British Commonwealth artillery men in this campaign. On the ground, over time and on their own they developed and implemented exactly the intent of that doctrine, in a desolate, harsh and unforgiving hell of a theater. Well done.
US and British artillery were world-class in WW2 because of the sophisticated fire control methods used. No one else got close to that level of quality.
Alexander was a timid General he did not demand Clarks replacement when he went to liberate Rome against orders thus allowing the German Army to escape I think that was the tipping point where the British were shoved to the side. Monty made it his business to identify with his troops And kept them in the picture The Auke I do not think so.
I used to know a chap who was some kind of maintenance officer for a dozen trucks in the desert, " I never lost a truck". He said "we just didn't have the equipment in the beginning". And added something like - but when the Americans came in things changed.
He also tried to give me three feet of old house pipe. Realising I didn't want it (I have a work vehicle full of tools, which maybe reminded him of the old days. I wish it was a 1939 Matador but it's a 2015 Focus), he said something like - "in the desert we never threw anything away, because you never knew when you might get any more supply" , because he was maybe a bit embarrassed and wanted to explain why he was offering me his old tat. I wish I'd taken it now. Note: not making this up . I did work at his house and he had a very successful career in the police and lived to be 90+ Very interesting man.
Some day in the near future I am going to have time to actually catch a live show. The side bar as always has interesting conversations. More so in this presentation. As for Jon I have a deep respect for his knowledge from an operational point and hope I am still alive when he finishes his book on 1942 lol. El Alamein was one of those battles I remember seeing in one of the History in pictures of WW II that my uncle had. Its too bad my relatives threw away those 3 books circa 1949 I think. I was perhaps about 10 or 11. Whenever we visited I would look through the pages and I recall the picture of the commonwealth soldiers charging with his bayonet mounted Enfield past a knocked out Pz III and the caption saying that it took place at El Alamein. Great show Woody
You don't need the barrels for it, It's build into the fire control systems now. A battery of 3 to 9 guns each fire multiple shots, timed on target. It took time for me to get my head around to it but because the modern ones are a lot more accurate, they're actually more deadly. 3 Modern guns can do what a 100 older guns can (yes, the discrepancy is really that high). My problem with this reasoning is that a 100 guns can do something that 3 guns can never do: Loose 3 guns and still be a fighting unit.
@@exharkhun5605 Yup. Modern systems can put a bunch of rounds in the air, from one tube, that will all hit at the same time. Not only that, they can be moving before the first round impacts.
Truly insightful stuff as we are coming to expect from you and your many contributors. The format knocks spots off the dryness of so many books etc and the opportunity to 'go down rabbit holes' and discuss further certain points is captivating. My view re the whole western desert campaign is the profound shift in initiative arising from intelligence. For much of 41 and 42 Rommel was blessed with Bonner Fellers giving a strategic overview of the British order of battle and more. Further he benefited from tactical knowledge from world leading field intelligence. He subsequently lost both as the Ultra information became more and more available to Montgomery. Intelligence itself did not win the campaign but it went a long way to dictating who held the initiative and was able to respond best to the very many confused encounters at critical points in the battle.
Considering that, Sir John Monash first developed Combined Arms towards the end of World War 1, and used it to great effect winning battles several time. It is most unlikely that the senior ANZAC officers were not aware of this tactic.
John Monash was comanding the battle in WW1 when he implemented the Combined Arms Strategy in El Alamein the Australians and Kiwis were part of the 8th Army and followed Montgomery's battle strategies.
yes Blamey Morshead over in New Guinea Allan Cyril White Yes we had the more experienced Officers right though WW2 e.g. Patton 1916 Patton Chasing Villa and not catching him Australians winning and losing in France but actually fighting
Operation compass ended with a crushing victory over the Italians. Operation crusader thanks to Auchinlek and a blunder by Rommel was a success. The background to what happened there is very different to 2nd Alamein. Also Auchinlek stopped Rommel at 1st Alamein. Montgomery benefitted from clearing house with full authority of Alexander and Churchill to get his commanders to do what he ordered.
Monty's force at El Alamein was not the first highly diverse - in terms of nationalities - British-led Army. Remember Wellington's army at Waterloo ? Regarding Rommel - I wonder how different would be his image post-War if he'd fought on the Eastern Front
Jon at the end is quite correct, in complex operations like a major battle, rarely is it one matter that determines victory. But I would say that there is one overriding matter that was the major factor. beginning in 1942 which is the focus of his book. And that was the massive material superiority of the Allies once America came into the War. The Arsenal of Democracy was still just gearing up at the beginning of 1942, but by the end of the year, it was beginning to make itself felt in far-flung battlefields, including the ones that Jon ticks off--Alamein, Torch, and Guadalcanal. Aid reaching the Soviets was limited in 1942, but by early 1943 had begun reaching the Red Army in real quantity.
I realize that people are different and in different places, but "Shattered Sword" changed what I "knew" about Midway. Trent Hone's "Learning War" (which I just finished) was another mind-changer. While much is made of US technology superiority in the Pacific, what really cemented it and was the battle-changing development was the materiel and organizational structure to collect, integrate, and communicate to pictures coming from various sensors and observers. That development, the CIC, is kind of mentioned casually in passing in books I've read. Hone has much more, of course. "Sword" and "Learning" give the doctrinal and people context in which decisions were made and actions were taken.
I think labeling this as the “American perspective” is divisive and not surprising some people looked at the presentation from an America v British perspective. Ironically, during the presentation Paul asks Jon what was Montgomery thinking? Then goes on to say lavish praise that Jon is really good at being neutral. 26:18 if it is a nuetral point of view, which I do believe, the labeling as “American perspective” seem off.
As late as Caen in 1944, the British had the tendency to employ their tanks unsupported in mass (Co, Bn, and Brigade). The British also failed to support infantry with on-call air and artillery, except for what was organic to the smaller units. I was told by an 8th army infantryman that the only support they relied on were their heavy machine guns and light mortars. He was at El Alamein, on.
Really interesting idea from Trent Telenko about Pedestal being the decisive carrier battle of '42. Don't think I agree, but I enjoy thought provoking ideas like that. Pedestal was a clear tactical defeat for the British; they suffered heavy losses and dished out very little in return (I think 2 Axis Subs sunk and ~50 aircraft shot down). Secondly, the American invasion in early November was coming, so a little bit more/less Axis supplies getting to NA wasn't going to change the impending doom of the Afrika Corps. Force K simply did not have that kind of decisive impact by this point in the war. Finally, it's only really a carrier battle if the other side is bringing carriers of their own to the party, which neither the RM nor KM was. The 4 key carrier battles of '42 remain Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz, each of which stopped a major Axis offensive in its tracks.
@@johnburns4017 Sure, the strategic goals of the British were met so in that sense definitely a strategic victory. But also clearly a defeat on the tactical level. You could also argue that Malta was declining in strategic importance by this time, since we now know that Operation Torch and El Alamein were coming and would ultimately prove decisive in North Africa, with or without Malta's nice contribution in September-December to the attrition of Axis convoys.
@@johnburns4017 Of course I'm operating with hindsight, that's what we do when we analyze history. It's one of our most valuable tools, not sure why you would disparage it. Of course no one knew that Torch was going to happen; they also didn't know if rescuing Malta would prove decisive. They certainly sacraficed a lot based on the hope that it would be...
@@johnburns4017 I 100% agree, one of the challenges of historians is putting themselves in the shoes of the participants and really trying to see things (and help their readers to see things) from that perspective. This is an indispensable tool. But so too is the tool of evaluation with hindsight. We ought to use both to do our analysis. But your point is well taken :)
@@johnburns4017 I agree that Somerville failing to hit Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean was a big missed chance. On the other hand, had that become a daytime battle, he would have gotten his clock cleaned by the 5 best IJN Fleet Carriers, so perhaps some caution was warranted :). Regarding the US planes having radar at Midway - correct me if I'm wrong but Kido Butai wasn't even spotted until around 6 AM on June 4, and was wiped off the order of battle by that same evening, so not sure how radar would have mattered on that specific day. Might have helped hit the invasion force though, which was spotted the day before!
The competency of Italian troops can be easily accounted for by seeing how they fought in Italy after the Italian surrender against the Germans under Allied command. They performed admirably with American equipment and with American logistics supporting them.
So happy to have John Parshal and his legendary wallpaper. His veiws and understanding of 1942 and IJN operations is outstanding.
Thanks Woody, this podcast is top notch.
The wallpaper is a natural backdrop for the beard.
I was just thinking of that wallpaper 😂
Jon Parshall has incredibile range. I had thought he was a Pacific War expert, but he keeps showing knowledge in many areas.
The "1942" book is an excellent treatise on how SOME allied leaders and commanders directed the catch-up war. Nimitz/King, Charles Lockwood, Alexander Vandegrift, Wm
Halsey all accomplished more with less, and put the Japanese on their back foot the rest of the Pacific. The best commanders survived errors and put together the structure by the end of 1943, which would go on to crush the Empire of Japan. The character of the Pacific War of keeping pressure on the Japanese started with Admiral Ernest King, some still argue "before we were ready", but also before we had earned Japanese respect and even notice, which caused them to make critical errors very early which cost them the opportunity to evict the Marines from Guadalcanal, which as it happened,was the blow from which there would be no recovery. Those years when there were plenty of bleak hours let the light shine from where it could, and kept the fires lit while the boilers were firing up. It's a fascinating, drama that continues to educate those who will listen and learn, and shows the roads to perdition for those who will not. Still.
Did he mention that it was the Australians that beat the Japs first on land and that we were the dominate force in New Guinea
Always fascinating to listen to John. Great stuff.
I could listen to Jonathan Parshall all day long.
I could read Parshall all day too.
Back when the History Channel did Battle 360 Enterprise. They kept going to this guy named Parshall for background (black beard in 05). I thought what's the deal with this guy.
Then I read Shattered Sword that was all I needed to know!
Thanks so much for having Jon guest on your channel. He always brings a smile and some true insight to the discussion... and it will probably bring WW2TV more subscribers!
Actually, the Sherman was a quite decent tank. It was easy to operate and repair. In 1942 it was reasonably armed with a medium velocity 75mm gun that fired both high explosive and armoured piercing shells. It was also very reliable and fast. But most importantly, the Sherman was easy to produce in quantity.
Add in the capacity of the shipboard cranes setting a limit on just how heavy a tank could be fielded. Could the Sherman have been improved? Sure. As witnessed by the fact that late war Sherman's had very little in common with the early models. The biggest improvenent that could have been fone 3arly on in my opinion. A different engine for one (1). The aircooled radial had certain advantages. The pack of a cooling system for one. But it had bad points too. One of which was to increase the overall height. One possible source of engines if (2) the tooling (3) still existed would have been the Wright Conqueror or D-12 V-12 aero engines.
1) Produced with a variety of powerplants. The Wright radial, the twin GMC diesel two stroke inline sixes, the Chrysler Multibank, the Gubersten radial diesel and the Ford GA V-8.
2) If, biggest and slipperiest word in the English language. Right ahead of "is".
3) The patterns, forge dies, specialized cutting tools, fixtures etc.
Also if it recall correctly the first M4s to arrive in Egypt were actually shipped on an early roll on/roll off type ship that was built originally as a rail car transporter.
Yes it was a good tank and better than the Brit tanks However it tracks were soft and on the chase of Rommel west The Valentine and Armoured Cars took up the chase The Shermans had to be entrained .
@nigellawson8610 And too often ignored, the Sherman was capable of being transported from Detroit by rail and the European/North African battlefields by sea. America could have shifted earlier to a heavier tank but would have had trouble getting sizeable numbers to the battlefield WHEN they were needed.
@@mpetersen6 Good comment. The cranes were important, but just part of the transport problem. The rail lines from Detroit would have had trouble with a heavier tank. These were problems that could be solved, but that would take time. And the need was to put large numbers of tanks in the hands of Allied fighting forces as rapidly as possible.
Woody another absolutely brilliant session! Two of the very finest WW2 historians having a great meeting of minds on a key battle but in brilliant context to how Alameine strategy, force doctrine development, battle outcomes, key leadership & personalities all fit into the wider implications of 1942. For mine the way this executed more as an informed discussion and meeting of minds rather than a more pre-set presentation, really works in this case. A genuine and heartfelt Bravo Zule! and an apology for missing this brilliant session last year until today.
Yes, please dream up any excuse to get Parshall back on your show.
Fascinating discussion about El Alamein and touched on so many facets that the 1 3/4 hr programme just flew by!! Jon Parshall is always worth listening to, so thank you Paul for getting him on again. Great point about the conflict being between two power blocks and a single battle was never going to be "the turning point" or decide the outcome of the war.
I’m an American, and have studied WW2 for like 50 of my 56 years, and have nothing but the highest admiration of the British and Commonwealth soldiers that fought there. And despite the “Patton” image of Montgomery, I have nothing but admiration for him as a commander. And in the course of British history, El Alamein has to be one of the greatest battles. It is a victory as great as Waterloo or Trafalgar.
Yes but Monty was a prat, but he’s our prat. Just like Patton was an ass, but he’s our ass.
@@niesenjohn spot on. Montgomery was a rude cunt but an excellent general. Hence why history has not favoured him very well. He offended most of the people that wrote it.
@@johnburns4017 No...but thanks for playing.
Anybody think John Burns is a Monty fan?
The reason I rate Wavell higher than Monty is that Geographically, Wavell's domain was Huge included Iran Iraq. Monty was the Head of the 8th Army with just one job to destroy DAK
The British general who doesn't get the credit that was due to him was Claude Auchinleck. It was he who made the decision to prepare the El Alamein line as a fallback position. Because of his foresight he was able to stop Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. Auchinleck also receied tremendous from Conningham's Desert Airforce. Without the help of the RAF the 8th Army might have been routed after their defeat at the battle of Gazala.
No Auchinleck could not geton with his C/wealth Commanders and kept them in the dark Whereas Montgomery made it his business to speak to all his men. He did NOT wear the Aussie slouch hat because he liked it. His best fighting force identified with him
The Auk also after Churchill send him to India built a huge efficient Indian army that Slim used to drive the Japanese from Kohima to Singapore
Great point about the British Army.
Mr. Parshall has become my favorite author based on the books I read on WWII in my youth...now I feel older and wiser. Thanks to WWII TV, I get to hear him say "shot to pieces". I concur on the 25lber, and the Assuies. Their stance at New Guinea from Miline Bay, Way, Buna and Gona.
and many others according to the Australian War Museum Research centre we had 31 battles in New Guinea alone New Guinea was dominated by Australia.
Fantastic discussion. Jon is superb, would love to see him come back at some point.
The 25 pounder credit
Accession Number: 024513
Gunners of 2/8th Australian Field Regiment firing a 25-pounder during the July battle. Artillery was used at El Alamein on a massive scale, supporting the infantry when they went forward, and protecting them when they were counterattacked.
To be fair, the US army couldn't do proper combined arms until Normandy. That's when General Quesada put UHF radios in the P-47's and also with front line ground spotters.
I will just point to Guadalcanal, where Americans did use combined arms, Air, Sea, and ground forces and had fewer supplies than their enemy.
@@davidgladstone6588 PTO goes witout mention.
That's where Churchill LOST the British Empire!
Another brilliant program. I learn so much every time I tune in. God bless all who make these episodes possible. Thanks again.
I remember a scene from the movie Patton between Rommel and a German officer, the officer says "British commanders and American soldiers, the worst of everything" Rommel then replies "I remind you that Montgomery is a British commander, and he has driven us half way across Africa."
Do you think propaganda and screedplays (sic) are real history?!
Uhh I dont remember Rommel ever being on screen in Patton…wrong movie maybe?
Fantastic episode! Really impressed with Jonathan Parshall. His "1942" book sounds like it will be essential reading for WW2 buffs.
The 9th division was formed in 1939/40 and fought in Borneo until 2 months after the Japanese surrender so fought longer than most other armies.
Remember when the Americans landed in North Africa they didn’t know how to fight and the British held the line against the Germans until the Americans reorganised and learnt how to use their tanks. They needed the experience in Nth Africa before they could enter Europe
I served in the 12th SF with a former Luftwaffe Fallschirmjaeger who said his battalion went in to El Alamein supported by 2 tanks, 1 had a gun that would fire but turret wouldn't turn and the other had a turret that would turn but gun wouldn't fire, he also said they were getting only 1/3rd of the supplies they needed and were short of water. They walked into a mine field under heavy artillery fire which destroyed both tanks. They were cut off and surrounded by 2 full strength Canadian battalions and taking heavy casualties. The Canadians ordered them to surrender and not seeing any alternative other than to get wiped out, they accepted "the offer". He said the Canadians had lot of respect for the Fallschirmjaeger and treated them pretty them well. He said the Germans were in really bad shape going into El Alamein, short on supplies and parts and down on strength with no replacements.
No Canadian units were at El Alamein, so I wonder to whom your colleague surrendered
5 million Axis mines in depth...
@@allanhillman1958 I don't recall any Fallschirmjaeger there either.
There was no Canadian units at el Alamein
@dave3749 There was Ramcke's Parachute Brigade.
Love the show, and Jon Parshall is always a great guest!
I appreciate how you and your guests strive for an all around understanding of the event under discussion.😊
German counterattacks were easy to predict: there was a reason that the British troops came up with the saying 'there are three things certain in life: death, taxes, and German counterattacks'
57:20 of course Australians are the best infantry and yes the aggressive patrolling is definitely part of that , we learnt its importance in ww1 and its never let us down
@@OldWolflad The British only had one infantry division in the region until mid 1942 in the form of the 7th division which was renamed twice as first the 6th division in 1940 and then 70th division before the relief of Tobruk in 1941.
Montgomery selected Morshead and the 9th division to lead the attack and absorb Rommel's inevitable counterattack (it was German doctrine in two world wars) because they had done it before at Tobruk in 1941. The 9th division was also supremely confident that it could do it again.
The Australian's suffered 20% of the casualties at el Alamein despite numbering only 10% of the men. Montgomery himself said that he could not have won without the Australians.
@@guyh9992 And the Australians couldn’t have done it without all the other commonwealth nations. Hence why were all allied.
What about the Canadians
When asked which soldiers were the most proficient in the Desert Winston Churchill said the Australians.
What a lot of rot! And I'm an Australian.
Parshall is always worth a listen, what a Boss!
I thoroughly enjoyed the conversation between guest and host, as well as the many astute points made in the sidebar. What I took away from the episode was that for the first time, a General came along who was able to shape the 8th Army into an effective team. Regardless of what one thinks of Montgomery personally, one cannot deny that he accomplished what no other British commander had done in the desert campaign up the that point. My view is that El Alamein was a First World War set piece battle perfected by the new technologies not available then. Look at the artillery operations as is mentioned by John as an example. This was a superb show that provided great food for thought.
In viewing many WW2 videos, Montogery was famous for holding his forces back, when he was to go ahead, causing major problems for the others involved. I believe he did this during Market Garden, not real sure.
@@sandranatali1260 Thank you for responding Sandra. I think your statement about the many films and videos is apt. The views put forth in many of the videos are biased against Monty being decisive. Many of the film makers tend to only use references that they find to support this view, but fail to present opposing viewpoints. It's kind of what we see in the news media today. The truth takes much more work to discover.
I've read the opinion of Montgomery (sadly, I can't remember who said it) that he would have been "a great First World War general." I think this is pretty accurate.
EDIT: I found part of what I was looking for. Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker said of Montgomery, in a letter to historian Ronald Lewin, "Monty was a 1918 general."
i reckon the key factor is found with 1st alamein -it was the auk who showed how to stop the panzers using infantry as bait and arty on the ridges
Mr Parshall is really good value. Like his contribution a lot.
Global 1942. Good stuff Jon and Woody! Jon you tie the “big picture” perfectly. Loving it. I’m still playing catch up on your shows
Another great program- thank you.👍
Parshall is incredible.
Agreed
Absolutely top-notch show...the discussion both on screen and in the sidebar was first class. Only about 3 slides but sometimes not needed as today, with discussion and debate of this calibre.....well done to both of you.
Very interesting discussion. My biggest takeaway was the stellar performance of British artillery in supporting both the infantries initial defensive operations and subsequent counterattacks. I thought the tensions around Montgomery between guest and host+audience could have been explored but maybe that’s too overdone. Any time Jonathan Parshall is talking the conversation is worth listening to.
British field artillery was generally superb. Montgomery's insistence on fighting divisions intact, instead of scattering them in brigades fighting on their own. added to that effectiveness because it took better advantage of the centralize fire control and communications tools available.
@@executivedirector7467 They will not believe you. It is the latest thing to down play the Brits and Montgomery
Great to see Jon Parshall again, sound common sense plus genuine insight.
Another great talk. I loved the discussion that evolved between you two guys.
I can kind of understand the British attitude towards tanks providing infantry support to a degree. I think the main culprit is the 2pdr gun of early war British tanks and it's mediocre HE round that was so ineffective it wasn't even issued in North Africa. With a proper gun like the British started receiving with the US Lend Lease Grant and Sherman tanks earlier in the war the British world likely have seen the utility of tanks in infantry support as obviously as everyone else. For some reason every other major tank power thought of this in some way pre-war and you see tanks armed with 75mm low to medium velocity guns in service with the Germans, French, and American forces as soon as they can get them.
Very interesting presentation. Thank you
Midway was a Turning Point in that it negated the Japanese dominance in Carriers and reduced it to more or less parity. This freed even a careful command to consider going on the offensive operationally if not yet strategically.
Great choice of subject and great content thanks to both the presenters. Thank you.
Thanks for the nice comment Mark, and if you haven't already, please make sure you subscribe to WW2TV and perhaps consider becoming a member? ua-cam.com/channels/UC1nmJGHmiKtlkpA6SJMeA.htmljoin
Yay! Huge Parshall fan!
More of a general comment about the morale victory that 2nd El Alemaine privided, but i think one of the things the Montgomery does not get enough credit for was being the first British general who didnt give into the pressure Churchill was placing on various field commanders to attack prematurely. For that alone he deserves praise and his following success speaks for itself.
Really fascinating, informative, interesting conversation with this author.
Sure Monty had the numbers advantage but he still had to overcome extremely formidable defences, 600,000 mines and a whole line of anti tank guns. Defending is much easier than attacking.
Thanks!
The inability to use Combined Arms on part of the British is quite staggering really, by 1939 British battalions and divisions were equipped with those weapons they needed, whilst supporting weapons such as tanks and artillery were provided at Corps level by ancillary units. It looked good theoretically, but it left British commanders dangerously reliant on fire support weapons that they did not directly control. In reality, British commanders had to go through the time-consuming business of requesting back-up, so could not react quickly or spontaneously. So, these coordination problems seriously hampered the mobility of the British. The Germans on the other hand had the structure to generate superior fire-power by coordinating the assets of several layers of command.
The New Zealand 2nd Division were indeed probably the best offensive or mobile division on the Allied side, well Rommel thought so, followed by the Aussies. Agree underrated 4th Indian and South African 1st Division need much more praise. British hindered somewhat by static battle philosophy, but whilst some British divisions were poorly trained and unreliable (notably conscript), don't forget British 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Divisions who were excellent. Rommel also specifically acknowledged toughness of 7th Division whom he described as "the mainstay of the 8th Army", and British Guards Brigade, stating: - "The Guards Brigade was almost the living embodiment of the virtues and faults of the British soldier - tremendous courage and tenacity combined with a rigid lack of mobility. At one battle this division had mauled our German units".
Whilst the Anzacs were probably the most adept and most mobile in the heat of the desert, Rommel's Commander-in-Chief Siegfried Westphal thought the British Divisions were the toughest opposition, stating: - “The hardest, toughest in attack, and most persistent in defence were the British divisions, and of these the 7th Armoured Division was undoubtedly the best. The uniformity of the British personnel was most striking. One saw not so much extraordinary audacity but the absence of failures. The 2nd New Zealand division was also outstanding in its fighting ability.”
Also don't forget the British 70th Infantry Division (really the 6th) who had earlier broken out of Tobruk under Auchinleck to end the siege, losing half as many men in 19 days of savage fighting against Rommel's forces that the heroic Aussies lost on six months at Tobruk, and also Operation Torch involved the elite British 78th 'Battleaxe' Division, formed from various veteran units.
But yes it was largely a multi-national Commonwealth force, involving Greeks and Free-French too.
The opponents will not agree.
46:44 artillery for the win , again a Vietnam reference at the battle of Long Tan Aussie and New Zealand artillery was firing 6 rounds a minute per barrel then multiply that by a regiment . We learnt this at Alamain
Artillery conquers infantry occupies.
Artillery wins battles, the infantry determines only how much - Napoleon
@@TheDavidlloydjones North Vietnamese had some serious artillery. In most of the South the NVA & Viet Cong used mortars and rockets but in the north the NVA had Soviet 152 & 130mm tubes stationed just north of the DMZ and in Laos. Their guns were often well dug in or in caves. They could outrange US 105 & 155mm artillery. The US troops in I Corps at Con Thien, Gio Linh, & Khe Sanh etc were recipients of heavy artillery bombardments. When US 175mm guns were established at Camp Caroll and the Rock Pile we could utilize counter battery fire. This is a stretch cause I was infantry. “That’s all I’ve got to say about that.”
One of our presidents up here at Upwey/Belgrave RSL, was artillery at Long Tan, a great bloke with a good story.
General Jake Devers of US Armored Forces and my great grandfather, General Ted Brooks, flew around Africa in December 1942 into January 1943 debriefing British leadership regarding Armored combat tactics and strategy that had turned the tide against Rommel. Their analysis guided much of US doctrine and training going forward.
Ah , Ted Brooks the CG of the 2nd Armored Division and then the VI Corps. Been looking for a biography of
him for quite some time .
@@michaelsurace1028 I have all the material but probably won’t get the time to do it until my retirement. Planning to be a guest here in December, though! 😊
@@michaelsurace1028 in the meantime I maintain his Wikipedia entry. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_H._Brooks
Hope you get a round to it some day . Very few bios of Corps or Division commanders out there. Even Jacob Devers only recently had bios written about him.
Mostly in a negative sense though. US armored divisions were reorganized so as to imitate German practice, and they mostly succeeded in 1943-45 in operating as flexible combined-arms formations. The British persisted right to the end of the war with the obsolete armored division organization of a tank brigade and an infantry brigade. There were few SP artillery systems in British armored divisions, very little mechanized infantry, poor organization and poor leadership in most of the armored divisions (Roberts being by far the best of their armored division commanders).
US armor absolutely did NOT follow British practices.
Learned a load more.. many thanks you guys..
Very interesting discussion with a different perspective. Long wait for the book.
Woody/Jon,
Great presentation. Very informative. For the first time, I felt emotive in a WW2TV presentation! Thanks. Bob
Thanks for the nice words, I had a ball myself
Some Australian troops also captured Rommels communications intel unit early in the Battle. With men, vehicles, gear and top secret info.
621st Radio Intercept, July 1942. They also had RDF.
pdf THE CAPTURE OF UNIT 621, AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL
Folgore fought with great distinction at Alamein and, as I recall, were allowed to surrender bearing arms by the British as they marched into captivity. This honor was not given to any other Axis unit in WWII. (If memory serves)
The current Folgore Parachute Brigade are very proud of their El Alamein battle honour today. Their last sole veteran of that battle Santino Pellichi was given pride and place in all anniversary commomerations till his death 2 years ago. If you're interested about the WW2 Folgore, check out Neil Lawrence's show on WW2TV a year ago.
That is magnificent
As Churchill said about Alemein. "Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."
Yes that fat slug had a way with words
I have the Time Life picture book on WW2 from the 60s. Read it all as a kid. It covered the North African theatre fairly well. Gruesome picture of British officer sitting on the sand with his side caŕved out by an 88 round that hit him.
Need to remember that Montgomery and other senior British officers experienced the trench warfare of WW1 which informed their opinion that for victory to be certain you needed overwhelming superiority , especially in artillery which was responsible for the vast majority of casualties . That superiority took time to build . People may say “ ah what about blitzkrieg ? “ . Blitzkrieg was a tactical rather than strategic theory and the German generals knew that in France in 1940 they were very lucky and got away with it . Joined up allied thinking , as in the Ardennes offensive , would have seen it off .
Great show!
It is stunning to learn that the British Armor and Infantry were at Normandy and STILL couldn't fight beside each other. It makes it very difficult to maintain a coalition. The more I listen to historians like the ones running this program (and their zssociates), the more I understand how close run the war was at its onset. Thanks to our historian/hosts. Well done. Thank you. You turned some lights on for me. This is the THIRD time I've watched this program. I could (and probably will)watch it again.
this is from an American perspective, so what can you expect
@@terrysmith9362 This is not the only account of difficulties with fighting along side the Brits. In listening and reading other accounts about the problems they had, I'm still amazed that after all of that fighting ... supposedly side by side ... they still didn't seem to be very concerned about the inability of artillery and infantry or infantry and armor to solve the problem. During 1942 in particular, there was a tremendous amount of parochial infighting between the Army and the Navy, the Army Air Corp and the Infantry and other branches on both sides. It seemed to be a bigger problem between the Americans and the Brits. While I did expect some of it early on, I figured that after about 3 years of fighting and suffering heavy casualties, the problem would not still be so serious that it would catch the attention of historians 60+ years later. They were still arguing about whether to standardize between metric and the American system of measurement !!! What did I expect? I expected BOTH sides to quit bitching, to work it out and reduce the number of casualties. I think that is a realistic expectation. I suppose that I gave both sides more credit that it seems they deserved.
It's the same as in every army...see, the American marines in Vietnam, major, major problem, not their greatest 10yrs !
The British army in WW2 had many strengths but combined arms ops were never one of them. Robert Forczyk has a good diagnosis of this problem in his new book on the desert campaign.
They had no unified doctrine and thus no training or organization to support combined arms operations. And you are absolutely right that these weaknesses show up in 1944-45. The 11th Armoured Division was nearly alone in seeing the problem and seriously trying to deal with it.
@@dancolley4208 Brits 19 days beat 116000 those Germans ran away 1700 miles and were still good enough to give the USArmy a hiding.
Brilliant discussion. We need more of the same with Jon. Wish I could have asked what either of think of how we might have survived 1942 if we'd had today's social media
It was a logistical turnpoint with the US ramping up to full production and the German economy reaching its limits.
When the Italians were well led, despite their equipment problems, they were not too bad. Their parachute divisions were first rate.
I remember starting to learn about WW2 reading the Warlord and Victory magazines and annuals.
Yep, me too
When John Parshall mentions Corelli Barnett, that sealed the deal for me! Parshall shows he is a brilliant student of war and clearly had read Barnett's great book, The Audit of War.
An absolute pleasure watching this treatise on a battle with so many nuances.
excellent as usual
A discussion that was enjoyable to listen to.. Nice perspectives put out on Monty from you two and the side bar talks. Still amazed at the the fortitude shown by the Desert Rats on overcoming those minefields over multiple days and nights of fighting. Amazing job the 'Sappers' had to do under fire. Quite a victory for the Commonwealth Forces.
Great show. I can’t wait for the 1942 book to come out.
Enjoyed this now that I finally listened to the end. After the first 15 minutes I thought it was going to descend into the usual American bashing of Montgomery, but it actually didn't, so that was a relief.
What wasn't addressed is that Montgomery very cleverly predicted the battle would last circa 12-14 days and he was spot on. The anticipated casualties were also predicted by him reasonably accurately.
Lastly, I feel Montgomery is overly criticised (not here in this discussion, thankfully) for letting Rommel escape after El Alamein but few realise that the 8th Army still did an amazing 1,300km in 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942. And that was immediately after fighting a near two week gruelling battle and getting through half a million mines. It wasn't Montgomerys fault that the retreating Axis force, much lighter and less encumbered and with a head start, managed to keep that bit ahead of him. If anyone knows of a longer and faster advance by any other army in WW2, particularly immediately after fighting a major battle, well Id like to hear about it.
I don't think we will encounter any Monty bashing during this set of shows
I very much hope so Paul. I enjoyed you pointing out that those under his command seemed to think highly of him, as opposed to those on his level and over.
Here is the text of a letter Matt Ridgway wrote to Montgomery after The Bulge:
""It has been an honor and a privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal"
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yes and whatever forces slipped away were minimal anyway, Historian Matthew Cooper said that were less than 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, and 12 field howitzers left. The Afrika Corps out of 116,000 soldiers lost 111,000 men.
Bullet-Tooth Tony,
Indeed. I don't see why even historians seem to think the 8th Army should have caught up with Rommel, who had a head start. Rommel didn't exactly have many tanks and heavy weapons to drag along. He had a lighter skeleton force that could keep ahead of the more heavily weighed down 8th Army. There were also some very major rains on I think it was the 7th or 8th November that hampered movements. Its true to say Rommel was affected by the rains too, but he didn't have to haul the vehicles that Montgomery did. Also, Montgomery did not want to overstretch his forward echelons and risk a back hander from Rommel.
The 8th Army did well to move that far and that fast immediately after El Alamein.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Not to mention the amount of prisoners of war captured slowing the Eighth army down over 49,000 men. Rommel described the Eighth armies advance to his wife in a letter as "vulture like"
A lot of people cite El Alamein as a turning point in the struggle against Rommel’s forces - but we have to remember this was all about the fight for the Allies to hold onto the Egyptian oil fields. The Germans were desperate for oil.
One event, well before El Alamein, that prevented Rommel Rommel from pushing through to Egypt was the Australians and the British Artillery holding onto Tobruk. Churchill wanted them to stand firm against Rommel for 2 -3 weeks.
The Aussies ( named the rats of Tobruk by Rommel ) gel on for six months!
( until relieved by South Africans - which eventually surrendered)
Those six months were crucial in the Allies being able to build up their forces for counter attack
I agree, but it wasn't all about the oil. At some point the Axis forces need to be taken on and bested
British artillery was superb in WW2. On the 25 Pounder though, yes, it had a high rate of fire but it NEEDED a high rate of fire to do the job because of the small shell it fired. The US and German 105s could do the same job with far less ammo expediture.
An overlooked good feature of the 25 pounder is its better range than the US or German 105.
However,Parshall is right to stress the responsiveness of British artillery. That's what it's about. That's how they greatly exceeded German capability.
I really feel like people underestimate suppression & disrupting fire, a bullet whizzing past your ear means that the other guy can see you & potentially hit you.
The same works for artillery, the first shell doesn't get you, but now you have to get to ground & hope the next one doesn't, if the guns can fire 3-6rpm then you've got 10 seconds between impacts to recover, check your guts ar3 still in place & find a hole in the ground/get back into your tank & button up
@@NM-wd7kx Quite right. Almost all fire is suppressive fire.
But the rate of fire of individual guns isn't especially relevant here. A battery doesn't fire all guns at once. It staggers them so the enemy cannot tell how many weapons are firing and to keep up that suppressive effect as continuously as possible. Add in multiple batteries and the ROF of any single piece becomes irrelevant.
Frank Chadwick talks about the lack of combined arms in the British Army in his brilliant work entitled "The Honor of the Regiment." Regimental traditions of many years had an impact on the reluctance to embrace any universal tactical doctrine.
Quite right. It was like a bunch of separate clubs with little doctrinal sharing between them. Also contributed to a really serious lack of professionalism.
Montgomery was a superb professional and this is what pissed off a lot of his colleagues.
@@executivedirector7467 I was a member of one of those clubs as you say.
A very interesting presentation by Jon with yet another perspective on the battles in N Africa. Woody, its a high standard you have to keep up for the next 2 weeks of this El Alamein series to match the last 2 shows, but I'm sure WW2TV won't let us down.
What can they show ? After El Alamein it was the US Army that was utterly defeated at Kasserine
@@jacktattisRommel’s Pyrrhic victory. He couldn’t afford those losses while not achieving all his goals.
@@rinkevichjm He did achieve his goal brush aside the USArmy before the 8th Army arrived
@@jacktattis no he failed to get to the HQs behind the pass as he was stopped by heavy artillery and close air support. Within days he withdrew from the passes and they were reoccurred and Patton started an offensive.
@@rinkevichjm He had to withdraw It was not the US that made him cautious it was Montgomery and the 8th Army that gave him worries.
At that time of the war the USArmy did not phase the Germans
John gives a very interesting US view of the Battle of El Alamein.
The Italian paratroops “Fologre” fought off numerous Allied attacks.
In my humble opinion, “Patton” as a movie is a terrible depiction of history at many levels. Yes, brilliant performance by George C. Scott, tremendous musical,score….. but……
Just a side note, the US Army worked very hard with the limited resources at its disposal in the 1930’s to develop the doctrine of what became known as “concentrated fires from distributed positions,” to achieve rapid concentration of time on target fires from dispersed firing units. The development of The distributed fire control center (our fire direction center) was based on the revolutionary concept (at the time) of tailoring the build of a specific radio technology on the requirements of the Fire Direction Center.
That radio technology was the military and civilian FM radio, and the US Army held all 14 patents for FM radio technology until their expiration.
Perhaps the two single greatest applications for FM radio in my life was its role in my Army career and driving across my native Texas with AC/DC’s “Thunderstruck” with the volume set to “11”.
Loved this segment, as it demonstrates the brilliance and professionalism of British Commonwealth artillery men in this campaign. On the ground, over time and on their own they developed and implemented exactly the intent of that doctrine, in a desolate, harsh and unforgiving hell of a theater.
Well done.
US and British artillery were world-class in WW2 because of the sophisticated fire control methods used. No one else got close to that level of quality.
'The British hadn't been winning before Alemein'
I disagree.
Alexander was a timid General he did not demand Clarks replacement when he went to liberate Rome against orders thus allowing the German Army to escape I think that was the tipping point where the British were shoved to the side.
Monty made it his business to identify with his troops And kept them in the picture The Auke I do not think so.
The picture of Montgomery at 13:11 looks like he's stolen Bill Slim's jungle hat
I used to know a chap who was some kind of maintenance officer for a dozen trucks in the desert, " I never lost a truck". He said "we just didn't have the equipment in the beginning". And added something like - but when the Americans came in things changed.
He also tried to give me three feet of old house pipe. Realising I didn't want it (I have a work vehicle full of tools, which maybe reminded him of the old days. I wish it was a 1939 Matador but it's a 2015 Focus), he said something like - "in the desert we never threw anything away, because you never knew when you might get any more supply" , because he was maybe a bit embarrassed and wanted to explain why he was offering me his old tat.
I wish I'd taken it now.
Note: not making this up . I did work at his house and he had a very successful career in the police and lived to be 90+ Very interesting man.
Some day in the near future I am going to have time to actually catch a live show. The side bar as always has interesting conversations. More so in this presentation. As for Jon I have a deep respect for his knowledge from an operational point and hope I am still alive when he finishes his book on 1942 lol. El Alamein was one of those battles I remember seeing in one of the History in pictures of WW II that my uncle had. Its too bad my relatives threw away those 3 books circa 1949 I think. I was perhaps about 10 or 11. Whenever we visited I would look through the pages and I recall the picture of the commonwealth soldiers charging with his bayonet mounted Enfield past a knocked out Pz III and the caption saying that it took place at El Alamein. Great show Woody
Thanks for the nice comment
Montgomery’s reputation will never recover from Montgomery’s attempts to manage Montgomery’s reputation.
Australian and New Zealand artillery where still using the stonk in Vietnam . Dont think we have the barrels to do it anymore
You don't need the barrels for it, It's build into the fire control systems now. A battery of 3 to 9 guns each fire multiple shots, timed on target. It took time for me to get my head around to it but because the modern ones are a lot more accurate, they're actually more deadly.
3 Modern guns can do what a 100 older guns can (yes, the discrepancy is really that high). My problem with this reasoning is that a 100 guns can do something that 3 guns can never do: Loose 3 guns and still be a fighting unit.
@@exharkhun5605 Yup. Modern systems can put a bunch of rounds in the air, from one tube, that will all hit at the same time. Not only that, they can be moving before the first round impacts.
Truly insightful stuff as we are coming to expect from you and your many contributors. The format knocks spots off the dryness of so many books etc and the opportunity to 'go down rabbit holes' and discuss further certain points is captivating. My view re the whole western desert campaign is the profound shift in initiative arising from intelligence. For much of 41 and 42 Rommel was blessed with Bonner Fellers giving a strategic overview of the British order of battle and more. Further he benefited from tactical knowledge from world leading field intelligence. He subsequently lost both as the Ultra information became more and more available to Montgomery. Intelligence itself did not win the campaign but it went a long way to dictating who held the initiative and was able to respond best to the very many confused encounters at critical points in the battle.
Considering that, Sir John Monash first developed Combined Arms towards the end of World War 1, and used it to great effect winning battles several time.
It is most unlikely that the senior ANZAC officers were not aware of this tactic.
John Monash was comanding the battle in WW1 when he implemented the Combined Arms Strategy in El Alamein the Australians and Kiwis were part of the 8th Army and followed Montgomery's battle strategies.
yes Blamey Morshead over in New Guinea Allan Cyril White Yes we had the more experienced Officers right though WW2 e.g. Patton 1916 Patton Chasing Villa and not catching him Australians winning and losing in France but actually fighting
Operation compass ended with a crushing victory over the Italians. Operation crusader thanks to Auchinlek and a blunder by Rommel was a success. The background to what happened there is very different to 2nd Alamein. Also Auchinlek stopped Rommel at 1st Alamein. Montgomery benefitted from clearing house with full authority of Alexander and Churchill to get his commanders to do what he ordered.
Monty's force at El Alamein was not the first highly diverse - in terms of nationalities - British-led Army. Remember Wellington's army at Waterloo ?
Regarding Rommel - I wonder how different would be his image post-War if he'd fought on the Eastern Front
Does John mention when the 1942 book is expected?
I think next year
Certainly Alamein was when the Brits in Africa stopped getting in their own way as much as Rommel did.
Definitely legend . Great historian, great storyteller.
Hard to do anything during this show. Jon Parshall is a compelling speaker.
Yes he is
Yes, it's eyes front the whole time.
Jon at the end is quite correct, in complex operations like a major battle, rarely is it one matter that determines victory. But I would say that there is one overriding matter that was the major factor. beginning in 1942 which is the focus of his book. And that was the massive material superiority of the Allies once America came into the War. The Arsenal of Democracy was still just gearing up at the beginning of 1942, but by the end of the year, it was beginning to make itself felt in far-flung battlefields, including the ones that Jon ticks off--Alamein, Torch, and Guadalcanal. Aid reaching the Soviets was limited in 1942, but by early 1943 had begun reaching the Red Army in real quantity.
Word of the day: " Pollyglot"..... carry on.
I realize that people are different and in different places, but "Shattered Sword" changed what I "knew" about Midway. Trent Hone's "Learning War" (which I just finished) was another mind-changer. While much is made of US technology superiority in the Pacific, what really cemented it and was the battle-changing development was the materiel and organizational structure to collect, integrate, and communicate to pictures coming from various sensors and observers. That development, the CIC, is kind of mentioned casually in passing in books I've read. Hone has much more, of course. "Sword" and "Learning" give the doctrinal and people context in which decisions were made and actions were taken.
After 80yrs Americans still Monti bashing, not sure why, what American general would you put in command of the battle ?
You mean among the comments? Because Jon isn't a Monty Basher
How about Lloyd Fredenhall??!!😂🤣
At ~1:31 Parshall distills the matter to epitaph quality "The Germans were trying to do too many things at once".
I think labeling this as the “American perspective” is divisive and not surprising some people looked at the presentation from an America v British perspective. Ironically, during the presentation Paul asks Jon what was Montgomery thinking? Then goes on to say lavish praise that Jon is really good at being neutral. 26:18 if it is a nuetral point of view, which I do believe, the labeling as “American perspective” seem off.
And we all saw Rat Patrol. The Desert War was three jeeps driving around with a machine gun zapping Jerries
As late as Caen in 1944, the British had the tendency to employ their tanks unsupported in mass (Co, Bn, and Brigade). The British also failed to support infantry with on-call air and artillery, except for what was organic to the smaller units. I was told by an 8th army infantryman that the only support they relied on were their heavy machine guns and light mortars. He was at El Alamein, on.
@JimLecka Most of those problems were ironed out by 30th July in Operation Bluecoat.
Really interesting idea from Trent Telenko about Pedestal being the decisive carrier battle of '42. Don't think I agree, but I enjoy thought provoking ideas like that.
Pedestal was a clear tactical defeat for the British; they suffered heavy losses and dished out very little in return (I think 2 Axis Subs sunk and ~50 aircraft shot down).
Secondly, the American invasion in early November was coming, so a little bit more/less Axis supplies getting to NA wasn't going to change the impending doom of the Afrika Corps. Force K simply did not have that kind of decisive impact by this point in the war.
Finally, it's only really a carrier battle if the other side is bringing carriers of their own to the party, which neither the RM nor KM was. The 4 key carrier battles of '42 remain Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz, each of which stopped a major Axis offensive in its tracks.
@@johnburns4017 Sure, the strategic goals of the British were met so in that sense definitely a strategic victory. But also clearly a defeat on the tactical level. You could also argue that Malta was declining in strategic importance by this time, since we now know that Operation Torch and El Alamein were coming and would ultimately prove decisive in North Africa, with or without Malta's nice contribution in September-December to the attrition of Axis convoys.
@@johnburns4017 Of course I'm operating with hindsight, that's what we do when we analyze history. It's one of our most valuable tools, not sure why you would disparage it. Of course no one knew that Torch was going to happen; they also didn't know if rescuing Malta would prove decisive. They certainly sacraficed a lot based on the hope that it would be...
@@johnburns4017 I agree.
@@johnburns4017 I 100% agree, one of the challenges of historians is putting themselves in the shoes of the participants and really trying to see things (and help their readers to see things) from that perspective. This is an indispensable tool. But so too is the tool of evaluation with hindsight. We ought to use both to do our analysis. But your point is well taken :)
@@johnburns4017 I agree that Somerville failing to hit Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean was a big missed chance. On the other hand, had that become a daytime battle, he would have gotten his clock cleaned by the 5 best IJN Fleet Carriers, so perhaps some caution was warranted :).
Regarding the US planes having radar at Midway - correct me if I'm wrong but Kido Butai wasn't even spotted until around 6 AM on June 4, and was wiped off the order of battle by that same evening, so not sure how radar would have mattered on that specific day. Might have helped hit the invasion force though, which was spotted the day before!