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What is Nominalism? (Universals and Abstracts)
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- Опубліковано 12 сер 2024
- An explication of two different kinds of Nominalism, Nominalism about Universals and Nominalism about Abstract Objects. Including the distinction between universal and particulars and the distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects.
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
I do consider myself a Nominalist, though only after being referred to as one by a professor of mine who pointed me at this particular philosophical niche. My big push is that when two people are talking to eachother, about some weighty issue, typically, they can be using precisely the same words and still not be talking about the same things. This comes down to the idea that objects do not become interwoven with their names. There is no universal voodoo that binds an object to a concept. Because what is a chair? Well, there's a flat part, a back part, and a floor part, typically. A "chair" is convenient to sit down on, and stand up from. However, you can go to another "chair" and it be totally different, think Dining table chair versus office chair. They look different, however, they have some parts that are reminiscent of eachother and they serve a similar purpose. But the name doesn't mean anything until we agree to put the two objects in the same category. You can go outside right now and find an object that is lacking the flat bit, the back bit, and the floor bit, and call it a chair, but the name doesn't make it a chair. Why? Because there's not some eternal chair-god that you're invoking to magically transform it into a chair, but rather, you are invoking the person that you are speaking to and asking them to agree with the premise that the object is a chair. So you can see how this can become complicated in politics and such where two people are invoking the name of a certain philosophy like capitalism, or socialism, or democracy, or conservatism, or liberalism, etc ad nauseam. Two people can use precisely the same terms based on their perception of the terms, but until two people agree to use the same MEANINGS, all they're doing is throwing names of things at eachother and expecting the other to understand.
Thanks for your input on this matter. I find it fascinating. Please allow me to contribute.
Your view appears to be similar to what Noam Chomsky posited. He argued that words are useful in a conventional sense, i.e. if there is no ambiguity about what we are talking about then the name is correct - I will call this conventionalism. In a practical sense, the notion of conventionalism appears to be stable when referring to physical objects such as chairs but becomes unstable when referring to concepts such as capitalism. For example, phones are vastly different today from what they were 50 years ago, and indeed there is no ambiguity in what we mean when talking about a phone. In a sense, the meaning of the object has evolved with the object. But there seems to be a problem when talking about 'concepts'. Let's say, for example, you and I agree on what sales and marketing are without considering their a priori values (or what they are meant to be), then we run the risk of foolishly making sense to one another. It appears, therefore, that a concept is more like a wrapper for holding together various 'a priori' values, functions or properties. In turn, this explains why the meaning of a concept does not naturally migrate, in a conventional sense, similar to that of an object. Therefore, there must be some kind of abstract or ideal form (as it were), from which we instantiate the meaning of concepts, and in so doing, retain the efficacy of our discussion (as much as possible).
Anyway, thanks for sharing your thoughts. I look forward to hearing from you in this regard. And yes, I could also be sleeping right now. hehehe
www.vusisindane.com
Gottlob Frege (a platonist) dicovered the same issue as you did, this is solved by sense and reference, you should read his wikipedia article (unless you want to read a lot of pages about logic in math)
Considering sense and reference as separate*
Does this then not just mean that the word "chair" and the different objects that can classify as chairs simply broadens our understanding of what a "chair" is? The universal is still the same (but a broader spectrum than what the individual who envoces the word knows), it is more that us individuals that speak of these words have flawed/limited/dogmatic understandings about the words we use?
@@ignaciovargas3237 I thought he, she or they wasn't an academic philosopher, I consider myself a nominalist and it was like this from studying it years ago which slipped because I forgot all about it then I realised it's the truth, it was displaced by conceptualism, what bullshit, there's no computerness of a computer or the rockness, they're made of molecules which boil down to strings. It's that simple although nothing is simple with the people I'm with.
P.S. I should add that I find your channel to be an excellent resource for the layman philosopher, so thanks for the hard work you so obviously have put into the content.
+David Martin Thanks! I'm glad to help. Thanks for watching!
Firstly, thank you for the brilliantly precise and clear explanation.
I think I'm a nominalist both in respect to universals as well as abstracts, and go hand in hand with classist.
As my psychologist says, I'm more of a head person than a heart person, a very fitting description of my perspective on Life.
As a french studying philosophy, I find it very helpful, thanks a lot.
I am more confused after listening to this
I may be oversimplifying this, but basically, just to use maths as an example like the video, consider the old question about whether or not mathematics is "invented" or "discovered". Nominalism is closer to "invented", whereas realists/Platonists believe that it is "discovered". If it helps, remember that the 'nom' in nominalism just means name, so whereas a realist thinks that abstract objects are real, a nominalist thinks that they are just names (or concepts, definitions, etc.)
I'm not that good at explaining things succinctly, so I hope I didn't make things more confusing haha, but if you want to read more, this article might help, I haven't read through the full thing, but the opening two paragraphs explain the subject clearly enough imo: iep.utm.edu/universa/
@@cmswrD thx for your explanation could you tell the the difference between materialism and nominalism?
@@user-td3ut4tg3v Materialism is the philosophy that everything that exists is "physical", i.e. no spiritual elements, supernatural, or abstract objects. Nominalism is similar, but only denies the existence of universals/abstract objects. All materialists are nominalists (or at least conceptualists, which is a type of nominalist), but not all nominalists are materialists.
This finally cleared the issue for me. Thank you so much.
it's seems incorrect to me. Universals are also abstracts. And those abstracts you presented are universals. In platonism there's nondifference between let's say >redness
and idea of the colour "red"
I noticed something similar: if nominalists claim that there are no such thing as universals because everything is particular, that creates a problem for them since particularity becomes a universal.
Our language fed our capability to define - and redefine - our environment. We stopped saying "A mammoth and a mammoth and a mammoth" by saying "three mammoths". Now, none of these may have equaled the other in most ways, but the mammoths were abstracted. Or: we talked about "two little mammoths and a big one", so we categorized them. All these things are not "natural" since reality is far too complex to be shoved in convenient boxes. It's something we constructed and codified. It's what I call "constructs".
That is not to say animals are completely void of constructs. My dogs shoves his drinking bowl to me when he wants to drink - which is clearly symbolical. He goes to the door when he needs to go out - although he is unable to leave without my permission.
We store these symbols in "states". When I write the name of my wife in the wet sand, all I do i change its state - but when decoded it bears significance in the sense that it transmits information and concepts. Our brain cells also have "states". Now these states are real, but at the same time "weightless" - unlike true objects. They are not timeless, because time changes states. And the state itself is not actually representing the concept. A painting is nothing more than a few strokes of color on a 2D surface. It isn't a pipe and my dog won't recognize it as a pipe - because it doesn't look like a pipe or smell like a pipe or make a sound like a pipe (falling).
So I cannot but conclude that constructs are not real. It is a veil we put upon the real world in order to understand it and communicate about it in a comprehensive way. But that having said, they are too handy a tool to dismiss so easily as "unreal", because that carries a negative connotation. Personally, I don't think it is a meaningful question - since it carries little consequence IMHO. Even "unreal" we won't stop using them and it doesn't change our view of the world if they are "unreal".
I'd rather contemplate if concepts are "valid", a useful tool to observe, describe and analyze reality - or not.
What exactly is at stake in this debate between Nominalism and Realism? How does this affect the way one lives out their practical lives?
The gender debate is probably the most relevant.
Did you hear it? That was my mind being blown. Now I can understand Osgood's theory on the semantic differential. THANK YOU!!!!!
As someone new to this, it seems (feels) more likely to me that nominalism is my position, both to universals and abstracts. But isn't this hunch just a feeling? I could intuit wrongly here. How would I go about deriving the truth of nominalism? Or is this a core issue in philosophy that ultimately boils down to preference/psychology?
Very true! In Philosophy its all about the questions not the answers...
@@sarahf1155 Philosophy's about the truth, truth is, truth is just being. There's no such thing as a philosopher without a course in philosophy.
I liked your content, I will share and use your teaching platform in my classes, Brazil will love your content, keep it up, success.
Got a question, all these things are really relationships between the 'observer' ie. 'blue' only exists in that sense (the reflection of light onto my eye' and a label, 'blue' I've been taught to distinguish part of the spectrum And likewise how I label the relationship of a group (say, '8'), so all I'm really doing is nominalizing process, (seeing frames rather than the movie), so where Do I stand in this model?
+Jimbo Jones It depends. Do you think that there exists something out there, namely blue, which is instantiated by all of the things that you can distinguish are blue, or that there is no real universal out there that these things have in common that makes them all blue in virtue of instantiating that property? The first is a realist, the second is a nominalist.
+Carneades.org er, well I'd say the only common factor would exist in how my brain translates the information that reaches my eyes, beyond that it doesn't exist, so does a 2nd Order 'construct 'blue' qualify as a 'realist' view or as a 'nominalist' category?
I feel like I'm a nominalist but I'm not sure I really wish there was more dialogue about this subject
The only ontology that nominalism seems to be able to offer is a very long list of radically unique individual things with no relation to and nothing in common with anything else on that list. The trouble then, beyond rendering cognition and perception unintelligible, is how nominalism is compatible with science, which seeks not just to know the concrete relations that happen to obtain between this individal thing and that individual thing, but the relations between *kinds* of things, like potassium molecules and h2o. Science also needs to be able to *explain* the relations between kinds of things, i.e., it needs to be able to say in virtue of what this kind of thing has such-and-such an effect on that kind of thing in order to make predictions about other kinds of things that share the causally relevant features in common with the kinds of things whose effects are already known. An ontology consisting in only concrete particulars, and which denies the existence of commonalities and kinds, seems to render science impossible.
Causality is a challenging thing to describe. Not to mention all of the problems with holes. :) ua-cam.com/video/5B9224txYNg/v-deo.html
@@CarneadesOfCyrene I think the bigger problem for nominalism has to do with kinds: if no spatiotemporally disjoint things literally have any one thing in common, as seems to be entailed by the claim that everything is concrete and particular (setting aside abstract particulars and concrete universals, which i don't think ultimately help anyways), then why do we group some things together, but not others. Kind nominalism tries to get around this by saying every possible grouping is just as real as any other, but only some will be useful to us. So, all the red things constitute a group, just as my shoe, the sun, and the Bluejay in the tree outside all constitute a group, not because the things in either group have anything in common with each other, but just because (thier membership in those groups is necessary and brute). But the kind nominalist therefore has no explanation for why some groupings are useful and others are not. The antinominalist has a ready answer: because all the red things have something in common (whereas my shoe, the sun, and the Bluejays do not). Insofar as science makes inferences based on what things have in common (e.g., thing A will have similar effects on thing C as thing B does because they're both chunks of plutonium and are radioactive) there seems to be tension between science and nominalism.
Nice and simple explained. Thank you!
thank you
can you claim that abstract objects are relativistic and universal are not (or maybe follow a somewhat similar formula/model)?
What exactly do you mean by relativistic? Are you talking about our perception of them or the objects themselves?
I am not a nominalist. Why? Well, does do thoughts and thinking exist? of course they do. Are they concrete? I don't think so.
Distinguished between abstract object and concrete object . Explain and examine nominalism theory
I'm a computer scientist with an interest in philosophy and often wrestle with the problem of the same terminology being used differently in the two paradigms. It often seems that there is much overlap in meaning but seldom complete agreement between the two. In this case hopefully you can help me. In computer science, we often use the terms concrete and abstract to simply differentiate between the (abstract) type of an object (which cannot be instantiated, and (concrete) instances of that type. How far does this match the definitions you use here and to what degree and in what way do the philosophical uses of these terms differ from this?
An example would be fruit (abstract) and orange (a concrete instantiation of fruit). This distinction forms the basis for defining hierarchies of types and is commonly used in the object oriented paradigm of system design and development.
+David Martin You may want to check a couple Numberphile videos: "Do numbers exist?" and "Philosophy of Numbers." As a student of philosophy (with an interest in comp sci), I think the issues here turn on what people mean by "existence" and what people think makes a statement true. 1) Should we talk about things "existing abstractly?" 2) Are statements about abstract objects made true in the same way that statements about physical objects are made true?
Micah Sadoy Thank you for your suggestion. I've read and researched a little on those topics but if you have any links or suggestions on specific content I'd be really grateful.
I can't give too many suggestions, I mostly think about social ontology. Quine and Putnam might be interesting to you. Speaking personally, I wouldn't worry too much about this stuff. When things go wrong, it's usually obvious (e.g. Plantonism or fictionalism).
+Micah Sadoy Thanks for the numberphile recommendation. The philosophy of numbers videos are great and I think I now have a better grasp of the different approaches. There's also a wealth of other fascinating number theory content including one of my all time favourites, 1+2+3+... (to infinity) = -1/12. :)
+David Martin That is not generally how philosophers will talk about abstract and concrete objects, but then again there is disagreement as how exactly we should define abstract and concrete objects. The SEP has a great, though dense, article on several of the ways that this distinctions are made, plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/. I also have a couple of videos on the subject of abstract objects as they relate to statements and propositions in my series on Truth (ua-cam.com/video/ln3Qz5QRpSA/v-deo.html and ua-cam.com/video/un0KbGfsdUM/v-deo.html).
would it be safe to say that a universal is a property that is held in common with multiple objects
Not quite. A universal also can be a relation (to the left of, the father of etc.) or a type or kind (like jade of amphibian). And there is actually some debate as to whether properties are universals or particulars.
@@CarneadesOfCyrene I think a universal is held in common with what everyone perceives, if I perceive a tree it's just a tree, it's universal that it's a tree, if I perceive a hallucination and think it's real, it's a universal that it's a hallucination, and nothing sidesteps this reasoning.
Interesting.
Can you help me, Carneades? I've found it rather difficult to distinguish between the metaphysical and the supernatural. Is this something you might consider addressing in a video? I'm sorry if it seems a ridiculous question! I know about the "metaphysical" poets and I get what that's about, but I'm a bit lost when people seem to suggest that what is "metaphysical" should be taken seriously - at least as seriously as "physical". I'm not stupid, I assure you, just a bit confused.
This is a very old comment, but in case anyone in the future comes across this: metaphyics covers things like consciousness, our thoughts and feelings, concepts like 'good', 'rights', 'love', and 'morality', properties of objects (e.g. 'blueness'), and so on. Any 'thing' that is not a physical object is within the domain of metaphysics. Even having an opinion like 'there is no such thing as objective 'good', 'rights' do not really exist' is an opinion on metaphysics.
In constrast, 'supernatural' refers to things beyond the laws of nature - ghosts and such. When people explore this, they're not usually trying to find formal laws and rules that explain ghosts and assimilate them into the rest of science.
Whereas metaphysics is trying to work out what the laws of our world are, in the non-physical realm - they're trying to make coherent theories to make sense of the world. Rather than trying to prove what people don't think exists and what we have little reason to think exist (ghosts), they're trying to understand the things that we generally do think exist (morality, goodness) and understand them better.
@@user-tx5vr2lu6e Thank you for this helpful response. I have moved on a bit in the last 7 years and I would probably have answered myself now very much as you have answered me.
The problem I was having then - and which still persists to this day - is that there are people who believe in the existence of "Gods" because ... "metaphysical". I have now learned to point out that everything "metaphysical" has its roots in something physical - no "Gods" required. They think that "metaphysical" belongs to the realm of "God" rather as they have persuaded themselves philosophy does. It is nonsense, of course. Philosophy ought long ago to have distanced itself from the claptrap of religion.
@@Nai61aWhat do you mean by "everything metaphysical has its roots in something physical"?
And metaphysics as such has nothing to do with religion. Metaphysics tries to understand and study the "foundations" of existence, so to speak. This of course has a big role in philosophy of religion, but metaphysics per se has nothing to do with religion.
@@esauponce9759 Existence has its roots in the physical, does it not? That's what I was thinking of. Or consciousness as an emergent property of the (physical) brain. I used to get faced with a lot of "God"-existence believers who, in their efforts to justify their beliefs would speak/write about the "metaphysical" as if it were some special phenomenon in a special realm where "God" could be located. All bollocks, of course. I do not take it seriously these days.
@@Nai61a //Existence has its roots in the physical, doesn't it?//
I don't know. That's a metaphysical view that would have to be shown true by arguments and evidence. There are metaphysical views that don't bottom down in the physical. Those views would also need to be argued for.
how can a nominalist go about explaining similarities and abstract entities?
For similarities, or universals, they might use something like the trope theory. For abstract objects, it will depend on the object. The SEP article on nominalism goes into great detail, particularly in section 4.
Any two entities are similar in some respects, different in others. For example a tennis ball and a golf ball are similar in shape but different in size, and so on. ,How might a philosopher who rejects abstract entities go about explaining similarity and difference?
Thanks, carneades
My answer would be that roundness is a name we give to the similarity we see in round things, but roundness is not something that has its own independent existence apart from round things. It's just a concept or label we use to point out the similarity.
@@davidgifford7289 so, abstract concepts or labels exist and we can use them?
so, nominalists would claim there is no such thing as "p-ness"?
William Carlos Williams, the US poet's maxim was 'no ideas but in things.'
bro, a map of metaPHYSIC yet? thankU
+Ed Thoreum One day. We are trying to space those out. But it will come eventually.
What's your moral position?
I'm a skeptic, which means that I don't have any beliefs as to morality or ethics, I don't have any beliefs at all.
Carneades.org Are you sure?
Mac Guyver why did you ask if he's sure?
That sounds dangerous.
Skepticism is self contradictory because it means that knowledge is impossible to obtain which means there's no truth but it has to be true that there's no truth which is contradictory and thus false.
It would seem that a philosophical materialist would by definition not believe in abstract objects. Am I correct in my thinking?
They are very similar positions, but The Stanford Encyclopedia claims that they are not perfectly identical. (note that they refer to materialism as Physicalism). Here's an excerpt:
"Nominalism: the idea that there are no abstract objects, i.e., entities not located in space and time, such as numbers, qualities or propositions. If we assume that abstract objects, if they exist, exist necessarily, i.e., exist in all possible worlds, then supervenience physicalism is completely silent on the question of whether abstract objects exist. All supervenience says is that if a world is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world, it is a duplicate simpliciter. But if abstract objects exist then they clearly exist in both the actual world and any duplicate of the actual world. What this suggests is that nominalism is a distinct issue from physicalism (Schiffer 1987, Stoljar 1996)."
How can universals and abstracts have a real existence especially spatially when it's virtually undeniable that both are mere concoctions of the mind.
Orthodox Christian here everyone probably has heard of us. We probably come up with the definition of Nominalism we’ve been refuting the position for hundreds of years along with everyone else’s position. people thinks a position is new but they really just Rehashed heresies from hundreds of years ago lol
thanks man!
What?
Two either exits or doesn’t exist. There are two alternatives, therefore two exists.
One perhaps cannot perceive an abstract without a particular instantiation, but that does not necessarily mean the abstract does not exist without instantiation. Abstracts are manifest across a range of particulars, and one can easily conjure a new manifestation by the choice of particulars. How does one choose? By reference to the abstraction.
Thus I reject nominalism.
All of this supposedly clever response still exists in language, which in itself is just labels we put on reality. Sure I can call two trees two, but if I'm not there to analyze them through my mind, are they really two trees? My answer would be no, they just exist, and we later come and label them as "two trees".
@@zacharyyost645 I admit to being a bit cute in my comment, but I think the argument stands. It doesn't matter what word you use, the fact of two things exists regardless of whether we use the word two or duo or dos. This is how we discover new mathematical concepts. PI (the ratio of the circumference to the diameter) exists as a fact of nature regardless of its name or number. You could kill all the conscious beings in the universe and it would still be a fact, called by another name by whatever conscious species emerged next.
As you said, it's a label we put _on reality._
@Nathan Kendrick Your last sentence is exactly my point. A label≠reality. We create numbers and names because it's simply impossible and impractical to conceive of the world in any other way, but without us there, objects just exist. Also, using some hypothetical separate race of sentient beings is, in my opinion, exceptionally weak. How do you know a sentient being will think and compartmentalize in the same way we do? You can't, and for all we know they could conceive of reality in a completely different way to us.
@@zacharyyost645 "Exceptionally weak." Ouch.
You're, of course, completely correct that they would likely perceive the world in an entirely different way. But I think it is a safe assumption that "two" as a concept would still exist to them. The reality of two-ness would exist whether they see two objects, hear two objects, touch two objects, or even by the simple relationship of one self to another self. Perhaps, one could imagine, they perceive everything as a continuous field, but even within a field there is binary, up or down, stronger or weaker, closer or nearer. Maybe that's stretching it, perhaps it is possible to have mathematics that has no discrete quantities. I don't know.
Perhaps we're talking past each other. I'm saying there is a reality that creates, by its physical existence, mathematical concepts such as two, which would be evident and discoverable to any conscious being. Thus "two" exists a priori.
You seem to be saying that "two" is a just a label, a mental concept, that does not exist a priori, without a consciousness to experience and label it. Without a being to perceive two things, there is no such property as two.
Does that sound right?
So basically, nominalists reject that there are universal category of any property.
By that explanation, a property is merely a substantiated universal. I don't see how using two different words for it is useful.
If an idea exists in your mind, it exists in space\time. The question is what layers and filters exist between. Your mind also exists in space time, even though we can't measure it that way.
This is all a semantic argument that doesn't appear to shed much light on anything.
All "things" regardless of materiality, are patterns with a purpose and the resolution of the purpose determines the resolution of the pattern.
REDNESS REDNESS REDNESS REDNESS REDNESS REDNESS
Isn’t mathematics inherently abstract? Last time I checked there was no such thing as a 1 or 2 in the material world, therefore, how can anybody that uses math claim to be an abstract nominalist?
I don't define abstract, but I define universal, that the sky and ocean are blue is a universal truth, that's the bottom line, the truth of Plato's Forms is only true, things can exist as ideas and not in the outside world, and can also exist in the outside world, which is in your head as an inaccurate copy, however it's universal only in that we all think ways to cook up a product and it's displayed on the supermarket shelves. There's nothing overly stupid going on from there.
Universal and abstract have only one "definition", better said being
I thought properties were particulars.....
Only if you think that they are "tropes" ua-cam.com/video/xxMW30y6V7A/v-deo.html.
There are no particulars, reality is holding universality of profound proportions.
So nominalism can't answer the questions of nominalism. Got it.
nominalism sounds like common sense
It can run into problems with holes. :) ua-cam.com/video/5B9224txYNg/v-deo.html
Nomalism is a universal synonymous to dumbness or craziness.
Dumbness and craziness is a particular, because it's not universal that you're dumb, you can think in sophisticated ways, I'm putting my foot down, if you're not a shitty philosopher, which you are, you'll see universals in the right tone like the academics propounding their philosophy.
To exist means to cause
All that is not composed (of atoms) is imaginary = does not exist.
Universals are abstracts are properties are imaginaries.
Language is real, DOES exist, it is composed of visible- iow real symbols.
For an example in a real book or on the real screen.
Symbols (LOGOI) either refer to
- the imaginary (PSYCHE=property)
- the real: Things (PHYSIS)
- (other) symbols (LOGOI)
For an example,
the "Periodic table {OF=objectizing=FAKING} the properties {OF=FROM/ABOUT} the elements
is LOGOI {OF=objectizing=FAKING} the PSYCHE {OF=FROM/ABOUT} the PHYSIS
Materialists are mostly religious, they religiously believe that
"properties DO exist, for they are precisely measurable"
which does not logically follow:
the imaginary does not cause the measurement of the property.
Only the real causes the measurement of properties from/about it.
The meassurement is very real, it FAKES that the property as such BE real.
Whether materialists like or not,
any property
per se = as such, it-self, on its own, in its own right -
is but the awareness=PSYCHE fabricated in their brain,
when they watch a very real
- calculation {OF=FAKING} the property on the paper
- measurement {OF=FAKING} the property on a technical device.
The calculation or measurement commonly also called "quantity" or "value" -
!!!OF!!! the parameter,
!!!OF!!! = objectizing = substantifying = FAKING
Curious what you think of holes. ua-cam.com/video/5B9224txYNg/v-deo.html
@@CarneadesOfCyrene Thank you so much for your request, I highly appreciate it, I am dead serious. I never thought that much about "does the symbol >hole< symbolize a thing or an imaginary" until I stumbled over the video ("transcendental a**hole") - ridiculing the "TAG as presented by MattSlick"
A hole -
per se = as such, it-self, on its own, in its own right
is an imaginary.
it is as imaginary as is any other shape, but also any size, color, texture
OF a thing.
"But we DO see a hole"
NOPE!
You see an object. (For an example the butt)
Even If you mean to see a hole, all that you DO see is a fraction of the object.
If you remove the object,
A hole is no-where and any-where in the same instance.
A hole is an example of space.
Space can only be measured from/about an object.
Space cannot change, bcz it is not real.
All that IS very real, on this occasion, and can change,
it is the calciulation on the paper or the measurement on a technical device,
the calculation also called "value" or "quantity" of space.
kindest regards from GERMANY
So wrong, reality's physically real, that must mean it exists, it's in your imagination. Perceptible to the apparent senses the Forms isn't a contradiction of nominalism about particulars, e.g. that universals exist.
@@charlesfraunhofer7893 Sizes, forms (shapes, geometries) and colors are examples of universals = abstracts = properties = truths = opinions = imaginary-non-causal = epiphaenomenal.
You can tell us ONLY how you see an object. For an example "oh, it is red" Every child (well, in Germany) knows that you see the object,
ie your brain fabricates the universals from/about it. the object is real, the universal is imaginary.
- The color is, like any other universal=property, is invisible TO the eye.
- The color LIES, like any other universal=property, ONLY !!!IN!!! they eye.
@@kleenex3000 So very true, I'm just saying that the nominalism about universals isn't a rejection of Plato's Forms.
Nominalism seems to be the easy answer.
We love simple things
It's not the easy answer, it's the easy solution, even though it seems to be the easy answer. Universals are actually present, no matter what you think, I can hold that I'm alive right now, it's a universal truth.
I'm open to that nothing exists. But if something exists, then (universal) properties and (abstract) classes exist.
This shit is confusing as fuck!!!
I'm sorry, understanding philosophy takes time, and a lot of it builds on itself so it is a difficult field to get started in.