Battle of Gettysburg: tactical, operational & strategic levels of war
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- Опубліковано 24 сер 2024
- The Battle of Gettysburg offers timeless lessons to Soldiers, military leaders, corporate CEOs and others. Listen to Professor Len Fullenkamp, Army War College historian, as he discusses that leaders can see three dimensions of war at Gettysburg: tactical, operational and strategic levels.
A couple of points here: The Union strategy was to hold the Confederates in the East while slowly eating away at the center of the CSA by pushing through to Atlanta and beyond, while cutting off the South from outside aid by blockade and the capture of ports. The operational intent in the East under Meade was to simply keep Lee contained. Look at Lincoln's orders to Meade. He was free to maneuver the Army of the Potomac as long as he could beat Lee or arrive at the same time if Lee should take a lunge at DC. Meade knew he could stand off and refuse to attack Lee on chosen ground or in his fortifications, whether it was at Falling Waters or Mine Run. While Meade had his bad moments in the follow-on campaigns of late 1863, he also did well, avoiding Lee's attempt to get around him before the Rappahannock, giving him a bloody nose at Bristoe Station and then after some beautiful attacks across the Rappahannock against exposed portions of Lee's army, maneuvering him down to the Rapidan. Keep in mind that Meade did not have to attack Lee at Gettysburg or Cashtown and he had Lincoln's orders to look for an opportunity, not a Fredericksburg. Further, by moving his lines of communication to Westminster, he put his primary LoC behind his army. Lee could maneuver to Meade's left all he wanted and would never threaten Meade's logistics. Tactically, Meade was poorly served by luck and his subordinate commanders on the first two days. On the 1st day, he looses Reynolds, who might have kept O.O. Howard from spreading his corps all over the countryside north-east of Gettysburg, where a single brigade of Confederate infantry almost rolled him up by itself, defeating the XI Corps in detail. One has to wonder what Slocum was thinking to not march to the sound of the guns or at least take the initiative, knowing what Reynolds, Howard and Hancock were screaming to Meade about. Than there was Sickles and the Wheat Field on the second day. But everything came together of the third day and the competent performance of his cavalry division commanders throughout the campaign.
I'm glad I found these videos. I'm learning more and more about The Battle of Gettysburg. I was born, raised, and live in PA, and I have been to Gettysburg many times. I'm still in awe of the field, Little and Big Round Top, Devils' Den, The Wheat Field...etc..etc..
One thing I always have wondered....did The South ever attack Big Round Top? I know they attacked Little Round Top. Big Round Top is quite a hike to the top. I cannot imagine in the July heat and wearing wool uniforms and carrying gear how anyone could really attack Big Round Top.
Thank you for these historical and educational videos.
At Gettysburg , and elsewhere Lee seems to make 'suggestions' i.e. Culps Hill one the first day, rather than specific hard orders.
Brilliant lecture.
Having walked the field of Pickett's Charge, it seems like it was a suicidal move. Lee blew it at Gettysburg, plain and simple. He should have taken Longstreet's advice.
+KnightOwl2006: My exact feeling when I was there. You look at Cemetery Ridge from Seminary Ridge . . . and you say to yourself: "No way."
KnightOwl2006 on
KnightOwl2006 of
federal artillery blew them to pieces. Ended an era of warfare that day.
Longstreet knew it was suicide and time would not have changed it. If you ever visit Gettysburg, walk the wheat field, you will see things as they were.
I disagree with these statements about Lee not having cavalry, leaving him blind. He had at least two brigades of cavalry. But, because lee did not trust them ; they weren't used.
Why weren't they trusted ? Because of a feud between Stewart and another officer over a woman.
lkyelberg Why should the feud interefere if Stuart wasn't even there? Why would Lee not trust the two brigades? According to the Killer Angels, they relied on a scout or two to keep them posted. How could Stuart's attack in the rear on the third day be thwarted by a mere element of union cavalry?
I watched another video recently that went over this -- what actually happened is there were 7 brigades of cavalry under Stuart. 3 regular brigades went with him on the raid on Union supplies, 2 regular brigades were relegated to supply line and rearguard (due to personal animosity with Stuart with their commanders), and the last 2 brigades left with Lee were irregulars. Lee was distrustful of irregulars, as he did not believe they were capable of carrying out their tasks -- that is why Lee did not use the cavalry that was with him at the beginning of the battle.
They weren't trusted by Lee because they were irregulars. Lee wanted nothing to do with them. They should be been the ones guarding the supply train in the valley.
@@junebug172 exactly.
@@deidryt9944 This is a very valid question, and in hindsight was a huge mistake by Lee. In modern theory, commanders are taught that if their reconaissance elements are unavailable/destroyed, he should immediately create new ones out of other units, because recon is so important. Lee certainly had options available to him that he failed to use. Examples: 1. Use the irregulars, 2. Use the irregulars, but send regular officers along with them to verify the report, 3. Make new recon elements from infantry (many infantrymen knew how to ride a horse), 4. Use foot-infantry to perform recon. Lee for some reason ignored these options, and chose to do nothing. A huge mistake as we can see now.
All comes back to the same thing: if it had been Jackson telling Lee what Longstreet was telling him . . . Lee would have agreed. I blame Jackson for getting himself killed before Gettysburg.
On the third day Lee expected Porter Alexander's artillery barrage to be effective, whereas it had been aimed long. He also expected coordinating attacks to be going on. The ANV just did not have the the AoP's sophisticated technology of communication to pull off large-scale manuevers.
Lee's order to Stuart: "You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river EAST of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, &c." Stuart could and did pass around Meade's army but was unaware that Ewell had been recalled south to Cashtown/Gettysburg.
The more you study Gettysburg the more you realize lee was in impossible strategic position- he HAD too attack- Meade also correctly assessed that Lee had to attack and prepared accordingly. Lee also was up against one of the best 4-5 Union generals...fighting on home ground, solid supply lines/communication etc. I am unpersuaded that even without Chamberlains stand at Little round top Lee would have achieved his necessary strategic objectives. After all the Re]bels had broken through at the Peach orchard already but been unable to exploit that breech due to Meade’s superior internal communications and greater reserves, cavalry and artillery. Lee would have had to have been at his best and Meade would have had to have been the typical inept union general to date to change this outcome....and lee withdrew just in time...despite the Union exhaustion, casualties among top leaders and remarkably unappreciated impact of soldiers terms ending and being replaced by very green troops, had Meade another day to recoup, regroup., consolidate and interpose himself between lee and the Potomac, the army of Virginia may have been cut off and defeated. In retrospect, knowing that Meade was competent, there were enough capable subordinates in Buford Chamberlain , Hancock now etc to effectively lead many units, the odds of Lee winning the Gettysburg campaign were NOT in his favor. NB while Grant took to the field soon thereafter as head of the Army, Meade remained head of the army of the Potomac and performed well throughout the war. The astonishing thing was how difficult it was for grant to grind down the south despite having 2-1 and greater numbers thereafter. No on should have been surprised the south felt they had not been well and truly beaten and never submitted to emancipation for another century. In retrospect Sherman’s march should have begun earlier .
General Stuart by the time of the Gettysburg campaign was battle fatigued. His performance prior to Gettysburg campaign was fought with brilliance with exception of Brandy station when Yankee cavalry surprised him. Overall The illustrious general Stuart's lustrous performance throughout the war until his death at yellow tavern was an attitude of always be battle ready 2 provide intel, protect the army, N strike the enemy. This characterizes a Cavalry commander of the Highest order...
At Chancellorsville Jackson WAS seen by numerous Federal Units who reported this to Hooker. Sickles even attacked a portion of Jackson's column however Hooker misinterpreted Jackson's intent and convinced himself that the Confederate Army was in retreat despite the fact that Lee had never abandoned a Battlefield without a fight. As a result the western flank of the Union Army was itself flanked by Jackson and rolled up like a blanket.
I agree with the statement that Lee had to worry about Mead attacking while Longstreet was away trying to get behind Mead. When Longstreet changed the approach he should have informed Lee about the delay. However, by then the situation was well lost by then. When the battle started Lee should have not reinforced the initial forces, and immediately pulled back.
I could debate this on several points but space does not really permit this. 1. Stuart is cognizant of his duty and clearly failed to execute it. 2. Longstreet/Lee are not, as Prof. Fullenkamp would have you believe, operating on different strategic levels. His analogy here is clearly misplaced for the purposes that he is trying to suggest. 3. Lee clearly had the ability to disengage from Gettysburg without putting himself at great risk. Although Meade is a dynamic source to be dealt with he is not concentrated in position to act effectively as of the evening of 1 July. His men are force marching as it is to reach the field by noon of 2 July and his largest corp is still out of position even at this time. The advantage of maneuver still lies with Lee until that time.
antares4s "Longstreet/Lee are not, as Prof. Fullenkamp would have you believe, operating on different strategic levels. His analogy here is clearly misplaced for the purposes that he is trying to suggest" Do you have any proof of this? Preferably drawn from statements by Longstreet and Lee themselves, and not some armchair history buff blogging on a crackpot web site?
+antares4s
Except Lee did not know the status of the Union Army. No recon, remember?
AldousC
True in a limited sense. He actually had him more than half of the army's cavalry with jom but they weren't of the same quality as those units who were with Stuart and Grumble Jones hadn't arrived on the field from Virginia as of 1 July. He would have been the next best available commander but was still in the process of coming north at the time. So you are basically correct in that Lee was more or less blind to where units of the Army of the Potomac were at the time. Was a move as suggested by Longstreet possible? Yes, but only in the sense that we know more than Lee did at the time.
Stuart had seven brigades of cavalry under his command/control, five regular (experienced and professional)
and two non-regular (less experienced). Lee did not respect the fighting ability or info gathering capacity of
irregular cavalry. Stuart took three regular brigades on his eastern scout, but ordered two remaining regular cavalry
to stay back in lower Shenendowa Valley to guard Lee's rear and sent the two irregular cavalry with Lee, but Lee than
refused to use the irregulars for scouting east because he had no confidence in irregular cavalry. Stuart should have
sent the remaining regular cavalry with Lee to scout and left irregulars to perform rearguard duties. News flash -- Stuart
had personal beefs with each of the regular brigade commanders left behind which caused him to assign their brigades
to duties less likely to lead to glory. Personal beefs led to Lee not having cavalry fighting ability or info gathering
capacity he would of had, but for Stuart's personal beefs with brigade commanders.
I never understood why Lee could not have dispatched half a dozen riders in several directions to scout out the enemy's forces regardless of Stuart's location. Surely Lee had at his disposal as many scouts as he needed.
..
Thomas McCarthy absolutely I saw the same video
"Half a Dozen" riders would not be able to get any information. As they approached the Federals, Union cavalry would have killed them. This is what is called the "Recon War" Reconaissance elemets of both sides are attempting to see their enemy, and kill all incoming scouts. A dozen scouts against 3000 cavalry would simply evaporate.
The Cavalry left behind with the ANV were not the crack scouting units of the Confederate Cavalry, Stuart had taken the Armies best scouting units with him. The Cavalry Stuart left with Lee were rear guard and flank units and raiders... and that's exactly what they did. Thats an important job that Cavalry fills, and can't be overlooked... but they also scout, and thats were Stuart failed as he took the best scouting troops and essentially removed them from the conflict. Also the cavalry did not share unified command with Imboden reporting to Lee and Jenkins reporting to Ewell.
My thoughts are that Lee knew the Confederacy could not sustain a long war and that every year that passed, made it more likely the Confederacy would lose. Lee was a winner, he could not imagine losing. Lee knew that at Gettysburg, he had the best chance he would ever have to win, so he went all in, in an attempt to pull off a miracle and win. Yes, it was long odds, yes it was suicidal, but Lee thought it was the only way to win. But, the conversation comes full circle, if it is that bad, do you still do it ? Personally, I would have been on the side of Longstreet. I don't see how anything could have been accomplished towards victory after the 2nd day.
Longstreet's behavior was used post-war to criticize him as the one who lost Gettysburg. But his realization about the danger of frontal assaults against entrenched positions was real and worth heeding. Unfortunately Lee (and later Grant and Sherman) would all be in love with the concept of a successful frontal assault against an entrenched enemy. Before Fredericksburg (where Lee was entrenched, and Burnside was guilty of the frontal assaults, and paid heavily for them), Lee made the same stupid mistake at Malvern Hill, ruining the conclusion of the Seven Days Battle by allowing Fitz John Porter's men to decimate Lee's charging men with artillery. Lee (of course) repeated the move with Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg. Grant would do it at Cold Harbor (and would later say it was the worst blunder of his career), and Sherman did it at Kenessaw Mountain against an entrenched Joe Johnston. Only one Civil War commander had a successful frontal assault in his career - George Henry Thomas against Braxton Bragg at Missionary Ridge in the Battles around Chattanooga - and Thomas later claimed he never gave his troops an order to charge the Confederates.
They did this because this is what the tactics of the Mexican War proved to be the way a ground war was fought and the way the theory of battle was taught. Technology drives tactics but few civil war commander, save Longstreet, were able to see that the technology of the 1860s had outmoded the tactics. The theory of ground conflict had clearly changed but few saw it and as a result many would pay the ultimate price.
antares4s Very true, but even as the war progressed over 4 years they contnued with the same tactics, in fact they contiued with the same tactics even into WWI despite the fact that weapons became even far more destructive.
The problem wasnt solved until the Germans perfected the blitzkrieg in WWII
antares4s Grant actually had the right idea in the Overland Campaign despite some mistakes, he kept moving to his left around Lee, trying to catch him off balance behind him and before Lee dug into a defensive position. He was unsuccessful but not because it wasnt a good idea.
In Grant's defense (but not Lee's): Grant's strategic goal was to keep Lee busy fighting him and Meade in Virginia while Sherman was rampaging through Georgia and the Carolinas. While the assault at Cold Harbor was not the right move, it nevertheless succeeded on a strategic level.
But yes, Longstreet was right. And he was thinking just as strategically as Lee was: The goal was to destroy the Army of the Potomac north of Washington. The ANV had an inferior force, and thus had to beat the AoP with either superior concentration or superior positioning. At Gettysburg, they had neither. Longstreet proposed moving to a position that allowed for both and forced the AoP to battle, accomplishing the goal of the entire campaign.
As a friend of mine said, wars are always initially fought with the the tactics of the prior conflict, but usually with modern weapons. Like in WW1 for all sides and WW2 for the allies. The one side who takes the lessions learned first, has a temporarily advantage, like the Wehrmacht had it from 1939 to about 1941. After this the allied adapted and not only outgunned and outproduced the axis, they also were on even terms on tactical and strategic levels. If Lee had listened to Longstreet on the evening of the 1st of July, the Army of Virginia could have taken a good position between the Army of the Potomac and Washington D.C., forcing Meade to attack. The outcome of the civil war could have been totally different then, having two American nations. This would have had an enormous effect on the world as we know it. But I do understand Lee. He wanted to bring it to an end and he wanted to show the world and especially he Union, the British and the French, that the Confederation was a power to recon with. IF they were successful on the 2nd day of battle, this would not have been a statement, it would have been a manifest.
Lee had 2 brigades of cavalry sitting in his camp but he didnt want to use them. That is on LEE and not on Steward.
Even if Lee did not trust those brigades of Irregular Cavalry, there was nothing in the world preventing Lee from selecting 30 regular infantry officers and instructing them... "I want you to ride along with these irregular cavalry tomorrow, and verify what they see. Report back to Longstreet personally." He chose to go without recon.... bad choice.
Lee used all his Cavalry... He charged Stuart with scouting the enemy and screening the Army which Stuart failed at. Thats 100% on Stuart. The 2 detachments Stuart left behind with the ANV were left behind because they were not scouting units... they were busy doing to the other things 19th century calvary did.... rear guard, protecting flanks, raiding other objectives, etc.... For instance Imboden's irregular Cavalry Raiders did not go with Stuart because he was charged with raiding the B&O Railroad, because thats what they did well.... raiding.... after they accomplished their objective they return to Lee and acted as rear guard protecting supplies and wagon trains during the battle. Stuart took all of his crack scouting units that were charged with screening the armies movements and scout the enemies positions and effectively removed them from the conflict at hand. When Hill encounters federal cavalry on June 30th at Gettysburg (a town they already occupied on June 26th chasing out state militia) he made the decision to mount a reconnaissance in force the next day with Infantry... a move that Stuart would have been normally expected to do, flush out Union Cavalry. Lee puts out a confusing order to take the fight to the enemy but do not bring on a major battle until the Army is concentrated at Cashtown... and boom.... you have Gettysburg.
The focus placed on Longstreet in this video is a superfluous. Despite his complaint regarding Lee's strategy for battle, Longstreet was still the most accomplished corps commander Lee had at Gettysburg on July 2; to call his assault "modestly successful" is a grievous understatement. The delay that Longstreet caused by following his superior's orders and maneuvering his army into position unseen had nothing to do with the failures of 2nd and 3rd Corps. If a student of Gettysburg wants examples of subordinates failing to align with their superior's vision, he or she would do better to examine Hill and Ewell. The former only managed to get a third of his available brigades onto the battlefield, July 2nd, and the latter's "coordinated supporting attack" initially only consisted of an artillery demonstration, despite most of the Union infantry defending the Federal right being drawn left to deal with Longstreet's assault.
History has shown that Longstreet was not only Lee's best commander at Gettysburg but probably the best of all the Confederate tactical commanders of the war. Even though Jackson could better understand Lee's thinking, Longstreet is the better over all field commander.
Tenebarum
"The wrong side"? Not sure what you are implying here. Longstreet's family came from Georgia/S. Carolina. He wasn't about to turn his back on his family. He get castigated after the war because of his friendship with Grant from whom he accepted a political appointment.
is a superfluous WHAT ? The word is an adjective, not a noun. Sorry to nit-pick, but you undermine your case when you can use the King's properly.
Longstreet WAS thinking strategically. He said move to the right, threaten DC. AotP would have to come off the high ground. AoNV stops on ground to their advantage and defeats the AotP. The strategic victory they were looking for. rather than a 50/50 chance at Gettysburg, you improve your chances to 75/25 or even 80/20 if you have the tactical advantage. and what is the strategic outcome if you lose? It appears that Lee didn't care.
combat 101: DO NOT attack a superior enemy entrenched on the high ground and you sure a heck do not be "heh diddle diddle let's be stupid and go right up the middle".
Sorry, but it was LONGSTREET who was thinking on all three levels. while Lee was stupid and got target fixation. Longstreet was using modern day maneuver warfare while Lee was stuck using outdated Napoleonic tactics.
Is it possible that better use of massed artillary for the assault on the Union center, could have been more effective by clearing obstacles while "range finding" in order to clear the way for the advancing infantry?
Range finding was virtually impossible. Artillery of that time blanketed the field with such think smoke that it would be like trying to see 20 yrs through a sandstorm. Also timed fuses on ammunition was pure luck of the draw. One might explode in 20 seconds, the next in 5. All you really had to go on was the response from enemy fire.
Artillery of that time was a lot more accurate than our friend antares4s, gives it credit for. The problem with range-finding... is that you have to be the only gun, on the line firing, that is firing at that time. or you won't be able to say which puff of smoke was caused by your shell. And the biggest problem? your cannon creates a huge cloud of smoke, not a problem for you sighting. you can put spotters on your flanks to be able to see where the shell explodes. the cloud of smoke marks your own position, for counter fire by the enemy batteries to aim at. I think antares, needs to watch the videos on the artillery batteries, in the Gettysburg video series. The 11th New York, I think?, was detailed to protect a battery. and their monument shows the men, lying down on the ground. as they become "witnesses" to counter-battery fire, from the Confederates.
Is this available without the music ?
Lee took a complicated situation and took a chance.
Wonderfully clear analysis and presentation
Stuart's cavalry. Stuart commanded 7 brigades. He took 3 with him on his ride round the federal army. Two were sent to protect the confederate line of retreat. Two were left with Lee. Lee chose not to use the two cavalry brigades because they were inexperienced irregulars and he didn't trust them. The clear failure here is Stuart's and his personal conflict with the two brigade commanders he sent south, to protect the line of retreat. Most movies and even history books simplify this issue by blaming Stuart for riding around the union army. In fact, he had Lee's permission to to just that and he had done it previously at least twice, to great success. Second day. I have a very hard time believing that Longstreet was not informed by Lee of the attacks by Hill and Ewell and the necessary timing. The better conclusion is that Longstreet decided that it was better to be late and have the element of surprise than be on time and have the federals forewarned of his attack. It's also worth mentioning that Longstreet from the very beginning was against this move into Pennsylvania. Longstreet wanted to use his corps to reinforce Tennessee and defeat Rosecrans and so compel Grant to abandon his siege of Vicksburg. It's fair to say that Longstreets strategic and tactical conclusions were the better ones (after the fact, of course).
J.E.B. Stuart had the option of destroying the rifles and doing the cavalry's primary job of supporting the infantry. Also of the cavalry job of scouting the enemy, information is as valuable as rifles.
Longstreet had a valid and proven plan to draw Union forces out of defensive positions. Sun Tzu had centuries before written that to attack a fortified position required overwhelming numbers. Drawing the Union forces from the their positions, the Unions' chosen battlefield. and onto a battle ground of Longstreet's choosing would at least equal the numbers. Longstreet did fail to support an overall plan which the communications of the time, no radios, could not let him be aware as battlefield situation changed and this was a basically flawed choice of action.
The Confederate forces here had a serious flaw in their logistics. Both sides artillery used timed shells to burst in the air over their targets heads. The Union used a metal cased fuse to time the shells. The Confederates used a paper fuse which had to be hand trimmed to set the timing. The hand trimming would inherently produce different timing depending in the individual gunners cutting the fuses. Worst was the Confederate fuses were made by three different factories and there was no enforcement of standards between the three. All gunners used the same chart to trim fuses that burned at three different speeds. Maybe only a third of these shells exploded where most effective. Maybe a third exploded harmlessly before reaching their target. As much as a third burrowed into the ground to explode with reduced effectiveness. Thus the needed artillery bombardment needed to reduce the effectiveness of Union fortified positions was reduced to maybe 33 percent.
The young officers talk tactics while the old general talked logistics.
So what is the generally accepted argument against Lee trying to get past Meade's left, get between Meade and Washington, and fight a defensive position at Fredericksburg (?)
You have to look at the conditions of the field on all aspects as Lee surley must have. Where was the enemy on our flank. What roads do we move on. What of our trains. How do we move the entire army at night along limited routes. What will the enemy do to us as we manuever all srung out. How long can we stay in enemy territory before retiring. What renforcements will Washington send to check our movement. What are we to gain by not staying here with the possibiliy of success. People like to think that Lee could have moved by the right like a file if Indians and Meade would just allow it to happen.
@@howardclegg6497 Two problems: 1. The road network possibly would not support moving an army directly east. 2. Meade was coming from the east, moving in that direction might cause the right side of your army to be swallowed by the entire army of Meade coming from that direction, Without Recon to tell you where the enemy is, it is VERY dangerous to start moving your army around when the enemy is within striking distance, he could crush your exposed flanks etc.
Don't believe the 2nd day blame should be on Longstreet, since the only possibility for success was a surprise attack since they are fighting superior numbers of troops uphill
Also Union 3rd Corp was on Longstreet flank during the assault
Here's the thing that has always gotten me... On one hand we are told that the attack was nearly hopeless. Yet on the other hand we are told that the remarkable heroics of Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th saved the Union flank and prevented the entire Union army from being rolled up. I don't see how it can be both. If the Maine boys (or the Minnesota boys Hancock ordered into the breach) stepped in to rescue a dire situation, by definition the battle could have been lost had any number of things happened a little differently.
If the Union had done what was expected and held the ridge and the hills, it would have been suicide. Instead, Sickles advanced his corp forward and left the hills undefended (only a Union signal troop was on the hill). If it wasn't for General Warren and Colonel Strong realizing the hills were undefended and rushing a brigade into position, Longstreet's attack would have carried the day.
This point of view re Stuart has become orthodoxy. Stuart had orders from Lee to pass the rear of Meade and capture baggage. He followed those orders. That's why Stuart did what he did.
Stuart was doing what Lee expected him to do and certainly he knew that he was going to loose direct communication with him. Stuart left orders with Robinson and Jones to conduct the expected Recon that Lee required. No fault should be placed on Stuart.
The failure of Lee's officers to chase the Union Army north of the Rappahannock after Chancellorsville was an implicit recognition of the Rappahannock as the northern boundary of the Confederacy, giving Washington a buffer between it and Richmond. Preparations in May/June 1861 reveal that the Confederate leadership was split on what to protect -- the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg or the rail junction at Manassas. The issue of the Rappahannock is lost to history because Lee and Davis exploded when they saw their officers negotiating a settlement that differed from war policy, and they marched the army north to either end the war with a victory on Union soil or seize provisions for more conflict. As it turned out, blunders by the Confederacy were followed by blunders by the Union Army, and Lee lost Gettysburg but escaped with massive amounts of provisions, excluding even the 7 million tons of Union provisions left unguarded at Westminster, Maryland.
4:02 But what if this "wrong" order is essential for success?
Lee's hubris led to the debacle at Gettysburg.
+Michael Quinn: Yes. The only mitigating consideration is that Lee's "hubris" included a profound confidence and belief in his soldiers. That's admirable . . . even if ultimately applied unrealistically.
It also needs to be remembered that the man had suffered a heart attack, and would have been in a hospital bed if it had happened today. His greatest feat might be battling through that most profound weariness (aka "the process of dying") to lead the ANV as well as he did.
Author Shelby Foote once said, "Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having R.E. Lee."
Perhaps Stewart should have split his force. Turn the wagons around and send them south while taking his main force north to link up with Lee.
He who wins the recon fight.....
So much misinformation is out there about Confederate cavalry during the Gettysburg campaign. Stuart had 7 brigades as follows:
Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee (Robert E. Lee’s nephew)
Brig. Gen. William H. F. “Rooney” Lee (Robert E. Lee’s second son)
Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton
Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson
Brig. Gen. William E. “Grumble” Jones
Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins
Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden
Imboden’s command had just been converted from partisan rangers that spring, and had had its first action as “regular” cavalry in the Jones-Imboden Raid of April 1863. These men were untried and hence suspect.
Jenkins’ command had also recently joined the “regular” cavalry service, serving mainly as mounted infantry much more so than in the conventional role of cavalry.
Robertson’s brigade was extremely green. It consisted of two very large, but very green regiments of North Carolina cavalry. They had seen their first action at Brandy Station on June 9, and had not done well at all. Stuart detested Robertson and did not want to work with him under any circumstances.
Grumble Jones was as good a commander as the Confederates had; he was really outstanding. Stuart quite correctly called Jones the “best outpost officer in the army,” meaning that he recognized Jones’ real talent for operating in a detached fashion. Even though Jones and Stuart were unable to get along, Stuart knew that Jones and his command were fighters.
One of the myths of the Gettysburg campaign is that Jeb Stuart went off on a ride around the Union army to salve his wounded pride after being surprised at Brandy Station. Stuart was following orders from Lee. He was to gather supplies for the use of the army, create chaos where possible and then link up with Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which would be operating in south-central Pennsylvania. Ewell's corps had Jenkins cavalry attached which screened his advance into Gettysburg on July 1. Early had the 35th Virginia battalion attached to his division. In order to induce the AoP to advance on a broad front and break their concentrated position at Frederick, Lee had Ewell advance to Carlisle, which threatened Harrisburg, and moved Early to York, which threatened an advance on Baltimore or DC. Stuart, operating in this area, was to sell the idea that he was there to screen the advance of the army, which worked, because Meade broke the concentration at Frederick and advanced on a broad front. Stuart missed connecting with Early's division at Hanover by seven hours but attacked Kilpatrick's division at that location which enabled Early to make it to Gettysburg unmolested and launch his flank attack on July 1.
On June 25th, the 35th Virginia Battalion skirmished at Point of Rocks and informed Lee that the AoP had pontoon bridges in place to cross the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, so at least as early as that date Lee had reliable information that the AoP was crossing into Maryland.
Stuart gave very specific orders to Robertson that his brigade and Jones’ brigade were to guard the mountain passes until the ANV had passed, and that they were then to follow the army north into Pennsylvania. Robertson failed miserably and did not arrive in Gettysburg until the morning of July 3. Had Robertson obeyed his orders, he would have arrived in time to lead the advance of Hill’s and Longstreet’s Corps as they advanced from the direction of Chambersburg. Unfortunately, Robertson ranked Jones, meaning that Robertson ended up in command of the two brigades, and not Jones. I firmly believe that had Jones been in command of this task force-rather than Robertson-things would have been very different indeed, as Jones would have been much more aggressive and much more diligent about seeing that the column moved with alacrity. It’s not a big surprise that Robertson was relieved of command after the Gettysburg Campaign and that he never commanded troops in the field again after his miserable failures during the campaign.
That leaves Imboden’s Northwestern Brigade. The simple truth is that they were untried and hence unknown. Consequently, Robert E. Lee didn’t trust them. Instead of being called to operate with the main body of the army, they were sent off on a foraging expedition. As late as July 1, they had a skirmish in the streets of McConnellsburg, PA, sixty miles due west of Gettysburg. Lee did not call Imboden’s command to the main battlefield until the morning of July 3. They then were given the arduous task of escorting the seventeen-mile-long wagon train of wounded to the Potomac River crossings at Williamsport, MD, and then to defend the town against Buford’s attacks on July 6. Imboden was nothing short of spectacular during these four or five days, clearly his greatest contribution to the Confederate war effort.
In short, then, had Robertson obeyed Stuart’s orders, there would have been two full brigades of cavalry with the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia. Jenkins’ brigade was with Ewell and was actively engaged. Imboden’s command was not summoned by Lee, who made a conscious choice not to utilize those men.
Seems like Longstreet disagreed with Lee quite a bit!
Same thing with Hitler and his generals, they wanted to attack strategically unimportant Moscow despite Hitler insisting they head south for the Oil fields key to winning the war
Moscow is a logistical capital, though.Loss of Moscow means much more difficult to maintain fronts north and south of it.
Moscow had significant political importance and was the mission of Army Group Center in late summer 1941(Operation Typhoon). Army Group South, the following summer, 1942, was split into Army Group A and Army Group B . With the 'Case Blue' operation, "A" was tasked with crossing the Caucasus mountains to reach the Baku oil fields.
Lee and Longstreet let Stuart go away from the main army although they didn't know where the Army of the Potomac was. Not a good idea to lose your best recce unit when you don't know what's going on. I think this lost Lee the battle. Was Longstreet's diea of moving round the AoTP's flank on? Moving blind - no (or not very good) cavalry, country you don't know, in contact with the enemy - seems a bit risky to me. Was Longstreet's idea of taking ground and waiting for an attack sound? Not a bad idea tactically and if Lee was between Meade and Washington the politicians would have had kittens but in view of Lee's tenuous supply position could the ANV have waited long - you can't send out foragers when you're in contact with the enemy, they will be rounded up like sheep. Doesn't seem to me this approach was on either. Probably Lee should have fallen back after the First Day but it's easy to be wise after the event.
Plus... the Union had captured Longstreets entire field trains prior to the battle.
I believe Lee should have been more cautious without his cavalry.
I believe he should have found high ground & waited for his cavalry to find him.
People place too much importance on Stewart not being with Lee at the start of Gettysburg. Yes having him with his carvery would have helped and maybe even changed the out come but laying blame at his feet for the loss is silly. In war you have to roll the dice on every move and hope your information on you adversary is accurate when you roll those dice. Had Lee not run into Union Troupes at Gettysburg, Stewart would be celebrated for brilliance in harassing the Union but the dice gave him snake eyes.
while Lee was using outdated Napoleonic tactics, Longstreet wanted to use modern maneuver warfare. so who was forward thinking, thinking strategically, thinking outside the box? It sure wasn't Lee. which is strange since he used maneuver warfare with the flanking movement at Chancellorsville just a few months prior
He had Jackson at Chancellorsville.
There is a good deal of discussion about this, it probably all boils down to Lee's physical and mental condition at the time. Simple things can have a huge effect on judgement. Just imagine taking a final exam with only 2 hours of sleep, and you can start to realize how physical condition can cause mistakes. Lee was also much older than most Generals, so he may have been sick, tired, or worse. There are even people who propose that Lee had a stroke at Gettysburg.
Knight owl, I think Lee should have stayed with his original plan and not fight at Gettysburg. He would have to if his army had followed his orders to NOT ENGAGE THE UNION ARMY. ONCE THEY DID THE ANCHOR WAS SET.
3:15 if those ppl who says that Lee sould have listen to longstreet heard this they may think again.
The Unfortunate General, learn to write literate English. Your pathetic sentence fragment is unintelligible without correct spelling, verb tense, and punctuation.
You constantly hear from Confederate sympathizers "If Stonewall Jackson where there...". Well, Jackson was not a perfect commander, his performance during the 7 Days was horrendous. It's as if victory for the Confederates at Gettysburg were an entitlement...if only for Longstreet...
Lee's army had had a remarkable string of victories, so much so that it became in the minds of some the norm, and perhaps also in the mind of Lee, which he seemed himself to acknowledge after the fact. Perhaps this remarkable string of victories can be chalked up to an incalculable, that is luck, because just as the confederates had done all the right things, the Federal forces did all the wrong ones. At Gettysburg Lee's luck ran out and the natural advantages of Union forces thereafter prevailed.
No one is ever entitled to victory, and certainly not in all circumstances and all the time.
WITH INFERIOR NUMBERS LEE CHOOSE TO CHARGE UPHILL AGAINST WELL FORTIFIED POSITIONS, PICKETT'S CHARGE WAS NOT SUPPORTED AT THE FLANKS AND CHARGED INTO THE JAWS OF THE BEAST. PICKETT HIMSELF QUESTIONED THE ORDER TWO TIMES. IN THE CIVIL WAR YOU WOULD NOT WANT TO CROSS A MILE LONG OPEN FIELD IN FRONT OF UNION CANNON. LEE PUT TOO MUCH FAITH IN THE ARMY OF THE VIRGINIA AGAINST ALL ODDS. IT WAS UNREALISTIC IN MANY WAYS AND WENT AGAINST CONVENTIONAL WISDOM. LONGSTREET UNDERSTOOD THIS. I WISHED THERE WOULD BE RESEARCH DONE INTO LEE'S HEALTH. IT HAS BEEN SAID HE EXPERIENCED A HEART ATTACK AND WAS NOT AS COHERENT AS HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT GETTYSBURG. WAS IT RUMOR OR THE TRUTH???
Thanks for yelling
Terrible presentation. If this is what we can expect from the "War College" now, then we really don't have a War College.
Stuart disobeyed his orders to " feel the right of the army" after crossing the Potomac. Longstreet disobeyed his orders to attack in the morning on the second day. He also failed to attack at the original time planned by Lee on the third day. The all seeing and all knowing Longstreet, who presumed to be superior to the proven Lee, forgot that when Marse Robert won his greatest battle at Chancellorsville, HE was at Suffolk, Virginia....guarding PEANUTS !!
This music is utterly ridiculous!
A superfluous WHAT? The word is an adjective, not a noun. Yes, this is nit-picking, but you undermine your position by slaughtering the King's English.
Only with the .0000001% of people who let something like that matter.....