I've been visiting someone in prison a few times. Every interior door is centrally controlled but I'd love to get a hold of the actual lock because what I've seen while passing through doesn't look that secure to me.
imagine you're in prison, and in the middle of the night you suddenly hear ....this is the lock picking lawyer, and what I have for you today is a typical prison cell door lock
Prison cells are one way locks so only have a key hole on the outside. At least in the uk. But what worked for me once was filling the lock hole with lol roll or paper so the lock dosn't shut. Worked once. I was just testing if it would work as uk prison guards have IQs in the teens. The prison I was in they still used old style keys and locks from the 80s I was only inside for 4 months for driving with a suspended licence but if I was in there longer I could get out but wasn't going to risk getting 10 years added to my centence. If I was in for life without any chance of getting out I would try no stop lol.
I never imagined that one of my all time favourite things to do of an evening would be watching a man demolish my illusion of security with such succinct precision. This is 100% a compliment.
That's a subcontext to his whole channel. A lock will not give you security by itself. A security service decal in the window provides more safety then most common door locks.
@@Kishandreth However that security service decal could be detrimental to have if you actually use a sticker for the security system you have installed as they can then look up the model etc and the default bypass or a major security flaw.
@@empoleonmaster6709 That's why you use a generic sticker instead of a branded and model one! So they know there's something but not WHAT. Though a surprise without sticker could also be good. Or good old "security led".
@@SaphireLattice Do better and get stickers for nearly every company you're NOT signed up for which will make it impossible to figure out you have one of the security systems that's NOT listed via your stickers.
this type of thing of thing never comes up in mission impossible movies. They'd have found a way to copy the fingerprint or executed an awesome stunt to cut the power. LPL- here I am with a screwdriver and a paperclip
@@Anton-cv2ti reminds me of when I was a civilian contractor working on a air Force Base that I had to have clearance enhanced to work on this particular building and a full time escort to get into and out of the area. The gard was unable to get his electric key to work as well as unable to call the inside gard ( both required to have keys and unlock at the same time). So I was like let's go through the overhead door they put the switch on the outside and I think with a screwdriver I can hit the open button. Boom 16X16 door opens. Never figured out what they did in that building other than have a very fancy lock on the man door.
There's usually a "weak link in the chain" in most systems, the trick it to find it. At 1:29 "All this looks very impressive, but there's a pretty fundamental flaw with the setup"... yeah it's called the LPL attack. lol
Because it's not picking, it's bypassing. Most Bypasses on mechanical locks are just as easy, when they exist. Actually pixking electronic locks is practically impossible
When he cut the ottolock with Tin snips they accused his video of being deceptive. He then cut the improved version with tin snips, and responded to the accusation with what one comment described as "the most polite roast" they'd ever seen
It's the old thought of, a lock keeps the well behaved out, but anyone that TRULY wants into something can always find a way. I bet 1out of 10 smashing this head unit defaults to opening up too or might short the cables as well...lol.
The thing is that there is door contacts on most doors in shops or wherever so when a door is opened and the alarm is set opening the door will result in a alarm.
Such an atrocious design. Even if they're too lazy to switch the side that the authentication is performed on, they couldn't at least have used a PWM signal instead? Obviously still unsecure, but requires a significantly greater amount of knowledge and technology to overcome than a paperclip.
@@MatthewStauffer would cost more to implement, either raising the MSRP or reducing profit per unit. So instead we have LPL demonstrating that the product is utter crap and should be returned to the seller as not fit for purpose.
@@MatthewStauffer Look, there are multiple problems here; using Phillips screws, rather than any other type that decreases the likelihood of an attack to the interior of the electronic components, is already a huge flaw that signifies a particularly telling lack of interest on the manufacturer's part. Having just *_one_* screw that is easily accessible from outside is just ridiculous.
I used to work as an security alarm/door access technician. It amazed me how unsecure "security" devices are. Especially the "high tech" ones costing thousands and thousands of dollars.
@@livenotonevil8279 Or, more commonly, the resistors are set up in the controlling device - out of convenience - instead of the tail end controlled device (i.e. a sensor or a detector).
Hollywood movies: The hacker connects to the door panel with a fancy laptop and starts running complicated hacker tools on the door. LPL: Here's a paperclip and a screwdriver, let me show you how that's done.
there is an RJ45 port inside and a usb port on the OUTSIDE so a software attack is probably also possible. this is why LPL says a NON standalone digital access control system is much better, in this case to gain entry it is necessary to control a computer farther away to open the door, which requires some kind of cyber attack, so you might as well have an actual inside man to just open the door for you at that point.
No, this is stunningly flawed. Some of the mechanical/physical exploits seem to me like they require knowledge of the particular mechanism... but this one is written in silkscreen on the circuit board.
For me senior project we are using a fingerprint sensor in a similar type project and another flaw besides that is that they typically store the fingerprint templates ON the sensor board. So theoretically you could pluck that board, plug it in somewhere else and dump all the stored fingerprints. How do I know? I've tested it for my project.
*The FBI raids LPLs house and takes him in for questioning* The FBI: So... we've been watching you for some while now, we know that you are experienced in lock picking and may be a threat to the United States, we have seen your lock picking abilities and have put you in handcuffs no mere mortal could escap... HEY ARE YOU EVEN LISTENING TO ME. LPL: Nothing on 1, nothing on 2, some tension on 3, a nice click on 4, and another nice click on five. Alright guys and that's how you get out of military grade handcuffs. Not that hard all you really need is a paperclip and a button on your shirt and you can do it at home.
I used to do car breakdown nightshift, that included lockouts. Some cars are so fast to open, some customers refused to sign off my work receipt for me to be paid because they didn't believe I had unlocked them, and that it must have already been unlocked, twice I relocked them again and left the scene because the customers were so arrogant and rude. Easy to say take longer then to convince them of the effort, but there was always people waiting for me, and I got paid by each individual job.
I was like, "Oh man, almost four minutes," and then the first 1:30 was literally just him explaining and modeling how the lock works, followed by another minute of him talking about how to undermine it.
Places in need of security should hire this guy after they've installed their security systems, just to have him detect flaws so they can improve on them.
That was so wonderfully simple and anticlimactic. The beep, the lock falling open, that's it. One-cent Paperclip - 1, $170 dollar Lock - 0. Bravo, sir!
When you're watching Stargate and Carter opens a door with a knife and you think "that's alien tech, it wouldn't be that easy" LPL .. "well, actually..."
holy crap! I almost choked when you said the verification and authentication system was on the insecure side. One would have to be almost literally brain dead to make a design like that.
almost ... no I ont think almost is that dumb ... heck a village idiot knows enough to drop a woodedn bar across the other side to secure a door ... and at an IQ if 17 that is about as brain dead as one can get ... hmm come to think of it .. we do have a prime minister who would need to go to school to become a village idiot
@@pugnate666 I2C uses two wires and can transmit the read data to the control unit for processing and verification using one *less* wire than the current setup lpl is showing us. And can't be shorted open.
Finally the moment we have all been waiting for: Opening a lock with a paperclip. (Although, admittedly, it wasn't the kind of lock, or the way to open it, that I was expecting.)
Thank you for this as always. I am an old man. One thing that I notice with security devices is that no matter how sophisticated they become there is always a need for physical security This is often missing. You can have a very secure access system but if someone can just put a boot through the door, or short it out with a paper clip, the level of security is low.
I love backends too.... though in the bedroom. ;D All they had to do is encrypt the signal from the fingerprint reader to the main control unit, problem solved (well, not for LPL lol).
jigsaw: the key is hidden in your hand and you need to cut it to get the key can you do it LPL: and this how you opens easily opening locks with only paperclips jigsaw: wait thats not how you play the game
Jigsaw just gets more and more pissed as he tries more brutal techniques, only to find that lpl has picked every lock before he even finishes explaining them
Just a little grease down the drain every day for a few years can completely clog a city sewer system. Seen it done. If I remember right, they're called fat bergs
@Богдан Кондратов Equipment will never replace mentality and training. Give me a good driver with a Volkswagen Beetle from the 1930s over a bad driver with the all new 2020 Nissan Altima.
@@pavelthefabulous5675 Yeah. but his point is: if the bad driver with the 2020 Nissan Altima ends up hitting the 1930 Beetle at 80 km/h (or 50 miles per freedom), guess who is more likely to survive..
As soon as I saw that setup I knew what the bypass was going to be, why would anyone think having your control circuitry on the non secure side of the door is a good idea. I have a couple of customers who have yards with electronic gates and the control box for said gate is on the outside of the fence/gate... the box that holds the electronics is quite stout and is all steel construction with hidden hinges but it is secured with basic cam locks!
If you think about it , it is so " MR TECH GUY CAN RESCUE YOUR LOCKED CAT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN / LOST / LOCK IN THE IDENTITY RDIF KEY , ETC ." But it's just way too easy a by pass . No identity needed for by pass .
There actually is a way to do this somewhat more securely - by having a tamper-switch inside the external device that disables the unlock functonality until it is reset from the inside of the secure area. But that would obviously add one more component, and cost more, so the cheap sets don't include it.
Exactly this. Unfortunately it's quite common though. Manufacturers prefer to put all the fancy electronics in one place, so because they're making a keypad/rfid reader/fingerprint scanner, it's easiest to just add the rest of the control circuitry there. It's a horrible plan, but extremely common. In the ideal world, the outside of the door would simply send the credentials (encrypted in such a way as to prevent MITM replay attacks if the outside device is compromised) to the inside. That inside module would then authenticate the credentials and decide if the door should be allowed to open. What's worse is that this isn't just done with cheap stuff you can order off Amazon, this is also done with many professional grade systems, and in fact the vast majority of apartment door buzzer systems do this too (the newer ones have locks on the front of a thin aluminium box, the older ones don't even have that). Even high end office control systems that use card access to a central server for authentication still frequently transmit the authentication from the reader to that central control system in plain text making them vulnerable to MITM replay attacks. You have to be very careful with electronic locks, most are designed only with electronic security in mind, not physical security.
@@SebastianSonntag That's not really a great solution anyway for a couple of reasons: first, almost all tamper switches can be bypassed in such a way that they never alarm in the first place with minimal skill. Second, if all your control circuitry is on the outside, then that tamper reset signal would necessarily also be travelling to the outside and be just as easily bypassed as the door bypass shown here. The only secure way to do it is to keep all the control circuitry, and all the authentication circuitry, on the secure side, and only pass encrypted, un-authenticated, data from the outside to the inside. All authentication must happen on the secure side of the door.
@@Green__one Your assertion that "almost all tamper switches can be bypassed in such a way that they never alarm in the first place with minimal skill" is inane. I use electronic fingerprint locks on some of the doors on several of my properties. In each case, the tamper switch is fully integrated into the casing of the fingerprint reader, with dozens of contact points and sensors. Accessing the electronics without tripping the tamper switch, while it might be theoretically possible if you were to take a jackhammer - although that would almost certainly trip the vibration sensor - to the wall and attack the enclosure (which is recessed into said wall) from the back where there are fewer contact points, is as close to impossible as it can be. At that point you're better off breaking a window if you want to get in. Additionally, of course not *all* the control circuitry is on the outside. The tamper control module is inside the secure area. Once the tamper switch is tripped, the control module needs to be reset from the inside, because it cuts all power to the door module by tripping a breaker which has to be physically switched back on. No electronic lock is perfectly secure. Fingerprints can be copied, RFID tags can be spoofed, PINs can be guessed or brute-forced (which can be as easy as checking which buttons on the keyboard show the most wear on certain installations). However, with a little effort an electronic lock can be made at least as good as a mid-range mechanical lock, which is usually sufficient. On most properties, there is no point in trying to create a perfectly secure door lock because criminals will just find another way in.
I mean it is pretty secure but, as he said, if the part that controls the lock is also outside it's easily bypassable, or less easily depending on how much effort they spent on anti-tamper. Also, assuming you are using an seperate control box inside, you probably want to set it up so that it requires a key/fingerprint and a passcode.
also without them its eas hackable, the validation process should not be done on the outside LPL points out. Cause thats the real weakness of the system. If memory of users and also validation is inside, it should be way harder to break.
As an electronics engineer this makes my day lmao! It's so easy to do at least some sort of indirect connection but they went with a relay switching a silkscreened connector. Genius!
Even a hobbyist is able to build something more secure for a couple of bucks, just switch positive, reduce the incoming voltage when you send it back and the reciever checks for the right voltage, the devices could have random signal voltages, or each device a list of voltages that switch on every use randomly jusg by sending a one digit integer for a switch statement, this would make it ways harder to hack, even if you know how it works. But this is just ridiculous, I mean there is only one simple screw, a curious kid could open this thing and finally even steal it because it looks so cool and best thing is that it doesn't even need the other parts to reuse it because this is the whole control unit, the kid could have a cool looking door lock and you couldn't enter your own place, well, until you short the two wires by accident 😂
Year 2055 "This is the lockpicking lawyer and today, I'm going to show you how to open the master lock "retina-pro plus" retina scanning padlock using nothing more than a common soup spoon"
s3sebastian I assume it’s more so the wires aren’t supposed to give that much (As in they should be tight not allowing for the cover to be removed without damaging the wires) And when the wires are damaged the system remains locked.... Assuming I’m right I’d say this is actually a pretty alright lock...
@@swordstrafe Nah, theres no way for the secure side to know if the wires are damaged or not. Even if the connector breaks when you remove the body you could just connect your paperclip to pairs of wires until it unlocks. Also its very unlikely that the connector will break because the installer need enough cable lead to install the product in the first place. Also the connector will just disconnect from the plug, its just a common JST plug which arent fragile by any means. Even after it disconnects its just as novel to decode the wire functions. The only way to make this style of system airtight in anyway is to have the verification on the secure side, as suggested by LPL, with the verification using one time keys or time coded keys to defeat sniffer attacks (that read valid signals and resends them later).
A serious access control system would never utilise a local relay on an externally mounted device. At minimum there should be a cover tamper monitoring on the reader.
umm atm machine ... it takes 5 seconds to drop a fake pad overlay on it and get everyones code and card number ... and those suckers are supposed to be tamper proof
@@ctrl_x1770 Considering there's 4 wires and 2 of them are universally recognizable to anyone who has worked with any kind of electronics... Not exactly a difficult puzzle to solve.
@@Oznerock Picking and torquing a mechanical lock is also extremely obvious to any one who pays you any attention. Now if you really wanted to, you could get some kind of blue carpenter's coveralls and if anyone questions why you're opening the lock with a screwdriver, tell them you're maintenance. The average person is less likely to question that than question why you're attacking a mechanical lock with a pick set or whatever your method of attack is.
Locks keep honest people honest. If somebody wants to get in, if sufficiently determined, they’ll get in. The difference is whether you notice right away or not.
I've installed some of these sorts of security systems in apartment buildings, any half decent system has little to no way to tamper with they entry code box cover. In most cases we install them in special boxes before the drywall even goes up so that there is no way to access them. Very annoying if you have to go back and work on them later though 🤣
@@Moleoflands Didn't pay attention to the video did ya? It doesn't "send info", it's just an over complicated switch. that was one of lpl's complaints about this unit, the control circuitry should be in the external box, not in the easily accessible box.
thank you for telling me to stick to the old lock n' key, at least it doesn't take seconds. maybe i'll just invest in many multiple locks. you've also instilled a paranoia. still love your videos
The main defense is misdirection. The burglar gets in, goes to your bedroom, and starts looking in the usual places for jewelry and watches. Maybe his tweaker buddy is running around grabbing laptops and tablets. They also check the typical "safe in plain view" products like the super obvious wall shelf. You have a big heavy safe in the garage that can't be lifted by four people, and maybe they drag that away with a truck, or maybe they waste time picking it; it's full of lead bricks and boring porn. Your real goodies are in your hoarder shed under all the bales of crochet magazines in a soiled cardboard box labeled "pink bathroom sink". Of course, you could always use the patented Millennial Defense: just don't own anything.
Reminds me of the very expensive "2N IP Force" door intercom I once reviewed for my former employer. Very rugged, anti-vandalism design with a price tag of >1000€, but you could just unscrew the front panel, giving direct access to the door opener wires. Essentially, you could bypass that beast with just a torx screwdriver and a 9V battery.
As a former security systems tech, I can tell you that this is a garbage design that you will never see in any commercial setting. Card authentication is never done at the door on any real system. The reader is only there to send the card data (facility code and encoded ID #) to a security panel that will fire a relay to open the door. Security panels are typically installed inside of a locked data closet that is located INSIDE the space you're trying to enter. The panel may even be located multiple floors above, or below the floor that you're currently standing on.
Coming from the perspective of an apartment manager, I wouldn't have known to drill the security vendor on this issue. It also seems like this setup makes the outer-facing components more expensive to replace if vandalized. When it's set up like you described, replacing the outside panel sounds like a much cheaper job.
@@googiegress as a manager you should know more than average people but realistically it's impossible to know everything, that's why security experts exist. Consult with one of them before you go looking through stuff on Amazon otherwise you might think "slash proof" means something (LPL has a great series about slash proof stuff).
@@purplefreedom1631 Oh in this situation we'd definitely go with vendor recommendations instead of just slapping something down from Amazon. I'm just saying it's possible for the vendor to go cheap with me none the wiser. Except I guess in this case I know to ask about this one specific thing.
I would hate to actually do an escape room with him though. We wouldn't have time to work out the clues; if he brinks in his set of picks he'll just pick the door open and win every time
yeah we have a similar system, when you take a small flathead screwdriver and place it between the magnet and the doorplate you easily pry it open too, the 600 pound is only when pulling it straight, so any outward swinging doors are a bit more secure. but with a good solid door you can still pull them apart with a good yank.
Anyone that has a basic fundamental understanding of electricity would know this lock is garbage. I'd bet money that pouring a cup of water on the keypad would open the lock up. Hell, even turning off the power would open it up. The lock is constantly relaying a command to stay closed, if at any point that relay is disrupted, the door opens. Theres no fail safe. And what kind of lock manufacturer puts the access point (screws) on the exterior side of the lock? There should be either a separate mechankcal key required to access the screw, or some screw access door that only opens when the pin code is entered.
You really do not understand the product development process. Making ultra-secure things that cost a LOT of money is not that profitable due to low volume. Looks at the best-selling safes and door locks on Amazon. The #1 digital Lock on Amazon RIGHT NOW (YL-99) was featured on this show and defeated with a right-angle screw driver. They are purchased due to low price and that kind of volume is VERY profitable. The problem is that you think (as a consumer) that the "best" and most secure product makes the most money when the reality is that the cheapest product that offers "good enough" features actually rakes in the most $$$$. You blame the designers when the reality is that consumers actually define what developers make (developers use data to determine what to make while you use your "feelz" to determine what you like). AS a developer: making the "best" will get you fired while making the most $$$ will get you promoted (even if it's not very secure).
@@mouthwash8182 Incorrect. Yes if power was off to the magnet, then yes it would open (as with any electromagnet), but given that bridging the connection opened the lock, means that it was a lack of connection that keeps it closed (i.e. losing power to the controller would not result in lock opening).
The security at my work had the wrong door code for the outside of the last door of our fire exit at work yesterday. One of the fire doors in between that got stuck shut because of a piece of metal on the outside which was a huge risk for obvious reasons. Thanks to one of your videos I managed to work out the correct combination and pick the lock, so we cleared the obstruction and the fire exit. If there was a fire people could have died because the fire exit was blocked. Thank you for making these videos
Electrical engineer here: if the control signal is a high-impedance input like the gate of a MOSFET or CMOS device, then it genuinely might work if you get lucky and water bridges between the control and common wires. I recommend salt water for extra conductivity, and I also don't recommend doing anything illegal lol. Sadly, you probably won't get a dramatic shower of sparks and electrical arcing like in the movies.
@@Nonplused Or as he has already tried, zapping the entire circuit with his high voltage car transformer circuit arcing and resetting the system and it opens by default :)
I remember a friend of mine bought one of those small cut-proof/fire-proof digital keypad safes from Walmart, he was carrying it up some stairs in his polebarn and accidentally dropped it right on the keypad and it shattered, whatever material it was behind the plastic keypad looked like metal but it just crumbled and conveniently enough thats where all the tumblers were so by essentially dropping it he was able to get into it, unfortunately for him he didnt need to get into it and hadnt even gotten the chance to put anything into it, he was so mad but I couldnt help but think that youd be even more angry if someone else got into it
unfortunately probably a lot less than should. As popular as he is it is likely a drop in the bucket compared to their manufacturing savings by making units simpler to make.
You have to remember that anyway, most of his methods of lockpicking are "soft" ones and most burglars use "hard" ones. Look aroudn you and you'll often see 500€ locks installed on flimsy 100€ doors, or even sometime reinforced doors on a cheap door frame. Security is not just a lock. And for those panels he display there, most of the time I see them mounted in a metal shell that is bolted from behind the wall, that prevents any messing with the screws. But even then, it wouldn't take long for a thief to just wait and ask someone to get inside, or just a skillfull observer to get an entry code. There's always a failure somewhere. And the human factor is the one you can't fix.
Where I work we have door locks very similar to this. I'm the one responsible for lock security. There's a whole lot of requirements for the lock system to be fulfilled even to be remotely considered. The system in this video violates so many points on our list, I'm flabbergasted that it even exists. THAT thing shouldn't even have left the napkin stage in development.
There already are systems like that. One of the few gripes I have with LPL is he does go for low hanging fruit sometimes. A lot of his electronic bypass series is targetted at devices that are not meant for true security (though he does point out some that claim to be). This system is less than $200 and has both RFID and fingerprint reader. Those components and the magnet probably make the bulk of the price tag. There are a lot of card reader systems on the market that don't have these simple flaws, but they're more expensive and are usually used in large buildings, rather than the apartment complexes and small business offices you see the ones in this video at. Even his gun lock videos mostly focus on things meant to child-proof, not secure against theft.
@@giannicomoretto with some skills in programming, you can easiely set up a door lock with Raspberry Pi. Over a bus system the code or fingerprint is send to the raspberry pi, and there you can unlock the door. It's faster to cut off the glass, then trying to open this lock.
That bypass could be fixed by a simple circuit. A circuit that would require a certain voltage to be passed through the wires instead of simply just closing the circuit. Or have a required variable pulsed code to unlock through the wires to unlock.
like he said its simply wrong by design. The Terminal should just transmit the dialed numbers to the power supply control box. And the actual verification is done on the "secure side", not on the terminal side.
And as is so often the case a bleedingly obvious step that should have required two seconds of thought during the design phase is somehow missed; all this really requires is for the control board to be on the other side of the door with the number pad and sensors being wired through, it would mean more wires but render this actually worth more than about $5.
@@3DCGdesign That's what I mean; unless they've fucked up even harder than shown, the number pad and biometric sensor should only be sending signals to the control board, which is where the actual verification of the number sequence/scan data should take place. Which is why that board should be on the secure side of the door, rather than the insecure side.
It would require much more knowledge. This is a mechanical device with basic electronics. If you want to do it right it must be a secured connection, otherwise it’s easy to bit bang the signal. It won’t be as ‘cheap’ anymore then. 😅
I defeated my secondary school lock system years ago by removing the the front covers,whiched revealed a bunch of contact points for me to short circuit. The next thing you know, I was using paperclips to bypass all the lock and even trespassed my own school. And thus, almost got myself into a police case for trespassing. What memories to live by.
My school's theater had a rollup door that didn't have a latch for when it was down, so I could get in whenever I wanted. That was 15 years ago, and my nephew says it's still like that.
Yes, but the brand name Mengqi and the fact that they do not appear to have any website suggests that this may be manufactured by some Chinese generic that doesn't really care.
Unfortunately addressing it would require a complete redesign, to a more expensive design. At the moment, there's one circuit board, one power supply, and a couple of switches, all connected by fairly basic wiring. To address this problem, you'd need to split the circuit board, so that input processing to a digital form is handled on the external controller, and then have an internal control box (either separate or built into the power supply) that processes the requests to open the door. You'd likely also have to make the inside door switch more complicated, as it would have to request access from the control box instead of just opening the circuit. Then the external controller and the internal control box need to be able to communicate digitally, over a wire that's protected from tampering. With all of that in place, it's going to be a significantly more complex system to design and manufacture, and install is likely to be more complicated as well. (Note in this one there are four wires from the power control to the external box, which LGL has just cut and spliced. If those were carrying actual data, that would likely make the system not work as the wires would need shielding and cross-talk prevention - which is also going to mean the installer can't adjust the length of them.) The price is going to have to go up - likely by another 50 to 100 dollars - to do all this. So a fix is likely to essentially double the cost, and is unlikely to happen. What really needs to happen is for consumers to realize that this type of product built to adequate quality is going to cost $300 or more, and treat these $160 'locks' as junk and not buy them.
aside from the daft electronic lock.. 600lb isn't that much force to overcome for that magnetic latch, I'm sure a big fella running at the door or anyone with a crowbar would be through in seconds.
It is unbelievable how easy that system was fooled into opening. It is so sad that an unsuspecting purchaser would be putting their trust into something which could be bypassed by a child. What a way to rip off a potential customer. Thank you for sharing this information with us and I hope enough people view this to make a huge difference to its purchases, then maybe the maker will sit up and take notice and redesign for the better.
“Seems like you are having issues opening the door, do you wish for me to aid you?
-Clippy 2020
Clippy! Forever in my heart))
I still use them for picking... If it won't break, best thing ever!
Best comment!
Hahaha you deserve a comments award
fun fact his actual name is clippit, not clippy
Well, at least there were no high-security sponges involved this time.
IW4 “high security sponge” 😂
Which video did the security sponge meme come from?
@@Mikemk_ ua-cam.com/video/i7g-TvczpSw/v-deo.html
Luckily otherwise it would've been impossible 😂
That's great that's literally the last video that I seen
Step 1: find a secure facility and note what lock they use
Step 2: send one of those locks to lpl
Step 3: profit
Lolololol... Clever af
it's a powerful technique. you can defeat a grandmaster in chess using a similar method
Step 4: go to jail
@@ericr7611 step 5: send prison locks to plp
@@duckgoesquack4514 I think he has already done a few of those.
We can never put this man in jail he'll just post a video being like "leaving a high security prison with a bagel and thumb tack"
"The bagel isn't actually necessary I just wanted a snack for the road."
"To show it wasn't a fluke, I will do it again"
haha
I've been visiting someone in prison a few times. Every interior door is centrally controlled but I'd love to get a hold of the actual lock because what I've seen while passing through doesn't look that secure to me.
@@giarnovanzeijl399 haha 😂
“this is the lockpicking lawyer and today we are breaking into a bank vault with a potato chip and a red bull can”
Except he didn't need the potato
@@rnemovr59 mans gotta eat when mans gotta eat
the video would probably only be like 2.5 mins long
The red bull can is to by-pass. The potato chip is just for snack purpose...
DN
imagine you're in prison, and in the middle of the night you suddenly hear
....this is the lock picking lawyer, and what I have for you today is a typical prison cell door lock
he's the chosen one!
He’s like finally I’m free!
Prison cells are one way locks so only have a key hole on the outside. At least in the uk.
But what worked for me once was filling the lock hole with lol roll or paper so the lock dosn't shut.
Worked once. I was just testing if it would work as uk prison guards have IQs in the teens.
The prison I was in they still used old style keys and locks from the 80s
I was only inside for 4 months for driving with a suspended licence but if I was in there longer I could get out but wasn't going to risk getting 10 years added to my centence.
If I was in for life without any chance of getting out I would try no stop lol.
@@TheWhteWolf Next week on BBC:
Serial Killer on the loose after using toilet paper.
XD
I never imagined that one of my all time favourite things to do of an evening would be watching a man demolish my illusion of security with such succinct precision. This is 100% a compliment.
That's a subcontext to his whole channel. A lock will not give you security by itself. A security service decal in the window provides more safety then most common door locks.
@@Kishandreth However that security service decal could be detrimental to have if you actually use a sticker for the security system you have installed as they can then look up the model etc and the default bypass or a major security flaw.
@@empoleonmaster6709 That's why you use a generic sticker instead of a branded and model one! So they know there's something but not WHAT.
Though a surprise without sticker could also be good. Or good old "security led".
@@SaphireLattice Do better and get stickers for nearly every company you're NOT signed up for which will make it impossible to figure out you have one of the security systems that's NOT listed via your stickers.
@@empoleonmaster6709 But then you just guess what sticker you don't have. So the best solution is to just stick everything including one you do have.
This man can be responsible for the biggest heist of all time.
Can be?
Next time, on Ocean's14!
Can be?²
Can be?³
🤣🤣🤣
this type of thing of thing never comes up in mission impossible movies. They'd have found a way to copy the fingerprint or executed an awesome stunt to cut the power.
LPL- here I am with a screwdriver and a paperclip
To be fair, mission impossible is usually about super top secured facilities, where consumer hardware like this would never be used.
Wasn't McGiver like this? But to be point of stupidity?
Anton Juul-Naber Eh.. military grade doesn’t mean much.
Military grade mean't made by the lowest bidder right?
Not always the case, but hey maybe when Area 51 raid actually happens.
@@Anton-cv2ti reminds me of when I was a civilian contractor working on a air Force Base that I had to have clearance enhanced to work on this particular building and a full time escort to get into and out of the area. The gard was unable to get his electric key to work as well as unable to call the inside gard ( both required to have keys and unlock at the same time). So I was like let's go through the overhead door they put the switch on the outside and I think with a screwdriver I can hit the open button. Boom 16X16 door opens. Never figured out what they did in that building other than have a very fancy lock on the man door.
"The more sophisticated the lock, the more prone it is to primitive attack. People often overlook the obvious."
"What's that?"
"Bent paper clip."
Not enough puns
Po lil tank tank
- Wakandans
lolol
There's usually a "weak link in the chain" in most systems, the trick it to find it.
At 1:29 "All this looks very impressive, but there's a pretty fundamental flaw with the setup"... yeah it's called the LPL attack. lol
Now I get why rich people buy lions and tigers.
Feed them milk and let them sniff sleepy powder....we good. Or
Shoot darts and tranquilizers
"Now to distract this tiger here, I'm going to take out this steak Bosnian Bill and I prepared..."
And bears, oh my!
He's going to unlock the tiger anyway.
My dude, Best comment ever. Cracking up
That was actually a lot easier than picking a mechanical lock
Think so too. I cant open a mechanical lock. No chance. But this here can be done by a 5 year old lol
Because it's not picking, it's bypassing. Most Bypasses on mechanical locks are just as easy, when they exist. Actually pixking electronic locks is practically impossible
@kokamargali9540 spy agent fluent in binary maybe
Gotta ask, do companies ever get pissed at you and email rude things cause you destroy their locks and such?
I'd like to know that either!
I'm listening..
Yeah same here
When he cut the ottolock with Tin snips they accused his video of being deceptive. He then cut the improved version with tin snips, and responded to the accusation with what one comment described as "the most polite roast" they'd ever seen
I know he received an angry letter from a Chinese lock manufacturer and posted it on Twitter awhile back
Wow, just goes to show that most security systems rely on intimidation and general ignorance over actual security. One screw, that's ridiculous.
@Curi Osity Nice. Anything to slow them down is a win in my book. :)
It's the old thought of, a lock keeps the well behaved out, but anyone that TRULY wants into something can always find a way. I bet 1out of 10 smashing this head unit defaults to opening up too or might short the cables as well...lol.
That screw may be small, but it's 3D printed out of cold-rolled, degaussed, depleted titanium.
The thing is that there is door contacts on most doors in shops or wherever so when a door is opened and the alarm is set opening the door will result in a alarm.
@@TheTruthKiwi He's saying the heater has the security screw, not the lock lol.
This is the hardware equivalent of authenticating your password client-side...
Yup.
Such an atrocious design. Even if they're too lazy to switch the side that the authentication is performed on, they couldn't at least have used a PWM signal instead? Obviously still unsecure, but requires a significantly greater amount of knowledge and technology to overcome than a paperclip.
@@MatthewStauffer would cost more to implement, either raising the MSRP or reducing profit per unit.
So instead we have LPL demonstrating that the product is utter crap and should be returned to the seller as not fit for purpose.
Fire up disassembler, bridge the jmps with paperclip, done.
@@MatthewStauffer Look, there are multiple problems here; using Phillips screws, rather than any other type that decreases the likelihood of an attack to the interior of the electronic components, is already a huge flaw that signifies a particularly telling lack of interest on the manufacturer's part. Having just *_one_* screw that is easily accessible from outside is just ridiculous.
I used to work as an security alarm/door access technician. It amazed me how unsecure "security" devices are. Especially the "high tech" ones costing thousands and thousands of dollars.
Even systems with available supervisory resistors are bypassed by installers to make the installation easier.
@@livenotonevil8279 Or, more commonly, the resistors are set up in the controlling device - out of convenience - instead of the tail end controlled device (i.e. a sensor or a detector).
Hollywood movies: The hacker connects to the door panel with a fancy laptop and starts running complicated hacker tools on the door.
LPL: Here's a paperclip and a screwdriver, let me show you how that's done.
And he still gets it done faster and easier than the hacker while teaching you how to do it.
Why does Ocean's Eleven come to mind?
But if we see a high security lock being picked this way in a movie, we will complain
@@WHIRLWOLF Not really, only people who don't know locks.
there is an RJ45 port inside and a usb port on the OUTSIDE so a software attack is probably also possible. this is why LPL says a NON standalone digital access control system is much better, in this case to gain entry it is necessary to control a computer farther away to open the door, which requires some kind of cyber attack, so you might as well have an actual inside man to just open the door for you at that point.
The fundamental flaw is underestimating the Lock Picking Lawyer.
Or he's wife, when she wants ice cream!
No, this is stunningly flawed. Some of the mechanical/physical exploits seem to me like they require knowledge of the particular mechanism... but this one is written in silkscreen on the circuit board.
@@WeslomPo his, not he's
The flaw would be securing the panel with a single small screw and not making it impossible to get into without sending it back to the manufacturer
my favorite part is the beginning when he explains how beautifully everything works... because I am thrilled waiting for the "but..."
For me senior project we are using a fingerprint sensor in a similar type project and another flaw besides that is that they typically store the fingerprint templates ON the sensor board. So theoretically you could pluck that board, plug it in somewhere else and dump all the stored fingerprints. How do I know? I've tested it for my project.
Fk that's really bad.
no shit
@@connorzoesch9087 I more meant for the system he was working with, but I can see how the way I worded is confusing.
But Is it on Github?
@@piezaclave393 no.
And thats how an engineering team get humilated in 3.40 mins...
He takes the time to explain. It would have been done in 40 seconds otherwise
It was probably a Chinese child.
@@albertlopez7079 Actually, it's pretty weird. They usually use some simple coding, not just on-off signal.
should's use centralized system for that one .. smh ..
3.40 minutes is 3 minutes and 24 seconds.
I thought we might have a little drama: "Do I cut the red wire, or the blue wire?" But, no, just a pedestrian paper clip...
Sometimes the best option isn't to cut the power, but to redirect it or give more power.
heeey thats MacGiver's! paperclip! ok !
@@Krushak69 MacGyver
*The FBI raids LPLs house and takes him in for questioning*
The FBI: So... we've been watching you for some while now, we know that you are experienced in lock picking and may be a threat to the United States, we have seen your lock picking abilities and have put you in handcuffs no mere mortal could escap... HEY ARE YOU EVEN LISTENING TO ME.
LPL: Nothing on 1, nothing on 2, some tension on 3, a nice click on 4, and another nice click on five. Alright guys and that's how you get out of military grade handcuffs. Not that hard all you really need is a paperclip and a button on your shirt and you can do it at home.
don't even try to lock him up with a lock that he can reach.
FBI & CIA: You are hired!
FBI & CIA: NO WE HIRE HIM FIRST
LPL: May the best Detective wins and let the game begins.
@@Pancak3trap he can use the force duh
Longest joke I've ever read
@@OMARD55 You clearly haven't read your username before.
I used to do car breakdown nightshift, that included lockouts. Some cars are so fast to open, some customers refused to sign off my work receipt for me to be paid because they didn't believe I had unlocked them, and that it must have already been unlocked, twice I relocked them again and left the scene because the customers were so arrogant and rude.
Easy to say take longer then to convince them of the effort, but there was always people waiting for me, and I got paid by each individual job.
Lets get out the Paperclip BosnianBill and I had around the office...
😁
Under rated comment.
@@herefishyfishy6907 519 at 9:27 PST now
I was searching exactly for this one
Who would win:
a 160$ security system
or
Clippy
?
My money is on clippy boy
"It looks like you are trying to break in through a security system.
Would you like some help?"
> Yes No
I still miss clippy :-(
That depends on who is wielding the clippy
@Богдан Кондратов Clippy isn't alone, he has Screwy by his side.
I was like, "Oh man, almost four minutes," and then the first 1:30 was literally just him explaining and modeling how the lock works, followed by another minute of him talking about how to undermine it.
I appreciate the time he takes to explain things, but im also like, "Do the thing".
just be happy he is not like the rest of the you tubers that make every single video 10:01. long.
Places in need of security should hire this guy after they've installed their security systems, just to have him detect flaws so they can improve on them.
> Places in need of security should hire this guy after they've installed their security systems
*Before* they install their security systems...
Cables: *NO*
Lock picking lawyer: Paperclip
Cables: *YES*
The fact that they misspelled "serial" should be a tip off that this is junk.
No, you spelled "seral" wrong!
The pair of you are stupid, the correct spelling is “cereal”
Yes because typos are always indicative of lying about whats happening in the video youre playing of what you did
@@realitynowassigned If they're too lazy to get a dictionary, why should we give them the benefit of doubt about the lock?
@@creeperhunterD if youre too ignorant to understand a typo how does that translate into invalidated video proof
I'm waiting for the day LPL gets out of a high security prison using a taco.
...that BosnianBill and he made.
El Chapo beat him to it.
@@two_tier_gary_rumain Yeah, but with a bike and a tunnel. Not a taco.
@@SuryanIsaac He was eating one at the time. :)
Meat taco
That was so wonderfully simple and anticlimactic. The beep, the lock falling open, that's it. One-cent Paperclip - 1, $170 dollar Lock - 0. Bravo, sir!
When you're watching Stargate and Carter opens a door with a knife and you think "that's alien tech, it wouldn't be that easy"
LPL .. "well, actually..."
Thats a good one sir :D Never thought i see a Stargate comment on 2021 lol
Hahaha yeah guess Stargate wasn't so farfetched after all.
I REALLY miss Stargate. Carter was so awesome, LPL would certainly make an excellent SG team member!
Indeed. *jaffa deadpan*
@@Preston241 aye, kri to that
Just put up a sign.
“No screwdrivers allowed on the premises”
BOOM- Fort Knox security levels again.
"Hey, this is a gun, eer, screwdriver free zone"
Didn't you know? - Criminals can't commit crimes if they're told they're not allowed to.
Or you could put 601lbs of force and the lock would give
@@kevinlin7674, I'm pretty sure at 500lbs the frame might just give way. The 600lbs is just a novelty unless you bolt it into the floor.
@@saints360row Thanks for the heads up! Hey folks, we only need to exert 501lbs of force now!
Surprise they didn’t use a star bit screw. At least a little extra security
This looks like something you’d see on an episode of MacGuyver and think was too silly to be true.
is normal to me though.
佐藤海翔 because UA-cam have disabled the thumbs down button; I am writing this comment just to let you know that I thumbed down your comment.
What’s macguyer
@@Anonymous-vh6kp is either you're dreaming or you are drunk xD
CCP trolls?
MacGuyver used some powder to duplicate a finger print I think... I saw that episode
holy crap! I almost choked when you said the verification and authentication system was on the insecure side. One would have to be almost literally brain dead to make a design like that.
Welcome to website security! 😃
This way they don't have to run that many wires into the "Power Supply Control" and get away with one processor. They're just going cheap.
@@metamud8686 welcome? I've been doing comp sec for 40 years. :)
almost ... no I ont think almost is that dumb ... heck a village idiot knows enough to drop a woodedn bar across the other side to secure a door ... and at an IQ if 17 that is about as brain dead as one can get ... hmm come to think of it .. we do have a prime minister who would need to go to school to become a village idiot
@@pugnate666 I2C uses two wires and can transmit the read data to the control unit for processing and verification using one *less* wire than the current setup lpl is showing us. And can't be shorted open.
The label on the latch reading "seral no." gives me the highest confidence
i am proud of you
Nice catch!!!
Chy-na
Lol nice find. I Googled "Seral No" And guess what popped up? The exact same magnetic door lock
Yeah, and that's not even the vulnerable part.
Next weeks episode, I'll show you how to break into Fort Knox using a plastic zip tie and a chicken.
He'll need 5 minutes - 10s to unlock everything with the zip tie and 4 minutes 50 to eat the chicken.
There's no gold... LOL...
thats a bullcrap conspiracy theory there is nothing at fort knox, there is currently 147 troy ounces worth $290 billion
@@iamasmurf1122 And it's on loan from israel.....
plastic zip tie and a rubber chicken....
*This system is installed all over my University*
Me after watching this: hehe boi😂😂
That's exactly what I'm thinking bro... Faculty room I'm coming boi
Bro what university do you attend?
@@dekotakilcrease9525 Hogwarts University wbu
thats bad
Pro tip: once you've bypassed the lock, quote 1:55 to scare everyone even more shitless 😂
"This is the Lockpicking Lawyer, and today I'm going to show you that the president really isn't that safe from my abilities."
During this COVID quarantine, I am learning new skills for the coming apocalypse!
Same
you read my mind
And specially the walking dead apocalypse
Get ready for the Great Reset. Join the resistance now!
@@Hi-cz3nv That'll be the most secure lock in such an event...as I never ever witnessed a zombie with a paperclip.
Finally the moment we have all been waiting for: Opening a lock with a paperclip.
(Although, admittedly, it wasn't the kind of lock, or the way to open it, that I was expecting.)
Imagine the LPL doing an escape room.
LPL: "searching for clues? Boring. I'll just pick all the locks in order"
LPL: The world's toughest escape room is a joke: Jiggled open in 2 minutes.
INEXCUSABLE FLAWS
I'd watch that
[1589] "Un-escapeable" escape room escaped within 2 minutes
Thank you for this as always.
I am an old man. One thing that I notice with security devices is that no matter how sophisticated they become there is always a need for physical security This is often missing. You can have a very secure access system but if someone can just put a boot through the door, or short it out with a paper clip, the level of security is low.
boots work grate on most doors and windows!
This is like having the user authentification in the front-end instead of the backend
"like"?
it literally is
it is literally front-end authentication
And including authorized boolean in the request
wow, IT geek jokes.. 👌
I love backends too.... though in the bedroom. ;D
All they had to do is encrypt the signal from the fingerprint reader to the main control unit, problem solved (well, not for LPL lol).
jigsaw: the key is hidden in your hand and you need to cut it to get the key can you do it
LPL: and this how you opens easily opening locks with only paperclips
jigsaw: wait thats not how you play the game
@@noviefros8911 what?
@@noviefros8911 what?
Jigsaw just gets more and more pissed as he tries more brutal techniques, only to find that lpl has picked every lock before he even finishes explaining them
To get lpl in a saw game you'd need to cut off his hands first, and even then I'm not too confident he couldn't pick his way out with his tongue
@@npc6817 now I know why his wife loves him.
"The more they overthink the plumbing, the easier it is to stop up the drain." - Scotty, Star Trek III
But clearly they underthought this one!
Just a little grease down the drain every day for a few years can completely clog a city sewer system. Seen it done. If I remember right, they're called fat bergs
@Богдан Кондратов Equipment will never replace mentality and training. Give me a good driver with a Volkswagen Beetle from the 1930s over a bad driver with the all new 2020 Nissan Altima.
@@pavelthefabulous5675 Yeah. but his point is: if the bad driver with the 2020 Nissan Altima ends up hitting the 1930 Beetle at 80 km/h (or 50 miles per freedom), guess who is more likely to survive..
Thomas Vlaskamp III - I’ve dated a few of those in my time.
I've always thought those magnets that can hold doors closed are so cool.
Did they leave a good impression on you?
It’s just a electro magnet
@@conradgladue4717 I'm sure she has a name, don't be so condescending
@@SedgeSedgicus huh
@@yourlocalhuman3526 the magnet...
As soon as I saw that setup I knew what the bypass was going to be, why would anyone think having your control circuitry on the non secure side of the door is a good idea.
I have a couple of customers who have yards with electronic gates and the control box for said gate is on the outside of the fence/gate... the box that holds the electronics is quite stout and is all steel construction with hidden hinges but it is secured with basic cam locks!
If you think about it , it is so " MR TECH GUY CAN RESCUE YOUR LOCKED CAT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN / LOST / LOCK IN THE IDENTITY RDIF KEY , ETC ."
But it's just way too easy a by pass . No identity needed for by pass .
There actually is a way to do this somewhat more securely - by having a tamper-switch inside the external device that disables the unlock functonality until it is reset from the inside of the secure area. But that would obviously add one more component, and cost more, so the cheap sets don't include it.
Exactly this. Unfortunately it's quite common though. Manufacturers prefer to put all the fancy electronics in one place, so because they're making a keypad/rfid reader/fingerprint scanner, it's easiest to just add the rest of the control circuitry there. It's a horrible plan, but extremely common.
In the ideal world, the outside of the door would simply send the credentials (encrypted in such a way as to prevent MITM replay attacks if the outside device is compromised) to the inside. That inside module would then authenticate the credentials and decide if the door should be allowed to open.
What's worse is that this isn't just done with cheap stuff you can order off Amazon, this is also done with many professional grade systems, and in fact the vast majority of apartment door buzzer systems do this too (the newer ones have locks on the front of a thin aluminium box, the older ones don't even have that). Even high end office control systems that use card access to a central server for authentication still frequently transmit the authentication from the reader to that central control system in plain text making them vulnerable to MITM replay attacks.
You have to be very careful with electronic locks, most are designed only with electronic security in mind, not physical security.
@@SebastianSonntag That's not really a great solution anyway for a couple of reasons: first, almost all tamper switches can be bypassed in such a way that they never alarm in the first place with minimal skill. Second, if all your control circuitry is on the outside, then that tamper reset signal would necessarily also be travelling to the outside and be just as easily bypassed as the door bypass shown here.
The only secure way to do it is to keep all the control circuitry, and all the authentication circuitry, on the secure side, and only pass encrypted, un-authenticated, data from the outside to the inside. All authentication must happen on the secure side of the door.
@@Green__one Your assertion that "almost all tamper switches can be bypassed in such a way that they never alarm in the first place with minimal skill" is inane. I use electronic fingerprint locks on some of the doors on several of my properties. In each case, the tamper switch is fully integrated into the casing of the fingerprint reader, with dozens of contact points and sensors. Accessing the electronics without tripping the tamper switch, while it might be theoretically possible if you were to take a jackhammer - although that would almost certainly trip the vibration sensor - to the wall and attack the enclosure (which is recessed into said wall) from the back where there are fewer contact points, is as close to impossible as it can be. At that point you're better off breaking a window if you want to get in.
Additionally, of course not *all* the control circuitry is on the outside. The tamper control module is inside the secure area. Once the tamper switch is tripped, the control module needs to be reset from the inside, because it cuts all power to the door module by tripping a breaker which has to be physically switched back on.
No electronic lock is perfectly secure. Fingerprints can be copied, RFID tags can be spoofed, PINs can be guessed or brute-forced (which can be as easy as checking which buttons on the keyboard show the most wear on certain installations). However, with a little effort an electronic lock can be made at least as good as a mid-range mechanical lock, which is usually sufficient. On most properties, there is no point in trying to create a perfectly secure door lock because criminals will just find another way in.
Fingerprint/RDIF: I am strong and secure.
LPL: Yeah, now talk to my paperclip.
I mean it is pretty secure but, as he said, if the part that controls the lock is also outside it's easily bypassable, or less easily depending on how much effort they spent on anti-tamper. Also, assuming you are using an seperate control box inside, you probably want to set it up so that it requires a key/fingerprint and a passcode.
😅👍
When will these companies stop putting externally accessible screws on their locks?
Then there are the ones that slap a sticker over top like a Band-Aid.
@@sinnison23 And the sticker will say "Voids warranty if removed".
also without them its eas hackable, the validation process should not be done on the outside LPL points out. Cause thats the real weakness of the system.
If memory of users and also validation is inside, it should be way harder to break.
@@Tjalve70 genius
I'm glad he's one of the good guys, immense heist potential otherwise.
I like to imagine he did one giant job and then retired XD
Hey, there’s plenty of heists out there to be done for the good of humanity. (half serious)
your quick to assume he hasnt done a heist with the skillset he has
Or is he a good guy? (Vsauce music plays)
I mean .... He could be both
As an electronics engineer this makes my day lmao! It's so easy to do at least some sort of indirect connection but they went with a relay switching a silkscreened connector. Genius!
All the fancy tech just to operate a mechanical relay.
Even a hobbyist is able to build something more secure for a couple of bucks, just switch positive, reduce the incoming voltage when you send it back and the reciever checks for the right voltage, the devices could have random signal voltages, or each device a list of voltages that switch on every use randomly jusg by sending a one digit integer for a switch statement, this would make it ways harder to hack, even if you know how it works. But this is just ridiculous, I mean there is only one simple screw, a curious kid could open this thing and finally even steal it because it looks so cool and best thing is that it doesn't even need the other parts to reuse it because this is the whole control unit, the kid could have a cool looking door lock and you couldn't enter your own place, well, until you short the two wires by accident 😂
Ahhh - the good old Processor And Peripheral Electronic Reactive Computer Line Interface Probe.....
Good one
:)
I read that in the voice of Agent 86, AKA Maxwell Smart.
ha nice
OK, KND operative.
Year 2055
"This is the lockpicking lawyer and today, I'm going to show you how to open the master lock "retina-pro plus" retina scanning padlock using nothing more than a common soup spoon"
Nope, only a small booger would be sufficient if it's a Master Lock.
He then proceeds to just pressing the big red "OPEN DOOR" button, bypassing everything
@@canalalex0119 of course my horse
Just saw your video for the first time and This was great. Great voice, diction and concise format. Fun
Nothing on “thumb”, slight click out of the bottom plate, counter rotation on the paper clip...and there you go!
Surely the manufacturer is like: You're not supposed or allowed to remove that screw!
I bet the removal of the screw violates warranty 😀
s3sebastian I assume it’s more so the wires aren’t supposed to give that much (As in they should be tight not allowing for the cover to be removed without damaging the wires)
And when the wires are damaged the system remains locked....
Assuming I’m right I’d say this is actually a pretty alright lock...
if they'd used a star screw or at least something less common than a Phillips head it might have fared a bit better
@@swordstrafe Nah, theres no way for the secure side to know if the wires are damaged or not. Even if the connector breaks when you remove the body you could just connect your paperclip to pairs of wires until it unlocks.
Also its very unlikely that the connector will break because the installer need enough cable lead to install the product in the first place. Also the connector will just disconnect from the plug, its just a common JST plug which arent fragile by any means. Even after it disconnects its just as novel to decode the wire functions.
The only way to make this style of system airtight in anyway is to have the verification on the secure side, as suggested by LPL, with the verification using one time keys or time coded keys to defeat sniffer attacks (that read valid signals and resends them later).
Darcy Moloney is the wire are damaged you can’t send the unlock signal.
LPL: "Thank you for your generous donation"
Marc: "DONATION?!?!?"
well: surely LPL would send it back, but... this thing would not be secure enough to keep a candy bar safe, so... would anyone want it back?
@@sarowie They would, for a refund.
lol
Marc. with a c.
*key and peele reference*
@@Slepepe Cark?
A serious access control system would never utilise a local relay on an externally mounted device. At minimum there should be a cover tamper monitoring on the reader.
umm atm machine ... it takes 5 seconds to drop a fake pad overlay on it and get everyones code and card number ... and those suckers are supposed to be tamper proof
"Bypassing this is as simple as bypassing a simple mechanical lock" Wrong, this is way easier
Tbf you have to unscrew the case. That does make it really obvious as to what you're doing to everyone for miles and does slow you down.
@@Oznerock Unless you went at night with no one to see~
And you need to know which parts to bridge.
@@ctrl_x1770 Considering there's 4 wires and 2 of them are universally recognizable to anyone who has worked with any kind of electronics... Not exactly a difficult puzzle to solve.
@@Oznerock Picking and torquing a mechanical lock is also extremely obvious to any one who pays you any attention. Now if you really wanted to, you could get some kind of blue carpenter's coveralls and if anyone questions why you're opening the lock with a screwdriver, tell them you're maintenance. The average person is less likely to question that than question why you're attacking a mechanical lock with a pick set or whatever your method of attack is.
The lock is perfectly secure provided that everyone with physical access to it plays by the rules.
It's an honor system. 😜
You will just as well off with a sign that says, "Authorized personnel only". Or better results with a sign that says, not an exit or emergency only.
OmniscientWarrior yeah I feel like most people are hesitant about “emergency only” doors as they usually suspect it sounds some sort of alarm
Locks are only for honest people, no matter what kind of lock.
Stop and frisk for paper clips - problem solved.
Locks keep honest people honest. If somebody wants to get in, if sufficiently determined, they’ll get in. The difference is whether you notice right away or not.
I've installed some of these sorts of security systems in apartment buildings, any half decent system has little to no way to tamper with they entry code box cover. In most cases we install them in special boxes before the drywall even goes up so that there is no way to access them. Very annoying if you have to go back and work on them later though 🤣
It's still plastic though, cut out the panel front and bridge. Or better yet, smash with a hammer and short circuit the wires directly.
@@keimakatsuragi5807 sometimes, good ones are metal. Hammer could still work but it would not be covert at all.
@@keimakatsuragi5807 Smashing the input box is pointless, since it doesn't actually control the lock - just sends info inside
@@Moleoflands Didn't pay attention to the video did ya?
It doesn't "send info", it's just an over complicated switch.
that was one of lpl's complaints about this unit, the control circuitry should be in the external box, not in the easily accessible box.
@@chrisbaker8533 OP and Bui are talking about a decent system, not the one in the video /facepalm
thank you for telling me to stick to the old lock n' key, at least it doesn't take seconds. maybe i'll just invest in many multiple locks. you've also instilled a paranoia. still love your videos
The main defense is misdirection. The burglar gets in, goes to your bedroom, and starts looking in the usual places for jewelry and watches. Maybe his tweaker buddy is running around grabbing laptops and tablets. They also check the typical "safe in plain view" products like the super obvious wall shelf. You have a big heavy safe in the garage that can't be lifted by four people, and maybe they drag that away with a truck, or maybe they waste time picking it; it's full of lead bricks and boring porn.
Your real goodies are in your hoarder shed under all the bales of crochet magazines in a soiled cardboard box labeled "pink bathroom sink".
Of course, you could always use the patented Millennial Defense: just don't own anything.
You missed the point of this lock. It actually is a security measurement, as every criminal will be incapacitated by laughter.
I hear the sound of wailing and panic from the marketing team over at Mengqi
There's even enough room in there to hide an Arduino board so you can have permanent easy access without anyone knowing.
Or a radio controlled switch as seen in other lpl videos...
Wonder if you can code in your own fingerprint while you have the lock open?
You can even put your weed in there!
Someone's been watching some Modern Rogue, I see.
i'd say get an esp32, it has the wifi already built in :D
High tech lock: **exists**
LPL: "Oh, no... Anyways..."
High tech 🤣 its literally a button
Reminds me of the very expensive "2N IP Force" door intercom I once reviewed for my former employer. Very rugged, anti-vandalism design with a price tag of >1000€, but you could just unscrew the front panel, giving direct access to the door opener wires. Essentially, you could bypass that beast with just a torx screwdriver and a 9V battery.
-Someone: Can you open that door?
-LockPickingLawyer: Hold my documents
Good one... 😅
Good one! 😅
I'd say it should be "hold my briefs" but that has a whole different connotation.
This kind of thing is why the only real security is lethal booby traps.
Well, a dead thief doesn't steal anything...unless they are able to reanimate themselves.
A gun is the original deterrent to burglary
Endless object puzzles are also an option.
Punji sticks protect my home inside and out. Sadly I forgot where some of them are
@@Qardo Make a saving throw.
As a former security systems tech, I can tell you that this is a garbage design that you will never see in any commercial setting. Card authentication is never done at the door on any real system. The reader is only there to send the card data (facility code and encoded ID #) to a security panel that will fire a relay to open the door. Security panels are typically installed inside of a locked data closet that is located INSIDE the space you're trying to enter. The panel may even be located multiple floors above, or below the floor that you're currently standing on.
These are probably bought by cheapskates who want a lock, but don’t want to pay for a good one!
Coming from the perspective of an apartment manager, I wouldn't have known to drill the security vendor on this issue.
It also seems like this setup makes the outer-facing components more expensive to replace if vandalized. When it's set up like you described, replacing the outside panel sounds like a much cheaper job.
@@googiegress as a manager you should know more than average people but realistically it's impossible to know everything, that's why security experts exist. Consult with one of them before you go looking through stuff on Amazon otherwise you might think "slash proof" means something (LPL has a great series about slash proof stuff).
@@purplefreedom1631 Oh in this situation we'd definitely go with vendor recommendations instead of just slapping something down from Amazon. I'm just saying it's possible for the vendor to go cheap with me none the wiser. Except I guess in this case I know to ask about this one specific thing.
What would happen if one slid a thin sheet of metal (magnetic ofcourse) between the locking magnets ? Would the threshold of 600 lbs come down ?
I would honestly love to see LPL design an escape room with locks even he can't bypass.
I would hate to actually do an escape room with him though. We wouldn't have time to work out the clues; if he brinks in his set of picks he'll just pick the door open and win every time
All the locks would just be welded shut.
That room would have a body count
yeah we have a similar system, when you take a small flathead screwdriver and place it between the magnet and the doorplate you easily pry it open too, the 600 pound is only when pulling it straight, so any outward swinging doors are a bit more secure. but with a good solid door you can still pull them apart with a good yank.
When people who know how to make electronics have no understanding of security.
I don't think you need a degree in physical penetration testing to have a little bit of common sense and critical thinking.
Anyone that has a basic fundamental understanding of electricity would know this lock is garbage. I'd bet money that pouring a cup of water on the keypad would open the lock up. Hell, even turning off the power would open it up. The lock is constantly relaying a command to stay closed, if at any point that relay is disrupted, the door opens. Theres no fail safe. And what kind of lock manufacturer puts the access point (screws) on the exterior side of the lock? There should be either a separate mechankcal key required to access the screw, or some screw access door that only opens when the pin code is entered.
You really do not understand the product development process.
Making ultra-secure things that cost a LOT of money is not that profitable due to low volume.
Looks at the best-selling safes and door locks on Amazon.
The #1 digital Lock on Amazon RIGHT NOW (YL-99) was featured on this show and defeated with a right-angle screw driver.
They are purchased due to low price and that kind of volume is VERY profitable.
The problem is that you think (as a consumer) that the "best" and most secure product makes the most money when the reality is that the cheapest product that offers "good enough" features actually rakes in the most $$$$.
You blame the designers when the reality is that consumers actually define what developers make (developers use data to determine what to make while you use your "feelz" to determine what you like).
AS a developer: making the "best" will get you fired while making the most $$$ will get you promoted (even if it's not very secure).
@@mouthwash8182 Incorrect. Yes if power was off to the magnet, then yes it would open (as with any electromagnet), but given that bridging the connection opened the lock, means that it was a lack of connection that keeps it closed (i.e. losing power to the controller would not result in lock opening).
@@benhook1013 Losing power on the house mains would, howevr, Just unplug the main fuse.
Thanks for the tutorial man, now I am a millionaire with your help and living my life peacefully
When is the unpickable safe for a bank to be open? Asking for a friend.
I'm going to tune in tomorrow and watch you defeat the door locks on NORAD with a peppermint.
enters greenbrieer with tinsel
Probably not the mints, but sometimes the wrapper is electrically conductive 😁
The true mark of quality: A "Seral No."
The security at my work had the wrong door code for the outside of the last door of our fire exit at work yesterday. One of the fire doors in between that got stuck shut because of a piece of metal on the outside which was a huge risk for obvious reasons.
Thanks to one of your videos I managed to work out the correct combination and pick the lock, so we cleared the obstruction and the fire exit. If there was a fire people could have died because the fire exit was blocked.
Thank you for making these videos
LPL episode 2000: LPL stares at the lock to open it.
"Open sesame"... ?
I wouldn't be surprised if that actually happened, with iris scanners becoming more commonplace and locks that are being made poorly.
@@justice_1337 I fully understand the lack of originallity, hence the question mark, intended as the "funny" part ;-)
Likely, a crappy retinal scanner.
Scaring a lock open
I wonder if you could just dump a bucket of water on the keypad for the same result
Probably 😅
Electrical engineer here: if the control signal is a high-impedance input like the gate of a MOSFET or CMOS device, then it genuinely might work if you get lucky and water bridges between the control and common wires. I recommend salt water for extra conductivity, and I also don't recommend doing anything illegal lol. Sadly, you probably won't get a dramatic shower of sparks and electrical arcing like in the movies.
@@veraxis9961 if there's no electrical arching, is it really worth opening
@@Septimus_ii there could be fun electric things behind the locked door
maybe just put 2 screwdrivers into the next outlet and force the mainfuse to explode.. no power ..no magnetforce to close the door.
Hmm, bridging electrics with a paperclip - I'm glad that this was LPL and not Electroboom ;)
Electroboom would have used 240 volts and blown the whole circuit to smithereens, but still got in.
@@Nonplused ,because the door was that of the hospital that brings him back to life.
@@Nonplused Or as he has already tried, zapping the entire circuit with his high voltage car transformer circuit arcing and resetting the system and it opens by default :)
I remember a friend of mine bought one of those small cut-proof/fire-proof digital keypad safes from Walmart, he was carrying it up some stairs in his polebarn and accidentally dropped it right on the keypad and it shattered, whatever material it was behind the plastic keypad looked like metal but it just crumbled and conveniently enough thats where all the tumblers were so by essentially dropping it he was able to get into it, unfortunately for him he didnt need to get into it and hadnt even gotten the chance to put anything into it, he was so mad but I couldnt help but think that youd be even more angry if someone else got into it
I can't imagine how many lock companies have went bankrupt because of him.
unfortunately probably a lot less than should. As popular as he is it is likely a drop in the bucket compared to their manufacturing savings by making units simpler to make.
You have to remember that anyway, most of his methods of lockpicking are "soft" ones and most burglars use "hard" ones.
Look aroudn you and you'll often see 500€ locks installed on flimsy 100€ doors, or even sometime reinforced doors on a cheap door frame.
Security is not just a lock.
And for those panels he display there, most of the time I see them mounted in a metal shell that is bolted from behind the wall, that prevents any messing with the screws. But even then, it wouldn't take long for a thief to just wait and ask someone to get inside, or just a skillfull observer to get an entry code.
There's always a failure somewhere. And the human factor is the one you can't fix.
0 is a hard number to imagine. It took centuries until we were able to properly express it.
The moment you mentioned signals, I realized how easy the bypass would be. Thank you high school engineering.
Where I work we have door locks very similar to this. I'm the one responsible for lock security.
There's a whole lot of requirements for the lock system to be fulfilled even to be remotely considered.
The system in this video violates so many points on our list, I'm flabbergasted that it even exists. THAT thing shouldn't even have left the napkin stage in development.
I guess it's time to report a security fail and enjoy a promotion
It will keep my kids out of my office (for a while)
What do you protect? Aliens or hookers?
@@Scorch428 Yes
Lock development team: "why didnt we put two screws? WHY DID WE GO JUST ONE SCREW?!"
Simple, they saved $0.02 on the total cost. lol
Companies should hire you to design a lock that cannot be opened with common tools in the market
There already are systems like that. One of the few gripes I have with LPL is he does go for low hanging fruit sometimes. A lot of his electronic bypass series is targetted at devices that are not meant for true security (though he does point out some that claim to be). This system is less than $200 and has both RFID and fingerprint reader. Those components and the magnet probably make the bulk of the price tag. There are a lot of card reader systems on the market that don't have these simple flaws, but they're more expensive and are usually used in large buildings, rather than the apartment complexes and small business offices you see the ones in this video at. Even his gun lock videos mostly focus on things meant to child-proof, not secure against theft.
You can manufacture tools. The lock must be intrinsically safe. Safety by ignorance (of the right tool, in this case) is no safety at all.
@@giannicomoretto with some skills in programming, you can easiely set up a door lock with Raspberry Pi. Over a bus system the code or fingerprint is send to the raspberry pi, and there you can unlock the door. It's faster to cut off the glass, then trying to open this lock.
He is making waay more money on YT while having fun.
The moment you said paper clip in the title i knew exact what was about to happen. Gotta love design flaws
Last time I was here this early, LPL only used lockpicks
That bypass could be fixed by a simple circuit. A circuit that would require a certain voltage to be passed through the wires instead of simply just closing the circuit. Or have a required variable pulsed code to unlock through the wires to unlock.
like he said its simply wrong by design. The Terminal should just transmit the dialed numbers to the power supply control box. And the actual verification is done on the "secure side", not on the terminal side.
And as is so often the case a bleedingly obvious step that should have required two seconds of thought during the design phase is somehow missed; all this really requires is for the control board to be on the other side of the door with the number pad and sensors being wired through, it would mean more wires but render this actually worth more than about $5.
You can still short the two wires where they enter the numpad. So, that's not the answer. Verification must happen on the backend.
@@3DCGdesign That's what I mean; unless they've fucked up even harder than shown, the number pad and biometric sensor should only be sending signals to the control board, which is where the actual verification of the number sequence/scan data should take place.
Which is why that board should be on the secure side of the door, rather than the insecure side.
It would require much more knowledge. This is a mechanical device with basic electronics. If you want to do it right it must be a secured connection, otherwise it’s easy to bit bang the signal. It won’t be as ‘cheap’ anymore then. 😅
@@RustOnWheels It's not cheap, it's $170
Oh my... < 30 seconds to bypass and that's including the unfolding of the Paperclip!
Next can you do “how to escape from ankle bracelet”, I really want some McDonald’s
"How to escape your ankle bracelet without detection!!!" 🤣🤣🤣
Super easy fix on the manufacturers end. Quick engineering is always sure to cause simple flaws.
One of those ADs: "Lock manufacturers HATE this guy"
I defeated my secondary school lock system years ago by removing the the front covers,whiched revealed a bunch of contact points for me to short circuit.
The next thing you know, I was using paperclips to bypass all the lock and even trespassed my own school.
And thus, almost got myself into a police case for trespassing. What memories to live by.
Great..
My school's theater had a rollup door that didn't have a latch for when it was down, so I could get in whenever I wanted. That was 15 years ago, and my nephew says it's still like that.
Woo, that's pretty rough. They need to address that problem asap.
Yes, but the brand name Mengqi and the fact that they do not appear to have any website suggests that this may be manufactured by some Chinese generic that doesn't really care.
Unfortunately addressing it would require a complete redesign, to a more expensive design. At the moment, there's one circuit board, one power supply, and a couple of switches, all connected by fairly basic wiring. To address this problem, you'd need to split the circuit board, so that input processing to a digital form is handled on the external controller, and then have an internal control box (either separate or built into the power supply) that processes the requests to open the door. You'd likely also have to make the inside door switch more complicated, as it would have to request access from the control box instead of just opening the circuit. Then the external controller and the internal control box need to be able to communicate digitally, over a wire that's protected from tampering.
With all of that in place, it's going to be a significantly more complex system to design and manufacture, and install is likely to be more complicated as well. (Note in this one there are four wires from the power control to the external box, which LGL has just cut and spliced. If those were carrying actual data, that would likely make the system not work as the wires would need shielding and cross-talk prevention - which is also going to mean the installer can't adjust the length of them.) The price is going to have to go up - likely by another 50 to 100 dollars - to do all this.
So a fix is likely to essentially double the cost, and is unlikely to happen. What really needs to happen is for consumers to realize that this type of product built to adequate quality is going to cost $300 or more, and treat these $160 'locks' as junk and not buy them.
aside from the daft electronic lock.. 600lb isn't that much force to overcome for that magnetic latch, I'm sure a big fella running at the door or anyone with a crowbar would be through in seconds.
@@SuprSi Or anyone who able to cut power lines.
@@DanStaal Exactly.
It is unbelievable how easy that system was fooled into opening. It is so sad that an unsuspecting purchaser would be putting their trust into something which could be bypassed by a child. What a way to rip off a potential customer. Thank you for sharing this information with us and I hope enough people view this to make a huge difference to its purchases, then maybe the maker will sit up and take notice and redesign for the better.