Adequate. (In the best sense.) Rather than wandering into the Meinongian quagmire of Dumbledore, my mind is a bit snagged on the first speculative expansion. If the practical mind (φρονεσισ?) decides which three colors the figure is to be painted, and the truth resides in the image to the degree that it reflects, and continues to reflect, the creator's will, we're kind of in a Kantian (III) world of communion of minds, and (as a complete amateur) I wonder how transparent Aquinas/Aristotle is to this Kantian notion of reflective communion of minds with the creator as the measure of the truth of an object. (As opposed to the intention-list as the artisan defined it, i.e. the splotch of paint on the painting was truthful because the painter intended it, or the icon's shape and lines are as precisely as generated by tradition and specified by the artist.) And if we nonetheless opt for the "reflective communion" model rather than a sort of discrete artist-shopping-list model, we still inevitably have "one and the many" issues with the work of art as we try to suss out which elements might fall into the non-excluded middle, i.e., specific detail x is actually composed of choices (y1, y2, y3) and x itself is a piece of larger element Α. Especially given changes in theories of representation, etc. Just top of-the-head wiseacring from a complete stranger who happened to wander by. Thanks for posting. Cheers.
It seems that there could be implicit truths (that could be said to be T/F) that are not *fully* determined in the mind of an artistic creator at the time of creation. This type of entailment (not strict entailment) would have to follow from other explicit decisions that the artist has made. For instance, if Muse 1 has a blue dress, Muse 2 has a green dress, and Muse 3 is not colored, it seems it would be *wrong* to color Muse 3 magenta even if it was under-determined in the mind of the artist and the subsequent painting (though perhaps there is a limited set of colors or spectrum of colors that are valid). Maybe this would rely on broader artistic rules (e.g. from color theory) which we can infer were present in the mind of the artist or are just universally true. It seems like the proposed violation of LEM would require (at the least) there being no literary or artistic convention nor a natural entailment based on other artistic decisions in the piece. Do you think this limits the cases of the third option which you are proposing?
Adequate. (In the best sense.)
Rather than wandering into the Meinongian quagmire of Dumbledore, my mind is a bit snagged on the first speculative expansion. If the practical mind (φρονεσισ?) decides which three colors the figure is to be painted, and the truth resides in the image to the degree that it reflects, and continues to reflect, the creator's will, we're kind of in a Kantian (III) world of communion of minds, and (as a complete amateur) I wonder how transparent Aquinas/Aristotle is to this Kantian notion of reflective communion of minds with the creator as the measure of the truth of an object. (As opposed to the intention-list as the artisan defined it, i.e. the splotch of paint on the painting was truthful because the painter intended it, or the icon's shape and lines are as precisely as generated by tradition and specified by the artist.) And if we nonetheless opt for the "reflective communion" model rather than a sort of discrete artist-shopping-list model, we still inevitably have "one and the many" issues with the work of art as we try to suss out which elements might fall into the non-excluded middle, i.e., specific detail x is actually composed of choices (y1, y2, y3) and x itself is a piece of larger element Α. Especially given changes in theories of representation, etc.
Just top of-the-head wiseacring from a complete stranger who happened to wander by. Thanks for posting. Cheers.
It seems that there could be implicit truths (that could be said to be T/F) that are not *fully* determined in the mind of an artistic creator at the time of creation. This type of entailment (not strict entailment) would have to follow from other explicit decisions that the artist has made. For instance, if Muse 1 has a blue dress, Muse 2 has a green dress, and Muse 3 is not colored, it seems it would be *wrong* to color Muse 3 magenta even if it was under-determined in the mind of the artist and the subsequent painting (though perhaps there is a limited set of colors or spectrum of colors that are valid). Maybe this would rely on broader artistic rules (e.g. from color theory) which we can infer were present in the mind of the artist or are just universally true. It seems like the proposed violation of LEM would require (at the least) there being no literary or artistic convention nor a natural entailment based on other artistic decisions in the piece. Do you think this limits the cases of the third option which you are proposing?