Thanks! There used to be an old video here on YT produced by the British Army, analysing Goodwood. They came to a more positive conclusion that I had encountered before. Not an objective source, but stimulating nonetheless. Thanks again!
Just recently learnt that my great grandfather was in the 2nd Guards Armoured division during D-Day, i have been trying to do some research into his tour and what battles he participated in. Thankyou for posting this video, i found it very insightful. Love all the videos too!
The problems of combined arms were eventually solved when the British introduced homogenous brigades which involved an armoured regiment and a infantry battalion together
I’m reading a book about the battle for Normandy from the German perspective. The aerial and naval bombardment leading up to the battle was so intense that some German soldiers committed suicide. Entire battle groups were simply annihilated - ceased to exist. Tanks were flung into shell holes like toys. The Germans knew they were hopelessly out gunned and had no air support but they rode into battle anyway. They knew the battle was hopeless. Quite a horrendous thing to read. I guess things worked out a bit better than they’d hoped.
Please note that at 12 seconds the Cromwell is wearing experimental form of British version of zimmerit that was rubber and had adhesive on the back. Don'g forget that the Germans had plenty of magnetic mines in Normandy.
Monty knew exactly what he was doing he was being called for heavy infantry loss and he needed the german armour in front of him to stay there and if possible draw in more and this happened, he could afford to lose tanks but not infantry goodwood was a victory in the sense that he dictated to the germans rather than the other way around, before long the germans would be in headlong retreat and the long march to berlin could begin, great effort HE subscribed for more. love to all.
Great comment. You’ve nailed it. So glad you enjoy the channel it’s only going to get better and better as I improve. I’ve got a series coming up from the ground in Normandy soon too 👍 I really appreciate your support
@@thehistoryexplorer I will look forward to that being an normandy addict that i am, i love utube in regard to all these great programs put out by artists like yourself.
As I understand it, Monty's plan, agreed with Eisenhower, was to keep the German armour in front of the British and Canadians, between them and Paris, while the Americans break out into the flat plains and sweep around to trap the German forces (parry with the left and punch with the right).
@@thehistoryexplorer I understand some have suggested Eisenhower apparently thought Monty had more or less promised that intention and that Ike felt he had been misled to think so. I am not at all sure myself, but I think Montgomery's claim that Goodwood went according to his intention (if not the very heavy losses part of it) was a defensible one, given how the rest of the Normandy campaign turned out.
Could be characterised as strategic success and tactical failure. Essentially one armoured division attacked on a narrow front against powerful defence in depth. Question is more why couldn't Allied tactical air have prevented the 1st SS Pz Div from coming to save the day for the Germans?
Excellent video, thank you, the views from the actual German defensive positions especially helpful. My 2p on Op Goodwood;- 1) Monty should have communicated far better with Eisenhower over what was actually expected, even if Monty did have his hands full at the time. 2) It's easy to forget with hindsight what 'should' have been done. The Allied units didn't have the luxury of forming up as they would have liked. There was time pressure on them, & not enough time to clear minefields/add extra bridges/clear up the usual traffic jams/get the right units up, sometimes in the dark on narrow roads with very limited light, made even worse by being bombed, shelled or mortared daily/having to sort out all units & supplies in an area beforehand that was too small in reality. 3) Relentless logistical pressure from behind the Allied lines of units & supplies 'on hold' as the Allies hadn't advanced as planned. The timetables were planned & organised months in advance, & stoppages cause utter chaos. This supply line stretched all the way back to the USA! 4) Allied units advanced into the most heavily defended part of the German line. I've heard it was 5 lines deep, whereas in Russia, the strongest German lines were only 3 lines deep, & had nowhere near the density of troops this area of Normandy had. A Russian military advisor asked what ratio of attacking/defending troops there were, & was surprised to hear the Allies were attacking with far less than what the Russians thought was needed - BUT, the Allies had to attack with what they had, to keep pushing forward, with a chance to breakthrough, or at least win the attrition battle. The Allies knew the Germans were getting short of fuel & reinforcements. 5) Allied troops had to advance uphill, against longer ranged weapons, against dug in opponents (some elite/veteran troops) & good defensive country. Lines of attack were also channelled (especially along the old Bourgebus ridge to Colombelles factory (sp?) train embankment, which only had a few openings, making it easier for the defenders. 6) You can't necessarily move the artillery forward when they have traffic jams in the way. There was only a limited road network (or areas not observed), & it was generally 'managed chaos'. 7) British Infantry/Tank ratio doctrine still wasn't very good (but was improving), & Monty was trying to conserve his troops. Both he & Churchill were acutely conscious of declining manpower numbers. It may have been seen that sending infantry into large open fields under German observation & artillery was even worse (the flipside being problems with armour on it's own). The British training shortcomings were also exposed. A big issue was that the British army didn't have enough area to train their units properly, or in European terrain & urban areas. Although some units had been training for years, the reality of what they faced in Normandy was very different, both in type, complexity & scale, & they had to learn 'on the job', which led to higher casualties. Even the veteran 'Desert Rats' had to unlearn a lot, & learn new tactics. The Allies did learn, & became better & stronger, whilst the Germans grew weaker. 8) The Germans counter attacked with a strong force, but still couldn't push the Allied units back to their start lines, losing valuable resources, & territory. Each advance gave the Allies a chance to unload more units/supplies, & have better jumping off points for the next offensive, & the Germans couldn't compete. Arriving Panzer divisions then had to be strung out to hold the line, & weren't able to be concentrated for a main attack. The Germans had to hold forward lines, to have any chance of pushing the Allies back to the beaches (whether this was actually possible a few days after D-Day is another matter), but the Germans could only go by what their maps & battlefield intelligence was telling them. 9) Whilst the Allies did lose heavily, the Germans couldn't afford what they lost, on the front lines, or units travelling to, or away from the combat zones. Allied air power, breakdowns & lack of fuel took a constant toll. TL:DR Technically Goodwood could have done more, but this is with hindsight. The Allied troops did what they could, with what they had, when & where they could, in the time they had, & fighting all the forces arrayed against them - & still pushed the Germans back, making future offensives more likely to succeed.
The German generals in the know, and doubtless any officers and men who could count, knew that after a day or two there was no chance of pushing the Allies back onto their beaches following D Day. Allied armour simply piled up too fast and German armour was nowhere near close enough in the strength needed. The Juno beach region was the area best suited for an armoured counterattack but the Canadian right flank advanced so quickly and deeply to Bretteville and Putot that the Germans were on their back foot thereafter. Moreover, twice as much artillery was immediately landed on Juno beach as on literally any other Allied beach because Montgomery and his staff realized this was the prime German target for an armoured counterattack. A thin line of German armour from 21 Panzer did manage to reach the coast between Juno and Sword but fled back when serious naval gunfire convinced them their goal was futile and their survival unlikely. German armoured attacks on Bretteville and Putot from 12 SS and Panzer Lehr were repulsed by the Regina Rifles and Royal Winnipeg Rifles respectively with nasty losses over the period from June 8 to 10, 1944. After that the Germans were never in a position to get anywhere near the beaches and the Allied victory overall was assured.
@@thehistoryexplorer Thank you. I knew little about this until I read "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day" (2014) by Dr. Marc Milner. Marc has been interviewed on Paul Woodage's WW2TV program here on UA-cam several times. Milner combed recently declassified documents from the Allied archives at Kew in London and found a very different story than had previously been told by most American and British historians. His book is genuinely revisionary (not merely a wannabe) and is recognized by serious historians as authoritative. It is an excellent read and puts a lot of previously believed views in the fable category where they belong. Like the oft-cited belief that Patton was the most feared Allied general, when prior to August 1944 the Germans almost literally didn't know who he was, the 1970 movie "Patton" notwithstanding. 😉 Juno beach was recognized by Montgomery and his Allied planning staff as the only target the Germans could use because it is so wide open and flat--perfect tank country. On the other hand, hedgerows dominated the other Allied beaches making them very unsuitable for a quick panzer counterattack. Once Juno was truly secured by June 10, 1944, the Germans were destined for defeat. Rommel in particular knew this.
Eisenhower ensconced himself in a nice safe chateau near Cherbourg and this had terrible communications. It was Eisenhower who should have made the effort to have a HQ with better communications.
A lot of people said that Monty went too slow but he tied up a lot of german forces in this area enabling the us army to come around from the south.. Incidentally my father fought at cagny with the 7th guards armoured division, he was in the coldstream guards. My brother and I took him back there in 1976 and he showed us a farm yard at cagny that they attacked south of the paris rail line. Beyond the farmhouse was a mansion that they attacked. He said they were throwing grenades at the windows but the glass was that thick they were bouncing off. The farmer came to talk to us and said some germans and local police had visited a few years earlier and had dug up a body of a german soldier near a popular tree in his garden and had then found 2 more germans in a field outside of the farm. He also told me after he had jumped the farm wall he landed near a stable and heard noises from within and threw a greande in. When he went in it had a horse and a cow in it.
Good video lad. On a Staff Ride based in Caen this week and just visited the viewpoints you’ve highlighted. Op GOODWOOD, GREENLINE and POMEGRANATE are a fascinating chapter in the Battle of Caen. Plenty wrong with Op GOODWOOD, however it played its role in the wider Battle of Normandy. Keep up the good work.
@@thehistoryexplorer Have you watched the Pathe news reel "battle of the Rivers" it shows London bridge being constructed. Part of the film shows a Firefly crossing the bridge followed by a Cromwell tank (3.23 mins into the film) the firefly is my fathers tank. I was showing my father a book I had bought and in this book was a small photograph showing a Sherman crossing the Orne canal. He spotted it and shouted "that's us" They had given Richard Dimbleby a lift on the tank prior to crossing (possibly he or his photographer took the shot) It took me ages to find the original photograph which apparently appeared in all the main newspapers at the time entitled "The breakout of Normandy". Unfortunayely my Father died in 1999 so he did not see the full image or the pathe news reel which clearly shows the London Bridge sign, which the picture in the book did not show, and the Cromwell in the background. On the Pathe news reel you can see the Chateau de Benouville in the background. You can line it up on Google maps and see more or less where it crossed the Canal. If you want me to send you a copy of the photo let me know how I can send it. I have a framed copy with his medals, cap badge and insignia on my wall.
12:32 I have tried to source the photo of the pak 88 but have so far been unable to discover where this photo comes from of who took it. It is not in The Canadian archives though film of the same men and 17 pdr taken by Canadian film cameramen exists so the film and still photographers were both there at the same time. There was a post-battle count done of German equipment left on the battlefield and no pak 88 is shown in this position. They are wrecked 88's north, south and west of the claimed location but nowhere near the claimed von Luck position. The single flak 88 found was to the south of Cagny and across the railway line
Great point and this will be featured in another video looking at the Von Luck claim. Thanks for the comment I really appreciate your insight. There are so many very knowledgable WW2 enthusiasts out there 👍
Thanks for a very interesting video. I learned a lot from it especially the excellent illustrations and on the spot videos. One of the things that comes across to me is the need for infantry, armour, artillery and air power to fight the same battle. I think it was a victory in that it held the Germans and allowed the Americans to break out forcing the German retreat from Normandy. Thanks again, Thoroughly enjoyed the video
Really nice job! Well done and the photos and film footage augment your presentation. As a USAF guy, I can’t figure out why they did NOT use massed fighter ground attacks into the tree lines: more accurate than random heavy bombers. Your geolocating place and photos is cool: would like to see advance line overlays too. Thanks and keep up the good work!!
Thank you John I really appreciate the feedback. There was definitely a lack of precision in this campaign and the allies relied on battlefield inoculation rather than targeting.
I've just started following your channel, you're doing a great job and your more recent videos are just as good if not even better. Seeing so much criticism of Montgomery in the comments (maybe people took Tom Hanks and his "That guy's overrated" too close to heart), I would absolutely love to see what you could produce for Montgomery's pivotal role in the Battle of the Bulge. That would really get the tongues wagging! Thanks again and please keep up the great work. It's clearly a labour of love; you put in the labour, but we all love it. Signing off with the exact words of US General Omar Bradley in an interview with LIFE magazine: "Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout. In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful"
"Deficiencies in infantry-armour integration were again apparent, as the tanks outran their support and suffered at the hands of German tanks and anti-tank guns. Ironically, given Montgomery's desire to spare his infantry, secondary operations by the three infantry divisions on the flanks of the advance outweighed those of the armoured divisions (2,710 compared to 1,149). The rate of loss in the infantry battalions was 9% - twice that of the armoured regiments. 'Goodwood' may not have been the breakout so desperately wanted, but it kept the bulk of the German forces in that sector. So when US forces launched Operation 'Cobra' on 25 July they faced only eleven weak divisions with limited fighting power. 'Cobra' broke the front open southwards from Saint-Lô, and American forces began a headlong advance westwards into Brittany and eastwards towards the Seine. The Germans had kept Allied forces bottled up for six weeks. But in so doing they had reduced themselves to remnants, devoid of reserves and unable to withstand the breakout when it came." IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
"for Montgomery's pivotal role in the Battle of the Bulge" The Ardennes Offensive Part 03: Forget Bastogne - Head For The Meuse (1980) ua-cam.com/video/YLEz48t79EA/v-deo.html
@@thehistoryexplorer "The National Army Museum conducted a poll in 2011 to determine Britain’s greatest general. Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists." Bernard Law Montgomery - Military History - Oxford page
@@nickdanger3802 The Defiiciences in infantry armour were not apparent during Operation Bluecoat. Pip Roberts rearranged his armoured divisions into brigade sized forces like the Jock Columns in North Africa.
At 11:40 von Luck is referenced and his claim about the Luftwaffe 8.8cm guns. The location of these guns has never been fixed and apart from von Luck not a scrap of evidence to confirm the story. Worth noting that a Luftwaffe Flak unit would not have pak 8.8cm but rather the standard AA version. Post-battle surveys found a single Flak 88 left at a position south of Cagny and 4 pak 8.8cm guns in various locations around Cagny. von Lucks story may be correct but not at the north of Cagny location. .
@@thehistoryexplorer another great episode, I like how you mentioned a few times during the episode that you had more information on certain areas and that this would be divulged in later videos. Suspense!! Love it
@@thehistoryexplorer you have a very interesting channel. Now all you need is a patreon or something to help. If I am correct you support one or more charities with the help of these vids. I would definitely donate a few £ per new episode. Not a lot I know, but as they say, every penny counts
The most concise easy to follow explanation of this battle i have seen, excellent integration of all material unsure how I have not seen this one. Going next week to have a look around on my motorbike but this may be too much for my mate but will certainly use your info and follow the steps of the battle with your guidance on a future trip. Please keep up the great work, better than much of the pro media thanks very much.,
Thank you so much. This video is one of my first and nobody really saw it. Shame as I did a lot of background reading. Have a wonderful time and please let me know if the video helped to get around one the ground
Very Good, one point though, the 16 Luftwaffe field division regts 46 and 32 were really shot up from operation Charnwood and offered little resistance. However the pioneers and fusiliers along with the 8 StuGs and the 1st company of the anti tank regiment held Colombelles and the Foundry area, they held these positions for almost two days against the Canadians (operation Atlantic), 80% of that part of the city was destroyed including the 14th century chateau walls and 18th century Chateau and outbuildings, the monastery school which commanded the view over Ranville from the west was flattened, the foundry burnt for four days after was not fully operational again until 1952.
Very good, if one sided. The "Goodwood enabled Cobra argument" rather falls down when we take into account Monty's boasts to the press about what Goodwood would achieve compared with what it did achieve....as this had been a recurring issue going back to D-Day itself when Monty proclaimed the objective of capturing of Caen on Day one Monty rendered himself very vulnerable but for Churchill's staunch support. If he had been judged by the standards he applied to lesser Generals whom he fired left right and centre he would have been in the same can as they were.
Actually Montgomery privately scaled back the goals of Goodwood. He overstated the objectives to Eisenhower simply to get the air support he required. Let's be honest as well, the Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo in mid June and the breakout was supposed to have occurred a month earlier. It wasn't just the British and Canadians that were slow in taking Caen and that surrounding area. The Americans were equally as slow in taking St Lo and breaking out. Ultimately however, Montgomery was 400km ahead of schedule by 3rd September and was in Brussels, Belgium when only Paris was supposed to be reached by then.
The British were still new to manoeuvre warfare at this stage and the armour and Infantry were still trying to workout how to work together. Normandy would have been a difficult fight due to the land, open spaces, bocage, small hamlets and larger villages. The high points dominate so much land around them giving those who hold it would have had a great advantage. Regarding the German's they never seemed to learn from their own and our mistakes. Great video, thanks mate.
@markienatnots9479 The British had also practiced manuevre warfare in North Africa during Operation Compass in 1940. I think this more of a rigid plan than anything, commanders were not given the initiative they had to follow orders. In the right circumstances this could have been more like totalize under Richard O Connor instead of Dempsey.
@jason10842: Yes, that’s true if you only compare the smaller scenario, Kursk vs Goodwood! However, if you look a the bigger picture & then compare Kursk or even Bagration operations & with Operation Overlord, one on one, then the scales & complexion of such things changes significantly & is more of a realistic & appropriate comparison of respective Allied & Axis operations & total resources involved on both sides, then taking place during WW2!
It depends what you are measuring. For example the whole Normandy front at the time of GOODWOOD would fit into the 'Kursk' battlefield about 4 times and then some. In terms of men/tanks per mile then nothing comes anywhere near Normandy June-July 1944. By far the most Panzers-per-mile in WW2 was Normandy.
Very informative video. In my marginally learned opinion Operation Goodwood is something akin to Market Garden in that it’s success or failure is confused by larger issues of nationality and personality. I have trouble believing the sole objective of the operation was to fix German forces, particularly the panzer divisions in place though it did succeed in doing that. It was a failure of combined arms and offensive manoeuvre that did succeed, however, in facilitating Operation Cobra and a resultant breakout from Normandy.
Monty needed , that man, to believe the US weren't the legends that they actually were,... so we just needed to take the position and hold While the US Swept though to his south
In John Keegan's absolutely riveting work of genius "Six Armies in Normandy", which I'm just finishing up (must read if you haven't BTW) he gives a harrowing account of the horror of Goodwood, in which he likens the engagement to Waterloo, with the Germans as Wellington's army and the British in the role of the French, and it's a very compelling analogy of the grand tactical situation (i.e. a mobile attacking force attacking over open ground uphill, against a well sited defensive force with plenty of cover) But it reminds me of another earlier and equally famous British battle, only this time the British are reprising their own earlier role rather than that of their enemy; can you guess which one I'm thinking of? Hint: Tennyson got a bloody good poem out of it. Ok I'll give it to you. The Charge of the Light Brigade, Balaklava, Crimean War 1854. An excellently motivated and disciplined cavalry force attacks onto heights crowned with enemy guns, the attackers virtually unsupported by infantry, with a predictable result. Is it just me or is there a slight taste of history repeating itself there? But of course, I think Montgomery's move was certainly more calculated, where Lucan, Cardigan and Captain Nolan were acting out a tragicomic opera of error and miscommunication. At any rate, those poor British tankers certainly paid a heavy price to facilitate US maneuver for Operation Cobra. Great content, much appreciated!
Fabulous comment! Thank you for sharing. I’m so glad you enjoyed the video and there are many lessons to be taken from operation GOODWOOD which we can apply today
Montgomery's directive was to engage the German armour and wear it down and enlarge the British left flank this was achieved but at cost. Allied intelligence also seriously underestimated the depth of the German defences by around 6 miles.
I think if you look at it from the objectives given to Dempsey and the other senior commanders by Monty on the eve of the battle rather than any vague remarks he made about a breakout, the operation was reasonably successful. The main issue with how Operation Goodwood has been looked at is tank losses and the fact it's been calculated differently for the two sides. The losses for Allied tanks have normally been counted by the number of tanks still operational at the end of each day of the operation, even though a large number of those counted as lost will be operational within a couple of days. While the German tank losses only count those tanks which are completely lost and unrecoverable after the end of the operation. So you end up with Allied losses of nearly 500 tanks against German losses of around 100 tanks, but if you use the same type of calculation for both sides, in this case the German system, Allied losses fall to 150-200 while German losses remain the same at 100.
Brilliant comment. I had intended to cover three more headings but it just got way too long. I still haven’t found my feet in terms of how much information people want or if less is better. But all of your points are bang on. I hope you enjoyed it 👍
Nickel1147 Yes they certainly did. Tiger phobia was a very real condition.. Kelly's Heroes plays on it. There is a documentary on the Tiger with British veterans of the Normandy invasion admitting how fearful they were of lurking Tigers.
@@Nickel1147 There were Tigers at Villers Bocage, Operation Goodwood and Hill 112. The 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion,Michael Wittmans Heavy SS Panzer Battalion 101 and 3rd company of Tiger Battalion 503. Some of the bloodiest fighting of the Caen campaign happened at Hill 112 where 6 SS Panzer divisions were concentrated, it took 10 weeks of fighting to take back the hill.
@@Nickel1147 There were 3 battalions of Tigers in Normandy totalling 126 Tiger Is and 12 Tiger IIs. All were deployed in the British Commonwealth sector yes. The British tankers didn't know where or when one would pop up. The worry about meeting a Tiger was quite substantial particularly after Villers Bocage on June 13th. There were also 623 Panthers and 26 Jagdpanthers sent to Normandy, so that's around 800 big cats in total, all in a pretty restrictive area of frontage. Source. Zetterling, Normandy 1944.
I've wondered if Richard O'Connor could have improved the planning of this operation. I could see him greenlighting the use of APC'S and some infantry support. These are elements that Dempsey did not provide to O'Connor. It really does seem that he had to make do with what was available and was forced to operate under uncooperative superiors and in difficult positions. O'Connor knew that things would get difficult upon reaching the Bourguebus-Verrieres Ridge. A little more organisation regarding Tactical Air Support would have helped but of course this would be in the hands of those in the positions above O'Connor. Plus the fact that the Panther Battalion of the Leibstandarte reached the Ridge undetected leaves me with the impression that a little bit of Air Reconaissance would have helped.
Combined arms integration should have seen the coordination of armour and infantry with a simultaneous bombardment onto likely defensive positions. Instead, due to a lack of infantry and an over reliance on steel the advance as largely unsupported. As the guns were out of range early on they couldn’t provide suppressive fire to fix the defenders
This is one of the most controversial battles because of a failure to understand how losses are reported in British and German armies. The British used the End of Day Report, which listed all tanks not with the regiment at the end of the day, for whatever reason. The Germans claimed they destroyed 500+ tanks, but EoD Reports listed 352, but of these all but 130 Write-offs were reparable and soon back in action. In contrast the Germans only reported documented Write-Offs and that could take several days. So at Goodwood the Germans initially recorded 75 Write-Off, later adjusted to 107. In reality the battle was much closer than originally reported.
Brilliant comment. There were differing agendas at the time of GOODWOOD and thing the varying narratives from each camp played a big part in how GOODWOOD was understood by many
The Germans lost 75 tanks and assault guns in the West in the period, and not all of them in Goodwood (Tamelander and Zetterling, 2003). Most of the German losses occured during the initial carpet bombing.
Tank losses were heavy, but the allies had plenty of tanks. Personel losses were not that bad. Chester Wilmot in 'The Struggle For Europe' gives the figures. around 3500 killed wounded and missing over the whole operation. Given the numbers of men involved that is quite low. He also reproduces Montgommeries written objectives for the operation. The objective was to tie down German armour, nothing more. I saw an interview with Montgommery by an American journalist some years ago. In it Montgommery said that Eisenhower never understood his plan. Bradley did, but Eisenhower didn't.
@@alangledhill6454 The German Army Group West never achieved one of their stated goals in Normandy. They were stopped at Caen and never got anywhere near the beaches. It was the greatest victory of the NW Europe campaign. The Americans never understood the fact that battle plans change. They criticized Monty for failing to take Caen on the first day. A little hypocritical as the US never took any of their objectives on time during the whole campaign! But that's Americans for you.
Great video, very well-presented and informative. I'm no expert but I think that Goodwood can be called a failure (it's hard not to call it a failure when you launch an attack and it gets repulsed with heavy losses) but not a disaster. If you have two large forces (US and Commonwealth) sharing a front with the enemy (the Germans), then the obvious strategy is to deliver a "one-two punch". The first strike provokes a defense which the second strike circumvents to deliver the telling blow. In this case, I think that the first strike (Goodwood) was poorly executed and excessively costly. The blame for that has to go to Montgomery. Not being able to take Bourguébus Ridge with 3 times as many tanks and total air superiority is objectively inexcusable.
You are right that GOODWOOD was a 'one-two-punch'. Bradley was supposed to start COBRA (punch two) on July 19th but his failure at St Lo (he was 'too slow'?) let Monty down and was forced to go ahead on his own. How do you think Bradley's failure at St Lo ( where he had 3 times as many tanks and total air superiority) compares to Bourguébus on the 'objectively inexcusable' scale?
@@michaelkenny8540 I do think that slow, purposeful commanders are the best at getting their own men KIA. You probably know more about this than me, but I thought that the original conception of Cobra was that it should start on the 21st, and it was delayed by weather until the 24th. Was Bradley actually tardy? Not sticking up for his generalship, just not sure about the factual question.
@@aaronsomerville2124 COBRA was planned to start a day later (the bombers needed two days as they could not do it all on one day) but Bradley got bogged down at St Lo. When the rain started on July 20th that became to excuse to explain the delay. Fact is Bradley has postponed his half of the attack before July 18 so rain or no rain he was not going to carry out his half of the attack. By the way GOODWOOD was not 'repulsed' it just failed to capture all its objectives.
To get a small German perspective of "Goodwood" and the battles preceding, I think The Reaper's Harvesting Summer: The 12.SS-Panzer Division ‘Hitlerjugend’ in Normandy is a must read.
How would you have liked to have been a tanker during this "offensive" ??? There was a reason Parliament was going to open an investigation concerning the losses and the inferiority of allied armour compared to..... this was not a success for Montgomery and almost cost him his command.... There is a great series that utilizes the British sub commanders as well as the German commanders during Goodwood.... we lost something near 413 tanks.... one round from a German Mk IV, Mk. V, Mk VI or 88 or Stug spelled instant disaster for our guys... their optics were so much better that they normally hit the first round until they started using "boys"...... Thanks for your good work Cheers DH
Veterens said when those hidden 88's fired from the edge of that field they could see the wheat part like jesus and the red see and the channel it was making, those that was slogging behind on foot could actually see which tank that big ol shell was was coming for....like that scene in jurassic park with the velocerapters...
I think there's merit to both sides. While Monty may have issued orders to subordinates calling for a more limited holding attack rather than a breakout attempt, that was not the picture portrayed to Eisenhower (who was famously very angry about the ordeal) or the media. There's also the issue with just how poorly planned/executed the whole thing was. The lack of proper infantry support, the tiny axis of advance, the failure to place the artillery properly (and using a freaking creeping barrage like its 1916), seemingly poor recon along said tiny axis of advance. The whole thing was amateurish. It did tie down a lot of the German armor but that doesn't mean it was a good plan or that there weren't better alternatives.
@@thehistoryexplorer From what I have read Richard O Connor was slightly held back by Dempsey during Goodwood, Richard had urged the use of armoured personnel carriers for the British infantry, but Dempsey did not agree to it.
Success of failure is not the question. It should never have happened. Monty was supposed to take Caen by day three but he failed. To Take Caen cost over 400 tanks and 80 to 100 thousand men. The reason for the battle was not to hold the Germans there. If they had spread across the whole front in force they would have been too weak to hold any attack no matter where it took place.
Omar Bradley: ’While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout. In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._ While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against him whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them. The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“ -The American LIFE Magazine 1951.ty John Peate
The Americans totally giving up on St Lo in June because of bushes in the way (St Lo was a June 15th objective) meant that the Germans were able to deploy every single panzer division in Normandy to the Caen sector all through June. Seven panzer divisions were in the Caen sector by the end of the month, plus a Tiger battalion with two more Tiger battalions on the way there. Perhaps if the US 1st Army had actually applied pressure against St Lo in June then taking Caen wouldn't have been as difficult. Regardless, by beginning of September Montgomery was 400km ahead of schedule and liberating Brussels, Belgium when only Paris was supposed to be reached by then. Shame that Eisenhower then took his job as C-in-C of all allied ground forces and stalled the allies for the next six months with his broad front disaster, getting pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Turning an obvious and Hummiliaiting defeat into a strategic victory,is one of the most Disgusting and Despicabale things someone can do concerning the hundreds of young men who died following orders, specialy from very incompetent High Ranking Officers. No Respect at all for those who paid the ultimate price just because the Ego of one useless Man.
I’m not sure I follow? You do realise the British were victorious and knocked out large swathes of the German armour, fixing it in the east to allow a breakout in the west.
Numerous Military Historians such as John Buckley, Ian Daglish, Simon Trew, Stephen Badsey and Christopher Dunphie all agree that Operation Goodwood was a successful effort to draw German reserves, particularly armour, onto the 21st Army group to support Operation Cobra.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- "'Goodwood' may not have been the breakout so desperately wanted, but it kept the bulk of the German forces in that sector. So when US forces launched Operation 'Cobra' on 25 July they faced only eleven weak divisions with limited fighting power. 'Cobra' broke the front open southwards from Saint-Lô, and American forces began a headlong advance westwards into Brittany and eastwards towards the Seine. The Germans had kept Allied forces bottled up for six weeks. But in so doing they had reduced themselves to remnants, devoid of reserves and unable to withstand the breakout when it came." IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
I honestly cannot consider Operation Goodwood a success. The losses of those tanks that were notoriously outmatched by the German Panzer divisions, were too many. The tank personnel of the Allies were so brave knowing they were so totally outmatched and on a suicidal mission. Sure, the Americans benefited and were able to break out, but the Brits and Canadians were the bait and were swallowed whole. Sometimes I think of Monty as a genius and other times baffled at he outlandish schemes he fights to enact. Anyway, another great video and I repeat, my sincere gratitude for the way you present a balanced view of the battlefield and its combatants.
@Mrkaycee7 I don't understand how the way the tanks were used in Goodwood was Monty's problem though. As an Army Group commander Monty's job was to give the operational goals, everything else was left to his subordinates. The blame should go to Dempsey, Crocker, O Connor or their subordinates, or maybe to overall British doctrine. It should be noted out that the tank losses of the British (often quoted on here as 400) were *repaired* within 24 hours and in fact were actually 150-200 tanks. The Germans suffered around 100 tanks and self propelled guns all of which were *total losses/destroyed - non repaired.* though at least 17 of the German tanks lost in the battle were Tigers and over 30 of those were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the Wehrmacht than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British. After all even after Goodwood, the British had another 500 tanks still piling up on the beaches of Normandy. After the destruction in the Falaise Pocket less than 100 German tanks out of 2,500 made it back to Germany while Monty had over 2,400 tanks in 21st Army Group alone. So as you can see, in the long run, the attritional impact was worse for the Germans than it was for the British. It should also be noted that the Germans suffered personal losses of at least *7,000 men* compared to the Allies 5,000 men in this battle.
@@thehistoryexplorer What surprised me was the lack of close air support for the offensive I would have thought that this would be ideal Tiffy hunting ground, taking out the artillery pieces while they were busy with the tanks
@@g8ymw Hello - I agree with your observation however I remember reading somewhere that the Forward Air Controller allocated to this operation became a casualty very early on and the Brits lost a very important resource. Now I've always wondered why there were not replacements to step up asap, however I suppose there was a interservice issue between the RAF and the Army when it came to releasing trained pilots for this role. Nowadays the Gunner FOO's (Forward Observation Officer) are trained in calling in air support, but even then the pool of expertise is not enough to cover all theatres. I recently read a book about the Brits in Afghanistan and there was an unfortunate Bombardier (full corporal) who had to do tour after tour in country because he was so good as Forward Air Controller and they couldn't organise a replacement for that particular part of the country.
IWM "The British failure to take Caen on D-Day and make progress further inland meant the Germans were able to get sufficient forces into the battle area to contain the Allied armies. 12th SS HitlerjugendDivision proved a particularly formidable opponent. By nightfall on D-Day its lead elements were in position on the left flank of 21st Panzer Division, facing the Canadian 3rd Division. Over the next few days the fanatical SS formation made repeated attempts to drive a wedge through to the sea. The Canadians held the SS at great cost but were prevented from continuing their own advance further south, and could only consolidate their positions. By 9 June the German Army’s elite Panzer Lehr Division had also arrived. It took up position west of Hitlerjugend, opposing British 50th Division around Tilly-sur-Seulles, south of Bayeux. These three formations formed the main defence for Caen, but plans for a major counterattack had to be abandoned as a result of Allied air attacks." The German Response to D-Day page
The division's advance to the areas near the British-Canadian landing beaches of Sword and Juno proceeded slowly due to Allied air attacks. The first units of the 12th SS reached their assembly area near Evrecy at 22:00 hours on 6 June but the Panther battalion ran out of fuel east of the Orne River.[11] According to Marc Milner, "[t]his was just the first example of sloppy staff work and command and control that characterized 12th SS Division's experience in the beachhead battles".[12] Marc Milner is a Canadian military and naval historian, author of several books including one novel. He is Director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick.
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage." IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS "The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence." "Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. *Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes."* "On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes." *"If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine."* Source - Charles Perry Stacey in the Victory Campaign page 83.
Considering general Montgomery's history and the fact that he was an osterman. The number one concern I have is why would he sacrifice his countrymen just to give The knockout moves to the colonials The Americans?
I’m not sure he saw it as sacrificing his men. He sacrificed equipment and materiel for sure, but GOODWOOD was part of an operational scheme of manoeuvre
Ever heard of the strategy known as the "Hammer and Anvil"? well the British and Canadians were to play the anvil to pin and destroy German armour reserves while the US, the hammer, breakout. It all worked as part of Monty's Overlord strategy.
He spun it that way after the fact. "While during the planning there had been lofty talk, from Montgomery especially, of driving beyond Caen on D-Day, deep concern had also been expressed that the entire enterprise might fail." The Days After D-Day: What Happened Next page
@@nickdanger3802 I don't know why you posted that when Canadian Historian Dr. Brad St.Croix presented counter evidence to the point that said it was part of the plan in "Was Saving Private Ryan Right to blame Monty?"
My take. Monty was under pressure to push so he used his most expendable commodity . He was too egotistical to just wear down German armour he wanted a full breakthrough and the main role as such . That he afterwards made out that the former was actually his intention all the time was just like him. In private he must have been very disappointed as the onus would move on To Cobra and St Lo and not him.
COBRA/GOODWOOD were not meant to be 2 separate attacks. The original plan was Monty to attack first and the next day Bradley was to attack. However Bradley got stalled at St Lo and had to let Monty know he could not manage to attack on July 19th. Monty told him to take as much time as he needed and went ahead on his own. It was Bradley's failure at St Lo that contributed to the problem. Bradley was 'too slow' and he did not start his COBRA attack until he had a massive numerical superiority in both men and tanks.
Your 'theory on Monty's character' appears to be based on an in complete understanding of the planning and actual execution of the combined COBRA/GOODWOOD attacks. Can you please provide an update (based on Bradley's character?) that explains why Bradley was unable to take St Lo 'to timetable' and thus start COBRA on July 19th as he had agreed with Monty. Also how do you think Bradley's failure impacted on the objectives for GOODWOOD?
Even though the heavy bombers weren't used much for tactical bombing and in this battle didn't accomplish what it was meant to, Operation Cobra had better success. I believe it would have been better used more in a tactical manner instead of the strategic terror bombing campaign used and cherished by Bomber Harris, it would have been more effective. The strategic bombing campaign eventually seen its fruits in the last year of the war and was but one part of an overall plan to defeat Germany, but was it worth it when you compare how many airmen were lost? One way that the heavy bombers were used extremely effective was in the bombing of the oil refineries.
The Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo in mid June and broken out. They took St Lo 5 weeks behind schedule, applying little pressure on St Lo in June because of bushes in the way. This lack of pressure against St Lo enabled the Germans to send and keep all their panzer divisions in the Caen sector.
It all comes down to coordination and communication at the time. The allies relied on a mass of bombers to prepare the battlefield and artillery for close support, but its effectiveness can be questioned
I take issue with the aerial bombardment being ineffective, the Germans certainly didn’t see it that way and were extremely concerned that a similar barrage would precede future allied operations. A lot of the German heavy units were too far forward and caught in this barrage resulting in their being removed as an effective fighting force.
I understand your point, but the suppressive effect of a pre H aerial bombardment is suggested to be ineffective by the many AARs conducted by the British. This isn’t my assessment
Was it a failure? It committed masses of German armour to be destroyed in the coming days and weeks where as the allied armour was mostly recovered and on the road again in the same time frame. It enabled the US breakout near St Lo during operation COBRA
@thehistoryexplorer Montgomery puts 3 Armored Divisions into 3km, which causes heavy traffic jams. For the Qrmored Divisions, traffic jams are unwelcomed and most of the troops of Germany survived the bombing. Which made those 3 Armored Div which 1,100 of the tank's were for the allied troops literally got humiliated and lost 4,000~5,000 men and 300~500 tanks while Germany lost 1,000~2,000 men and also 70~100 Panzers. If it was a feint plan with Operation Cobra. They could went to a smaller offense which could have caused lower casualty but what we can know about Montgomery and how he acted, there is only one answer that he wanted victory for himself and also, Montgomery wasn't that good with George Patton. Every time they meet, Eisenhower and Oma bradley had to mediate those two.
@@Hamzeeeeee7 They did not lose 500 tanks the Allies lost around 150-200 tanks with the rest being repaired in 24 hours, and btw the Germans actually lost 7,000 men not 2,000.
The Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo and broken out much earlier than they did, but they cited bushes in the way as the reason. Seems to be ok to have excuses when you fail if you're American. Same with the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Ardennes etc.
@@lyndoncmp5751Quite right. Cobra was not the first break out attempt by the US army. That was a series of operations on the whole US front in the first week of July. After 7 days fighting only 5 miles were gained and it was all called off on the 8th. On the 10th Bradley advised Montgommery that he would need 10 days before he could make another attempt. This would allow the US army to capture St Lo and advance to a more favorable start line. This delay made Goodwood neccessary because the Germans could not be allowed a 10 day respite. An attack in the Odon sector was scheduled for the 14th, Goodwood for the 18th with Cobra scheduled for the 20th. In the event these dates were not met but that does not detract from the overall success of this series of operations.
When brtian were mention in WW2 BRITISH will always talk about 17pounder Sherman firefly and CAEN 😂😂 for the British 17,,pounded firefly and CAEN is the most important thing for the British it's their HOLY TRINITY atleast one Britishers will mention those name atleast one time in every video whenever ww2 topic comes up
They did not bomb the troop positions. They killed several thousand French civilians in Caen. Bomber Harris hated tactical bombing and this may have had some influence with the British bombers.
The Tommie Cooker (Sherman Tank ) was an Infantry tank....it was not built for tank on tank warfare....they did not carry anti tank guns.....this goes for Brits and American Sherman tanks......Even when they started arming the Sherman with the High Velocity 76 mm anti tank gun..they were still not up to par with the Germans........The American and British Tankers that were sent into battle with the Sherman...knew they were committing suicide fighting German Tanks and yet they still did it ....which says a lot........The allied commanders knew they were sending these men to their deaths also......They should have been Court Marshaled after the war......
That's not the full story though. When the Sherman was introduced in 1942, it was seen as comparable/better to the German tanks (although the new long barrelled Pzr IV 75mm had a better anti tank gun), & the Allies were still on the defensive. After El Alamein, this changed. Proposed Allied heavy tanks were either adopted (Churchill) or requested, but put back for further development (T1/Pershing). It was more difficult for the Allies to design & produce tanks as they didn't have a controlled economy like Germany, & didn't yet see the need. Allied private contractors were waiting on specifications from the UK/USA War Depts, which kept changing their minds. The Pzr III or IV was still the Germans most common tank, & the Soviets didn't really share the details of the Tiger. The Sherman was still seen as 'adequate' in 1944, & massive numbers seen to be the key. The Pzr IV, was known as the 'tin can' by it's crews due to the lack of armour, it also caught fire, so it wasn't just the Allies who complained. Could the Allies have put out heavier tanks earlier - 'yes', but the Navy & Airforce took resource & skills priority. In the the UK, tank design for years had been a low priority. Shermans in US doctrine weren't supposed to fight German tanks anyway, that was the tank destroyers job. European infrastructure wasn't ready for heavier tanks either, the Germans had huge issues getting their tanks to the battlefields, & then maintaining or recovering these overcomplicated beasts. Due to their numbers, the Shermans in reality were able to flank & take out their German opponents, winning the attrition war. What also must be remembered, is how many Allied infantry lives were saved due to the massive numbers of Shermans. German infantry complained bitterly that the Shermans were everywhere, providing Allied infantry with direct support (which was it's main job) from it's main gun & mgs. Having a lower velocity gun, it's barrel lasted far longer than the German high velocity types. Shells were smaller, so more ammo could be carried to. It was far more suited to taking out bunkers, houses, strongpoints etc that the Allies had to do on the offensive. The Sherman Fireflys & those with 76mm guns, especially with later ammunition were able to take out most German tanks from the front. In the Pacific, the Sherman was crucial in helping the Infantry/Marines clear bunkers. So, while the Allies could have fielded a 'heavier' tank with a 'better' anti tank gun earlier, it may well have been underdeveloped, unreliable, a logistical problem, & reduce Sherman production - WHILST STILL BEING PENETRATED BY GERMAN ANTI TANK GUNS. The heavily armoured British Churchill, whilst it gave it's crew more protection (& was less likely to catch fire), wasn't invulnerable. The British had their AT/Tortoise assault tanks in design, but these had their own issues. I'm not taking anything away from the bravery of the Allied tankers, or denying that 'penny pinching' got in the way of UK/US tank design (something the Germans didn't have to worry about), or that Allied Generals didn't think some form of higher velocity guns weren't necessary early enough, but there will always be compromises in war.
An excellent video. Using the aerial photos really helps to explain the battle. I have been to the battlefield and as you noted, the Anglo-Canadian forces were fighting uphill and under constant observation. Definitely, the Germans had well prepared, well thought out defensive positions and the SS forces knew the area well. Von Luck's 88s had a perfectly prepared shooting gallery. The Germans also realized that Caen was a lot closer to Germany than St. Lo. and knew the importance of holding the left flank of the invasion beaches. I think Monty really wanted to break out onto the Falaise Plain and it had potential for future airfield construction. If he had slugged it out for one more day, the German defences might have collapsed. I understand that the operation ended with torrential rains turning the battlefield into a quagmire and was a big factor in continuing the battle. The bridges also constituted a major bottleneck. I believe along with Ike that Goodwood was a total failure.
Thanks! There used to be an old video here on YT produced by the British Army, analysing Goodwood. They came to a more positive conclusion that I had encountered before. Not an objective source, but stimulating nonetheless. Thanks again!
Thank you very much. This was one of my first ever videos so I cringe a bit when I watch it but hopefully it gets the information across
Just recently learnt that my great grandfather was in the 2nd Guards Armoured division during D-Day, i have been trying to do some research into his tour and what battles he participated in. Thankyou for posting this video, i found it very insightful. Love all the videos too!
You’re very welcome!
The problems of combined arms were eventually solved when the British introduced homogenous brigades which involved an armoured regiment and a infantry battalion together
I’m reading a book about the battle for Normandy from the German perspective. The aerial and naval bombardment leading up to the battle was so intense that some German soldiers committed suicide. Entire battle groups were simply annihilated - ceased to exist. Tanks were flung into shell holes like toys. The Germans knew they were hopelessly out gunned and had no air support but they rode into battle anyway. They knew the battle was hopeless. Quite a horrendous thing to read. I guess things worked out a bit better than they’d hoped.
Yep, experienced tankers from the Eastern Front said they never experienced anything like it in Russia.
Please note that at 12 seconds the Cromwell is wearing experimental form of British version of zimmerit that was rubber and had adhesive on the back. Don'g forget that the Germans had plenty of magnetic mines in Normandy.
Monty knew exactly what he was doing he was being called for heavy infantry loss and he needed the german armour in front of him to stay there and if possible draw in more and this happened, he could afford to lose tanks but not infantry goodwood was a victory in the sense that he dictated to the germans rather than the other way around, before long the germans would be in headlong retreat and the long march to berlin could begin, great effort HE subscribed for more. love to all.
Great comment. You’ve nailed it. So glad you enjoy the channel it’s only going to get better and better as I improve. I’ve got a series coming up from the ground in Normandy soon too 👍 I really appreciate your support
@@thehistoryexplorer I will look forward to that being an normandy addict that i am, i love utube in regard to all these great programs put out by artists like yourself.
That’s very kind. Thank you
Seriously well done. Thanks for the effort you've made here
Thank you buddy I really appreciate it.
I've got some questions having watched this but I'm off to the pub! I'll write back later but I really enjoyed this. Good work man
Enjoy the pub!
What were the questions you had?
I admire your attention to details and professionalism! Great job!
As I understand it, Monty's plan, agreed with Eisenhower, was to keep the German armour in front of the British and Canadians, between them and Paris, while the Americans break out into the flat plains and sweep around to trap the German forces (parry with the left and punch with the right).
Basically yes! Although there are many who believe Monty had intended a breakout with massed armour south of Caen and through the Bourgbois ridge
@@thehistoryexplorer I understand some have suggested Eisenhower apparently thought Monty had more or less promised that intention and that Ike felt he had been misled to think so. I am not at all sure myself, but I think Montgomery's claim that Goodwood went according to his intention (if not the very heavy losses part of it) was a defensible one, given how the rest of the Normandy campaign turned out.
15:04. The 12 Armoured Regiments in the 7th, 11th and Guards AD suffered a total of 280 casualties on July 18 and 449 for July 18,19 & 20.
It does depend on which source you look at for 18 July. The usual range is between 215-228
My father was with 7th guards armoured division and was wounded at La Marvindiere, forgive my spelling of it. He was wounded 5th of august.
Could be characterised as strategic success and tactical failure. Essentially one armoured division attacked on a narrow front against powerful defence in depth. Question is more why couldn't Allied tactical air have prevented the 1st SS Pz Div from coming to save the day for the Germans?
Excellent video, thank you, the views from the actual German defensive positions especially helpful. My 2p on Op Goodwood;-
1) Monty should have communicated far better with Eisenhower over what was actually expected, even if Monty did have his hands full at the time.
2) It's easy to forget with hindsight what 'should' have been done. The Allied units didn't have the luxury of forming up as they would have liked. There was time pressure on them, & not enough time to clear minefields/add extra bridges/clear up the usual traffic jams/get the right units up, sometimes in the dark on narrow roads with very limited light, made even worse by being bombed, shelled or mortared daily/having to sort out all units & supplies in an area beforehand that was too small in reality.
3) Relentless logistical pressure from behind the Allied lines of units & supplies 'on hold' as the Allies hadn't advanced as planned. The timetables were planned & organised months in advance, & stoppages cause utter chaos. This supply line stretched all the way back to the USA!
4) Allied units advanced into the most heavily defended part of the German line. I've heard it was 5 lines deep, whereas in Russia, the strongest German lines were only 3 lines deep, & had nowhere near the density of troops this area of Normandy had. A Russian military advisor asked what ratio of attacking/defending troops there were, & was surprised to hear the Allies were attacking with far less than what the Russians thought was needed - BUT, the Allies had to attack with what they had, to keep pushing forward, with a chance to breakthrough, or at least win the attrition battle. The Allies knew the Germans were getting short of fuel & reinforcements.
5) Allied troops had to advance uphill, against longer ranged weapons, against dug in opponents (some elite/veteran troops) & good defensive country. Lines of attack were also channelled (especially along the old Bourgebus ridge to Colombelles factory (sp?) train embankment, which only had a few openings, making it easier for the defenders.
6) You can't necessarily move the artillery forward when they have traffic jams in the way. There was only a limited road network (or areas not observed), & it was generally 'managed chaos'.
7) British Infantry/Tank ratio doctrine still wasn't very good (but was improving), & Monty was trying to conserve his troops. Both he & Churchill were acutely conscious of declining manpower numbers. It may have been seen that sending infantry into large open fields under German observation & artillery was even worse (the flipside being problems with armour on it's own).
The British training shortcomings were also exposed. A big issue was that the British army didn't have enough area to train their units properly, or in European terrain & urban areas. Although some units had been training for years, the reality of what they faced in Normandy was very different, both in type, complexity & scale, & they had to learn 'on the job', which led to higher casualties. Even the veteran 'Desert Rats' had to unlearn a lot, & learn new tactics. The Allies did learn, & became better & stronger, whilst the Germans grew weaker.
8) The Germans counter attacked with a strong force, but still couldn't push the Allied units back to their start lines, losing valuable resources, & territory. Each advance gave the Allies a chance to unload more units/supplies, & have better jumping off points for the next offensive, & the Germans couldn't compete. Arriving Panzer divisions then had to be strung out to hold the line, & weren't able to be concentrated for a main attack. The Germans had to hold forward lines, to have any chance of pushing the Allies back to the beaches (whether this was actually possible a few days after D-Day is another matter), but the Germans could only go by what their maps & battlefield intelligence was telling them.
9) Whilst the Allies did lose heavily, the Germans couldn't afford what they lost, on the front lines, or units travelling to, or away from the combat zones. Allied air power, breakdowns & lack of fuel took a constant toll.
TL:DR Technically Goodwood could have done more, but this is with hindsight. The Allied troops did what they could, with what they had, when & where they could, in the time they had, & fighting all the forces arrayed against them - & still pushed the Germans back, making future offensives more likely to succeed.
Brilliant post! Thank you for sharing.
The German generals in the know, and doubtless any officers and men who could count, knew that after a day or two there was no chance of pushing the Allies back onto their beaches following D Day. Allied armour simply piled up too fast and German armour was nowhere near close enough in the strength needed. The Juno beach region was the area best suited for an armoured counterattack but the Canadian right flank advanced so quickly and deeply to Bretteville and Putot that the Germans were on their back foot thereafter. Moreover, twice as much artillery was immediately landed on Juno beach as on literally any other Allied beach because Montgomery and his staff realized this was the prime German target for an armoured counterattack. A thin line of German armour from 21 Panzer did manage to reach the coast between Juno and Sword but fled back when serious naval gunfire convinced them their goal was futile and their survival unlikely. German armoured attacks on Bretteville and Putot from 12 SS and Panzer Lehr were repulsed by the Regina Rifles and Royal Winnipeg Rifles respectively with nasty losses over the period from June 8 to 10, 1944. After that the Germans were never in a position to get anywhere near the beaches and the Allied victory overall was assured.
@@ToddSauve thank you Todd what a brilliant post. There is a degree of inevitability when we think about the invasion.
@@thehistoryexplorer Thank you. I knew little about this until I read "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day" (2014) by Dr. Marc Milner. Marc has been interviewed on Paul Woodage's WW2TV program here on UA-cam several times. Milner combed recently declassified documents from the Allied archives at Kew in London and found a very different story than had previously been told by most American and British historians. His book is genuinely revisionary (not merely a wannabe) and is recognized by serious historians as authoritative. It is an excellent read and puts a lot of previously believed views in the fable category where they belong. Like the oft-cited belief that Patton was the most feared Allied general, when prior to August 1944 the Germans almost literally didn't know who he was, the 1970 movie "Patton" notwithstanding. 😉
Juno beach was recognized by Montgomery and his Allied planning staff as the only target the Germans could use because it is so wide open and flat--perfect tank country. On the other hand, hedgerows dominated the other Allied beaches making them very unsuitable for a quick panzer counterattack. Once Juno was truly secured by June 10, 1944, the Germans were destined for defeat. Rommel in particular knew this.
Eisenhower ensconced himself in a nice safe chateau near Cherbourg and this had terrible communications.
It was Eisenhower who should have made the effort to have a HQ
with better communications.
A lot of people said that Monty went too slow but he tied up a lot of german forces in this area enabling the us army to come around from the south.. Incidentally my father fought at cagny with the 7th guards armoured division, he was in the coldstream guards. My brother and I took him back there in 1976 and he showed us a farm yard at cagny that they attacked south of the paris rail line. Beyond the farmhouse was a mansion that they attacked. He said they were throwing grenades at the windows but the glass was that thick they were bouncing off. The farmer came to talk to us and said some germans and local police had visited a few years earlier and had dug up a body of a german soldier near a popular tree in his garden and had then found 2 more germans in a field outside of the farm. He also told me after he had jumped the farm wall he landed near a stable and heard noises from within and threw a greande in. When he went in it had a horse and a cow in it.
Thanks for the comment. Very interesting!
The Americans moved way slower in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine, and were even pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Good video lad. On a Staff Ride based in Caen this week and just visited the viewpoints you’ve highlighted. Op GOODWOOD, GREENLINE and POMEGRANATE are a fascinating chapter in the Battle of Caen. Plenty wrong with Op GOODWOOD, however it played its role in the wider Battle of Normandy. Keep up the good work.
Thank you Jonathan, glad you enjoyed the video. I think goodwood is genuinely fascinating and it’s no wonder the British are obsessed with it!
I have a great photograph of my Father crossing London bridge in a Sherman firefly. He was the radio operator/loader
Wow! Would love to see that
@@thehistoryexplorer Have you watched the Pathe news reel "battle of the Rivers" it shows London bridge being constructed. Part of the film shows a Firefly crossing the bridge followed by a Cromwell tank (3.23 mins into the film) the firefly is my fathers tank. I was showing my father a book I had bought and in this book was a small photograph showing a Sherman crossing the Orne canal. He spotted it and shouted "that's us" They had given Richard Dimbleby a lift on the tank prior to crossing (possibly he or his photographer took the shot) It took me ages to find the original photograph which apparently appeared in all the main newspapers at the time entitled "The breakout of Normandy". Unfortunayely my Father died in 1999 so he did not see the full image or the pathe news reel which clearly shows the London Bridge sign, which the picture in the book did not show, and the Cromwell in the background.
On the Pathe news reel you can see the Chateau de Benouville in the background. You can line it up on Google maps and see more or less where it crossed the Canal.
If you want me to send you a copy of the photo let me know how I can send it. I have a framed copy with his medals, cap badge and insignia on my wall.
12:32 I have tried to source the photo of the pak 88 but have so far been unable to discover where this photo comes from of who took it. It is not in The Canadian archives though film of the same men and 17 pdr taken by Canadian film cameramen exists so the film and still photographers were both there at the same time. There was a post-battle count done of German equipment left on the battlefield and no pak 88 is shown in this position. They are wrecked 88's north, south and west of the claimed location but nowhere near the claimed von Luck position. The single flak 88 found was to the south of Cagny and across the railway line
Great point and this will be featured in another video looking at the Von Luck claim. Thanks for the comment I really appreciate your insight. There are so many very knowledgable WW2 enthusiasts out there 👍
Thanks for a very interesting video. I learned a lot from it especially the excellent illustrations and on the spot videos. One of the things that comes across to me is the need for infantry, armour, artillery and air power to fight the same battle. I think it was a victory in that it held the Germans and allowed the Americans to break out forcing the German retreat from Normandy. Thanks again, Thoroughly enjoyed the video
Thank you for the excellent comment. Combined arms if key! Proven time and time again
Really nice job! Well done and the photos and film footage augment your presentation. As a USAF guy, I can’t figure out why they did NOT use massed fighter ground attacks into the tree lines: more accurate than random heavy bombers. Your geolocating place and photos is cool: would like to see advance line overlays too. Thanks and keep up the good work!!
Thank you John I really appreciate the feedback. There was definitely a lack of precision in this campaign and the allies relied on battlefield inoculation rather than targeting.
I've just started following your channel, you're doing a great job and your more recent videos are just as good if not even better.
Seeing so much criticism of Montgomery in the comments (maybe people took Tom Hanks and his "That guy's overrated" too close to heart), I would absolutely love to see what you could produce for Montgomery's pivotal role in the Battle of the Bulge. That would really get the tongues wagging!
Thanks again and please keep up the great work. It's clearly a labour of love; you put in the labour, but we all love it.
Signing off with the exact words of US General Omar Bradley in an interview with LIFE magazine:
"Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout. In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful"
What a great comment. Thank you very much and I’m so glad you enjoy the channel
"Deficiencies in infantry-armour integration were again apparent, as the tanks outran their support and suffered at the hands of German tanks and anti-tank guns. Ironically, given Montgomery's desire to spare his infantry, secondary operations by the three infantry divisions on the flanks of the advance outweighed those of the armoured divisions (2,710 compared to 1,149). The rate of loss in the infantry battalions was 9% - twice that of the armoured regiments.
'Goodwood' may not have been the breakout so desperately wanted, but it kept the bulk of the German forces in that sector. So when US forces launched Operation 'Cobra' on 25 July they faced only eleven weak divisions with limited fighting power. 'Cobra' broke the front open southwards from Saint-Lô, and American forces began a headlong advance westwards into Brittany and eastwards towards the Seine. The Germans had kept Allied forces bottled up for six weeks. But in so doing they had reduced themselves to remnants, devoid of reserves and unable to withstand the breakout when it came."
IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
"for Montgomery's pivotal role in the Battle of the Bulge"
The Ardennes Offensive Part 03: Forget Bastogne - Head For The Meuse (1980)
ua-cam.com/video/YLEz48t79EA/v-deo.html
@@thehistoryexplorer "The National Army Museum conducted a poll in 2011 to determine Britain’s greatest general. Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists."
Bernard Law Montgomery - Military History - Oxford page
@@nickdanger3802 The Defiiciences in infantry armour were not apparent during Operation Bluecoat. Pip Roberts rearranged his armoured divisions into brigade sized forces like the Jock Columns in North Africa.
At 11:40 von Luck is referenced and his claim about the Luftwaffe 8.8cm guns. The location of these guns has never been fixed and apart from von Luck not a scrap of evidence to confirm the story. Worth noting that a Luftwaffe Flak unit would not have pak 8.8cm but rather the standard AA version. Post-battle surveys found a single Flak 88 left at a position south of Cagny and 4 pak 8.8cm guns in various locations around Cagny. von Lucks story may be correct but not at the north of Cagny location. .
Thanks Michael, you’re stealing my sandwiches for a future video! It’s a great story but sadly I think it is fabricated
Great vid, enjoy yours very much. Thank you
Thank you Greg I really appreciate the comment. Any suggestions for future videos? Anything you would want to watch?
I love this videos it lets you put real places with battles and you get a much better understanding of battles
Thank you! So glad you enjoyed it
Just got home from work, poured a Jack and Coke then got the notification for a new episode YAY
love the intro
Awesome! I hope you enjoy it. I’ve got a new laptop and microphone so hopefully it’s a step to getting better with each video
@@thehistoryexplorer another great episode, I like how you mentioned a few times during the episode that you had more information on certain areas and that this would be divulged in later videos. Suspense!! Love it
@@Diglett_Dude I hope you enjoyed it and I really appreciate your support 👍
@@thehistoryexplorer you have a very interesting channel. Now all you need is a patreon or something to help. If I am correct you support one or more charities with the help of these vids.
I would definitely donate a few £ per new episode. Not a lot I know, but as they say, every penny counts
The most concise easy to follow explanation of this battle i have seen, excellent integration of all material unsure how I have not seen this one. Going next week to have a look around on my motorbike but this may be too much for my mate but will certainly use your info and follow the steps of the battle with your guidance on a future trip. Please keep up the great work, better than much of the pro media thanks very much.,
Thank you so much. This video is one of my first and nobody really saw it. Shame as I did a lot of background reading. Have a wonderful time and please let me know if the video helped to get around one the ground
Very Good, one point though, the 16 Luftwaffe field division regts 46 and 32 were really shot up from operation Charnwood and offered little resistance. However the pioneers and fusiliers along with the 8 StuGs and the 1st company of the anti tank regiment held Colombelles and the Foundry area, they held these positions for almost two days against the Canadians (operation Atlantic), 80% of that part of the city was destroyed including the 14th century chateau walls and 18th century Chateau and outbuildings, the monastery school which commanded the view over Ranville from the west was flattened, the foundry burnt for four days after was not fully operational again until 1952.
Thanks for the info, much appreciated. So glad you enjoyed the video too, this was one of my first ones
Very good, if one sided. The "Goodwood enabled Cobra argument" rather falls down when we take into account Monty's boasts to the press about what Goodwood would achieve compared with what it did achieve....as this had been a recurring issue going back to D-Day itself when Monty proclaimed the objective of capturing of Caen on Day one Monty rendered himself very vulnerable but for Churchill's staunch support. If he had been judged by the standards he applied to lesser Generals whom he fired left right and centre he would have been in the same can as they were.
Actually Montgomery privately scaled back the goals of Goodwood. He overstated the objectives to Eisenhower simply to get the air support he required.
Let's be honest as well, the Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo in mid June and the breakout was supposed to have occurred a month earlier. It wasn't just the British and Canadians that were slow in taking Caen and that surrounding area. The Americans were equally as slow in taking St Lo and breaking out.
Ultimately however, Montgomery was 400km ahead of schedule by 3rd September and was in Brussels, Belgium when only Paris was supposed to be reached by then.
The British were still new to manoeuvre warfare at this stage and the armour and Infantry were still trying to workout how to work together. Normandy would have been a difficult fight due to the land, open spaces, bocage, small hamlets and larger villages. The high points dominate so much land around them giving those who hold it would have had a great advantage. Regarding the German's they never seemed to learn from their own and our mistakes. Great video, thanks mate.
Thank you very much and thanks for your insight. Really appreciate it 👍
@markienatnots9479
The British had also practiced manuevre warfare in North Africa during Operation Compass in 1940. I think this more of a rigid plan than anything, commanders were not given the initiative they had to follow orders. In the right circumstances this could have been more like totalize under Richard O Connor instead of Dempsey.
great video thanks! I just subscribed. good quality content mate! Grüße
Thank you so much! Appreciate it
Kursk - nothing comes close. I'm glad you qualified this as the largest BRITISH tank battle. Just found your channel - really terrific. THANK YOU!
Welcome aboard! I hope you enjoy the channel 👍
@jason10842: Yes, that’s true if you only compare the smaller scenario, Kursk vs Goodwood! However, if you look a the bigger picture & then compare Kursk or even Bagration operations & with Operation Overlord, one on one, then the scales & complexion of such things changes significantly & is more of a realistic & appropriate comparison of respective Allied & Axis operations & total resources involved on both sides, then taking place during WW2!
It depends what you are measuring. For example the whole Normandy front at the time of GOODWOOD would fit into the 'Kursk' battlefield about 4 times and then some. In terms of men/tanks per mile then nothing comes anywhere near Normandy June-July 1944. By far the most Panzers-per-mile in WW2 was Normandy.
Goodwood was larger than Prokorovka, the so called biggest tank battle. The Soviets exaggerated both German armour numbers and German armour losses.
Very informative video. In my marginally learned opinion Operation Goodwood is something akin to Market Garden in that it’s success or failure is confused by larger issues of nationality and personality. I have trouble believing the sole objective of the operation was to fix German forces, particularly the panzer divisions in place though it did succeed in doing that. It was a failure of combined arms and offensive manoeuvre that did succeed, however, in facilitating Operation Cobra and a resultant breakout from Normandy.
Bang on Chiller. Great comment 👍
Monty needed , that man, to believe the US weren't the legends that they actually were,... so we just needed to take the position and hold While the US Swept though to his south
Great video, my opinion is No, it wasn't a failure.
But it was costly.
Arm Chair Generaling is an easy job.
Thanks again, subbed
Thanks for watching!
Really interesting and informative . Makes one think what beautiful country side secret they hold
What would the markings for the sherman fireflys and the m4 dvs look like?
In John Keegan's absolutely riveting work of genius "Six Armies in Normandy", which I'm just finishing up (must read if you haven't BTW) he gives a harrowing account of the horror of Goodwood, in which he likens the engagement to Waterloo, with the Germans as Wellington's army and the British in the role of the French, and it's a very compelling analogy of the grand tactical situation (i.e. a mobile attacking force attacking over open ground uphill, against a well sited defensive force with plenty of cover)
But it reminds me of another earlier and equally famous British battle, only this time the British are reprising their own earlier role rather than that of their enemy; can you guess which one I'm thinking of?
Hint: Tennyson got a bloody good poem out of it.
Ok I'll give it to you. The Charge of the Light Brigade, Balaklava, Crimean War 1854.
An excellently motivated and disciplined cavalry force attacks onto heights crowned with enemy guns, the attackers virtually unsupported by infantry, with a predictable result. Is it just me or is there a slight taste of history repeating itself there? But of course, I think Montgomery's move was certainly more calculated, where Lucan, Cardigan and Captain Nolan were acting out a tragicomic opera of error and miscommunication. At any rate, those poor British tankers certainly paid a heavy price to facilitate US maneuver for Operation Cobra.
Great content, much appreciated!
Fabulous comment! Thank you for sharing. I’m so glad you enjoyed the video and there are many lessons to be taken from operation GOODWOOD which we can apply today
@@thehistoryexplorer thanks, that awfully kind of you! I've subscribed, and, looking at your back catalogue, I see alot that I will want to look at!
I hope you enjoy the videos, many more to come and I’m improving all the time…hopefully!
@@thehistoryexplorer I'll be watching for new material. Market Garden? 😉
Montgomery's directive was to engage the German armour and wear it down and enlarge the British left flank this was achieved but at cost. Allied intelligence also seriously underestimated the depth of the German defences by around 6 miles.
I think if you look at it from the objectives given to Dempsey and the other senior commanders by Monty on the eve of the battle rather than any vague remarks he made about a breakout, the operation was reasonably successful. The main issue with how Operation Goodwood has been looked at is tank losses and the fact it's been calculated differently for the two sides.
The losses for Allied tanks have normally been counted by the number of tanks still operational at the end of each day of the operation, even though a large number of those counted as lost will be operational within a couple of days.
While the German tank losses only count those tanks which are completely lost and unrecoverable after the end of the operation. So you end up with Allied losses of nearly 500 tanks against German losses of around 100 tanks, but if you use the same type of calculation for both sides, in this case the German system, Allied losses fall to 150-200 while German losses remain the same at 100.
Interesting.
Brilliant comment. I had intended to cover three more headings but it just got way too long. I still haven’t found my feet in terms of how much information people want or if less is better. But all of your points are bang on. I hope you enjoyed it 👍
Nickel1147
Yes they certainly did. Tiger phobia was a very real condition.. Kelly's Heroes plays on it. There is a documentary on the Tiger with British veterans of the Normandy invasion admitting how fearful they were of lurking Tigers.
@@Nickel1147 There were Tigers at Villers Bocage, Operation Goodwood and Hill 112. The 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion,Michael Wittmans Heavy SS Panzer Battalion 101 and 3rd company of Tiger Battalion 503. Some of the bloodiest fighting of the Caen campaign happened at Hill 112 where 6 SS Panzer divisions were concentrated, it took 10 weeks of fighting to take back the hill.
@@Nickel1147
There were 3 battalions of Tigers in Normandy totalling 126 Tiger Is and 12 Tiger IIs.
All were deployed in the British Commonwealth sector yes.
The British tankers didn't know where or when one would pop up. The worry about meeting a Tiger was quite substantial particularly after Villers Bocage on June 13th. There were also 623 Panthers and 26 Jagdpanthers sent to Normandy, so that's around 800 big cats in total, all in a pretty restrictive area of frontage.
Source. Zetterling, Normandy 1944.
I've wondered if Richard O'Connor could have improved the planning of this operation. I could see him greenlighting the use of APC'S and some infantry support. These are elements that Dempsey did not provide to O'Connor. It really does seem that he had to make do with what was available and was forced to operate under uncooperative superiors and in difficult positions. O'Connor knew that things would get difficult upon reaching the Bourguebus-Verrieres Ridge. A little more organisation regarding Tactical Air Support would have helped but of course this would be in the hands of those in the positions above O'Connor. Plus the fact that the Panther Battalion of the Leibstandarte reached the Ridge undetected leaves me with the impression that a little bit of Air Reconaissance would have helped.
Reconnaissance is sedum wasted! It could have made a significant difference
@@thehistoryexplorer O'Connor used reconnaisance in Operation Compass, he would have done the same here I reckon.
Great video production Thank you
Glad you enjoyed it! One of my first ones
I don't understand how this tank charge was unsupported by infantry 🤨 Isn't the idea of combined arms warfare to use tanks alongside infantry?
Combined arms integration should have seen the coordination of armour and infantry with a simultaneous bombardment onto likely defensive positions.
Instead, due to a lack of infantry and an over reliance on steel the advance as largely unsupported. As the guns were out of range early on they couldn’t provide suppressive fire to fix the defenders
This is one of the most controversial battles because of a failure to understand how losses are reported in British and German armies. The British used the End of Day Report, which listed all tanks not with the regiment at the end of the day, for whatever reason. The Germans claimed they destroyed 500+ tanks, but EoD Reports listed 352, but of these all but 130 Write-offs were reparable and soon back in action. In contrast the Germans only reported documented Write-Offs and that could take several days. So at Goodwood the Germans initially recorded 75 Write-Off, later adjusted to 107. In reality the battle was much closer than originally reported.
Brilliant comment. There were differing agendas at the time of GOODWOOD and thing the varying narratives from each camp played a big part in how GOODWOOD was understood by many
The Germans lost 75 tanks and assault guns in the West in the period, and not all of them in Goodwood (Tamelander and Zetterling, 2003). Most of the German losses occured during the initial carpet bombing.
@@TTTT-oc4eb The Germans according to their own records lost 2,300 tanks and Stugs during the battle for Normandy. So what are talking about?
Tank losses were heavy, but the allies had plenty of tanks. Personel losses were not that bad. Chester Wilmot in 'The Struggle For Europe' gives the figures. around 3500 killed wounded and missing over the whole operation. Given the numbers of men involved that is quite low. He also reproduces Montgommeries written objectives for the operation. The objective was to tie down German armour, nothing more. I saw an interview with Montgommery by an American journalist some years ago. In it Montgommery said that Eisenhower never understood his plan. Bradley did, but Eisenhower didn't.
@@alangledhill6454 The German Army Group West never achieved one of their stated goals in Normandy. They were stopped at Caen and never got anywhere near the beaches. It was the greatest victory of the NW Europe campaign.
The Americans never understood the fact that battle plans change. They criticized Monty for failing to take Caen on the first day. A little hypocritical as the US never took any of their objectives on time during the whole campaign! But that's Americans for you.
Great video, very well-presented and informative. I'm no expert but I think that Goodwood can be called a failure (it's hard not to call it a failure when you launch an attack and it gets repulsed with heavy losses) but not a disaster. If you have two large forces (US and Commonwealth) sharing a front with the enemy (the Germans), then the obvious strategy is to deliver a "one-two punch". The first strike provokes a defense which the second strike circumvents to deliver the telling blow. In this case, I think that the first strike (Goodwood) was poorly executed and excessively costly. The blame for that has to go to Montgomery. Not being able to take Bourguébus Ridge with 3 times as many tanks and total air superiority is objectively inexcusable.
You are right that GOODWOOD was a 'one-two-punch'. Bradley was supposed to start COBRA (punch two) on July 19th but his failure at St Lo (he was 'too slow'?) let Monty down and was forced to go ahead on his own. How do you think Bradley's failure at St Lo ( where he had 3 times as many tanks and total air superiority) compares to Bourguébus on the 'objectively inexcusable' scale?
@@michaelkenny8540 I do think that slow, purposeful commanders are the best at getting their own men KIA. You probably know more about this than me, but I thought that the original conception of Cobra was that it should start on the 21st, and it was delayed by weather until the 24th. Was Bradley actually tardy? Not sticking up for his generalship, just not sure about the factual question.
@@aaronsomerville2124 COBRA was planned to start a day later (the bombers needed two days as they could not do it all on one day) but Bradley got bogged down at St Lo. When the rain started on July 20th that became to excuse to explain the delay. Fact is Bradley has postponed his half of the attack before July 18 so rain or no rain he was not going to carry out his half of the attack. By the way GOODWOOD was not 'repulsed' it just failed to capture all its objectives.
To get a small German perspective of "Goodwood" and the battles preceding, I think The Reaper's Harvesting Summer: The 12.SS-Panzer Division ‘Hitlerjugend’ in Normandy is a must read.
I havnt read that. I’ll have to give it a go
@@thehistoryexplorer It's pretty gruesome, and gives a good account of the Canadians fighting the 12thSS.
@@thehistoryexplorer Author Angelos Mansolas
How would you have liked to have been a tanker during this "offensive" ??? There was a reason Parliament was going to open an investigation concerning the losses and the inferiority of allied armour compared to..... this was not a success for Montgomery and almost cost him his command.... There is a great series that utilizes the British sub commanders as well as the German commanders during Goodwood.... we lost something near 413 tanks.... one round from a German Mk IV, Mk. V, Mk VI or 88 or Stug spelled instant disaster for our guys... their optics were so much better that they normally hit the first round until they started using "boys"......
Thanks for your good work
Cheers
DH
Thank you DH and I appreciate the interesting comment.
"we lost something near 413 tanks.."
Read the post I put on this video, this figure is not quite accurate.
Veterens said when those hidden 88's fired from the edge of that field they could see the wheat part like jesus and the red see and the channel it was making, those that was slogging behind on foot could actually see which tank that big ol shell was was coming for....like that scene in jurassic park with the velocerapters...
Amazing. I can well imagine
I think there's merit to both sides. While Monty may have issued orders to subordinates calling for a more limited holding attack rather than a breakout attempt, that was not the picture portrayed to Eisenhower (who was famously very angry about the ordeal) or the media. There's also the issue with just how poorly planned/executed the whole thing was. The lack of proper infantry support, the tiny axis of advance, the failure to place the artillery properly (and using a freaking creeping barrage like its 1916), seemingly poor recon along said tiny axis of advance. The whole thing was amateurish. It did tie down a lot of the German armor but that doesn't mean it was a good plan or that there weren't better alternatives.
Great comment. I couldn’t agree more mate. Poor use of combined arms being the key factor for me
@@thehistoryexplorer From what I have read Richard O Connor was slightly held back by Dempsey during Goodwood, Richard had urged the use of armoured personnel carriers for the British infantry, but Dempsey did not agree to it.
I strongly agree ith that Jacob.
Success of failure is not the question. It should never have happened. Monty was supposed to take Caen by day three but he failed. To Take Caen cost over 400 tanks and 80 to 100 thousand men. The reason for the battle was not to hold the Germans there. If they had spread across the whole front in force they would have been too weak to hold any attack no matter where it took place.
No it wasnt the goal was to fix the german tanks in place to allow a us breakout
Omar Bradley: ’While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout. In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort._ While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against him whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them. The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“ -The American LIFE Magazine 1951.ty John Peate
The Americans totally giving up on St Lo in June because of bushes in the way (St Lo was a June 15th objective) meant that the Germans were able to deploy every single panzer division in Normandy to the Caen sector all through June. Seven panzer divisions were in the Caen sector by the end of the month, plus a Tiger battalion with two more Tiger battalions on the way there.
Perhaps if the US 1st Army had actually applied pressure against St Lo in June then taking Caen wouldn't have been as difficult.
Regardless, by beginning of September Montgomery was 400km ahead of schedule and liberating Brussels, Belgium when only Paris was supposed to be reached by then.
Shame that Eisenhower then took his job as C-in-C of all allied ground forces and stalled the allies for the next six months with his broad front disaster, getting pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Turning an obvious and Hummiliaiting defeat into a strategic victory,is one of the most Disgusting and Despicabale things someone can do concerning the hundreds of young men who died following orders, specialy from very incompetent High Ranking Officers.
No Respect at all for those who paid the ultimate price just because the Ego of one useless Man.
I’m not sure I follow? You do realise the British were victorious and knocked out large swathes of the German armour, fixing it in the east to allow a breakout in the west.
Numerous Military Historians such as John Buckley, Ian Daglish, Simon Trew, Stephen Badsey and Christopher Dunphie all agree that Operation Goodwood was a successful effort to draw German reserves, particularly armour, onto the 21st Army group to support Operation Cobra.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- "'Goodwood' may not have been the breakout so desperately wanted, but it kept the bulk of the German forces in that sector. So when US forces launched Operation 'Cobra' on 25 July they faced only eleven weak divisions with limited fighting power. 'Cobra' broke the front open southwards from Saint-Lô, and American forces began a headlong advance westwards into Brittany and eastwards towards the Seine. The Germans had kept Allied forces bottled up for six weeks. But in so doing they had reduced themselves to remnants, devoid of reserves and unable to withstand the breakout when it came."
IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy page
I honestly cannot consider Operation Goodwood a success. The losses of those tanks that were notoriously outmatched by the German Panzer divisions, were too many. The tank personnel of the Allies were so brave knowing they were so totally outmatched and on a suicidal mission. Sure, the Americans benefited and were able to break out, but the Brits and Canadians were the bait and were swallowed whole. Sometimes I think of Monty as a genius and other times baffled at he outlandish schemes he fights to enact. Anyway, another great video and I repeat, my sincere gratitude for the way you present a balanced view of the battlefield and its combatants.
I honestly appreciate your feedback and your kind comments buddy. Thank you so much and I’m glad someone is enjoying my videos 🙏
@Mrkaycee7 I don't understand how the way the tanks were used in Goodwood was Monty's problem though.
As an Army Group commander Monty's job was to give the operational goals, everything else was left to his subordinates. The blame should go to Dempsey, Crocker, O Connor or their subordinates, or maybe to overall British doctrine. It should be noted out that the tank losses of the British (often quoted on here as 400) were *repaired* within 24 hours and in fact were actually 150-200 tanks.
The Germans suffered around 100 tanks and self propelled guns all of which were *total losses/destroyed - non repaired.* though at least 17 of the German tanks lost in the battle were Tigers and over 30 of those were Panthers, and each of these was much more of a loss to the Wehrmacht than the loss of a Sherman or Cromwell was to the British.
After all even after Goodwood, the British had another 500 tanks still piling up on the beaches of Normandy. After the destruction in the Falaise Pocket less than 100 German tanks out of 2,500 made it back to Germany while Monty had over 2,400 tanks in 21st Army Group alone. So as you can see, in the long run, the attritional impact was worse for the Germans than it was for the British.
It should also be noted that the Germans suffered personal losses of at least *7,000 men* compared to the Allies 5,000 men in this battle.
Yeah, well..that's how we learn. You could say that this battle is the reason that the A10 Warthog exists...
Can you imagine if an aircraft with that firepower had been available…
@@thehistoryexplorer What surprised me was the lack of close air support for the offensive
I would have thought that this would be ideal Tiffy hunting ground, taking out the artillery pieces while they were busy with the tanks
@@g8ymw Hello - I agree with your observation however I remember reading somewhere that the Forward Air Controller allocated to this operation became a casualty very early on and the Brits lost a very important resource. Now I've always wondered why there were not replacements to step up asap, however I suppose there was a interservice issue between the RAF and the Army when it came to releasing trained pilots for this role.
Nowadays the Gunner FOO's (Forward Observation Officer) are trained in calling in air support, but even then the pool of expertise is not enough to cover all theatres. I recently read a book about the Brits in Afghanistan and there was an unfortunate Bombardier (full corporal) who had to do tour after tour in country because he was so good as Forward Air Controller and they couldn't organise a replacement for that particular part of the country.
IWM "The British failure to take Caen on D-Day and make progress further inland meant the Germans were able to get sufficient forces into the battle area to contain the Allied armies. 12th SS HitlerjugendDivision proved a particularly formidable opponent. By nightfall on D-Day its lead elements were in position on the left flank of 21st Panzer Division, facing the Canadian 3rd Division. Over the next few days the fanatical SS formation made repeated attempts to drive a wedge through to the sea. The Canadians held the SS at great cost but were prevented from continuing their own advance further south, and could only consolidate their positions. By 9 June the German Army’s elite Panzer Lehr Division had also arrived. It took up position west of Hitlerjugend, opposing British 50th Division around Tilly-sur-Seulles, south of Bayeux. These three formations formed the main defence for Caen, but plans for a major counterattack had to be abandoned as a result of Allied air attacks."
The German Response to D-Day page
The division's advance to the areas near the British-Canadian landing beaches of Sword and Juno proceeded slowly due to Allied air attacks. The first units of the 12th SS reached their assembly area near Evrecy at 22:00 hours on 6 June but the Panther battalion ran out of fuel east of the Orne River.[11] According to Marc Milner, "[t]his was just the first example of sloppy staff work and command and control that characterized 12th SS Division's experience in the beachhead battles".[12]
Marc Milner is a Canadian military and naval historian, author of several books including one novel. He is Director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick.
Thanks for sharing
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
"The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence."
"Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. *Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes."*
"On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes."
*"If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine."*
Source - Charles Perry Stacey in the Victory Campaign page 83.
Considering general Montgomery's history and the fact that he was an osterman. The number one concern I have is why would he sacrifice his countrymen just to give The knockout moves to the colonials The Americans?
I’m not sure he saw it as sacrificing his men. He sacrificed equipment and materiel for sure, but GOODWOOD was part of an operational scheme of manoeuvre
Ever heard of the strategy known as the "Hammer and Anvil"? well the British and Canadians were to play the anvil to pin and destroy German armour reserves while the US, the hammer, breakout. It all worked as part of Monty's Overlord strategy.
He spun it that way after the fact.
"While during the planning there had been lofty talk, from Montgomery especially, of driving beyond Caen on D-Day, deep concern had also been expressed that the entire enterprise might fail."
The Days After D-Day: What Happened Next page
@@nickdanger3802 I don't know why you posted that when Canadian Historian Dr. Brad St.Croix presented counter evidence to the point that said it was part of the plan in "Was Saving Private Ryan Right to blame Monty?"
Like most situations of that period of the war, I feel that this was political and that Monty's hands were tied.
My take. Monty was under pressure to push so he used his most expendable commodity . He was too egotistical to just wear down German armour he wanted a full breakthrough and the main role as such . That he afterwards made out that the former was actually his intention all the time was just like him. In private he must have been very disappointed as the onus would move on To Cobra and St Lo and not him.
Very possible. Good point. It’s hard to argue with your logic
Where's the evidence?
it's a theory on Monty's character . You may come to a different one than me .
COBRA/GOODWOOD were not meant to be 2 separate attacks. The original plan was Monty to attack first and the next day Bradley was to attack. However Bradley got stalled at St Lo and had to let Monty know he could not manage to attack on July 19th. Monty told him to take as much time as he needed and went ahead on his own. It was Bradley's failure at St Lo that contributed to the problem. Bradley was 'too slow' and he did not start his COBRA attack until he had a massive numerical superiority in both men and tanks.
Your 'theory on Monty's character' appears to be based on an in complete understanding of the planning and actual execution of the combined COBRA/GOODWOOD attacks. Can you please provide an update (based on Bradley's character?) that explains why Bradley was unable to take St Lo 'to timetable' and thus start COBRA on July 19th as he had agreed with Monty. Also how do you think Bradley's failure impacted on the objectives for GOODWOOD?
Even though the heavy bombers weren't used much for tactical bombing and in this battle didn't accomplish what it was meant to, Operation Cobra had better success. I believe it would have been better used more in a tactical manner instead of the strategic terror bombing campaign used and cherished by Bomber Harris, it would have been more effective. The strategic bombing campaign eventually seen its fruits in the last year of the war and was but one part of an overall plan to defeat Germany, but was it worth it when you compare how many airmen were lost? One way that the heavy bombers were used extremely effective was in the bombing of the oil refineries.
Operation Cobra happened because Monty was too slow in taking Caen which was supposed to have been taken by the end of day 3 after DDay.
Operation cobra happened because monty pulled in 2 german armoured corps into his sector freeing up the americans
The Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo in mid June and broken out. They took St Lo 5 weeks behind schedule, applying little pressure on St Lo in June because of bushes in the way. This lack of pressure against St Lo enabled the Germans to send and keep all their panzer divisions in the Caen sector.
So why didn’t the Allies use close air support in the offensive like the German Blitz offense?
It all comes down to coordination and communication at the time. The allies relied on a mass of bombers to prepare the battlefield and artillery for close support, but its effectiveness can be questioned
It was a failed ,poor recon ??
Certainly a contributing factor
I take issue with the aerial bombardment being ineffective, the Germans certainly didn’t see it that way and were extremely concerned that a similar barrage would precede future allied operations. A lot of the German heavy units were too far forward and caught in this barrage resulting in their being removed as an effective fighting force.
I understand your point, but the suppressive effect of a pre H aerial bombardment is suggested to be ineffective by the many AARs conducted by the British. This isn’t my assessment
Largest Tank Battle X Largest tank Failure O
Was it a failure? It committed masses of German armour to be destroyed in the coming days and weeks where as the allied armour was mostly recovered and on the road again in the same time frame. It enabled the US breakout near St Lo during operation COBRA
@thehistoryexplorer Montgomery puts 3 Armored Divisions into 3km, which causes heavy traffic jams. For the Qrmored Divisions, traffic jams are unwelcomed and most of the troops of Germany survived the bombing. Which made those 3 Armored Div which 1,100 of the tank's were for the allied troops literally got humiliated and lost 4,000~5,000 men and 300~500 tanks while Germany lost 1,000~2,000 men and also 70~100 Panzers. If it was a feint plan with Operation Cobra. They could went to a smaller offense which could have caused lower casualty but what we can know about Montgomery and how he acted, there is only one answer that he wanted victory for himself and also, Montgomery wasn't that good with George Patton. Every time they meet, Eisenhower and Oma bradley had to mediate those two.
@@Hamzeeeeee7 They did not lose 500 tanks the Allies lost around 150-200 tanks with the rest being repaired in 24 hours, and btw the Germans actually lost 7,000 men not 2,000.
its Monty's excuse for a victory sadly a complete flop, though it helped the USA break through.
Come on there is far more to it than that.
The Americans were supposed to have taken St Lo and broken out much earlier than they did, but they cited bushes in the way as the reason. Seems to be ok to have excuses when you fail if you're American. Same with the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Ardennes etc.
@@lyndoncmp5751Quite right. Cobra was not the first break out attempt by the US army. That was a series of operations on the whole US front in the first week of July. After 7 days fighting only 5 miles were gained and it was all called off on the 8th. On the 10th Bradley advised Montgommery that he would need 10 days before he could make another attempt. This would allow the US army to capture St Lo and advance to a more favorable start line. This delay made Goodwood neccessary because the Germans could not be allowed a 10 day respite. An attack in the Odon sector was scheduled for the 14th, Goodwood for the 18th with Cobra scheduled for the 20th. In the event these dates were not met but that does not detract from the overall success of this series of operations.
@alangledhill6454
Quite right and very well put. A most excellent post.
Hey,there's little Monty.
Did you enjoy the video?
When brtian were mention in WW2 BRITISH will always talk about 17pounder Sherman firefly and CAEN 😂😂 for the British 17,,pounded firefly and CAEN is the most important thing for the British it's their HOLY TRINITY atleast one Britishers will mention those name atleast one time in every video whenever ww2 topic comes up
Ok buddy 👍 thanks for the feedback
They did not bomb the troop positions. They killed several thousand French civilians in Caen. Bomber Harris hated tactical bombing and this may have had some influence with the British bombers.
The Tommie Cooker (Sherman Tank ) was an Infantry tank....it was not built for tank on tank warfare....they did not carry anti tank guns.....this goes for Brits and American Sherman tanks......Even when they started arming the Sherman with the High Velocity 76 mm anti tank gun..they were still not up to par with the Germans........The American and British Tankers that were sent into battle with the Sherman...knew they were committing suicide fighting German Tanks and yet they still did it ....which says a lot........The allied commanders knew they were sending these men to their deaths also......They should have been Court Marshaled after the war......
That's not the full story though. When the Sherman was introduced in 1942, it was seen as comparable/better to the German tanks (although the new long barrelled Pzr IV 75mm had a better anti tank gun), & the Allies were still on the defensive. After El Alamein, this changed. Proposed Allied heavy tanks were either adopted (Churchill) or requested, but put back for further development (T1/Pershing). It was more difficult for the Allies to design & produce tanks as they didn't have a controlled economy like Germany, & didn't yet see the need. Allied private contractors were waiting on specifications from the UK/USA War Depts, which kept changing their minds. The Pzr III or IV was still the Germans most common tank, & the Soviets didn't really share the details of the Tiger. The Sherman was still seen as 'adequate' in 1944, & massive numbers seen to be the key. The Pzr IV, was known as the 'tin can' by it's crews due to the lack of armour, it also caught fire, so it wasn't just the Allies who complained.
Could the Allies have put out heavier tanks earlier - 'yes', but the Navy & Airforce took resource & skills priority. In the the UK, tank design for years had been a low priority. Shermans in US doctrine weren't supposed to fight German tanks anyway, that was the tank destroyers job. European infrastructure wasn't ready for heavier tanks either, the Germans had huge issues getting their tanks to the battlefields, & then maintaining or recovering these overcomplicated beasts.
Due to their numbers, the Shermans in reality were able to flank & take out their German opponents, winning the attrition war. What also must be remembered, is how many Allied infantry lives were saved due to the massive numbers of Shermans. German infantry complained bitterly that the Shermans were everywhere, providing Allied infantry with direct support (which was it's main job) from it's main gun & mgs. Having a lower velocity gun, it's barrel lasted far longer than the German high velocity types. Shells were smaller, so more ammo could be carried to. It was far more suited to taking out bunkers, houses, strongpoints etc that the Allies had to do on the offensive. The Sherman Fireflys & those with 76mm guns, especially with later ammunition were able to take out most German tanks from the front. In the Pacific, the Sherman was crucial in helping the Infantry/Marines clear bunkers.
So, while the Allies could have fielded a 'heavier' tank with a 'better' anti tank gun earlier, it may well have been underdeveloped, unreliable, a logistical problem, & reduce Sherman production - WHILST STILL BEING PENETRATED BY GERMAN ANTI TANK GUNS. The heavily armoured British Churchill, whilst it gave it's crew more protection (& was less likely to catch fire), wasn't invulnerable. The British had their AT/Tortoise assault tanks in design, but these had their own issues.
I'm not taking anything away from the bravery of the Allied tankers, or denying that 'penny pinching' got in the way of UK/US tank design (something the Germans didn't have to worry about), or that Allied Generals didn't think some form of higher velocity guns weren't necessary early enough, but there will always be compromises in war.
@@eze8970 My father said the 17 pounder shermans levelled the playing field to some extent.
@@stevekay5486 Correct, there just weren't enough of them by the time of D-Day.
Excellent summary
An excellent video. Using the aerial photos really helps to explain the battle. I have been to the battlefield and as you noted, the Anglo-Canadian forces were fighting uphill and under constant observation. Definitely, the Germans had well prepared, well thought out defensive positions and the SS forces knew the area well. Von Luck's 88s had a perfectly prepared shooting gallery. The Germans also realized that Caen was a lot closer to Germany than St. Lo. and knew the importance of holding the left flank of the invasion beaches. I think Monty really wanted to break out onto the Falaise Plain and it had potential for future airfield construction. If he had slugged it out for one more day, the German defences might have collapsed. I understand that the operation ended with torrential rains turning the battlefield into a quagmire and was a big factor in continuing the battle. The bridges also constituted a major bottleneck. I believe along with Ike that Goodwood was a total failure.
Thanks for the comment.