Russell's Theory of Descriptions 1 - Some Puzzles
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- Опубліковано 18 чер 2024
- This series is a basic introduction to Russell's theory of descriptions. In this video, we begin by considering some puzzles about singular terms.
Re the distinctions listed at 5:44 : If you're at all unclear about any of these, I introduce all three of them here: • Necessary; analytic; a... .
As for my claims regarding on which side of the distinctions (3) and (4) fall, of course there are questionable and have been questioned. It has been held, for example, that identity statements such as "Robert Zimmerman = Bob Dylan" are necessary, not contingent. The very distinction between analytic and synthetic statements has been challenged. Some empiricist philosophers (Mill is the most famous example) have held that even logical truths such as A=A (Robert Zimmerman = Robert Zimmerman) are contingent, a posteriori, synthetic. Etc.
What's clear, though, is that there is some prima facie difference in meaning between (3) and (4), and it's difficult for the commonsense view of singular terms to account for this difference.
Zappa, Dylan, and Beefheart in a video on Bertrand Russell... I think we’re the same sort of person.
Kane. I discovered to my delight recently your range of lectures here, and have been working through them steadily over the past week or two. As a non-academic who has been trying to educate himself in philosophy since my, erm, semi-retirement (read "abject sloth") they have been enormously helpful to me. Your clarity of presentation is superb. Thank you so much!
Now, just a quick question, if you'll indulge me, regarding the current video. Around the 5:40 mark, you contrast sentences (3) and (4)...
(3) Robert Zimmerman is Bob Dylan
(4) Robert Zimmerman is Robert Zimmerman
... telling us that (3) is contingently true (to quote yourself: "Robert Zimmerman didn't have to also use the name 'Bob Dylan'. Robert Zimmerman might have used a different name, or might have stuck with his birth name."), while (4) is necessarily true.
Your claim that sentence (3) is contingent seems to me at odds with Saul Kripke's analysis of rigid designators and a posteriori necessary truths. Yes, Mr Zimmerman might -- in another possible world -- not have selected this particular stage name, or chosen no stage name at all, as you correctly point out, but since he did, surely the referents of the names "Bob Dylan" and "Robert Zimmerman" are one and the same man -- in all possible worlds!, just as in all the familiar examples, the name "The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star" refer to one and the same object (i.e., the planet Venus), and thus, on a Kripkean analysis at least, a sentence such as "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" is necessarily true. A thing cannot not be itself.
Likewise, the ancients might have chosen the name "Big Shiny" rather than "The Morning Star"; the statement "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" is nonetheless necessarily true.
Perhaps you were presenting sentences (3) and (4) as they would have been regarded by Russell and his contemporaries, long before Kripke appeared on the scene to rock their Russellian yacht? It's also eminently possible that I'm simply confused. To emphasize again, I'm no expert; just an avid reader.
I'd love to hear any clarification you might have to offer on this point, Kane. Thank you once again for the wonderful work you've shared with us all.
Colin
Great stuff. I've seen all three of your vids about def descriptions. Your explanations are concise although I still have some trouble understanding some of the concepts. I feel as though I understand the general concept behind his theories on linguistics construction and logic.
I also appreciate the fact that you took your time and didn't explain things away in 3 min like some other youtube channels do. It's ridiculous how anyone is expected to learn the material by recapulating major works in under 5 min!
I'm sure there is a lot more to cover. It seems Russell spend most of his lifetime writing.
I just picked up The Foundations of Geometry and find it quite interesting.
From where did you get his definite descriptions from?
thank you very much! this was very helpful!
Thanks mate, my brain was hurting for a good hour before this video.
Is there a single book that contains all the information you have in this philosophy of language playlist?
thank you so much for this
Ooops. I hadn't noticed the "Show More" option. Just clicked on it. I guess that covers my question :)
Thank you!
Hey. Thanks for ur videos.
Why is the first puzzle a puzzle ? Natural deduction need not preserve the property of contingentness
Consider the statements:
(1) The earth is spherical and 0=0.
(2) 0=0
Then clearly (2) is necessary but (1) is contingent, even though (2) was deduced from (1)
In other words, it's perfectly ok to deduce trivial statements from non trivial ones
THANK YOU FOR EXPLANATION
can you do a new PowerPoint for me on this :)
How did Russell solve the four puzzles that he problematized in his philosophy of language?
+Bert Poole (Lolafacerola) sent me here. :)
Why can't singular propositions merely refer to fictional entities or concepts that have no material ontology? If for example I say that unicorns don't exist, I am not saying that a nonexistent entity does not exist, but rather I am saying that the *concept* of a unicorn has no manifestation in physical reality.
This seems like such an obvious solution to the problem of negative existentials, but clearly I have missed something if much smarter people than myself reject such a glaringly obvious answer.
And if the King of France were to be the rebuttal, then surely just pointing out that unlike unicorns, the King of France is not a well defined concept and so we cannot definitively say anything about it's attributes.
We all know that a unicorn is a horse with a horn, so we can says things about them without them existing, but until the attributes of the King of France are equally well defined we clearly cannot say anything about the attributes of the concept.
"Robert Zimmerman is Robert Zimmerman" is not always true. Consider two different person with the same name Robert Zimmerman. You might synthesize the context in which the sentence would be falsely.
Is there a flaw in this?
In that case, you're just using two different names that happen to have the same spelling. So no, that's not a counterexample to the claim that "x is x" is necessarily true.
@@KaneB the intuition of this sentence being not always true came from the assumption that "x" and "x" might describe different objects. In logic "x is x" is always true, but it's just not really clear how far this "descriptive" theory lies from the pure logic.
@@q_e__d6183 The point of using the variable "x" in "x is x" is that you're supposed to substitute the same name for each use of "x". That's not what you're doing if you're using the first instance of the name "Robert Zimmerman" to refer to the famous musician, and the second instance to refer to e.g. your next-door neighbour.
if you've ever programmed in c++ all of these puzzles make a little more sense
I have always thought that the problem of making the statements "Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman" and "Robert Zimerman is Robert Zimmerman" equivalent is because the following steps are being hidden: "There is something that is Bob Dylan and that is Robert Zimerman" it is equivalent to saying "There is something that is equal to itself." That is, the identity obtained in the first step is preserved in the second step if we have obtained the identity of Robert Zimerman and Bob Dylan as one and the same thing. Then we can ask, is Bob Dylan necessarily Robert Zimerman? It seems not. But they are not necessary in the same sense that it is not necessary that the thing that we identify with Robert Zimmerman is the one that we identify with the name Robert Zimmerman (his parents could have named him differently, or Robert Zimmerman himself could have changed the name). So Robert Zimerman is equal to Robert Zimmerman is no less contingent than Robert Zimerman is Bob Dylan. Even the Kripke's initial baptism is not in this sense a necessary act.
How many Bob Dylans can fit on the head of a pin? Analytic philosophy is just modern day Scholasticism, but not as profound.
Bertrand Russell's nonsensical universe
Bertrand Russell was a nutcase. According to Russell, propositions must have concrete, really existing entities as their constituents [1]. This is nonsensical, as it disqualifies mathematical or logical propositions, or moral or aesthetic propositions. And moreover, all so-called really existing entities are not concrete, they must be, according to Leibniz's logic, contingent--- continually changing-- even though Russell had written a text of Leibniz's logic. Yet this paper "On Denoting", has been held in high esteem by many prominent philosophers.
I believe that Russell may have mistakenly gotten the idea from a misreading of Leibniz, who describes a monad or substance as a complete concept, meaning that it contains a all applicable predicates. At that point Leibniz was trying to get across the idea of what a monad is. Of particular importance is that
all monads have corresponding physical bodies.
Another major fault in Russell's philosophy is that, although he correctly acknowledged that there are two types of knowledge:
a) knowledge by descriptions (public or Third Person knowledge) and
b) knowledge by acquaintance (personal First Person knowledge or knowledge by experience)
but presumably because as a materialist he could not deal with mental matters,
he only included a) in his so-called "analytic philosophy", further isolating us from
experience and mental phenomena.
Because of such gross errors, I believe it is time to dump Russell and his fellow materialists
into the trash bin of bad philosophy.
[1] B. Russell, "On Denoting". See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Denoting
--
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (retired, 2000).
See my Leibniz site: rclough@verizon.academia.edu/RogerClough
For personal messages use rclough@verizon.net
jose sanchez
He is a troll I think, he just spews diatribe all over the place and brags about credentials in every single post.
It's quite sad really.
Totally agree. Would you mind sharing how different from yours was Wittgenstein's opinion of him?
a 15 min vid about pure schemantics. great. not.
Thank you!