Do We Have Free Will? Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism
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- Опубліковано 25 сер 2024
- Clarification
In the video, my explanation of "causal determinism" is somewhat misleading. I explain it in terms of cause and effect. But you can have cause and effect without causal determinism. More accurately, causal determinism is this idea: the past + the laws of nature = guarantees exactly one specific outcome.
Video Description:
Do we have free will? It seems like it. But doesn't everything in the universe follow the laws of nature--even our brains? If so, aren't our choices ultimately determined by the laws of nature? If you think the laws of nature take away our free will, then you're an incompatibilist. If you think we can still have free will despite the deterministic laws of nature, then you're a compatibilist.
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Love these! I’d love to see an idea by which I could apply the thought to real life to see how I might determine which way I lean. Makes me miss fun late night convos with good people, in my twenties!
My 20s was an awesome time--unlike the 2020s.
My 20s *IS* in the 2020s
Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist? Do you think that we can still have free will even of we're bound by the laws of nature?
The laws of nature are purely descriptive and have no causal powers. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the universe can be said to cause events. The laws of nature simply describe the reliable patterns of behavior that have been observed. This distinction is key, because we happen to be one of those objects that go around causing things to happen.
I think that's probably right. But it's still debatable. The exact nature of a law of nature is controversial. It sounds like you're suggesting a "Humean Supervenience" model. This isn't in my specialization in philosophy, so it's a bit out of my wheelhouse. But the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a great article on it: plato.stanford.edu/entries/laws-of-nature/
@@ThinkingAboutStuff In their article on Causal Determinism Carl Hoefer points out that the "laws of Nature" are a metaphor. I point out some issues with that article here: marvinedwards.me/2017/08/19/determinism-whats-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it/
Marvin Edwards I checked out your blog. Really cool! It sounds like at one point you argue against “scientific reduction”-suggesting that biology and psychology cannot be reduced to just facts about how physics works. I’m inclined to agree. (Though again, not my specific area of expertise so my opinions shouldn’t count for much!)
If God is the first mover this changes everything.
The sci-fi series DEVS revolved around this idea (it was a decent series, too).
When you are looking at a natural phenomena, you give it a name and you can describe it. If you are working with a concept, then a definition is the first order of business. Free will is an observed natural phenomena, so whatever conceptualization or definition you concoct, you can't then go back to nature and say, "No it's not" because it does not make sense in your mind. As Philip K Dick said, "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away."
Free will is not an observed natural phenomenon. It's the observed natural phenomenon plus unfounded beliefs about being able to select options we don't in fact select.
The speaker gets it wrong right from the start. Does it really seem like we could do otherwise in a way incompatible with causal determinism? How does it seem like I could have chosen a different breakfast? How does it seem like I could have voted for a different political party? How does it seem like I could have chosen not to go to work last week?
It's a really bad error to think it seems like we have free will. Ordinarily it does not!
Quantum mechanics does not “suggest” a probabilistic view of the laws of nature. This question is no longer in doubt and has not been for 100 years. Why do people like this still not realise that NOTHING is absolutely determined by the laws of nature when measurements are made?
I'm sure you know more about quantum mechanics than I do, so I can't/won't argue for what's the "right" model to use. And I know that the vast majority of physicists hold to genuinely indeterministic models. But I didn't want to use language that ruled out the *possibility* of determinism even given quantum physics. My understanding is that there are deterministic models that technically are consistent with the experimental data (even if those models are unpopular or not regarded as the best models).
@@ThinkingAboutStuff Quantum mechanics is really really strange. Once initial conditions are set up, what happens next can never be predicted precisely - what ensues follows a probability distribution. So determinism is wrong. That does not in itself prove anything about free will.
@Mark Hollingsworth I don't doubt such experiences, but they don't have any bearing on the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. QM and the Standard Model describe nature in the small scale with amazing accuracy, but we don't understand why. We have a set of mathematical rules that work for reasons we don't understand.
@@monitorcomputersystemsltd2375 You say that "(o)nce initial conditions are set up, what happens next can never be predicted precisely - what ensues follows a probability distribution.”
We can all agree with the first part of your statement. But by claiming that we can "never" predict outcomes when it comes to quantum mechanics, aren't you implicitly assuming that we know all we can know about quantum mechanical behaviour?
Quantum mechanics, needless to say, is a shiny new field of inquiry. Can we be perfectly confident that we won't someday move beyond mere probability of outcomes to predict them precisely?
And if that possibility were to eventually come to pass, would that not have a fundamental impact on the question of free will?
Dunno what I am. As a "particularist" I'd answer that a degree of free will seems self-evident as well as a natural laws, so probs a compatabilist. Though, wouldn't rock my world to learn that scientists discover stuff that disproves determinism in a way that crumbles a lot of hypothesis we have about the natural world.
I’m a compatibilist, too. For the longest time I was a libertarian (a version of incompatibilism that says we have free will and determinism is false). But there’s a guy named Peter Strawson who basically said, “Look. If we discovered for certain that determinism is true, would anyone *really* give up on the idea that we’re responsible for our actions?” Probably not. Determinism doesn’t really matter for our practices of moral responsibility.” I think he’s right.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff That's a helpful perspective. I do sense every "wants" one or the other to be true so they can either deny responsibility for their actions, OR force responsibility for others.
A sense of freewill, developing within a determined universe, is a pretty good reason to believe in freewill and potentially an immatetial substance such as a soul.
if 2 persons have the same genes and harmonies and same social circumstances they will take the same decisions
Internaal causes do not mean "free".
You've misrepresented compatibilism. Compatibilism does not assert that "free will is possible" in a deterministic universe. Compatibilism asserts that free will itself is deterministic. You see, "choosing" is a deterministic operation. Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice.
The choice is usually in the form of an "I WILL", as in "What WILL I have for lunch today? I like the Quarter Pounder with Cheese, and the Crispy Chicken, and the Big Mac. It's been a while since I've had a Big Mac, so I WILL have the Big Mac today".
Having set our intent upon the Big Mac, that intention then motivates and directs our subsequent behavior. We tell the McDonalds worker, "I WILL have the Big Mac". And he tells us how much it will cost, holding us responsible for our deliberate act, and we pay him. Finally, we enjoy the Big Mac.
The meaningful and relevant causes of our choice were all located within us. The hunger was us. The preference for the Big Mac today was us. The choosing was a process that we, and we alone, performed. And, we placed the order, and were held responsible for that choice.
So, where were the "Laws of Nature" while all this was going on? Well, it turns out that the "Laws of Nature" are not a some entity that goes about in the world causing things to happen. The "Laws of Nature" simply describe the reliable patterns of behavior that science has observed in the objects and forces that make up the physical universe. The "Laws of Nature" are not causative, they are only descriptive. And what do they describe? They describe the reliable interactions of objects and forces as they bring about events.
Why is this distinction important? Because we happen to be one of those objects that actually go about in the world causing things to happen. The "laws" governing our behavior are described by the Social sciences, which include psychology and sociology. While we are affected by physical forces like gravity, we are not governed by them. We routinely defy gravity by walking uphill or taking a flight to another city. Nor are we governed by our biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. We are affected by these drives, but when, where, and how we satisfy these drives is governed by our imagination, our evaluation, and our choosing.
This is the "rational causal mechanism". The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality consisting of objects and events. With that model it can imagine different scenarios, estimate the likely outcome of different options, and choose the option that will best suit our own purpose, our own reasons, and our own interests.
And this operation of deciding for ourselves what we will do is called "free will". Free will is when a person decides what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Free will is when we make that choice for ourselves versus cases where a choice is forced upon us by someone or something else.
If we wish to use the metaphor of the "Laws of Nature" then we must complete that metaphor to include us. We are specific packages of those laws, going about in the world, causing things to happen because it suits us to do so.
For a critical review of the SEP article on "Compatibilism", see marvinedwards.me/2018/10/20/compatibilism-whats-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it/
Thanks for your comment. But I disagree that I’ve misrepresented compatibilism. That’s how it’s standardly defined in philosophy. As you note in your blog, that’s even how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it.
Of course, one can think free will is compatible with determinism AND also think determinism is required for free will. Lots of compatibilists believe that. But that’s more than mere compatibilism.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff I suppose I would be called a "hard compatibilist" then. The problem is not just in the definition of free will, but also in the definition of determinism. Determinism may safely assert that there will be a single actual future (after all, we only have one past to put it in ), but the notion of possibilities is part of the deterministic machinery of choosing. And, within the domain of human influence, the single inevitable future will be chosen from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.
@@marvinedwards737 point well taken. “Laws of nature” is a messy topic with lots of different accounts. And we’re in nature so if laws are just describing regularities and we’re part of it, then they’re no “threat” to freedom.
But one way I like to think about the claim of determinism is this: the fundamental particles and their causal stories are enough to fully explain events at the macro level (including explaining our choices). That’s not exactly determinism but i think it captures the “worry” people have about determinism.
@@ThinkingAboutStuff The hard determinist and the libertarian share the same delusional view of reliable causation. They both view determinism as an external force exercising control over their lives, removing all of their own control and freedom. This "boogeyman" version of determinism sends the theist running to the supernatural and the atheist running to quantum indeterminism for escape.
But that view is superstitious nonsense. Yet it is being foisted upon new believers daily as they are duped into the unscientific hoax called the determinism "versus" free will paradox. Once infected with the paradox, mainly by the use of figurative language, people start to question free will, responsibility, and even the notion of self.
Figurative statements include things like "given determinism there is no choice". What they mean to say is that "given determinism it is AS IF there is no choice". But every figurative statement is literally false. Choosing is a real event that takes place in the physical universe within the brain of an intelligent species. And it requires at least two real possibilities to even begin. There is choice. There is choosing. And, of course, there is the distinction between a choice I make for myself (free will) versus a choice imposed upon me by someone or something else (unfree will).
And it is obvious that particles do not make choices, only a machine built for that purpose, like the human brain or the computer, make choices.
The laws of society govern human behavior. We stop at a red light because we, at the macro level, using rational causation, have determined that we can prevent harm by using traffic lights to regulate the behavior of drivers at an intersection. The atoms of which we are made have no interest in our safety. That interest only emerges at the macro level where we live.
Reductionism suggests we study the parts to help understand how the whole operates. And that's fine. But our explanation of how free will works does not "explain it away", it only explains how it works.
And then there's the reductionist paradox. Every level is subject to further breakdown. So, atoms can be reduced to their components (protons, neutrons, electrons) , and their components can also be broken down into even smaller parts (quarks), and these in turn may likewise be broken down repeatedly into the theoretical "smallest part of the smallest part".
The events at each level will follow rules that work uniquely only at that level. Quantum "indeterminism" is likely to be a problem of prediction, due to the problem of observing their behavior outside of a super-collider. It is quite likely that events at the quantum level are just as deterministic as any other level, but simply following a set of rules that we cannot discover.
Marvin
You're confusing soft determinism with compatibilism.
A compatibilist can believe indeterminism is true or be agnostic about determinism.
A soft determinist believes determinism is true and we have free will.
Also a hard determinst believes in causal determinism just as you do.
It's just he defines free will in a way incompatible with causal determinism.
Hope that helps.
No, it seems like we choose things, which we obviously do. It does not seem like we could do otherwise with exactly the same past.
"(I)t seems like we choose things, which we obviously do."
You call it "obvious" that we make choices. Most everyone would concede that it's obvious that it "seems" as though we're making choices, but those who don't believe that we have free will make a persuasive case that this "seeming" is an illusion and that we're not actually making choices at all. That's the central point of the issue.
How this ideas may be compatible?
We observe reliable cause and effect every day (deterministic). We observe ourselves and others making choices every day (free will). How can two objective facts be incompatible?
It is *known* that the universe is not deterministic.
Obviously you have no clue what free will is. To be, or not to be? That's the question. Free Will comes only through Devine Intervention.