I'll have to ponder how the penis might be related to free will. An initial thought: we sometimes talk colloquially of how dudes "think with their dick" -- when they make bad decisions motivated by sexual desire. Can such decisions be said to be made freely? Perhaps thinking with one's dick undermines the capacities required for free will.
@@KaneB We might be able to elaborate on that using Frankfurt's distinction between first and second-order desires, unless you have independent reasons to reject this distinction. It's plausible, I mean, to suppose that "thinking with one's dick" implies that, although one desires some x, one does not desire to desire x. This makes a division of faculty plausible too.
@@KaneB Can the argument be generalized to the problematic existence of any desire? Any desire sufficiently strong will override rationality. Furthermore, the existence of multiple desires, even competing desires, which we did not choose, just means that one of those will win. As Schopenhauer said, "Man can do what he wills but cannot will what he wills."
9:22 You're arguing that we should treat the observed world like it's not a dream, just in case we are wrong - we wouldn't have moral obligations in dreams. I'm wondering if there's also an argument in here that when dreaming, we should also act like we have moral obligations, just in case we are wrong about dreaming. I'm also getting undertones of Pascal's wager here :)
@@cacssarcaeustan2543 haha nice! Yep I don't believe in categorical imperatives, definitely. But I'm not sure if that gets me to 'no moral obligations'... perhaps in respect of some values I have, I do have hypothetical imperative moral obligations.
Morals are self imposed, there is a socially agreed upon level, to an extent. But you never signed a social contract, you were forced into it. Up to you what to do with your personal morals, just know nothing you choose is wrong! :)
Usually when I'm dreaming, I don't realize I'm dreaming... I often don't act in line with my normal moral values, but then looking back on my behaviour in the dream feels more like reading about the actions of a fictional character. It's not really *me*. Having said that, I do sometimes have lucid dreams. I've never done anything too risky or morally terrible in a lucid dream, precisely for the reason you mention. There's always a little room for doubt about whether I'm actually dreaming.
@Oners82 self imposing a moralistic functioning society is your thing. Not everyone wants that, Noone can claim it’s the best thing. You got your code you decided for yourself and others have theirs.
maybe the break from social norms of this situation would instead cause distrust in the external world in observers. "This isnt what happens in what i know of the external world"
Odontological argument against skepticism and theism: You got an unberable tooth ache You pray to God to take the pain away You wait for hours for the miracle Finally you go to a dentist
@@RaraAvis42 I tried that one but discarded it because the joke is about to get cured urgently by a dentist. Unfortunaly there is no a good word to match "ontological" in the field of dentistry. I tried "dentistological" but sounds ugly. So I created "odontological" because odontology is the study of theeth in general.
@@hectorromero5593 Ah, I see. Now tell me more about these theeth you mention. They might be the key to this whole thing. The jewel in the crown, so to speak.
I'm not sure I fully agree with the characterization of plausibility as relying so centrally on a comparative emotional response, e.g. a comparative emotional response between the Moorean proposition-"I have a hand/penis"-and the premises of skeptical arguments. Instead, I think plausibility is supposed to reflect an intuitive assessment of how much evidence there is for a proposition. Two reasons for preferring that reading. First, if it's just about the fact that closure principles aren't comparatively emotionally engaging, it seems to make Moorean arguments too close to the Humean pool room point. Second, some of the literature on assessing Moorean arguments develops the evidential reading in what I think are worthwhile ways. For example, I'm sympathetic to reading Moorean arguments as making implicit comparisons of the epistemic merits of our methods for justifying various propositions. That's a nice reading as it lets us develop and assess the arguments beyond their immediate intuitive pull. In the external world skepticism case, the idea would be that our methods for justifying things like the closure principle (conceptual analysis?) seem suspect relative to our methods for justifying belief in hands. Unfortunately, if that's the best way to read Moorean arguments, I don't think the penis provides a stronger argumentative thrust than the traditional "here's a hand" example. Whatever could justify us in belief in hands seems to be the same kinds of processes that justify belief in penises. That said, I think the pragmatic, moral version of the argument avoids this worry about how to characterize plausibility.
"how a real philosopher behaves". In a sense the dream world is more real than the real world More attempts to use the former to describe. Though purely ideal, while also being geographically and culturally determined, the concept real philosopher, stands in for flesh and blood people who think. The subdivision of the hand from the arm is also purely ideal, unless he has severed somebodies hands and holds them in his own, More saying "I have two hands", is a statement filled with metaphysical subtleties.
You are saying that if the penis-shower makes the skeptic audience exclaim in 'moral' disgust then she succeeded; because if it was just a dream or they were a brain in a vat; why would it matter if they saw a penis.? But the penis-Moorean assumes here that it doesn’t matter for the skeptic whatever the latter does or experiences. The skeptic can just say that even if this was all a dream he feels disgusted by it and doesn’t like it: he can say 'yes I'm maybe controlled by some briliant neuroscientists and I'm in a mental world but I still have phenomenal experiences, feelings and emotions and now I feel morally disgusted: this is my reality.' . So I do not think the Moorean argument - the d'ck variation course - is a good argument. Plus, if you stated Moore's hand argument correctly, then to me it doesn't hold because he takes his hands to be something external to him..? This is not something separate from him: his whole body is a unit: we are trying to figure out if there is an external world *outside of* yourself. You can't take your hands as proof of the external world!
Hi Kane. How is it going? I have been binge watching your videos (I love your content, by the way), and I found one you did with your friend Cole some time ago explaining why you became a vegetarian. I found it quite intriguing that in spite of not giving a s**t about animals (your own words) you seem to care deeply about the environment. If it is ok not to care about the welfare of animals, it should be equally as ok not to care about the environment, right? I am pointig this out because you said that the meat industry destroys the environment and the natural habitat of the animals whose welfare, by the way, you don't care about. Do you see why I got confused? How did you manage to persuade yourself into becoming a vegetarian with this sort of argument? I would be very grateful if you could clarify. And in case you are wondering, I do eat meat.
I agree that the Moorian premises/argument cause an emotional rhetorical response that gives it the ring of indisputable truth. Perhaps in the context of philosophical argument asserting things we take for granted like “I have hands” or “there is a chair” has the effect of ‘making strange’ something ordinary, by foregrounding something that usually we tacitly accept in the background. In addition is gives specificity and tangibility -external existence of a particular thing to prove external existence in general, which is hard to visualize. On a separate but I think related topic, I have a general question about the existence of absence or non-presence as a part of mind independent reality. - What if my hand in the Moorian premise were disfigured-probably everyone will be able to agree that they stand before a disfigured hand, in the same way that we will agree that I have a hand. But do we really think that disfigurement is a mind independent existent. It seems we have to have a concept of a normally configured hand and then say, its not here-making relevant what is not here. What I mean is to assent “yes, you have a disfigured hand”, part of what we are describing (or maybe all) is that a condition of normal configurement has not been realized. By definition a possibility that has not been realized is not a part of reality- because our common sense of reality is restricted to the stuff that has been realized. I’m gonna bring this topic up on Discord.
Aren't these "absences" presupposed by any description? If I hold up a hand and say, "here is a hand", part of what I'm asserting is that certain other conditions are not realized *here* -- it's a hand, so not a foot, not a tractor, not a slice of chocolate cake, etc.
@@KaneB That is something I’m exploring and reminds me of a semiotic type approach to meaning, but I think most would say no. “Here is a hand” refers to the configuration of presence which constitutes the hand, and that not being a house is not a part of the hand in the same way as the features that make it up, a prototype we are matching it up to or some other operationalized criteria we use to signal its presence. The loud realist voices in my head would say that “not being a house” is incidentally true -it's kind of a mental imposition arbitrarily selected from an infinite set of interchangeably non-hand possibilities. Closer to the point, what is the difference between the reality being described in saying “my keys are on the table”, versus the reality being described in a circumstance where I say “my keys are not on the table”. Both are true in a truth conditional sense, but the former describes some condition actualized in reality, while the latter describes that the first condition has not been met. It seems the latter is not even describing something real. It is negating that a possible reality of keys being on the table, obtains. If the audience at the penis exposure philosophy forum is responding to the lack of clothing in the groin area-or body where clothes should be- If they are focused more on the penis as an interruption of clothing, then what they are apprehending in the penis is not something there, but what is not there-clothing. I don’t see how the reification of absence onto the external world can square with the realist’s metaphysics of presence. And so I think pointing it out may offer a more convincing critique than the possibility that we are dreaming of MIAV possibilities.
If you are serious about your hypothesis, shock will create a more convincing arguement, then you will need to address the issue that such a tactic can lead quickly to non sequitors. So opposition to your position wouldn't talk about that position but instead concentrate on the moral outrage your example causes. Censors use this tactic a lot. Overall a topic that I think 13 year boys might have between sniggering! I thought you were a little more serious.
I'm not sure that the increased likelihood of non sequitur responses should be taken as a mark against the argument. Instead, shouldn't that be a mark against the intellectual abilities of the audience, if they're unable to restrain their moral impulses in order to carefully consider some philosophical point? Otherwise, it seems your criticism would apply to any argument for some controversial moral conclusion. Moreover, the initial moral outrage to be expected from publicly emancipating one's phallic apparatus is actually part of the point, as described by Kane. It's supposed to arouse people's senses in order to convince them that they're living in a real world, contra skepticism.
@@anonymouscat6207 Yeah, that's exactly my point. The suggestion is that by eliciting moral outrage, the Moorean Penis has succeeded in convincing the audience of the external world. If it's just a dream character or a fiction produced by the evil demon showing a penis, who cares?
You keep saying "her penis", which is either a contradiction in terms, or a reference to the vanishingly small number of women who get a prosthetic penis - why is this? I notice that in a lot of your videos you often say "her" in reference to theoretical philosophers, I guess to break some kind of stereotype that philosophy is the domain of bearded men - that part I can get behind. Great video though, as always :)
I think it is part of the attitude to balance out the ratio of using his or her, because in nearly every situation, people say the male pronoun, even when it should really be Gender neutral, but because English sucks, that can't really be done. Therefore, we have to mix up which word we use.
@@spongbobsquarepants3922 but if we're talking about someone's genitalia then we aren't being gender neutral by definition right? Actually if we're mentioning genitalia then we're talking about someone's sex, not their gender.
@Ext3rmin8or Most of the time, a person's genitalia and gender line up. But not always. This is what allows Kane to say her while talking about someone with a penis. It could just be someone with a penis who has a female gender. Furthermore, to me it is funny to refer to the penis owner as a she.
@@TheMathDieu I'm honestly not sure where you got the idea that I didn't think that trans women were a thing lol, nothing in any of my replies in any way suggested I thought that. I'm tired of replying to this now though. No point defending myself against something I never said anyway.
For more on penis epistemology, see my video "The Blue Balls Debate" that I did with my friend Cole: ua-cam.com/video/PbXAXiye4ZM/v-deo.html
How was I supposed to resist clicking with a title like that?
Kane B discovered how algo works
No one can resist the Epistemic Penis.
@@gradientO Hopefully this will catapult me to fame and in the future, I will be remembered by all philosophers as the creator of penis epistemology.
@@KaneBwe’ll inscribe it on your epitaph
If you develop this further I humbly suggest calling it the "Free Willy Argument"
I'll have to ponder how the penis might be related to free will. An initial thought: we sometimes talk colloquially of how dudes "think with their dick" -- when they make bad decisions motivated by sexual desire. Can such decisions be said to be made freely? Perhaps thinking with one's dick undermines the capacities required for free will.
@@KaneB would this be part of the "philosophy of sex" playlist?
@@KaneB We might be able to elaborate on that using Frankfurt's distinction between first and second-order desires, unless you have independent reasons to reject this distinction. It's plausible, I mean, to suppose that "thinking with one's dick" implies that, although one desires some x, one does not desire to desire x. This makes a division of faculty plausible too.
@@KaneB Can the argument be generalized to the problematic existence of any desire? Any desire sufficiently strong will override rationality. Furthermore, the existence of multiple desires, even competing desires, which we did not choose, just means that one of those will win. As Schopenhauer said, "Man can do what he wills but cannot will what he wills."
I am thoroughly convinced by your "Show your penis" argument. Skepticism has been refuted.
this is amazing. Publish it in a academic journal immediately
Now this is the content I subscribed for
Glad to hear you enjoyed it!
the algorithm has won. this was in my recommendations. not clicking this is like having 30 mosquito bites in a suit of armor you can't scratch with.
never clicked a video title faster
The what now?
now that’s the quality content
9:22 You're arguing that we should treat the observed world like it's not a dream, just in case we are wrong - we wouldn't have moral obligations in dreams. I'm wondering if there's also an argument in here that when dreaming, we should also act like we have moral obligations, just in case we are wrong about dreaming. I'm also getting undertones of Pascal's wager here :)
Even if the world is not a dream you still don't have moral obligations (edgy, but real)
@@cacssarcaeustan2543 haha nice! Yep I don't believe in categorical imperatives, definitely. But I'm not sure if that gets me to 'no moral obligations'... perhaps in respect of some values I have, I do have hypothetical imperative moral obligations.
Morals are self imposed, there is a socially agreed upon level, to an extent. But you never signed a social contract, you were forced into it. Up to you what to do with your personal morals, just know nothing you choose is wrong! :)
Usually when I'm dreaming, I don't realize I'm dreaming... I often don't act in line with my normal moral values, but then looking back on my behaviour in the dream feels more like reading about the actions of a fictional character. It's not really *me*. Having said that, I do sometimes have lucid dreams. I've never done anything too risky or morally terrible in a lucid dream, precisely for the reason you mention. There's always a little room for doubt about whether I'm actually dreaming.
@Oners82 self imposing a moralistic functioning society is your thing. Not everyone wants that, Noone can claim it’s the best thing. You got your code you decided for yourself and others have theirs.
maybe the break from social norms of this situation would instead cause distrust in the external world in observers. "This isnt what happens in what i know of the external world"
0:48 "eh-PISS-tem-ALL-ogy" Hahahahahahahahaha!
This is a paper apt for The Journal of Controversial Ideas!
most epic clickbait title ever
I hope people don't feel misled by it, though. I think I make a pretty good case that the penis is indeed an epistemic topic.
@@KaneB now that we have covered our lower body parts. Can there be an epistemic topic for every part of the human body part?
Not clickbait if he actually delivers the promised content 😂
Odontological argument against skepticism and theism:
You got an unberable tooth ache
You pray to God to take the pain away
You wait for hours for the miracle
Finally you go to a dentist
I believe this is called the Orthodontical Argument.
@@RaraAvis42 I tried that one but discarded it because the joke is about to get cured urgently by a dentist. Unfortunaly there is no a good word to match "ontological" in the field of dentistry. I tried "dentistological" but sounds ugly. So I created "odontological" because odontology is the study of theeth in general.
@@hectorromero5593 Ah, I see. Now tell me more about these theeth you mention. They might be the key to this whole thing. The jewel in the crown, so to speak.
why... does no one mention the thumbnail? lmao
Guess what President ‘Johnson’ would slam on the desk in the Oval Office to emphasize a point.
All the skeptic baddies in the philosophy department be pullin out their gocks on the reg
The pp argument
That's the reason why I subscribed on this chan👍
Neck beard gone? You’ve changed Kane B
The neckbeard has been gone for years.
I'm not sure I fully agree with the characterization of plausibility as relying so centrally on a comparative emotional response, e.g. a comparative emotional response between the Moorean proposition-"I have a hand/penis"-and the premises of skeptical arguments. Instead, I think plausibility is supposed to reflect an intuitive assessment of how much evidence there is for a proposition.
Two reasons for preferring that reading. First, if it's just about the fact that closure principles aren't comparatively emotionally engaging, it seems to make Moorean arguments too close to the Humean pool room point. Second, some of the literature on assessing Moorean arguments develops the evidential reading in what I think are worthwhile ways. For example, I'm sympathetic to reading Moorean arguments as making implicit comparisons of the epistemic merits of our methods for justifying various propositions. That's a nice reading as it lets us develop and assess the arguments beyond their immediate intuitive pull. In the external world skepticism case, the idea would be that our methods for justifying things like the closure principle (conceptual analysis?) seem suspect relative to our methods for justifying belief in hands.
Unfortunately, if that's the best way to read Moorean arguments, I don't think the penis provides a stronger argumentative thrust than the traditional "here's a hand" example. Whatever could justify us in belief in hands seems to be the same kinds of processes that justify belief in penises. That said, I think the pragmatic, moral version of the argument avoids this worry about how to characterize plausibility.
Looking good bro
compared to the long haired pre 2021 Kane B and the completly shaved Kane B, this is by far my favourite Kane B hairstyle.
Thanks dawg
"how a real philosopher behaves".
In a sense the dream world is more real than the real world More attempts to use the former to describe.
Though purely ideal, while also being geographically and culturally determined, the concept real philosopher, stands in for flesh and blood people who think. The subdivision of the hand from the arm is also purely ideal, unless he has severed somebodies hands and holds them in his own, More saying "I have two hands", is a statement filled with metaphysical subtleties.
Epistemipepis
Nice mullet chum.
Any update on woman situation?
You are saying that if the penis-shower makes the skeptic audience exclaim in 'moral' disgust then she succeeded; because if it was just a dream or they were a brain in a vat; why would it matter if they saw a penis.? But the penis-Moorean assumes here that it doesn’t matter for the skeptic whatever the latter does or experiences. The skeptic can just say that even if this was all a dream he feels disgusted by it and doesn’t like it: he can say 'yes I'm maybe controlled by some briliant neuroscientists and I'm in a mental world but I still have phenomenal experiences, feelings and emotions and now I feel morally disgusted: this is my reality.' . So I do not think the Moorean argument - the d'ck variation course - is a good argument. Plus, if you stated Moore's hand argument correctly, then to me it doesn't hold because he takes his hands to be something external to him..? This is not something separate from him: his whole body is a unit: we are trying to figure out if there is an external world *outside of* yourself. You can't take your hands as proof of the external world!
Thank you for making my day
You. Are. Awesome.
Hi Kane. How is it going? I have been binge watching your videos (I love your content, by the way), and I found one you did with your friend Cole some time ago explaining why you became a vegetarian. I found it quite intriguing that in spite of not giving a s**t about animals (your own words) you seem to care deeply about the environment. If it is ok not to care about the welfare of animals, it should be equally as ok not to care about the environment, right? I am pointig this out because you said that the meat industry destroys the environment and the natural habitat of the animals whose welfare, by the way, you don't care about. Do you see why I got confused? How did you manage to persuade yourself into becoming a vegetarian with this sort of argument? I would be very grateful if you could clarify. And in case you are wondering, I do eat meat.
The environment is also the habitat of humans. I don't want to live on a garbage dump.
I agree that the Moorian premises/argument cause an emotional rhetorical response that gives it the ring of indisputable truth. Perhaps in the context of philosophical argument asserting things we take for granted like “I have hands” or “there is a chair” has the effect of ‘making strange’ something ordinary, by foregrounding something that usually we tacitly accept in the background. In addition is gives specificity and tangibility -external existence of a particular thing to prove external existence in general, which is hard to visualize.
On a separate but I think related topic, I have a general question about the existence of absence or non-presence as a part of mind independent reality.
- What if my hand in the Moorian premise were disfigured-probably everyone will be able to agree that they stand before a disfigured hand, in the same way that we will agree that I have a hand. But do we really think that disfigurement is a mind independent existent. It seems we have to have a concept of a normally configured hand and then say, its not here-making relevant what is not here. What I mean is to assent “yes, you have a disfigured hand”, part of what we are describing (or maybe all) is that a condition of normal configurement has not been realized. By definition a possibility that has not been realized is not a part of reality- because our common sense of reality is restricted to the stuff that has been realized.
I’m gonna bring this topic up on Discord.
Aren't these "absences" presupposed by any description? If I hold up a hand and say, "here is a hand", part of what I'm asserting is that certain other conditions are not realized *here* -- it's a hand, so not a foot, not a tractor, not a slice of chocolate cake, etc.
@@KaneB
Sorry for the lengthy response.
@@KaneB
That is something I’m exploring and reminds me of a semiotic type approach to meaning, but I think most would say no. “Here is a hand” refers to the configuration of presence which constitutes the hand, and that not being a house is not a part of the hand in the same way as the features that make it up, a prototype we are matching it up to or some other operationalized criteria we use to signal its presence.
The loud realist voices in my head would say that “not being a house” is incidentally true -it's kind of a mental imposition arbitrarily selected from an infinite set of interchangeably non-hand possibilities.
Closer to the point, what is the difference between the reality being described in saying “my keys are on the table”, versus the reality being described in a circumstance where I say “my keys are not on the table”. Both are true in a truth conditional sense, but the former describes some condition actualized in reality, while the latter describes that the first condition has not been met. It seems the latter is not even describing something real. It is negating that a possible reality of keys being on the table, obtains.
If the audience at the penis exposure philosophy forum is responding to the lack of clothing in the groin area-or body where clothes should be- If they are focused more on the penis as an interruption of clothing, then what they are apprehending in the penis is not something there, but what is not there-clothing. I don’t see how the reification of absence onto the external world can square with the realist’s metaphysics of presence. And so I think pointing it out may offer a more convincing critique than the possibility that we are dreaming of MIAV possibilities.
her? 🤨
Fair enough
I love how you keep to to having female as default despite it not really working for this subject (the majority of women lack penises)
Isn't this an argument for the superiority of empiricism?
13:41😂😂
😂😂😂
If you are serious about your hypothesis, shock will create a more convincing arguement, then you will need to address the issue that such a tactic can lead quickly to non sequitors. So opposition to your position wouldn't talk about that position but instead concentrate on the moral outrage your example causes. Censors use this tactic a lot. Overall a topic that I think 13 year boys might have between sniggering! I thought you were a little more serious.
I'm not sure that the increased likelihood of non sequitur responses should be taken as a mark against the argument. Instead, shouldn't that be a mark against the intellectual abilities of the audience, if they're unable to restrain their moral impulses in order to carefully consider some philosophical point? Otherwise, it seems your criticism would apply to any argument for some controversial moral conclusion. Moreover, the initial moral outrage to be expected from publicly emancipating one's phallic apparatus is actually part of the point, as described by Kane. It's supposed to arouse people's senses in order to convince them that they're living in a real world, contra skepticism.
@@anonymouscat6207 Yeah, that's exactly my point. The suggestion is that by eliciting moral outrage, the Moorean Penis has succeeded in convincing the audience of the external world. If it's just a dream character or a fiction produced by the evil demon showing a penis, who cares?
What about the epistemic chungus?
😐
You keep saying "her penis", which is either a contradiction in terms, or a reference to the vanishingly small number of women who get a prosthetic penis - why is this? I notice that in a lot of your videos you often say "her" in reference to theoretical philosophers, I guess to break some kind of stereotype that philosophy is the domain of bearded men - that part I can get behind. Great video though, as always :)
I think it is part of the attitude to balance out the ratio of using his or her, because in nearly every situation, people say the male pronoun, even when it should really be Gender neutral, but because English sucks, that can't really be done. Therefore, we have to mix up which word we use.
@@spongbobsquarepants3922 but if we're talking about someone's genitalia then we aren't being gender neutral by definition right? Actually if we're mentioning genitalia then we're talking about someone's sex, not their gender.
@Ext3rmin8or Most of the time, a person's genitalia and gender line up. But not always. This is what allows Kane to say her while talking about someone with a penis. It could just be someone with a penis who has a female gender. Furthermore, to me it is funny to refer to the penis owner as a she.
Trans women are also a thing
@@TheMathDieu I'm honestly not sure where you got the idea that I didn't think that trans women were a thing lol, nothing in any of my replies in any way suggested I thought that. I'm tired of replying to this now though. No point defending myself against something I never said anyway.